The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.
The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.
The G77 represents the Global South in the United Nations (UN). It holds a two-thirds majority and exercises significant influence in the General Assembly, while also being party to North–South tensions in the UN. Nearly all intergovernmental processes at the General Assembly, particularly those related to economic and financial issues, are marked by protracted and frustrating negotiations that affect the UN’s ability to develop solutions to global challenges. Despite its influence in the General Assembly, little is known about the G77’s internal processes. This article addresses this gap by examining the group’s decision making and how it shapes multilateral negotiations and outcomes in the General Assembly. It introduces an ideal-type model of intra-group interest aggregation and assesses how this function unfolds in the G77 and with what effects on UN negotiations. Drawing on group politics literature and interviews with UN delegates, the article demonstrates that while the G77 can leverage its numerical strength, there are noteworthy deficits in the group’s function of aggregating interests. Specifically, the limited inclusiveness in the group’s decision making, the dominance of a few members and the lack of informed input can undermine effective multilateralism and reinforce North–South tensions.
In the coastal zone, the triple planetary crisis manifests as accelerating losses and changes and increasing challenges and risks for people and livelihoods. Acceptance of a future existential crisis compels the urgency of corrective action to cause an inverse positive societal response to bend the negative trajectories of loss and damage. The rate and extent of corrective societal action (policies, laws, practices, knowledge, etc.) should at least keep pace with the projected rate of loss and environmental degradation. This urgency and acceleration of action are major societal challenges, especially considering the overwhelming evidence of impacts. In this paper, we offer three propositions for accelerating urgent actions and fostering innovation in coastal research and management, focusing on emerging trends and foundational changes. Scientists need to (1) reflect on the performativity of their research and perceptions of neutrality in anticipating the future of coasts; (2) think and act equitably in local and global partnerships; and (3) improve their engagement and willingness to innovate with society. This is not a call for linear or incremental change, but a call for the radical. The relationship between society and science drives progress and shapes our collective future.