Feed aggregator

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

- Agenda / France - Régions, Croatie

Claims circulating in various media outlets that Russia has betrayed Syria, Iran, and Venezuela do not withstand serious scrutiny. They overlook both historical lessons and the evolving realities of global politics. One-Sided 'International Duty' No Longer Works Ideally, Russia's relations with other countries should be structured so that economic and political ties remain stable regardless of changes in government. Ideological motivations, including anti-Western solidarity, still matter, but they are no longer decisive. Russia is moving away from the mindset that once justified the fulfillment of a one-sided "international duty,” as seen in Afghanistan and Angola. To a large extent, it was precisely the costly support of allied states during periods of falling oil revenues that exhausted the Soviet economy and contributed to its collapse. Priorities were misjudged, and debts owed by former "brotherly” capitals were almost never repaid, with rare exceptions such as India, Turkey, Jordan, and the UAE.

At the edge of Davos, the 19th-century church-turned-‘USA House’ seems to be the architectural epitome of Weberian ethics and American techno-capitalism (Source: Financial Times)

The White House’s confirmation that President Donald J. Trump will attend the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2026 instantly reframed the meeting’s stakes. Davos has long been caricatured as a champagne-soaked conclave of globalist elites—precisely the kind of venue Trump once mocked. Yet his return is neither ironic nor accidental. According to the Observer, Trump now openly eyes a “U.S. conquest of Davos,” using the forum to sell American capitalism back to the very elites who once dismissed it as politically toxic.

This is not Trump’s first Davos gambit. In a virtual 2025 address to the World Economic Forum, Trump delivered a blunt carrot‑and‑stick message to global business leaders: bring production and investment to American soil or face tariffs on goods sold into the U.S. market. He promised lower corporate taxes and regulatory certainty for companies that manufacture in the United States, while warning that those that did not would “very simply… have to pay a tariff” on their exports—potentially generating hundreds of billions of dollars to strengthen the U.S. economy and reduce debt.

Davos 2026, however, will be about more than tariffs. Backed by corporate heavyweights such as Microsoft and McKinsey—each reportedly pledging up to $1 million to support the US Davos hub—the United States is set to stage a precise and confident showcase of its economic and technological clout. Most events will unfold in a 19th‑century English church just outside the forum’s security perimeter, reimagined as “USA House” and adorned with imagery celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. Its chosen themes—“peace through strength,” “digital assets & economic resilience,” and “faith‑based initiatives”—reflect a blend of economic patriotism and techno‑pragmatism, crafted to underline America’s central role in shaping the twenty‑first‑century order. Within this carefully choreographed setting, Trump’s appearance could fuse a revived American capitalist narrative with an emerging club-based techno‑geopolitical initiative called Pax Silica—turning Davos into a stage for a new convergence of power, capital, and innovation.

(Source: US Department of State)

What Is Pax Silica?

Formally launched by the U.S. State Department on December 12, 2025, through the adoption of the Pax Silica Declaration, the initiative brings together a core group of U.S. allies and trusted partners—including the United Kingdom, Singapore, Israel, and the Netherlands—around a shared set of mission values: securing supply chains, protecting sensitive technologies, and building collective resilience against coercive or non-market practices. Pax Silica builds directly on earlier U.S. industrial policy, most notably the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors(CHIPS) and Science Act of 2022, while extending those domestic commitments into a coordinated diplomatic framework. By embedding industrial policy within alliance coordination, it seeks to align private capital, public regulation, and strategic planning across borders, transforming what were once national initiatives into a shared geopolitical architecture.

Within Pax Silica, participation is not defined by ideological alignment, but by adherence to common standards governing compute infrastructure, semiconductor manufacturing, energy reliability, and critical minerals sourcing. In this regulatory- and incentive-based sense, the framework operates as a selective coordination mechanism, privileging those both willing and able to meet its governance and security thresholds. From this politico-economically selective base, Pax Silica articulates ambitions that extend beyond immediate supply-chain risk mitigation. As artificial intelligence consolidates its role as a general-purpose technology, the framework treats sustained control over the full technology stack—not only algorithms, but hardware, energy, and upstream inputs—as the foundation of future economic power. Its enduring objective is therefore neither wholesale decoupling nor indiscriminate reshoring, but a rules-based reordering of global production that channels investment, innovation, and growth through trusted networks capable of sustaining competitiveness and security over time.

The implications for Davos 2026 follow naturally. Pax Silica’s appeal lies in its club-based logic: privileged access to advanced innovation ecosystems, capital markets, and technology platforms for those inside the framework, paired with rising frictions and exclusion risks for those outside it. In this light, the initiative functions less as a formal alliance than as the organizing backdrop for debates over tariffs, reshoring, and AI leadership—precisely the terrain on which Trump’s return to Davos is likely to unfold.

Could Davos 2026 Herald the New Start of Trumpian Expansionary(Scalable) Club Diplomacy?

Davos 2026 convenes under the banner of “A Spirit of Dialogue,” yet its underlying imperative is sharply pragmatic: sustaining growth and trust as compute capacity and strategic supply chains increasingly function as instruments of state power. Within this environment, Pax Silica may emerge not merely as a discrete policy agenda, but as the principal institutional lens through which the global tech‑industrial divide is interpreted. By lowering coordination costs and harmonizing standards, its club‑based logic aims to expand participation over time—quietly furnishing a strategic framework that could, in turn, shape the context of Trump’s return.

As AI shifts from experimentation to scaled deployment, decisions involving compute capacity, data‑center siting, and energy infrastructure now dictate both national competitiveness and corporate valuation. Consequently, at Davos 2026, AI represents the central axis along which growth, capital allocation, and strategic dependence converge—precisely the set of issues poised to dominate the discussions among executives, investors, and policymakers.

For Trump, AI thus constitutes the most pragmatic policy lever. When filtered through Pax Silica’s logic of scalability, strategic leverage concentrates upstream—across compute, platforms, energy, and ecosystem governance—the very domains Pax Silica seeks to standardize among trusted networks. Given U.S. primacy in frontier models and cloud infrastructure, the Trumpian approach is likely to be integrative rather than coercive: aligning AI investment, infrastructure build‑out, and regulatory expectations within a shared framework that broadens participation while anchoring it in U.S.‑centered technological norms.

Under these conditions—and driven by the urgency of scaling AI governance among like‑minded partners—Davos 2026, when accompanied by Pax Silica‑themed events, is poised to act less as a forum for persuasion than one for consolidation. Within this elite nexus, asymmetric technological advantages can be translated into durable commitments—joint ventures, shared infrastructures, and long‑term partnerships—rooted in an American‑centered AI stack. Ultimately, Trump’s presence would amplify this dynamic, positioning Pax Silica as an emergent paradigm through which technological preeminence matures into enduring economic cohesion.

By David Howarth (University of Luxembourg) and Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)

Financial market integration has been a core objective of European integration since the 1950s. Over several decades, the European Union (EU) has adopted hundreds of legislative acts aimed at removing barriers to cross-border finance and harmonising the regulation and supervision of capital markets. Yet progress has been uneven, contested, and repeatedly repackaged.

The most recent example is the transformation of the Capital Markets Union (CMU)—launched in 2015, relaunched in 2020, and rebranded as the Savings and Investments Union (SIU) in early 2025. Our recent article with JCMS examines key policy narratives—the causal stories policymakers use to justify and promote specific reforms— that have been used to promote CMU over time. We find it surprising that—despite the importance of financial market integration for EU economic growth—the Commission has strategically promoted the policy through a variety of narratives linked to policy goals that have greater support among member state governments and public opinion.

A technical project with broad ambitions

Financial market integration is, at its core, a technical policy area. It primarily concerns banks, non-bank financial firms (e.g., asset management), stock exchanges, clearing houses, and supervisors. For most citizens—and many politicians—it remains remote and opaque. Yet over time, EU institutions have increasingly presented financial integration as a solution to a wide range of broader economic and political challenges — notably, the digital and green transitions, and European competitiveness in relation to the United States and China.

This expanding ambition is also visible in the shift from CMU to SIU. What began as a project to deepen European capital markets has been reframed as a tool to support economic growth, finance the green and digital transitions, strengthen Europe’s geopolitical position, and mobilise household savings for long-term investment. Rather than abandoning a stalled project, EU policymakers have repeatedly changed the story told about it.

To explain this strategy, we adopt an actor-centred constructivist perspective, which highlights how purposeful actors deploy ideas strategically to build political support for a policy. In particular, we examine how EU supranational actors use policy narratives to widen support for a highly contested integration project.

Five narratives for one project

Drawing on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of 421 public speeches delivered between 2014 and 2024 by senior officials at the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), we identify five main policy narratives used to promote financial market integration.

First, CMU has been framed as a way to create new opportunities for European financial firms, enhancing their competitiveness and scale. Second, it has been presented as a mechanism to increase private funding for the real economy, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. Third, EU officials have linked CMU to the green and digital transitions, portraying integrated capital markets as essential to financing climate action and technological innovation. More recently, a fourth narrative has gained prominence: financial integration as a response to geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges, notably Europe’s lagging competitiveness relative to the United States and China. Finally, a fifth narrative focuses on long-term investment and savings, emphasising the need to channel Europe’s high household savings into productive investment—an argument central to the rebranding of CMU as SIU.

These narratives overlap, but their relative importance has shifted over time, reflecting changing economic conditions and political priorities. The evolution of CMU narratives closely tracks broader shifts in EU policy priorities. In its early phase, CMU was tied to post-crisis economic recovery and investment, notably through the Juncker Plan. After 2020, it became increasingly linked to financing the green and digital transitions. Following the pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and growing global economic fragmentation, geopolitical narratives moved to the fore.

The latest rebranding as Savings and Investments Union builds on these earlier narratives while adding a new emphasis on retail savings. Influential reports by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi have reinforced the argument that Europe must better mobilise household savings to support long-term investment and competitiveness. The shift also reflects an effort to make financial integration appear more relevant to citizens, not only as workers or consumers but as savers and investors.

Why progress towards CMU has been so difficult

The repeated reframing of CMU reflects the deeply contested political economy of financial market integration. CMU is not a single reform but a bundle of measures, including supervisory centralisation, tax harmonisation, insolvency law reform, market infrastructure consolidation, and the expansion of non-bank finance.

Each of these elements creates winners and losers across and within member states. Large economies may favour stronger EU-level supervision, while smaller states resist it. Countries with low corporate taxes oppose harmonisation, while others push for it. Banks often support securitisation reforms but resist measures that increase competition from non-bank intermediaries.

As a result, stable coalitions in favour of CMU have been hard to build. EU officials themselves have acknowledged that national vested interests have repeatedly stalled or diluted reforms. In this context, policy narratives become a key political tool. By linking financial market integration to widely supported objectives—such as climate policy, innovation, or strategic autonomy—EU institutions seek to expand the boundaries of the issue and attract new supporters beyond the financial sector.

The limits of narrative power

Our findings highlight both the strategic use and the limits of policy narratives. EU supranational actors clearly act as ideational entrepreneurs, flexibly reframing financial market integration to align with the priorities of the moment. This confirms the importance of ideational power for institutions that lack strong coercive tools. At the same time, repeated shifts in narrative have not delivered a decisive breakthrough in financial market integration. Despite more than a decade of reframing, CMU—and now SIU—remains incomplete. Narratives can attract attention and broaden debate, but they cannot eliminate underlying distributional conflicts.

The story of CMU and SIU thus illustrates a broader dynamic of European integration: when political consensus is elusive, projects persist not by succeeding, but by being continuously reinterpreted. Whether the latest narrative centred on savings and investment will finally unlock significant progress remains an open question.

David Howarth has been a Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Luxembourg since 2012 and was previously a Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Edinburgh. He researches on European economic governance / political economy topics and specifically financial regulation and Economic and Monetary Union. He is the author or co-author of six monographs, a textbook, over seventy peer-reviewed journal articles and dozens book chapters. He has also edited or co-edited fifteen journal special editions and six volumes on these topics including, most recently (with Judith Clifton and Daniel Fuentes), Regional Development Banks in the World Economy (OUP, 2021). His most recent monographs are Banking on Europe: How the European Commission became a semi-sovereign borrower (OUP, 2026, with Dermot Hodson et al.), Bank Politics (OUP, 2023, with Scott James) and The Political Economy of Banking Union (OUP, 2016, with Lucia Quaglia).

Lucia Quaglia (DPhil Sussex, MA Sussex) is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. Previously, she was Professor at the University of York. She has published 9 books, 7 of which with Oxford University Press. Her most recent book is The Perils of Internal Regime Complexity in Shadow Banking, Oxford University Press. She has guest co-edited seven special issues of academic journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, New Political Economy, Review of International Political Economy, Journal of Common Market Studies, and Journal of European Integration. She has published more than 60 articles in refereed academic journals in the fields of public policy, political economy, and EU studies. Together with Manuela Moschella and Aneta Spendzharova she has edited the textbook European Political Economy, Oxford University Press, 2024.

The post From Capital Markets Union to Savings and Investments Union: Why the EU keeps changing the story on financial integration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Az Eurostars program innovatív kis- és középvállalkozások, valamint partnereik nemzetközi kutatás-fejlesztési és innovációs projektjeit támogatja. A programban való részvétel lehetőséget biztosít arra, hogy a szervezetek állami finanszírozást vegyenek igénybe a K+F projektek megvalósításához, akár 100%-os támogatással. 

Ses gesticulations n'y pourront rien, c'est la première impression qui restera : le communiqué de la honte. On a compris qu'il s'agit de Macron et du Venezuela. « Corriger », « infléchir » ou, selon le langage automatique du journalisme, « hausser le ton » : c'est presque pire après qu'avant, puisque chaque pauvre tentative de rattrapage n'a pour effet que de re-souligner la misérable chose qu'elle s'efforce de rattraper. À ce stade tous les mots sont légitimes : vassalisation, serpillière, paillasson…

- La pompe à phynance / États-Unis, France, Géopolitique, Politique

In early 2025, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II. The US actions led to many retaliatory responses of increased tariffs by trading partners including the European Union (EU). Over the next several months, the US engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with the EU and others.

This paper explores first, the short term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the economies of the EU and Greece. Second, it considers how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its policy implications for the EU and Greece. The paper concludes that the recent turmoil in international trade should be addressed through the implementation of a basic set of policies to strengthen European integration and institutions as articulated by recent major studies commissioned by the EU, as well as, through trade agreements between the EU and like-minded countries.  These policies should help the European Union rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and lead to a future strengthening of the WTO.

Read here the policy paper by Constantine Michalopoulos, ELIAMEP Senior Policy Advisor; former senior official World Bank and USAID; Adjunct Professor, American University, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Introduction 

In early 2025, the Greek economy had mostly recovered from the disastrous calamities of a decade earlier and the pandemic’s aftermath. Although income levels had not regained pre debt crisis levels, the economy had been growing steadily for three years. However, continued structural deficiencies, an aging population, as well as technology and climate change, all presented serious challenges to long term economic prospects; and there were two raging wars in the near vicinity. [1]As if these challenges were not enough, the new US administration announced a series of tariff increases in violation of its commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), undermining the very system of trade rules that the US had helped establish after World War II.

In the US, the administration’s actions prompted numerous challenges to their constitutionality.[2] Internationally, they led to many retaliatory actions by trading partners including the European Union (EU), China and others. Over the next several months, the US backed off a number of the very large early tariff increases and engaged in a series of negotiations leading to so called ‘framework’ agreements with many countries, including the EU. But throughout 2025, the US continued to introduce arbitrary tariff changes, all in violation of the fundamental Most Favored Nation (MFN) non-discrimination principle, enshrined in the WTO, thereby raising significantly the degree of uncertainty in trading transactions.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore the short-term implications of these chaotic changes in the world trading regime on the Greek economy; and second, to consider how the world trading system will evolve in the medium to longer term and its implications for the EU and Greece. The analysis, by its very nature, will be tentative, as the policy changes are relatively recent and have not had the time to make a serious impact on trade transactions. Besides, the main new element introduced by the US actions is increased policy uncertainty.

The EU- US Agreement 

The US administration introduced peremptorily and unilaterally a number of tariff changes in early 2025 without offering an authority or justification for them. For example, President Trump announced plans on February 26, 2025, to impose tariffs of 25 percent on imports from the European Union. The major executive action that prompted reaction from the EU occurred on April 2, when the US announced a set of so called “reciprocal” tariffs affecting more than 60 countries, some as high as 50% depending on the countries’ trade balance with the US. According to these, International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, the US reciprocal rate on imports from the EU would have been set at 20 percent. On May 23, President Trump announced he would be imposing a 50 percent reciprocal tariff on the EU beginning June 1. On May 25, he announced these tariffs would take effect July 9 instead. On July 12, President Trump announced the reciprocal tariffs for the EU would be set at 30 percent by August 1 [4].

In the meantime, the EU retaliated by lifting the suspension of previous tariffs, with rates of up to 50 percent, affecting $8 billion of US exports scheduled for April 1, 2025 and increased tariffs to an additional $20 billion of US exports scheduled for April 13. Finally, on July 15, the EU released a list of $84 billion worth of US goods that would face retaliatory tariffs, if no deal was reached by August 1 [5].

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

On August 4, 2025, the US and the EU reached a framework agreement on tariffs and other economic issues which governs the tariff rates affecting trade between them to date.

According to the main trade related commitments of the agreement, the US will:

• Apply a maximum, all-inclusive 15% tariff ceiling for EU products, including cars and car parts, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors [6] and [7].
• Apply only MFN tariffs, (which are effectively zero or close to zero) to the following EU products: unavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors.
• Impose tariffs of 50% to aluminum and steel products justified by the US under a different exemption, on grounds on national security (US Section 232, of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act).

The EU agreed to:

• Eliminate completely tariffs on a large number of industrial products imported from the US—with an estimated value of €5 billion [8].
• Improve significantly market access to US exports through tariff reductions for certain seafood, nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, grains and planting seeds, soybean oilseeds, pork and bison meat and lobster  all implemented via product-specific Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs).

In addition, the two sides agreed to work together to eliminate non-tariff and technical barriers to trade, accept and provide mutual recognition of each other’s standards in automobiles as well co-operate on a number of other important issues affecting trade with China—for example, regarding the latter’s imposition of export controls on rare earths. Finally, the agreement contains a number of EU commitments to ease procedural requirements which the US feels restrain its exports as well as to purchase $40 billion worth of AI chips [9].

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests.

There was widespread criticism that the deal was too one-sided favoring the US. But there were also voices suggesting that this was the best the EU could do under the circumstances and that, in any case, there was no logical response to the US requests [10].

The US actions regarding tariffs were expected to be implemented in some cases as of September 1, 2025 and in others as soon as the EU Commission submitted the needed legislative proposals, which it did in September, 2025. The EU Council took the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including through the establishment of tariff quotas for US products [11].  It is expected that the EU Parliament will complete approval of the relevant legislation by February 2026. At this point it is unclear whether the Parliament will introduce changes in the agreement or what will happen, if such changes are introduced.

Economic Impact on the EU- short term

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced.

In the course of 2025 various studies concluded that the US tariffs would result in significant GDP losses both to the US [12] and to the global economy, as well as increased inflationary pressures in the short term [13]. As the year progressed, the estimates of the damage the tariff actions would cause were reduced for several reasons: exporters absorbed some of the increased tariff costs; many importers anticipating the tariffs, had stocked up during the year and the original tariff increases were subsequently reduced [14].

The economic impact of the EU-US trade agreement on individual EU countries will depend on several factors: (a) the amount and composition of each country’s exports to the US; (b) the amount and composition of its imports from the US whose tariffs will be reduced; (c) the specifics of the pass-through in each traded good; (d) any exchange rate changes following the imposition of the tariffs; and (e)  the indirect effects on each country’s future trade of changes in income resulting from the EU-US agreement.

Early studies on the issue [15], suggested that the US tariffs will result in a decline of approximately 0.2-0.3% of EU GDP in 2025. A more recent study [16] confirmed the 0.3 % GDP decline on average and suggested that different countries will have different results depending on the importance of the US in their export market and the composition of their exports. Using a model that took into account the longer term second order effects adversely affecting EU exports as a result of declines in EU and other countries incomes as a consequence of the tariffs, the study suggested a decline of 0.5% on average for 2026. Similar views were expressed by European business in a survey in November 2025 [17]. The most recent IMF World Economic Outlook [14] includes two risk scenarios for 2026: in the worst case, GDP of the euro area would decline by about 1%t below its original baseline in 2026; in the best case, output of the euro area could increase by around 0.7–0.8 percentage points above baseline despite the tariffs. But no studies appear to have included the longer term positive but likely small effects of EU incomes rising as a result of the future reduction of tariff barriers against US imports.

In the first 8 months of 2025, US exports to the EU increased by about 10% and imports, slightly less—around 9.5%. This resulted in an increase in the US trade deficit with the EU in the first eight months of the year from $151.9 billion in 2024 to $165.8 billion in 2025. The results are skewed however, because of very large anticipatory US imports in early 2025. In the months June- August 2025, US imports from the EU declined relative to 2024 [18].

Economic Impact on Greece-short term

Early commentary on the impact of the EU-US agreement on Greece suggested a much higher decline in Greece’s exports and GNP in 2026 than that presented in the above studies. Kathimerini [19] predicted a GDP decline of 0.5%-1.0% in 2025, and smaller effects ranging from 0.2% to 0.4% in 2026 and even smaller declines in 2027.

…the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average.

It is unclear on what analysis these projections were based and no model estimates based on an econometric model of Greece appear to exist. Nevertheless, given the projections for EU as a whole and the size and composition of Greek exports, the analysis below will argue that the effect of the US tariff increases and the subsequent US-EU trade agreement will result in significantly lower adverse effects on Greek GDP. The main reason for this is that Greece depends much less on the US market for its exports than the EU average. Table 1 below shows the evolution of Greek trade with the EU, the US and the rest of the world (ROW) over the 2018-2024, period, i.e. after the Greek economy stabilized from the debt crisis.

Table 1 shows that Greek exports to the US account pretty steadily for about 4% of total Greek exports and about 10% of Greek exports outside the EU. This compares to an average of EU exports to the US of 21% of EU exports to the rest of the world [16]. Roughly speaking, Greece is about half as much exposed to the US market for its exports relative to the average EU member, and much less than countries like Germany or Ireland. The story is similar for Greek imports. Greece has run a small surplus in its trade balance with the US in the last two years while running a persistent huge trade deficit overall. Greece offsets its traditional large trade deficits by running a large surplus in services, especially through earnings from shipping and tourism [21].

The composition of Greek exports to the US does not suggest that Greece would be hit harder than the average EU member by the increased US tariffs. While no detailed estimates are available, the main problem appears to derive from Greece exports of aluminum and steel products which are subject to 50% tariffs (see below Table 2). It should be noted however, that the US tariffs on aluminum (and steel) had been earlier imposed by the US on the grounds of security (Sec. 232) and separately from the IEEPA tariffs that ultimately led to the US- EU agreement.

 

Table 2 shows two dimensions of the importance of aluminum and steel on the Greek economy: first, they are small relative to Greek exports to the US, 7.0% and 2.1% respectively; and second, that the proportion of Greece’s exports of aluminum and steel products to the US are quite small relative to the total Greek exports of these products, 5.1% and 6.5% respectively. The latter would imply that Greek exporters could shift sales of these products elsewhere.[3]

Of the products in which the US is an important market accounting for more than 10%  of total exports, only the agricultural products in the categories of Vegetables and Fruits (20.9%), Essential oils (10.5%) and Edible fruits (16.2%) are likely to be affected by the new US tariffs. And the US has committed that these will not exceed 15%. Greece is not an oil producer and the large exports of oil products  to the US as well as the rest of the world are determined primarily by decisions of the oil companies, some US owned, which import crude oil from the Middle East refine it in Greece and ship out oil products all over the world.  The US importance of the category ‘Aircraft, spacecraft’ probably reflects transactions of air carriers and repairs of aircraft engines and parts as Greece does not produce either aircraft or spacecraft. Greece does produce a variety of crude materials, salt earth etc., for which the US market is significant (21.6%), but as noted earlier, the US will maintain minimal tariffs on these products.

 

Estimates of US trade with Greece for the first eight months of 2025 showed the US to have decreased both its export and its imports to and from Greece- in the case of exports by 10% in the case of imports—i.e. exports from Greece by 3.3% [19].  These data suggest that the pattern of Greece’s trade with the US is somewhat different than that noted earlier for the EU as a whole. It remains to be seen how this pattern will be affected in the longer term by the emerging changes in the world trading system.

Recent reports confirmed the mixed impact of the US tariffs on Greek exports to the US.  Tariffs on edible fruits have been recently removed, but exports of dairy products have been adversely affected. Despite high tariffs, “iron/steel pipes, rose from a zero base in 2023, to €21.8 million in 2024 and to €49.2 million in the April-September 2025 period. Electrical conduits reached €38.4 million in 2024 but during the tariff period they experienced a decrease of 88.1%” [22]. 

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates.

On balance, given the relatively small importance of the US market to Greece, compared to other EU countries, it is fair to conclude that the impact of the US-EU agreement on Greek GDP will be significantly smaller than for the EU as a whole. We would guess that the impact could be in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 0.15% reduction of GDP relative to baseline forecasts for 2025 and 2026, much smaller than earlier estimates. That size of an effect could easily be overwhelmed by other developments in Greece or in the global economy.

The World Trade System

…the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT) . Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT).

Throughout 2025, the US actions on tariffs violated its commitments to the core principle of the WTO of not unilaterally increasing duties that have been capped in previous agreements with its partners (Article II of the GATT)[4]. Similarly, the bilateral deals, such as those with the UK as well as the EU, China, and other countries violate US commitments to the most-favored nation (MFN) non-discrimination clause (Article I of the GATT). Such preferential deals are permitted only if they are part of an established Free Trade Area or Customs Union. These deals also defy the WTO approach of promoting trade through multilateral negotiations [23] and [24].

For a while, it appeared that the US may wish to leave the WTO. It had withdrawn from other multilateral institutions such as UNESCO and WHO and it had not paid its WTO dues for two years. There were even some voices suggesting that the trading system as a whole would be better off if the US did leave the WTO [25]; or for that matter that it could be expelled [26]. But the US did pay its dues, and others have argued that the US should stay in the WTO as it could provide a useful counterbalance to China which has also been guilty of significant WTO violations.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU.

It is also fair to argue that, in the last twenty years, the WTO based trade system has been undermined by an erosion of global commitments to multilateral rules by many countries including the EU. It started first, with the failure of completion of the Doha Round of negotiations, which were abandoned after more than a decade of trying—for which, countries like India and China, were as responsible as the EU and the US.  Later, economic and political and developments resulted in reduced emphasis on multilateral approaches to improve firms’ participation in international trade:

• Attempts to facilitate small and medium enterprises foreign trade participation led to “mini-deals” that may be beneficial for a subset of firms in certain sectors but undermine global standards. “The EU has concluded over 2,000 such mini-deals, which cumulatively cover a large share of EU trade participation in global supply chains” [27].
• Countries, and the EU in particular, have established regulatory standards based on concerns about the environment, health and safety, cross border data flows, cyber-security, consumer or worker protection. The national agencies tasked with implementing regulations generally have not wanted, even if they are permitted — to adjust regulatory norms simply to facilitate trade [28].
• The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in a sudden and large contraction in global trade, revealing deep vulnerabilities in international supply chains. This led many countries to introduce policies that promote strategic autonomy, meaning steps that would the ensure availability of critical goods without dependence on foreign suppliers. Governments adopted export restrictions, stockpiling, and incentives for domestic production or near-shoring [27].
• A direct consequence of the strategic autonomy logic was a renewed interest and justification of a wide range of industrial policy measures. Industrial policy became more fashionable and acceptable [29].

Despite, or one would argue, in parallel with these developments, the WTO continued to function. A fisheries agreement came in to force in mid-summer and the EU finalized a WTO compatible agreement with Mercosur that had been under negotiation for more than a decade. And as WTO Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala noted in a September 17, 2025 speech, following the US measures there was an 8% decline of trade conducted under MFN rules, but MFN rules continued to apply to 72% of world trade.

In light of these developments, what can be said about the future of rules that would govern world trade? As of November 1, the US average effective tariff rate was 13.1% compared to 2.5% in 2024 [31]. Clearly the most important new element is the introduction of additional uncertainty, for better or worse. On November 14, 2025, the US administration, facing increasingly unfavorable reaction by the US public to the imposition of tariffs on consumer goods, eliminated the   IEEPA tariffs on a whole lot of food and agriculture products. And the constitutionality of all of the IEEPA tariffs is uncertain with the US Supreme Court expected to rule on the issue in the spring of 2026.

Still, given the apparent attraction of tariffs as a foreign policy instrument to President Trump, it is expected that in the event the US Supreme Court rules that the IEEPA tariffs are unconstitutional, the US Administration will seek to justify tariffs under different legislative provisions, such as under section 301 or 202 of the US code or under section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 which gives the President the authority to impose a temporary tariff of up to 15 percent for up to 150 days to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits”. All these measures are likely to be challenged in US courts, resulting in litigation that could easily last another 1-2 years.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028.

This means essentially, that global uncertainty on the rules of international trade is likely to continue at least until the end of the current US administration in 2028. A look into the Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) Index is quite telling in this respect: it shot up in early 2025, came down for a while and shot up again [32]. Other things equal, this factor alone is going to affect adversely the volume of future world trade.

Medium Term Scenarios

The uncertainties surrounding the future of the world trade system have led to the elaboration of many alternative scenarios. In considering these scenarios, one should keep in mind that trade negotiations take a long time to conclude as they involve detailed analysis of data, something that the ‘framework’ agreements concluded by the US did not do. Nevertheless, all scenarios about the future of word trade in the medium term—until 2028, are bleak.

The scenarios discussed below do not include what might happen, if there is a major political or military conflict involving the three major protagonists in world trade, the US, the EU and China. Also, for reasons discussed above, the scenarios do not include a ‘Retreat’ scenario in which the US administration, faced with a recession and declining public support, reverses course and abandons its WTO inconsistent tariff policy.

Scenario 1- Malaise

Under this scenario, WTO members would tolerate higher tariffs and US-dictated deals for as long as they last, while continuing to go about their other WTO business as usual. “The relevance of the WTO will continue to be eroded, though its stabilizing influence may not disappear entirely”[5]. But this scenario contains a lot of complex issues for WTO members. For example, Brazil may file a complaint in the WTO that the US-EU agreement that gives preferential treatment to US exports to the EU damages Brazil’s interests. In this case the EU may not wish to jeopardize its agreement with the US or face counter-measures, in which case it may need to appeal through the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) members [33].

It is unclear how long WTO members would be willing to accept this situation. Perhaps they will wait until the end of the current US administration- while in the meantime they pursue other options. In the case of the EU, it is clear that it would be desirable to explore links with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). A free trade agreement between the EU and CPTPP will account for 30% of world trade. Krueger has argued that the two groups should combine to establish a new organization, the GTO without the US [25].

Scenario 2 –Fragmentation

Under this scenario fragmentation accelerates. The MFN principle and multilateralism are further weakened and give way to a new logic: every country or exporting firm cuts the best deal for itself.[6]

The scenario has many regional variants. If the WTO continues to produce nothing and the EU combines with CPTPP and others to produce a modern agreement, is it necessary to anchor it in the WTO ?

A lot will depend on what role China will want to play. Under one variant, China could take the lead in organizing a large group of countries, for example through an expanded BRICS, to set up their own system. But many countries are worried about unfair Chinese policies that support Chinese firms as it promotes its manufacturing exports because of over capacity at home; and/ or countries may be concerned about China’s willingness to employ trade as a coercive instrument for foreign policy purposes.

Still, such an initiative by China could force Europe to work with Japan, South Korea, and Australia to create their own group and the US with some Latin American and Caribbean to establish yet another. Africa would strengthen its regional trade institutions and possibly ally itself with the BRICS. In all these variants, the WTO is not closed down, but becomes increasingly irrelevant. On the other hand, China has recently indicated that it is willing to abandon its WTO treatment as a ‘developing country’ suggesting a willingness to work within the WTO and thereby dropping a source of a lot of disputes.

The Future of EU Trade Policy

In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

Co-operation in trade was the essence of what started European integration through the Treaty of Rome more than 70 years ago. In these uncertain times, it would be natural for the EU to take the lead in strengthening the global multilateral trade system, to the benefit of its members, including Greece but also to the benefit of global trade and the reduction of global poverty.

EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America.

The EU Commission views at this point is that an EU-CPTPP link is a complement and not a substitute to the WTO [34].[7]. In my view, EU should start working hard to strengthen its links with CPTPP. Combined with the EU- Mercosur agreement, this would make a formidable group of countries which could become the basis of attracting other members from Africa and Latin America. It could then work with China and possibly the US to strengthen the multilateral trade system and the WTO.

Such an effort should have two dimensions: first, work with others to establish needed reforms to the WTO; second, adopt internal EU policies that use trade to support equitable and sustainable economic growth for its people.

Regarding WTO reform Mavroidis [24] suggests that it may be useful for the international community to attempt a last-ditch negotiation to bring the US back to the multilateral house, and they should be prepared to amend the WTO’s rules in order to lure the US back to the spirit of the multilateral agenda that would benefit the institution at large. This initial agenda should take care of the US’s concerns such as the introduction of more flexibility in the current Safeguards Agreement or to deal with oversupply in particular sectors as well as amending the Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication (CTPA).

This is certainly worthwhile. The question is at what point it should be done. The current administration has in mind a totally different non- multilateral approach to international trade, feels that the “ancient régime” is obsolete, and should be substituted with a new supposedly more fair and balanced scheme. In any case, putting together an EU- CPTPP understanding will take time, after which a different US administration may be in place which may be more agreeable to global trade agreements. 

There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries.

It is clear that WTO reforms are needed in several areas in addition to the ones noted above that bother the US. These include the following five areas:

• There is a need to revise the basis of participation in the WTO by different groups of countries. The existing provisions regarding special and differential treatment that permit a group of countries to participate on the basis of more limited commitments to general rules for being ‘developing’ based on ‘self-selection’ proved unworkable during the Doha Round[8]. Yet, there is a need to reduce differences in national regulatory regimes that impact international trade through the mutual adoption of agreed good regulatory practices to which not every WTO member can or may be willing to adhere. Such efforts can be pursued among like-minded states — that is, on a plurilateral and variable-geometry basis. Open Plurilateral Agreements (OPAs) — agreements between groups of countries on specific policies that significantly affect international trade costs and that are open to participation to any country willing to implement a set of agreed rules and disciplines can make a major contribution to facilitating trade. Such agreements can be pursued in several areas such as Digital Trade, Climate and Environment [28], as well as subsidies (see below).[9]

• The WTO subsidies agreement should be revised in order to address several issues: first, is the issue of how to deal with subsidies that provide public goods—including those that address environmental issues. A subsidy that reduces world market prices for products like solar panels or wind turbines has positive consequences for the energy transition, but negative economic repercussions for local producers. Revisiting current WTO rules that center on the adverse effects of foreign subsidies on national firms to recognize that some types of subsidies may be appropriate and desirable to address market failures, in the process benefiting foreign countries, is an important subject for plurilateral negotiations. Still other issues arise from the complexities involving subsidies of trade in global value chains, as well as the desire to pursue ‘industrial’ policies.

• The definition of ‘economic security’ needs to be clarified as the relevant WTO provisions are too vague.

• There is a need to make meaningful progress of liberalizing trade in services. Everybody is infatuated with the desire to protect and restore production of goods, in particular manufacturing, forgetting that services will inexorably rise as a share of incomes and output.

• The link between trade policy and environmental action needs to be clarified especially as the EU is starting to implement its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in January 1, 2026. As noted above, this is an area where an OPA can be especially useful as it is quite clear and it is internationally agreed that poorer countries are not in a position to make the same kind of commitments as more developed economies. A specific proposal for an OPA of such a ‘club’ is contained in [37].

This is a tall order of reforms that need to be undertaken. They will take time to negotiate in part because the political economy of negotiating trade issues resulting from regulatory regimes is more difficult than negotiating a mutual reduction of quotas or tariffs where the costs to some domestic producers can be offset by gains of exporters.  Also, the Doha failure suggests that countries are not likely to want to try to have a ‘Round’ where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed by every participant. A more modest approach using OPAs may be a better avenue for future reform.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical.

These efforts must be accompanied by EU policies that use trade to support a sustainable and equitable growth of incomes. In this connection, measures that raise productivity of EU producers are critical. Since 2019 labor productivity in the EU grew by 2% compared to 10 % in the US [38]. According to a recent study, the main difference between US and EU in labor productivity growth is that EU productivity rose much less than that of the US in the services sector since 2000 [39].

The Draghi study commissioned by the EU in 2024 contains a large number of recommendations on how to raise productivity, some of which are only now slowly being implemented [40]. In particular, there is concern that the EU is lagging far behind the US and China in the application of AI which is critical to future productivity growth. According to Draghi’s report, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), introduced by the EU to protect citizen’s privacy in 2018, is a drag on Europe’s competitiveness. “Europe must move beyond fragmented and overly rigid regulatory structures if it wants to remain competitive in a fast-changing digital landscape. Evidence already shows that GDPR data transfer rules have constrained export potential, and additional regulatory layers introduced through the AI Act risk amplifying these pressures”[41].

Measures to promote diversification of imports of oil and natural gas, by accelerating the green energy transformation are of obvious importance to future trade policy as well as steps to diversify supply of critical minerals away from China. These efforts, however, should not lead to generalized promotion of import substitution through protection incompatible with WTO provisions or commitments with regional trade partners.

“A ‘manufacturing-first’ attitude has taken hold in the European economic policy discussion. New strategies and industrial policies are designed with the ambition of boosting development and output in traditional industrial sectors” [42].[10] There is a clear danger, that disturbances in international trade will encourage the establishment of inefficient EU production —reshoring or home-shoring justified on the vagaries of ensuring adequate supplies of ‘critical’ products from global supply chains—while the future lies in services where growth has been and likely will continue to be greater than in manufacturing; and where the EU is the largest exporter in the world.

Implications for Greek Policy

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level.

For Greece, foreign trade policy is determined at the EU level. This should be helpful in protecting its interests through the large weight that Brussels would bring to bear in any negotiations with China or the US. [11] There are also serious limits to what individual countries can do to promote exports. As Greece has a very small share of exports relative to its GDP, there is a temptation to suggest that export promotion agencies can correct this problem [43]. They obviously can be of some help, but they are not likely to be determinant of overall performance, and in a country like Greece, where there is a tendency of cronyism, there are dangers of trying to pick winners by supporting friends. The best way to promote exports is through general policies that increase productivity and reduce bureaucratic hassles [44].

In this connection, the recommendations of the Draghi report are especially relevant. In many respects, the report sounds as if it was talking specifically about problems facing Greek industry and more generally the Greek economy. The importance of productivity growth to export performance has been well established. In this connection, I argued long ago that the export performance of the ‘Asian Targets’ in the 1960’s was critically dependent on the growth of total factor productivity [45].

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP.

Among the Draghi’s report many recommendations are proposals to raise productivity through more training as well as improved technology through increased expenditures on research and development. Implementing these proposals in Greece would require significant increases in both public and private investment from the current levels of roughly 15% of GDP. EU support can be helpful to Greece in this area, but it cannot substitute for stronger and better implemented public sector investments.

Conclusion

In sum, the recent turmoil in international trade should not result in a deviation from the basic set of policies that Greek governments need to pursue in collaboration with their European counterparts to strengthen European integration and institutions. They should do so based on the policy recommendations contained in the several studies referred to above. As it has done in the past, Europe can rise to the challenges created by the current turmoil and restore faith in the prospects of a sustainable and equitable future for its people. This will not happen through retrenchment and protection but through openness to trade. The EU is in the best position to lead a future restoration of a trade system governed by multilateral rules and agreements and a strengthened WTO.

[1]For a discussion see [1] and [2].

[2] Lower US courts judged the IEEPA tariffs to be unconstitutional, but the US Supreme Court permitted them to be retained until it passed a final judgement on them expected in early 2026 [3].

[3] There may be limit to such a shift, as both products, especially aluminum, appear to be in global over supply.

[4] GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade- incorporated in the treaty establishing the WTO.

[5] This scenario is basically the same as what Cernat [30] called ‘Sclerosis”.

[6] This is similar to Cernat’s’[30] third scenario ‘contagion’.

[7] Experience with international organizations over the last century suggests that they are almost as difficult to shut down—even after their usefulness is questionable [35] as to create new ones

[8] For a detailed discussion of the absurdities in the current system see [37]. For example, Turkey and Israel just like China were considered ‘developing countries’ just because they said so.

[9] Such agreements can also be pursued outside the WTO and at some point brought into the system.

[10] As well as in the United States.

[11] But EU membership may not provide cover in the wider US-China conflict: The recently appointed US Ambassador to Greece expressed her concerns to Prime Minister Mitsotakis about the 67% ownership of the Port of Piraeus by the Chinese firm Cosco and suggested that Greece may wish to force a sale of it in the future. To which the Prime Minister responded that agreements have to be respected [46].

 

 

La construction d'une station d'épuration des eaux cristallise les tensions politiques du Monténégro. Les partis pro-serbes, relayés par Belgrade, entretiennent l'opposition des habitants du village de Botun, menaçant de quitter le gouvernement. Décryptage.

- Articles / Monténégro, Environnement, Politique, Après Milo, Environnement dans les Balkans, Monitor (Monténégro)

"Csak a bátorság gyönyöréért jöttünk, a magasztos férfipróba örömére s eljövünk felétek, valahányszor ebben kedvünk lelik…" - így szólt részben az egyik üzenet azok közül, melyeket az olasz légierő felderítőgépei röplapokon szórtak le egyszer Bécsre az I. világháborúban. Az akkor igen hosszúnak számító repülőúton a bátor propaganda-különítményt a hírneves irodalmár, a katonai pilótának mellesleg már eléggé túlkoros Gabriele D'Annunzio őrnagy vezette, és tőle származott a fent idézett nyilatkozat is, melyet (a 400 ezer röplapból 50 ezret) a többivel ellentétben a parancsnokság mulatságos módon le sem fordíttatott németre, merthogy annak magvas üzenetét osztrákok úgyse értenék - mintha csak egy orosz avantgárd művészekről szóló viccet hallana az ember. (Ezt a hiányosságot könnyen lehet, hogy azóta se pótolta senki; angol fordítással viszont szolgál a Wikipédia.)

[...] Bővebben!

Space capabilities are a core element of any modern defence arsenal. In Europe, how­ever, military space capabilities are limited and dependence on the United States remains high. Europe must develop its capabilities in order to reduce dependencies and enhance its capacity to act on its own, thereby fostering European autonomy. To ensure that European space capabilities are developed efficiently, it is necessary to identify which dependencies on the US are particularly critical and which obstacles would hin­der the development of such capabilities. Priority should be given to space situational awareness, military reconnaissance, navigation resilience and missile early warning.

By Rachel Avraham   In the contemporary global debate on sovereignty, few countries embody the paradox of independence and unresolved historical justice as powerfully as Algeria. More than six decades after the end of French colonial rule, Algeria officially stands as a fully sovereign state — yet its political narrative, institutional memory, and diplomatic posture continue to be shaped not only by the trauma of colonization, but also by the unfinished moral and legal questions that surround it. Algeria’s story is not simply one of liberation; it is the story of a state that insists that sovereignty is incomplete without historical truth.   Across much of the post-colonial world, sovereignty has long been interpreted as a formal condition — the existence of borders, a national government, a flag, and a seat in international organizations. Algeria challenges this minimalist understanding. For Algiers, independence was never meant to be merely administrative separation from France; it was envisioned as a deeper, restorative process in which recognition of colonial crimes, acknowledgement of cultural erasure, and moral accountability would stand alongside political autonomy. What emerged instead is a long-term gap between legal sovereignty and historical justice — a gap that continues to inform Algeria’s strategic behavior at home and abroad.   The French colonial enterprise in Algeria was not a marginal episode of empire; it was one of the most entrenched settler-colonial projects of the twentieth century. Land confiscation, population displacement, systematic repression, and cultural assimilation policies were accompanied by mass violence during the war of independence. These realities explain why Algeria views memory not as a symbolic exercise, but as a sovereign right. Paris, on the other hand, has walked a cautious line — acknowledging suffering, yet often avoiding full juridical language such as “crime” or “responsibility.” This tension has produced what may be called a dual narrative: legal decolonization without comprehensive moral reckoning.   It is precisely within this contradiction that Algeria positions itself in the emerging global “parade of sovereignties,” where states increasingly link legitimacy not only to power or territory, but to ethical claims rooted in history. While many post-colonial states remain satisfied with nominal independence, Algeria argues that a sovereign nation cannot be fully whole so long as its past remains officially disputed or minimized. For Algiers, the struggle for independence did not end in 1962; it transformed into a campaign for recognition — archives, remains, apologies, compensation mechanisms, and the right to narrate its own history.   This posture is not without strategic consequences. Algeria’s insistence on historical justice shapes its diplomacy, fuels segments of its domestic political identity, and at times places it in friction with former colonial actors who prefer reconciliation without accountability. Critics argue that this approach can serve as a political instrument, reinforcing state legitimacy through memory narratives and allowing the ruling elites to frame sovereignty as a perpetual revolutionary project. Supporters counter that historical silence is the greater danger, because it leaves colonial violence unexamined and perpetuates structural asymmetries in international relations.   In a broader sense, Algeria exposes a deeper transformation underway in global politics: sovereignty is evolving from a purely territorial principle into a moral-political claim. From Africa to Latin America, states increasingly demand that independence be understood not as a single historical milestone, but as an ongoing process linked to dignity, memory, restitution, and epistemic autonomy — the right to define how history is written and whose suffering counts. Algeria stands at the forefront of this intellectual shift, presenting itself as both a survivor of empire and a claimant of historical truth.   Yet the challenge for Algeria, like for many post-colonial societies, lies in balancing memory with governance. The legitimacy derived from anti-colonial struggle must coexist with the responsibilities of economic reform, political accountability, and social development. A sovereignty narrative grounded solely in the past risks becoming static; one built on both justice and modernization can evolve into a constructive force. The country’s future relevance will depend on whether it can transform historical grievance into a forward-looking project that strengthens institutions rather than replacing them.   The Algerian case therefore invites a deeper reflection on the meaning of liberation in the twenty-first century. Independence may remove the colonial power, but it does not automatically resolve the ethical and psychological legacies of domination. Formal sovereignty establishes the state; historical justice completes it. Algeria’s insistence on this distinction is not merely an internal debate — it is a message to the international system that recognition, memory, and dignity are no longer peripheral themes, but foundational components of modern sovereignty.

C'est une intox lancée par les services russes : le patriarcat oecuménique de Constantinople voudrait reconnaître une Église orthodoxe monténégrine, comme il l'a fait pour celle d'Ukraine. L'opération vise à décrédibiliser Bartholomée Ier, mais surtout à aggraver les tensions politiques au Monténégro.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Monténégro, Religions, orthodoxie, Poutine et les Balkans

The policy brief by Dr. Ioannis Armakolas (Head, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration), “Enlargement and the EU Budget: Is the price to pay high? The case against fiscal alarmism”, was prepared in the framework ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans. 

At a time when EU enlargement is increasingly contested by Eurosceptic and radical-right forces, the policy brief examines one of the most politically sensitive aspects of the debate: the budgetary and fiscal implications of enlargement. Building on think nea’s thematic report on radical-right narratives, the authors analyse how fears about costs to taxpayers, agricultural subsidies, and cohesion funds are mobilised to undermine public support for further EU expansion, particularly in net-contributor Member States.

Drawing on recent EU budget proposals for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, as well as economic modelling and lessons from previous enlargements, the brief demonstrates that the actual fiscal cost of enlargement is modest and manageable, especially when phased-in mechanisms and structural reforms are applied. At the same time, it shows that EU transfers are transformational for candidate countries, particularly in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Ukraine, supporting convergence, institutional reform and infrastructure development.

The analysis also highlights the opportunity costs of non-enlargement, emphasising how past rounds of enlargement generated significant economic gains for existing Member States through trade, investment, labour mobility and integrated supply chains. In this light, the brief reframes enlargement not as a fiscal burden but as a strategic investment in Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and long-term stability.

The paper concludes with concrete policy recommendations on how to reframe public debate, embed enlargement within the EU’s new competitiveness and strategic autonomy agenda, and counter fiscal alarmism by presenting enlargement as a win-win process that benefits both current and future Member States.

You can read the policy brief here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network, led by Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

Iranexpertin, zu den Opfern der Massenproteste im Iran

Le Venezuela est bien un lieu de transit pour les cartels sud-américains et balkaniques de la cocaïne, mais son rôle est mineur par rapport à celui de pays voisins comme la Colombie, le Guatemala ou encore l'Équateur.

- Articles / Monténégro, Serbie, Croatie, drogues, Défense, police et justice, Courrier des Balkans