Agrégateur de flux

While the meeting between the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin in Russia earlier this month alerted the

Russia's state security service, the FSB, and in particular the 2nd service, the SZKSBT (IO, 28/06/23), is closely monitoring the

Arms supplier Excalibur Army was recently approached by the Indonesian authorities to take over the financing of the Bell 412

How an innovative patent law could incentivize R & D and save millions of lives.

The illusory success of state capitalism.

Auf dem Wohnungsgipfel hat die Bundesregierung ein Paket gegen den Wohnungsmangel beschlossen. Martin Gornig, Bauexperte und Forschungsdirektor für Industriepolitik im DIW Berlin, kommentiert die Maßnahmen wie folgt:

Der Wohnungsneubau bleibt durch den sprunghaften Anstieg der Finanzierungskosten weit hinter den Erwartungen zurück. Gleichzeitig klafft schon heute eine große Lücke zwischen Fertigstellungen und Wohnraumbedarf. Dennoch ist jetzt kein Platz für Panikmache und wilden Aktionismus. Entscheidend ist nicht, ob die pauschale Zielmarke von 400.000 neuen Wohnungen jährlich erreicht wird. Entscheidend ist, dass mehr bezahlbarer Wohnraum in den Ballungsräumen entsteht. Der Fokus muss daher darauf liegen, die Liegenschaften des Bundes und der Länder für den Wohnungsbau zu aktivieren und den sozialen Wohnungsbau in Ballungsräumen aufzustocken.

Auch eine viel ehrgeizigere Förderung der Umwandlung von Büro- und Verkaufsflächen in neuen Wohnraum sollte Teil dieser Strategie sein. Dabei kommt es nicht nur auf Finanzmittel, sondern auch auf neue Ideen in der Planung und Umsetzung an. Der Vorstellung, man könne mit Steuergeldern die steigenden Finanzierungskosten wegsubventionieren, muss hingegen eine klare Absage erteilt werden. Mittelfristig sollten auch sinkende Bau- und Immobilienpreise den neuen Finanzierungsbedingungen Rechnung tragen.

As high-level European Union (EU) policy documents call for investment in active cyber defence capabilities, the legal and political powers for their use remain ill-defined. To demonstrate their commitment to principles of responsible state behaviour and due diligence, the EU and its member states have a duty to establish the normative foun­dations for the use of active cyber defence measures ahead of their deployment, while carefully managing the risk of a gradual militarisation of the cyber and information domain.

President Joe Biden’s approach toward the People’s Republic of China carefully balances on a knife’s edge. On the one hand, Beijing is the pacing threat for national defense and a long-term strategic competitor. On the other, it is an essential partner for tackling existential global challenges like climate change. The White House has paradoxically positioned itself to embrace Beijing in a narrow set of cooperative areas while simultaneously preparing for a protracted security contest because the future is clear as mud.

The United States and China have never “solved” their differences, but they always found ways to manage them. This system no longer operates because China has lost interest in playing, exposing the relationship to increased turmoil and uncertainty. The White House is trying to make the best of a very bad situation and remain flexible to prepare for any scenario that strategic competition may yield, up to and including war.

Diplomacy is the bedrock of international relations. Washington is thus prioritizing strengthening communication channels with Beijing in a bid to help stabilize their turbulent relationship. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s initial March 2021 summit with China was more akin to a verbal fighting match than a diplomatic meeting, ominously setting very low expectations for how relations would unfold over the coming years. Biden’s lone meeting in office with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2022 similarly did little to alter this bleak outlook.

Washington confronts the harsh truth that conducting meaningful diplomacy is difficult when the other party does not return the favor. Quite the contrary, Beijing has persistently weaponized high-level talks to signal its displeasure. The Chinese “great wall of pettiness” serves as an imposing barrier to achieving diplomatic breakthroughs. Nevertheless, the White House has put forth an honest effort.

In May, Washington offered for Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to meet his Chinese counterpart Li Shangfu on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Beijing declined, opting instead for a brief handshake. In June, Blinken traveled to Beijing to meet with Xi. Both sides paid lip service to the urgent need for stability, but the trip failed to achieve its core objective—a resumption of military-to-military talks. In July, special climate envoy John Kerry visited Beijing to attempt and broker a climate agreement between the world’s two largest emitters. This too, resulted in failure.

Despite all this talking, China has yet to reciprocate by sending even a single envoy to Washington. White House Press Secretary Jake Sullivan succinctly captured this unfortunate mismatch of effort and results by stating, “[we]… do not view these trips as about deliverables or particular policy outcomes.”

While Beijing’s cold shoulder has frozen diplomatic progress, its malign actions abroad have heated up the U.S.-China security contest and pushed several key actors to Washington’s side. In August, Biden participated in the first-ever trilateral stand-alone summit with the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea. The three sides issued joint remarks critical of Beijing and vowed to expand and deepen security cooperation. Notably, they also reaffirmed their commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, widely viewed as the region’s most likely flash point.

The Biden White House has given special focus toward Taiwan as it faces the grim prospect of annexation by China, which claims the self-governing island democracy as a renegade province. On multiple occasions, Biden publicly declared the United States would defend Taiwan if attacked, in contravention of decades of established protocol to remain ambiguous on the matter. Though not a formal change in policy, these statements underscore that a future potential conflict over Taiwan weighs on the President’s thoughts. With this scenario in mind, Washington approved Taiwan for the Foreign Military Finance program, usually used by sovereign states to finance American arms purchases, to go along with a $345 million arms package.

Red Shift Theory posits the universe is expanding in all directions—just like China’s territorial claims, which have brought India, Vietnam, and the Philippines closer to Washington. In June, the United States and India reaffirmed a burgeoning security relationship declaring themselves “among the closest partners in the world.” Pivotally, Washington secured Prime Minister Modi’s commitment to uphold the international rules-based maritime order paving the way for India’s contribution to push back against growing Chinese coercion in the South China Sea.

This September, Vietnam and the United States are expected to upgrade their diplomatic ties to a “strategic partnership” in a classic case of “ the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This decision is undoubtedly motivated by Hanoi’s desire to retain its political and security autonomy from China. Vietnam is steadily building links with the U.S.-led regional security architecture as indicated by Hanoi’s upgraded ties with the Republic of Korea and announced plans to do so with Australia later this year.

U.S.-Philippine security ties have undergone a fundamental reset in the best way possible. Washinton gained access to nine new bases for joint training with the Philippine Armed Forces and hosted the largest-ever annual combined U.S.-Philippine military exercise this year. In a thinly veiled shot at China’s growing preference for using coercion to enforce its disputed maritime claims with Manila, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to Article V of the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.

However, Washington’s gains in the competition space are not limited to the Indo-Pacific. European attitudes toward China have soured amidst Beijing’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, creating opportunities for the United States. In July, all thirty-one NATO member states echoed Washington’s long-stated criticisms of Beijing in a sharp statement condemning Chinese political, economic, and military coercion targeting European allies. China’s failed attempt to portray itself as a neutral party in the Ukraine War also helped push the European Union’s pledge to join the United States in countering Chinese disinformation and anti-market trade practices.

The Biden administration’s approach toward China, while not universally successful, skillfully takes into account the fact that Beijing gets a vote. Leaving the door cracked open for diplomacy provides Beijing an off-ramp to deescalate tensions, but the decision to take it ultimately rests with Xi. The U.S. has led the horse to water but cannot force it to drink. Similarly in the security realm, Xi could easily choose to initiate a conflict over Taiwan or accidentally trigger one over a disputed South China Sea claim.

Strategic competition with China does not mean presupposing war is inevitable, but it does mean doing everything possible to prevent it by acting responsibly and being prepared should it occur. Steering the U.S.-China relations to greener pastures is beyond the control of the White House, Pentagon, or Congress. Until Beijing reciprocates Washington’s diplomatic gestures, strategic competition will lack clearly defined boundaries and the risk of instability will remain ever-present. Given a lack of clear alternatives, Washington’s best bet is to continue hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.

Ryan Bercaw is a Marine Corps veteran with a decade of public service in the U.S. government focused primarily on Indo-Pacific regional security. He completed his Bachelor's degree in International Studies at the American University in Washington D.C. His published works have also appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette and the International Policy Digest. He also speaks Mandarin Chinese.

The views/statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this piece are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or U.S. government. This essay does not imply DoD or U.S. government endorsement or factual, accuracy or opinion.

Washington and Beijing have been taking steps to resume normal diplomatic engagement, which had been largely suspended for several months after the “spy balloon” incident in February. A potential meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in San Francisco in November is widely viewed as the next opportunity to restore some positive momentum to the relationship. To that end, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently met with China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, and Secretary of State Blinken met with Chinese vice president Han Zheng on the margins of the UN General Assembly. 

However, frankly, it is getting increasingly difficult to anticipate any scenario for substantial rapprochement between the United States and China in the near term, if not the foreseeable future. This is because of the structural and historical forces driving their strategic rivalry, the adversarial dynamic of their interactions, and the domestic politics on both sides that thwart mutual understanding and accommodation. These drivers keep pushing both sides—despite their rhetoric about getting bilateral relations back on track—to exchange harsh rhetoric and pursue antagonistic and retributive policies toward each other, fueling competitive tensions and hindering progress toward détente.

The historical context is fundamental. The United States spent most of the past seventy-five years as the preeminent power in the world and got used to taking that position for granted and taking advantage of it. But the end of the Cold War, coinciding as it did with China’s economic rise, began an incremental realignment of the balance of global power and influence that was accelerated by 9/11 and the Global Financial Crisis. The United States has resisted and even sought to deny its relative decline due to these developments. Washington continues to claim global preeminence—especially relative to China’s accumulation of wealth, power, and influence. The Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy states, “The United States remains the world’s leading power.”

For its part, China has been the primary beneficiary of the historical shifts in the balance of power since the Cold War (even though it remains behind the United States in absolute terms by most development metrics). Beijing’s foreign policy for the past generation has aimed to claim what the Chinese see as their rightful place in the world and promote the “reform of global governance” toward a “community of common destiny” that more accurately reflects the twenty-first-century balance of power. This is the agenda for Xi Jinping’s signature “Global Security Initiative,” “Global Development Initiative,” and “Global Civilization Initiative.” Contrary to much commentary, this agenda does not intend to establish Chinese global hegemony—only to maximize China’s international influence and legitimacy and bring global attention to its interests and security. However, it is also intended to move the world beyond U.S. global hegemony. As China’s former top diplomat famously said during the Biden Administration’s first high-level exchange with senior Chinese officials, “the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.”

This is essentially the basis for the strategic rivalry and “intense competition” between China and the United States, thus, the backdrop for U.S.-China diplomatic interaction. The Brookings Institution recently hosted an insightful seminar addressing whether this rivalry constitutes a “new cold war.” That depends on how one defines the term and assesses the relevance of the example of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War and whether we view China and the United States as “existential” threats to each other (accurately or otherwise). My own view is that it doesn’t matter whether we call it a “cold war” or not because the strategic rivalry will persist and probably intensify regardless of the semantics.

This dynamic is further exacerbated by domestic insecurities in both China and the United States, which are reinforcing and even inflating perceptions of the threat from the other side. In America, political polarization and dysfunction, racial and ethnic tensions, and the erosion of economic competitiveness have increased a sense of national vulnerability that has fueled the exaggeration of the China threat. In China itself, the economic slowdown and accompanying risk of domestic unrest have heightened Communist Party leaders’ fears of regime instability and foreign subversion—especially from the United States. Both Washington and Beijing now talk increasingly about the growing risks to “national security,” and are expanding their definition of it and their requirements for maintaining it. It is now routine for both sides to perceive and characterize the other as an “existential” threat.

Given these mindsets and mutual suspicions, it is not surprising that both Washington and Beijing are so automatically antagonistic and even adversarial in their approaches and responses to each other. This was amply reflected during the “spy balloon” episode, during which both sides presumed the worst about each other’s actions and intentions and reacted accordingly—at the expense of mutual understanding and de-escalation. 

It continues to characterize and hinder most efforts at resuming constructive bilateral ties. Both sides now routinely blame each other exclusively for the poor state of the relationship. Wang Yi, during his meeting with Blinken in Beijing in June, reiterated Beijing’s view that “the root cause” of U.S.-China tensions is “U.S. misperceptions toward China, which have led to misguided China policies” in Washington. Similarly, the United States generally holds Beijing wholly accountable because of its authoritarianism and its coercive and predatory international behavior. Each side accuses the other of harboring hostile intentions, partly by exaggerating its strategic ambitions. Both sides also accuse each other of not being seriously interested in constructive engagement—perhaps as an excuse for not pursuing the kind of accommodative policies that rapprochement would probably require.

All of this is further reinforced by the paradox that both Washington and Beijing appear to calculate that they have the hard power upper hand and the moral high ground in the relationship. This is because both sides overestimate their relative leverage and underestimate the other side’s. Washington, confident in its relative strengths and its global influence, sees no need to make substantial concessions to Beijing. However, Beijing, weighing its own emerging strengths, relative U.S. vulnerabilities, and the hedging of much of the rest of the world, is not inclined to cede ground. Hence, a contest of wills.

Both sides thus appear inclined to disregard each other’s strategic perspectives. In Beijing’s view, Washington has shown little readiness to acknowledge any legitimate Chinese interests and concerns or to show any empathy for Chinese views of the bilateral relationship. For example, American observers routinely deride Xi Jinping’s statement earlier this year that the United States seeks to “suppress, encircle, and contain” China—without examining how Beijing might get that impression from a wide range of Washington’s actions. These would include export and investment restrictions clearly aimed at hindering China’s economic development; several United States-led multilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific (such as the “Quad,” “AUKUS,” and the recent Trilateral summit at Camp David) aimed at pressuring China across its periphery; and explicit calls by many in Washington for “containment” of China.

Also, from Beijing’s perspective, Washington appears disinclined to acknowledge that bilateral tensions are in any way attributable to American actions. An emerging theme in Washington is that the United States moved toward strategic competition with China only because Beijing had become more aggressive and expansive in its ambitions under Xi’s leadership. In a recent interview, scholar David McCourt—who examined the community of American China experts and their impact on U.S. policy over the past decade—deduced that Washington shifted from engagement to competition because of an assessment that changes in China necessitated a different American response. He concluded that the United States is unlikely to return to engagement because “the Chinese seem to have no real interest in changing any of the major actions and things that they are doing that prompted the shift to strategic competition in the first place.” This overlooks both the extent to which Chinese policy shifts responded to American policies and that Washington seems to have no real interest in changing any of its relevant policies or actions.

Beijing, of course, makes it hard to be sympathetic to its perspective. It similarly shows little empathy for the views of the United States and denies any culpability for bilateral tensions. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) acts and reacts in ruthless and offensive ways that both reinforce other countries’ resistance to Beijing’s agenda and undermine their willingness to engage with it. Indeed, Chinese leaders often appear either oblivious or indifferent to how China is perceived internationally. Like Washington’s rejection of the idea that it is engaged in encirclement or containment of China, Beijing appears dismissive of the reputation it has earned with its coercive international behavior, mercantilist trade practices, heavy-handed influence operations, acquiescence to atrocious behavior by other autocratic regimes, and brutal human rights practices at home. The CCP may calculate that it needs to act offensively in pursuit of its interests and security in a hostile international environment or that China has sufficient economic clout that it can afford to alienate other countries. However, its behavior is nonetheless counterproductive to Beijing’s efforts to win global hearts and minds in its pursuit of a “community of common destiny.”

Perhaps most importantly, domestic politics in both China and the United States are making it increasingly difficult to undertake the kind of constructive engagement policies that could avert an escalation of the strategic rivalry to more hostile levels. In Washington, the very notion of “engagement” with Beijing is denounced by those who equate it with a strategy aimed at liberalizing China, which they say has irrevocably failed in ways that compromised U.S. interests and security. In a recent article, scholar Michael Beckley warned against “reengagement” as perhaps “the most dangerous [approach] of all because it neither satisfies Chinese demands nor deters Beijing from taking what it wants by force.” This prematurely dismisses the possibility that it might actually accomplish both. Moreover, despite making a rhetorical distinction between engagement and “appeasement,” Beckley comes close to equating them with each other and with “capitulation” to China. In any event, it is misleading to characterize and reject engagement as a strategy; it is instead best understood simply as a tactic—synonymous with diplomatic interaction—and a necessary mechanism for pursuing American interests.

Yet, it has become politically risky for anyone in Washington to advocate for normal diplomatic interaction with Beijing on the grounds that it is inimical to U.S. interests and rewards Chinese bad behavior. Moreover, China is widely portrayed as a fundamental ideological and systemic challenger to the United States, requiring U.S. policy to adopt an adversarial, “all-of-government” and even “all-of-society” response to confronting the threat it poses. Although this mindset is helping to fuel the antagonism in U.S.-China relations, the delicate electoral balance and political volatility in the United States make it unlikely that any American leader of either party will be prepared in the foreseeable future to assume the political risks of significantly diverging from this approach toward China.

On the Chinese side, Xi faces no comparable electoral constraints. However, historically, Chinese elite politics has been even more potentially volatile, and a growing accumulation of domestic and foreign policy challenges has reportedly left Xi vulnerable to internal criticism, if not latent challenges to his authority or at least his policy direction. Moreover, given the intensity and centrality of nationalism in Chinese politics and the prevailing belief that the United States poses the most significant external threat to China, Xi can ill afford to risk being perceived as “soft” in confronting or responding to that threat. Accordingly, it would be neither politically easy nor personally instinctual for him to advocate an accommodative approach to Washington.

The Taiwan issue is a perfect illustration of all these systemic elements of the U.S.-China strategic rivalry. Historically, it was the linchpin of establishing relations between the United States and the PRC. Now, because of profound changes in the strategic environment and the balance of power in East Asia over the past forty years, the Taiwan issue has become the fulcrum of the U.S.-China competition in the region. Both sides have deemed it a vital interest, and each side blames the other exclusively for heightening the risk of conflict that now prevails across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, domestic politics in both Washington and Beijing have proscribed a more flexible approach. This stalemate only increases the potential for escalation to a serious crisis or conflict.

So, this is the bilateral strategic context in which Washington and Beijing are ostensibly seeking to build a relationship that will not “veer into conflict.” Both sides see themselves in a zero-sum competition and an existential ideological struggle. The pursuit of détente is considered illusory and a sign of weakness. The United States and China have inflated perceptions about the other side’s strategic intentions. They find it easier to exaggerate the threat, accuse the other side of subverting constructive engagement, and blame the other for self-inflicted vulnerabilities than to consider accommodation or compromise seriously. In any event, domestic politics leaves little room for successfully advocating the latter. Instead, girding for intense competition across-the-board appears to be the only reasonable and viable option. Neither Washington nor Beijing seems able to recognize or be willing to acknowledge all of these symmetries.

It is hard to see the exit ramp that will allow the United States and China to escape this current path toward an adversarial relationship and instead find a way toward reciprocal accommodation and peaceful coexistence. The circumstances are reminiscent of the famous line in the classic film Cool Hand Luke, “What we’ve got here is…failure to communicate.” What can break the cycle of miscommunication, mutual miscomprehension, and mutual recrimination between the United States and China? What could?

Paul Heer is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).

The Horn of Africa has long been synonymous with instability and insecurity, and for good reason. The region has endured numerous conflicts, including the Somali Civil War, the Eritrean War of Independence, the South Sudan War of Independence, intermittent disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and ongoing internal unrest within Sudan and Ethiopia. Eritrea remains the only country in the region that has yet to experience an internal civil war, thanks to the iron grip of its dictator, President Isaias Afewerki, who has ruled for over three decades. However, his reign cannot last forever, and in this region, a succession crisis boiling into a civil war is the norm rather than an exception.

The Horn of Africa has emerged as a magnet for insecurity, with Sudan and Ethiopia currently grappling with significant civil unrest. Somalia, too, faces non-state actors and a lack of centralized authority, while South Sudan is held together by a fragile peace agreement. Surprisingly, the most stable country in the region is Eritrea, a rigid Marxist dictatorship nicknamed the “North Korea of Africa.” The Horn of Africa stands at a crossroads, and the prospect of prolonged internal ethnic, political, and military conflicts in Ethiopia, with a population of 123 million, and Sudan, with a population of 46 million, threatens to engulf the region in perpetual instability. The Horn of Africa can ill afford another failed state like Somalia, and the notion of Sudan or Ethiopia joining the ranks of failed states in East Africa could plunge the region into a lasting quagmire of political, economic, social, and military unrest.

Sudan’s Two Lions

The likelihood of a negotiated cease-fire settlement and a pathway to peace negotiations in Sudan appears slim. The conflict between two key actors, General Abdel Fattah Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, informally known as “Hemedti,” has become a zero-sum game. In the quest for peace, stability, and security, one dominant Nubian lion must rule over Khartoum with an iron fist, relegating idealistic political agendas to the background. If the conflict persists, Sudan’s trajectory could mirror that of Libya, leading it to join the ranks of Africa’s “Mad Max” states, such as Somalia, Libya, Chad, and the Congo.

Military coups in Sudan are as customary as democratic elections in the West, with the country experiencing a staggering thirty-five military coups since gaining independence in 1956. The most successful Sudanese dictator, Omar Al-Bashir, maintained his grip on power for nearly three decades, from 1989 to 2019, by excelling in the art of authoritarian leadership. Al-Bashir manipulated the political landscape through the co-optation of the security apparatus, brutal repression, and the strategic utilization of two opposing organizations: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, a paramilitary force, was created by the Sudanese intelligence sector in 2013, evolving from the Janjaweed militias with the primary aim of brutalizing and subduing the inhabitants of the Darfur region. Consequently, despite lacking formal military training, Hemedti emerged as the de facto commander of Sudan’s most formidable paramilitary force. 

Astute dictators like Al-Bashir do not maintain power for nearly three decades without political and military acumen. He intentionally designed the RSF as a bulwark against potential threats from the SAF. Yet, Al-Bashir made a critical mistake in the coup-proofing structure of his regime. He assumed that an individual like Hemedti, a power-hungry, morally bankrupt paramilitary leader and a product of the intelligence services, would not survive without the invisible hand of Al-Bashir’s regime, and the web of orchestrated state corruption that sustained both Al-Bashir, the RSF, and the SAF.

Contrary to popular belief, the RSF and SAF collaborated and orchestrated a coup in 2019, not to topple Al-Bashir’s regime or stabilize Sudan’s precarious political, social, and economic landscape but to squelch the nascent democratic movement and eradicate the non-violent political activism that had been gaining momentum since 2013. Dictators and the state apparatus organizations that enable and prolong their rule tend to be paranoid about grassroots democratic movements, especially when compounded by state oppression and economic crises, which can lead to a state’s terminal illness. Consequently, the RSF and SAR preemptively aligned with the populace as part of a power-sharing deal, not to address legitimate grievances but to co-opt, destabilize, and ultimately normalize institutionalized subversion.

The civil war in Sudan diverges significantly from other African civil conflicts due to the size of the SAF, boasting 200,000 military personnel. They are pitted against the RSF, numbering between 70,000 and 150,000. Both factions vie for control of the state, with the vast natural resources of Sudan serving as a critical battleground. The RSF is not only a paramilitary organization; it is a highly profitable illicit business, with its economic reach extending into sectors such as banking, mercenary services, mining (particularly gold smuggling), media, and illegal cross-border trade, enriching Hemedti and his cohorts. Meanwhile, more than a formal military organization, the SAF manages over 200 commercial enterprises, including farming, gold mining, rubber production, and livestock processing. Thus, both belligerent actors are engaged in a resource competition stemming from institutionalized corruption. The multifaceted civil war has seen the breakdown of sixteen attempted cease-fires, resulting in the displacement of 3.7 million people, with more than 15 million individuals facing acute hunger.

As the crisis in Sudan continues to smolder, the likely outcome is a protracted conflict between the two factions. The absence of a dominant actor in both the political and military structure, as well as the lack of a monopoly on violence, creates a window of opportunity for external and non-state actors to exert their power, pushing Sudan in the direction of Somalia and Libya.

Ethnic Regional Militias and the Uncertain Future of Ethiopia

The ongoing ethnic and regional conflict in Ethiopia, involving Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s regime, the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups seemingly found resolution on paper with the signing of the highly fragile Nairobi Agreement on November 12, 2022. However, the resolution failed to bring about much-needed stability,. The enduring ethnic and regional strife among the Amharas, Oromos, and Tigrayans, combined with the resurgent Islamist militant group al-Shabaab and the uncertain actions of Egypt regarding the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, portend increasing political, economic, and social instability in Ethiopia.

Since coming to power in 2018 following the resignation of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, Abiy Ahmed has consolidated his authority. While he has managed to forestall the balkanization of Ethiopia through the cessation of hostilities with the TPLF, ethnic hatreds continue to simmer. Failed peace negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLA) exacerbate this threat, particularly given the Oromo population’s substantial size, comprising 36 percent of Ethiopia’s populace. Meanwhile, Abiy Ahmed’s administration grapples with the Amhara militia, Fano, The Amharas constitute the second largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, comprising 24.1 percent of the population.

Somalia has languished without a central government for three decades, with al-Shabaab staging a worrisome insurgency. This poses a significant concern for both Somalia and Ethiopia, as they share a 1,024-mile border. The African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATIMS) will withdraw from the country by December 31, 2024, with 2,000 forces already pulled out in June and an additional 3,000 scheduled to withdraw by September 30. Ethiopia’s precarious situation is further compounded by its proximity to three countries in varying states of instability: Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan. Ethiopia shares borders with all three of these nations, and should they devolve into failed states, the region’s stability will be at grave risk. Adding to these challenges is the potential for Egyptian military actions if Ethiopia’s stability deteriorates further. Egypt may exploit such an opportunity, especially after Ethiopia announced its filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) reservoir.

Ethiopia has long projected an image of unity characterized by a single flag, language, and people. However, beneath this veneer lies a nation historically marred by divisions along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. If left unaddressed, these lingering rifts hold the potential to fracture the country from within. To forge a more harmonious future, both the Ethiopian state and its people must confront the difficult history of the Abyssinian Empire and its communist successor state. The path forward demands a transformative approach that prioritizes inclusivity for all Ethiopians while dismantling the remnants of historical ethnic hegemony. Only through such endeavors can Ethiopia hope to cultivate a more unified and equitable society.

The Horn of Africa: Perilous Pathways to Stability

The Horn of Africa teeters on the precipice of prolonged instability. Should Sudan and Ethiopia succumb to this fate, the region faces the grim prospect of decades-long instability. The potential collapse of these two nations, collectively housing a population of over 170 million, carries profound implications for the international economic corridor along the Red Sea, impacting the Middle East and Europe and intensifying migration crises in East and North Africa. Within the Horn of Africa, the situation is markedly fragile. Among the eight countries—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda—that comprise East Africa, only Kenya stands as a relatively democratic and stable entity. Dictators lead Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, while Eritrea operates under a unique Marxist regime, and South Sudan navigates a perilous path characterized by extreme instability.

Furthermore, the presence of Islamic non-state actors in Somalia, sharing a border with Ethiopia, and Libya, sharing a border with Sudan, adds complexity to an already delicate situation. Neither country can afford the turmoil of an internal civil war. The crises unfolding in Sudan and Ethiopia are not issues that the international community can afford to overlook.

Daniel B. Haile is a writer and East African geopolitical specialist currently serving as an active-duty U.S. Army CBRN Officer. He holds an MA in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M and an MA and BA in International Studies from Texas State University. 

The ideas in this essay are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.

- Agenda / Serbie, Région parisienne

- Agenda / Serbie, Région parisienne

Le président Emmanuel Macron, invité dimanche soir des journaux de TF1 et de France 2, a annoncé le retour à Paris de l'ambassadeur à Niamey et le retrait du Niger des troupes françaises "d'ici à la fin de l'année". Une annonce saluée par le régime militaire au pouvoir qui se réjouit d'"une nouvelle étape vers la souveraineté".

Dans une interview accordée à la BBC, l'anthropologue et sociologue Claudine Haroche explique que le manque de contact entre les gens et le temps passé devant les écrans nous rendent plus isolés et vulnérables.

Le calme est revenu dimanche soir dans le nord du Kosovo, après une journée d'échanges de tir aux abords du monastère de Banjska. Bilan provisoire : un policier kosovar tué, ainsi que trois assaillants serbes. Aleksandar Vučić rejette toutes les responsabilités de la nouvelle crise sur Albin Kurti, sans annoncer la moindre mesure concrète.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Tensions Nord Kosovo, Kosovo, Défense, police et justice, Relations régionales

María Domínguez se rend chaque jour de sa ville à l'école rurale où elle enseigne et n'a d'autre moyen d'y parvenir que la générosité de ceux qui parcourent la route.

Emmanuel Macron présente, lundi, sa planification écologique qui doit permettre à la France de réduire ses émissions nettes de gaz à effet de serre de 55 % d’ici 2030 par rapport à 1990. Les objectifs pour chaque secteur sont déjà connus, mais pas les moyens d’y parvenir. Voici une liste de mesures qui, si elles étaient appliquées, montreraient la réelle volonté du chef de l’État.

Dans les villages en ruine du Haut Atlas, dévastés par le tremblement de terre meurtrier qui a frappé le Maroc, les enfants n'ont pas encore surmonté le traumatisme qu'ils ont subi.

Le président français doit s'exprimer dimanche dans les journaux télévisés de 20 heures sur TF1 et France 2. Une interview programmée par l'Élysée après une semaine "historique où la France a reçu le roi du Royaume-Uni ainsi que le pape en pleine Coupe du monde de rugby". Les sujets qui fâchent ne devraient toutefois pas être éludés à quelques jours de la présentation du budget pour 2024.