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A külügyminiszterek és a védelmi miniszterek együttes ülést tartottak a biztonságra és a védelemre vonatkozó végrehajtási tervről.

A Tanács ülésén a főképviselő – az Európai Bizottság alelnökeként és az Európai Védelmi Ügynökség vezetőjeként – nyújtotta be a tagállamoknak a biztonságra és a védelemre vonatkozó végrehajtási tervet.

A Tanács elfogadta az EU globális stratégiájának a biztonság és a védelem területén történő végrehajtásáról szóló következtetéseket. A következtetések célkitűzéseket és konkrét intézkedéseket határoznak meg. Ezek az intézkedések segíteni fogják az Uniót és tagállamait Európa jelenlegi és jövőbeli biztonsági és védelmi szükségleteinek további kezelésében.

A biztonságra és a védelemre vonatkozó végrehajtási terv a kül- és biztonságpolitikára vonatkozó globális uniós stratégia nyomon követésének részét képezi. A főképviselő június 28-án nyújtotta be az Európai Tanácsnak az EU globális stratégiáját, amelynek címe: „Közös jövőkép, közös fellépés: erősebb Európa”. A stratégia célja, hogy iránymutatásul szolgáljon az EU kül- és biztonságpolitikájához az elkövetkező évekre. A Tanács 2016. október 17-én elfogadta a globális stratégiáról szóló következtetéseket.

A biztonság és a védelem az EU globális stratégiájának végrehajtását célzó munka egyik kiemelt területe. E munka további területei többek között a következők: rezilienciaépítés, valamint integrált konfliktus- és válságkezelési megközelítés, a belső és a külső szakpolitikák közötti kapcsolat erősítése, a meglévő regionális és tematikus stratégiák naprakésszé tétele vagy új stratégiák készítése, továbbá a társadalmi diplomáciai erőfeszítések fokozása.

A biztonsággal és a védelemmel kapcsolatos munka a Bizottság által az európai védelmi cselekvési tervre vonatkozóan végzett munkával összhangban, valamint az Európai Tanács elnöke, az Európai Bizottság elnöke és a NATO főtitkára által tett együttes nyilatkozat végrehajtásának figyelembevételével zajlik. A végrehajtási tervet a tanácsi következtetésekkel együtt várhatóan az Európai Tanács decemberi ülésére fogják benyújtani.

photo Aseemblée Nationale 9 novembre 2016 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées - Compte rendu n° 15 Présidence de Mme Patricia Adam, présidente — Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Marwan Lahoud, président du groupement des industries...

We politicians, our people, but also investors, bankers, live in uncertain times, ever since the outcome of the British referendum, the UK and the continent have regarded each other with some suspicion.

Coming from the Netherlands, I strongly regret the outcome of the referendum, but we have to respect and accept the choice of the British people. In my mind, it is a lose-lose situation, which we must manage as well as possible. It is now in the interest of both the UK and the rest of Europe to come to a fair and clear arrangement for our future relation. A new settlement with clarity on how the British government sees the role for itself in the Europe of the future, on how to proceed with our trade and international affairs and to limit the economic damage to the UK and the European Union.

Many things are uncertain, but we do know that whatever the future will look like, we'd better face it with a strong foundation. And that's what we are focusing on. Because the eurozone economy is now in a better shape and it needs to improve further. Since the crisis, we have taken important steps to secure our recovery. We are better prepared for possible shocks in the future. Thanks to the decisive steps we took, all European economies are growing again in the third quarter, unemployment is falling and deficits have been reduced. The average government deficit in the euro area in 2009 was over six percent, and will fall below two percent this year.

We have added safeguards to strengthen our shock absorption capacity so our economies can keep growing in the future, our people can find jobs again and investors are willing to invest in our countries and companies. But this doesn't mean we're there yet.

We've come a long way

First, look at how far we have come. In 2008 and 2009 our economies were hit by a huge financial crisis. In the US, the UK and all over continental Europe banks had to be saved by taxpayers' money in order to prevent chaotic defaults. But by preventing the collapse, government debt increased and investors became concerned about the prospects of repayment of government debt. This affected the banks' health, as they hold large amounts of sovereign debt. And so the vicious link between banks and sovereigns was born.

This is the reason we have taken unprecedented steps over the last couple of years. We have created a banking union, which aims to protect 340 million European taxpayers from future financial crises. The banking union was set up in only three years.

What are the results of the project so far? I see five key elements, which I will discuss in more detail in a minute: First, stricter and harmonized capital requirements. Second, enhanced supervision at European level. Third, making bail-in the new norm: if a bank gets into trouble, its investors must foot the bill. Fourth, resolution of failing banks at European level and setting up of a single resolution fund. Fifth and finally, we are determined to create a European deposit insurance scheme once remaining risks have been sufficiently reduced in the coming years.

These important steps will make banks and governments better prepared for possible shocks in the future.

Where are we now?

The European financial sector is in a much better shape than before. Thanks to the first two key elements of the banking union - stricter common rules and the single supervision mechanism - problems in bank balance sheets have become transparent in a uniform way. This is good news, because although this transparency shows that challenges remain, it also ensures that banks take their responsibility and take steps to become more resilient.

So banks can contribute to the recovery of the real economy and further reduce the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and banks.

As I said, we aren't there yet. A number of banks throughout the eurozone still suffer from a high stock of non-performing loans. These loans are putting pressure on bank's profitability and their ability to provide new credit. This is slowing down the economic recovery in a number of our countries. The gross carrying amount of these loans in the EU amounts to over a trillion euros. Insolvency laws in some countries have recently been modernized. But In practice there are also obstacles like the capacity of the courts. Therefore out-of-courts settlements are badly needed. The European Commission will propose legislation very soon.

But banks cannot afford to simply sit on their hands and wait. Without timely and adequate provisioning and write-offs of loans, their long term profitability and viability are at risk. While this might be painful in the short run, banks need to be ambitious, and raise additional capital if necessary, to survive in the long run.

Also, some banks still have a lot of scope for improving cost efficiency. Bold measures are needed to cut costs further. In addition, many banks have been hit by large fines due to unethical behavior. And I hope to say: unethical behavior in the past. These fines have been a drag on the recovery of some institutions. Here, prevention is better than cure. To survive in the long run, banks should always view things from the perspective of their clients and do what is right for them.

Earlier I mentioned five elements of the Banking Union. The third element, bail-in, is crucial. I am well aware, that some say bail-in is too painful, risky, and hard to apply. But it ensures that we won't have to save banks with taxpayers' money anymore. It is a sound economic principle and deals with losses in a fair way. Some may worry about stability, but I firmly believe that bail-in will ultimately safeguard stability and strengthen bank's resilience. And it gives markets an incentive to price risks as accurately as possible.

The effects are already becoming visible. Major rating agencies have downgraded their expectations about public support to much lower levels in eurozone countries. And several studies show that investors are responding accordingly. For example, we see an increase in the difference between banks' CDS spreads and the spreads of their sovereigns, which means that investors believe in the principle of bail-in.

The newly established Single Resolution Board, the fourth key element I mentioned, has not yet had to deal with a failing bank. This might sound a bit odd, but it makes sense, because bail-in also has a very strong  preventive effect. The threat of bail-in has caused banks to increase their buffers  by raising private capital, issuing shares or merging with other banks. In Greece, for example, the threat of bail-in late last year significantly increased private participation in the recapitalisation process of some Greek banks, thereby reducing the public burden. The same can now be seen in Italy. Private solutions are once again preferred.

What do we, the governments, do?

Let me reassure you: it's not all up to you.It's also up to governments. This brings me to the fifth element of the banking union: creating a European deposit insurance scheme once the remaining risks have been sufficiently addressed. I think we politicians should do two things in this respect:

First, we need to finish what we've started.

The banking union is a work in progress and we - the legislators - have to complete it so we have the right framework in place to deal with future crises.

One of the most important next steps is to start working on the Commission's legislative proposals that are expected before the end of the year. They should focus on reducing the risks that still exist. For example:

• They should clarify the quality and quantity of bail-in-able buffers for banks by ensuring that bail-in is possible without material risk of litigation. To achieve this, the creditor hierarchy in Europe needs to be further clarified and harmonised.
• The proposals should also create a level playing field by harmonizing further capital rules for banks by removing the remaining options and discretions.
• The final Basel 3 reforms should be put into practice, especially regarding the leverage ratio. 
• Insolvency laws and practices should be harmonised and strengthened to address banks' problems with non-performing loans, which I have already mentioned.

Another important element in reducing risks in bank balance sheets is the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures to banks. We're still waiting for the Basel Committee's findings, but we'll return to this issue in the future and consider the way forward in Europe, as this will also help to break the vicious circle.

The sooner we achieve these reforms, the sooner we'll be able to work on further steps to share risks. For example by creating a common backstop for the single resolution fund and introducing a European deposit insurance scheme.

The second thing we politicians need to do is stick to what we have agreed.

Over the last few years, we have all learned that saving a continent from financial ruin isn't easy and isn't always popular with voters. So I understand that my colleagues and myself  find it hard to keep doing what's necessary. I understand that it takes determination. But we have to stick to our plan. The road to populism is paved with paralyzed politicians.

European banking supervision and stricter prudential regulation will ensure we address the legacy problems in banks, and prevent the build-up of future risks. Bail-in limits the bank-sovereign nexus and helps set investors' incentives right. That's what we agreed to do. And it's important that we all remain committed. This brings clarity and stability. And that's how we contribute to further economic recovery throughout the eurozone.

Let me conclude. Brexit, globalisation, low interest rates, rising populism: we live in uncertain times. We have a strong common interest is to maintain financial stability and if possible political stability. In order to create opportunities and provide security. That's what people expect. That's what we should deliver.

Thank you.

In the wake of populist successes in the UK and the US, Viviane Gravey examines the prospects for a Front National victory in the upcoming 2017 French presidential election. She argues that, while the institutional structure of French politics would limit the room for manoeuvre of Marine Le Pen, it is ultimately the responsibility of other political actors to provide convincing alternative leadership, rather than solely rely on the checking power of institutions.

République française, lisecher, CC-BY-NC-2.0

After the double shocks of Brexit and Trump’s election, people are wondering when and where the next electoral shock will come. Will it be on 4 December, with the rerun of the Austrian presidential election and the Italian constitutional referendum? Will it come later, in early 2017 with the French presidential election, or in late 2017 with the German General Election? As we ponder where this populist wave will strike next, one key element is often left out of the discussion: the role of political institutions, of constitutional arrangements. Behind the catch-all label of ‘Western democracies’ lies a great diversity of institutional rules, which may limit the success of populist candidates.

This article investigates the role of institutions in stemming (or reinforcing) this populist wave by focusing on France and Marine Le Pen. The leader of the French Front National was propelled further in the media last week – first to discuss Trump’s election on France 2 on Wednesday, second by being invited on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show on Sunday. But is her election in May 2017 inevitable? And what power would she wield as French President?

French elections are run on a two-round system: the first round of 2017 Presidential election will be on 23 April, with the second round on 7 May (if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round, which is unlikely to happen). Only the two candidates with most votes advance to the second round. This system allows for a plurality of views to be aired in the first half of the campaign – in the 2002 Presidential election 16 candidates ran in the first round – and gives voters the opportunity to gather behind their favoured (or least worse of the two) candidate in the second round. There are thus two major differences compared to US presidential elections: a window of 14 days to reconsider; and small parties influencing not the vote share differences between the ‘big two’, but who qualifies for the second round.

The 2002 French election is a case in point. French PM Lionel Jospin’s failure to reach the second round in 2002 was in part explained by left-wing voters choosing to support smaller left-wing parties in the first round. But Jean Marie Le Pen’s failure in the subsequent second round against incumbent French President Jacques Chirac was born out of a mass demonstration against him, and a rise in voter turnout. In the UK and in the US, Brexit and Trump’s election have led to demonstrations – pro-EU, anti-Trump. The French electoral system allows for these demonstrations to take place before the final vote and to galvanise opposition to populist parties.

Let us imagine that these demonstrations are not enough, that tactical voting in the first and second round fails and that Marine Le Pen is elected President in May 2017. What then? The French semi-presidential political system has a strong president (1) as long as the president can work with a government of the same side and (2) under the limits on his/her power set out by the French Constitution and enforced by the French Constitutional Court, the Conseil constitutionnel.

A month after the presidential election, French voters will cast ballots in parliamentary elections for the Assemblée nationale. These are also run in two rounds, and this electoral system has not been kind to the Front National in the past. In 2012, the Front National received 13.6 per cent in the first round (a drop from 17.9 per cent for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the presidential election), but obtained only 2 MPs in the second round.

In contrast to the presidential election, more than two parties can stand in the second round: you can stand as long as you gained more than 12.5 per cent of the popular vote. In many ‘triangular’ second rounds with the Left, Right and Extreme Right, either the Left or Right have stepped aside to allow a clear path to victory against the Extreme Right. In some ways, the Front National’s difficulties in parliamentary elections echoes UKIP’s woes in the 2015 UK General Election.

For the Front National to win a majority and be able to form a government, it would need to win an additional 287 MPs – a very unlikely outcome. No parties have ever agreed to enter into a coalition with the Front National to form a government. The most likely outcome of a Marine Le Pen win in the presidential election would be a cohabitation between a President from one party and a Government from another. This has happened three times since the foundation of the Fifth Republic: in 1986-1988, 1993-1995 and 1997-2002. In this situation, the president’s powers are limited to his/her constitutional prerogatives in the realms of defence and foreign affairs, with very limited influence on day-to-day politics.

Would Le Pen be powerless then, even if President? Not necessarily. As we see in the UK, you have MPs and ministers who voted for ‘Remain’ who are still working to deliver Brexit. With a Le Pen presidency, it may be tempting for a French Government to embrace some of her policies, or at least a watered-down version of them.

Even in this situation, only 60 members of the Assemblée nationale or of the Sénat are needed to refer a law, before it enters into force, to the Conseil constitutionnel. Its 12 members will have to judge whether it respects the constitution. This is key, as not only does the 1958 French Constitution have clear statements on the separation of powers, but the Conseil constitutionnel considers its preamble to have equal constitutional value.

This preamble refers to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the preamble to the 1946 French Constitution (which includes gender equality, asylum rights, rights to unionise…) and even the 2004 Environmental Charter (with the precautionary and polluter pays principle) – which will make it extremely difficult for a Le Pen presidency to contravene human rights; and, conversely, easy for opposition parliamentarians to seriously hamper the implementation of her policies.

In conclusion: institution matters! The global populist wave will impact different countries differently, in part due to their varying institutional and constitutional make-ups. France may well elect Marine Le Pen, but its two-round system makes it much more difficult. Its semi-presidential system, with a strong constitutional watchdog, would clip her wings once in power. But institutions cannot sustainably stem the rise of populism on their own: not only could Le Pen, if President, use her constitutional powers to increase her political power (eg by dissolving the assembly), but a popular party such as Front National repeatedly kept out of power could undermine people’s trust in their institutions. Thus, while institutions offer a safety valve, it is up to civil society, and to the other political parties, to offer compelling alternatives to citizens and make sure that populism does not override them.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

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Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2fWUSNb

Viviane Gravey | @VGravey
Queen’s University Belfast

Dr Viviane Gravey is Lecturer in European Politics at Queen’s University Belfast and co-author of Environmental Europe? She is Chair of the UACES Student Forum and Co-Editor of Crossroads Europe.

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The post Brexit, Trump, Le Pen? How France’s Institutions Will Make It Difficult for Le Pen to Win the Election and Govern appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Comme l’a souligné le rapport de la Cour des Comptes* publié le 14 novembre, les matériels déployés en opérations souffrent d’une « surintensité […] qui se traduit par une usure accélérée », notamment dans certaines zones de déploiement aux conditions climatiques sévères. Sable, chaleur ou encore humidité sont autant de facteurs pouvant impacter l’état du matériel terrestre. Exemple en Côte d’Ivoire où la mission de contrôle et d’assistance de la maintenance (MICAM) a dernièrement été déployée. Objectif : contrôler l’état technique des matériels et l’aptitude du personnel à le mettre en œuvre.

Après le Sénégal, l'assureur français April ciblera la sous-région dès 2017

Cet article Assurances : April affiche ses ambitions dans la zone Cima est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

A Tanács 2016. november 14-én felhatalmazta az Európai Bizottságot és az Unió külügyi és biztonságpolitikai főképviselőjét arra, hogy az Európai Unió és tagállamai nevében folytassanak tárgyalásokat az Azerbajdzsán Köztársasággal egy átfogó megállapodásról.

Az új megállapodás a tervek szerint az 1996. évi partnerségi és együttműködési megállapodás helyébe lép majd, és jobban figyelembe veszi az EU és Azerbajdzsán közös céljait, illetve a napjainkban előttük álló közös kihívásokat. A megállapodás az európai szomszédságpolitika 2015. évi felülvizsgálata során jóváhagyott elveket fogja követni, és megújult alapot fog kínálni az EU és Azerbajdzsán közötti politikai párbeszéd és kölcsönösen előnyös együttműködés tekintetében.

Antoine Delaporte et les équipes d'Adenia Partners (ex-I&P Management) passent la vitesse supérieure sur le mid-market, le segment des grosses PME africaines (5-40 millions de dollars de revenus).

Cet article Adenia voit grand sur le mid-market africain est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Justice Minister Nela Kuburovic said Serbia will introduce a law to punish the denial of genocide and war crimes if the offences have been confirmed by the International Criminal Court or Serbian courts.

Le conseil de l’Union européenne s’est accordé lundi sur un plan global de mise en œuvre de la stratégie dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité. L’Europe de la défense est-elle en train de se relancer ? Va-t-on vers une défense européenne autonome ? Ce plan va-t-il permettre à l’Europe « de franchir un pas de plus vers l’autonomie stratégique » comme l’a déclaré le ministre de la Défense français, Jean-Yves le Drian ?

Le texte adopté lundi 14 novembre par le conseil Affaires étrangères de l’Union européenne concerne l’application de la stratégie globale de l’UE dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité, publiée en juin 2016. Il s’agit, en quelque sorte, d’une feuille de route indiquant la marche à suivre sur les questions de défense. Des mesures sont prises dès aujourd’hui, d’autres restent à déterminer dans les mois qui viennent.
Nous attendions ce texte mais nous étions initialement pessimistes quant à son contenu. Il a été élaboré en coordination entre l’Union européenne et les Etats membres. Federica Mogherini, Haute représente de l’Union européenne pour les Affaires étrangères et la Politique de sécurité et vice-présidente de la Commission européenne, a eu, en effet, à charge de préparer un texte prenant en compte les propositions faites par les Etats. A l’image de la lettre des ministres de la Défense français et allemands qui avait été rendue publique en septembre 2016. C’est donc un exercice qui implique à la fois l’institution européenne et les Etats membres
Le texte final s’avère finalement plus ambitieux que ne le laissaient envisager les discussions préparatoires. Le document final comprend 31 pages, ce qui est beaucoup. Il se présente sous la forme de conclusions communes auxquelles est annexé un document de 31 pages qui identifie 13 actions à mettre en œuvre dans les mois à venir. Sont envisagées, par exemple, la création d’un fond d’investissement pour les programmes en coopération de l’Union européenne, une intégration plus forte des capacités pour mener à bien des opérations militaires au sein de l’UE, ainsi qu’une perspective de réflexion sur la coopération structurée permanente à la fois inclusive et modulaire. Cette coopération structurée permanente figure dans le Traité de Lisbonne mais n’a jamais été définie. De manière générale, l’objectif est d’avoir une défense européenne plus forte afin de mieux assurer la sécurité des citoyens européens, grâce à des capacités militaires accrues qui seront définies en coopération.
Le terme « autonomie stratégique » revient également plusieurs fois. Son emploi ne signifie pas que l’Europe sera indépendante pour sa défense, mais qu’elle veut se donner les capacités de conduire des opérations de manière autonome et de se doter de capacités militaires, industrielles ainsi que technologiques autonomes. L’objectif est simplement que les Européens fassent plus et mieux pour leur défense ce qui conduira nécessairement à une plus grande autonomie stratégique de l’Europe.

Les déclarations de Donald Trump font redouter à certains un désengagement des Américains de la protection militaire de l’Europe. N’est-ce pas finalement une opportunité pour l’UE de resserrer les rangs et de s’entendre vers plus d’intégration ?

C’est effectivement possible. L’élection de Donald Trump met les Européens dans une situation de grande incertitude, car de sa politique étrangère et de défense, nous ne connaissons que des déclarations prononcées durant la campagne qu’il faut parfois qualifier « d’exotiques ».
Compte tenu des propos de Donald Trump et de la composition de son entourage qui n’en est encore qu’à ses balbutiements, il est encore difficile de savoir si les Etats-Unis ont tranché entre deux lignes de conduite : un retour à l’isolationnisme, revendiqué par Donald Trump, ou une politique plus interventionniste, plus néoconservatrice, sous l’influence de certains conseillers puisqu’on évoque le nom de John Bolton qui faisait partie des conseillers lors du premier mandat de George W. Bush de 2001 à 2005.
Dans les deux cas de figure et dans la lignée du slogan « America first », le budget militaire des Etats-Unis devrait augmenter. Pour autant, cela ne signifie pas que les Etats-Unis adopteront une ligne interventionniste et qu’ils continueront à garantir le même niveau de protection aux Européens.
Face à ces deux options, le texte adopté par l’Union européenne apporte des réponses pertinentes. Le Vieux Continent envoie un message outre-Atlantique : plus d’efforts seront mis en œuvre par les Européens dans l’organisation de leur propre défense répondant ainsi par avance à une Amérique qui deviendrait plus isolationniste. Le New York Times ne s’y est pas trompé en titrant « Europe rethinks defense in Trump era. ». Les conclusions de la réunion du conseil des affaires étrangères du 14 novembre renvoient toutefois à des actions concrètes dont on ne verra véritablement la portée qu’en juin 2017, date à laquelle la clause de rendez-vous est fixée. Les actions concrètes restent à définir précisément et à appliquer. Or l’Union européenne nous a habitué, ces dernières années, à beaucoup de déclarations d’intention en matière de défense et de sécurité pour peu de réalisations concrètes. Il faudra rester vigilant.

Concrètement, quel serait l’impact d’un retrait de l’OTAN de la part des Etats-Unis ? L’Europe a-t-elle les moyens de se défendre ?

Je ne vois pas les Etats-Unis se retirer de l’OTAN, malgré les déclarations de Donald Trump en ce sens. En effet, l’organisation transatlantique constitue, pour la première puissance mondiale, un moyen de contrôle de la politique étrangère et de défense des Européens sans pour autant déployer des moyens réellement importants. L’OTAN est un instrument d’influence irremplaçable des Etats-Unis sur les Européens, y compris pour y exporter les équipements militaires fabriqués par l’industrie d’armement américaine. Cela étant, tout en restant dans l’OTAN, Donald Trump offrira-t-il les mêmes garanties de protection vis-à-vis de la Russie comme les pays d’Europe centrale et d’Europe du Nord le demandent aujourd’hui ? La question mérite d’être posée, notamment en ce qui concerne les Etats baltes et la Pologne.
Si la garantie de sécurité donnée aux Européens par l’Amérique de Donald Trump est limitée, elle ne disparaîtra jamais totalement, ils essaieront de trouver un accord avec la Russie pour régler le conflit ukrainien et apaiser les tensions en Europe. La résolution du conflit ne figure-t-elle pas dans les intérêts européens ? Le seul écueil d’une telle perspective est que l’Union européenne disparaîtrait une nouvelle fois de l’échiquier diplomatique, l’accord se faisant directement entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie.

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/9_26_2013-95122---cohesion-policy-projects-16-9-preview_103.8_thumb_169_1478707958_1478707958_129_97shar_c1.jpg

EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 16 November 2016 to address cohesion policy by taking stock of the modifications on the common provision regulation and adopting conclusions on results and new elements of the cohesion policy and the European structural and investment funds.

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Freedom of establishment
Under the Services Directive, applicants for a licence cannot be required to pay costs relating to the management and enforcement of the licencing regime when submitting their application

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La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à une réglementation nationale autorisant la reproduction numérique des livres indisponibles dans le commerce en méconnaissance des droits exclusifs des auteurs

Soulier et Doke
La directive sur le droit d’auteur s’oppose à une réglementation nationale autorisant la reproduction numérique des livres indisponibles dans le commerce en méconnaissance des droits exclusifs des auteurs

Soulier und Doke
Die Urheberrechtsrichtlinie steht einer nationalen Regelung entgegen, die die digitale Vervielfältigung im Handel vergriffener Bücher unter Missachtung der ausschließlichen Rechte der Urheber gestattet

Le phénomène, étudié à l’échelle continentale par des scientifiques kényans, pourrait coûter près de 300 milliards de dollars par an.