Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bonn, 18. September 2023. Keine andere Initiative stand seit ihrem Start 2013 derart im Rampenlicht der Weltöffentlichkeit wie Präsident Xi Jinpings „Belt and Road Initiative“ (BRI). Weltweit haben sich kaum ein politischer Thinktank oder eine wissenschaftliche Einrichtung nicht mit diesem Vorhaben auseinandergesetzt.

Eine der Hauptadern dieser Neuen Seidenstraße bildet der China-Pakistan-Wirtschaftskorridor (CPEC) mit Investitionen im Wert von 62 Milliarden USD für die Errichtung von Kraftwerken, Infrastrukturen und Sonderwirtschaftszonen (SWZ). Die pakistanische Staatsführung bezeichnete das Projekt angesichts des beispiellosen Umfangs der Investitionen und Zusagen aus China als „Game Changer“ und „Fate Changer“ und erhoffte sich im Zuge einer verstärkten regionalen Vernetzung einen Wandel in der allgemeinen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes. Doch diese Einschätzung ist offenbar zu optimistisch, denn sie lässt außer Acht, dass mit den aktuellen geopolitischen Spannungen in der Region das Ziel einer regionalen Konnektivität und eines wirtschaftlichen Wandels über eine von China finanzierte Infrastruktur in weite Ferne gerückt ist.

Von den sechs Wirtschaftskorridoren der BRI weist der CPEC einige Besonderheiten auf. Erstens ist er der einzige Korridor, an dem der Landgürtel und die Meeresstraße in Gwadar aufeinandertreffen. Die Hafenstadt liegt strategisch günstig nahe des iranischen Hafens Tschahbahar und der Straße von Hormus – weltweit eine der strategisch wichtigsten Meerengen, über die täglich 30 Prozent der internationalen Seetransporte von Rohöl abgewickelt werden (S&P Global Commodity Insights, 2018). Zweitens ist der CPEC im Unterschied zu anderen BRI-Korridoren ein „Ein-Land-Korridor“, auf dem alle Infrastrukturprojekte ohne Drittstaatenbeteiligung durch Pakistan verlaufen. Drittens wurden auf dem Korridor mit dem Abschluss mehrerer Projekte bereits zahlreiche Zwischenziele erreicht.

Für 2023 haben die beiden Regierungen Feierlichkeiten zum zehnjährigen Bestehen des CPEC geplant. Chinas stellvertretender Ministerpräsident He Lifeng stattete Pakistan anlässlich der Gedenkzeremonie im Juli 2023 einen Besuch ab. In den vergangenen zehn Jahren konnten bedeutende Fortschritte erzielt werden: Insgesamt 26 Vorhaben mit einem Investitionsvolumen von 17 Milliarden USD sind bereits abgeschlossen. Aktuell laufen 30 Projekte im Wert von 8,5 Milliarden USD, weitere 36 Projekte im Wert von 28,4 Milliarden USD sind geplant. Bislang wurden mit CPEC-Projekten in Pakistan direkt oder indirekt 200 000 Arbeitsplätze geschaffen, mehr als 6 000 MW zusätzlich in das nationale Netz eingespeist, etwa 809 km Straßeninfrastruktur errichtet und 886 km Stromtrassen installiert. Mit zahlreichen abgeschlossenen Projekten, darunter auch der Bau der ersten U-Bahn-Linie in der zweitgrößten Stadt des Landes, Lahore, ist der CPEC in Pakistan also ein gutes Stück vorangekommen.

Während das Land bei der Energieerzeugung und beim Bau von Straßeninfrastrukturen wesentliche Fortschritte erzielen konnte, ist die Entwicklung der neun innerhalb des CPEC priorisierten SWZ nur langsam vorangeschritten. Auch bei den geplanten Eisenbahnprojekten gab es keine nennenswerten Fortschritte. So ist beispielsweise der Bau der als Main Line-1 (ML-1) bekannten Eisenbahnlinie zwischen Peschawar und Karatschi ins Stocken geraten. Nach Fertigstellung der ML-1 können die Züge auf der Strecke deutlich schneller verkehren, wodurch sich die Fahrzeit zwischen Karatschi und Peschawar um die Hälfte verkürzt. Außerdem würde die neue Bahnlinie laut einer Veröffentlichung der pakistanischen Regierung von 2021 mehr als 170 000 neue direkte Arbeitsplätze schaffen. Nach ihrer Inbetriebnahme wird mit einem Anstieg der Frachtmengen um das Fünffache, von 5 Millionen auf 25 Millionen Tonnen jährlich, und mit einer Zunahme der Passagierzahlen von 55 auf 88 Millionen pro Jahr gerechnet. Verzögerungen und Nachverhandlungen haben die Kosten für die ML-1 auf 9,9 Millionen USD ansteigen lassen, was einem Zuwachs um mehr als 3 Milliarden USD oder knapp 45 Prozent gegenüber der ursprünglichen Kalkulation entspricht. Bei der Entwicklung des Eisenbahnsektors im Rahmen des CPEC konnte Pakistan also keine spürbaren Fortschritte erzielen.

Was das Ziel der regionalen Vernetzung anbelangt, bietet Pakistan mit seiner Lage am Schnittpunkt zwischen Zentral-, Süd- und Westasien den idealen Standort als Handels- und Logistik-Drehscheibe. Auch die Weltbank hat dies bereits anerkannt. Das Land selbst hat in mehreren Strategiedokumenten die Absicht verkündet, sein Potenzial als regionale Handels- und Logistik-Drehscheibe zu nutzen. Die geplante Ausweitung des CPEC auf den Binnenstaat Afghanistan könnte durch eine verstärkte Konnektivität einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu dieser Zielsetzung leisten. Mit der Aufnahme Afghanistans käme Pakistan seinem langgehegten Wunsch nach einer Ausweitung seiner Handels  und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Staaten in Zentralasien näher. Darüber hinaus könnten zentralasiatische Binnenstaaten den pakistanischen Hafen von Gwadar nutzen. Pakistan bietet den Staaten Zentralasiens die kürzeste Landverbindung zu warmen Gewässern – die pakistanische Küste ist über Afghanistan etwa 2 600 km, über den Iran oder die Türkei dagegen 4 500 bzw. 5 000 km entfernt. Außerdem wollen China und Pakistan mit der Aufnahme Afghanistans in den CPEC die Stabilität in der Region sichern und ihre Wirtschaftsinteressen durchsetzen. Allerdings liegt noch kein konkreter Zeitplan vor, obwohl bereits alle drei Ländern dem Vorschlag zugestimmt haben.

Auch von der Aufnahme Indiens könnte ein Multiplikatoreffekt für die Initiative ausgehen. Dafür müsste Pakistan allerdings Indien einen Landzugang zu den Märkten in Afghanistan und Zentralasien gewähren. Sollte Indien einem Beitritt zum CPEC/BRI zustimmen, könnte dies auch eine Wiederbelebung von Initiativen wie der Gaspipeline zwischen Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Indien (TAPI) und dem Zentralasien-Südasien-Energieprojekt (CASA) mit Kirgistan, Tadschikistan, Afghanistan und Pakistan zur Folge haben. Die Verbindung zwischen energiereichen Staaten in Zentralasien und Staaten mit hohem Energiebedarf in Südasien bietet ein hohes Potenzial, und China verfügt über die entsprechenden Mittel, um derartige Initiativen zu fördern. Allerdings sind die Erfolgsaussichten sehr gering, da sich Indien bisher offiziell von der BRI ferngehalten hat. Neu-Delhi lehnt den CPEC ab, weil es die wachsende Rolle Chinas in seiner Nachbarschaft als Sicherheitsgefahr für die indische Vorherrschaft in der Region betrachtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund bleibt die geopolitische Lage, nicht nur zwischen Pakistan und Indien, sondern auch zwischen Peking und Neu-Delhi, weiterhin kritisch. Die aktuellen geopolitischen Spannungen in Südasien, die sich durch den Machtzuwachs Chinas in der Region weiter verschärfen, schaffen erschwerte Bedingungen für eine Stärkung der regionalen Konnektivität und des gemeinsamen Wohlstands.

Murad Ali ist ehemaliger Gastwissenschaftler im Forschungsprogramm "Inter- und transnationale Zusammenarbeit". Er ist Leiter des Department of Political Science der University of Malakand, Pakistan. Sie können ihn unter muradali.uom@gmail.com erreichen.

Climate change exacerbates the pronounced water scarcity in the Middle East and also acts as a threat multiplier, for instance in the areas of health, food security and livelihoods. Increasing competition over water and the failure to address related challenges intensify tensions and conflicts within and between countries. Water cooperation is necessary to address the enormous challenges in the region, but traditional intergovernmental water agreements are politically complex and, in many cases, not very promising. This study presents an alternative approach to boost inter-state water cooperation in the region. Looking into five prominent water-related action areas at national and local levels uncovers entry points for inter-state cooperation. These action areas are: (1) the water-energy-food-ecosystems (WEFE) nexus; (2) water-related ecosystems; (3) water knowledge through data collection, citizen science, awareness raising and social science expertise; (4) water-related disaster risk management at transboundary level; and (5) water cooperation in the context of displacement, migration and reconstruction. These action areas allow water cooperation to be reimagined and pursued via thematic entry points of both national and regional interests. This places emphasis on individual and shared benefits for the countries from measures implemented in a multi-level approach: at local level (sometimes in border regions), at national level (not least in dialogue with other states in the region) and at regional level.

Climate change exacerbates the pronounced water scarcity in the Middle East and also acts as a threat multiplier, for instance in the areas of health, food security and livelihoods. Increasing competition over water and the failure to address related challenges intensify tensions and conflicts within and between countries. Water cooperation is necessary to address the enormous challenges in the region, but traditional intergovernmental water agreements are politically complex and, in many cases, not very promising. This study presents an alternative approach to boost inter-state water cooperation in the region. Looking into five prominent water-related action areas at national and local levels uncovers entry points for inter-state cooperation. These action areas are: (1) the water-energy-food-ecosystems (WEFE) nexus; (2) water-related ecosystems; (3) water knowledge through data collection, citizen science, awareness raising and social science expertise; (4) water-related disaster risk management at transboundary level; and (5) water cooperation in the context of displacement, migration and reconstruction. These action areas allow water cooperation to be reimagined and pursued via thematic entry points of both national and regional interests. This places emphasis on individual and shared benefits for the countries from measures implemented in a multi-level approach: at local level (sometimes in border regions), at national level (not least in dialogue with other states in the region) and at regional level.

Climate change exacerbates the pronounced water scarcity in the Middle East and also acts as a threat multiplier, for instance in the areas of health, food security and livelihoods. Increasing competition over water and the failure to address related challenges intensify tensions and conflicts within and between countries. Water cooperation is necessary to address the enormous challenges in the region, but traditional intergovernmental water agreements are politically complex and, in many cases, not very promising. This study presents an alternative approach to boost inter-state water cooperation in the region. Looking into five prominent water-related action areas at national and local levels uncovers entry points for inter-state cooperation. These action areas are: (1) the water-energy-food-ecosystems (WEFE) nexus; (2) water-related ecosystems; (3) water knowledge through data collection, citizen science, awareness raising and social science expertise; (4) water-related disaster risk management at transboundary level; and (5) water cooperation in the context of displacement, migration and reconstruction. These action areas allow water cooperation to be reimagined and pursued via thematic entry points of both national and regional interests. This places emphasis on individual and shared benefits for the countries from measures implemented in a multi-level approach: at local level (sometimes in border regions), at national level (not least in dialogue with other states in the region) and at regional level.

Die US-Wirtschaft funktioniert und das liegt wesentlich an den Investitionspaketen, die Joe Biden auf den Weg gebracht hat. Doch es gibt Risiken.

As the European Union (EU) is repositioning itself as a global actor in a multipolar world it should embrace Global Public Investment to underline its ambition of promoting effective multilateralism.

As the European Union (EU) is repositioning itself as a global actor in a multipolar world it should embrace Global Public Investment to underline its ambition of promoting effective multilateralism.

As the European Union (EU) is repositioning itself as a global actor in a multipolar world it should embrace Global Public Investment to underline its ambition of promoting effective multilateralism.

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On Sunday, September 17, 2023, IPI held its eighteenth annual Ministerial Working Dinner on the Middle East in its Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security, and Development. The dinner drew the participation of foreign ministers and other high-level representatives.

The event was chaired by IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and co-hosted by Qatar and the European Union, represented respectively by Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, and Josep Borrell, Vice President and High Representative of European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Participants had a frank discussion on regional issues held under the Chatham House Rule.

Attendees included Hadja Lahbib, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs, and of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium; Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Fuad Mohammad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq; Ayman Safadi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Murat Nurtleu, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Abdallah Bouhabib, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon; Dominique Hasler, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Education, and Sport of the Principality of Liechtenstein; Catherine Colonna, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France; Micheál Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Ireland; Sheikh Jarrah Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of Luxembourg; Khalifa Shaheen Almarar, State Secretary of the United Arab Emirates; Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Albusaidi, Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman; Riyad Al-Maliki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine; Ahmet Yildiz, Deputy Minister of Foreign of Republic of Türkiye; Anniken Huitfeldt, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway; Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi, Minister of State to the State of Qatar; Lolwah Rasshid Al-Khater, Minister of State for International Cooperation to the State of Qatar; Sameh Hassan Shoukry Selim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt; and Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain.

Also present were Luise Amtsberg, Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Assistance; Jasem Mohamed AlBudaiwi, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Prince Turki AlFaisal, Chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and member of IPI’s International Advisory Council; Hissein Brahim Taha, Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; Amr Moussa, Former Secretary General of the League of Arab States and member of IPI’s International Advisory Council; Rosemary A. DiCarlo, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Mary Robinson, Chair of the Elders, First female President of Ireland, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; Miguel Moratinos, High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations; Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; Ferid Belhaj, Vice President of the World Bank; Jeffrey Feltman, Former USG –DPPA and John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy in the Foreign Policy program, Brookings Institute; Daniel Levy, President of US / Middle East Project (USMEP); Tor Wennesland, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority; Sven Koopmans, EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process; and Alya Ahmed Saif Al-Thani, Permanent Representative of Qatar to the UN.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.