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Le Bureau de formation et de recherche pour un développement intégral (BUFORDI), une ONG locale, a remis en cause, mardi 30 juillet, la procédure des marchés passés entre la société MIRU Systèm et la Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) dans l’achat des kits électoraux du processus électoral de 2023.

Le coordonnateur de cette structure, Bon Ngutu Muhema l’a fait savoir au cours d’un point de presse animé à Kinshasa.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Ukraine, among others, are current candidates for the enlargement of the European Union (EU) that have experienced periods of war and grave human rights violations in the past or present. In the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, they underwent transitional justice processes in the 1990s and still attempt to address the consequences of the contentious past. In the case of Ukraine, the conflict continues, the future remains uncertain, and the claim for peace solutions is constant.

 

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the armed conflict once again became a significant issue on the public agenda. However, in this new stage of global tensions and armed conflicts, the lessons left by the conflict that occurred in the Balkan wars of the 1990s are not often mentioned. The oversights committed during transitions and the effectiveness of the institutional reforms that followed the transition were not deeply analyzed, despite the increase in initiatives that aim to strengthen peace achievements through rule of law mechanisms since the transition times (an issue that the EU has considered in the integration processes of the Western Balkans).

 

In the past, the EU has recognized the importance of supporting reconciliation processes and strengthening the rule of law. Documents such as the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions (2018) have emphasized that the Western Balkans (key actors for regional stabilization) must address issues such as consolidating reconciliation in response to the wounds left by the conflicts. This premise has been maintained over time, from the path leading to the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreements to recent communications such as that of the European Council on the “Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans” (2024) which insists on the development of measures that reinforce the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights.

 

The implementation of these types of measures is important to improve the health of democracy. Nonetheless, no democratic or reconciliation project can be achieved by excluding the interests of women when deep social transformation and the maintaining of peace are pretended. Regarding this, the democratic transition in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s offers important historical lessons concerning the building of conflict narratives and the exclusion of women’s agency in those processes. Matter that paradoxically contrasts with the increasing support for gender agenda.

 

Indeed, bodies such as the European Parliament have stated that women are not only war victims but also peacebuilders and survivors, highlighting the importance of including a gender approach in this topic. Moreover, the EU has been engaged in developing measures to realize gender equality and women’s human rights, promoting legislation, gender mainstreaming, and specific measures for the empowerment of women. Despite this, it is criticized that the EU does not fully understand the principle of equality and gives it secondary importance, reinforcing a protective role instead of adopting a transformative approach to the structural causes of armed conflicts and gender inequality.

 

After the end of the aforementioned armed conflict, there was no doubt about the exacerbating consequences of war on women’s rights and the need to pursue gender-based crimes. Beyond this, it has been noted that one of the major failures during the transition was the inadequate protection of women’s interests during and after the conflict and the essentialization of gender by institutional actors. This problem is not unexpected, considering that international law usually associates gender roles in conflict with essentialist and stereotypical gender conceptions.

 

The role of gender in armed conflict

 

Historically, the understanding of war has been tied to assumptions such as internal enemies, legitimate or illegitimate aggression, military interventions, and other concepts associated with male values. Moreover, gender stereotypes have influenced the development of laws applicable to armed conflict, reducing gender matters to the protection of victims (women suitable to certain prototypes).

 

Women suffer intense violence during war, but after and before conflict, they are also vulnerable to domestic violence, lack of opportunities, employment discrimination, and others. In accordance with this, many studies investigate whether there is a difference between violence in times of conflict and peace. Regardless of the answer, it is generally concluded that law and judicial decisions often fail to capture the wide range of violence and its relation to broader phenomena such as structural violence.

 

In this regard, it is asserted that the legal framework applicable to armed conflict does not make gender distinctions except in some cases that set out special protection for pregnant women’s integrity and prevent acts of sexual violence, appealing to fragility paradigms. These references do not defend an equality status free of stereotypes, except for a few cases, such as Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, which promotes equality regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

 

According to international law, the role of law is to control the immediate crisis scenarios and humanitarian disasters generated by the war. On this matter, it is pointed out that reducing war to an “extraordinary” fact disregards women’s interests because it puts aside the analysis of the interconnected series of events, including the structural inequalities that are precede and influenced by them. Also reinforces the ideals of the “protective” role (played by States, agreements, or organizations, that represent the white male imaginary) under which women’s lives are considered valuable only when their affectation endangers the stability of a State, or a hegemonic social group, in exceptional circumstances.

 

Despite this, the institutionalization of the gender approach and the struggles of the feminist movements, just as the judgments of the international courts, have transformed the content of the international framework, including many provisions related to gender issues. These developments have impacted both international law and local experiences of peacebuilding.

 

In particular, the convictions provided by the ad hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda laid the groundwork for understanding gender crimes. And subsequently, the Rome statute recognized rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, etc., as grave crimes against humanity and war crimes. This recognition coincided with the revelation of the magnitude of the sexual violence that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, during the Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna  in 1993.

 

Based on the previous notes, the advances in these matters have been remarkable. Nevertheless, as indicated by transitional justice studies, the most significant advances in matters of human rights protection of women focus on specific and symbolic cases, while major shortcomings persist in most cases due to issues such as revictimization. Concerning this, the reproduction of rhetoric that infantilizes women is criticized, overlooking the effects and causes of conflicts and the diverse roles women play in war, and reducing gender studies to condemning sexual violence.

 

Even in the more apparently successful experiences, multiple mistakes have been made in providing justice solutions for women, just as succeeded during the Yugoslavia trials. In these trials, women were subjected to inappropriate treatment because the processes were focused on the perpetrator prosecution and the goal of issuing convictions, a purpose materialized in contexts of threat and harassment to women. Besides, after finishing the trials, women confronted difficulties related to social and family reintegration, concerns ignored by authorities and society.

 

Transition in the former Yugoslavia and the gender issues

 

Transitional justice encompasses objectives such as delivering justice to perpetrators of past wrongs, achieving recognition and reparation for victims, establishing truthful and common public narratives for past wrongdoings, exploring new conditions for lawful order and social justice, etc., all aimed at overcoming and preventing war. Furthermore, as noted by Gray & Levin (2013), transitions not only represent unique opportunities to advance the goals of sustainable peace but also to address broader issues of justice, such as forms of gender injustice, which are crucial for achieving long-term social stability.

 

Addressing broader issues of justice does not fully resolve structural problems such as gender-based violence, which pre-dates the conflict and transcends the boundaries of transitions. Likewise, the inclusion or exclusion of women has not prevented the signing of peace agreements and the initiation of transitional processes. Nonetheless, the exclusion of women impacts the degree of resource distribution, marginalization, etc., concerns that are linked to the causes and consequences of conflicts. Indeed, as Rooney (2018) noted, a lower percentage of benefits for the most marginalized in a conflict-affected community “intensifies the value and contentiousness of any redistributive gain involved, be it material, cultural, or symbolic”.

 

In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the signing of the Dayton Agreements represented a transcendental political, social, and economic change. Besides, the implementation of new democratic projects was not isolated from the goals of gender equality, which was already a predominant issue on the international public agenda. Nevertheless, women continued to face many obstacles in entitling their rights within both public and private life in post-conflict countries.

 

During the conflict, women occupied different social roles; however, when it finished, the demands of the patriarchal social context led women to return to their traditional roles (for instance, the motherhood). In this context, the violence increased (mainly in the domestic sphere), exacerbated by factors such as the deterioration of individual/collective mental health, as well as the challenge to rooted gender stereotypes. At the same time, the authorities took advantage of the essentialization of gender to release their responsibility in executing post-conflict politics. Hence, caregiving tasks related to social reconstruction measures were assigned to women appealing to the “innate peacemaker” stereotype.

 

On the other hand, regarding the administration of justice by judicial bodies, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set an international precedent in recognizing the relationship between gender and the commission of certain crimes. This tribunal contributed to exposing the accountability of perpetrators in positions of power, enabled the representation of women in trials, and served as a deterrent and tool in the fight against gender-based violence within the international context. Despite this, it was also criticized for substantial shortcomings in both retributive and distributive justice, the slow advance of trials, and the secondary trauma inflicted on victims, particularly women. These failures had an impact on women, who years later established a people’s court in which women’s agency was vindicated.

 

Both the successes and the failures in peace-building processes have significant repercussions on the future of countries that choose to move from a period of serious human rights violations towards a more peaceful and democratic time. In the case of failures, their persistence over time hinders and delays objectives such as the reduction of internal conflicts. On the other side, excessive triumphalism delays necessary discussions on entrenched issues like inequality and the loss of goals realized during transitions due to the effect of weak democracies.

 

It is criticized that during the aforementioned transition, ethnic divisions and nationalist projects were institutionalized instead of tackling the structural causes of the conflict. Therefore, as happened in other cases, successes achieved in the prosecution of gender-based crimes became fragmented, leaving unresolved discussions such as the connection between poverty, gender discrimination, and war damages, as well as the complexity of structural discrimination or its consequences during wartime.

 

No armed conflict should be preferred over the possibility of peace, even considering the consequences of an imperfect peace. Nonetheless, the peace that excludes women from their own agency and voice is neither just nor lasting.  In the Western Balkans, the transition ended a period of violence, and armed confrontation has not returned despite the social, economic, and political challenges faced by the countries. Notwithstanding, there are growing points of war tension around the world, sustained and compounded by structural injustice problems. In this context, it is always important to review the lessons learned in previous experiences, such as the importance of including gender approaches as the key to overcoming the violent past or present.

The post Gender and war: Reflections on the future of Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

ALGER, merc. 31/07/2024 – Après l’examen de l’ensemble des dossiers de candidature et des recours, la Cour constitutionnelle a publié, ce mercredi 31 juillet, la […]

L’article Présidentielle 2024 : Les 5 recours rejetés, Aouchiche et Hassani Cherif seuls face à Tebboune est apparu en premier sur .

The July 4th Election

The British Conservative Party had been in power for the past 14 years. Public perceptions of the party have varied greatly over their 14-year tenure, but for the past four years, the party and its leaders have been under consistent scrutiny for a series of scandals and political and economical faffs. These incidents include, but are not limited to, the following: Brexit negotiations; the Covid-19 pandemic; ‘Partygate’ under former Prime Minister Johnson; the internal Conservative Party leadership debacle (i.e. Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak); former Prime Minister Liz Truss’s economic mismanagement and the resultant crisis in the British economy; and the domestic cost-of-living crisis. In response to widespread unpopularity, Rishi Sunak, British Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party, decided to call a snap general election on May 22, 2024. I argue that the result of this snap election, which will be expounded in greater detail in the proceeding paragraphs, offers insight into the changing nature of Anglo-British political identity.

The general election was set for July 4, 2024 and was expected to generate a massively changed British government, differing significantly from the current set of sitting officials elected in 2019. As predicted, there was substantial restructuring. After 14 years of Conservative government, the Labour Party had finally regained the public’s electoral mandate, achieving a majority of 412 seats, up from their previous standing of 201. The Conservative Party, by contrast, dropped to 121 seats after previously holding 372. The UK’s ‘third party’, the Liberal Democrats, also capitalised on the perceived failings of the Conservatives, increasing their number of seats from eight to a considerable 64.

Although this was a national, pan-UK election, the most significant changes occurred in England, the largest – in geography, by population, and by GDP per capita – of the four home nations (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) that comprise the UK. Unlike the other home nations, England is not granted devolved governmental powers like Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland; all English laws and policies are created and voted on within Westminster Parliament, meaning representatives from the other home nations are able to influence the trajectory of English lawmaking and politics. The English, however, do not possess the same ability to impact lawmaking and politics (due to devolution in a vast number of policy areas, i.e., sports and the arts, education and training, health and social care, etc.) in the home nations. Concerns about England’s national identity and Anglo-specific issues have been largely neglected, if not suppressed, by the structure of British government, namely, Westminster Parliament and devolution. Furthermore, England and Englishness are often, rightly or wrongly, conflated with Britain and Britishness. It is because of this conflation that I feel the term Anglo-British identity is appropriate.

 

Tory England

The Conservative Party (colloquially referred to as ‘The Tories’), technically a pan-British political party, has, under various leaders in both historical and contemporary (the last decade) contexts, found its greatest support in England. In fact, support for the Conservatives is almost exclusively grounded in England, particularly Southern England (excluding most London boroughs). In turn, the party has positioned itself as the party of England and English interests; it has also presented itself, both pre- and post-devolution (1997), as the party most concerned with maintaining the British political union, with England at its core, in the face of increased political fragmentation between the home nations. The modern Conservative Party is more internally divided than ever, as evidenced by the formation of various party member groups, including the New Conservatives, National Conservatives, and Popular Conservatives, coupled with the constant change in party leadership and reshuffling of cabinet ministers.

Nevertheless, the party has attempted to maintain an overarching ideological identity, including a somewhat cohesive imagination of British national identity. The Conservative Party’s image of British national identity is centred on the idea of British sovereignty, guided by a ‘Britain first’ mentality with England at its core. Brexit can (and should) be viewed as a manifestation of the Conservative Party’s ‘Britain first’ mentality. In keeping with the Conservative’s Anglocentrism, the Brexit result was channelled through the English electorate in particular. As evidenced by the exit statistics of the Brexit referendum, it was English voters who essentially determined the result of the referendum: 53.4% of the English voting population who voted in the referendum voted to leave the European Union (EU), meaning 15,188,406 voted ‘leave’ in England (see: Brexit Referendum Results – BBC ). It could be argued that Brexit was at least in part an expression of English nationalism.

Yet, UK-wide statistics illustrate that many Britons, including English voters, now regret leaving the EU, especially the younger generations. In fact, as of May 2024, 55% of people consulted in a Statista poll consider leaving the EU to have been a mistake (see: Bregret – Statista ). The polls leading up to the July 4th election predicted a massive change in government as the British electorate grew increasingly frustrated with the perceived failings of Brexit, the cost-of-living crisis, and general dissatisfaction with the Conservative government. Therefore, the result of the election did not come as great a surprise to those involved in, or attuned to, UK politics. Still, it hugely significant that England, the traditional bedrock of Conservative electoral support, almost completely reorientated itself towards the Labour Party. The aforementioned political and economic failings of the Conservative Party, as well as the numerous scandals within the party, all contributed to this political turn. Yet, there is another factor at play as well.

 

A Change in English Identity? Tory England No More

Labour’s victory in the July 4th election signals a change in Anglo-British identity, shifting from a more traditionalist, inward-looking, and sovereigntist set of values and beliefs, those commonly associated with the Conservative Party, to a new identity that places greater emphasis on progressiveness, community, and interdependence. Keir Starmer, formerly the Leader of the Opposition and now the UK’s Labour Prime Minister, spoke about reclaiming Englishness from the right, arguing in an open letter that “Labour is now the true party of English patriotism”. Starmer goes further, stating that the Conservatives have done a disservice to “some of our proudest national institutions – from the BBC, to the National Trust and England football team – … [and have shown through their actions that] they don’t have faith in the strength of our history, identity and flag to withstand discussion” (to read the letter in full, see: Starmer Open Letter – The Telegraph). Through interchanging between the two identities as he writes, Starmer outlines how Englishness is a vital aspect of Britishness, making them practically inseparable.

Prime Minister Starmer’s conceptualisation of English identity is more progressive, multiculturally sensitive, and compatible with multiple identities, meaning that individuals are able to hold a combination of identities. We may therefore see a marked drop in the number of individuals in England who identify as exclusively English – as opposed to Anglo-British or even, Anglo-British-European. Thus, the massive shift in UK government we have just witnessed, especially the change in party allegiance amongst English voters, suggests that the Anglo-British political identity is changing in response to the perceived failings of the Conservative government. England, the vital base from which the Conservatives garnered their support for their past 14 years of government, has expressed its desire for political change, endorsing a new value set manifest in Keir Starmer’s Labour Party.

This shift is significant on three levels:

1) At the home nation (English) level: Starmer’s variant of Englishness is more inclusive and accessible to those who do not necessarily meet the stereotype of what it means to be English (i.e., white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant – WASPs), as well as to newcomers to England who wish to assimilate;

2) At the national level of the UK: a more equitable and open English nation(alism) will lead to greater cooperation and harmony amongst the home nations, creating a more robust British political union with less animosity between the four home nations;

3) At the international/European level: a renewed, more outward-looking and agreeable English identity will point England and the UK in the direction of multilateralism, potentially leading England and the UK towards an ever-closer relationship with the EU – although rejoining is off the cards, at least for the immediate future, a foundation can be set.

 

The End (For Now)

To conclude, in reflecting upon the July 4th election in the UK, I believe that the result is indicative of a changing Anglo-British identity, moving away from the more exclusive and closed-off version put forth by the Conservatives and shifting towards a more open and inclusive form under Labour. It is still too early to say with any certainty that the majority of English people who voted Labour did so out of genuine belief in the Labour platform as opposed to voting for Labour as a means of expressing their disenchantment with the Conservatives. That being said, I believe that Starmer’s reframing of Englishness may continue to change what it means to be English, including the relationships between Englishness, Britishness, and Europeanness, in the coming years.

 

 

WORD COUNT: 1521

The post The Resurgence of Labour: what it means for Anglo-British Identity appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

EU lawmaker Stine Bosse from the Danish Moderate Party (Renew Europe) announced on Wednesday (31 July) she is resigning from the board of the Norwegian bank DNB to avoid a possible conflict of interest with her role in the European Parliament.

Star de la cuisine africaine sur les réseaux sociaux, Cheikh Niang, plus connu sous son pseudonyme de Niang Cook, était de passage au Sénégal, son pays d’origine, en juillet. L’occasion de se ressourcer et de partager ses recettes avec la population.

Der amtierende Binnenmarktkommissar Thierry Breton wurde vom französischen Präsidenten Emmanuel Macron für eine weitere fünfjährige Amtszeit vorgeschlagen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wurde er von Interessenvertretern der Telekommunikationsbranche aufgefordert, einige seiner früheren Positionen zu überdenken.

Less than a year after Hungary launched its rapid manufacturing program at its newly opened military vehicle factory, the first domestically-made KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) has been delivered. The Lynx was completed last December, but as the initial vehicle to roll off the assembly line at the facilities in Zalaegerszeg, it was put through extensive inspections and performance tests.

It was officially handed over to the Hungarian armed forces earlier this month – the first of a new batch of IFVs that will be produced in Hungary under license from the German-based Rheinmetall arms manufacturer. Budapest is already on track to receive forty-six of the German-made tracked IFVs by the end of next year, with the first of the Lynx already delivered in October 2022.

Production on the remaining vehicles began last year at the new Hungarian facility, which was opened as part of a Rheinmetall Hungary Zrt. joint venture – with Rheinmetall controlling a fifty-one percent stake and the Hungarian government maintaining a forty-nine percent share.

Hungary will receive a total of 209 of the modular Lynx vehicles as part of an August 2020 deal valued at 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion). Forty-five will be produced in Germany, while the remaining 172 vehicles will be built domestically in Hungary.

"We are grateful to be able to support the Hungarian armed forces as an industrial partner in the Lynx lighthouse project. We have now reached an important milestone within the project. With the production of the Lynx, we are seriously proving our commitment to creating local added value in Hungary and transferring technology to the country. This model is also transferable to other countries which might also be interested in similar partnerships," said Dr. Björn Bernhard, head of Rheinmetall Vehicle Systems Europe.

In addition to the basic IFV vehicle, other variants include a mobile command post, armored reconnaissance vehicle, fire control vehicle, mortar carrier, medical vehicle, and driving school vehicle. A Lynx air defense tank, armed with a Skyranger 30 turret, is currently in development as part of a second contract that was placed in December 2023.

"Peace requires strength, which means a lot of kinds of strength, and in this regard, we have gained real and serious strength with Rheinmetall and in this alliance, which significantly enriches Hungary," added Hungarian Minister of Defense Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky. "This is a kind of strategic partnership that is more than strategy or partnership – this is a real alliance, and within this framework, we hope to win the future for Hungarians, and we're building something that will remain for the next generations, and we're strengthening Hungary."

The Lynx Beyond Hungary

In addition to supplying the Hungarian Army, the factory will produce the KF41 Lynx for other NATO members and partners. The Lynx was one of the platforms considered by the U.S. Army in its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program to replace the aging Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

However, the initial Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) was canceled in January 2020, only to be "rebooted" in July 2021. The program has since continued to move forward, and in June 2023, the American Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx was selected – along with an offering from General Dynamics Land Systems – as part of the program's efforts to produce the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Le Royaume-Uni est choqué deux jours après l’attaque au couteau dans un centre aéré au nord de Liverpool, pendant laquelle trois petites filles de 6 à 9 ans sont décédées. Cinq autres enfants et deux adultes restent dans un état critique. Mardi 30 juillet au soir, une marche blanche a été organisée dans la ville de Southport, mais l’hommage a tourné à l’émeute dû à des actions attribuées à l'extrême droite.

Dans une note rendue publique, l'Etat major des armées maliennes porte à la connaissance de l'opinion publique, que conformément à la solidarité entre les Etats membres de la Conféderation des Etats du Sahel (AES), et en application du mécanisme de défense collective et d'assistance mutuelle de l'AES, les FAMa, en coordination avec les Forces armées du Burkina Faso, ont debuté, ce mardi 30 juillet 2024, une campagne aérienne dans le secteur Tinzaouatene.

L'opération vise selon le communiqué, à sécuriser les personnes et les biens dans la localité de Tinzaouatene et ses environs, contre la coalition de terroristes, à la base d'exactions, d'abus et de trafics illicites contre les populations maliennes.

L'État-Major Général des Armées invite la population civile dans le secteur, à se tenir à distance des positions occupées par les Groupes Armés Terroristes durant la période de l'opération, pour prévenir tous dommages collatéraux.

Lefaso.net

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche was the U.S. Army's ambitious attempt to create a stealth attack helicopter, designed to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and provide undetected reconnaissance and support.

-Despite the program's $7 billion investment from 1996 to 2004, the Comanche never entered production due to technological challenges and unproven stealth capabilities. The helicopter featured a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint, along with a quieter composite rotor.

-Although the program was eventually canceled, the Comanche highlighted the potential value of stealth technology in helicopter operations, especially for special missions like the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

Why the RAH-66 Helicopter Program Failed

For the the last several generations, American aerospace designers have invested heavily in stealth technology. The majority of new fighters and bombers that roll off the assembly plant are stealth airframes, with radar cross sections comparable to that of a bumble bee. Examples of new stealth aircraft include the F-117 Nighthawk, the B-2 Spirit, the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Lightning II, and the B-21 Raider. But as one may have notice, the list does not include any helicopters, despite the use of the rotary-winged aircraft in attack, reconnaissance, and special operations roles which stealth capabilities would be quite useful.

Conceptually, a stealth helicopter makes a lot of sense. US war planners thought so, at least, which is why considerable resources were dedicated to building the RAH-66 Comanche, a stealth attack helicopter. The Comanche never quite panned out, but you can’t fault the effort.

Squaring a Circle with Comanche Helicopter

Helicopters are inherently unstealthy. The turbine exhaust system is cacophonous; the tail rotor is loud; the fuselage vibrates vigorously during flight. Helicopters are simply not well suited for moving through air and space undetected. Yet, given the inherent challenges of sanding down the non-stealth corners of the rotary-winged aircraft, the fact that aerospace designers were willing to try speaks to the value that a stealth helicopter would add.

Stealth characteristics would be helpful for a helicopter in any situation in which you did not want the helicopter detected – that is to say, in most military operations. Consider how helicopters are used: fire support, troop transport, and reconnaissance. Nearly every facet of helicopter operations would benefit from stealth technology. And of course, helicopters are a central component of special operations, which are, almost innately stealthy.

Consider the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound – an example of why the US might want stealth helicopter technology. The US needs to surreptitiously infiltrate a sovereign state (because the US did not have permission to enter the sovereign state), locate an approximate location (bin Laden’s compound), and deliver a SEAL Team. The needs of the mission all demanded a helicopter – aside from the need to enter the sovereign state undetected; which would require stealth. Fortunately, the US happened to have a stealth Blackhawk prototype on hand, two of which were deployed for the raid. This article isn’t about the bin Laden raid or the stealth Blackhawk, but rather a demonstration of why the US might be interested in developing a stealth helicopter like the RAH-66.

Developing the RAH-66

The RAH-66 made a lot of sense on paper, prompting the US Army to invest $7 billion dollars on the program between 1996 and 2004. The RAH-66 was slated to replace the OH-58 Kiowa, a scout helicopter that often attracts small-arms fire. Naturally, the Army would have appreciated a scout helicopter with the ability to move about unseen.

Two Comanches were built, with a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint. The Comanche was also outfitted with an all-composite, five-blade rotor, which churned more softly than other helicopter rotors. But the Comanche never entered production, because “aspects of Comanche’s technology were deemed too risky (i.e. immature i.e. hadn’t been developed i.e. didn’t exist),” wrote Dan Ward for TIME.

The Comanche was a financial flop. But you can appreciate why the Army may have wanted such a stealthy helicopter.    

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Cinq informations judiciaires supplémentaires pour viols et viols aggravés ont été ouvertes par le parquet de Nanterre à l'encontre de Patrick Poivre d'Arvor, ex-présentateur vedette du journal télévisé de TF1. Le journaliste a toujours nié les accusations et à ce jour, toutes les plaintes ont été classées sans suite.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on expensive, complex nuclear-powered submarines is under scrutiny as global rivals like China and Russia expand their naval capabilities.

-Despite the proven effectiveness of diesel-electric submarines—used successfully by allies like Japan, Sweden, and Israel—the U.S. has focused on nuclear subs, which are costly and slow to produce.

-Diesel-electric subs offer a quieter, more affordable alternative that could quickly bolster America's undersea fleet. By purchasing these submarines from advanced allies, the U.S. could enhance its naval power and meet current challenges more effectively, rather than waiting for long-term solutions.

The U.S. Navy: Time for Diesel Submarines? 

The United States Navy has fallen in love, like the rest of the Armed Forces of the United States, with technological wizardry and expensive programs to augment, indeed replace, less sophisticated, affordable, and plentiful systems. America’s wünderwaffe is going strong today. 

Yet, the U.S. military is quantifiably the weakest it has been since the interwar years. One key system that the Navy will need to defend against America’s rising great power rivals is the submarine. And, thanks to long-running problems with America’s failing defense industrial base, as well as the increasing cost of complex systems, America’s vital submarine capability is insufficient to meeting the challenges America faces today.

There is no amount of funding that can address the bottlenecks in our defense industrial base. Nothing short of a complete overhaul of our infrastructure will make U.S. capabilities meet the needs of the U.S. Armed Forces. Despite having spoken wistfully of the need to restore America as the “arsenal of democracy,” no political leader—not former President Donald Trump or current President Joe Biden—has managed to revitalize the dying arsenal of democracy. In fact, as multiple crises across various fronts pull America’s limited supplies of critical systems, ammunition, and personnel to their breaking points, almost nothing has been proffered in the way of a reliable solution in the near term. 

And no one in Washington thinks about the long-term anymore (and whenever they do, the bureaucrats usually get it wrong).

The threats, however, persist. 

What America Really Needs for Subs

The need for a large and capable submarine force remains. We keep hearing about the glories of America’s allies. Although, increasingly, these alliances seem to be pretty one-sided: America gives and gives, while the allies take and take. But America does have competent and technologically advanced allies. 

Many of these allies, such as Sweden or France, routinely and unapologetically rely upon diesel-electric submarines to meet their strategic needs. 

This is not because America’s allies are technologically inferior to the Americans. Quite the contrary. It’s usually because America’s allies don’t want to spend the kind of money, time, and resources building the entire fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that the Americans have built. 

Even the recent Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) submarine deal demands that Australia purchase, and the Americans and British provide, nuclear-powered submarines. Thus, defense contractors are happy because these are long-term contracts that are worth far more than if the contracts were for diesel-electric submarines.

In the meantime, America’s rivals—notably China—grow stronger and their own navies grow larger and more competent. By the time these proposed new nuclear-powered submarines make it to the battlefield, the facts on the ground may have fundamentally changed in China’s favor. What’s needed, therefore, are solutions in the here and now. Not theoretical solutions for 2040 and beyond (which is what the Pentagon is planning for). 

The fact of the matter is that diesel-electric subs work. Indeed, these were the kind of submarines (although much less sophisticated than the diesel-electric subs operated by multiple modern navies today), that won the Pacific Theater of World War II for the Americans. After that conflict ended, though, the U.S. Navy was bitten by the nuclear bug. It’s an understandable trend. Nuke-powered subs are better than their conventional, diesel-electric submarine older brothers. 

But they’re expensive and take long to build—and require long stays in already overburdened U.S. shipyards.

The Case for Diesel-Electric Submarines

Besides, a coterie of diesel-electric submarines has proven their worth against their nuclear-powered brethren. More importantly, diesel-electric subs have proven their mettle in a variety of instances against nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carriers! 

That’s because diesel-electric submarines, on top of being cheaper than nuclear-powered boats, are usually quieter. They’re harder to pick up on sonar. An ancient Chinese Song-class diesel-electric submarine infamously popped up within torpedo firing range of the USS Kitty Hawk when the nuclear-powered carrier was on maneuvers in the Pacific. 

Similarly, a Swedish Gotland-class diesel-electric submarine got within firing range of an American aircraft carrier during joint training exercises. The crew of the American carrier was none the wiser until it was too late. 

A French diesel-electric submarine did the same to an American flattop during joint training between the U.S. and French navies.

The Israelis have also proven that diesel-electric submarines are more than capable of providing for their national defense. While never officially acknowledged, everyone understands that Israel possesses a flotilla of German-built, diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines that can carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Israel is a highly sophisticated nation that could easily build nuclear-powered boats. They chose not to because diesel-electric subs are cheaper, easier to maintain, and still get the job done. 

During World War II, America’s submarine force became a refined and essential element of America’s maritime defense. While the nuclear-powered sub had yet to be invented, and there were real limitations of diesel-electric subs back then, the fact remains that the United States was able to mass produce these subs and overwhelm the Japanese at sea. America’s rivals today, such as China and Russia, routinely rely upon a mixed force of diesel-electric and nuclear-powered subs to meet their strategic needs. 

Why can’t America do this as well?

Here’s What America’s Allies Can Do for Us

The best part of this entire story is that America’s overburdened shipyards do not need to build diesel-electric subs from scratch. Washington should simply purchase a tranche of diesel-electric subs from one of America’s various advanced allies. James Holmes believes that the Japanese-built Soryu-class diesel-electric sub would get the job done. 

But why stop there? 

We should purchase a hodgepodge of various diesel-electric subs from Japan, Sweden, and France. Let our allies help us out. America needs to augment its submarine force with simple numbers. American allies are more than capable of helping us with this task.

After all, quantity has its own quality. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Les résolutions des Nations unies ont toutes échoué à régler le contentieux autour de l’ancienne colonie espagnole, le Maroc ne concevant l’autodétermination de la population sahraouie que comme l’instrument de validation de sa présence.

Summary and Key Points: As tensions with China rise, the U.S. Navy's reliance on the F-35 Lightning II faces scrutiny, particularly regarding its range limitations. The F-35C, designed for carrier operations, has a combat radius of 600 nautical miles—outdistancing the F/A-18 Super Hornet but still within the reach of China's long-range anti-ship missiles.

-This raises concerns about the vulnerability of carriers in the Pacific theater.

-The Navy’s next-generation F/A-XX program aims to address these issues with enhanced range and capabilities, but the question remains whether any carrier-based aircraft can keep carriers safe from emerging threats.

F-35 Stealth Fighter, China and the Question of Range

Throughout its development history, the F-35 Lightning II was plagued by delays and budgetary overruns. Although it took much longer to reach initial operating capability than expected, the end result is a well-refined tactical aircraft. Detractors of the program have not been silenced, however, and continue to point out challenges facing the aircraft. As tensions with China increase and planners look to the wide expanse of the Pacific, questions about the F-35’s range become more acute, particularly in the case of the Navy.

Launching from a carrier far out at sea limits the options pilots have for landing to refuel; realistically, they usually must return to the boat. If their fighters don’t possess much range, that means the carrier must sail that much closer to the adversary in order to launch effective sorties, potentially exposing itself to enemy defenses.

So, does the F-35 have a range problem? And, if so, what can the Navy do about it?

F-35 Range and Specs

Widely considered to be the most dominant fifth-generation platform in the skies today, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter incorporates stealth, versatility, range, top speed, and advanced electronic warfare/avionics. The F-35 comes in three different variants with their own specifications and, importantly, different ranges.

The F-35A is colloquially designated as the “runway queen” of the group as it is operated like a traditional fighter. This low-cost variant requires roughly 8,000 feet of standard runways to take off properly and land. The F-35B is the Marine Corps’ Lightning II variant. As the most mechanically complex of the three, the F-35B features short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) capability.

The Navy operates the C “Charlie” model. Designed for carrier operations, the F-35C has the largest fuel load and, consequently, the longest range. With full tanks, its combat radius is 600 nm, edging out the F/A-18 Super Hornet at 570 nm in the air-to-air mission configuration. For attacking ground or surface targets, the F-35 maintains its radius while the Super Hornet’s radius drops to only 320 nm.

While the Lightning II does outrange the Super Hornet, it cannot carry nearly the same payload. It makes up for this drawback in that it is a stealth aircraft with a radar cross-section about three orders of magnitude less than that of the F/A-18.

All the stealth airplanes in the world won’t hide the carrier itself, however, and even though the F-35C has longer legs, the carrier would still have to place itself in harm’s way in order to carry out strikes.

The F/A-XX and the CSG

Although the F-35 is still a relatively new platform, the Navy is already looking for its next tactical aircraft in the form of the F/A-XX program. This jet, intended to replace the Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler, is expected to have stealth capabilities, mount-directed energy weapons, and be capable of integrating with unmanned systems.

Depending on the direction the Navy pursues, it could also have an even greater range than the F-35.

Ultimately, however, no carrier aircraft will have enough range to keep the mothership safe. Tensions between Beijing and Washington have continued to escalate, indicating that the vast Indo-Pacific region is a likely future area of combat operations for the sixth-generation platform.

The Navy will require the jet to have long-range capabilities in order to evade China’s air defense systems across long distances. The rapid growth of the People Liberation Army’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the form of long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles cannot be overstated.

Their current missiles are capable of reaching a staggering 2,200 nm or more, far beyond even the most ambitious of endurance aircraft.

Clearly, the Navy will have to consider other options for its carriers if it wants to keep them safe and relevant. 

About the Author: Maya Carlin, Defense Expert 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Deux militaires FARDC ont été tués et d’autres blessés lors d’attaques simultanées lancées ce mercredi 31 juillet par des hommes armés sur des positions de la force navale à Kasenyi, Tchomia et Sabe, sur le littoral du lac Albert en Ituri.  

Selon le gouverneur de province, ces assauts sont l’œuvre des miliciens du groupe armé Zaïre. Il soutient que « ces miliciens ont été mobilisés par des ennemis de la paix pour déstabiliser » cette partie de la province, frontalière avec l’Ouganda.

Summary and Key Points: The F-35 Lightning II, the most advanced fighter jet in the skies, faces a hefty $2 trillion lifetime cost, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

-The report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, significantly higher than previous projections, and $445 billion in acquisition costs.

-Factors driving the increased expenses include the U.S. military’s plan to operate the F-35 until 2088 and higher inflation.

The F-35 Fighter Will Cost In Total Around $2 Trillion 

The F-35 program’s complexity stems from its three variants (A, B, and C), each designed to meet the specific needs of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, replacing multiple older aircraft.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced jet in the skies today. However, its journey to the skies hasn’t been easy. Indeed, the F-35 program had to overcome several challenges and setbacks to be where it is today. To a certain extent, these challenges continue to this day.

According to the latest assessment by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the F-35 Program will cost more than $2 trillion during its lifetime. This astounding cost makes it the most expensive defense program in recent history and one of the most expensive in military history in general.

Specifically, the GAO report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, which include operational demands and maintenance – this is about 45 percent higher than the previous estimate in 2018 ($1.1 trillion). It also estimates approximately $445 billion in acquisition costs, which include the development and procurement of the stealth fighter jet.

One of the main reasons for the hefty half a trillion dollars increase in sustainment costs is the fact that the U.S. military plans to operate the F-35 fighter for an additional decade, or until 2088. Another reason is the higher inflation.

The fact that the GAO had to revise its estimate within six years coupled with the ongoing production and delivery of the aircraft, could indicate that the F-35 Program’s cost might further increase in the near future.

Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have tried to bring costs down but without significant success. Nevertheless, for many, the high cost and challenges surrounding the F-35 Program have a reasonable explanation.

F-35 Stealth Fighter: It Can Do It All? 

Much like the Russian Babushka wooden dolls that fit several similar toys of different sizes in each other, the F-35 Lightning II isn’t just one aircraft and isn’t intended to replace just one aircraft.

The F-35 comes in three versions: A, B, and C. Although they are essentially the same aircraft in terms of capabilities, each is designed differently to meet the different demands of the U.S. military’s services. Essentially, Lockheed Martin designed three different aircraft in one, and that is reflected in some of the costs.

The F-35A is the conventional take-off and landing aircraft that operates from runways; this is the version used by the Air Force and most of the 19 countries that comprise the F-35 Program.

The F-35B is the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the aircraft and can take off and land like a helicopter but still fly like a fighter jet; this version is used by the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as several foreign partners.

Finally, the F-35C is the aircraft carrier version of the aircraft and is designed to withstand the extreme pressures of carrier operations; this iteration is used only by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

In addition, the three versions of the F-35 Lightning II are going to replace several older aircraft, including the A-10 Warthog close air support aircraft, AV-88 Harrier STOVL fighter jet, and also probably the F-16.

As such, they include capabilities that would normally be spread over several aircraft. This streamlining of mission sets in a single aircraft is a logistical miracle for the U.S. military and will benefit it in a time of war.

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a Greek Army veteran (National service with 575th Marines Battalion and Army HQ). Johns Hopkins University. You will usually find him on the top of a mountain admiring the view and wondering how he got there.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The program to replace America’s aging nuclear ICBM arsenal, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, is already projected to go at least 81 percent over budget, which represents tens of billions of dollars in anticipated cost overruns. Yet, despite the program’s ballooning expenses, the Pentagon has reaffirmed its commitment to the effort, calling its continuation, “essential to national security.”

To many outside of the Defense apparatus, the Sentinel ICBM program may seem unnecessary. After all, the United States already maintains a standing arsenal of more than 400 nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs, each of which can deliver its nuclear payload to targets more than 8,000 miles away, traveling at speeds over Mach 23. These weapons lay in wait, housed in hardened underground silos spanning Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, and represent only the land-based portion of America’s traditional nuclear triad.

A bevy of nuclear gravity bombs, spanning in yield from as low as 0.3 kilotons to as high as 1.2 megatons, serve alongside long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles as the airborne leg of the triad, delivered via a laundry list of bombers and fighters. And then, most importantly, a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple warheads onboard, serve as the at-sea leg of the triad while also representing the majority of America’s deployed nuclear arsenal.

The land-based Minuteman III fleet is often seen as the least important facet of America’s deterrent nuclear posture, with many experts and analysts dismissing these weapons and their hardened silos as little more than a “warhead sponge,” meant to give adversary nations such a long and daunting list of targets for any potential first strike that there will have little hope of blunting the edge of America’s nuclear response. But while this might make these ICBMs seem less important than the Navy’s deployed SLBMs, for instance, the truth is, using these isolated facilities as a “warhead sponge” might make all the difference in a nuclear conflict. 

The known and permanent locations of these ICBM silos give enemy nations a list of hundreds of targets to focus on, allowing America’s missile subs and nuclear-capable aircraft to retaliate with less interference.

In other words, with hundreds of nuclear ICBMs lying in wait beneath the grasslands of the Great Plains, adversaries planning a nuclear first strike must address the looming threat of these missiles, which are dispersed and sufficiently hardened to nearly require a direct nuclear strike on each to eliminate the possibility of Minuteman III retaliation. 

Even for Russia, which maintains the largest nuclear stockpile in the world and claims to have some 1,710 deployed warheads at any given time, this would be a serious challenge. If you assumed a broadly unlikely 100 percent hit rate, using just one Russian warhead for each of America’s known 450 Minuteman III silos, nerfing America’s ICBM fields alone would require more than a quarter of the nation’s entire deployed nuclear arsenal. If Russia opted to play it safe and devote two warheads to each silo, it would dramatically increase its chances of success, but at the expense of more than half of its deployed nuclear arms. This, of course, also means no other nation on the planet besides Russia has the warheads and the means to mount an effective attack against America’s ICBM fields. 

China’s nuclear stockpile is growing faster than any other nation’s in the world, but its entire arsenal currently amounts to just 500 or so warheads, meaning it could feasibly require every nuclear weapon in China’s inventory – not just the ones deployed – to have the same effect. 

It might be easier to think of the importance of the Minuteman III as a guard standing his post with his rifle up at the alert. Adversaries know there are other guards hidden throughout the landscape and the known location of that rifleman might make him an obvious target, but attackers still have to deal with him first if they intend to mount a successful assault. 

“The land leg’s geographic dispersal creates targeting problems for our adversaries, and our missileers sitting in an alert posture 24/7 ensures responsiveness,” explained Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife on July 8th.

It’s a cynical and deeply depressing way to see this swath of the American midwest – with these remote, but populated communities carrying that target on their backs for the sake of the rest of the nation. Yet, that’s the inherent and objectively cold-blooded math of nuclear warfare: It’s a game that ultimately, has no winners; only survivors.

And it’s in the interest of continuing this nuclear game of chicken that the Air Force is now forced to swallow the now-projected $140.9 billion cost of replacing those “warhead sponge” Minuteman IIIs, as the ballistic missiles Uncle Sam has long kept tucked beneath the northern Great Plains are rapidly aging into what the Pentagon considers to be an unsafe and strategically neutered obsolescence.

This is a problem the Pentagon saw coming. The Minuteman III program began in the early 1960s, with the first operational missiles entering service in 1970 before microwave ovens were common in American kitchens. At the time, the projected service life of these weapons was just 10 years, meaning the Minuteman III arsenal was slated to be replaced starting in 1980.

Since then, the branch has invested billions of dollars into not just maintaining these weapons but updating them to remain viable in a rapidly changing technological world. After all, these missiles and their launch facilities were designed and built before personal computers, VCRs or portable tape players had been invented. In fact, it wasn’t until 2019 that the Air Force finally migrated away from using eight-inch floppy disks (from the 1970s) to operate the Strategic Automated Command and Control System, or SACCS, that’s responsible for launch functionality.

The dated electronics found throughout the Minuteman III weapon and support infrastructure create significant concerns about cybersecurity – a defensive realm that simply didn’t exist when the weapon was being designed. Likewise, despite limited updates and upgrades over the years, the Air Force has been clear that the Minuteman III’s intercept countermeasures, or classified systems carried onboard meant to hinder an enemy’s ability to shoot the missiles down before they reach their targets, are aging out of relevance, presenting the real possibility that the longstanding nuclear deterrent philosophy of mutually assured destruction may no longer be quite so mutually assured.

More pressing than concerns about hacking, or the unrealistic idea that an adversary state could intercept hundreds of inbound warheads simultaneously, are the continuously reduced reliability of aging systems and components that are now so old that there’s no vendor, contractor, or commercial entity that can support, repair, or replace them – at least, not without a prohibitively high price tag. 

To put it into simpler terms, the Minuteman III is the nuclear equivalent of a 1969 Dodge Charger. Its iconic design and powerful legacy are still enough to leave many in awe, but nobody in their right mind would want to race in the thing today. Upgrading the Charger to make it safe and competitive on the modern race track is certainly possible with enough money and willpower, but there’s no denying that it would be a whole lot cheaper (and easier) to just buy a modern race car.

And that’s exactly what the Air Force determined in 2014 when it conducted what the Congressional Research Service describes as a “comprehensive analysis of alternatives” to the Minuteman III, ultimately assessing that replacing these aging weapons with new, more modern ones would reduce life cycle costs while also ensuring America’s ICBMs are technologically capable of outpacing emerging threats. 

Of course, there are always two sides to a debate, and others have argued that continued service life extension programs (SLEPs) on the Minuteman III arsenal, replacing aging components with more modern ones and eventually producing the ballistic missile equivalent of the Ship of Theseus, might actually be the more cost-effective solution. 

That was the position taken by a group of analysts at the Rand Corporation in 2014 who were tasked with assessing possible alternatives to a new ICBM program (then known as the  Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program). While the Air Force’s 2014 analysis concluded that modernizing the Minuteman III would cost just as much as replacing them, the Rand study presciently argued that a replacement ballistic missile system “will likely cost almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and sustainment of the MM III system.”

Yet, even the Rand analysis left the door open for replacement to be the logical conclusion based on three potential factors. These were, firstly, if the Air Force felt the pressing strategic need to increase the capability of these weapons, which wouldn’t be cost-effective using the old missiles as a basis. Secondly, if the threat environment outside the U.S. changed in such a way that demanded it – such as emerging missile defense capabilities reducing the likelihood of success for Minuteman III strikes. Thirdly, and most pressingly, if the number of Minuteman III missiles the United States had left to launch declined. 

As part of ensuring the land-based leg of the nuclear triad is ready and capable of responding to attack, the United States usually conducts four to five ICBM test launches per year. If the U.S. continued this pace of testing, it would run out of extra weapons to launch by 2035, forcing it to either halt test launches indefinitely or start shaving operational weapons off the inventory to be used for these tests. 

Yet, the Air Force contends that there are several other challenges it would have to face to keep the Minuteman III alive for the foreseeable future. The first and most prominent is the aging out of the rocket motors meant to carry the weapons to their targets. Rocket motor lifespans are determined by destructively testing a small number of them and measuring the degradation of physical, chemical, and mechanical properties to create statistical models that can be used to determine when the motor’s functionality would fall below operational thresholds. In other words, they subject these rockets to immense stresses, measure the damage, and then use that data to extrapolate an expiration date for when the rocket will no longer work well enough to accomplish its mission. 

Based on the Air Force’s rocket lifespan modeling, the three boosters in the Minuteman III will begin to expire in 2029. 

The next technical hurdle another service life extension program would need to overcome is the weapons guidance system also aging out of service. The Minuteman III originally came equipped with the NS-20 Missile Guidance System, which had already aged out of relevance by the 1990s, prompting the branch to kick off the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program midway through the decade. This program saw the NS-20 swapped out for the more modern and accurate NS-50 system. This cost some $1.6 billion in 1995 currency, or roughly $3.34 billion today, and would extend the lifespan of these guidance systems out to 2020. 

By 2012, the Federation of American Scientists reported that the Defense Department had already invested a total of $7 billion into various Minuteman III service life extension efforts – roughly $9.7 billion in today’s dollars, and it certainly didn’t end there. 

Then, 2020 came and went without a Minuteman III replacement, and the Air Force had to award several subsequent contracts to Boeing to stretch their lifespans out to 2030 and beyond – when the Minuteman III’s replacement was meant to come online. 

While not a conclusive list of these life-extending costs, public records exist for a $51.2 million contract award to Boeing for the job in January 2015 ($68.83 million today), followed by at least two contract modifications to add an additional $15.6 million the following February and an additional $8.1 million in July (a combined $31.43 million today for a total of $100.26 million). 

But even with all this invested, the Minuteman III still faces a laundry list of systems that are not only aging out of relevance but aging out of being feasible to maintain and support. 

A 2019 analysis conducted by the conservative think tank Hudson Institute posited that between 2031 and 2033, as many as 50 missiles might age out of service due to motor or onboard systems falling below the operational threshold, and by 2037, the operational Minuteman III fleet could be as small as 100 weapons. However, the Air Force awarded Boeing another $1.6 billion in February 2023 for Minuteman III “guidance subsystem support,” which is likely to curtail at least a portion of these losses, even if it did mean eclipsing the $10 billion mark on service life extensions. 

As the Pentagon sees it, continuing to funnel billions of dollars into keeping these Kirk-and-Spock-era weapons in service simply isn’t sustainable from either financial or strategic perspectives. 

As Lt. General Andrew Gabera, deputy chief of staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration explained, the Air Force has already modeled out the costs of keeping the Minuteman III relevant, but even those projections have limited value because they simply don’t know what the future may hold. Adapting to unforeseen threats would objectively be simpler (and cheaper) with a fully modern system. 

In 2021, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Navy Admiral Charles Richard, did not mince words regarding the future of the Minuteman III, saying it was simply no longer logical to pursue more service life extensions for the weapon, and issuing harsh criticisms for external calls to do so. 

“I don’t understand frankly how someone in a think tank who doesn’t have their hands on the missile, looking at the parts, the cables, all of the pieces inside that. I was out at Hill Air Force Base looking at this. That thing is so old that in some cases the drawings don’t exist anymore. Or where we do have drawings they’re six generations behind the industry standard. There’s not only not anybody working that can understand them, they’re not alive anymore,” he said. 

The admiral went on to highlight concerns about cyber vulnerabilities, saying the U.S. needed to replace what was “ basically a circuit switch system with a modern cyber defendable up-to-current standards command and control system.”

“Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward,” he argued. 

He also highlighted the changing threat environment, one of the factors the 2014 Rand analysis acknowledged would justify an ICBM replacement. 

“This nation has never before had to face the prospect of two, peer, nuclear-capable adversaries who have to be deterred differently and actions to deter one have an impact on the other. This is way more complicated than it used to be,” Richard said. 

The LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM program

But if replacing the Minuteman III was supposed to be the budget-friendly solution, that appears to have backfired. Originally, Northrop Grumman and Boeing were competing for the opportunity to design and field this new missile, with both firms planning to use solid rocket motors produced by Orbital ATK. However, Northrop Grumman purchased the rocket maker in 2019, giving them the ability to procure their rocket motors at cost, while Boeing would have to buy them at market rate. This allowed Northrop Grumman to significantly undercut Boeing’s proposal, and recognizing that, Boeing bowed out, leaving Northrop to pursue the contract uncontested. 

The Air Force ultimately awarded the company a $13.3 billion developmental contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that would become the Sentinel ICBM in September of 2020, with a projected overall program cost of $77.7 billion by the time a new fleet of missiles, silos, and launch facilities had been constructed and put into service. 

Of course, it wasn’t long before that projected $77 billion price tag began to climb. By February of 2021, the projected program cost has already risen to $100 billion, a figure that held until 2023, when the Pentagon acknowledged that the program’s cost had risen so substantially that even a “reasonably modified” version of the ongoing missile program, meant to reduce overall costs, would still likely ring in at roughly $140.1 billion — representing an 81% cost overrun over the effort’s initial projections. More recent estimates from earlier this month saw another roughly $800 million increase, bringing the current total to $140.9 billion.

While cost overruns are pretty commonplace among the Defense Department’s highest-priority efforts, an increase this substantial is not — in fact, the Sentinel’s budget woes are so severe that the program ran the risk of being canceled by law until just a few weeks ago. 

Significant cost overruns in the 1980s associated with programs like the H-60 Series Black Hawk helicopter and MIM-104 Patriot Air Defense System prompted Senator Sam Nunn and Representative David McCurdy to sponsor what has come to be known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which mandated public reporting to Congress when Defense acquisition costs began to skyrocket. 

This law has seen at least nine amendments since, with today’s Nunn-McCurdy laws identifying two types of budgetary breaches separated by severity. Significant Breaches occur when a weapon system or platform’s per-unit cost exceeds 15 percent or more of the current baseline cost, or when overall program costs grow more than 30 percent above their original baseline estimate. More severe Critical Breaches occur when costs increase 25 percent or more over current baseline estimates or 50 percent more than the original baseline estimate. 

As of 2009, any program that meets the criteria for a Critical Breach is considered legally canceled unless certified otherwise by the Secretary of Defense, which is generally accompanied by a plan to restructure the program and a full written explanation of the problems — and intended solutions — for Congress. 

At 81 percent above the original program cost estimate, the LGM-35 certainly met the criteria to be classified as a Critical Breach, prompting a Defense Department review of issues the program is facing and potential alternatives to continuing its development. 

The results of that review were released to the public on July 8, with the Pentagon certifying the program to continue despite its immense cost for a number of reasons that could truly all be boiled down to one: The Air Force simply doesn’t have any other option. 

America’s deterrent nuclear posture requires that the country maintain at least 400 operational ICBMs, and even if all the technological hurdles to extending the Minuteman III’s life could be easily overcome, testing alone will ensure that number can’t be maintained through the foreseeable future, as Uncle Sam simply starts running out missiles to launch. 

“We fully appreciate the magnitude of the costs, but we also understand the risks of not modernizing our nuclear forces and not addressing the very real threats we confront,” explained Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. 

“Based on the results of the review, it is clear that a reasonably modified Sentinel program remains essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of our warfighters.”

Over a 120-day review, the Pentagon considered options ranging from starting over with a new ICBM program to doing away with permanent silos in favor of road-mobile ICBM launchers like those employed by nations like Russia. However, it was determined that none of these options could meet the nation’s strategic needs without also coming with an even higher price tag. 

But it isn’t all bad news for the Sentinel program. As General Andrew Gebara pointed out, the missiles have actually been progressing well through development, and while this effort is centered around the new ICBM, the vast majority of cost overruns within the program aren’t related to the weapon itself. 

“It is important to remember the program that stage one, two and three of the missile have been successfully test fired already. I’m not going to say that we’ve retired every risk on the missile. But largely the issues of the missile are known issues that can be worked, and are largely okay,” he said.

The problems, it turns out, are almost entirely caused by the exploding costs of building the new missile’s command and launch facilities. While the plan is to reuse as much of the existing launch infrastructure left behind by the Minuteman III as possible, much of the communications systems, command and control infrastructure and even the launch silos themselves will need to be modernized at best and completely replaced at worst. 

Based on the Air Force’s original assessment, this will require the demolition of 45 missile alert facilities (MAF’s) in the existing silo fields, to be replaced by 45 new communications support buildings in their place, with 24 new “launch centers” constructed to support them, as well as a complete renovation of all 450 launch silos. 

The plans also call for the procurement of 62 plots of land, each roughly 5 acres in size, near existing missile fields to erect the same number of new 300-foot-tall communications towers, as well as the construction of some 3,100 miles of new utility corridors for utility lines to be housed entirely below ground, and a whole lot more. 

As of July 8, however, the Pentagon has rescinded the program’s Milestone B decision that would have allowed the Sentinel ICBM to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, pending a program revamp meant to keep the program at or beneath their newly projected $140.9 billion figure. Chief among these changes will be a “scaling back” of the planned launch facilities to make them smaller, simpler, and more cost-effective. 

The Air Force also fired Sentinel Systems Director, Col. Charles Clegg, at the end of June, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to lead the effort. The branch said his termination was not related to the Nunn-Mccurdy violation, but was instead because the colonel “did not follow organizational procedures.”

All told, the Air Force believes plotting out the new way forward for Sentinel may take as long as 18-24 months, and during that time, other big-ticket programs within the branch are also finding themselves in flux. The Air Force’s new air superiority fighter, being developed under the name Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), is still expected to see a contract award this year, but senior Air Force officials have voiced uncertainty about its future, while being clear that it will have to see cost reductions — almost certainly informed by the need to pick up Sentinel’s financial slack. 

Ultimately, the LGM-35 Sentinel is still expected to enter service sometime in the 2030s, though it may be late in the decade before these new weapons finally do come online. Once they’ve finally made it into their silos, these weapons are expected to remain in service until at least the 2070s, with modular systems meant to allow for cheaper and easier updates as the years press on. 

Of course, there remains a growing chorus of dissenting opinions, with some arguing that the U.S. should simply continue to update the Minuteman III and simply reduce the total number of ICBMs kept in service to 300 or even just 100. This would allow for a continued land-based deterrent at a much lower cost, though others argue that doing so would defeat the purpose of using these sprawling missile fields as a conceptual shield for the rest of the nation, and importantly, the rest of the triad. 

Those who contend the Sentinel ICBM program is absolutely essential to America’s deterrent nuclear posture argue that it’s not just about maintaining a large number of targets for adversaries to worry about, but it’s also about distributing the focus — and the resources — of enemy states looking for ways to work around this deterrent nuclear shield. Put simply, with fewer ICBMs to worry about, Russia and China could allocate more money toward funding ways to detect or track America’s ballistic missile submarines, potentially reducing their efficacy in the long term. 

And therein lies the heart of the financial warfare that is nuclear deterrence. For the better part of a century, the United States’ greatest military asset has been a big pile of money that it can use to fuel a wide variety of defensive endeavors, but nowhere is cost a greater factor than when it comes to nuclear weapons — which are vastly expensive systems to develop, to build, and to maintain, despite having absolutely no utilitarian value beyond the threat of their use. 

While new fighters or bombers could be used in a wide variety of conventional combat operations, nuclear weapons have only two potential use cases: Holding off the end of the world, or directly causing it. 

And that makes the value of these high-dollar assets difficult to quantify. After all, there’s really no way to know how many times nuclear war has been deterred by the mere presence of America’s sprawling nuclear triad, if it truly ever has at all. But deterrence only has to fail once to change the face of our planet and civilization forever. 

And while $140 billion is a high price to pay for a few hundred missiles, some would argue that the cost of nuclear deterrence is worth it, no matter how big the price tag. 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

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