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A Yamato osztályú csatahajókon használt 460 mm-es kaliberű lövegek a modern csatahajókon beépített legnagyobb kaliberű fegyverek voltak. (Ehhez hasonló, 457 mm-es kaliberű ágyúkkal csak az angol Furious csatacirkálót szerelték fel 1917-ben, de csak egy rövid időre.) A löveget hivatalosan a „40cm/45 Type 94” jelzéssel látták el, hogy kalibert illetően megtévesszék a többi haditengerészetet. Ez olyan jól sikerült, hogy az amerikaiak a háború végéig meg voltak győződve arról, hogy a hajók 406 vagy 410 mm-es ágyúkkal vannak felfegyverezve.

A különösen nagy kaliberű ágyúk kifejlesztését a japánok azért tartották szükségesnek, mert számítottak rá, hogy hajóiknak számbeli fölényben levő ellenséggel kell megküzdeniük, és ezért nagy jelentőséget tulajdonítottak annak, hogy a mennyiségi fölény híján legalább a minőségi fölényt, azaz ebben az esetben a nagyobb tűzerőt a magukénak tudhassák. Már az első világháború alatt, 1916-ban nekiálltak egy 48 cm-es kaliberű ágyú kifejlesztésének, ám végül úgy találták, ez az űrméret túl nagy a csatahajókon való használatra, és a tervezett új csatahajók részére inkább a 46 cm-es kalibert választották. Egyébként ennek a 48 cm-es kísérleti lövegnek éppúgy, mint a Nagato osztályon használt 410 mm-esnek, vagy a Yamato osztályra beépített 46 cm-esnek, az angol 380 mm-es Mark I hajóágyú szolgált mintaként, melyből a tervezők kiindultak. (Az első világháború után az amerikaiak is tervezték ilyen kaliberű ágyúk rendszeresítését, de a fejlesztést leállították, mielőtt még az első prototípus elkészült volna.)

[...] Bővebben!

Three missions and billions of U.S. dollars later, the al Qaeda affiliate is stronger than ever in Somalia.

Idén lett volna 90 éves a gyergyóditrói születésű grafikus és festő, Gaál András. A tájképfestészetet megújító alkotónak, a nemzedékeket oktató pedagógusnak, a székelyföldi művészeti élet egyik legjelentősebb szervezőjének halála után 5 évvel nyílt emlékkiállítása Csíkszeredában, a Csíki Székely Múzeumban. A kurátor, Túros Eszter művészettörténész rádiónknak elmondta: van egyfajta kronológiai íve is a kiállításnak, de ehhez […]

Articolul Gaál András-emlékkiállítás Csíkszeredában apare prima dată în Kolozsvári Rádió Románia.

Le dispositif de sécurité est renforcé ce mardi 15 septembre, autour du Palais du peuple à Kinshasa, à l’occasion de l’ouverture de la session ordinaire de septembre de l’Assemblée nationale et du Sénat. Les forces de l’ordre sont particulièrement visibles aux abords du siège du Parlement, notamment le long du boulevard Triomphal, selon le constat fait par Radio Okapi.

ANALYSE - Plutôt acceptées jusqu’ici, les initiatives infantilisantes du premier ministre commencent à braquer au sein de ses troupes.

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

This discussion paper examines the development of Syria’s electricity sector before and since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. It also assesses what this implies for the post-war reconstruction of the electricity sector. Drawing on field research conducted in Damascus and Qamishli between August and December 2025, and using a theoretical framework that prioritises environmental sustainability and social inclusion, this paper explores opportunities and challenges for pursuing a transformative reconstruction of the electricity sector that is environmentally sustainable (prioritising renewables) and socially inclusive (participatory and affordable). The paper finds that fragmentation is a key characteristic of the energy regime in post-war Syria,materialising in recent years in three isolated electricity systems: an off-grid, generator-based system in the north-east; a Turkey-linked, semi-private supply system in the north-west; and a national-grid system in the rest of the country. Further findings highlight that the transitional government prioritised the rapid restoration of centralised, fossil fuel-based power plants over renewable energy. It restructured electricity-related public institutions according to market rules and further privatised the electricity market to attract investors, raising electricity tariffs significantly, even as 90 per cent of Syrian households live in poverty. The paper concludes that the ongoing reconstruction pathway is a state-led, market-driven and socially insensitive model. International development cooperation can help local actors bridge this gap at the legal, administrative and technical levels. At the legal and administrative levels, international development cooperation can support local efforts to develop an inclusive electricity-governance framework. To date, electricity-related rules have changed rapidly under the transitional government’s top-down approach, with little transparency or community participation. At the technical level, shifting from standalone, off-grid solar systems to connected hybrid and mini-grid systems requires a targeted programme. This is an area for collaboration between the transitional government and international development cooperation. Nevertheless, closing the information gap in the electricity sector is still a key challenge for policy planning. 

EXCLUSIF - À sept mois du scrutin élyséen, celui qui assume de s’y «préparer» a investi un local de 90 mètres carrés dans le XIe arrondissement de Paris où ses équipes sont déjà à pied d’œuvre. Le Figaro s’est rendu sur place.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - Entwurf einer Empfehlung zu dem Entwurf eines Beschlusses des Rates über den Abschluss – im Namen der Union – des Abkommens in Bezug auf Gibraltar zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft einerseits und dem Vereinigten Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland andererseits
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
Thijs Reuten, Nina Carberry

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Aucun cas de maladie à virus Ebola n’a été enregistré depuis le début du mois de septembre à Kasindi, cité frontalière entre la RDC et l’Ouganda, dans la province du Nord-Kivu, a affirmé la société civile locale, ce lundi 14 septembre. 

Elle appelle toutefois la population à maintenir la vigilance en raison de l’intensité des mouvements de personnes entre les deux pays.

Marie Francisco

The recent progress of large language models, and generative artificial intelligence (AI) more generally, has been the object of many discussions that have inspired both awe and fear. One point seems to rapidly gather consensus: AI must be regulated.

My PhD project (Francisco 2025) aimed to analyse the international governance of AI from a sustainability and geopolitical perspective. As a matter of fact, pressing challenges spanning algorithmic bias, cybersecurity, impacts on the labour market, democracies and data ownership are important and necessary aspects of making sure AI does no harm. But in addition, questions about the water and energy consumption of generative AI and the construction of data centres show one thing: the successful governance of AI cannot miss out on ensuring AI is sustainable and contributes to sustainability when used.

In addition, how AI governance is understood will impact who benefits, how, and where. This is why political ideas and the power they hold must be interrogated, and this what I have shed light on with my research.

 

AI governance: promoting AI for sustainability and for the benefit of all

Studying international and national policies about AI and digitalisation highlights three main tensions in AI governance (Francisco & Heintz, 2026). The first one is how to balance the need for global regulations, which may require flexibility, with developing policies that are precise enough to have an impact when implemented. The second tension lies between long-term and short-term benefits and risks, as governing AI addresses different temporality. The final tension finds itself between the interests that countries, and polities like the European Union (EU), may have in ensuring technological sovereignty and advantages, and the need for international collaboration to develop successful AI models. In this context, international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the OECD or the African Union have attempted to play a role as platform for collaboration (Francisco & Heintz, 2026).

Against this background, policy documents from the UN, the EU or the World Economic Forum show two approaches to the governance of AI in a sustainability context (Francisco & Linnér, 2023). The first approach aims to encourage the use of AI for sustainability purposes. We identified that the use of AI is expected to contribute to better data collection and analysis, with examples such as diseases outbreak, climate change patterns, or energy systems. The idea underlying this argument is that sustainability challenges can be solved with high quality and rapid knowledge of what is happening, but also more accurate future predictions. In addition, AI is expected to enhance automation. Automation, in combination with more evidence-based decision-making, is also expected to bring about greater efficiency and reduced inequalities, especially for women and girls, and populations in developing countries (ibid.). But on the other hand, many of the policies from international organisations and states I analysed call for a global common framework with room for flexibility, to be complemented by more precise, and national regulations (Francisco & Heintz, 2026; Francisco & Linnér, 2023). The EU, the UN, and the OECD in particular have been calling for trustworthy, ethic-based or human-centred approaches in AI development (ibid.).

 

The hidden geopolitics of AI governance

The ideas behind international and AI policies orient the debate and goals of AI governance. The AI governance policies I analysed reinforce the focus on data-based and technologically-enabled environmental action, which is typical of the ecomodernist and green governmentality discourses (Francisco, 2025; Francisco & Linnér, 2023). In this respect, the reliance on technical solutions for environmental governance are in fact common discourses in environmental governance, which seem at odds with the otherwise expectation that new technologies are transformative (Ulnicane et al., 2022).

Moreover, the current AI governance landscape tends to sideline the interest of the Global South (Francisco, 2025; Francisco & Heintz, 2026). Of course, there are calls for the inclusion of developing countries and marginalised groups, especially by the UN, the OECD, and the African Union (Francisco & Heintz, 2026; Francisco & Linnér, 2023). But when looking more in detail at what the policies focus on, structural inequalities and the global political economy of AI, for example the extraction of critical minerals for building computer hardware, or the ethical challenges linked to data annotation and extraction, are seldom points of discussions. It means that while international policies recognise the need to actively include marginalised populations, many of their specific needs go unacknowledged. In addition, the AI policies I analysed implicitly create power imbalances, with a centre composed of the United States, China, and leading organisations like the UN, the OECD and the EU, while other states are relegated to more peripheral roles (Francisco, 2025).

 

AI governance and climate security: different perspectives

The complex geopolitical and sustainability challenges surrounding AI lead to the question of climate security.  Something does not simply happen to be a security problem; it is usually the result of political debates and efforts by political actors to turn a topic into a matter of security. With global environmental change, the climate has become an important element of security, with different understanding of what should be secured and how (McDonald, 2013).

Depending on what is meant by climate security, the understanding of how AI can be included is likely to differ in four main ways (Francisco, 2023). First, AI could be included in efforts to foster national security. That is, the political focus would be on the use of technologies such as drones and computer vision in climate-induced conflicts (or conflicts perceived as such). A national understanding of security would also focus on the use of online propaganda and misinformation, as opinions on climate change are tied to strong political identities. Second, an international understanding of climate security would shed light on how AI could be used by international organisations in their work to foster sustainable development, but also on the use of AI by private companies. Third, a human understanding of climate security would support efforts to use AI-technologies for sustainable development and the betterment of humans more generally, on the condition that risks are also addressed. Finally, an ecological view on climate security would allow for an exploration of how AI and digital technologies affect the way we see and relate to the world, which could open avenues on the sustainable governance of AI (Francisco, 2023, 2025).

 

Dr. Marie Francisco is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Thematic Studies- Environmental Change of Linköping University, Sweden. With a background in International Relations and Social Environmental Science, her research focuses on the environmental policy discourses about artificial intelligence and digital technologies at the international and national level.

 

References

Francisco, M. (2023). Artificial intelligence for environmental security: National, international, human and ecological perspectives. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 61, 101250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2022.101250

Francisco, M. (2025). Making Sense of Artificial Intelligence for Global Environmental Governance: Ideas, Power, and Policy Pathways. Linköping University Electronic Press. https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-213333

Francisco, M., & Heintz, F. (2026). 14- The geopolitics of AI in global environmental governance. In B.-O. Linnér, T. Bennich, & H. Carlsen, Handbook on the Geopolitics of Sustainability (pp. 167–178). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035342549.00026

Francisco, M., & Linnér, B.-O. (2023). AI and the governance of sustainable development. An idea analysis of the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Economic Forum. Environmental Science & Policy, 150, 103590. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2023.103590

McDonald, M. (2013). Discourses of climate security. Political Geography, 33, 42–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.01.002

Ulnicane, I., Knight, W., Leach, T., Stahl, B. C., & Wanjiku, W.-G. (2022). Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Emerging International Trends and Policy Frames. In The Global Politics of Artificial Intelligence. Chapman and Hall/CRC. https://doi.org/10.1201/9780429446726-2

The post AI in or for environmental governance? Ideas, sustainability pathways and geopolitics appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As the strategically located Pakistani port’s geopolitical value increases, can its market readiness keep pace?

Le Royaume-Uni se penche sur une page particulièrement sombre de son histoire : l’esclavage. Une nouvelle enquête du Guardian parue le 14 septembre révèle l’ampleur de l’implication britannique dans la traite transatlantique des esclaves, et particulièrement celle de la monarchie : des milliers d’investisseurs, des parlementaires, des rois et des reines.

Ces nouveaux modèles peuvent atteindre des vitesses allant jusqu'à 480 km/h, soit plus vite que les intercepteurs de défense aérienne ukrainiens.

La police interdit la marche de l’opposition prévue ce mardi 15 septembre à Lubumbashi et met en garde contre tout comportement susceptible de perturber l’ordre et la tranquillité publics. Le commissaire provincial de la Police nationale congolaise (PNC) dans le Haut-Katanga, le général Blaise Kilimbalimba, a lancé cet appel lundi 14 septembre, lors d’une parade mixte réunissant la PNC et les Forces armées de la RDC (FARDC), au stade Kibasa Maliba, dans la commune de la Kenya. 

Members of the Uyghur delegation pose with the director of their host organisation, CADAL, during their visit to Buenos Aires, Argentina, 23 August 2026. The sky flag is strictly banned by the Chinese government under anti-separatism laws. Credit: CADAL.

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 15 2026 (IPS)

On 24 August, I took part in a human rights conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Days before it opened, the city legislature cancelled the intended venue after the Chinese ambassador complained to the Argentine government about the participation of prominent Uyghur human rights defenders, including Dolkun Isa, an activist exiled in Germany. Beijing has waged a campaign of mass detention and forced assimilation against the mostly Muslim Uyghur population for years.

The organisers found another venue at the last minute, and the conference went ahead, but the episode was revealing. This was a small gathering, of no great consequence to anyone beyond those in the room, in a global south city over 19,000 kilometres from Beijing, yet China still went out of its way to stop it. The episode showed how China aims to deny its critics any platform, however modest, anywhere. A phone call to a compliant government is the least of what it does in pursuit of this objective.

China’s global campaign

China is the world’s leading perpetrator of transnational repression, the practice of reaching beyond borders to intimidate, punish and silence critics in exile. Its new ‘Ethnic Unity Law‘, in force since July, lets the government target dissidents abroad when they are deemed to be ‘undermining ethnic unity’ or ‘creating ethnic division’. Freedom House has documented at least 319 instances of China’s physical transnational repression targeting Hong Kong democracy activists, Tibetans and Uyghurs, in addition to Taiwanese civil society and political figures, whom it treats as if they were Chinese nationals.

China’s transnational repression spans the spectrum of severity. At the far end, dissidents disappear. Chinese dissident Yi Haihua reportedly vanished in Dubai in April, having fled China via Hong Kong the previous November. China also uses prosecution and imprisonment to punish dissent abroad. Those targeted include a student who was handed a six-year sentence when he returned to China after participating in a pro-democracy protest in Australia.

Less extreme but far more widespread are surveillance, intimidation and repression by proxy, through which China monitors and threatens dissidents abroad and pressures family members back home. China also applies economic leverage against states, as seen in April when the government of Zambia, a state heavily indebted to China, called off the RightsCon digital rights conference, over the participation of Taiwanese activists, days before it was due to open in Lusaka.

Beyond China

China is not alone. Vietnam and Russia are the second and third worst offenders, and at least 54 states have engaged in transnational repression, with six — Afghanistan, Benin, Georgia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe — identified as using these tactics for the first time in 2025.

Latin America, once largely spared, is now home to transnational repression. In June 2025, former Nicaraguan army major Roberto Samcam, an outspoken critic of dictator Daniel Ortega, was shot dead at his home near San José, Costa Rica, the third such killing of a Nicaraguan exile there in recent years. Nicaragua has also taken the lead in stripping dissenters of nationality. Since 2023, the government has removed citizenship from over 300 former journalists, opponents and political prisoners and confiscated their assets, leaving them stateless and unprotected.

Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro pursued its opponents with similar determination. In February 2024, men in fake police uniforms abducted exiled former army lieutenant Ronald Ojeda from his apartment in Santiago de Chile. His dismembered body was found buried under concrete nine days later. Chilean prosecutors concluded the killing was ordered by the Venezuelan government and carried out through a Venezuelan gang, part of a growing practice of outsourcing violence that offers plausible deniability. In October 2025, gunmen in Bogotá opened fire on exiled activists Yendri Velásquez and Luis Peche. Fortunately, they survived their multiple gunshot wounds.

Weak response

In March 2025, a New York jury convicted two members of an Eastern European crime ring hired by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard over a 2022 plot to kill exiled journalist Masih Alinejad at her Brooklyn home. This June, a UK court convicted two men of spying on UK-based Hong Kong democracy activists, and in July, it convicted those responsible for a knife attack on exiled Iranian television presenter Pouria Zeraati. The USA has imposed visa bans on Thai officials responsible for forcibly returning Uyghurs to China.

Yet these are exceptions in a pattern of host states quietly enabling the repression they claim to oppose. On top of failing to do enough to prevent transnational repression on their soil, many are facilitating it through their border and immigration systems, with geopolitical calculations and political pressure to curb immigration numbers trumping human rights protections.

In June, Germany deported Tajik opposition activist Asadullo Boboev and his son despite a documented risk of arrest. Tajik authorities detained Boboev on arrival. The USA has repeatedly returned Russians to the authoritarian government they fled, and has let officials from Iran’s consulate into US detention facilities to help process Iranian asylum seekers for deportation, including Christian converts and women’s rights protesters. In 2025, the UK reopened the door to extraditions to Hong Kong, five years after suspending cooperation over the territory’s draconian national security law. The Trump administration’s 2025 dismantling of USAID and freeze on democracy funding have cut off support that once helped threatened activists relocate and rebuild their lives.

The European Parliament, the G7 and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have all formally acknowledged transnational repression as an assault on human rights and state sovereignty, but recognition hasn’t brought stronger responses. Democratic states must resist pressure, impose consequences on foreign officials who order transnational repression and refrain from returning exiles to face danger. Democracies must not prioritise calculations of trade and diplomacy over the protection of the people seeking safety.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org