Agrégateur de flux

A new governing coalition offers more of the same.

Die französische Regierung hat einen umfangreichen Plan für mehr Klimaschutz vorgestellt. Die Wärmepumpenproduktion soll in den kommenden vier Jahren verdreifacht werden, die beiden letzten Kohlekraftwerke vom Netz gehen und E-Autos gefördert werden. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert die Pläne wie folgt:

Frankreichs Plan, mit gezielten politischen Maßnahmen eine Reindustrialisierung Frankreichs durch die Elektrifizierung von Verkehr und Industrie anzustreben, ist grundsätzlich lobenswert. Der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen und Elektro-Fahrzeugen ist durchaus effizient und sinnvoll. Allerdings hat Frankreich ohnehin schon ein Strom-Problem, weil viele Atomkraftwerke marode sind. Strom muss aber effizient genutzt und darf nicht verschwendet werden. Es wäre daher sinnvoll, wenn Frankreich die Subventionierung der Stromproduktion einstellt und die Strompreise nicht mehr künstlich niedrig hält. Nur wenn diese die Kostenwahrheit widerspiegeln, kann Strom gespart und effizient genutzt werden.

Frankreich kann es gelingen, mit der Förderung von Wärmepumpen und E-Fahrzeugen die Wirtschaft beziehungsweise die Industrieproduktion anzukurbeln, sofern das Energiesystem effizient ist. Deutschland kann ebenfalls von diesen Programmen profitieren, da zahlreiche Wärmepumpen-Anbieter die Produktion hochfahren und auch die deutschen Autohersteller mehr auf Elektromobilität umstellen werden. Daher sollte in Deutschland der Einsatz von Wärmepumpen nicht zerredet werden.

But countering China’s growing regional clout is proving to be an uphill battle.

“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices,” wrote Adam Smith in 1776. That’s why it’s unsurprising that the cattle industry association R-Calf USA has a petition calling for tariffs on Australian and New Zealand sheep products.

The proposed tariffs would violate the free-trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and Australia. It has no chance of succeeding against Australia and would also raise lamb prices for American consumers. The petition makes baseless claims that Australia has inferior environmental and production standards despite Australia’s very stringent standards.

American lamb is expensive because the U.S. government has restricted poisonous bait for predators, disastrously affecting the domestic sheep population. Sheep farmers can blame their government and the environmental lobby for prioritizing the welfare of coyotes and foxes over ranchers and sheep. 

As the petition states, “The use of sodium fluoroacetate (compound 1080), a chemical compound once widely and effectively used as a poisonous bait in the United States by the sheep industry to control predators and thus reduce predation, was prohibited in 1972 (by the EPA) and later reauthorized with severe restriction in 1985.”

According to Meat & Livestock Australia:

 Lethal baiting is considered to be the most effective available method of controlling foxes and is cost effective over large areas. Ground baiting tends to be more effective and has a decreased risk of baiting non-target species than aerial baiting. There are strict restrictions on the availability and use of 1080 and persons using 1080 must ensure they meet appropriate state requirements and follow instructions.

If R-Calf USA felt they had a genuine legal dispute against Australian entities, they could seek to resolve their dispute through consultation as called for by Article 21.5 of the U.S.-Australia FTA. Failing that, according to Article 21.7, “where consultations are not effective in resolving a dispute, the Agreement provides for an arbitral panel to consider the matter.”

This option has been available since 2005, but the trade association has chosen not to pursue it because they are on weak legal ground. Instead, R-Calf USA has misrepresented the situation to Hill staffers and Members of Congress while obscuring the existence of the FTA and its parameters.

The petition presents a distorted view of free-trade agreements in general and even makes erroneous claims about other FTAs, such as NAFTA.

Instead of attacking popular imports from our closest allies, R-Calf USA should encourage the American sheep industry to innovate and lobby for changes to regulations concerning the necessary culling of predators of American sheep.

R-Calf USA should recognize that the Biden administration is no friend of animal farming. The extreme environmental and Net Zero policies that have taken hold in the West are declaring war on everything from sheep and cattle to fossil fuels. If the Net Zero extremists get their way, they will cull all sheep and cattle to achieve their unobtainable targets.

The Biden administration is now attacking agriculture in this new green war, following the examples of the Netherlands and Belgium. Biden’s Special Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, said concerning Net Zero at the U.S. Department for Agriculture, “We don’t get this job done unless agriculture is front and center as part of the solution.” The attack on emissions is taking its toll on food.

The Australian and New Zealand agricultural interests have been far more resourceful in capturing foreign markets for their sheep products. For example, lamb is a favored food product in Muslim-majority countries. Australia and New Zealand have effectively produced Halal-compliant food products in these markets. American producers could learn from this example, innovate, and compete in the international export market.

Regulations, inefficiency, and a lack of innovation and infrastructure are miring the U.S. sheep industry. Australia and New Zealand, two of our closest allies, should not be blamed for these failures, especially when we need their cooperation in national security matters relating to Chinese aggression, as exemplified in the recent AUKUS agreement.

Most importantly, the petition is correct to highlight the harmful effects of inflation on the U.S. sheep industry and the increased price of American sheep products. But blame for that should be leveled squarely at the Biden administration’s reckless overspending that has caused the inflation and the complacency of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Chairman Jerome Powell, who declared that inflation was transitory. 

Inflation hit a forty-year high in 2022, affecting all businesses and shoppers. The production-cost spikes, including nearly a 23 percent increase in fuel costs and a 13.5 percent increase in feed costs during 2021, have burdened sheep producers with mounting expenses. You can’t blame Australia and New Zealand for that, but you should blame Joe Biden.

Merchants always incentivize blocking competition to keep prices high and stifle innovation, but Congress should not fall for this petition. In these inflationary times, Americans need low-cost meat. Both trade policy and regulatory changes can help them get it.

Andrew Hale is the Jay Van Andel Senior Trade Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ever since December 2, 1823, the United States has been committed to the independence of Latin America. While the precise interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and its implications have varied over the past 200 years, the core interests of the United States have not. South and Central America is one of the few areas that could actually threaten the U.S. heartland, and American statesmen have long recognized this fact.

However, this recognition has been lost on recent administrations. A mix of regional populism and sheer American ineptitude allows American adversaries to gain footholds that could quickly turn into regional power. 

While much attention has been paid to Wagner mercenaries in Haiti, offering a coherent security force in a nation without a functioning government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has leveraged its economic might to gain valuable influence in the region. China’s use of its credit to entice vulnerable countries into Faustian bargains with the CCP is nothing new. Since launching the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 10 years ago, China has used its economic investment capabilities to further its strategic interests across Africa and Asia. This “debt-trap diplomacy” has come at a severe cost for several of China’s partners, with Sri Lanka being the most notable and tragic example. What is new is the extension of these lines of credit to the Western hemisphere and the deafening lack of a serious response from Washington. Historically, any intrusion into the region by any great power would have elicited swift action under the Monroe Doctrine.

Now, it is important to note significant differences between the current moment and the close of World War II, the last time the United States found itself as a power center in a multipolar world. Back then, most third parties were either poor or in ruins. Lines of demarcation were quickly drawn. This time, the emergence of multiple power centers across the globe has been gradual. As such, it is only reasonable for nations to seek a policy of strategic nonalignment to extract as many benefits as possible through cooperation with other powers. Jorge Heine of Boston University’s Active Nonalignment outline is perhaps the most noted example of this in Latin America. At the same time, Modi’s noncommittal stances in India over the past year show the potential value of maintaining strategic autonomy in this new environment.

It is striking that instead of playing all sides off each other for concessions, most Latin American nations are only ever offered deals from one side, and it’s not the democratic West. Latin America is desperate for investment, and many nations prefer alignment with the United States, but their pleas too often fall on deaf ears in Washington. Uruguay has been begging for a free trade deal with the United States for more than a decade. Still, the isolationist and anti-free trade sentiment currently in fashion in both the Democratic and Republican parties means few are enthusiastic about a trade deal with a “low-priority” country in South America. The lack of progress toward an agreement has left Uruguay with no option other than Beijing.

What’s more infuriating is the case of Ecuador. Due to the previous administration's irresponsible spending policies, the country was crippled by its obligations to repay Chinese debt. What’s worse, much of the loans were required to be paid back in long-term oil contracts, preventing the country from benefiting from the global spike in oil prices after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that followed. Ecuador sold its oil to China at a discount. With his back against a wall, President Guillermo Lasso reached a deal restructuring the country’s $6.5 billion debt last year. However, as that country's political instability worsens, its economic dependence on China will only increase in the coming years.

Moreover, Chinese investment is often incredibly destabilizing for nations that receive loans. Beijing has a history of offering money without any conditions regarding how it is spent. Such negligence opens the door to elite capture, exacerbating corruption and weakening the rule of law, ultimately rolling back democratic institutions and sliding the region towards autocracy. Additionally, most Latin American nations have little experience with these types of deals, only strengthening Beijing’s hand in negotiations.

Ultimately, the best tool the United States has is trade. Its greatest asset is its economic might, the depth of its capital markets, and its ability to borrow and lend at rates unreachable by other nations. Increased trade between the United States, U.S. allies, and Latin America increases the region’s ties to the United States and reduces its dependence on Chinese credit.

Too often, American politicians and intellectuals, in deriding free trade dogmatism, have retreated to a quasi-mercantilist stance. On one level, post-liberals have an ounce of truth in their grievance. At the same time, the basic math behind Ricardian equivalence remains true, the potentially severe social and political repercussions of such policies require proactive management. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made all parties wealthier and more economically integrated. It also had the unfortunate side-effect of wiping out Mexico’s agriculture industry and U.S. manufacturing in the upper Midwest. The long-term effects of these developments are still felt across North America. What is needed is a proper understanding of the level of trade necessary for our current situation—a level above autarchy and below free trade dogmatism. On a concrete level, that means a large number of narrow trade deals targeting specific industries. 

The Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has also found balancing developmental assistance with foreign policy objectives challenging. Additionally, it has a distinct “America First” economic orientation, meaning that its investment in developing nations is intended to benefit American firms. The problem with this approach is that the United States is not the best source of the kind of investment that these countries need most. For instance, the United States hasn’t built a new deep-water port in decades, so the goal of U.S. policymakers needs to be connecting Latin American nations with firms from friendly countries that are not beholden to the CCP and can best meet their development needs. 

On a practical level, this means identifying nations that are receptive to U.S. interests and investment and focusing on turning them into regional leaders as well as U.S. allies. The Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Chile, and Guatemala are all potential candidates. Once identified nations show progress towards stability and prosperity, it will entice other countries towards a similar course of action.

What is perhaps most important for American diplomats to do is avoid making our Latin American policy a strictly anti-China strategy. Latin American leaders aren’t stupid, and they don’t enjoy seeing themselves as being used as chess pieces in a “New Great Game.” Instead, America should approach investment deals as primarily profit-seeking enterprises or on humanitarian grounds, not as geopolitical moves. Anti-American fears are an easy specter for populist Latin American leaders to invoke when politically convenient. U.S. policymakers need to be aware of these tendencies so as not to exacerbate them.

Additionally, the potential of sending migrants to the southern U.S. border severely limits American maneuverability in Central America. Any interference in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the so-called Northern Triangle, could trigger ever larger exoduses of migrants, something those nations’ leaders have been quick to capitalize on. 

The Plan Colombia initiative (2000–2015) was a major triumph of diplomacy, in which American intelligence and coordination successfully broke up the Marxist FARC rebels and increased control of the legitimate government of Bogotá over the countryside. Such a plan should serve as a blueprint for further action in fragile regimes. At a time when major U.S. presidential candidates are calling for military action against the cartels in northern Mexico, such a move would be a much narrower and more prudent alternative. The Merida Initiative (2007–2021) was supposed to act as just that. Still, it was never managed well, and its replacement, the Bicentennial Framework, is too focused on social programs to achieve American strategic objectives. A focused, well-planned initiative with an emphasis on security needs to be a priority of American foreign policy, with a stick-and-carrot approach to bring a reluctant Mexican government on board.

Finally, the United States should look for easy psychological victories demonstrating its commitment to Latin America. “Illegal, Unregulated, and Unrestricted” (IUU) fishing is an excellent place to start. Such practices have devastated the environment, with fishing populations stripped bare and whole ecosystems irreparably harmed. When an armada of Chinese fishing vessels appeared off the Galapagos Islands in 2020, Ecuador begged for international assistance. A show of American force, as little as a few frigates dispatched to the region to disperse the illegal fishing fleet, would have sent a clear message. Better yet, a joint action by the Organization of American States (OAS) spearheaded by the United States and regional navies would have shown solidarity in an area where China was clearly in the wrong.

If the United States does not wish to cede any more ground in a region vital to its interests, it must rethink its regional policies. Washington needs to demonstrate a credible commitment to the area in such ways that increase Western economic interdependence, don’t ferment populist sentiment, and prevent further CCP intrusion. It’s a tall order, but one for which the United States must rise to the occasion.

Haydon N. Parham works in mortgage finance. He was a Spring 2023 New Whiggery Fellow at the Institute on Religion and Democracy and a 2024 Public Policy Fellow at the Fund for American Studies. His interests include Philosophy, Economics, and History, and he lives in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock

U.S. Air Force Hits The mark In Savannah, Georgia, At William Tell 2023 Air to Air Weapons Meet. William Tell, the U.S Air Force’s legendary fighter competition has returned after a nineteen-year pause, testing the [...]

The post The U.S Air Force’s Legendary Fighter Competition ‘William Tell’ Has Returned appeared first on The Aviationist.

Présentation
Une société qui sait se tenir ne craint pas de recourir aux armes pour régler ses différends, d’homme à homme. La nôtre l’a oublié, au bénéfice des couards, qui n’ont plus à payer le prix de leur impudence, sinon en frais de justice. Il y a fort à parier que certains journalistes ravaleraient leurs provocations et montreraient une salutaire prudence si leurs écrits les engageaient sur le pré… L’Éloge du duel, loin de célébrer la force brute, est tout au contraire une invitation à revenir à une civilisation réglée par le code de l’honneur, faite d’hommes trempés comme l’acier et de femmes qui se battent seins nus. Universitaire et mousquetaire dans l’âme, Bernard Lugan retrace l’histoire de cette noble institution et défend les valeurs viriles contre les velléités castratrices du wokisme.
- Editeur : La Nouvelle Librairie
- 168 pages
- Disponible dans toutes les librairies

Pour le commander via l'Afrique Réelle :

         Livraison France 25,00 EUR UE 29,00 EUR Monde 43,00 EUR

Emmanuel Macron a présenté, lundi, les grands axes de sa "planification" pour une écologie "souveraine", "compétitive" et "juste". Le chef de l'État a notamment promis d'annoncer en octobre une reprise du "contrôle sur notre prix de l'électricité" face aux oppositions qui l'accusent de laisser la facture exploser.

Dans un monde où nous semblons tous vouloir être minces, il est difficile d'imaginer que certaines personnes veulent et ne peuvent pas prendre du poids.

A levegő minősége hatással van mindannyiunk egészségére, a Parlament ezért szigorúbban szabályozná a légszennyezést.

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2023 - EP

(B2) Le retrait de l'ambassadeur français du Niger était inéluctable. De même que le retrait des soldats français. Il aurait été sans doute plus sage et plus avisé de le faire plus tôt. Sans ce bras de fer inutile et finalement perdu.

La décision prise par le président Emmanuel Macron était la seule possible. Annoncée dimanche (24 septembre) au détour d'une interview télévisée bien préparée (1) sur TF1 et France 2, elle interpelle.

Le fond et la forme

Si sur le fond, la position française est logique — refuser de composer avec une junte militaire et considérer le président élu Mohamed Bazoum comme la seule autorité légitime — la forme est beaucoup plus discutable. Camper comme un matamore sur une position ferme — nous ne bougerons pas —, pour ensuite, plier bagage, sans tambours ni trompettes est plutôt incompréhensible. Aucune justification concrète n'est donnée à ce revirement. La seule explication valable étant que la situation était politiquement, militairement et moralement intenable.

Mali, Niger, bis repetita

La même situation s'était produite au Mali où, dans un premier temps, les Français avaient dit, nous ne partirons pas, puis avaient finalement plié bagage, clôturant l'opération Barkhane (lire : Le retrait du Mali : une sacrée défaite française). Au final, l'image et la réputation de la France en sort écornée. Elle laisse l'impression que si une junte militaire est ferme et droite dans ses bottes dans le refus de la coopération, la France après avoir dit haut et fort ce qu'elle pense, rompt le camp. C'est un très mauvais signal envoyé à tous nos alliés en Afrique et un bel encouragement pour de futurs coups d'État.

Un repli sur le territoire européen ?

En même temps, ce départ signe, avec celui qui l'a précédé au Mali, la fin des grosses opérations extérieures conduites par l'armée française (2) en Afrique, voire même dans le monde. Le repli est ainsi sonné vers la défense du territoire national et de l'espace européen. La visite du ministre des Armées, Sébastien Lecornu, en Moldavie, est un signe notable de cette évolution. Un changement tactique, plutôt que stratégique pour l'instant (3).

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

1. À la 27e minute sur une question de relance, apparemment bien concertée avec l'Élysée, de la présentatrice du 20h de TF1, Anne-Laure Coudray
2. L'opération Chammal en Iraq pourrait faire exception. Mais elle se déroule de façon très discrète et, surtout, dans une coalition (conduite par les Américains et non les Français).
3. Cela ne signifie pas la fin des engagements extérieurs. La France conserve un nombre non négligeable  de points d'appui en Afrique ou ailleurs dans le monde, qu'il s'agisse de bases militaires accueillies par les pays africains (Djibouti, Tchad, Côte d'Ivoire, Sénégal, etc.) ou du Moyen-Orient (Émirats arabes unis), ou des départements et territoires d'outre-mer (Guyane, La Réunion, Nouvelle Calédonie, etc.).

Lire aussi :

• [Analyse] Après le coup d’état au Niger, plusieurs questions se posent
• [Analyse] Le Global South se détache peu à peu. L’Europe déstabilisée ?
• [Réflexion] La fin des grandes interventions extérieures occidentales ?

The EU's trade chief travelled to China to send a clear message: the EU does not want to cut off ties, but fair competition is needed and more action is necessary to rebalance the current Brussels-Beijing €400bn trade deficit.

Autrichienne jusqu'au début du XXe siècle, avant de devenir italienne puis yougoslave et finalement partagée entre la Slovénie et la Croatie, l'Istrie connaît un enchevêtrement de frontières, facilement franchies par les migrants qui abou- tissent à Trieste. Pour justifier leur refoulement, le (...) / Histoire, Frontières, Italie, Slovénie, Nationalisme - 2023/09

Recent anti-UN protests have fueled concerns that some UN peacekeeping operations are facing a “crisis of legitimacy” among host-state populations. Without local legitimacy, there are questions about whether peacekeepers should be present. Peacekeeping operations also depend on local legitimacy to effectively implement their mandates. It is therefore important to understand how local populations perceive UN peacekeepers.

While researchers have studied local perceptions within specific peacekeeping contexts and compared historical data on local perceptions in past peacekeeping operations, few have compared recent data on local perceptions of current missions. This article therefore explores existing data on local perceptions of the four current multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations: the missions in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and South Sudan. This data points to several cross-cutting insights that could help inform conversations around local perceptions of UN peacekeeping.

The paper concludes that there is wide variation in perceptions of peacekeepers, both between and within peacekeeping contexts and across time. This means that it rarely makes sense to talk about UN peacekeeping operations having or lacking “legitimacy.” Instead, they have multiple “legitimacies.” Understanding the factors behind these legitimacies requires better data on and nuanced analysis of local perceptions.

Download

Une poignée de poussière provenant d'un astéroïde lancé à toute allure dans l'espace pourrait révéler à la Nasa l'origine de la vie sur Terre.

What can critical and postcolonial European Studies scholars learn from W.E.B. Du Bois’ sociological thought? And how can this contribute to the agenda of  ‘decolonising’ Europe? A UACES Microgrant report on the 53rd Annual European Studies Conference in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

A UACES Microgrant report by Joshua M. Makalintal.

 

 

Critical European Studies has gained some ground, particularly at the recent UACES Annual Conference that took place at Queen’s University Belfast in Northern Ireland earlier this month. Uniting 11 panels and over 30 contributions under the themed track entitled ‘(En)countering Europe as Global, Othered and Transperipheral Voices’ (EUROGLOT), this year’s event enabled a space to elevate pressing issues and critical works that have mostly been and are still usually marginalised within the field. The contributions under this themed track engaged in questions of how to approach Europe and its various historical legacies as well as its encounters with the broader social world.

For the EUROGLOT panel on ‘Theorising Europe, Otherwise’, I took the opportunity to present my working paper reassessing W.E.B. Du Bois’ immanent critique of Europe and empire. This paper forms part of a more comprehensive theoretical research project of mine that aims to reconstruct his ideology-critical and anti-disciplinary sociological work. My contribution in this context foregrounded an attempt to intervene in critical and postcolonial European Studies.

W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) was an Afro-American historian, sociologist, and a leading figure of the US civil rights and pan-African movements. While substantial debates within the social sciences have erupted intensively in recent years regarding Du Bois’ place in the classical canon, his disruptive scholarship has yet to be acknowledged in other disciplines. Indeed, Du Bois’ critique of European imperialism remains undervalued in both mainstream and critical European Studies; however, as I have argued in Belfast, his anti-imperial thought may offer us a vast array of crucial resources in problematising the myths that persist within contemporary imaginaries of the European project’s history and modern trajectory. This would consequently pave an alternative pathway towards more radical and reflexive understandings of modern Europe struggling to account for its colonial pasts.

For instance, I highlighted a key concept coined by Du Bois — the notion of the colour line, which depicted the global racialised structure of his era that had governed societal relations and practices, thus producing multiple patterns of subjugation, and in turn, various forms of resistance. Using the colour line as an analytical anchor and ideological resource, Du Bois reiterated an immanent critique of European subjugation — a domination “through political power built on the economic control of labour, income and ideas”, as he wrote in 1946. Excavating the inherent contradictions within such domineering practices, Du Bois underlined how these dynamic antagonisms would stimulate the critical consciousness necessary to trigger practical opportunities for resistance and social transformation.

Du Bois has long been one of the social sciences’ marginalised voices, and rectifying this epistemic neglect entails proactively recuperating his subversive scholarship. Reclaiming and re-applying his critical thought and practice in this sense would no doubt contribute to the project of ‘decolonising’ Europe by innovatively enabling us to uncover patterns of domination and forms of injustices that are otherwise unobtrusive. By further enriching critical European Studies scholarship through various transdisciplinary (and anti-disciplinary) perspectives, coupled with the aim of subverting the epistemic hegemonies that persist within the field, we as scholars would undoubtedly be better equipped to assess the current European societal conjuncture — prone to failures, crises, and various antagonisms. This entails confronting these contradictions, compelling us to understand their immanent inevitability and consequently prevail over them, thus further stretching the space for effective interventions in the broader social world.

I was able to share these insights at the 53rd Annual European Studies Conference in part thanks to the UACES Microgrant. I am grateful for the fact that there are academic associations that are determined to financially support students and scholars of all levels in their research pursuits. My participation in this conference provided me not only with valuable feedback, but also inspiration from the other panels that would certainly further broaden my knowledge in the rich interdisciplinary field of European Studies scholarship. I am also grateful to my fellow panellists as well as to the impressively attentive audience for the insightful discussions. It was great to be part of an important and long-overdue conversation on studying, theorising, and critiquing Europe otherwise, especially in such a compelling academic setting.

 

 

The post Theorising Europe from the Margins: A Reappraisal of W.E.B. Du Bois’ Critical Thought appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A tiszta víz nélkülözhetetlen az emberek és az egészséges környezet számára. Milyen lépéseket tesz az EU és az Európai Parlament a vizek állapotának megőrzése érdekében?

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2023 - EP

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade relations it is imperative to update the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Plurilateral agreements are a viable option for responding to trade issues on which multilateral consensus is difficult. They should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation.
– In their current form, WTO rules do not adequately address pressing global challenges such as food security, pandemic responses, and climate change. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for reform.
– Effective plurilateral agreements feature a layered architecture of rights and obligations – similar to that of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) – and encompass capacity-building measures.
– WTO Members should initiate plurilaterals on topics that are of particular concern to developing countries and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) and that can help achieve the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).