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A szövetségi elnök tegnapi nagyváradi sajtótájékoztatóján hosszan beszélt arról a törvényről, amelyet tavaly decemberben fogadott el a Cioloș-kormány sürgősségi kormányrendelettel, és amely szerint a föld-visszaszolgáltatási folyamatnak be kell fejeződnie jövő év január elsejéig. A jogszabály értelmében azok a területek, amelyeket nem sikerült visszaszolgáltatni, visszakerülnek az állami földalapba. Kelemen Hunor szerint ez óriási hiba lenne, mert bár a tulajdonosok nem hibáztak, ők veszíthetnek. Hozzátette, a visszaszolgáltatás nehézkességének több oka van, de az világosan látszik, hogy másfél hónap alatt nem fog rendeződni, emiatt az RMDSZ azt indítványozza, hogy ezt a határidőt sürgősségi kormányrendelettel hosszabbítsák meg 2020-ig. Emlékeztetett arra is, hogy RMDSZ már hónapokkal ezelőtt benyújtotta az erre vonatkozó törvényjavaslatát, de nem került eddig napirendre.

A szebeni regionális időjárás-előrejelző szolgálat jelentése szerint az 1800 méter fölötti hegycsúcsokon nagy mennyiségű hó rakódott le, az Omu-csúcson 41 centiméteres a hóréteg, a Bâlea-tónál 60 centiméteres, míg a Transzfogarason a 2 és fél métert is meghaladja. A Páringban szintén lavinaveszély van. A hegyi túrautak zárva vannak.

Das trotz negativer Wahlprognosen erfolgreiche Abschneiden der HDZ bei den vorgezogenen Parlamentswahlen vom September 2016 und die Kür ihres Spitzenkandidaten Andrej Plenković zum neuen Ministerpräsidenten durch den kroatischen Sabor Mitte Oktober war für viele überraschend, aber nicht unbegründet.

L'UE a besoin d'un registre européen des bénéficiaires effectifs d'entreprises, d'une définition logique - et d'une gestion - des transactions suspectes ainsi que d'une coopération transnationale accrue, comme l'unité d'investigation financière américaine. C'est ce qu'ont affirmé des experts sur l'application des lois contre le blanchiment d'argent en Belgique et en Allemagne à la commission d'enquête du Parlement sur les Panama Papers lundi.
Commission d'enquête chargée d'examiner les allégations d'infraction et de mauvaise administration dans l'application du droit de l'Union en matière de blanchiment de capitaux, d'évasion fiscale et de fraude fiscale

Source : © Union européenne, 2016 - PE

(CNN Politics)

For Hillary Clinton supporters the inevitable arrival to Washington, D.C. of the man many of them see as a real-world Darth Vader feels like the tense wait prior to the landfall of a Category 5 hurricane. Liberal prognosticators, pundits and minority communities strain for any information that could provide fidelity on the trajectory of the terrifying tempest. They speculate on its likely impact on their lives and ask themselves, “Should we stay in place hoping for the best or should we get the hell out the way fearing the worst?”

Beyond U.S. borders, leaders of multilateral institutions like the United Nations, security alliances like NATO, clutch trading partners like Mexico and China are also gazing beyond the horizon nervously anticipation the storm surge and squalls that might be coming their way.

But will Trump really be the devastating hurricane that will reorder big chunks of the American and global economic and security architectures or will his impact on the status quo be more like a reshuffling of card decks via a dramatic flipping over of the entire table?

Predicting Trump’s decision-making on major foreign policy issues especially will make hurricane forecasting seem like kinder-garden math in comparison—far more abstract art than blue print interpretation. The reason for this is that like his recently vanquished democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, Mr. Trump appears to maintain “both a public and a private position” on key issues.

For example, consider his public opinion on the United Nations. In March of 2016, the then republican front-runner blasted the United Nations ideological orientation before a powerful pro-Israel lobby group. He tongue lashed the U.N system stating that, “The United Nations is not a friend of democracy…. It’s not a friend to freedom. It’s not a friend even to the United States of America, where as we all know, it has its home. And it surely isn’t a friend to Israel.”

But in 2005 he sung a far different tune about the world’s premier conflict resolution body and leader of international climate change resiliency. The occasion was his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee where he was invited to testify as a commercial development expert regarding out-of-control renovation costs of the U.N. headquarters. In his testimony, Trump the business man remarked:

“I have to start by saying I’m a big fan, a very big fan, of the United Nations and all it stands for,” Trump told  the senators. “I can’t speak as to what’s been happening over the last number of years, because it certainly hasn’t been good, but the concept of the United Nations and the fact that the United Nations is in New York is very important to me and very important to the world, as far as I am concerned. So I am a big fan.”

So on how many other policy matters does Trump maintain a public and private positions? It might be far more than his supporters could have ever imagined. Consider that just after meeting with President Obama two days after his epic electoral victory Trump roll backed his proposal for a total repeal of Obama Care stating that there are parts of Obama’s flagship domestic accomplishment that he really likes.

He has also quietly defanged his proposal to deport 11 million undocumented people residing in the U.S. It is insightful that his First 100 Days manifesto only discusses removing the more than 2 million criminal illegal immigrants from the country and applying penalties for people trying to reenter illegally. There is no mention of a “deportation force” or much feared draconian proposals that continue to cause millions of undocumented residents considerable angst.

Further, Trump has also recently suggested that he would revise his Muslim ban so that it targets people from countries “linked to terrorism” rather using their Islamic faith as a disqualifying criterion. So are the post-election shifts in tone and substance of flagship policy propositions a harbinger of what is to come? That is hard to know, however, what is certain is that the political Right’s change candidate has already begun to defang the most controversial of his policy proposals.

Lastly, it might be premature to say that Hurricane Trump won’t be packing a big punch, however, I think it’s safe to take the shutters down—almost.

The post Will the Real Donald Trump Please Stand up appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Athènes place ses espoirs dans une visite de Barack Obama, qui appelle toujours à une réduction significative de la dette grecque, pour convaincre l’Allemagne de lâcher du lest.

Le président russe Vladimir Poutine et le futur président américain, Donald Trump, se sont entendus le 14 novembre pour travailler en faveur d'une « coopération constructive », notamment en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, a déclaré le Kremlin.

After NATO Defence Ministers decisions in February 2016, Allies have swiftly made international efforts in terms of maritime to stem the flow of irregular migration in the Aegean Sea concerning the refugees and migrants crisis. The NATO mission, approved in record time, arises from the agreement between Angela Merkel and Prime Minister Davutoglu, announced during her visit in Ankara, and after the consent of the Greek Alexis Tsipras. NATO is contributing to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea. To this end, NATO is cooperating with the European Union’s border management agency Frontex, in full compliance with international law and the law of the sea. Since then the cooperation between the European Union and NATO has increasingly intensified, both in the field of the common security defense and migration. On 8 and 9 July, during the NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Atlantic Council expressed the intention to cooperate with the EU in the Central Mediterranean. After the month of February, the Aegean routes are monitored, and the central axis linking Libya to southern Europe has become the new route for migrants. On 26 and 27 October, following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense, NATO intervention in the central Mediterranean in support of the European Operation Sophia was decided. Firstly, this article will provide an explanation of NATO approach and its ability to adapt itself in facing new challenges. Secondly, it will introduce the situation in the central Mediterranean, by underlining the increase of migration flows and consequently, of victims. Finally, it will explain the implications of the EU-NATO joint mission in the fight against the smuggling of migrants, and thus the additional effects of this cooperation that is spreading more and more between South and Middle East.

A comprehensive approach

Since transatlantic allies are working on the implementation of the decisions taken during the NATO Summit in Warsaw, the threats faced by the Alliance in the European neighborhoods are divided between an Eastern Flank- which corresponds to the threat posed by the Russian foreign policy in Eastern Europe, the Baltic region and the Caucasus- and a Southern Flank, which includes terrorism, migration, and refugees flows in the Mediterranean. Challenges coming from several fronts have forced NATO to adapt its capabilities. That is why NATO has opened a way for a close cooperation with the European Union. NATO has indeed shown its commitment to reassurance measures in Eastern Europe as well as its ability to help the coordination of transatlantic intelligence regarding terrorism. In addiction, its capabilities to provide a strong border control and protection in the Mediterranean area have equally been proven.

According to Ian Lesser, Senior Director of Foreign Policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), and member of GMF’s executive team, the reason of this of cooperation between the two organizations is mainly due to certain structural weaknesses of the European Union, which for three years has to deal with the increasing flow of immigrants coming from Middle East and Libya.

Sure enough, on 11 February, NATO decided to assist with the refugees and migrants crisis. This was based on a joint request from Germany, Greece and Turkey. The goal was to participate in the international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean. NATO had to provide critical information and surveillance to combat human trafficking and criminal networks. Since then, NATO cooperated with national coastguards, and worked closely with the European Union both to monitor the illegal crossings in the Aegean Sea in cooperation with relevant authorities, and to establish a direct link with the European Union’s border management agency Frontex.

The cooperation between the European Union and NATO, and the attention of the latter towards the issues of immigration and terrorism were underlined during the summit in Warsaw on 8 and 9 July. The summit was presented as an opportunity for all Member States of the Alliance to present their issues related to international security challenges. According to the policy brief “National Priorities for the NATO Warsaw Summit” presented by the German Marshall Fund on 9 May, the meeting would have been an occasion for the introduction of national priorities.

The United States has continued to demonstrate its commitment to the NATO Alliance, as well as to Europe’s security and stability. They sought a more innovative, adaptive, and flexible Alliance that is able to deal with a full spectrum of threats. A recent Washington Think Tank consortium report, which included the GMF, identified the need to address a range of challenges extending from nuclear deterrence to hybrid threats.

Belgium expected NATO to help in managing the challenges of terrorism and sees a long term “Strategy South” as a key test for the Alliance evolution. This country believed that balance was an important factor for NATO’s unity and solidity. For Belgium, however, its security environment was principally defined by instability on NATO’s southern flank, a reality painfully demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in Brussels on March 22. Terrorism linked to Islamic extremism in southern Europe, including the phenomenon of foreign fighters, will head the list of challenges faced both by Belgium and other NATO allies in the years ahead.

France’s main priority at the Warsaw Summit was to maintain a balanced and flexible Alliance. This position reflects the desire of France to preserve its strategic autonomy and the ability to carry out its interests either via NATO or EU structures. Instead, German posture towards the south was reluctant because it recognized the necessity for more engagement in the South for a major political cohesion within the alliance.

But the most important position was that of Turkey, a member state of NATO but not of the EU. During the summit, Turkey expressed its concern on the migration issue, affirming its willingness to continue to seek the support of the Alliance to monitor the flows in the Aegean Sea. Partnerships, particularly the strengthening of the Mediterranean Dialogue and further enhancement of relations with Gulf countries through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative remained priorities for Turkey as Ankara has recently closed ranks with the Gulf Cooperation Council members.

NATO had to find a solution to resume different proposals from states with different needs and priorities. At the end of the Summit, NATO had not only adjusted its priorities as an organization, but it has also included proposals and concerns that several states pictured as « threats » coming from the South of the Alliance. When the Heads of State wrote the final document, a Communiqué, on the priorities of NATO and its approach on the migration crisis, it was underlined the NATO capability to adapt itself in order to struggle challenges coming from different parts of the Alliance.

At the point 92 and 93 of the Communiqué, NATO considered its intervention in the Aegean Sea as a success, thanks to the cooperation of Greece and Turkey, but above all thanks to the support provided by Frontex, the EU’s Border Management Agency. Also, just because of the concerns of some states, NATO agreed on a possible role in the Central Mediterranean, to complete the EU’s Operation Sophia through the provision of a range of capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and logistics support; through contribution to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested by the legitimate Libyan authorities and/or the EU; and in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 2292 on the situation in Libya, in close coordination with the EU.

In Warsaw, then NATO’s approach was comprehensive: it tried to summarize the preferences of its member states, trying to satisfy the demands (at least on the issue of migration) of the states most affected by the phenomenon of migration flows. NATO has indeed conceived the idea of further intervention in support of some of its member states, but this time in the case of the Central Mediterranean is a joint operation with the EU.

Sophia + Sea Guardian

The arrival of more than a million asylum seekers in Europe in 2015, deep divisions between EU Member States sparked, because it revealed both the weakness of the Schengen system, lacking sufficient tools to keep the external borders of the Union under control, and the unsustainability of the Dublin Regulation, which assigns the responsibility for registering and processing asylum applications to the country of first arrival. As numbers became unmanageable, Greece and Italy failed to prevent migrants from continuing their journey to northern Europe. Alongside immediate actions to cope with the urgency of the ongoing crisis, the European Agenda on Migration introduced proposals for structural reforms to manage migration in all its aspects in the longer term. The First Implementation Package of the European Agenda on Migration, presented by the European Commission on 27 May 2015, planned to triple the capacities and assets of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union’s (Frontex) joint operations Triton and Poseidon in 2015 and 2016, in order to restore the level of intervention provided under the former Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ search and rescue operation.

On 18 May 2015, the European Council approved the crisis management concept for a CSDP (Common security and defense policy) operation to disrupt the business model of smugglers in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The Union decided to conduct a military crisis management operation contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers, in accordance with applicable international law. On 22 June 2015, in Strasbourg, the Council decided to launch the operation, initially structured into 3 phases:

• support the detection and monitoring of migration networks through information gathering and patrolling on the high seas in accordance with international law;
• conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions provided for by applicable international law, and conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas or in the territorial and internal waters of that State, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking;
• in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, take all necessary measures against a vessel and related assets which are suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, in the territory of that State, under the conditions set out in that Resolution or consent.

Last 20 June 2016, the Council extended until 27 July 2017 Operation Sophia’s mandate reinforcing it by adding two supporting tasks: training of the Libyan coastguards and navy, and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. On 30 August and on 6 September 2016, the PSC authorized the commencement of the capacity building and training to the implementation of the UN arms embargo. For this reason, now, there is a 4th phase that will consist of a withdrawal of forces and completion of the operation. On 27 October, EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia started training the Libyan Navy Coast Guard and Libyan Navy. The objective is to enhance their capability to disrupt smuggling and trafficking in Libya and to perform search and rescue activities which will save lives and improve security in the Libyan territorial waters. The training is taking place on board of two EUNAVFOR MED assets on the high seas for 78 embarked trainees and their mentors. The initial training package comprises various models, ranging from basic seamanship to more advanced specialist skills and includes a substantial focus on human rights and international law. This task will be financed through voluntary contributions from some EU member states managed by the Athena mechanism, and from voluntary assets and personal contribution provided by the Member States.

On the same day, at the end of the meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which was also attended by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, decided to support the EU’s Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean with the Operation Sea Guardian. From November NATO ships and planes will be in the Central Mediterranean, ready to help the EU’s Operation Sophia with situational awareness and ready to provide logistical support.

In 2011, NATO launched an Alliance Maritime Strategy that foresees a complete revamping of NATO’s maritime forces, an extensive multi-year program of maritime exercises and training, and the enhancement of cooperation between NATO and its partners, as well as other international actors, in particular the European Union. In this context, NATO has created a Sea Guardian, which will respond to the threats linked to the maritime security that straddle the boundary between defense and law enforcement. NATO’s support to law enforcement under the Sea Guardian will contribute to mitigate gaps in the capacity of individual countries to enforce civilian and/or military law at sea. The NATO contribution will be complementary to efforts by other actors. NATO and the EU evaluated the employment of this operation in the Central Mediterranean during the Warsaw summit in July 2016.

This operation in the Central Mediterranean will have 7 main tasks:

• Support maritime situational awareness;
• Uphold freedom of navigation (surveillance, patrol, maritime interdiction, Special Operations, deployment of law enforcement detachments and, when authorized, the use of force);
• Conduct maritime interdiction;
• Fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
• Protect critical infrastructure;
• Support maritime counter-terrorism;
• Contribute to maritime security capacity-building.

Greece and Turkey announced that they will offer ships to Sea Guardian as of the 7th of November. Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey will provide air assets and that will be mainly maritime patrol aircrafts to help the European Union Operation Sophia to obtain a better situational awareness.

On 27 October, during the meeting, NATO decided to continue its intervention in the Aegean because its presence provides operational support to the efforts of the Coast Guards, to the Greek and the Turkish Coast Guards and to FRONTEX. From the beginning of the operation , there was a very substantial reduction in the numbers of illegal crossings and the Alliance was be able to cut the lines of the criminal networks organizing the illegal crossings. According to NATO many of the first sightings have been done by NATO vessels partly because they’re able to operate both in Turkish and Greek territorial waters. Moreover NATO presence in the Aegean Sea could add value, because it is a platform for enhanced cooperation between Turkey and Greece (and the EU as institution). So both for the operational reasons, but also as a political platform, the NATO presence in the Aegean has proven how an institution with a military vocation can promote the cooperation between coastal states.

 

Conclusions

The refugee and migrant crisis is the worst humanitarian crisis Europe has witnessed since 1945. NATO has established arrangements enabling direct links with Frontex at the operational and tactical levels. This allows the exchange of liaison officers and the sharing of information in real time so that Frontex can take even more effective action.

Since February 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has held discussions on the refugee and migrant crisis with several EU counterparts including the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, and the European Commissioner for Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos. To respond to the refugee and migrant crisis in Europe, NATO is working closely with the European Union. At the tactical and operational level, NATO cooperates with the EU Border Management Agency, Frontex. Thanks to the liason arrangements between Allied Maritime Command and Frontex, information is being shared in real time, enabling Frontex to take even more effective action. Furthermore, Greek, Turkish and Frontex liaison officers have been deployed to the NATO Aegean activity, which also enables the exchange of information. Cooperation is also ongoing at the political level.

At the Warsaw Summit in July, NATO leaders also agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in the Central Mediterranean, to complement or support the EU’s Operation Sophia.

On 9 November 2016, Operation Sea Guardian was launched. According to the Maritime Command Marcom (the central command of all NATO maritime forces) three NATO ships and two submarines – the Italian frigate ITS Aviere, the Bulgarian frigate BGS Verni, the Turkish frigate TCG Gemlik, the Greek submarine HS Papanikolis and the Spanish submarine ESPS Mistral – will conduct the first patrols in the central Mediterranean under NATO standing Operation Sea Guardian. At the Warsaw Summit in July, NATO announced the transformation of Article 5 Operation Active Endeavour into this new operation in response to the evolving security environment. Operation Sea Guardian has a broader scope adapted to a wider range of maritime security threats. Air support will include rotational patrols by Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPAs) from Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. These first patrols will run through the 17th Nov 2016, with other patrols on the forge and to occur according with approved schedule of operations.

Within a global context, the joint operation in the Mediterranean shows the strengths and weaknesses of the two organizations. Starting from the European Union, and considering the defense policy in the field of migration, support « asked » to NATO could be interpreted as a call for help to manage the crisis. This shows that, although since the last ten years, the EU has made great strides to respond to emerging crises, the intervention of a military organization is still considered. The management of defense policy, and in the specific case of the migratory crisis containment, is among the European Union’s competences. However, the request for an intervention by Turkey in the Aegean, but especially by Germany and Greece (European countries) to NATO, and the operation Sea Guardian, could be read as a lack of « trust » by member states towards the European means. In fact, in proportion to the NATO, the EU has a more limited experience in the military, defense and security field, and this may also explain why the EU wants to cooperate with NATO to counter the emerging crisis.

NATO availability has an explication, or maybe more. The first concerns the geopolitical aspect. The constant military presence of NATO in the south of the Alliance in a joint humanitarian operation with the EU is an opportunity to monitor the transit in the Central Mediterranean, and at the same time, to contribute to EU objectives, perhaps in the future, for the Libyan reconstruction. Other hypothesis can be put forward, for instance, to control the transits of ships bound for pro-government forces in Syria, but the Mediterranean is not a lake, and until now the aim of the mission includes maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism and capacity building. The second interpretation is linked to NATO’s legitimacy. The strong cooperation with the EU serves to NATO. This is the reason why since 2014 relations between the two organizations have improved, so that the joint program is to proceed hand in hand to follow a path based on mutual transparency, collaboration, and cooperation. The main reasons are two. The first is related to the Alliance’s composition: the majority of NATO member states are also EU members. The second is related to the existence of NATO. If it is considered when and why NATO was created, it can be noted that many things have changed and now the Alliance benefits from the cooperation with the EU in terms of legitimacy. On several occasions it has been said by both organizations that a stronger NATO means a stronger EU, and vice versa. This is because in reality, one has something the other lacks, and vice versa, so they tend to balance each other, and the proof is the joint operation in the Central Mediterranean.

Maria Elena Argano

For further information:

     -.Maritime Command Marcom Site, NATO Operation Sea Guardian Kicks off in the Méditerranéen http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/NATO-Operation-Sea-Guardian-Kicks-off-in-the-Mediterranean.aspx

     -. European external action service (EEAS) Site, Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini upon arrival at the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/13265/remarks-by-the-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-upon-arrival-at-the-nato-defence-ministers-meeting_en

     -. NATO Site, Press Conférence: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_136837.htm?selectedLocale=en

     -. EEAS Site, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia starts training of Libyan Navy Coast Guard and Libyan Navy: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/13195/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-starts-training-of-libyan-navy-coast-guard-and-libyan-navy_en

     -. Official Journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/972 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0972&qid=1435825940768&from=EN

     -. COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/778 : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D0778&qid=1435825940768&from=EN

     -. Egmont Institute Site, The European agenda on migration, one year on. The EU Response to the crisis has produced some results, but will hardly pass another solidarity test:http://www.egmontinstitute.be/publication_article/the-european-agenda-on-migration-one-year-on/

     -. EEAS Site, EUNAVFOR Med Sophia : http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/

     -. NATO Site, Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm#refugees

     -. NATO Site, NATO’s Deployment in the Aegean Sea: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-aegean-sea-eng.pdf

     -. NATO Site, Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm

     -. German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS) Site, Nato looks South: http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/02/16/natos-aegean-deployment-shape-things-come

     -. NATO Site, Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127972.htm?selectedLocale=en

     -. GMFUS Site, National priorities for the NATO Warsaw Summit: http://www.gmfus.org/publications/national-priorities-nato-warsaw-summit

 

Classé dans:RELATIONS EXTERIEURES

L'Allemagne et la Commission européenne ont rapidement rejeté la proposition de Nicolas Sarkozy visant à taxer les importations venant des États-Unis, si l'administration Trump svenait à dénoncer l'accord sur le climat conclu l'année dernière à Paris.

Allgemeines : Kleine "unbemannte Luftfahrzeuge", besser bekannt als Drohnen, können für verschiedenste Zwecke eingesetzt werden: Von Filmaufnahmen bis hin zur sicherheitstechnischen Überprüfung von Gaspipelines oder der Besprühung von Plantagen. Gleichzeitig ergeben sich aber Gefahren und Risiken für die Sicherheit des Luftraums und die Privatsphäre der Menschen. Am 10.11. hat der Verkehrsausschuss überarbeitete EU-Flugsicherheitsvorschriften inklusive neuer Sicherheitsregeln für Drohnen gebilligt.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2016 - EP

A l'heure où le focus politique n'est orienté que vers Chammal -un an après le Bataclan et les
Plus d'infos »

President-elect Donald Trump’s surprise victory places each of his foreign policy pronouncements under renewed scrutiny. His erratic campaign leaves many wondering where rhetoric will become reality. Foreign policy is no exception.

In Asia—the subject of the Obama Administration’s controversial “pivot” policy—the president-elect is already doing some pivoting of his own. South Korea was a specific target of Trump’s criticism during the campaign. America, he argued, has borne the cost and responsibility of protecting its allies for too long, and should no longer foot the bill for Seoul’s defense. Earlier this year, Trump rattled South Koreans by suggesting withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed there and bi-lateral U.S. talks with North Korea were both possibilities.

As president-elect, however, Trump has changed course. In a phone call with South Korean President Park Geun-hye just two days after the U.S. election, he said U.S. commitment to the South Korea alliance would continue if not grow in his administration.

A portion of presidential campaign rhetoric always dissolves on election night. Given Trump’s general penchant for extreme rhetoric, is he likely to walk back other campaign statements on international affairs? What does Trump’s South Korea reversal signal about the future development of his foreign policy?

Campaign reversals are nothing new, even reversals relating to South Korea. Trump’s turnaround repeats in short form a Democratic chapter in U.S.-South Korea relations. In The Two Koreas—a one-volume history of U.S.-South Korean relations following the Korean War—former Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer recalls the slow death of President Jimmy Carter’s own troop withdrawal policy.

Carter pledged, early in his campaign, to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. Troop withdrawals had occurred after the Korean War reached a stalemate in 1953. U.S. failure in Vietnam provided a motivation for Carter to want to reduce American troop presence in Asia, but the 38th Parallel remained the most volatile Cold War flashpoint after a divided Germany.

President Carter’s policy emerged as campaign desire to make an immediate mark on pre-existing policy. In Oberdorfer’s telling, Carter’s top aides were reluctant about the form and substance of his withdrawal policy from the start. Once on the record, however, Carter was driven to pursue the policy for its own sake, and after dividing his staff and straining bi-lateral relations, he ultimately settled for a small draw-down in U.S. personnel (roughly 3,000 overall) on the Korean Peninsula. Most tellingly, when Oberdorfer questioned Carter and several of his senior aides about the policy years later, each was unable to articulate why it was conceived and then pursued so doggedly.

Oberdorfer concludes:

“In his haste and lack of finesse, an inexperienced president had transformed a general impulse to reduce U.S. military forces in South Korea into a highly controversial policy with which he was personally, and negatively, identified. Many of the American diplomatic and military officials dealing with the issue were not opposed to substantial reductions if pursued in a well-planned fashion, but they were horrified by the peremptory and damaging way the issue was pursued by the Carter White House. By refusing to heed or even hear the objections until he finally was backed into a corner, Carter undermined his own position.”

This is merely an arcane, if interesting, history lesson but for the fact that the above paragraph describes many fears about President-elect Trump’s foreign policy. He is certainly an inexperienced president – having never held an elective office—and acting with a lack of finesse was a campaign trademark. To those fearing damage—direct and collateral—from Trump’s foreign policy impulses, his about-face on South Korea was a sign that he distinguishes between ephemeral campaign rhetoric—however blunt—and nuanced realities of policy.

Where this leaves Trump on other key security issues, however, is a question the foreign policy establishment is scrambling to answer. How will Trump balance his critical statements about America’s obligations to NATO with his seeming support for Putin’s Russia? Will he be as eager for wholesale change in the U.S.-led fight against ISIS as he suggested during the campaign? In short, where will Trump stick to his hardline rhetoric, and where will be open to change?

Try as they might, no one can see around the corner into a Trump presidency. The capacity for course correction in policy he has displayed may cause some to exhale. The Carter example, however, demonstrates how easily individual political ambitions (regardless of party) can damage U.S. alliance relationships.

Will the president-elect acknowledge this reality? Time will tell. As a candidate, Trump took notions of ‘plain speaking’ politics to extremes that offended large segments of the electorate. As president, America’s well being depends on his turning over a new leaf. We can only hope more ‘pivots’ are to come.

The post What Does Trump’s “Pivot” Back To South Korea Mean For His Foreign Policy? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

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La Cour des Comptes, dans son rapport diffusé hier (lire mon post ici), s'est penchée sur "le soutien en matière de transport stratégique" en particulier aérien, constatant "un large recours à l’externalisation, dans des conditions à clarifier" (photo Mindef).

Il y a visiblement matière à clarification dans ce domaine où la sérénité est loin de régner actuellement. En témoignent des interrogations sur les tarifs pratiqués, des critiques répétées sur les marchés passés depuis quelques années, des accusations récemment lancées contre certains prestataires, une concurrence qui n'a pas grand-chose de sain et dont la Défense ne doit pas pâtir. Le tout sur fond de tensions russo-ukrainiens dans le marché des gros porteurs et de dissolution de la co-entreprise Ruslan International Ltd.

Revenons aux conclusions de la Cour des comptes (dont le rapport est consultable ici). Pages 108 à 112, la Cour refait un constat de déficit capacitaire bien connu: "Dans le domaine du transport tactique comme stratégique, le recours à l’externalisation ne résulte pas d’un choix issu d’une analyse coûts/avantages, mais vise à pallier des déficits capacitaires qui peuvent être durables".

La Cour rappelle qu'en matière de transport aérien, outre la (très faible) mutualisation, il existe (il a existé) plusieurs marchés (voir aussi le tableau ci-dessous):
"• un accord-cadre d’affrètement en urgence, c’est-à-dire à moins de 20 jours, comportant trois lots relatifs aux passagers, au fret et au fret hors gabarit, attribué à sept titulaires (voir ici mon post de juillet 2014);
• pour une urgence moindre (20 jours et plus), un marché dit SALIS (Strategic airlift interim solution) passé par l’agence de soutien de l’OTAN avec la société Ruslan International, de droit allemand, qui regroupe les compagnies russe Volga Dnepr et ukrainienne Antonov Airlines, qui disposent à titre principal de 17 Antonov 124-100 ; par ce biais, la France, comme ses alliés, réserve et prépaie des heures de vol ;
• pour le même degré d’urgence depuis 2014 (20 jours et plus), un marché à bons de commande d’affrètement d’avions cargo attribué par la France début 2011, puis début 2015, à un groupement dont le mandataire est la société International chartering systems (ICS) ;
• un marché de transport de fret par voie aérienne commerciale, adapté à des petits colis ;
• jusqu’à la fin de l’année 2013, un marché de transport Afghanistan-France pour le désengagement de l’opération Pamir."

A noter que la Cour ne cite pas les marchés "locaux" passés par Barkhane ou Sangaris, avec la location d'avions et d'hélicoptères pour le transport du fret et des "pax" (les passagers). On se souviendra qu'une notification de marché pour quatre avions opérant dans la BSS est attendue (lire mon post ici).

En matière d'affrètements aériens stratégiques, la Cour préconise d'"améliorer l’efficience du recours aux moyens externalisés". Et la Cour de poursuivre: "Il s’agit, en tout premier lieu, d’établir des éléments de prix comparables, à partir des caractéristiques détaillées des prestations" et de "une claire priorité au recours au contrat le plus favorable par lequel des avions sont disponibles".

 

Remember The Day of the Jackal? This thrilling movie released in 1973 and featuring Edward Fox as enigmatic contract killer, is based on the failed attempt to assassinate Charles de Gaulle on 22 August 1962 by the paramilitary underground organisation OAS (‘Organisation de l’armée secrète’), composed by extreme right-wing activists who considered the Evian Treaty, signed in March 1962 in order to pave the way to Algerian independence, an act of high treason.

The fanatics who machine-gunned de Gaulle’s legendary Citroën DS fortunately missed the General. But they seriously injured the young Fifth Republic, profoundly handicapping her for life. What they did was provide de Gaulle with an unexpected, most welcome opportunity to modify the constitution under the pretext of ‘protecting’ the country. (Any resemblance with current Turkish presidents purely coincidental).

And he seized it quickly, because he felt that the conditions under which the Fifth Republic had been tailor-made to his personality in the first place – the need to put an end to the Algerian crisis – were no longer provided.

Only one week after the incident he announced a constitutional revision in his Council of ministers and notified public opinion in a press release that he was actively ‘preparing to take the necessary initiatives’ in order to ‘ensure, under all circumstances and without losing any time, the continuity of the State’. And on 12 September – just returned, by the way, from a triumphal visit to Germany where he laid the foundations of the path-breaking Elysée Treaty signed a few months later – he registered a television address that was broadcast on 20 September, informing the French population that it was time to ‘protect the country from crises and partisan ploys’, reminding them that ‘all this pain, the tears and the blood’, had created an ‘exceptional bond’ between the French people and himself, and that, for the sake of those who would one day have the heavy task to succeed him, he would submit the election of the president ‘by direct universal suffrage’ in a forthcoming referendum.

De Gaulle thus managed to push a constitutional reform that was anti-constitutional in itself! As the vast majority of observers and even the Conseil d’Etat pointed out, constitutional changes had to be decided and discussed in both chambers of the parliament, a provision de Gaulle simply dismissed (any resemblance with current British prime ministers purely coincidental). The Assemblée nationale did what it had to do: it adopted a vote of no confidence, obtained a large majority for it on 5 October and … as a result, was dissolved right away by de Gaulle (one of the convenient prerogatives of the French president), with new legislative elections announced for after the referendum.

If one is to believe Alain Peyrefitte in his book C’était de Gaulle (Vol. 1, Paris: Fallois-Fayard, 1994), the President was fully aware of the implications, telling his young secretary of state ‘What we are going to do is at the limits of legality. I even believe we crossed the line. (…) If we win, we will be able to say it’s legal because the people wants it.’

‘YES, it’s YOU who will elect the President of the Republic’

On 28 October 62.25% of the French electorate approved the new electoral process. The referendum was promptly ratified by the Conseil constitutionnel which showed a total absence of democratic backbone at this historical occasion.

What an incredible manipulation of constitutional provisions and public opinion! And what a massive vote of defiance against the ‘establishment’, which had been against it in closed ranks: all major politicians, trade unions, media, intellectuals and academics had warned against it – to no effect whatsoever. Is it exaggerated to say that in 1944 de Gaulle had promised the French he would make their country ‘great again’, and in 1962 he more or less told them ‘I am your voice!’ (Any resemblance with…).

Given his historical achievements, one can only have the greatest respect for Charles de Gaulle. His courage and determination, his moral and political legitimacy are undeniable. But that does not change the fact that, very clearly, the high art of demagogy is not reserved to shabby opportunists and ruthless cynics. There are moments when it finds a masterly application in the hands of uncontested heroes and great statesmen.

In de Gaulle’s case, the move was motivated mainly by his profound distrust of parliamentary democracy, with its litany of partisan spirit, unsatisfying compromise, tedious negotiations and fragile coalitions. In 1946 already, in his famous speech in Bayeux, he insisted on the need for ‘national arbitration above the political contingencies’ and made it clear that ‘it is from the Head of State, placed above the parties, that the executive power must proceed.’ In 1962, he got his will.

De Gaulle’s manoeuvre did not actually change the scope of power of the French President. It did not have any major immediate impact either – de Gaulle was of course re-elected in 1965 – and it may even be argued that the direct universal suffrage indirectly paved the way for political changeover in 1981: would there ever have been a Socialist in the Elysée if the President had always been chosen by the electoral college like in 1958?

But the long-term heritage for French politics is devastating: more than half a century later the poor Fifth Republic is more than ever held in the firm grip of de Gaulle’s plot of 1962. The presidential election has become a self-locking, seemingly unbreakable padlock for French democracy (and someone seems to have thrown away the key). Several posts of this blog will deal with the concrete consequences of de Gaulle’s historical constitutional ‘rape’, as former French premier Paul Reynaud famously commented at the time.

Fortunately the French are able to laugh about the padlock themselves. In the hilarious spy movie parody OSS 117: Lost in Rio, Jean Dujardin as secret agent Hubert Bonisseur de la Bath, on mission in Rio de Janeiro in 1967, refuses to consider Brazil a dictatorship, despite the arguments of his young colleague from the Mossad. And when she objects, asking: ‘But what do you call a country which has as head of state a former military with full powers, a secret police, one single television channel, and where all information is controlled by the State?’, he pauses for a moment and declares solemnly: ‘I call this la France, Mademoiselle. And not just any kind of France. The France of the General de Gaulle.’

Today France has more TV channels than it needs and information is certainly no longer under control. But the electoral padlock is still shut.

Albrecht Sonntag
@albrechtsonntag

This is post # 3 on the French 2017 election marathon.
Post # 2 here.
Post # 1 here.

The post France 2017: How the padlock was shut appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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The European Economic Area (EEA) was established on 1 January 1994 following an agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Union (EU).

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Les spectaculaires capacités des LRU vont l'amener, peut-être rapidement, à être déployé à Chammal,
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Craignant que Donald Trump coupe drastiquement les aides américaines et retire les États-Unis de l’aide au développement mondiale, les ONG se demandent quel sera l’impact de sa présidence. Un article de notre partenaire le Guardian.