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China appears to be closely monitoring the development of India-Vietnam relations, particularly in the areas of defense, maritime affairs, and strategic technology.

Le sommet France-Afrique s'est ouvert ce lundi 11 mai à Nairobi, au Kenya. Pour cette édition inédite en terre anglophone, le président français Emmanuel Macron a affirmé sa volonté de rompre définitivement avec les pratiques du passé pour bâtir une relation fondée sur la souveraineté des États et l'innovation.

La fin de l’ère du « pré carré »

Vladimir Poutine a déclaré ce week-end que la guerre en Ukraine touchait « à sa fin ». Son calcul initial reposait sur un retrait massif du soutien à l’Ukraine avec l’arrivée de Donald Trump, ce qui n’a pas eu lieu. Les États-Unis ont maintenu leur soutien en renseignement, tandis que l’Europe a financé massivement l’Ukraine via un prêt de 90 milliards d’euros.

Dans le même temps, Kiev a considérablement renforcé sa capacité de production militaire, notamment dans le domaine des drones, freinant l’avancée russe et stabilisant plusieurs fronts.

En mobilisant l’essentiel de ses ressources en Ukraine, Vladimir Poutine n’a pas été capable de soutenir ses alliés ailleurs : chute du régime de Bachar el-Assad en Syrie, revers de l’Africa Corps au Mali face au JNIM et au FLA, recul de l’influence russe en Asie centrale… La Russie apparaît aujourd’hui affaiblie sur plusieurs terrains stratégiques.

Malgré la hausse des revenus énergétiques liée aux tensions internationales dans le Golfe, le coût humain, économique et politique de la guerre devient de plus en plus lourd pour le Kremlin. La société russe s’épuise, la répression s’intensifie et la popularité de Vladimir Poutine montre des signes d’érosion.

Bien que la Russie ait étendu son territoire sur la Crimée et une partie du Donbass, le bilan global est négatif : affaiblissement géopolitique, isolement international et épuisement des forces. Vladimir Poutine n’a pas saisi l’opportunité de négocier avec Donald Trump, qui proposait de lever les sanctions en échange d’un statu quo territorial.

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Ukraine – Poutine : gains territoriaux, guerre perdue est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Anne Souyris, sénatrice Les Écologistes de Paris, est l'invitée de RFI. Spécialiste des questions de santé, elle avait organisé la stratégie parisienne lors de la pandémie de Covid-19. Que pense-t-elle des premières mesures annoncées en France ? Elle s'exprime également sur les débats au sein de la gauche française autour d'une éventuelle primaire en vue de la présidentielle et sur les débats au Sénat sur la question de la fin de vie.

When Trump and Xi meet in Beijing, the most consequential AI question on the table will be one neither government’s existing toolkit was built to answer.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The Liberal-National Coalition directed their preferences to a party that could ultimately replace them.

How China handles this conflict will reveal more about its actual power – and its vulnerabilities – than any trade deal announced in Beijing.

Sprūds stepped down on Sunday evening after two foreign drones crashed in Latvia last week

Les opérateurs miniers chinois sont de plus en plus ciblés par des attaques armées sur le tronçon Kisanfu-Kisankala dans la province du Lualaba ces deux derniers mois. En l’espace de deux mois, au moins trois attaques ont été enregistrées, selon l'ONG locale Eben Ezer, qui alerte sur la dégradation de la sécurité dans la zone.

Is India's love for Russia built on nostalgia for a relationship that no longer exists?

Companies set to receive millions more free CO2 allowances out than previously planned