UN Charter (October 24, 1945): Codified the prohibition of force (Article 2(4)) and institutionalized collective security alongside Great Power realpolitik via the Security Council (Chapter VII).
Cuban Missile Crisis (October 16–29, 1962): Highlighted the operational risks of nuclear brinkmanship, leading to the creation of the Washington–Moscow Hotline and modern decision-making models.
Operation Enduring Freedom (October 7, 2001): Triggered NATO’s Article 5 for the first time, introducing the „Afghan Model” of light-footprint precision warfare and long-term COIN challenges.
1. Entry into Force of the United Nations Charter (October 24, 1945) 1.1 Structural Foundations and Legal ArchitectureThe formal entry into force of the United Nations Charter on October 24, 1945, represented a decisive structural transformation in global security governance. Following the failure of the League of Nations to prevent systemic conflict in the 1930s, the Allied powers constructed a legally binding international architecture to enforce peace and regulate state behavior. Drafted at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the Charter established a centralized institutional framework centered on maintaining international peace and security.
The Charter’s core legal innovation lies in Article 2(4), which codified a comprehensive prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This norm replaced the classical jus ad bellum framework of Westphalian sovereignty with a restricted regime where armed force is legitimate under only two specific exceptions:
Individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack (Article 51).
Explicit authorization by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII.
Chapter VII provides the UNSC with sweeping coercive powers. Under Article 39, the Security Council holds the sole authority to determine threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. Once identified, the Council can mandate non-military sanctions (Article 41) or authorize military force (Article 42) to restore international security.
1.2 Realpolitik and Security Council Veto DynamicsWhile the Charter established normative principles of sovereign equality (Article 2(1)), its structural implementation acknowledged power politics. By granting permanent membership and veto power (the P5) in the Security Council to the primary victors of World War II—the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China—the Charter embedded a compromise between universal normative aspirations and Great Power realpolitik.
This design reflected the consensus that collective security could function only if Great Powers were legally shielded from enforcement actions against one another, thereby preventing direct military conflict between nuclear-capable states. However, this architectural constraint generated systemic vulnerabilities:
Strategic Paralysis: During the Cold War, opposing superpowers frequently utilized the veto to block UN intervention in conflicts within their spheres of influence.
Informal Adaptation: To bypass Security Council gridlock, the UN General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution (Resolution 377A) in 1950, allowing recommendations for collective action when the Security Council stalled.
Emergence of Peacekeeping: Because Chapter VII enforcement actions were frequently stymied, the UN developed traditional „Chapter VI and a Half” peacekeeping operations—deploying neutral military observers with host-state consent to maintain ceasefires.
From a strategic communication perspective, the UN Charter created a permanent platform for diplomatic signaling and crisis management. The Security Council serves as a critical forum for narrative warfare, normative framing, and public diplomacy. States routinely utilize UN debates to build international legitimacy, justify military interventions, or expose the legal vulnerabilities of strategic rivals.
In contemporary security policy, the UN Charter framework faces severe stress tests, including grey-zone aggression, cyber operations, proxy warfare, and direct breaches of territorial sovereignty by P5 members. Despite these strains, the legal principles established on October 24, 1945, remain the baseline benchmark for evaluating the legitimacy of military operations worldwide.
References & Key LiteratureBowett, D. W. (2009). Self-defence in international law. Manchester University Press.
Chesterman, S. (2001). Just war or just peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law. Oxford University Press.
Garey, A. (2020). The United Nations and security sector reform: Policy and practice. Routledge.
Kelsen, H. (2000). The law of the United Nations: A critical analysis of its fundamental problems. The Lawbook Exchange.
Weiss, T. G., & Daws, S. (Eds.). (2018). The Oxford handbook on the United Nations (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 16–29, 1962, stands as the most acute nuclear confrontation in history, bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to the verge of thermonuclear exchange. The crisis began when U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft confirmed the covert deployment of Soviet R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba.
From Moscow’s perspective, Operation Anadyr served dual strategic objectives: rectifying the nuclear imbalance created by U.S. missile deployments in Turkey and Italy, and deterring an American invasion of Cuba following the 1961 Bay of Pigs expedition. For Washington, nuclear missiles 90 miles off Florida fundamentally reduced strategic warning time and represented an unacceptable shift in the regional balance of power.
U.S. President John F. Kennedy established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to evaluate response options. Kennedy selected a naval „quarantine”—a blockade intended to halt offensive military shipments while leaving diplomatic space for de-escalation without provoking an immediate Soviet retaliation against West Berlin.
2.2 Crisis Communication and Decision-Making ModelsThe thirteen days demonstrated the friction inherent in nuclear brinkmanship. Operational escalation regularly threatened to outpace diplomatic command and control:
Tactical Miscalculations: On October 27 („Black Saturday”), an American U-2 aircraft was shot down over Cuba without direct authorization from Moscow. Simultaneously, the isolated Soviet submarine B-59, subjected to non-lethal U.S. depth charges, nearly launched a nuclear-tipped torpedo due to lost communications.
Back-Channel Diplomacy: Public posturing at the UN Security Council was matched by secret negotiations. Key channels included informal contacts between KGB agent Aleksandr Feklisov and journalist John Scali, alongside direct high-level meetings between Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.
The resolution required a complex diplomatic compromise. Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to publicly dismantle and withdraw Soviet offensive missiles under UN verification. In return, President Kennedy pledged publicly that the U.S. would not invade Cuba, while privately agreeing to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Strategic Dimension American Positioning Soviet Positioning Public Stance Naval Quarantine; Demand for immediate missile removal Declaration of defensive aid; Resistance to U.S. piracy Operational Action DEFCON 2; Blockade; Preparation for air strikes Covert deployment; Air defense readiness in Cuba Secret Concession Removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey Agreement to UN inspection/verification frameworks 2.3 Theoretical and Strategic AftermathThe crisis became the primary empirical foundation for modern strategic studies. Graham Allison demonstrated that state behavior during acute crises cannot be fully explained through a singular „Rational Actor” model (Model I), as decisions are heavily shaped by „Organizational Process” mechanics (Model II) and „Bureaucratic Politics” bargaining (Model III).
The realization that intelligence gaps and operational friction could trigger unintended nuclear war led directly to strategic adjustments:
Direct Communication Channels: In 1963, Washington and Moscow established the Washington–Moscow Direct Communications Link („Hotline”) to ensure rapid crisis communication.
Arms Control Regimes: The crisis catalyzed bilateral arms control, leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s.
Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). Longman.
Blight, J. G., & Welch, D. A. (1989). On the brink: Americans and Soviets reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hill and Wang.
Dobbs, M. (2008). One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war. Alfred A. Knopf.
Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A new history. Penguin Press.
Trachtenberg, M. (1991). History and strategy. Princeton University Press.
3. Launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (October 7, 2001) 3.1 Post-9/11 Security Paradigm and Alliance Mechanics
The initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001, launched the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and redefined Western alliance structures. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, the Bush administration defined the conflict as an armed attack triggering the right of national self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
On September 12, 2001, NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, declaring the attacks against the U.S. to be an attack against all member states. However, the initial military campaign did not deploy under a formal NATO command structure. Seeking maximum operational autonomy, U.S. leadership adopted an „ad hoc coalition of the willing” approach, aligned with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s operational doctrine that „the mission determines the coalition.”
A Three October Turning Points in Modern Security Policy (1945, 1962, 2001) bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.
Credit: UN Women/Samar Abu Elouf
By UN Women
NEW YORK, Oct 30 2026 (IPS)
More than 37,000 civilians were killed in conflict last year. Women and girls accounted for one in four of these deaths – double their proportion in 2021 – according to the 2026 UN Secretary-General’s report on Women, Peace, and Security, released today.
Approximately 750 million women and girls now live within 50 kilometers of an active conflict, 40 million more than in 2024, and more than at any time since 1990.
“More women and girls are trapped in wars than at any point in decades. Yet military spending keeps rising and development assistance keeps falling, even as investing in women’s leadership, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding has never been more urgent”, said UN Women Executive Director Sima Bahous.
For women and girls caught in war, the threat goes beyond bombs. Cases of conflict-related sexual violence verified by the United Nations nearly quadrupled between 2022 and 2025. War also drives women deeper into poverty and increases their unpaid care work. Around 170 million women and girls live in both conflict zones and extreme poverty, surviving on less than USD 3 a day. They account for almost 40 per cent of all women and girls living in extreme poverty globally. In conflict-affected countries, women and girls spend five times as many hours on unpaid domestic and care work as men and boys, double the global average.
These impacts are compounded by changing warfare and declining respect for international law. The increasing use of drones and long-range weapons in populated areas, including deliberate attacks on schools, markets, and hospitals – central to women’s daily lives – raises further safety concerns. Emerging AI-enabled military technologies add to these risks, particularly for women and girls already facing violence, displacement, and insecurity.
Even amid these challenges, women are working to protect communities and build peace.
“Every day, women around the world are working to end wars and build peace – protecting survivors, keeping communities together, and stopping violence before it starts. Their work is one of the best investments the world can make in peace”, continued the UN Women Executive Director.
Despite these contributions, the report shows that in 2025, women made up only five per cent of negotiators across 57 peace processes worldwide, down from seven per cent the year before.
Women’s exclusion from peace negotiations is compounded by a lack of investment in their work. Global military expenditure hit a record USD 2.9 trillion in 2025. Meanwhile, 40 per cent of women’s organizations in crisis-affected settings expect to shut down temporarily or permanently within the next year because of severe funding shortfalls. Women’s organizations are the backbone of lasting peace. They mediate local tensions, shelter the displaced, support survivors, and hold communities together. Their survival is essential to sustaining that peace.
UN Women calls for the protection of all women and girls and their rights, their meaningful participation in peace and security, and sustained investment in women-led conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We call for international law to be upheld and for an end to impunity.
IPS UN Bureau
Excerpt:
At least 25 women and girls are killed every day as civilian deaths mount, sexual violence rises, and women remain largely excluded from peace negotiations.A Yamatónak meglehetősen szép szakirodalma van, annak ellenére, hogy a már említett okok miatt igazából valamennyi csatahajó közül róla tudjuk a legkevesebbet. A Yamatóról, melyről leggyakrabban úgy beszélnek, mint egyedi építésű hajóról – a róla szóló japán filmben ha jól emlékszem, még csak meg sem említették a Musashit –, rendszerint valahogy úgy írnak, mint a csatahajók fejlődésének csúcspontjáról, vagy legalábbis egy új generáció, a „szuper-csatahajó” első példányáról. A „szuper-csatahajó” elnevezést gondolom a Queen Elizabeth osztály szakirodalomban rendszeresen visszatérő elnevezése, a „szuper-dreadnought” ihlette, és azt akarják vele sugallni, hogy a Yamato ugyanolyan korszakváltást jelentett a csatahajók evolúciójában, mint annak idején a Queen Elizabeth. Ami viszont így már biztosan nem igaz. Ha nem a méreteket, hanem a csatahajó teljesítményadatait nézzük, láthatjuk, azok nem sokban múlták felül a fő ellenségnek számító kortárs amerikai csatahajókét, már ha egyáltalán felülmúlták őket.
On 18 June 2026, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) launched an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into Germany’s pharmaceutical policy. The investigation could ultimately lead to tariffs being imposed on German exports to the United States. This is the first time the US government has used these legal powers to challenge drug pricing abroad. Although the regulation of pharmaceutical costs falls within national competence, defensive measures against US tariffs fall within the exclusive competence of the European Union (EU), which could consider invoking its Anti-Coercion Instrument. The German government should work with its EU partners to respond to this attempt to interfere with Germany’s public policies on drug pricing. Further partnerships, including with non-EU countries, could help address the transnational issue of drug pricing.
By Shahiduzzaman
DHAKA, Bangladesh, Oct 29 2026 (IPS)
Dowry is still persisting in society in one form or another. This deeply entrenched social practice continues deepen household poverty and cause violence against women. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh has a law against dowry. It does. The more uncomfortable question is why the law has failed to make dowry socially unacceptable and practically difficult to demand. The Dowry Prohibition Act 2018 makes the demand for dowry a criminal offence. Direct or indirect demands can result in one to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to Tk 50,000, or both. Giving, taking or assisting in the giving or taking of dowry is also punishable. The law even makes dowry-related agreements void. Yet, the existence of legislation has not eliminated the practice. Instead, dowry has increasingly adapted itself to modern economic and social realities.
Shahiduzzaman
It may no longer always be described as “dowry”. A demand for a motorcycle, cash for a business, furniture, electronics, a car, money for migration, payment of a loan or financial assistance to the groom’s family can be presented as a “gift”, “help” or “family contribution”. In some cases, demands continue years after marriage. This makes dowry harder to identify, document and prosecute.Research published in Development and Change in 2024 provides a disturbing illustration. In a study of 206 cases involving troubled marriages, 52 per cent involved complaints of continuing dowry demands. In 81 per cent of those cases, the demand was accompanied by violence against wives. The cases crossed economic classes, showing that dowry is not simply a problem of poor families.
The human rights consequences are profound. Dowry transforms marriage from a relationship between two individuals into an economic transaction in which a woman can be treated as a source of wealth. When the expected payment is not made, or when the husband or his family believes it is insufficient, the woman may face humiliation, threats, physical assault, psychological abuse, economic deprivation, abandonment or expulsion from the marital home.
The latest national evidence on violence against women makes the wider context impossible to ignore. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and UNFPA’s 2024 Violence Against Women Survey found that 76 per cent of ever-married women had experienced at least one form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime under the broader Bangladesh-specific definition. Nearly half, 49 per cent, experienced such violence during the previous 12 months. The survey specifically identifies dowry practices among the factors associated with increased risk of intimate partner violence.
This is not merely a women’s issue. It is a human rights issue involving the rights to life, dignity, equality, security and freedom from violence. The most frightening consequence is death. According to figures cited by the European Union Agency for Asylum from Ain o Salish Kendra monitoring, Bangladesh recorded 77 reported incidents of dowry-related violence against women in 2024. Of these, 36 women died as a result of the violence, and another seven reportedly died by suicide. During January-June 2025, 45 incidents were recorded, with 23 women reportedly dying from the violence.
These figures should not be interpreted as the total number of dowry-related deaths in Bangladesh. They represent documented cases recorded by a human rights monitoring organisation, and many incidents may never reach police, courts or the media. Indeed, the national violence survey found that 62 per cent of survivors never disclosed the violence they experienced.
The causes of dowry-related deaths are also revealing. They can include severe beatings, burns, strangulation, poisoning, forced or coerced suicide, and other forms of physical violence. In some cases, what is presented as suicide may follow prolonged harassment, threats and economic coercion. This is why every suspicious death of a married woman following allegations of dowry demand deserves an impartial investigation rather than being dismissed as a “family matter”.
Dowry also makes poor families poorer. For a low-income household, arranging a daughter’s marriage can mean selling land, livestock or productive assets, taking loans, borrowing from relatives or using savings accumulated over years. The World Bank has documented the strong relationship between poverty and dowry in Bangladesh.
This creates a vicious cycle. Poverty encourages families to see marriage as a financial necessity; dowry drains household resources; debt weakens the family’s economic security; and economic dependence can make women less able to leave abusive marriages. Dowry can also contribute to child marriage. UNICEF research notes that despite the 2018 law, families continue to face social pressure surrounding dowry. Because dowry can increase as girls grow older, some families marry daughters earlier to reduce the expected financial burden.
Bangladesh is not facing this problem alone. India offers an important comparison. Indian law not only prohibits dowry but also has a specific legal category for “dowry death”. Under Section 304B, now carried forward as Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, a woman’s unnatural death within seven years of marriage can be treated as dowry death when there is evidence of cruelty or harassment linked to dowry demands. The punishment is a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment and can extend to life imprisonment. But India’s experience also demonstrates that stronger legislation alone is not enough. Official Indian data recorded 6,156 dowry-death cases in 2023.
The lesson for Bangladesh is clear: criminalisation must be accompanied by effective enforcement, investigation, prosecution, survivor protection and social transformation. Bangladesh therefore needs to move beyond symbolic prohibition. First, police must treat dowry complaints as serious criminal allegations rather than private family disputes. Second, investigations into suspicious deaths of married women must examine previous dowry demands, financial transactions, messages, threats, medical records and testimony from neighbours and relatives. Third, victims need accessible legal aid, emergency shelter and economic support. A woman who has no income, no safe place to live and responsibility for children may remain with an abusive husband simply because leaving appears economically impossible.
The deeper problem is not the absence of law. It is the gap between law and social reality. A society cannot claim meaningful progress on women’s rights while a woman can be beaten because her family cannot provide money, forced to leave her marital home because a demand remains unpaid, or lose her life because marriage has been turned into a financial transaction.
The writer is the Editor and CEO of News Network
This story was originally published by The Daily Sun
IPS UN Bureau