Agrégateur de flux

As Intelligence Online reported last month (IO, 13/11/23), US analysts seem unfazed by Moscow's hardening military stance in the Arctic and are now turning their attention to monitoring Beijing's real intentions in the region. When it comes to monitoring the

The Dutch subsidiary of British cyber threat intelligence (CTI) company Security Alliance (SecAlliance) is to offer its services to the National Bank

Automotive Cells Company (ACC), a French-German joint venture created in 2020, claims to be a flagship of European sovereignty in

The stalled modernisation of two Cessna 208 aircraft destined for Chad's air force is worrying even the DGSE, according to

The Ukrainian MP Mariana Bezugla, who was elected in 2019 and joined the ruling Servant of the People party, is

Paris is carrying out an unprecedented mobilisation of its diplomats in Europe and the United States to ensure that Nicolas

After being divulged with great fanfare six months ago, a new think tank closely affiliated with Florida Senator Marco Rubio appeared

The proportion of affected populations who flee violent conflict is much smaller than is widely assumed. Many decide to remain in the conflict zones. They are often referred to as stayees. Three groups can be identified. Some people stay voluntarily. Others do so involuntarily, for example because they lack the resources to flee or because violent actors restrict their freedom of movement. Another group acquiesce to their immobility. Little is known about stayees, their needs and the reasons for their im­mobility. But several factors relevant to their decision-making can be identified. These include type of conflict, type of violence and personal situation. Whether they remain voluntarily or involuntarily, stayees employ sur­vival strategies including collaboration, neutrality, protest and resistance. Knowledge about stayees and their survival strategies is important for humanitarian aid and development actors. Only if they are well informed can they align their activities with actual needs and provide meaningful support to people living in and with violent conflicts. It is therefore essential to consider the entire spectrum of (im)mobility and to understand this expanded perspective as a positive – without neglecting the forcibly displaced. The agency of civilians in violent conflicts needs to be recognised and they must be protected from abuse and exploitation by aid workers (do-no-harm principle). Finally, stayees must be systematically included in all post-conflict initiatives supporting vol­untary return and reintegration.

 

Development policy in times of increasing autocratisation is a major discussion for European and German cooperation with Africa. In practical terms, Europe has given up on using its development aid and other economic instruments to incentivise democratisation in non-European countries. This change has become inevitable, as non-EU countries have rejected the notion of Europe driving particular forms of state-society relations, especially in former colonies. At the same time, European security and migration management interests, which are often at odds with democracy promotion, have been prioritised over programmes that support risky transformation processes.

This change in emphasis has been particularly notable in the EU’s cooperation with North African countries, where increased financial and rhetorical support for political change in the years following the 2011 Arab Uprisings has given way to pragmatic support for social, political and economic stability, especially since Tunisia’s democratic experiment was suspended in 2021. 

The change in emphasis has also been accompanied by a new policy framework. The Global Gateway infrastructure investment programme is becoming the new paradigm for European cooperation with the ‘Global South’. The Global Gateway cooperation model re-conceptualises development aid as a catalyst for investment, prioritises development projects that serve ‘mutual interests’, places principal focus on the ‘hardware’ of physical infrastructure and de-emphasises ‘software’ aspects such as governance, inclusion and rights.

Practical and moral considerations

The fact that investment partnerships are being formed with state actors in authoritarian countries raises important practical and moral questions. On a practical level, issues arise around transparency and efficacy. On a moral level, there are unanswered questions about the kinds of values that Europe wants to promote with its development cooperation and especially the issue of who should benefit: societies, or established autocratic elites. 

The EU has touched on these practical and moral questions in its communications around the Global Gateway. In her contribution to this blog series, Commissioner Urpilainen noted that ‘Global Gateway takes centre stage in strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership, with valuable support from various partners, including Germany. This partnership embodies the ideals of a more interconnected, collaborative world and shared values.’ The European Commission lists six ‘core values’ on its website, the first two of which are ‘democratic values and high standards’ and ‘good governance and transparency’. The Commission does not offer much detail about how these principles should influence investment projects in authoritarian partner countries.

As the Global Gateway gathers momentum, the practical and moral questions are becoming more relevant for Germany as well. Germany is a key financer and influential broker of EU-level decision-making. Germany is a key ‘Team Europe’ partner in several Global Gateway projects, both running and planned. In this context, the German government would be well advised to elaborate strategies to deal with inevitable trade-offs and to make effective use of its influence at the EU level.

The Global Gateway in North Africa: Democratic Oversight, Environmental Sustainability & Geopolitics

As Werenfels and Lacher discussed in this blog series, the EU has different interests in North Africa than in Sub-Saharan Africa. These are shaped by proximity and shared concerns about rapid global warming, energy security and demographic change. Moreover, as most North African countries already have closer economic relations with Europe than their sub-Saharan neighbours, cooperation across the Mediterranean under the Global Gateway is likely to be deeper, the Gateway’s whole-of-Africa ambition notwithstanding.

The EU – and therefore Germany – faces significant challenges in implementing the Global Gateway in North Africa. These range from the economy to social and environmental sustainability issues and geopolitical considerations, which raise practical and moral dilemmas for cooperation.

The first major challenges that arise stem from the inherent risks of doing deals in countries where not only the business environment and the investment climate lack transparency and accountability, but where political stability may be a mirage. The social and economic pressures that drove the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 and 2011 have not been addressed, and in some countries have even worsened. Anti-government protests from late 2016 in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were only suppressed by the COVID-19 pandemic, regime repression and electronic surveillance. Commissioner Urpilainen’s assurances about‘democratic values and high standards’ and ‘good governance and transparency’ are welcome, but clear definitions are missing and related monitoring and control mechanisms still need to be developed.

A second set of challenges arises around authoritarianism and environmental sustainability – a central objective of both Global Gateway and the European Green Deal. Trade-offs between sustainability and authoritarianism arise when trying to reconcile environmental standards (for instance for biodiversity or natural resources protection) with local needs of populations. In authoritarian settings, environmental policies tend to reproduce governance patterns, but if centralized top-down approaches do not consider local concerns, solutions may not be sustainable in the long term and produce negative side effects. The exclusion of relevant stakeholders and disregard for negative environmental impacts in Tunisia’s green hydrogen strategy is a case in point.

Furthermore, the Global Gateway’s investment guarantees are likely to support authoritarianism in North Africa, where governance systems are based on the rent-seeking behaviour of elites. The new rents may reinforce these patterns as well-connected businessmen grab market opportunities in green technologies. This raises serious questions about the equity of the so-called ‘just transition’ and thereby the legitimacy of Europe’s agenda.

A third set of challenges arises from the Global Gateway’s geopolitical ambitions. North Africa has witnessed several shifts in economic influence since independence, where prevailing economic ties with former colonial powers are increasingly replaced by extended cooperation with former Cold War allies (such as Algeria and Russia), regional partners such as Turkey and the Gulf States, and of course China. The Global Gateway is both an imitation of and a competitive response to China’s belt-and-road initiative. China has considerably expanded its presence in North Africa through infrastructure investments and the control of cyberspace, and will not be dislodged easily. The same goes for major Gulf investments such as the Saudi Green Initiative.

Build Credibility Along with Connectivity

The Global Gateway attempts to sidestep the reality of cooperation with authoritarian governments by focusing on infrastructure and mutual interests. Most European policymakers would still want to realise the ‘ring of friends’ vision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and an open and democratic North Africa would be a major part of this. However, after several decades of half-hearted democracy promotion efforts, European leaders are well aware that they do not have the power to force transformation, nor the will and moral backbone to support regional forces of change when established elites resist.

While the rise of anti-democratic populism in European politics is not going unnoticed in North Africa, the universality of democratic values was evident in the Arab uprisings, and more recently in the pre-Covid protests in Algeria especially. The likelihood that these values will again surface in a region where social, economic and environmental tensions remain unresolved is high, and Germany and the EU would be wise to be prepared for this.

In theory, the Global Gateway may have significant potential, both for treading the path of least resistance and for providing momentum for positive change in North Africa. The EU has used cooperation on critical infrastructure to foster European integration and enable the free movement of goods, capital, expertise and people. This process was not without practical and moral dilemmas, and they were not easy to resolve even within Europe. In most cases, however, European dilemmas were not simply ignored in the hope that they would go away.

For Germany and the EU, openly articulating and addressing the challenges mentioned above would be a major contribution not only towards more effective implementation of the global gateway but to Europe’s credibility as a legitimate and reliable partner in turbulent times. With the necessary honesty regarding practical and moral challenges, the Global Gateway could provide opportunities for addressing double standards, historic responsibilities and broken promises. Germany, as a major player within the EU, could seize the opportunity to shape the initiative in this direction.

Both authors, Dr Annabelle Houdret and Dr Mark Furness, are Senior Researchers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), where they are part of the research and advisory project team ‘Stability and Development in the Middle East and North Africa’.

Responsibility for the content, opinions expressed and sources used in the articles and interviews lies with the respective authors.

Climate change is leading to increasing displacement and migration, as well as invol­untary immobility. The associated challenges and costs have long been neglected in the international climate negotiations. Until now, efforts to open up mobility choices for people negatively affected by climate change have been chronically underfunded. One important starting point for changing this is the explicit reference to human mobility in the new Loss and Damage Fund. However, financial resources and tech­nical support alone are not enough. In order to meet the epochal challenge of climate change-induced human mobility ambitious migration policy solutions are needed, including planned relocation and the consideration of climate change impacts in the management of labour migration.

The resumption of the Palestine dossier at the International Criminal Court (ICC) that accompanied the Hamas attack on 7 October has raised fears of American pressure against any case against Israel, even as Washington steps up coordination with the court

The Brussels-based NATO Communications and Information Agency, led by Ludwig Decamps, is trialling the artificial intelligence, automatic detection algorithms developed

Intelligence Online understands that, despite attracting a large number of international visitors, Russia won no contracts at the Dubai Airshow,

Beijing - No visa-free travel to China for AUKUS membersLike Singaporean nationals, citizens of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain

Tehran is expanding its naval presence in the Red Sea, with a view to gathering intelligence and carrying out clandestine

The French external intelligence agency, the DGSE, is adapting to the government's new focus on economic sovereignty. As part of

Faced with growing signs of a potential political backlash as polls show unprecedented sympathy for Palestinians among US voters, the American

(B2) Les Européens jouent avec le feu au Proche-Orient. S'ils n'y prennent garde, ils pourraient se retrouver demain avec la « pire crise » migratoire que l'Union européenne ait connue. À côté, la crise des années 2015-2015 pourrait presque paraître contenue

Migrants arriving from Athens to the border between Greece and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

La seule porte de sortie : l'Égypte

La volonté israélienne est en effet d'en finir aujourd'hui avec le réduit de Gaza, de pousser ses habitants à fuir... Les derniers bombardements le prouvent. La volonté affichée par certains dirigeants israéliens aussi. L'Égypte est la seule voie de sortie possible. L'issue terrestre Nord comme la voie maritime étant bloquées par Israël. Or le gouvernement égyptien l'a bien fait comprendre au Haut représentant de l'UE comme aux quelque dirigeants européens venus au Caire. Il est hors de question d'accueillir ces Palestiniens. Pour des raisons politiques. Ce serait réduire à néant le processus de paix reposant sur une solution à deux États. Mais aussi pour des raisons internes et de sécurité. Ce serait subir un enkystement de mouvements islamiques aux antipodes du régime de al-Sissi qui a proscrit les Frères musulmans et consorts.

Les pays de la région peu disposés

De solution alternative, il n'y en a pas vraiment. Aucun autre pays de la région n'est disposé aujourd'hui à accueillir ces réfugiés. Pour les mêmes raisons. Auxquelles s'ajoute une autre : ils sont débordés. Si entre 2012 et 2015, ils ont accueilli à bras ouverts des centaines de milliers de Syriens à la recherche d'un asile, ils ne sont pas prêts à renouveler ce geste maintenant (surtout pour les Palestiniens). La Jordanie estime qu'elle a aussi fait le nécessaire. Le Liban est exsangue. La Turquie a fait le maximum en hébergeant déjà plusieurs millions de Syriens sur son sol.

Des bateaux vers l'Europe

Pour Le Caire, la solution est donc toute trouvée. Si l'Égypte se retrouve forcée, malgré elle (car la pression sera trop forte aux frontières de Rafah), de recueillir des Palestiniens de Gaza, ils seront rapidement mis sur des bateaux : direction l'Europe. Or accueillir une telle population, forte d'un peu moins deux millions d'âme, remplie d'une amertume certaine, d'une possible volonté de vengeance, et qui comprend en son sein quelques extrémistes notoires, formés au maniement des armes, à l'intelligentsia terroriste, ne sera pas de tout repos pour les Européens. Tel Aviv, Beyrouth et Le Caire le savent, les Européens sont prévenus. À bon entendeur...

(Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

Jó kérdés, hogy egy nemzetet mi tesz azzá, ami. Az elsők között ott van ugye a nyelve. Amíg a dolgokat magunk közt tudjuk, magyarul megbeszélni, addig kommunikációs értelemben szuverének lehetünk. Ez vonatkozik az általános (köz)ügyekre, de a részletekre, mondjuk a szakmai-érdeklődő közösségek fórumaira is, mint a repülés. Az anyanyelvi publikáció lehetősége ezért kulcsfontosságú, legyen szó akár tudományosan jegyzett, akár szélesebb körnek szóló, a szakmaiság és közérthetőség határmezsgyéjén operáló kiadványokról. Hogy egy adott korban hogy alakul mindennek a közvetítő közege, gyakorlati megvalósítása, tulajdonosi, finanszírozási háttere, ehhez képest másodlagos kérdés. A lényeg, hogy legyen és legyen aki csinálja. És mindig maradjon ehhez elég játéktér.

Mint az egyik "ősszerző", szubjektíve úgy gondolom, hogy az Aeromagazin, Sajtos Zoltán főszerkesztővel az élen, az egyik ilyen szereplő. Már csak azért is, mert Magyarország egyetlen általános repülési és űrhajózási újságjáról van szó.

Ráadásul immár 25 éve.

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