Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

On every Tuesday in November the SOEP offers another online workshop "SOEPcampus: Learn to use the SOEP over lunch" which consists of 4 parts. Thus, this online workshop series gives a short online introduction to the data of the Socio-economic panel study. Participants will be introduced to the content of the study, its data-structure, sample selection and weighting strategy and they will be provided with an overview over the study documentation.

To join the workshop, please register (name, institution) with Janina Britzke and you will receive the login data one week before the event. The workshop will be held in English and participation is free of charge. For further information please read here. 

The United Nations has increasingly focused on the modernization of peace operations, including through the Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping. However, the full potential of the link between digital transformation, new technologies, and peacekeeping has not yet been realized, particularly when it comes to the protection of civilians (POC). Too often, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) deploys new technological tools first and only then determines how to apply them to POC objectives. As a result, mission staff are often harnessing technologies for POC in an ad hoc manner.

One of the main ways new technologies can contribute to POC is through timely and effective early-warning mechanisms. Platforms like SAGE and Unite Aware can help missions analyze data on threats and violence against civilians. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools like satellite imagery and unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) can aid in the collection of such data. The monitoring of communication platforms can also provide contextual information and insight into trends in public opinion, giving clues about future waves of violence.

This paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing reflection on the interaction between new technologies and POC, particularly in relation to early warning. The paper reviews peace operations’ use of new technologies and data, which could be further used for early warning for POC. It then discusses the limitations and risks of the use of new technologies for POC, particularly around data protection and privacy. The paper concludes by calling for a theory of change for how new technologies can contribute to POC in peacekeeping operations.

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Since 2010, amid a series of overlapping crises, the EU has introduced far-reaching instruments both within and beyond the EU treaties that have expanded its responsibilities. These instruments often have a structure-defining character and/or have served as precedents in subsequent crises. An analysis of the decision-making processes on three key crisis instruments during the Covid-19 pandemic – vaccine procurement, the SURE programme to support national short-time working schemes and the recovery fund NGEU – reveals deficits in the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s crisis governance. The “emergency Article” 122 TFEU, which was used for all three crisis instruments, largely excludes the involvement of the European Parliament. As NGEU was linked to the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework, the EP was involved but politically marginalised by the member states in the Council. Because standard EU procedures were used, the German Bundestag was informed in all three cases and was even able to secure more extensive information rights than the EP. However, this cannot replace European-level parliamentary control. As far as the capacity to act in decision-making processes is concerned, Article 122 TFEU with majority voting allowed for very quick decisions to be made regarding vaccine procurement and SURE, but not NGEU. The model of NGEU – with a link to the Multiannual Financial Framework and lengthy national approval procedures – is therefore not suitable as a model for crisis instruments. There are clear deficiencies in the transparency of decision-making pro­cesses and implementation as well the allocation of political responsibility. In the short term, the EU should increase the transparency of crisis in­struments; in the long term, it should introduce a clear definition of a “state of emergency”, with appropriate limits, into the EU Treaty, while strengthening the role of the EP.

Die Koordination haben Markus Kaim und Stefan Mair übernommen.

Politikberatung gehört zu den Kernaufgaben des DIW Berlin. Um seine Forschungsergebnisse und Empfehlungen in die wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Debatte einzubringen, betreibt das Institut eine intensive Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. Die Abteilung Kommunikation bereitet Themen und Inhalte für unterschiedliche Zielgruppen in verschiedenen Formaten auf. Dazu gehören insbesondere Pressearbeit, Print- und Onlinepublikationen, Website- und Social-Media-Kommunikation sowie Veranstaltungen.

 Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine*n

Social Media-Redakteur*in (w/m/div) (Vollzeit).

Internationale Beratungsfirmen spielen im öffentlichen Sektor der arabischen Welt eine bedeutende Rolle, und sie weiten ihre dortige Tätigkeit massiv aus. So haben Consultancies etwa die saudische »Vision 2030« und ein Jahrzehnt zuvor Marokkos »Grüne Agenda« mitentworfen. Aktuell wächst ihr Einfluss auf staatliche Energie- und Klimastrategien. In der Regel geschieht dies ohne öffentliche Einflussnahme vor Ort. Dies mindert Legitimität und Qualität der erarbeiteten Politiken und unterminiert die lokale Entwicklung. Jenseits der Folgen für die Länder selbst tangie­ren die internationalen Beratungen auch deutsche und europäische Interessen, selbst wenn die Firmen durch hiesige Akteure oder internationale Organisationen beauftragt wer­den. Um negative Effekte zu vermeiden, bräuchte es mehr Kenntnisse und Transparenz zu den Aktivitäten der Consultancies. Kritisch zu hinterfragen gilt, ob, wann und in welchem Maße es sinnvoll ist, internationale Beratungsfirmen zu mandatieren.

Connectivity, especially in the transport sector, has become a ubiquitous issue in the South Caucasus in recent years. Transport connectivity also plays a central role in the European Union’s policy towards the region. As part of its Global Gateway Initiative, the EU has made a commitment that is both value-based and geostrategic. To do justice to this commitment, the EU should consider the different dimensions of transport connectivity and their implications on several levels and in an integrated manner. In particular, the EU should take into account the link between connectivity and questions of political power. The EU could provide support in establishing genuinely inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder processes and independent project moni­toring. This could point the way towards a more holistic approach to connectivity. The EU should also critically examine its commitment to connectivity for possible conflicts of objectives. The policy debate in Berlin and Brussels would benefit from a more in­tensive exchange with critical logistics, infrastructure and connectivity studies. Their findings could contribute to a more nuanced view of trans­port connectivity and its complexities and ambivalences.

Over the past 10 years, the de facto alliance of the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has exercised significant influence over developments in the Middle East. The common goal has been to prevent democratic transformation, stop the rise of political Islam and counter the influence of Iran and Turkey over the region. But joint regional political interventions have so far had little success. More­over, divergences of interest in bilateral relations between these authoritarian Arab states have come to light in recent months. The potential for conflict has become evident with regard to both economic and regional political issues and is only likely to increase in the future. For Germany and the European Union, these divergences of interest between the three countries offer an opportunity to pursue their own goals in the region.