Feed aggregator

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force is currently testing the B-21 Raider, a new stealth bomber designed to deliver nuclear and conventional ordnance. The Air Force is phasing out the B-2 Spirit and B-1 Lancer to make way for the B-21, raising concerns due to the untested nature of the new aircraft.

-Canceling the B-21 would jeopardize the Air Force's stealth bombing capabilities, leaving the U.S. dependent on outdated B-52 bombers.

-This would compromise the nuclear triad and reduce the strategic edge over adversaries. The success of the B-21 Raider is crucial for maintaining U.S. military strength and deterrence capabilities.

B-21 Raider: Why the U.S. Air Force Can't Afford to Cancel Its New Stealth Bomber

The US Air Force is currently flight testing their newest aircraft, the B-21 Raider, a stealth bomber capable of delivering nuclear and conventional ordnance.

The Air Force appears to be “all-in” on the B-21, opting to phase out the B-2 Spirit and the B-1 Lancer as it comes online.

The heavy commitment to a new airframe, which remains mostly untested, has raised some eyebrows and places significant pressure on the B-21 to deliver, as canceling the program doesn’t appear to be an option.

What if the B-21 were Cancelled

The Air Force is fully committed to the B-21. Actually, the Air Force seems to be skirting the “Fly Before You Buy” concept of aircraft procurement, in purchasing the B-21 upfront before the aircraft has been properly vetted.

“Fly Before You Buy is not a new concept,” Senator David Pryor said on the Senate floor in 1994. “It was first promoted in the wake of the Vietnam War after thousands of American soldiers lost their lives because of weapons that failed to perform as expected…operational testing is of little or no use if it conducted after the weapon system has been purchased.”

The Air Force Needs the B-21 Raider...Badly

The B-21 has not been thoroughly vetted yet must work as planned because the entire structure of the Air Force is dependent upon the B-21 working.

Were the B-21 cancelled for some reason, the US could potentially lose their stealth bombing capabilities. The B-2, America’s current stealth bomber, is being replaced for a reason; that reason is because the B-2’s stealth technology is already a generation-old and not as effective as when it first debuted. Soon, if not already, the B-2’s stealth may not be sufficient at all, rendering the aircraft, functionally, a non-stealth aircraft.

Without a stealth bomber in the inventory, the US would lose a major advantage over its adversaries, who fear the capabilities of the stealth bomber fleet. The mere existence of a stealth bomber offers a diplomatic and strategic edge; the capabilities are unmatched.

And were the B-21 to be cancelled, were the US left without a stealth bomber option, their nuclear triad would be compromised. True, the US has non-stealth aircraft capable of delivering nuclear ordnance, most notably the B-52 – but the non-stealth aircraft would be incapable of entering contested airspaces, where nuclear payloads are most likely to need to be delivered. The ultimate effect would likely be that the nuclear triad were reduced to a nuclear duad, consisting of just land- and sea- based nuclear options.

If the B-21 were cancelled, the Air Force would surely want to do the cancelling before the B-2 and the B-1 were taken off-line, otherwise, the US would be stuck solely with the aged B-52 fleet as the only bomber in the entire inventory.

The B-52 debuted in the 1950s, and many of the airframes are in questionable condition; B-52 flights are often grounded for mechanical reasons, and its unlikely the fleet could handle the increased burden of being the sole bomber at the US military’s disposal.

Indeed, canceling the B-21 would cause problems for the US military. Hopefully, the new stealth bomber will perform as advertised during its initial flight testing.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

After decades of the same elites ruling through largely undemocratic means, Armenia has in recent years seen a surge in political polarisation that is threatening its ongoing democratic transformation.

The constitutive meetings of the European Parliament's standing committees and subcommittees are taking place in Brussels on 23 July 2024, following the appointments of their members in the plenary sitting of 16-19 July. During the constitutive meetings, each committee and subcommittee is electing its respective bureau, made up of a Chair and Vice-Chairs, for a two-and-a-half year mandate. The newly set up committees will then start holding their regular meetings during the same week following their constitutive meeting.
The AFET constitutive meeting took place on Tuesday 23 July from 09.00 to 09.30 in room József Antall 2Q2 (Brussels).
The meeting was webstreamed.
AFET-SEDE-DROI calendar of meetings 2024
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The constitutive meetings of the European Parliament's standing committees and subcommittees are taking place in Brussels on 23 July 2024, following the appointments of their members in the plenary sitting of 16-19 July. During the constitutive meetings, each committee and subcommittee is electing its respective bureau, made up of a Chair and Vice-Chairs, for a two-and-a-half year mandate. The newly set up committees will then start holding their regular meetings during the same week following their constitutive meeting.
The AFET constitutive meeting took place on Tuesday 23 July from 09.00 to 09.30 in room József Antall 2Q2 (Brussels).
The meeting was webstreamed.
AFET-SEDE-DROI calendar of meetings 2024
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation into food delivery apps Delivery Hero and Glovo, examining whether the two are participating in a cartel, according to a Tuesday (23 July) press release.

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider is the most advanced long-range stealth bomber globally, crucial for restoring U.S. deterrence against China and Russia.

-However, America’s current industrial capabilities and reliance on materials from China pose significant challenges.

-The U.S. Air Force needs 300 B-21 units but is slated to receive only 150 over the next decade, costing $600 million each. Given potential economic constraints, prioritizing the B-21 is critical, yet alternative solutions like stealth drone swarms might be more feasible.

-These drones could support fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 and F-35, offering a cost-effective way to maintain air superiority and meet future combat demands.

Stealth Drones vs. B-21 Raider: Exploring Affordable Alternatives for U.S. Air Dominance

The B-21 Raider is the Air Force’s newest long-range stealth bomber. It’s undoubtedly the most advanced bomber in the world. If it could be produced to the level that the Air Force (quickly) needs them to be produced at, the United States would have likely restored a key element of its failing deterrence against China and Russia. 

But America’s industrial strength today is a fraction of what it was in the Second World War. In fact, our defense industrial supply chain sources many of its materials from China. 

Between that and the broken nature of the US defense industrial base, these planes won’t be available in any meaningful number anytime soon.

Anyway, the Air Force needs at least 300 units of the B-21. 

They’re slated to receive only 150 units over the next decade. At $600 million per unit, it seems unlikely that the Air Force will ever get its desired number of 300 units—let alone 150. They’ll probably get a few to a dozen aircraft in this model over 15 years (and with serious cost overruns and additional delays). 

Will it be worth the cost? 

The B-21 is Being Given the Short Shrift 

These are the questions that military planners must now ask themselves as we stare down the face of a massive debt crisis and likely recession. Unlike 2008, there will be no bailouts to be had, meaning that when the crisis hits the wider economy it will be felt for the duration of the crisis. The military will be impacted along with the rest of the country.

Personally, I think the Air Force should prioritize this plane over almost all of its other considerations. Having 300 of these birds soon would truly deter America’s rivals. But if the Air Force cannot—and Congress won’t allow for them to—build requisite numbers of these birds, the Air Force might want to consider canceling the project now and working its lessons learned into something more affordable. 

Drone swarms are a critical feature of any future combat planning. Yet, the United States is still working on this in the concept phase. If the Air Force cannot get the number of B-21s it wants and needs to achieve a deterrent effect, then it is necessary to look at other, cheaper modalities. 

Again, the B-21 is the best vehicle for restoring deterrence but if it’s too expensive and if the Air Force won’t prioritize it, then we need something else.

The Air Force is already working on advanced drones, such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) concept that Kratos is building (the XQ-58 Valkyrie). These drones will support the mission sets of America’s fifth-generation warplanes, the F-22A Raptor and the F-35 Lightning. The XQ-58 costs anywhere between $20.5 and $27.5 million per unit (significantly cheaper than the B-21). 

Creating stealth drones that are capable of swarming would be more expensive, though still less than the B-21 Raider costs.

A More Economical Solution

Building off the Air Force’s CCA concept, stealth drones could be deployed from F-22 or F-35 “motherships.” From there, these drones, armed with advanced propulsion and, eventually, artificial intelligence (AI), will augment existing air capabilities. The stealth drone swarms, at least in theory, would deliver the same kind of firepower over distant targets that the B-21 Raiders can—but at lower costs and with no direct danger to American pilots. 

Plus, building an entirely new generation of drones that are stealth capable, longer-range, and can swarm will help keep the amazing F-22A Raptor relevant (the Air Force idiotically wants to retire this great plane to make way for its ghastly sixth-generation warplane boondoggle). 

Time is of the essence. 

The world is speeding towards even greater geopolitical problems in which every technological asset that America can bring to bear will be required. Right now, the United States is going to lose that war. It needs to significantly—fundamentally—change things up. Before it’s too late. 

Stealthy drone swarms married to America’s fifth-generation warplane fleet is the surefire answer. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The B-21 Raider, unveiled in late 2022, represents the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. This sixth-generation stealth bomber is progressing on schedule, a rarity in military procurements.

-With costs between $600 million and $750 million per unit, it is significantly cheaper than its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit. Currently undergoing testing at Edwards Air Force Base, the B-21 will offer unmatched range, stealth capabilities, and durability.

-Designed to deliver both nuclear and conventional munitions, the Raider will serve as the Air Force’s premier deep-penetration bomber, ensuring strategic reach and effectiveness.

-The B-21 Raider stealth aircraft is the future of the U.S. Air Force bomber fleet. The sixth-generation strategic bomber was unveiled in late 2022 and conducted its first flight late last year. 

B-21 Raider: Advanced Capabilities and On-Schedule Progress for the U.S. Bomber Fleet

The B-21 Raider is the latest-technology project, yet it is surprisingly moving along as planned. 

B-21 Raider Moving Along 

That Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Raider is progressing according to plan might sound unremarkable to someone without knowledge of military procurements, but it is in fact a surprising development. 

New military projects tend to go over budget and over the agreed timeline. Sometimes by a few years and a few billion dollars, while other times a project may lag for many years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars more than expected. 

The estimated cost of the new strategic bomber hovers between $600 million and $750 million per aircraft. That is a lot, but it is still cheaper than the B-2 Spirit, the aircraft it will be replacing, which has a price tag of $2 billion per unit. 

In total, the B-21 has been in development for close to a decade and will be the first strategic bomber to join the fleet since the B-2. 

The first B-21 Raider prototype aircraft are currently undergoing intense flight and technology testing at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The Capabilities of the B-21 Raider 

As a sixth-generation strategic bomber in development, not a lot is known about the specific capabilities of the Raider. We know that it is going to have stealth capabilities, that it will be able to carry nuclear and conventional munitions, and that it will be the go-to deep-penetration bomber for the U.S. Air Force. 

During the unveiling ceremony of the strategic bomber, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin provided some information about the capabilities of the aircraft. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won't need to be based in-theater. It won't need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin stated. 

This means that the B-21 Raider, like its predecessors, will be beyond the reach of enemy munitions. That makes it a truly strategic asset. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” Austin added.

Stealth doesn’t make an aircraft invisible. But an aircraft with good stealth capabilities can remain undetectable to enemy air defenses, giving it precious time to deliver munitions. 

“Let's talk about the B-21's durability. You know, we really don't have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added. 

Good operational availability is an important aspect of a capable aircraft. What is the point of having a Ferrari in your garage if you can’t drive it because it constantly breaks down? 

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has faced numerous challenges since its commissioning, reflecting the broader issues within the Russian Navy. Unlike the U.S., which mastered aircraft carrier operations during and after World War II, Russia’s land-focused military delayed serious carrier development until the 1980s.

-The Kuznetsov, built in the Soviet Union’s final days, suffers from technical limitations, including the use of mazut fuel, outdated launch systems, and poor construction quality. Maintenance issues have plagued the vessel, often requiring tugboat escorts.

-Despite its shortcomings, Russia persists with the Kuznetsov to maintain a semblance of naval capability.

From Dreams to Disasters: The Saga of Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov

Aircraft carriers are the ultimate symbols of national power projection. The United States has led the world in aircraft carrier operations ever since the Second World War. Back then, there were multiple powers with flat tops, not just the United States. In fact, the US Navy didn’t know what to do with the aircraft carriers it had built before the tragic events of December 7, 1941—Pearl Harbor. 

It was the Imperial Japanese Navy that had pioneered the use of aircraft carriers as an offensive weapons platform. After all, the symbol of power projection back then was the battleship. But Japan did not attack Pearl Harbor with battleships. They used aircraft carriers. Similarly, the naval campaign of the Pacific Theater during the Second World War was not won by the battleship. It was won by the US Navy’s carrier force.

After World War II, the carrier remained as the pinnacle of naval power. Throughout the Cold War, American flat tops were the envy of the world. Whereas the Americans had mastered the art of aircraft carrier operations and had made the flat tops the basis of their surface fleet, the Soviet Red Navy lagged far behind the Americans. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviets even seriously contemplated building their own aircraft carrier. For decades, the Soviet Navy had made the heavy battlecruiser and submarines the basis of their navy’s power projection capabilities. 

Geography’s Influence on the Russian Navy and Aircraft Carriers

The Soviet Union and, today, the Russian Federation is a predominantly land power. Occupying a large swathe of northern Eurasia, Russia has conducted its military operations usually across the continent as opposed to across the oceans, as so many other Western powers had done. This geographical reality has informed every aspect of Russian society. It explains why Russia is has trended toward autocracy. And why it took so long for Moscow to even contemplate building aircraft carriers. 

By the time that Moscow opted to build an aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was intended to be one of three carriers. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union died with it. What followed was chaos and poverty. Moscow retained control over its carrier but Russian experience maintaining a carrier—an inherently costly endeavor under the best of circumstances—was limited. 

What’s more, the carrier was an incomplete mess heap that should have probably been scrapped or sold to the highest bidder (as was what happened to the Admiral Kuznetsov’s sister ship which became China’s first carrier, the Liaoning).

The Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov’s Technical Limitations

Run on “a goopy, tar-like substance,” called Mazut, which is a petrochemical derivative, the Russian carrier was never as advanced as its American counterparts, which ran on more efficient and powerful nuclear energy. Mazut creates an amazing amount of pollution, so much, in fact, that it poses a health risk to sailors and to the equipment on the ship employing Mazut as a fuel source. Yet, it is relatively cheap and Russia being a petro-producing superpower, never has to worry about the supply chain for this low-grade fossil fuel being disrupted.

Burning this energy, though, creates security risks as well as health risks for the ship employing it. Namely, a large smoke trail, which can be seen for many miles, billows from the warship’s smokestack, and leaves a trail that would be easy for an enemy to track. 

The carrier is an antique, too. 

It uses neither a steam powered catapult nor an electromagnetic catapult, such as does the US Navy’s new Ford-class carriers do, to launch aircraft into the wild blue yonder. Instead, a ski jump ramp is used to help deploy fighter jets from the carrier. What this means, for all practical purposes, is that aircraft deploying from the Admiral Kuznetsov must be lighter than what they normally would be—meaning those aircraft must carry less armaments than they would, if they launched from another carrier that possessed a powered catapult system.

The infrastructure within the warship itself is shotty. Built during the terminal days of the Soviet Union, engineers at the Ukrainian shipyard where this jalopy was built cut significant corners. Cheap, ineffective pipesdegrade the efficiency to transfer pressurized Mazut to the engines. This has caused all kinds of knock-on problems for the carrier. 

Then, of course, there’s the fact that the funding to maintain the aircraft carrier has been inconsistent and pretty much lacking. Thus, the carrier has been chock full of problems because of shabby maintenance schedules and inadequate parts. 

Oh, and don’t forget all the engine woes the carrier has been made to endure. It’s gotten so bad for the carrier that, for many years, the warship was forced to travel with a tugboat. There has been long period when the carrier could not leave port because of all the maintenance issues. 

A Hodgepodge of Broken Dreams & Lost Hopes

The Admiral Kuznetsov is a hodgepodge patchwork of broken dreams and lost hopes. 

The only reason Moscow keeps dumping money into the warship is because the Kremlin fears the creation of a capabilities gap in its navy. Sure, Russia’s navy has nowhere near the level of experience managing carriers that the Americans do. But they don’t have to be on par with Washington in that domain. They just need to have some degree of knowledge—especially if, inevitably, China and Russia fuse their carrier programs on some level to counter the Americans, as I fear they will eventually do. 

Those (limited) Russian carrier capabilities will be essential for helping China as much as China’s mass production capabilities will be critical for helping to establish a Russian carrier presence. 

There is no doubt, though, the Admiral Kuznetsov is truly the worst aircraft carrier ever made. Certainly, it is the most dilapidated on the high seas (or not on the seas) today. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

While the political balances of the new European Parliament started to be redrafted on Tuesday (23 July) as MEPs picked the leading roles for each policy committee, the influential economic and monetary affairs (Econ) and budget committees remained firmly in the hands of incumbent parties – S&D and ECR respectively.

Summary and Key Points: The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a troubled refit since 2018, with uncertain prospects for returning to service.

-Initially intended as a symbol of Russian naval pride, the carrier has faced numerous setbacks, including mechanical issues, fires, and corruption.

-Historically, Russia has prioritized land-based power over naval dominance, focusing on submarines and missile cruisers.

-Despite considering new aircraft carriers like the "Shtorm," financial and strategic challenges, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, make it unlikely that Russia will soon develop a new carrier. The ongoing issues with Admiral Kuznetsov underscore the broader struggles of the Russian Navy.

The Russian Navy's Aircraft Carrier Woes: A Deep Dive into Admiral Kuznetsov"

The Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, has been undergoing a refit since July 2018. The Kremlin has announced that the warship could finally conduct sea trials sometime in the future – but whether that actually happens has yet to be seen.

The problem-plagued warship was meant to be a symbol of pride for Moscow, but it has often been the butt of numerous jokes – often with good reason. At one point, the Kremlin did consider a replacement, yet likely, the warship will never sail.

And also for many good reasons.

Russia Has Been a Land Power

It is true that throughout the Cold War, the United States Navy's aircraft carriers were used for force projection throughout the world. Nearly a dozen and half aircraft carriers played a role during the Korean War, and naval aircraft provided much-needed air support – especially in the early stages of the conflict. The carrier air wings were instrumental in destroying enemy supply depots, bridges, roads, and railways. When the tide turned in November 1950, as Chinese forces pushed Allied units south, U.S. Navy aviators covered the retreat.

More than 250,000 sorties were flown by the U.S. Navy, contributing one-third of the total air effort in the war. The case for Cold War carriers was made, especially as the U.S. Navy began the war with 15 active carriers and ended it with 38 in service.

After the war, even as the United States developed strategic aircraft, concealed intercontinental missiles throughout the Midwest, and launched a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers played a crucial role in providing a defensive parameter around the United States.

"Control of the seas means security; control of the seas means peace; control of the seas can mean victory," stated President John F. Kennedy.

In the years that followed, U.S. Navy carrier strike groups have been deployed dozens of times to launch sorties around the globe. Today, the warships continue to allow the U.S. military to maintain force projection that is simply unrivaled.

The question then can be asked why didn't the Soviet Union – with its goal of spreading communism across the world – build true aircraft carriers? The short answer is that the Soviet Union, like Imperial Russia before it, was always a land-based power.

The Soviet's Failed Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

Despite it being a land-based power, there were numerous efforts to develop aircraft cruisers. Yet, the Soviet Union instead underwent a rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s that focused on submarines, as well as guided-missile cruisers and destroyers. Moscow saw the threat that the carriers presented, but Soviet military planners had to face the reality of its limited resources and the high cost to build and maintain carriers.

One factor was that, unlike the United States, the Soviets lacked the overseas bases to support the warships. Without foreign port facilities or the ability to resupply a carrier strike group at sea, Moscow could have truly employed the warships as effectively as the United States Navy.

It was only after Leonid Brezhnev came to power that the Soviet Union finally began to consider aircraft carriers once more. It eventually launched a total of two Moskva -class helicopter carriers, one in 1965 followed by another in 1968. The first Soviet aircraft carrier to support fighter jets, the Kiev-class, was only launched in 1975. It was a race that was already long lost, as the United States Navy's carrier efforts dated back to 1910.

The one serious attempt to build a carrier comparable to the American standards began as "Project Orel" in the 1970s, but it was scuttled over costs and disagreements within the Kremlin over the Soviet military's strategic priorities. Only in the 1980s did Moscow finally move forward with a new class of "aircraft cruisers."

In the end, just a single flattop was completed. Launched as the Leonid Brezhnev, and later as the Tbilsi, she was renamed Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of July 2022 that aircraft cruiser is currently undergoing a refit, during which time she has suffered a number of misfortunes. Her sister vessel Varyag was sold to China by cash-strapped Ukraine and refurbished as the Type 001 Liaoning.

The Modern Russian Carrier

In 2018, it was announced that the Russian Navy had begun to explore options for a new aircraft carrier. According to GlobalSecurity.org, one option was focused on a conventionally powered vessel with a displacement of around 70,000 tons – slightly larger than the 58,600-67,500 tons full load Project 1143.5 Admiral Kuznetsov. Another option called for a nuclear-powered carrier, with a larger displacement. That would be bigger than the 42,000-ton French Navy flagship Charles de Gaulle – the only non-U.S. Navy nuclear-powered carrier – yet not likely as large as the 100,000-ton American supercarriers.

The new "Shtorm" aircraft carrier – a.k.a. Project 23000E – was to be included in Russia's armament program for the 2019 to 2025 period.

As the trade magazine SP's Naval Force also reported in 2018, "Project Shtorm was shrouded in mystery for several years until an initial concept was unveiled by the Krylovsky State Research Center (KRSC) back in 2015. The new super-carrier would displace close to 100,000 tonnes, 330 m long, 40 m wide and could launch 80-90 aircraft with an EMALS system."

Russian officials had suggested the carrier could be laid down between 2025 and 2030 – while a model was presented at a past Army Technical Forum. Yet, as of 2020, the project hadn't been approved and given its financial costs would likely impact other Russian naval modernization efforts.

"Considering the estimated program cost of $9 billion, it seems quite unlikely that economically weakened Russia will move beyond the design stage," SP's Naval Force added.

That assessment was made before Russia's Ukrainian folly, and notably before vast sums of money were thrown into modernizing the Admiral Kuznetsov. Given the current situation – not to mention the advancements in anti-ship weapons – it would seem unlikely the Shtorm will ever be more than a concept that failed to sail off the drawing board.

Author Experience and Expertise

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, plagued with endless mechanical and operational problems, has not participated in the ongoing Ukraine conflict due to prolonged maintenance since 2017.

-This Cold War-era vessel, using outdated Mazut fuel and an ineffective bow ramp for aircraft launches, highlights significant deficiencies in Russia's military capabilities. The carrier's persistent issues, including boiler failures, poor piping, and structural damage, have raised questions about the future of Russia’s naval power.

-With resources stretched thin due to the war in Ukraine, the likelihood of Russia investing in a new aircraft carrier appears low.

-In fact, this aircraft carrier has just one enemy: no willingness by Russia as of yet to scrap the carrier. 

Admiral Kuznetsov: A Symbol of Russia's Naval and Military Challenges

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered revealing insights into the health of the Russian military.

While Russia is often billed as a near-peer power of the United States, with a capable fighting force, the Russo-Ukraine War has laid bare the rampant deficiencies of a Russian military that has struggled to establish a foothold in the territory of a weaker neighbor.

Russia has underperformed in air, land, and sea – deploying weapons systems that have fared poorly against the Ukrainian’s low-tech defense mechanisms.

The Russian invasion has renewed focus on Russian military specifics, raising criticism about outdated tanks, undertrained troops, and a shoddy naval fleet.

One vessel is especially notable: the Russian’s lone aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. To date, the Kuznetsov has failed to take part in ongoing hostilities – because the ship has been under maintenance since 2017, without a return date set.

The Admiral Kuznetsov has been so problematic that some observers have suggested Russia abstain from making aircraft carriers in the future.

Admiral Kuznetsov: Shifting priorities

Russia has become embroiled in a war of attrition, in what is generally considered the most viscous fighting on the European continent since the end of World War II.

The conflict, which has placed emphasis on land-based systems, caused Russia to hemorrhage tanks and soldiers – which, of course, taxes Russia’s finite resources. Paying for something like a new aircraft carrier is not a priority.

An aircraft carrier exists to project airpower flexibly without needing a fixed, land-based airfield. Sure, parking an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea could help supplement Russia’s ability to launch ground strikes on Ukraine or perhaps compete to control the air space above Ukraine. But Russia has more pressing concerns and the likelihood of investing in a new aircraft carrier right now seems low.

Besides, Russia’s current aircraft carrier has proven to be a massive headache.

Problems at Sea for Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier 

The Admiral Kuznetsov has a few problems - and that is putting it nicely for sure.

One, the Kuznetsov runs on Mazut, an outdated petrochemical that leaves a thick and hazardous exhaust fume. Whereas modern aircraft carriers are using nuclear power, and can operate indefinitely, the Kuznetsov burns fuel as if it were an automobile – imposing limits on the carrier’s range and endurance.

Relatedly, the burning of Mazut requires the fuel to be preheated and pressurized, which requires an extensive system of piping. Yet, the Russians installed low-quality pipes on the Kuznetsov. Piping failures have constantly plagued the Kuznetsov. The boat’s boilers tend to fail, too, forcing operators to alternate between working boilers, and occasionally, use just one boiler. The result has been a boat that sometimes travels as slow as four knots per hour.

The Russians recognizing that the Kuznetsov is prone to breaking down outright, always assign tugboat escorts to stick with the aircraft carrier, just in case she must be towed back to port.

Mazut, and the faults of the related infrastructure, are not the only problems hindering the Kuznetsov’s performance. The Kuznetsov employs a bow ramp to launch aircraft, which has proven outdated and limiting.

Modern aircraft carriers rely on catapults to launch aircraft. The Nimitz-class, for example, uses a steam catapult; The Ford-class uses a magnetic catapult (the EMALS). Both catapult systems can launch relatively heavy aircraft because the catapult is able to reach high speeds in a short distance. The Kuznetsov, meanwhile, does not use a catapult. Instead, Russia’s lone carrier uses a simple bow ramp. With a bow ramp, aircraft simply take off, self-powered, off an upward lilting ramp.

The bow ramp launches aircraft at a relatively slow speed – just fast enough to sustain flight. But the low speed doesn’t leave much room for error – and heavier planes, are unable to reach the speeds necessary to sustain flight from a bow ramp. The result is that the bow ramp can only launch relatively light aircraft.

And to meet the weight requirements of the bow ramp, Russian aircraft must cut down their ordnance and fuel loads. In effect, the Kuznetsov is only capable of launching aircraft that have had their range, and their ability to strike enemy positions, reduced. Since the aircraft carrier exists to project airpower, the Kuznetsov’s bow ramp detracts from the boat’s fundamental mission.

An Uncertain Future for Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier

If the Russians are ever going to make another aircraft carrier, they will need to consider what has gone wrong with – and potentially fix – the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has been docked for maintenance since 2017.

But the maintenance is way behind schedule. Fires, and in one dramatic instance, a 70-ton crane punching through the ship's deck, have added years to the Kuznetsov’s repair schedule.

Given the Kuznetsov’s checkered performance and past and given the resource commitments of the Russo-Ukraine War, the prospects of Russia building a new aircraft carrier in the near future seem dim.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a seasoned defense writer with over 1,000 articles posted. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has become a symbol of persistent naval woes. The carrier, infamous for its black smoke and mechanical failures, has faced numerous setbacks, including fires, accidents, and corruption.

-In 2011, U.S. Navy officials even feared it might sink during a Mediterranean deployment. Despite plans to retire the vessel by the decade's end, its ongoing refit, started in 2018, has been plagued by delays and accidents.

-With the latest reports suggesting service resumption no earlier than 2024, Admiral Kuznetsov continues to drain resources, raising questions about its future viability.

The Costly Nightmare of Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov

So many jokes could be made about the Russian Navy's flagship aircraft cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov - or Admiral Kuznetsov, for short - that most comedians would run out of time before they ever ran out of material.

The cursed carrier has been plagued with endless problems, and it is unclear when – or even if – the Cold War-era warship will ever return to service.

The Navy Feared Russia's Only Aircraft Carrier Could Sink

What wasn't a laughing matter is that in late 2011, some United States Navy officials feared Russia's only carrier would sink in the Mediterranean Sea as she struggled during her only fourth deployment from her northern base to reach the Russian naval facilities in Syria.

The concern was reportedly so great that the United States Navy's Sixth Fleet was even tasked with maintaining contact in case the carrier floundered.

The fears were actually well-founded, as just two years earlier Admiral Kuznetsov suffered a fire at sea while deployed to the Mediterranean, resulting in the death of a sailor onboard. In addition, the flattop – which had notoriously and routinely belched black smoke – spilled hundreds of tons of fuel into the sea while refueling.

Unlike western vessels that use gas turbines or nuclear power, the Russian flattop uses mazut as fuel, which often results in a trail of heavy black smoke that can be seen from great distances. Such a smoke signal is hardly ideal as it practically announces the location of the carrier.

Moreover, at best, the flattop's endurance is a mere 45 days, while Russia has few ports where the aircraft cruiser could operate year-round. During deployments, the carrier was often escorted with tugs in case she were to break down. Worst of all, the carrier relies on a bow ski ramp to launch fighters, and the Russian designs are ill-suited to the task.

She Made It Home to Russia (Barely)

It is hard to say for sure if the U.S. Navy's concerns were overstated – and perhaps they were meant to make the Russian warship look bad (not that much effort was required) – but in fairness, Admiral Kuznetsov did manage to make it to Syria and back to her home port at Severomorsk near Murmansk.

Yet, the problem hasn't gotten better, and after breaking down in a storm in late 2015, the carrier had to be towed back to port.

While the original plan from the Kremlin had been to retire the warship by the end of this decade, it isn't clear if she'd return to service in time to be retired.

The vessel has been undergoing a refit since 2018, and just recently, it was reported that the warship had suffered another repair delay and won't likely reenter service until 2024… at the very earliest.

A source in the Russian defense sector told state media that there have been defects in the work, and as a result, Admiral Kuznetsov will remain in dry dock for refit longer than initially planned.

The time already spent in the repair facilities hasn't really improved matters, and in some ways, those efforts have been to blame for the delays.

In November 2018, Admiral Kuznetsov was damaged when a 70-ton floating crane fell on the warship's flight deck, which tragically killed one worker and injured four more.

It was just over a year later that a fire broke out in the engine room during a welding accident; and it resulted in the death of two, while 14 more suffered injuries from fire and smoke inhalation. In addition, the actual drydock, which was vital to the repairs, was also damaged during a power outage, further delaying the refit.

Corruption has also contributed to the lack of progress on the carrier's refit. In March 2021, Yevgeny Zudin, general director of Shipyard No. 10 in Polyarny, was arrested under suspicion of the theft of 45 million rubles (approximately $600,000) that had been allocated to the repair of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet flagship.

Given these factors, the best option would be for the Kremlin to cut its losses and deep-six this sad excuse of a warship.

For now, it is just a hole in the water that Russia keeps pouring money into with no end in sight – while the carrier is truly the biggest joke floating (or barely floating as the case may be).

About the Author: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Dauer des Videos : 32'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2024 - EP

Length of video : 32'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In den Verhandlungen mit den Grünen zu ihrer Wiederwahl hatte Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen letzte Woche Zusagen für eine nachhaltigere Landwirtschaft gemacht. Die Grünen zeigen sich deshalb optimistisch, dass der Agrarsektor zukünftig stärker in den Green Deal eingenommen wird. 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs elected it's Bureau on 23 July 2024 during its constitutive meeting. David McAllister (EPP, Germany) was re-elected Chair of the Committee. He is joined in the Bureau by Hana Jalloul Muro (S&D, Spain) as First Vice-Chair, Urmas Paet (Renew, Estonia) as Second Vice-Chair, Alberico Gambino (ECR, Italy) as Third Vice-Chair and Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (EPP, Romania) as Fourth Vice-Chair (elected in absentia).
Taking the floor following his election, David McAllister stressed the need for AFET to start its work as quickly as possible in this time of high geopolitical tensions: "The European Union needs to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship, strengthen the European pillar within NATO, continue its support of Ukraine in its fight against the Russian war of aggression and contain Chinese influence. We need to put continued emphasis on the necessity of European enlargement. The Foreign Affairs Committee has an important role to play in all of those tasks. I will continue to work hard to ensure that all Members have the opportunity to contribute to this endeavour".
Press release
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The Committee on Foreign Affairs elected it's Bureau on 23 July 2024 during its constitutive meeting. David McAllister (EPP, Germany) was re-elected Chair of the Committee. He is joined in the Bureau by Hana Jalloul Muro (S&D, Spain) as First Vice-Chair, Urmas Paet (Renew, Estonia) as Second Vice-Chair, Alberico Gambino (ECR, Italy) as Third Vice-Chair and Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (EPP, Romania) as Fourth Vice-Chair (elected in absentia).
Taking the floor following his election, David McAllister stressed the need for AFET to start its work as quickly as possible in this time of high geopolitical tensions: "The European Union needs to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship, strengthen the European pillar within NATO, continue its support of Ukraine in its fight against the Russian war of aggression and contain Chinese influence. We need to put continued emphasis on the necessity of European enlargement. The Foreign Affairs Committee has an important role to play in all of those tasks. I will continue to work hard to ensure that all Members have the opportunity to contribute to this endeavour".
Press release
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Die deutsche Grünen-Abgeordnete Anna Cavazzini wird für eine weitere Legislaturperiode den Vorsitz im Ausschuss für Binnenmarkt und Verbraucherschutz (IMCO) des EU-Parlaments übernehmen. Auch ihre Stellvertreter wurden bekannt gegeben.

Die Vorsitzenden der drei einflussreichen Ausschüsse des Europäischen Parlaments für Energie und Industrie, Umwelt und Verkehr wurden am Dienstag (23. Juli) gewählt. Sie werden die Ausschussarbeit für die nächsten zweieinhalb Jahre leiten und zusammen die Gesamtarbeit des Parlaments koordinieren. 

The European Parliament’s Agriculture Committee (AGRI) elected on Tuesday (23 July) Czech MEP Veronika Vrecionová as its chair but postponed a vote on one of the vice-chairs after a dispute about gender balance.