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In Europa gibt es zahlreiche faszinierende und gleichzeitig gefährliche Naturphänomene. Einer der beeindruckendsten und oft unterschätzten sind die aktiven Vulkane. Diese geologischen Giganten bieten nicht nur spektakuläre Landschaften, sondern auch einzigartige Einblicke in die Kraft der Natur.

Von den heißen Lavafontänen des Ätna auf Sizilien bis hin zu den kalderienförmigen Inseln von Santorin zeigt sich Europas vulkanische Aktivität in vielfältiger Form. Jeder dieser Vulkane hat seine eigene Geschichte und seinen eigenen Charakter, was Sie besonders faszinierend macht. Entdecken Sie die Welt der aktiven Vulkane in Europa und erfahren Sie mehr über Ihre Schönheit und Gefährlichkeit.

Das Wichtigste in Kürze

• Der Ätna auf Sizilien ist Europas aktivster und höchster Vulkan.
• Der Vesuv nahe Neapel ist berüchtigt für den Ausbruch von 79 n. Chr.
• Stromboli ist ständig aktiv und hat alle 20-30 Minuten kleinere Ausbrüche.
• Der Vatnajökull in Island ist ein Vulkan unter einem riesigen Gletscher.
• Hekla in Island ist berüchtigt für seine gefährlichen pyroklastischen Ströme.

Ätna: Europas aktivster Vulkan auf Sizilien

Der Ätna ist bekannt als Europas aktivster Vulkan und befindet sich auf der italienischen Insel Sizilien. Seine regelmäßigen Ausbrüche sind eine beeindruckende Demonstration der geologischen Kräfte, die unser Kontinent prägen. Der Ätna erreicht eine Höhe von über 3.300 Metern und ist damit der höchste aktive Vulkan Europas. Dank seiner unvorhersehbaren Tätigkeiten zieht er sowohl Wissenschaftler als auch Touristen an, die seine spektakulären Eruptionen beobachten wollen. Historisch gesehen hat dieser Vulkan zahlreiche Dörfer und Städte in seinem Umfeld beeinflusst.

Trotz der potentiellen Gefahren, die vom Ätna ausgehen, bieten die fruchtbaren Böden rund um den Vulkan ideale Bedingungen für landwirtschaftliche Aktivitäten. Viele Einheimische nutzen diese Chance und betreiben dort intensive Landwirtschaft, insbesondere Wein- und Olivenanbau. Es gibt zahlreiche Wanderwege, die Besucher zu faszinierenden Aussichtspunkten führen, von denen aus Sie die aktive Kraterlandschaft sehen können. Der Vulkan ist nicht nur ein Naturwunder, sondern spielt auch eine zentrale Rolle im kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Leben der Region.

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Vesuv: Berüchtigte Ausbrüche nahe Neapel Aktive Vulkane in Europa: Gefährlich schön

Der Vesuv ist ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel für die Macht der Natur. Dieser Vulkan, der sich in der Nähe von Neapel befindet, ist berüchtigt für seinen historischen Ausbruch im Jahr 79 n. Chr., bei dem die Städte Pompeji und Herculaneum unter Asche und Lava begraben wurden. Er gehört zu den aktivsten Vulkanen Europas und hat seitdem mehrmals Eruptionen erlebt. Ein wesentliches Merkmal des Vesuvs ist seine Explosivität, die auch heute noch eine Gefahr für die umliegenden Gebiete darstellt.

Vulkane sind nicht nur geologische Phänomene, Sie sind Monumente der Natur, die tief in unseren Planeten blicken lassen. – Haroun Tazieff

Stromboli: Ständig aktive Vulkaninsel in Italien

Stromboli ist bekannt als eine der ständig aktiven Vulkaninseln in Italien. Dieser Vulkan bietet den Besuchern regelmäßig spektakuläre Eruptionen, was ihm den Beinamen „Leuchtturm des Mittelmeers“ eingebracht hat. Die Aktivität des Stromboli wird durch kleinere Ausbrüche charakterisiert, die normalerweise alle 20 bis 30 Minuten auftreten und somit ein unvergleichliches Naturschauspiel bieten.

Der Vulkan befindet sich auf einer kleinen Insel vor der Küste von Sizilien und gehört zu den Eolischen Inseln. Seine prominente Lage und dauerhafte Aktivität machen ihn zu einem wichtigen Studienobjekt für Vulkanologen aus aller Welt.

Vatnajökull: Isländischer Vulkan unter Gletschern verborgen

Der Vatnajökull in Island ist ein faszinierender Vulkan, der unter einem riesigen Gletscher verborgen liegt. Mit einer Fläche von etwa 8.100 Quadratkilometern und einer durchschnittlichen Dicke von 400 Metern ist er einer der größten Gletscher Europas. Der darunter liegende Vulkan ist besonders interessant, weil er regelmäßig zu spektakulären Ausbrüchen führt, die das Eis zum Schmelzen bringen und massive Fluten verursachen können.

Die vulkanische Aktivität unter dem Gletscher hat eine einzigartige Landschaft geschaffen, die sowohl atemberaubend als auch gefährlich sein kann. Es ist nicht nur die Größe, die beeindruckt; auch die Häufigkeit und Intensität der Eruptionen sind bemerkenswert und ziehen zahlreiche Wissenschaftler aus aller Welt an. Der Vatnajökull bietet somit eine bemerkenswerte Kombination aus Schönheit und Gefährdung, die für Besucher ebenso faszinierend wie lehrreich ist.

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.table-responsiv {width: 100%;padding: 0px;margin-bottom: 0px;overflow-y: hidden;border: 1px solid #DDD;overflow-x: auto;min-height: 0.01%;} Vulkan Standort Besonderheiten Ätna Sizilien, Italien Europas aktivster Vulkan, Höhe über 3.300 Meter, regelmäßige Ausbrüche Vesuv Nahe Neapel, Italien Berüchtigt für den Ausbruch im Jahr 79 n. Chr., hohe Explosivität Stromboli Eolische Inseln, Italien Ständig aktiv, kleine Ausbrüche alle 20-30 Minuten Hekla: Legendärer Vulkan in Island Hekla: Legendärer Vulkan in Island – Aktive Vulkane in Europa: Gefährlich schön

Hekla ist einer der berühmtesten Vulkane Islands und hat eine lange Geschichte spektakulärer Ausbrüche. Auch als „Tor zur Hölle“ bekannt, zog er immer wieder die Aufmerksamkeit von Abenteurern und Vulkanologen auf sich. Der Vulkan befindet sich im südlichen Teil des Landes und hatte seinen letzten großen Ausbruch im Jahr 2000. Seitdem überwachen Wissenschaftler ihn genau, da es bei Hekla nur kurze Vorwarnzeiten vor einem erneuten Ausbruch gibt. Zudem ist Hekla für seine pyroklastischen Ströme und gefährlichen Aschewolken berüchtigt, was ihn zu einem herausfordernden Forschungsobjekt macht.

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Santorin: Griechische Vulkaninsel mit kalderiengeformter Landschaft

Die Insel Santorin bietet eine faszinierende Landschaft, die durch einen monumentalen Vulkanausbruch im 16. Jahrhundert v. Chr. geformt wurde. Dieser gewaltige Ausbruch führte zur Entstehung einer beeindruckenden Caldera, die heute von zahlreichen Touristen besucht wird. Die weißen Häuser mit blauen Dächern, die sich malerisch an die Steilwände der Caldera schmiegen, sind ein beliebtes Fotomotiv und bieten einen atemberaubenden Anblick. Buchen Sie eine Bootstour um die Caldera, um den vulkanischen Ursprung dieser schönen Insel hautnah zu erleben.

Campi Flegrei: Supervulkan nahe Neapel, Italien

Campi Flegrei, ein Supervulkan in der Nähe von Neapel, stellt eine der größten vulkanischen Bedrohungen Europas dar. Mit einer kalderageformten Landschaft und zahlreichen heißen Quellen erinnert diese Region an die immense Kraft im Untergrund. Früher bekannt als die „Brennenden Felder“, haben die Campi Flegrei eine eindrucksvolle Geschichte von Ausbrüchen und geothermischer Aktivität.

Teide: Vulkanischer Höhepunkt auf Teneriffa, Spanien

Der Teide auf Teneriffa ist mit knapp 3.718 Metern der höchste Berg Spaniens und ein beeindruckender Vulkan. Der Vulkan bietet eine faszinierende Landschaft, die von erstarrten Lavaströmen bis hin zu fruchtbaren Ebenen reicht. Besucher können den Gipfel des Vulkans entweder durch eine Seilbahnfahrt oder eine anspruchsvolle Wanderung erreichen, wobei bei klarer Sicht atemberaubende Ausblicke über die gesamte Insel garantiert sind.

FAQ: Antworten auf häufig gestellte Fragen Wie kann ich am sichersten einen aktiven Vulkan besichtigen? Der sicherste Weg, einen aktiven Vulkan zu besichtigen, ist in Begleitung eines erfahrenen Führers oder Vulkanologen. Informiere dich im Vorfeld über die aktuellen Aktivitätsniveaus des Vulkans und halte dich stets an lokale Sicherheitsrichtlinien und Evakuierungspläne. Trage geeignete Schutzkleidung und -ausrüstung und achte auf Warnsignale wie Rauch oder Erdbeben. Welche Ausrüstung wird für eine Vulkanwanderung benötigt? Für eine Vulkanwanderung solltest du folgende Ausrüstung mitnehmen: festes und bequemes Schuhwerk, wetterfeste Kleidung, ausreichend Wasser und Verpflegung, Sonnenschutz (Hut, Sonnencreme, Sonnenbrille), ein Erste-Hilfe-Set, eine Taschenlampe, sowie eine Karte und ein GPS-Gerät oder Kompass. Ist es möglich, die Lava eines Vulkans aus nächster Nähe zu sehen? Ja, es ist möglich, allerdings nur unter strenger Beachtung der Sicherheitsvorschriften. An einigen aktiven Vulkanen, wie beispielsweise dem Ätna oder dem Stromboli, gibt es geführte Touren, bei denen man relativ nahe an die Lava herankommen kann. Es ist jedoch wichtig, sich nicht eigenständig und ohne fachkundige Führung in gefährliche Bereiche zu begeben. Wie erkenne ich, ob ein Vulkan gefährlich aktiv ist? Anzeichen für gefährliche vulkanische Aktivität können plötzliche Erdbeben, ansteigende Gasausbrüche, Rauchwolken aus dem Krater und verstärkte seismische Aktivität sein. Informationen hierzu werden in der Regel von vulkanologischen Instituten sowie den lokalen Behörden bereitgestellt. Es ist wichtig, immer über die aktuellen Warnstufen informiert zu sein. Gibt es spezielle Versicherungen für Vulkantouren? Ja, einige Versicherungen bieten spezielle Policen für Abenteuer- oder Extremtourismus an, die auch Risiken wie vulkanische Aktivitäten abdecken. Es ist ratsam, sich bei Deinem Versicherungsanbieter zu erkundigen und eine entsprechende Versicherung abzuschließen, bevor du eine Vulkanreise unternimmst. Können Vulkanausbrüche vorhergesagt werden? Obwohl Wissenschaftler die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Ausbruchs durch Überwachung seismischer Aktivitäten, Gasemissionen und geophysikalische Veränderungen vorhersagen können, ist es sehr schwierig, den genauen Zeitpunkt und das Ausmaß eines Ausbruchs präzise vorherzusagen. Frühwarnsysteme können jedoch helfen, die lokale Bevölkerung zu evakuieren und dadurch Leben zu retten.

Der Beitrag Aktive Vulkane in Europa: Gefährlich schön erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.

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Today’s disruptions and reforms are paving the way for a wide range of possible futures. A key endeavour of IDOS is to contribute to sustainable futures in an increasingly multipolar order, which we are convinced requires cooperative approaches. While people and societies around the world are
facing disruptions and uncertainties collectively – albeit unevenly – our intention at IDOS is to co-shape concrete action that enables us to respond to and navigate these challenges productively. Our aspiration with this final, more exploratory, contribution to the publication is to provide a coherent scenario for a desirable (preferred) future based on the sector-specific recommendations made by the authors in this volume. In this futuring exercise, we describe the state of the world in the year 2040 – understood as an important intermediate point at which our joint vision of sustainable futures is reachable. We aim to showcase an accessible, optimistic narrative depicting a world in which our proposed reform options have been adopted and are part of a broader global push towards cooperation and sustainable development. Envisioning this scenario can provide strategic orientation for the reform pathways we have to choose today. It can be used to highlight the long-term implications of policy shifts and the potential of agency to overcome existing path dependencies. Its value lies in broadening the sense of what is possible and highlighting our agency. […]

Today’s disruptions and reforms are paving the way for a wide range of possible futures. A key endeavour of IDOS is to contribute to sustainable futures in an increasingly multipolar order, which we are convinced requires cooperative approaches. While people and societies around the world are
facing disruptions and uncertainties collectively – albeit unevenly – our intention at IDOS is to co-shape concrete action that enables us to respond to and navigate these challenges productively. Our aspiration with this final, more exploratory, contribution to the publication is to provide a coherent scenario for a desirable (preferred) future based on the sector-specific recommendations made by the authors in this volume. In this futuring exercise, we describe the state of the world in the year 2040 – understood as an important intermediate point at which our joint vision of sustainable futures is reachable. We aim to showcase an accessible, optimistic narrative depicting a world in which our proposed reform options have been adopted and are part of a broader global push towards cooperation and sustainable development. Envisioning this scenario can provide strategic orientation for the reform pathways we have to choose today. It can be used to highlight the long-term implications of policy shifts and the potential of agency to overcome existing path dependencies. Its value lies in broadening the sense of what is possible and highlighting our agency. […]

Today’s disruptions and reforms are paving the way for a wide range of possible futures. A key endeavour of IDOS is to contribute to sustainable futures in an increasingly multipolar order, which we are convinced requires cooperative approaches. While people and societies around the world are
facing disruptions and uncertainties collectively – albeit unevenly – our intention at IDOS is to co-shape concrete action that enables us to respond to and navigate these challenges productively. Our aspiration with this final, more exploratory, contribution to the publication is to provide a coherent scenario for a desirable (preferred) future based on the sector-specific recommendations made by the authors in this volume. In this futuring exercise, we describe the state of the world in the year 2040 – understood as an important intermediate point at which our joint vision of sustainable futures is reachable. We aim to showcase an accessible, optimistic narrative depicting a world in which our proposed reform options have been adopted and are part of a broader global push towards cooperation and sustainable development. Envisioning this scenario can provide strategic orientation for the reform pathways we have to choose today. It can be used to highlight the long-term implications of policy shifts and the potential of agency to overcome existing path dependencies. Its value lies in broadening the sense of what is possible and highlighting our agency. […]

When we speak of tectonic shifts, we usually refer either to geology or to the international order. In geology, tectonic plates shift and build up tension until it is released. Likewise, since the end of the Cold War, the international order has experienced mounting pressure, and seemingly entrenched
global structures have begun to shift. At the same time, societies and cooperation systems are under internal pressure from the growing impacts of environmental and climatic change, younger generations’ demands for new opportunities, and technological advances, not least in artificial intelligence. In reaction to both external and internal pressures, reforming complex systems is challenging and requires skilled, dedicated people and well-connected institutions (Reiber & Reiners, 2019). Transnational knowledge cooperation has thus gained substantial relevance (see Lynders, 2024).

When we speak of tectonic shifts, we usually refer either to geology or to the international order. In geology, tectonic plates shift and build up tension until it is released. Likewise, since the end of the Cold War, the international order has experienced mounting pressure, and seemingly entrenched
global structures have begun to shift. At the same time, societies and cooperation systems are under internal pressure from the growing impacts of environmental and climatic change, younger generations’ demands for new opportunities, and technological advances, not least in artificial intelligence. In reaction to both external and internal pressures, reforming complex systems is challenging and requires skilled, dedicated people and well-connected institutions (Reiber & Reiners, 2019). Transnational knowledge cooperation has thus gained substantial relevance (see Lynders, 2024).

When we speak of tectonic shifts, we usually refer either to geology or to the international order. In geology, tectonic plates shift and build up tension until it is released. Likewise, since the end of the Cold War, the international order has experienced mounting pressure, and seemingly entrenched
global structures have begun to shift. At the same time, societies and cooperation systems are under internal pressure from the growing impacts of environmental and climatic change, younger generations’ demands for new opportunities, and technological advances, not least in artificial intelligence. In reaction to both external and internal pressures, reforming complex systems is challenging and requires skilled, dedicated people and well-connected institutions (Reiber & Reiners, 2019). Transnational knowledge cooperation has thus gained substantial relevance (see Lynders, 2024).

Academic freedom and independent scientific knowledge production are fragile achievements – first secured during the Enlightenment in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries – that now face substantial headwinds. In the United States in 2026, the Trump administration has advanced further proposals to reduce science spending (Grimm & Hornidge, 2025). Most notably, the White House foresees a 55 per cent cut in funding for the National Science Foundation in 2027 compared with 2026 levels (Garisto & Nature Magazine, 2026). However, the threats to science systems in the United States and beyond cannot be reduced to – drastic – budget cuts alone. Political interference in scientific quality assurance and decisions about which research receives funding is also reported to have increased substantially, particularly in the United States (e.g. Finucane, 2026). Although the Trump administration’s actions are notably blatant, attacks on science systems, academic freedom and knowledge cooperation, whether overt or subtle, can be observed in countries across income levels and continents. In Germany, the German Research Foundation recently published a position paper on threats to academic freedom and the German science system, explicitly referencing the positioning and influence of the right-wing political party AfD, as set out in its “government programme” for the state election in Saxony-Anhalt (Ad-hoc-Arbeitsgruppe, 2026). At the same time, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development announced in 2026 that China’s research spending had reached parity with that of the United States (OECD, 2026). This is also the year in which the African Union Commission and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) launched the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2034 Implementation Plan. According to the AUDA-NEPAD, this marks “Africa’s determination to move beyond overreliance on imported technologies and towards the sovereign production of globally competitive knowledge, stronger industrial capabilities, and socioeconomic value creation” (AUDA-NEPAD, 2026). Moreover, in 2026 the European Commission adopted a recommendation on the first-ever European Union (EU) framework for science diplomacy. Finally, on the multilateral level, 2026 marks two years since the launch of the UNESCO International Decade of Sciences for Sustainable Development, with UNESCO holding a large international conference with the ambition to “spotlight how transdisciplinary research, open science and strengthened science-policy-society interfaces can drive more inclusive and equitable futures for all” (UNESCO, 2026). With these developments shaping science systems in 2026, how is Germany positioning itself through national science policy to further develop its science and innovation systems and invest in transregional science cooperation as an engine for mutual learning, innovation and change? In early 2026, the German Science Council addressed the rise of anti-pluralist and anti-academic forces in a paper envisioning Germany’s science system in 2040 (Wissenschaftsrat, 2026). In it, the Council identifies four possible scenarios. Two scenarios assume substantial investment in science and in the science system as a whole: Scenario one outlines a well-funded German science and innovation system in a geopolitically turbulent world marked by high levels of societal polarisation, security risks and non-alignment with EU partners; scenario four envisages a global research area in which science cooperation is closely coordinated by a supranational organisation, creating cross-regional innovation spaces but also less localisation, and a decoupling of research and education as well as of research and society and policy. The two remaining scenarios give science far lower priority. Scenario two envisions a system in which science is predominantly instrumentalised for economic gain, while scenario three depicts science as marginalised, struggling for funding and political attention, and barely able to realise its potential. In the following, we explore selected developments in science policy in 2026, differentiate between different types of innovation policy and argue for the role of knowledge cooperation in creating shared innovation spaces. Finally, we bring this analysis together with the German Science Council’s scenario perspective and propose an additional, more visionary scenario that policy- and science-system-related decision-makers should strive to realise.

Academic freedom and independent scientific knowledge production are fragile achievements – first secured during the Enlightenment in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries – that now face substantial headwinds. In the United States in 2026, the Trump administration has advanced further proposals to reduce science spending (Grimm & Hornidge, 2025). Most notably, the White House foresees a 55 per cent cut in funding for the National Science Foundation in 2027 compared with 2026 levels (Garisto & Nature Magazine, 2026). However, the threats to science systems in the United States and beyond cannot be reduced to – drastic – budget cuts alone. Political interference in scientific quality assurance and decisions about which research receives funding is also reported to have increased substantially, particularly in the United States (e.g. Finucane, 2026). Although the Trump administration’s actions are notably blatant, attacks on science systems, academic freedom and knowledge cooperation, whether overt or subtle, can be observed in countries across income levels and continents. In Germany, the German Research Foundation recently published a position paper on threats to academic freedom and the German science system, explicitly referencing the positioning and influence of the right-wing political party AfD, as set out in its “government programme” for the state election in Saxony-Anhalt (Ad-hoc-Arbeitsgruppe, 2026). At the same time, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development announced in 2026 that China’s research spending had reached parity with that of the United States (OECD, 2026). This is also the year in which the African Union Commission and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) launched the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2034 Implementation Plan. According to the AUDA-NEPAD, this marks “Africa’s determination to move beyond overreliance on imported technologies and towards the sovereign production of globally competitive knowledge, stronger industrial capabilities, and socioeconomic value creation” (AUDA-NEPAD, 2026). Moreover, in 2026 the European Commission adopted a recommendation on the first-ever European Union (EU) framework for science diplomacy. Finally, on the multilateral level, 2026 marks two years since the launch of the UNESCO International Decade of Sciences for Sustainable Development, with UNESCO holding a large international conference with the ambition to “spotlight how transdisciplinary research, open science and strengthened science-policy-society interfaces can drive more inclusive and equitable futures for all” (UNESCO, 2026). With these developments shaping science systems in 2026, how is Germany positioning itself through national science policy to further develop its science and innovation systems and invest in transregional science cooperation as an engine for mutual learning, innovation and change? In early 2026, the German Science Council addressed the rise of anti-pluralist and anti-academic forces in a paper envisioning Germany’s science system in 2040 (Wissenschaftsrat, 2026). In it, the Council identifies four possible scenarios. Two scenarios assume substantial investment in science and in the science system as a whole: Scenario one outlines a well-funded German science and innovation system in a geopolitically turbulent world marked by high levels of societal polarisation, security risks and non-alignment with EU partners; scenario four envisages a global research area in which science cooperation is closely coordinated by a supranational organisation, creating cross-regional innovation spaces but also less localisation, and a decoupling of research and education as well as of research and society and policy. The two remaining scenarios give science far lower priority. Scenario two envisions a system in which science is predominantly instrumentalised for economic gain, while scenario three depicts science as marginalised, struggling for funding and political attention, and barely able to realise its potential. In the following, we explore selected developments in science policy in 2026, differentiate between different types of innovation policy and argue for the role of knowledge cooperation in creating shared innovation spaces. Finally, we bring this analysis together with the German Science Council’s scenario perspective and propose an additional, more visionary scenario that policy- and science-system-related decision-makers should strive to realise.

Academic freedom and independent scientific knowledge production are fragile achievements – first secured during the Enlightenment in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries – that now face substantial headwinds. In the United States in 2026, the Trump administration has advanced further proposals to reduce science spending (Grimm & Hornidge, 2025). Most notably, the White House foresees a 55 per cent cut in funding for the National Science Foundation in 2027 compared with 2026 levels (Garisto & Nature Magazine, 2026). However, the threats to science systems in the United States and beyond cannot be reduced to – drastic – budget cuts alone. Political interference in scientific quality assurance and decisions about which research receives funding is also reported to have increased substantially, particularly in the United States (e.g. Finucane, 2026). Although the Trump administration’s actions are notably blatant, attacks on science systems, academic freedom and knowledge cooperation, whether overt or subtle, can be observed in countries across income levels and continents. In Germany, the German Research Foundation recently published a position paper on threats to academic freedom and the German science system, explicitly referencing the positioning and influence of the right-wing political party AfD, as set out in its “government programme” for the state election in Saxony-Anhalt (Ad-hoc-Arbeitsgruppe, 2026). At the same time, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development announced in 2026 that China’s research spending had reached parity with that of the United States (OECD, 2026). This is also the year in which the African Union Commission and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) launched the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 2034 Implementation Plan. According to the AUDA-NEPAD, this marks “Africa’s determination to move beyond overreliance on imported technologies and towards the sovereign production of globally competitive knowledge, stronger industrial capabilities, and socioeconomic value creation” (AUDA-NEPAD, 2026). Moreover, in 2026 the European Commission adopted a recommendation on the first-ever European Union (EU) framework for science diplomacy. Finally, on the multilateral level, 2026 marks two years since the launch of the UNESCO International Decade of Sciences for Sustainable Development, with UNESCO holding a large international conference with the ambition to “spotlight how transdisciplinary research, open science and strengthened science-policy-society interfaces can drive more inclusive and equitable futures for all” (UNESCO, 2026). With these developments shaping science systems in 2026, how is Germany positioning itself through national science policy to further develop its science and innovation systems and invest in transregional science cooperation as an engine for mutual learning, innovation and change? In early 2026, the German Science Council addressed the rise of anti-pluralist and anti-academic forces in a paper envisioning Germany’s science system in 2040 (Wissenschaftsrat, 2026). In it, the Council identifies four possible scenarios. Two scenarios assume substantial investment in science and in the science system as a whole: Scenario one outlines a well-funded German science and innovation system in a geopolitically turbulent world marked by high levels of societal polarisation, security risks and non-alignment with EU partners; scenario four envisages a global research area in which science cooperation is closely coordinated by a supranational organisation, creating cross-regional innovation spaces but also less localisation, and a decoupling of research and education as well as of research and society and policy. The two remaining scenarios give science far lower priority. Scenario two envisions a system in which science is predominantly instrumentalised for economic gain, while scenario three depicts science as marginalised, struggling for funding and political attention, and barely able to realise its potential. In the following, we explore selected developments in science policy in 2026, differentiate between different types of innovation policy and argue for the role of knowledge cooperation in creating shared innovation spaces. Finally, we bring this analysis together with the German Science Council’s scenario perspective and propose an additional, more visionary scenario that policy- and science-system-related decision-makers should strive to realise.

Two features of AI stand out among technological innovations: It is exceptionally powerful, and its (computing) power is increasing faster than any previous technology in human history. AI is not a tool that can simply be added to the existing arsenal just for the sake of task automation and increased efficiency (Sinanoglu, 2025a). Its consequences are so profound that using it to advance broader development objectives requires changes to some of the ways development cooperation works. In this chapter, we go beyond more general assessments (OECD, 2025) of the use of AI by governments (OECD, 2026) and of the global development risks posed by AI (United Nations Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, 2026). We argue that successful development cooperation for sustainable futures depends on collaboration with others in iterative and adaptive ways to exploit opportunities for positive change more effectively in challenging contexts. To this end, current development-cooperation structures and processes should be reformed to facilitate and encourage organisational learning (Brandi & Büge, 2026) and adopt a more iterative approach to cooperation. To what extent does development cooperation currently deploy AI tools for such organisational learning? By “AI”, we mean generative and agentic artificial intelligence. We also distinguish between “AI in development” and “AI for development”. Whereas the former refers to how AI is used in middle- and low-income countries, the latter refers to how the development sector can use AI. We catalogued how the supply side of development cooperation (donors, ministries, agencies, development banks, United Nations (UN) entities, humanitarian implementers and funders) uses AI in its own operations, programming, advisory work and evaluations. The database comprises 172 AI deployments and, while not exhaustive, provides a comprehensive primary-source snapshot that lets us answer three questions empirically: Who is deploying AI? What for? And how far has it matured? (See Figure 9) Our data suggest that almost 60 per cent of recorded uses fall into just two functions: getting services to people in the field (programme delivery) and speeding up the back office at headquarters (internal operations). Together, the functions most closely tied to organisational learning – monitoring, evaluation, planning and coordination – account for only roughly 19 per cent of deployments. In short, the sector is now using AI to do its existing work faster, but not yet to change how it works and learns. 

Two features of AI stand out among technological innovations: It is exceptionally powerful, and its (computing) power is increasing faster than any previous technology in human history. AI is not a tool that can simply be added to the existing arsenal just for the sake of task automation and increased efficiency (Sinanoglu, 2025a). Its consequences are so profound that using it to advance broader development objectives requires changes to some of the ways development cooperation works. In this chapter, we go beyond more general assessments (OECD, 2025) of the use of AI by governments (OECD, 2026) and of the global development risks posed by AI (United Nations Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, 2026). We argue that successful development cooperation for sustainable futures depends on collaboration with others in iterative and adaptive ways to exploit opportunities for positive change more effectively in challenging contexts. To this end, current development-cooperation structures and processes should be reformed to facilitate and encourage organisational learning (Brandi & Büge, 2026) and adopt a more iterative approach to cooperation. To what extent does development cooperation currently deploy AI tools for such organisational learning? By “AI”, we mean generative and agentic artificial intelligence. We also distinguish between “AI in development” and “AI for development”. Whereas the former refers to how AI is used in middle- and low-income countries, the latter refers to how the development sector can use AI. We catalogued how the supply side of development cooperation (donors, ministries, agencies, development banks, United Nations (UN) entities, humanitarian implementers and funders) uses AI in its own operations, programming, advisory work and evaluations. The database comprises 172 AI deployments and, while not exhaustive, provides a comprehensive primary-source snapshot that lets us answer three questions empirically: Who is deploying AI? What for? And how far has it matured? (See Figure 9) Our data suggest that almost 60 per cent of recorded uses fall into just two functions: getting services to people in the field (programme delivery) and speeding up the back office at headquarters (internal operations). Together, the functions most closely tied to organisational learning – monitoring, evaluation, planning and coordination – account for only roughly 19 per cent of deployments. In short, the sector is now using AI to do its existing work faster, but not yet to change how it works and learns. 

Two features of AI stand out among technological innovations: It is exceptionally powerful, and its (computing) power is increasing faster than any previous technology in human history. AI is not a tool that can simply be added to the existing arsenal just for the sake of task automation and increased efficiency (Sinanoglu, 2025a). Its consequences are so profound that using it to advance broader development objectives requires changes to some of the ways development cooperation works. In this chapter, we go beyond more general assessments (OECD, 2025) of the use of AI by governments (OECD, 2026) and of the global development risks posed by AI (United Nations Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence, 2026). We argue that successful development cooperation for sustainable futures depends on collaboration with others in iterative and adaptive ways to exploit opportunities for positive change more effectively in challenging contexts. To this end, current development-cooperation structures and processes should be reformed to facilitate and encourage organisational learning (Brandi & Büge, 2026) and adopt a more iterative approach to cooperation. To what extent does development cooperation currently deploy AI tools for such organisational learning? By “AI”, we mean generative and agentic artificial intelligence. We also distinguish between “AI in development” and “AI for development”. Whereas the former refers to how AI is used in middle- and low-income countries, the latter refers to how the development sector can use AI. We catalogued how the supply side of development cooperation (donors, ministries, agencies, development banks, United Nations (UN) entities, humanitarian implementers and funders) uses AI in its own operations, programming, advisory work and evaluations. The database comprises 172 AI deployments and, while not exhaustive, provides a comprehensive primary-source snapshot that lets us answer three questions empirically: Who is deploying AI? What for? And how far has it matured? (See Figure 9) Our data suggest that almost 60 per cent of recorded uses fall into just two functions: getting services to people in the field (programme delivery) and speeding up the back office at headquarters (internal operations). Together, the functions most closely tied to organisational learning – monitoring, evaluation, planning and coordination – account for only roughly 19 per cent of deployments. In short, the sector is now using AI to do its existing work faster, but not yet to change how it works and learns. 

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015 in a political environment in which broad multilateral agreement still appeared possible. They reflected the belief that universal goals, shared language and collective implementation could organise international cooperation, even if
they were never free from contestation (Biermann, Kanie, & Kim, 2017; Chaturvedi et al., 2020). For global health, this mattered. The 2030 Agenda broadened the health agenda beyond selected infectious diseases and maternal and child health. It included universal health coverage, non-communicable diseases, mental health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the wider social, economic and environmental determinants of health (Murray, 2015; WHO, 2015). With only a few years left until 2030, progress remains uneven and many health-related targets are off track. At the same time, the political context for a future global development framework has changed substantially. Global health cooper-
ation is increasingly shaped by donor retrenchment, weaker multilateralism, geopolitical competition and ideological polarisation (Held, Kickbusch, McNally, Piselli, & Told, 2019; Kickbusch & Liu, 2022). Issues such as gender equality, vaccination, climate action and migration have become more contested. These tensions now affect financing, normsetting, institutional stability and the conditions under which cooperation remains possible. Three shifts are particularly important. First, financing has become more uncertain. Aid cuts and donor retrenchment weaken multilateral health institutions and create incentives for selective, interest-driven cooperation (Poddar & Rao, 2025; Witter et al., 2025). Second, ideological polarisation makes established health commitments more contested, especially around sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination, and climate and health (Greene, 2026; Khosla & Allotey, 2025). Third, the global health order is becoming more multipolar. Regional organisations, middle powers,
South-South cooperation and issue-based coalitions are gaining influence (Bull & Banik, 2025; Franz et al., 2024; Lal, 2026). Together, these shifts affect who leads, which priorities are defended and how ambition is defined. At stake is not only whether new commitments can be agreed, but whether the core principles of global health cooperation can be preserved. These include rights-based commitments, universality and equity, national ownership in implementation and international solidarity through coordinated collective action. These principles are grounded in the normative framework of the World Health Organization (WHO) and reflected, although unevenly, in the 2030 Agenda and subsequent declarations on universal health coverage (UN, 2015, 2019, 2023; WHO, 1948). The risk is not only stagnation. A more serious risk is selective rollback. Commitments that seemed relatively stable during the SDG period may become vulnerable in post-2030 negotiations. This applies particularly to sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination and climate-related health commitments (Haeuser et al., 2025; Khosla & Allotey, 2025; Romanello et al., 2024). If consensus becomes harder to reach, the price of agreement may be dilution. A future framework may preserve the language of multilateralism while narrowing the substance of global health ambition (see also Berger & Leininger in this volume).

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015 in a political environment in which broad multilateral agreement still appeared possible. They reflected the belief that universal goals, shared language and collective implementation could organise international cooperation, even if
they were never free from contestation (Biermann, Kanie, & Kim, 2017; Chaturvedi et al., 2020). For global health, this mattered. The 2030 Agenda broadened the health agenda beyond selected infectious diseases and maternal and child health. It included universal health coverage, non-communicable diseases, mental health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the wider social, economic and environmental determinants of health (Murray, 2015; WHO, 2015). With only a few years left until 2030, progress remains uneven and many health-related targets are off track. At the same time, the political context for a future global development framework has changed substantially. Global health cooper-
ation is increasingly shaped by donor retrenchment, weaker multilateralism, geopolitical competition and ideological polarisation (Held, Kickbusch, McNally, Piselli, & Told, 2019; Kickbusch & Liu, 2022). Issues such as gender equality, vaccination, climate action and migration have become more contested. These tensions now affect financing, normsetting, institutional stability and the conditions under which cooperation remains possible. Three shifts are particularly important. First, financing has become more uncertain. Aid cuts and donor retrenchment weaken multilateral health institutions and create incentives for selective, interest-driven cooperation (Poddar & Rao, 2025; Witter et al., 2025). Second, ideological polarisation makes established health commitments more contested, especially around sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination, and climate and health (Greene, 2026; Khosla & Allotey, 2025). Third, the global health order is becoming more multipolar. Regional organisations, middle powers,
South-South cooperation and issue-based coalitions are gaining influence (Bull & Banik, 2025; Franz et al., 2024; Lal, 2026). Together, these shifts affect who leads, which priorities are defended and how ambition is defined. At stake is not only whether new commitments can be agreed, but whether the core principles of global health cooperation can be preserved. These include rights-based commitments, universality and equity, national ownership in implementation and international solidarity through coordinated collective action. These principles are grounded in the normative framework of the World Health Organization (WHO) and reflected, although unevenly, in the 2030 Agenda and subsequent declarations on universal health coverage (UN, 2015, 2019, 2023; WHO, 1948). The risk is not only stagnation. A more serious risk is selective rollback. Commitments that seemed relatively stable during the SDG period may become vulnerable in post-2030 negotiations. This applies particularly to sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination and climate-related health commitments (Haeuser et al., 2025; Khosla & Allotey, 2025; Romanello et al., 2024). If consensus becomes harder to reach, the price of agreement may be dilution. A future framework may preserve the language of multilateralism while narrowing the substance of global health ambition (see also Berger & Leininger in this volume).

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed in 2015 in a political environment in which broad multilateral agreement still appeared possible. They reflected the belief that universal goals, shared language and collective implementation could organise international cooperation, even if
they were never free from contestation (Biermann, Kanie, & Kim, 2017; Chaturvedi et al., 2020). For global health, this mattered. The 2030 Agenda broadened the health agenda beyond selected infectious diseases and maternal and child health. It included universal health coverage, non-communicable diseases, mental health, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the wider social, economic and environmental determinants of health (Murray, 2015; WHO, 2015). With only a few years left until 2030, progress remains uneven and many health-related targets are off track. At the same time, the political context for a future global development framework has changed substantially. Global health cooper-
ation is increasingly shaped by donor retrenchment, weaker multilateralism, geopolitical competition and ideological polarisation (Held, Kickbusch, McNally, Piselli, & Told, 2019; Kickbusch & Liu, 2022). Issues such as gender equality, vaccination, climate action and migration have become more contested. These tensions now affect financing, normsetting, institutional stability and the conditions under which cooperation remains possible. Three shifts are particularly important. First, financing has become more uncertain. Aid cuts and donor retrenchment weaken multilateral health institutions and create incentives for selective, interest-driven cooperation (Poddar & Rao, 2025; Witter et al., 2025). Second, ideological polarisation makes established health commitments more contested, especially around sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination, and climate and health (Greene, 2026; Khosla & Allotey, 2025). Third, the global health order is becoming more multipolar. Regional organisations, middle powers,
South-South cooperation and issue-based coalitions are gaining influence (Bull & Banik, 2025; Franz et al., 2024; Lal, 2026). Together, these shifts affect who leads, which priorities are defended and how ambition is defined. At stake is not only whether new commitments can be agreed, but whether the core principles of global health cooperation can be preserved. These include rights-based commitments, universality and equity, national ownership in implementation and international solidarity through coordinated collective action. These principles are grounded in the normative framework of the World Health Organization (WHO) and reflected, although unevenly, in the 2030 Agenda and subsequent declarations on universal health coverage (UN, 2015, 2019, 2023; WHO, 1948). The risk is not only stagnation. A more serious risk is selective rollback. Commitments that seemed relatively stable during the SDG period may become vulnerable in post-2030 negotiations. This applies particularly to sexual and reproductive health and rights, vaccination and climate-related health commitments (Haeuser et al., 2025; Khosla & Allotey, 2025; Romanello et al., 2024). If consensus becomes harder to reach, the price of agreement may be dilution. A future framework may preserve the language of multilateralism while narrowing the substance of global health ambition (see also Berger & Leininger in this volume).

As governments increasingly prioritise national interests, security concerns and geopolitical competition over collective global responsibilities, traditional development finance mechanisms are being weakened, repurposed or redirected towards advancing narrow strategic objectives. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development projects a 23 per cent decline in official development assistance (ODA) between 2024 and 2025 (OECD, 2026). This reduction not only has immediate consequences for the lives and livelihood of millions of people in low-income countries (LICs) who depend on external assistance, but also creates uncertainty for partner countries, disrupts long-term development planning, and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of development cooperation. At the same time, development finance needs have risen sharply and continue to rise due to the climate crisis, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions and rising food and energy prices. Together, these pressures have contributed to a projected USD 6.4 trillion financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 (OECD, 2025a). Against this backdrop, mobilising greater volumes of private capital aligned with the SDGs has become increasingly important (on the need for the European Union to become more adept at facilitating private investment, see the contribution by Keijzer & Furness in this volume). In particular, blended finance has frequently been promoted as one key instrument to achieve this objective (on domestic revenue mobilisation as another key approach, see the contribution by Sen & von Haldenwang in this volume). However, despite growing attention from policy-makers and development institutions, the scale of blended finance has remained well below expectations and so far made only a limited contribution to closing the SDG financing gap. Although transaction volumes increased from USD 11.5 billion in 2020 to USD 18.3 billion in 2024, they remain small relative to the estimated USD 4 trillion annual SDG financing gap (Convergence, 2025; OECD, 2025a). As such, the Sevilla Commitment (UNCTAD, 2025) calls for scaling up private capital mobilisation through blended finance and a broader use of risk-sharing instruments. This chapter discusses the benefits and limits of blended finance as well as reforms that are needed at different levels to scale up blended finance and enhance its development impact.