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On April 10, 2024, amid the high-pitch and polarising campaign for the upcoming national elections, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi gave a crucial interview with Newsweek. Generally, BJP election campaigns put a high premium on hyper-nationalistic rhetoric on security issues. However, this time, Modi took an unexpected stance and softened his previously tough posture on India-China ties. In his Newsweek interview, he said, “Through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at diplomatic and military levels, the two countries will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquillity at the borders.” While emphasizing that the relationship with China is “important” and “significant,” he stated, “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us. Stable and peaceful relations between India and China are important for not just our two countries but the entire region and world.” Reacting positively to Modi’s statements, China also assured that “sound and stable” relations are in both nations’ interests.

In the diplomatic quarters, Modi’s statements have signaled a breakthrough toward achieving a thaw in the stiff and estranged bilateral ties between India and China. However, the question arises whether it is possible to achieve a lasting peace in the Himalayan borders, given the fact that twenty-one rounds of core commander-level meetings and twenty-nine meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China border affairs have failed to achieve any breakthrough. 

After the Galwan crisis in June 2020, which resulted in causalities on both sides, the bilateral ties worsened. Following the Galwan standoff, both sides amassed 50,000 troops in a mirror deployment pattern in the Ladakh sector. After four rounds of disengagement in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra (PP-17 A), and Hot Springs (PP-15), and continuing tensions in Depsang and Demchok, the deployments remain in a standoff on both sides of the border. Today, bilateral relations are at a nadir not seen since the 1962 war.

Nevertheless, focused as it is on the goal of a $5 trillion economy, India cannot afford to bait China into a major conflict and has no intention of doing so. On the other hand, amid rumors of China occupying further Indian territory and India forfeiting patrolling rights in some parts of Ladakh, the Chinese threat to Indian territorial integrity cannot be ignored. Further, the specter of a united China-Pakistan front will be a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. Bearing all of this in mind, how should India address the China question?

Understanding India’s Mind and its Dilemmas 

The greatest puzzle torturing Indian security czars is how to decode China’s intentions. In my interaction with several eminent Indian geostrategic experts, both practitioner diplomats and academic scholars, I found that there is hardly any agreement on what China wants. Does Beijing want to amicably settle the boundary issues and make further progress in trade and cultural ties, or simply grab India’s territory? 

Notably, in the perceptions of the Indian strategic community, the boundary issue constitutes a bottleneck preventing the improvement of bilateral relations. As many told me, India-China ties will take an upward trajectory once there is a breakthrough on the boundary front. However, regarding China’s intent, many Indian scholars and diplomats believe India can do business with China and resolve the boundary issues through bilateral diplomatic initiatives. They argue that from 1988 to 2020, both countries signed bilateral agreements in 1993, 1996, and 2005, ratifying the 1962 ceasefire line as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and focus more on building robust trade relationships. As a result, no significant differences existed on the LAC, even if the exact demarcation remained unsettled. Further, they argue that over the last three decades before 2020, India and China had discovered a successful modus vivendi to live together peacefully as neighbors, enhance commercial ties, and de-hyphenate the long-standing boundary issues from the commercial and business arena. 

The opponents of the abovementioned line of thought ask if China wanted peace, why did it unleash the Galwan conflict without provocation, spoiling the trust-building measures of the last three decades? Even before Galwan, China’s intent was never transparent and fair. In 2009, China constructed a road from Sumdo to Patrol Point 13 in the Depsang plains. The PLA’s 2011 and 2013 incursions into the Depsang plains led to a face-off with the Indian army. In 2014, PLA made incursions in Chumar (Eastern Ladakh), followed by a long-drawn standoff between the two armies in Doklam on the India-Bhutan-China trijunction in 2017. Except for the 2011 incursion, which the military leadership resolved, the remaining ones required negotiations with the civilian leadership. 

Additionally, on various occasions, China irked India by handing stapled visas to the citizens of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and blocking the designation of Pakistan-sponsored and based terrorist commanders as global terrorists in the UN. Further, China’s rigid and intransigent attitude on the boundary issues after twenty-one rounds of core commander-level talks following the Galwan deadlock, coupled with its heavy investment in the dual-use infrastructure in the border regions, raises serious suspicions about China’s long-term intent.

Another line of thought argues that the boundary issue in itself is irrelevant to China. A few remote tracks of land pale in significance to Beijing’s larger bid for regional and global power. As such, Beijing seeks to use the issue to subordinate India into acceptance of its status as an inferior power vis-à-vis the mighty “middle kingdom.” The 1962 war was, in part, intended to downsize India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, under whose leadership India was emerging as a leader of the non-aligned countries. In China’s grand strategy, a strong, confident India cannot exist as an equal civilizational state in its own backyard and challenge its status as a world power.

Furthermore, the border issue serves to counter India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which could threaten China’s shipping routes in the Malacca Strait. Beijing aims to keep India boxed in on land either by propping up the Kashmir issue with its all-weather friend Pakistan and its array of proxy terrorist groups or by salami-slicing incursions on the India-China border. Also, China may want to keep the borders vague at this stage, create confusion and ambivalence through occasional incursions, and finally settle the border under more favorable geopolitical conditions. These scenarios could include China’s attainment of decisive military and technological superiority over India, Indian isolation in global politics, or the erosion and weakening of Western capabilities and intent to support India against China.

This uncertainty and unease hovering around China’s long-term designs in the Himalayas is helped by the scarcity of information. Chinese political and military institutions are famously opaque, unlike those of democratic countries. Additionally, Indian intelligence agencies have devoted most of their attention and resources to Pakistan and its proxy terrorist networks in the last several decades. Consequently, they do not have robust intelligence capabilities and reliable assets within Chinese decision-making institutions. In fact, India relies on U.S. satellite imagery for intelligence about China’s troops’ deployment, infrastructure build-up, and other developments in the border areas. Academic scholars mostly rely on official documents from the Chinese government that are available in the public domain and articles published in prominent Chinese newspapers and media portals.

Mapping Escalation Scenarios

In 1962, when the Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a standoff in Himalayan borders over the boundary question, Chairman Mao, drawing his lessons from the classical Chinese tradition, told his commanders that China and India had fought “one and a half wars” throughout history, furnishing Beijing with valuable lessons. He narrated two instances of Chinese military intervention in India to his generals. The first war happened 1300 years earlier during the rule of the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), when China sent its military to support a legitimate Indian king fighting against an usurper. After the first war, India and China enjoyed a long period of peace and vibrant cultural, economic, and religious exchange. The “half-war,” according to Mao, occurred when Timur the Lame, a Mongol king, plundered and raided Delhi in 1398, killing at least 100,000 people.

In Mao’s understanding, the critical lesson from the two abovementioned historical incidents was that India and China were, in Kissinger’s words, “not doomed to perpetual enmity,” and they could enjoy sustained periods of peace and prosperity again. However, for this to take place, Beijing had to “knock” India forcefully to bring it to the diplomatic negotiations.

Weeks later, China invaded India and inflicted a devasting defeat, almost occupying the entire state of modern-day Arunachal Pradesh before retreating to the previous line of control and even returning the captured heavy weaponry. The defeat of 1962 is still a major humiliation for the Indian collective psyche.

The incident mentioned above reveals the deep historical roots in China’s strategic subconscious. Hence, if history is the best way to understand China’s underlying philosophy and forecast its future actions, then there is a strong likelihood of a 1962-style swift invasion in some sectors and major skirmishes in the other sectors. One recent report from the Royal United Services Institute predicts a Second India-China war between 2025 and 2030. In such a scenario, India cannot rule out the possibility of a quick surge of Chinese troops seven to eight kilometers inside the Indian territory. 

At the same time, Pakistan may activate the Line of Control and incite terror incidents in Kashmir and communal violence in India as a diversion tactic and facilitate the execution of Beijing’s game plan as swiftly as possible. In another scenario, China may continue embarrassing and pressuring India with its periodic salami-slicing incursions. Coupled with such military adventures, India may have to face cyber-attacks on its critical infrastructure, military and civil installations, financial institutions, and stock markets. 

An invasion may happen where India least expects it. Though most recent incursions and encroachment have taken place in the Ladakh region, New Delhi cannot assume that an attack can only occur in the western sector. Minor and periodic Chinese incursions could act as diversion tactics to hide the real game plan of a mid-sized invasion in the eastern sector of the India-China border, Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as “South Tibet.” To add more to the prevailing confusion, China may initiate incursions in the middle sector, encourage Nepal to be more aggressive on the Indian border and claim Kalapani, and create intense pressure in Bhutan either by deployment, increased patrols in disputed areas, or by infrastructure build-up. 

Reportedly, the Chinese may believe this middle path of swift and mid-sized invasion is feasible in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. First, the invasion will likely be very swift, giving minimum response time to the Indian side. Against the backdrop of existing uncertainty and ambiguity, by the time New Delhi realizes Beijing’s intent, the PLA would have secured most of its intended outcomes. Second, Indian communications and road infrastructure in the Himalayan region are developing fast; however, there is a long way to go before they catch up with China. 

I have discussed in a previous article that China has constructed a sophisticated network of axial roads in the border areas, which makes troop and equipment movement much easier and rapid vis-à-vis movement on the Indian side. In such a scenario, Americans can help only by providing intelligence, minor communications equipment, and technological support, enabling smooth logistics. They are unlikely to put their boots on the ground. Political will aside, the Himalayan terrain is harsh, and the American soldiers are not accustomed to it.

The battles in the Himalayan region are likely to be infantry and artillery-centric, in which the road infrastructure will play a critical role, and China has a clear short-term advantage on that front. Additionally, China can utilize its drones and rocket force. Lastly, in such a scenario, India’s relationship with Russia would be of little value once a conflict erupts. Due to Moscow’s increased dependence on Beijing after the Ukraine war, its capabilities are limited. By the time they can influence Chinese policymakers, Beijing will have secured its gains, after which the world powers will intervene, urging restraint and diplomacy.

The chances of such a swift, embarrassing, and destabilizing attack and the periodic accidental or deliberate skirmishes escalating into a full-fledged conventional war are minimal at this stage. If the conflict escalates beyond a point and gets longer, China will be embroiled in a long-drawn and protracted conflict in rugged Himalayan terrain. India has also come a long way from where it was in 1962. Today, India is a nuclear power and a leader in advanced space programs. In addition to its robust scientific, technological, and industrial base with the fourth largest military and fifth largest GDP, it has a much stronger and credible standing in global geopolitics. Hence, if it can neutralize the initial brunt of a Chinese attack, Indians could give a robust defense and counterattack, bringing massive embarrassment to China. 

Such a scenario will be a major setback to China’s long-term ambitions to become a world power and contend with the United States. Also, following such a scenario, India would likely abandon its neutrality and switch to the American side, get closer to Quad countries and the Western camp, and cause hurdles for China’s supply lines in the Malacca straits with its strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It can reject the “One China” theory in principle, take a strong anti-China stand by joining forces with Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, and Indonesia, and in theatres like the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the South Caucasus, where it has emerged with a robust strategic footprint. Also, it can be more active with the Quad countries in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration and  Terror Financing in Kashmir. He has a Ph.D. from OP Jindal University and an MPA from Cornell University.

Image: Natalia Davidovich / Shutterstock.com.

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Summary and Key Points: Logan Nye's article revisits the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on U.S. combat aviators by President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War, which severely hampered their effectiveness.

-These rules prevented preemptive strikes against enemy anti-aircraft units, contributing to significant American losses.

-Under President Nixon, more aggressive tactics, exemplified by Operation Linebacker II, significantly shifted the war's dynamics.

-The lesson learned carried into the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where President George H.W. Bush allowed military leaders to conduct operations with minimal interference, resulting in the successful and decisive Operation Desert Storm.

A  somewhat recent article comments on the absolutely ludicrous rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on American combat aviators by Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War. 

The article in question, written by Logan Nye for We Are The Mighty, doesn’t offer a new premise. But seeing how this year marks the 50th anniversary of the official end of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, his timing is certainly apropos.

Ceding the Initiative in Vietnam

In his bestselling 1995 mea culpa autobiography In Retrospect, Robert S. McNamara — secretary of defense under both JFK and LBJ — claimed that the latter president’s “instructions were clear: ‘Win!’” But the actions of McNamara and LBJ belied the expressed desire to win. 

The on-paper technological superiority of American warplanes like the F-4 Phantom — which garnered sixteen world speed and altitude records between 1959 and 1962, and held five of those records until the advent of the F-15 Eagle in 1975 — was negated by arbitrary ROEs that gave a distinct advantage to the enemy and wasted the lives of American aircrews. How so? By allowing the North Vietnamese Communists to take the initiative during American air raids.

LBJ and McNamara dictated that our fighter and bomber crews couldn’t proactively hunt the Communists’ anti-aircraft units — their anti-aircraft artillery guns and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Our flyboys couldn’t even attack the gun batteries and SAM sites until the enemy unit fired, or at least activated radar against them. In other words, never bleeping mind that we’re already actively engaged in a shooting war, we’re going to allow the enemy to fire the first shot every time.

Johnson even went so far as to brag that no single piece of ordnance could be placed on an American warplane in Vietnam without his personal approval.

Talk about micromanagement. And talk about murdering your own countrymen and wasting your material assets: A total of 1,737 U.S. fixed-wing aircraft were lost in combat during the war, including 40 percent of the total production of F-105 Thunderchiefs and one out of every eight F-4 Phantoms ever made. Two-thousand five-hundred eighty U.S. Air Force personnel lost their lives.

Along Came Kissinger and Nixon

LBJ’s White House successor, Richard M. Nixon, finally allowed American aviators to take the proverbial gloves off in their prosecution of the Vietnam War effort.

The difference became most glaringly obvious at the strategic level, specifically Operation Linebacker II, the so-called “Christmas bombing” of Hanoi in December 1972 that sent the North Vietnamese back to the peace table and nearly won the war for America.

But it applied at the tactical level as well, to fighter jocks as well as B-52 “BUFF” bomber drivers. This was thanks in no small part to U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. John D. Lavelle, then commander of the Seventh Air Force.

As Mr. Nye elaborates:

“Lavelle went to the Pentagon for permission…He says that approval came, with a caveat. Nixon was working on thawing relations with China in 1972. The Pentagon supported Lavelle coming up with his own ‘interpretation’ of the rules. ‘Secretary [of Defense Melvin] Laird told me he agreed, but the climate was just not right in Washington for any changes,’ Lavelle said. ‘He told me I should make a liberal interpretation of the rules of engagement in the field and not come to Washington and ask him, under the political climate, to come out with an interpretation; I should make them in the field, and he would back me up’…Lavelle came up with, ‘Yup, you can attack the guns under certain conditions,’ and his men destroyed 11 guns. They got a special thank you from the Thai prime minister on the same day Lavelle’s boss fired him.”

Lavelle may have been fired, but he still retired honorably from the Air Force with two stars on his shoulder boards. And soon enough, the official ROEs were changed for the better and made Operation Linebacker II possible.

Lesson Learned

Fast-forward to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, AKA Operation Desert Storm, and luckily America again had a POTUS in George H.W. Bush, who, like Richard Nixon, took to heart the need to let his generals fight the war as the latter saw fit — with minimal White House meddling. Thus, it was that Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner, commander of U.S. and coalition allies’ air assets during that war, was able to wage “Instant Thunder,” a refreshing contrast to the gradualism of LBJ’s “Rolling Thunder” — not only in semantics, but in terms of speed, intensity, ferocity, accuracy, and most importantly, freedom of decision-making, from Gen. Horner on down to the individual coalition fighter and bomber crews doing the actual fighting, killing, and dying.

The contrasting final results of “Instant Thunder” vs. “Rolling Thunder” speak for themselves.

Author Expertise 

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). 

La célébration de mariage de nombreux Nigérians est menacé.

Summary and Key Points: Israel is set to receive 25 additional F-35I Adir aircraft, bolstering its capabilities amid escalating conflicts with Iranian-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

-These fifth-generation stealth fighters are crucial for Israel's defense and potential long-range strikes, including deep inside Iran.

-The acquisition underscores the importance of maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) in a region fraught with hostilities.

-The F-35I’s advanced technology provides Israel with significant tactical advantages, essential for countering threats and conducting precision strikes, especially as tensions with Iran and its proxies intensify.

F-35I Adir: Israel's Key to Countering Iranian Threats

The F-35I Adir is Israel's Ace-in-the-Hole for Striking Iran

It’s official. The Israel Air Force (IAF) is getting 25 additional F-35I warplanes that are to be delivered in batches of three-to-five per year until 2028, according to the Times of Israel. The deal, worth $3 billion, comes at a time of extreme peril—and controversy—for the tiny Jewish democracy. 

Since the October 7 attacks, Israel has been at war with the Iranian-backed terrorist group, Hamas. 

Multiple offensives into Gaza, where Hamas is based, has turned international opinion against Israel, as civilian casualties among the Palestinian Arab population of Gaza mount (Hamas hides its personnel and equipment among the civilians of Gaza). 

And the longer that Israel continues its offensives deep into Gaza, the more exposed their northern flank against the far more powerful Iranian-backed terrorist organization in neighboring Lebanon is. 

Israel Needs Force Multipliers

Israel undoubtedly has the most powerful indigenous military in the Mideast. Yet, its small geographical size means it has a relatively small population base. So, the very worst thing that could happen for Israel would be to find itself surrounded by multiple hostile powers that have numerical advantages. To offset these potential numerical advantages, Israel needs advanced technology. 

In this context, Israel has purchased a variant of the US military’s fifth-generation warplane, the F-35. Known as the “Adir,” which means “Mighty” in Hebrew and is derived from the Book of Psalms in the Holy Bible. The initial tranche of F-35I’s were purchased back in 2010 and delivered in 2016 to the Nevatim Air Base. 

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaimed that, “Our long arm has now become longer and mightier.” The inclusion of the F-35 in Israel’s arsenal gives them a decisive advantage, especially over enemies, such as those found in Syria, Lebanon, and much farther afield, in Iran.

Interestingly, the Israelis were most displeased with the fact that the United States authorized the sale of a tranche of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is because Israeli leaders understandably feared that the sale could pose a “threat to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).” 

Essentially, the spread of F-35s to UAE might lessen Israel’s military heft in the region (degrading Israel’s technological superiority over their neighbors). Ultimately, the Israel government accepted the sale because, at the same time, the US government was helping Israel modernize its military, too.

The Importance of the F-35I Adir

The F-35I Adir is such an important piece of Israel’s advanced arsenal that the Iranian military targeted the Nevatim Air Base in their shocking missile attack against Israel in April of this year. 

Nevatim was targeted specifically because it was home to Israel’s F-35I fleet, as my colleague, Maya Carlin, elaborated in these pages at the time of those strikes. The missiles were deflected. But the fact that Iranian forces were targeting Nevatim indicates how important of an asset the F-35I is for Israel—and how much fear these systems instill in Israel’s regional rivals, such as Iran.

For its part, the F-35I was a critical component for Israel’s air defense the night of the Iranian missile attack. Multiple units were deployed as the missile fusillade approached Israel from Iranian territory. The F-35Is that were deployed successfully intercepted the missiles. 

And, for good measure, those F-35Is bombed a few Hezbollah targets next door in Lebanon. 

The additional F-35Is going to Israel is in keeping with Israel’s defense needs. Considering that the F-35I is being targeted by Iranian missile attacks, given that Hezbollah and Hamas, both groups that possess large (and growing) missile capabilities, Israel needs to ensure that they have backups to their existing fleet of Adirs. In the event their arsenal of F-35Is is damaged, another tranche of these birds from the United States would help prevent any loss in capabilities for the Israeli Air Force.

Of course, the real question is, will the presence of these planes be enough to stop the chaos currently encircling Israel? 

A Perfect Plane for Escalation

Israeli forces have understandably moved hard against Hamas after the terrorist attacks on October 7. Israel’s military has penetrated deep inside Palestinian Arab territories in Gaza, pushing as far south as the Philadelphi Corridor which borders Egypt. 

The only problem for Israel is that Hamas embeds itself among civilian populations. 

Very often, for Israeli forces to capture or kill Hamas fighters, they must do their utmost to avoid innocent civilians in Gaza, and, if lives are lost, Israel loses their standing in the court of international public opinion. When Israeli forces took the Philadelphi Corridor, they were fired upon by twitchy Egyptian border guards. Israeli forces returned fire, killing the Egyptian border guard in question. But this has complicated the already tense Israeli-Arab relations (a relationship the Israeli government desperately needs to maintain as it battles Iran for regional power). 

Meanwhile, sensing weakness, Hezbollah moves hard against Israel. It’s all part of Iran’s plan. And one of the only countermeasures against the all-out regional war that Iran seeks to wage upon Israel are the F-35Is that Israel has. 

Israel Can Use the F-35I to Strike Iran

Along with advanced interception capabilities and air-to-ground abilities, the F-35I provides Israel with long-range strike capabilities. In fact, the F-35I is one of only two warplanes in the IAF’s arsenal (the other being the F-15I Ra’am) that could reliably conduct a bombing mission against targets deep inside Iran. 

And that’s another important point here. 

Because the Israelis are not just going to sit back and watch as Hezbollah and Hamas move to encircle them. They understand all too well that Iran is the real culprit behind the violence in the region. Israel’s government just might decide to take matters into their own hands and directly strike Iranian targets inside of Iran. 

The F-35I Adir will allow them to do this. That’s why Israel wants the plane. And that’s why they understandably love it so much. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons. 

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