Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Während die führenden Wirtschaftsnationen um die digitale Vorherrschaft ringen und sowohl Soft- als auch Hardware zu nationalen Interessen erklären, ist es für die afrikanischen Länder und den Kontinent als Ganzes von großer Bedeutung, ihre Stimmen auf der internationalen Bühne zu erheben.

Während die führenden Wirtschaftsnationen um die digitale Vorherrschaft ringen und sowohl Soft- als auch Hardware zu nationalen Interessen erklären, ist es für die afrikanischen Länder und den Kontinent als Ganzes von großer Bedeutung, ihre Stimmen auf der internationalen Bühne zu erheben.

Während die führenden Wirtschaftsnationen um die digitale Vorherrschaft ringen und sowohl Soft- als auch Hardware zu nationalen Interessen erklären, ist es für die afrikanischen Länder und den Kontinent als Ganzes von großer Bedeutung, ihre Stimmen auf der internationalen Bühne zu erheben.

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

There is no consensus about the benefits and drawbacks in foreign direct investments. In the aggregate, is there an economic logic to attracting it? Kasper Vrolijk studies the case of Uganda and finds both positive technology spillovers and negative market competition, with the latter occurring mostly through domestic buyer-supplier linkages. The Ugandan case shows that policies that curb some of the negative effects may be needed.

Polen im Wahlkampf: Schlammschlacht in einem gespaltenen Land

The South Caucasus has long been a theatre of Turkish and Iranian cooperation and rivalry. While these two regional powers have historically balanced their inter­ests, there are signs that rivalry is taking precedence. Turkey’s unwavering backing of Azer­baijan during the 2020 Karabakh War consolidated Ankara’s footprint in the region. Azerbaijan’s retaking of the rest of Karabakh in the latest military strikes on 19 September 2023 makes a peace accord between Azerbaijan and Armenia more likely, furthering Turkey’s interests, and potentially limiting Russia’s role in the region. However, the prospect of a “less Russia, more Turkey” dynamic heightens Tehran’s apprehensions towards Ankara. Particularly concerning for Iran is the clause with­in the Moscow-brokered ceasefire of November 2020 that mandates the rebuild­ing of a road and rail link connecting Turkey to mainland Azerbaijan via Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave and Armenia’s south-eastern Syunik province; this risks marginal­ising Iran. In addition, Tehran is anxiously observing the deepening of ties between Turkey’s close ally, Azerbaijan, and Iran’s key adversary, Israel.

Après le premier tome l’an dernier, « Géostratégix II » vient de paraître ! Cette fois-ci, avec le dessinateur Tommy, nous nous penchons sur les grands enjeux du monde contemporain. Quels sont les enjeux des changements climatiques ? La démocratie est-elle universelle ? Quels sont le poids, l’influence et le rôle respectifs de l’Europe, des États-Unis, de la Chine, de la Russie, de l’Afrique, de l’Amérique latine et de l’Asie ? Autant de questions auxquelles nous tentons de répondre dans cette nouvelle bande dessinée.

 

La guerre en Ukraine a accentué la dépendance de Bruxelles à l’égard de Washington. Alors que celle-ci tendait à s’émanciper de Washington et à établir une autonomie stratégique européenne, l’Union européenne (UE) n’effectue-t-elle pas un retour à la case départ ? Quel rôle reste-il à jouer à l’UE dans ce panorama stratégique ?

Federico Santopinto, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS et responsable du programme Europe, stratégie et sécurité de l’IRIS, répond à nos questions dans le cadre de son chapitre publié dans « L’Année stratégique 2024 ».

Cooperation, financial aid, trade compensation, but no sanctions: According to media reports, these are the demands of the Mercosur countries Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. They are responding to the EU’s request this spring to amend the forest and climate protection provisions of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement within a supplementary declaration. Simultaneously, rules on deforestation-free sales into the EU have already been established in parallel.

Hard struggle for conclusion

After more than 20 years, the two major regional markets actually agreed on a joint trade agreement in June 2019. But then the Brazilian government under Jair Bolsonaro abandoned the prior climate protection pledges and allowed large-scale slash-and-burn agricultural practices. Under these changed circumstances, the EU was not willing to conclude the agreement. After his election in 2022, President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva announced that he would return to his previous climate-conscious policies. However, this did not satisfy the EU, which had become aware of the critical importance of deforestation, leading to a much tougher stance: The EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, which came into force in May, requires European importers of certain products such as soy, beef, and cocoa to ensure a deforestation-free supply chain and, in practice, to buy only appropriately certified goods. This will impact production methods and their documentation, and thus will also affect costs for supplier countries such as Brazil. In addition, the EU sought to make the negotiated agreement more sustainable: A supplementary declaration was intended to address corresponding weaknesses in the text, and also allow EU member states that had previously objected, such as France and Austria, to approve of the agreement.

The Mercosur countries have become increasingly critical of the unilateral EU initiatives developed in parallel, which they perceive as being intrusive and contradicting the idea of bilateral – and thus joint – negotiations on the agreement. The EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, as a unilateral instrument, does indeed provide for cooperation, for example in developing tools for implementation. In this context, it also offers room for a more favourable risk classification for exporting countries, which reduces administrative burdens and costs. It is unknown whether these possibilities were taken into account in the agreements’ negotiations. The supplementary EU declaration proposed in February – prior to the regulation entering into force – does not yet address this issue.

More cooperation required for the trade agreement

The Mercosur countries’ response to the EU’s supplementary declaration now addresses this cooperation consistently: They demand EU support in implementing the necessary standards, including financial resources, the exclusion of trade sanctions regarding commitments and, above all, the introduction of a compensation mechanism, which is intended to be triggered if the unilateral EU legislation nullifies the trade benefits of the agreement. The latter did not appear out of the blue, given the large number of new unilateral sustainability commitments: In addition to the EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, the European Supply Chain Directive, which is similar but covers all products, is well advanced in the Brussels legislative process, and a ban on imports of products from forced labour is being prepared. All of these new unilateral approaches impose partially different requirements on sales within the EU regarding deforestation, climate protection, labour standards, and human rights.

The recent demands of the Mercosur countries touch upon the fundamental question of how sustainability and fair trade are achieved. European legislation can prevent the EU and its consumers from unintentionally contributing to deforestation, environmental degradation, inhumane working conditions, and human rights abuses. However, in the case of global sustainability goals such as climate protection by preventing deforestation, strict rules can lead to trade being diverted to other, less strictly regulated markets. The sustainability goal will thus be undermined, albeit not by European consumers. Sustainability goals can therefore only be fully achieved with the acceptance and support of trading partners. Trade agreements can assist with this, if they are judiciously coordinated with the aforementioned unilateral instruments. In return, however, partners will expect clarity from the EU on what commitments they have to make and what the EU and its member states can contribute towards their implementation. Moreover, partners will demand more trade and competitive advantages in return for greater sustainability commitments.

The Mercosur proposal now offers opportunities to link unilateral actions with trade agreements. This is exactly what the EU itself envisaged in its review of the sustainability chapters in trade agreements in summer 2022. The Mercosur proposal should therefore be used constructively as a template, even if the design of individual elements still requires further discussion: For example, the EU should – for reasons of synergy and even more as a sign of appreciation – make greater efforts to utilise and at the same time support existing sustainability approaches on the Mercosur side, such as own certification. The proposed compensation mechanism could also increase the much-needed acceptance of sustainability goals. It fits into a well-known logic of trade agreements and Mercosur could conceivably impose protective tariffs, or the EU could offer increased market access, provided that unilateral sustainability targets are met.

The EU can now play a key role in linking sustainability and trade as well as promoting fair trade, also from the perspective of its partners. A failure of the agreement would benefit China in particular, which has already offered a trade agreement to individual Mercosur countries. Last but not least, the EU should seize the opportunity to design a forward-looking model for linking sustainability and trade to overcome the impasse on geo-strategically important agreements with other partners.

Die französische Regierung hat einen umfangreichen Plan für mehr Klimaschutz vorgestellt. Die Wärmepumpenproduktion soll in den kommenden vier Jahren verdreifacht werden, die beiden letzten Kohlekraftwerke vom Netz gehen und E-Autos gefördert werden. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert die Pläne wie folgt:

Frankreichs Plan, mit gezielten politischen Maßnahmen eine Reindustrialisierung Frankreichs durch die Elektrifizierung von Verkehr und Industrie anzustreben, ist grundsätzlich lobenswert. Der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen und Elektro-Fahrzeugen ist durchaus effizient und sinnvoll. Allerdings hat Frankreich ohnehin schon ein Strom-Problem, weil viele Atomkraftwerke marode sind. Strom muss aber effizient genutzt und darf nicht verschwendet werden. Es wäre daher sinnvoll, wenn Frankreich die Subventionierung der Stromproduktion einstellt und die Strompreise nicht mehr künstlich niedrig hält. Nur wenn diese die Kostenwahrheit widerspiegeln, kann Strom gespart und effizient genutzt werden.

Frankreich kann es gelingen, mit der Förderung von Wärmepumpen und E-Fahrzeugen die Wirtschaft beziehungsweise die Industrieproduktion anzukurbeln, sofern das Energiesystem effizient ist. Deutschland kann ebenfalls von diesen Programmen profitieren, da zahlreiche Wärmepumpen-Anbieter die Produktion hochfahren und auch die deutschen Autohersteller mehr auf Elektromobilität umstellen werden. Daher sollte in Deutschland der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen nicht zerredet werden.

Recent anti-UN protests have fueled concerns that some UN peacekeeping operations are facing a “crisis of legitimacy” among host-state populations. Without local legitimacy, there are questions about whether peacekeepers should be present. Peacekeeping operations also depend on local legitimacy to effectively implement their mandates. It is therefore important to understand how local populations perceive UN peacekeepers.

While researchers have studied local perceptions within specific peacekeeping contexts and compared historical data on local perceptions in past peacekeeping operations, few have compared recent data on local perceptions of current missions. This article therefore explores existing data on local perceptions of the four current multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations: the missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and South Sudan. This data points to several cross-cutting insights that could help inform conversations around local perceptions of UN peacekeeping.

The paper concludes that there is wide variation in perceptions of peacekeepers, both between and within peacekeeping contexts and across time. This means that it rarely makes sense to talk about UN peacekeeping operations having or lacking “legitimacy.” Instead, they have multiple “legitimacies.” Understanding the factors behind these legitimacies requires better data on and nuanced analysis of local perceptions.

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To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).