Diplomacy & Crisis News

As the media focuses on the many crises in the Middle East, Jordan’s capacity to endure the instability next door is noteworthy. Yet the Hashemite Kingdom faces tough challenges at home and abroad that make its future precarious.

Despite regional turmoil testing Jordan’s borders and population, the Hashemite Kingdom has remained remarkably stable. The resource-deprived country has largely weathered Iraq and Syria’s instability to the north, Israel and Palestine’s tensions to the west, and Egypt’s restive Sinai Peninsula to the south. Under the leadership of King Abdullah al-Thani, Jordan has also endured the domestic dangers of a swelling refugee population as well as growing political and economic volatility.

Security reigns supreme

Central to Jordan’s stability is its exceptionally sophisticated national security enterprise. With a $1.5 billion military budget underwritten by Western aid, the Kingdom boasts some of the most elite special forces and counterterrorism units in the region. All this is bolstered by the Kingdom’s extensive mukhabarat, which identifies foreign and domestic threats by carefully monitoring the country’s regional situation while penetrating the deepest levels of Jordanian society.

Jordan’s security establishment has effectively deterred most of the region’s unrest from spilling over into its borders. The Kingdom plays a pivotal role in preventing foreign jihadists from entering or exiting the Syrian conflict through Jordanian territory, and leverages its military might as part of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria.

As instability has increased in the Middle East in recent years, U.S. military and police assistance to Jordan has grown accordingly, peaking at $662 million in 2016. The growing threat of ISIS and its affiliates also prompted a Pentagon-funded, $100 million program between Jordan and the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon to improve security along the Kingdom’s northern border.

King Abdullah of Jordan shakes hands with former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen

Although these measures have strengthened Jordan, they also have coincided with an intensifying threat environment. In June 2016, two terrorist attacks linked to ISIS were carried out near Syrian refugee camps in Baqa’a and al-Rukban, killing five Jordanian intelligence personnel and six Jordanian military members respectively. In December, gunmen presumably affiliated with al-Qaeda or ISIS also killed seven Jordanian policemen and two civilians in the southern city of Karak. The success of these attacks despite Jordan’s comparative advantages suggests that the Kingdom will face an increasingly fragile security situation in the short to medium term. This is more likely as ISIS and its affiliates’ priorities shift from holding territory to performing more traditional terrorist operations.

Containing the refugee crisis

Jordan has shouldered a swelling refugee population. The country plays host to 1.27 million Syrian refugees, which compose nearly 13% of Jordan’s population. Lack of resources and available opportunities in refugee camps have disadvantaged many Syrians, forcing them to find employment in criminal networks, militias fighting in Syria, or terrorist groups. This creates high rates of violence and sexual abuse in refugee camps, and further threatens Jordan’s security from within.

The refugee population also burdens the Kingdom’s already struggling economy. Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is over 90%, and unemployment is around 16% with youth unemployment nearly double that. The refugee influx has further increased youth unemployment by 30% and has grown demand for basic commodities by 40%. The security risks linked to disenfranchised refugees have also shrunk Jordan’s vital revenue streams like tourism and external remittances.

The Kingdom has consequently depended on humanitarian aid from the United States, Gulf countries, and international agencies: the United States alone provided nearly $800 million for refugee assistance in 2015. While the combined aid flows have enabled Jordan to meet existing refugee-related costs to date, it will be increasingly difficult to meet the needs of  the country’s growing refugee numbers.

King Abdullah has continually stressed that job creation and foreign investment in Jordan can benefit the economy and the refugee situation more than direct aid. One promising initiative along these lines is a recent trade arrangement that incentivizes foreign companies to invest in Jordan and export products to Europe tariff-free if those companies derive at least 15% of their labor from Syrian refugees.

Another risk posed by the refugee crisis is that it has facilitated Jordan’s continuing reliance on short-term surges in foreign aid and investment, preventing the Kingdom from engaging in long-term, structural economic reform. As the country edges towards insolvency, Jordan must trim deficit-enabling redundancies in government, gradually wane unsustainable commodity subsidies, and improve ease-of-business measures for small-to-medium sized Jordanian enterprises—which make up 95% of Jordan’s private sector but are typically ignored by the government’s focus on initiatives for large and multinational enterprises.

Preserving power

Although Jordanian’s anxieties about their safety and finances are intensifying, the political system is fairly stable. The royal family is well-regarded, and the monarchy’s position is bolstered by the knowledge that the United States, Britain, and others need Jordan more than ever in a region wracked by various crises. King Abdullah has also maintained a firm grip on power since the 2011 Arab uprisings. Part of this is due to the monarchy’s clientelism; the King has recruited Bedouin leaders into military leadership and offered them monopolies on parts of the tourism trade. This has helped solidify tribal loyalty and maintain security in rural areas outside Amman.

Another source of the monarchy’s stability is the parliament. Most government power resides with the King, yet many Jordanians fault their elected officials for their economic gripes instead. In one recent survey, 87% of polled Jordanians were unable to name single positive achievement of the last parliament. The monarchy can accordingly deflect blame from itself, and even dissolve the parliament and call for elections to satisfy calls for political change—as it did in May 2016.

Yet politics is breeding unpredictability. Young Jordanians’ lack of economic opportunities and dissatisfaction with government has been repeatedly linked to support for Islamism in addition to Salafi-jihadism. Over a thousand Jordanians are estimated to be fighting for ISIS or al-Qaeda’s affiliate Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Syria. Law enforcement’s strict crackdown on those who simply praise ISIS on social media further breeds an antagonistic relationship with government among Jordan’s disenfranchised youth.

King Abdullah seemed to consider this in the September 2016 parliamentary elections. These elections returned to bloc voting (last used in 1989), where voters could select lists of candidates prepared by political parties instead of having one vote per one candidate. The hope was that empowering political parties will make Jordan’s parliament more technocratic and less of a hostage to patronage and tribal ties.

The September elections also allowed Islamists to run, particularly from the political arm of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamist Action Front. Unlike past Brotherhood messaging, the Islamist Action Front pushed a reformist brand instead of the standard, ‘Islam is the solution’ line. It also fielded contenders alongside women, Christian and minority candidates. This perhaps hints at coinciding goals for Jordan’s monarchy and Islamists. For Islamists, liberalizing their message could appeal broadly to a restive population and gain acceptance from Jordan’s leadership. For the monarchy, allowing Islamists in politics could generate legitimacy from disenfranchised refugees and the millions of devout Palestinians living in financial strain, all while tempering the more extreme Islamist ideologies among them.

Jordan will stay stable in 2017, but greater risks are present

Yet the election’s actual results were largely uneventful. Voter turnout was 37% compared to over 50% in 2013. Islamist candidates gained 15% of parliament’s lower house seats, but the legislature is still dominated by individuals with tribal affiliations or loyal to the monarchy.

While the monarchy could view the election results as a sign of stability, high voter apathy may also indicate widespread anti-establishment sentiment and signal greater political risk. Many young Jordanians—which make up 70% of the population—have been mobilizing and openly challenging the Kingdom’s political system. Deployed by a restive youth, these ideas—alongside emergent Islamism—could generate political volatility in the short to medium term.

While Jordan’s outlook remains optimistic, its situation looks increasingly risky for the coming year. As ISIS and its affiliates disperse through the region, the Kingdom’s deteriorating economic climate and testy political environment will produce an atmosphere that breeds insecurity from within the country’s borders. Containing these risks while addressing their causes will continue to be paramount.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by  Azhar Unwala, an analyst for government and corporate clients based in Washington, D.C.

The post Despite a Neighborhood on Fire, Jordan Remains Stable appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Japan Times, 2016)

Much noise has been made about U.S. president-elect Donald J. Trump’s recent telephone conversation with Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen and about Trump’s challenge to the “one-China policy” that Beijing unilaterally considers “the cornerstone of Sino-U.S. relations.”

While state-run mainland Chinese media arrogantly declared that the “mainland must shape Taiwan’s future,” a cadre of professional China apologists in the United States attacked Trump for “provoking China,” and the current U.S. administration rushed to reassure Beijing that America still respected its precious “one-China policy.”

The one thing we mustn’t ever, ever do, according to much of the foreign policy establishment, is anything that might upset or offend mainland Chinese dictators. Above all, we must be sensitive to China’s easily-hurt feelings regarding its unilateral claim of sovereignty over Taiwan (aka the “one-China policy” to which all the world is expected to kowtow). However it may bully its neighbors and abuse the human rights of its own citizens, we must always keep China a happy panda.

More recently, China lodged “stern representations” against content in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 including a plan to conduct high-level military exchanges with Taiwan. According to a December 26 editorial in People’s Daily, U.S. military cooperation with Taiwan “clearly violates the one-China principle, interferes in China’s internal affairs, infringes upon China’s sovereignty, endangers China’s national security, undermines peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and treats the Taiwan issue as a card to play against China.”

(Cagle Cartoons, 2016)

Let’s get real: Taiwan has never been a part of the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan is officially the one remaining part of the Republic of China that did not fall to communist rule in 1949. Previously, Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. Of the more than 120 years since Japan occupied Taiwan in 1895, the island has spent only four years (1945-1949) as part of a unified China.

While mainland China self-destructed under Mao, slaughtered its own young on Tiananmen Square, imprisoned dissidents, and constructed the world’s most extensive system of internet censorship, Taiwan underwent a normal course of development into the modern democracy and free society that it is today. Taiwan therefore has a very different history and a very different national identity from mainland China.

Nor do most of Taiwan’s 23 million citizens have any interest in being part of the People’s Republic of China. In every recent public opinion poll on the question, the vast majority of the island’s citizens are opposed to “reunification” with mainland China and consider themselves to be of “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” nationality. Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide electoral victory in early 2016 was furthermore a “clear call to remain separate from China.” Increasingly even the official name, “Republic of China,” is being rejected by independence-minded Taiwanese in favor of “Republic of Taiwan” to signify a complete break from China.

None of this matters to authoritarian Beijing, which insists that “Taiwan society ought to understand and attach importance to the feelings of the 1.37 billion residents of the mainland.” Funny how the opinions of the mainland’s 1.37 billion residents seem to matter to Beijing only when they can be turned against a smaller population that it wishes to subjugate. Like self-entitled brats, state-run mainland Chinese media have declared that “it’s Beijing who has the final say between peace and war on cross-Straits relations, not Taiwan or the U.S.”

(Sakura Jade House, 2016)

Mainland China is a one-party dictatorship, a human rights disaster area, and a clear adversary of the United States. Taiwan is a modern democracy with a positive record of respect for human rights and, at least potentially, a valuable U.S. ally in a region where the United States is losing allies almost by the day. While autocratic mainland China is rewarded for its bad behavior with full diplomatic recognition and full membership in the international community, however, democratic Taiwan is punished with diplomatic isolation.

For a nation such as the United States that considers itself a beacon of democracy and human rights, it doesn’t get much more ass-backwards than that. Beijing’s “one-China policy” is not merely a polite “diplomatic fiction“: It is an authoritarian absurdity, and continued U.S. obeisance to it is an insult to American values.

The post Beijing’s ‘One-China Policy’ is an Authoritarian Absurdity appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’hiver de Politique étrangère (n°4/2016). Sébastien Abis propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Vandana Shiva, Who Really Feeds the World?  (Zed Books, 2016, 176  pages).

Si la perspective de 10 milliards d’habitants dans le monde se précise pour l’horizon 2050, il semble difficile de contourner la nécessaire augmentation de la production agricole, estimée à 60 % du niveau actuel par l’Organisation des Nations unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture (FAO). Est-il préférable d’améliorer les rendements sur les terres agricoles déjà cultivées et présentant de bonnes conditions pédoclimatiques, à l’instar de l’Europe, ou convient-il d’étendre les espaces dédiés à l’agriculture dans le monde, en exploitant les terres arables qui restent disponibles et se situent majoritairement en Amérique latine et en Afrique subsaharienne ?

Un autre enjeu évident tient à l’inégale répartition des richesses sur la planète, tant d’un point de vue économique qu’agronomique. Le monde présente un potentiel agricole solide, capable de subvenir aux besoins alimentaires, dans une vision idéale systémique où chacun se contenterait des produits locaux de proximité (tant en quantité qu’en qualité) et dans laquelle les relations internationales ne se fonderaient pas prioritairement sur des jeux d’intérêts. La réalité est tout autre. Depuis des millénaires, le commerce joue un rôle fondamental pour rapprocher l’offre des besoins, précisément parce que les dotations géographiques sur le globe sont très hétérogènes. En outre, bien qu’il soit possible de réduire les pertes et les gaspillages tout au long de la chaîne alimentaire, il apparaît que l’augmentation des rendements en agriculture représente un levier important pour renforcer l’état de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale.

À ce propos, le livre de Vandana Shiva, militante écologiste de renom, pose des questions légitimes. Elle interroge les modes de production intensive pour promouvoir l’agro-écologie ; remet en cause le poids colossal de firmes multinationales qui, de l’agro-chimesterie à la distribution en passant par le négoce, n’auraient que le profit pour ambition ; rappelle que 70 % de la production alimentaire mondiale vient de petits producteurs et d’exploitations familiales essentielles pour nourrir les populations locales ; et insiste sur la préservation des savoir-faire traditionnels et des connaissances adaptées à chaque terroir, pour critiquer les solutions technologiques, le recours aux intrants et les effets de la globalisation alimentaire.

Dans un monde qui souffre encore de la faim, avec près d’un habitant sur huit toujours concerné par une insécurité alimentaire prononcée au quotidien, les arguments présentés par Vandana Shiva ne manquent pas de robustesse. Toutefois, ils paraissent trop souvent déconnectés d’une géopolitique mondiale où les stratégies de puissance dominent le paysage, et où les inégalités agricoles se creusent entre des régions qui peuvent produire plus et celles où les possibilités sont limitées par les contraintes climatiques et par les instabilités sociopolitiques (en Afrique notamment). Auteur de plusieurs livres dénonçant les OGM et défendant l’agriculture biologique, Vandana Shiva insiste sur les relations parfois contrariées entre science et progrès, et contribue à faire avancer le scénario d’une agriculture mondiale capable de produire mieux. Si elle émet de sérieux doutes sur la nécessité de produire plus, nous devons aussi nous demander quelles seraient les conséquences géostratégiques d’une production stable alors que la démographie continue à croître, ou, plus risqué encore, d’une orientation radicale prônant la décroissance de la production agricole.

Sébastien Abis

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Découvrez cette semaine un autre texte marquant de la revue Politique étrangère, écrit par Abdou Diouf : « Afrique : l’intégration régionale face à la mondialisation », publié dans le numéro d’hiver 2006 (n°4/2006).

Abdou Diouf a commencé sa carrière politique au Sénégal. Il a été directeur de cabinet de Léopold Sédar Senghor puis Secrétaire général de la Présidence de la République. En 1970, il est nommé Premier ministre. En 1981, il est élu président de la République, fonction qu’il occupe jusqu’en 2000. De 2003 à 2014, il est secrétaire général de l’Organisation internationale de la francophonie (OIF).

« Bon gré mal gré, l’Afrique doit aujourd’hui vivre, comme l’ensemble de notre planète, à l’heure de ce que l’on appelle la mondialisation. Mais, contrairement à d’autres régions du Sud, elle demeure mal outillée pour, à la fois, affronter ses contraintes et profiter de ses opportunités. Une des raisons de cette fragilité réside dans son extrême fragmentation, dans sa « balkanisation » comme on l’a souvent dit. À l’heure où les autres régions du monde s’organisent en espaces intégrés – économiques, géopolitiques ou culturels –, elle semble échapper à cette tendance, même si elle tente désormais de l’infléchir.

L’Afrique se compose d’une cinquantaine d’États, dont une vingtaine comptent moins de 10 millions d’habitants, et près d’une dizaine moins d’un million. Que pèse chacun d’eux face aux grands ensembles qui occupent aujourd’hui la scène mondiale ? D’un côté la Chine et l’Inde, États unifiés les plus peuplés du monde, qui entendent bien en devenir des puissances centrales ; de l’autre, des unions régionales de natures différentes, à la construction plus ou moins rapide et plus ou moins harmonieuse, mais dont l’un au moins des objectifs est de peser sur une scène internationale où prévalent les logiques de la globalisation : l’Union européenne (UE), qui s’est donné pour vocation de regrouper l’ensemble de l’Europe, l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALENA), le Marché commun du Sud (Mercado Comun del Sur, Mercosur) en Amérique du Sud, l’Association des nations du Sud-Est asiatique (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN). Du côté africain en revanche, une infinité de sigles qui, jusqu’à présent, ne reflètent pour la plupart que des regroupements virtuels.

L’Afrique peut-elle continuer à regarder, impuissante, l’évolution d’un monde sur lequel elle n’a pas prise ? Peut-elle continuer à se marginaliser alors qu’elle possède tous les outils d’une meilleure insertion dans le monde d’aujourd’hui : ressources naturelles, jeunesse et dynamisme de sa population, richesse de ses cultures, etc. ?

La question, en fait, n’est pas de savoir si l’Afrique – à l’exception de quelques-uns de ses États les plus importants – est insérée dans la mondialisation ou se situe en marge de ce processus. Aucun pays ne peut aujourd’hui évoluer en dehors de lui. Il s’agit plutôt de savoir pourquoi elle occupe une place si modeste dans le système mondial et pourquoi elle y participe sur un mode marginal. La nature de sa place dans l’économie globalisée fait qu’elle subit la mondialisation plus qu’elle n’y participe.

Il est temps qu’elle échappe à ce qui n’est pas un destin. Pour qu’elle puisse enfin se hisser à un niveau lui permettant de peser sur l’échiquier international, elle doit lutter davantage contre sa fragmentation, plus qu’elle ne l’a fait au cours du dernier demi-siècle.

L’Afrique est le continent de la planète qui compte le plus d’organisations continentales, régionales, sous-régionales, sectorielles et commerciales alors qu’elle est la région où les processus d’intégration et de régionalisation sont les plus embryonnaires. Il convient d’expliquer ce paradoxe, pour y remédier. […] »

Pour lire l’article en intégralité, cliquez ici.

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice, Washington, D.C., 2016.

President-Elect Donald J. Trump is following his iconoclastic campaign with an irregular and irreverent transition period. With a controversial nominee for Secretary of State (an oil executive decorated with an award by the Russian government), a renewed commitment to track Muslims, and tweets about “nukes,” the shaping of the future of U.S. foreign policy has been notable.

A distinction might be made, though, between the hard power of U.S. foreign policy and the soft power constructed daily from unofficial American foreign policy. Presidents make speeches, host summits, sign executive orders, and send troops into battle. But thousands of ordinary Americans serve as unofficial ambassadors of the United States—many counter, or oblivious to official policy.

Americans made over 73 million international trips in 2015. These included 12 million to Mexico, 12 million to Europe, 5 million to Asia, 2 million the Middle East, and more than 300,000 to Africa. Over 300,000 thousand American university students study abroad each year, including more than 10,000 in Africa, 30,000 in Asia, and nearly 50,000 in Latin America. More than 100,000 Americans serve overseas as Christian missionaries. Thousands more serve abroad in non-evangelical roles with organizations like the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. (And there are 7,000 active Peace Corps volunteers, a U.S. government agency but whose work in 60 countries far from the daily business of the State Department.)

Unofficial foreign policy is made with money, as well. U.S. companies held over $5 trillion in overseas direct foreign investment in 2015, including over $400 million in Ukraine, $90 billion in Mexico, and $2 billion in Libya. U.S. companies generated exports of $2.2 trillion in goods and services in 2015, and imports of $2.7 trillion. Migrant workers in the U.S. sent home over $60 billion in remittances in 2015. The U.S. Government’s foreign assistance budget is $34 billion, but American individuals and private organizations donated another $16 billion.

Together, American companies and individuals intentionally or unintentionally drive a tremendous amount of public diplomacy and the foreign policy agenda. Among the many competing interests, the message of one group of young people has stayed consistent for many years. Students and their Jesuit universities remain passionately committed to social justice, and the United States government’s unique obligations.

Their 18th annual conference met recently in Washington. Begun as a protest movement at the U.S. military’s School of the Americas (SOA), a Cold War-era training facility for Latin American anti-Communists, the 2016 Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice brought together over 1,800 high school and college students on a range of social justice topics, especially immigration.

The origins of this emphasis are rooted in the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, especially El Salvador. U.S. foreign policy at the time was driven by a worsening of the Cold War, supporting anti-government Contras against the Soviet-supported Nicaragua, and the military government of El Salvador against Soviet-supported guerrilla groups.

Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while celebrating Mass, after persistently advocating a “preference for the poor,” and just one day after he called for Salvadoran soldiers to stop killing their fellow countrymen. At Romero’s funeral, dozens more were killed by gunshots and the subsequent stampede.

In 1989, six Jesuits priests at the University of Central America in San Salvador were killed by the government death squads. As one observer noted, “It is frankly difficult to imagine anything more likely to spur American Jesuits to action than the complicity of their own government in the violent death of their fellow Jesuits.” The presidents of Georgetown University and Fordham University led the charge, and Jesuit universities across the country strengthened their commitment to peace in Central America generally and to the cause of Central American immigration specifically.

Immigration reform has new urgency as the Trump administration takes shape. The 2016 Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice took place just days after Trump’s victory. Students and their social justice mentors shared a shock and dismay at what the results might mean, especially those young beneficiaries of President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, or those with parents and friends without legal status in the United States.

The focus of these conferences leaves some questions. They seem to give more attention to undocumented aliens in the U.S. than to those trying to follow the system’s legal paths, and a precedence for Mexican and Central American immigrants over refugees from Syria, Iraq, Africa, or elsewhere.

But their commitment is not in doubt. Jesuit schools have been working with generations of students on these and related issues, like fair trade, the environment, and criminal justice reform. And not just for discernment—for action. After celebration and education on Saturday and Sunday, on Monday more than 1,000 students had appointments with Congressional staffs to express their political passions—and to begin to develop their political advocacy skills.

The new President and Secretary of State will have a wide range of foreign policy issues to attend to, including immigration, trade, the environment, conflict, global poverty, and more. The professional diplomatic corps, lobbyists, and policy wonks will make their contributions. But millions of unofficial ambassadors—as students and scholars, business professionals, service volunteers, donors, and tourists—will help shape the image and expectations of America abroad, and the policies of the new administration.

The post America’s Other Foreign Policy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Here are some gifts from around the world, fit for even the most insatiable global affairs glutton.

President-elect Donald Trump's comments and actions since winning the U.S. presidential election in November offer new insights into the kind of Asia policy his administration may pursue after taking office in January.

Xi Jinping sees the Soviet Union as a cautionary tale. But Beijing is learning all the wrong lessons.

‘Reality Presidency’ and New Diplomacy

The recent public execution of ‘political correctness’ in the U.S. and other Western countries had an unintended consequence: it has removed the curtain of pretense and hypocrisy. This, needless to say, is one of the key factors that could help solve some of the most critical political, economic, and faith-based issues of our time.

However, this positive outcome might not be immediately experienced or appreciated since assertive ignorance and crude communication dominate the public space. President-elect’s supporters had this to offer for post-election consensus building: ‘Donald Trump is the President; deal with!’ And his Transitional Team and selected Cabinet had nothing substantive to add. So, we must deal with this world-changing reality.

And this makes the unpacking of these two concepts critical: ‘conspiracy theory’ and its less known archenemy ‘conspiracy realism’. Both are relevant to understand and to function with the new diplomacy.

The Theorists’ Dilemma

Everything in life is not organized by clandestine cabals, secret societies, or sinister groups driven to achieve political, economic or religious objectives. And everything does not always have a wicked, illegal, or immoral motive. And yes, there are people who always look at authorities with a relentless antipathy and distrust; people who are obsessed in finding the evil geniuses behind everything in ways that borderlines, if not indicates, mental disorder. The notorious killer cult leader, Charles Manson is an example.

Much of the issues in politics and economics are multidimensional and complex. As such, it is too difficult for the average people to wrap their minds around them. Especially during the seasons of heightened uncertainties due to wars, economic downfall and such, it is easy to seek meaning through professional conspiracy theorists. These influence-wielding individuals such as Alex Jones of InfoWars often have packaged explanations to everything.

They—seekers and providers—never change their minds or admit being wrong when new facts emerge and new evidences are unveiled. To them facts are nothing more than convenient covers- hence their offshoot or the creeping effect of fake news websites.

Undermined Reality

The perennial question that puzzled great minds throughout the ages (Is man innately good or innately evil?) has never been more relevant. Most of us may have strong opinions on this matter. As a Muslim, I believe that the human being is hard-wired with divine nobility—moral conscience—and is granted the free-will to disgrace him/herself to the lowest of the lows.

Is man not capable of connivingly conspire to immorally and illegally claim power beyond his rights and thus impose his will on others or commit sexual violence to please his lust? In that case, who is haplessly naïve- the one who believes that man never conspires to control and exploit or the one who thinks he does?

Before the WikiLeaks on government and corporate exploitation and misconduct, Snowden’s expose of intrusive ‘Big Brother’, any such claim would’ve been easily dismissed as a conspiracy theory. Throughout history man has lusted for exclusive advantage in order to control, manipulate or exploit. Yet, most people are still robotically inculcated to disassociate themselves with anything that suggests conspiracy; they are likely to resort to knee-jerk reaction in defense of status quo- whatever that may be. Those in power are often the main beneficiaries.

Politics of the Label

Not all conspiracy claims are driven by far-left or far-right nutty mobs that have an inventory of conspiratorial misgivings and fantasies.

Unless one is locked into state of absolute conformity to one’s own biases or denial, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the cleansing of Native Americans, slavery, colonialism, geopolitics, al-Qaida, ISIS, Shabaab and other such mortal enterprises would not have been possible without some form of conspiracy. And this should compel us to have a frank and sensible discourse on this ever-present human controversy.

Nowadays, any credible challenge to the official narrative of any serious issue, policy, or action is met with resistance from devout conformists or is shot-down by professionals who should be called the conspiracy police. This intellect-policing force needs not to present facts or establish any pattern of analytical discrepancies. All they need is to unleash cold-blooded ad hominem.

On the Receiving End

There are some who vehemently deny the notion that there is a synchronized effort to collectively demonize Muslims and other minority groups. The growing number of mainly far-right politicians who cunningly use “dog whistle politics” to give subtle marching orders. The political operatives, and well-funded media institutions with colorful personalities whose jobs are to incite religious intolerance and to whip people into crippling hysteria, therefore dependency.

In the U.S. and some parts of Europe, anti-Muslim partners foster uniformed propaganda led by hate-mongering “hipsters”. Their motto is: “All Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are.” They insist that their motive is neither racist nor anti-Islamic. However, their thinly disguised racism falls apart as soon as one replaces “Muslims” with Jews, and “terrorists” with financial scammers. Was the latter not the malicious pretext that led to the holocaust?

In the current trend, Muslims are so demonized that individuals and mosques could be implicated arbitrarily and be condemned in the court of public opinion. And since neither media nor the law-enforcement is pressed to present evidence or establish clear trend before accusing any Muslim person or institution, whatever they present is often considered “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

Institutional Racism

In the spirit of conspiracy realism and trying out the new diplomacy, let me spread these cards on the table. There are mainly two phenomena that support the notion that Muslims are in political and economic crosshairs: First, geographical areas in which terrorists operate are almost always resource rich or are geopolitically important. Second, though terrorism presents real indiscriminate threat, all countries that succumb to political pressures to make counter-terrorism their principle domestic and foreign policies almost always grow more insecure. Are these random acts of nature or human intervention?

Against that backdrop, the President-elect and his selected Cabinet raise a red flag; especially with regard to their naïve world view and reliance on ‘security experts’ who are blinded by their hate of Islam and Muslims. To what extent are they going to abuse the authority vested in them is open for debate.

The known factor is that governments strategically keep society fearful, senseless, and disoriented in order to create sense of dependency or pass controversial policies or decrees? This is not something that only dictators such as el-Sisi of Egypt would do. Certain intelligence and law enforcement agencies within democratic states such the U.S. have historically fabricated and staged fearful dramas in order to achieve specific political objectives.

Like many Muslims across U.S. and Europe, when some Somali-American activists complained of being discriminatively targeted in the Twin Cities, they were swiftly dismissed as ‘conspiracy theorists’, until recently when a staff whistleblower exposed that TSA was indeed discriminating and “treating Somalis as a community of suspects.

Positive Change Is Coming

Much of humanity, especially those who are digitally connected, is in state of trauma due to wars, economic uncertainty and excessive negativity.

Watching the Aleppo holocaust in real time and the empty political rhetoric of those who could end that horrific misery but would not act has exposed humanity’s corroding collective conscience. Mindful or not, most of humanity—those who are connected to the rest of the world—are suffering from collective trauma of different levels. Still we should not allow that to push us into a state of hopelessness where all we can sense are bloody spooks moving in the blinding darkness. The last thing humanity needs is reckless leaders to make situations more volatile.

Collective Responsibility of Objective Scrutiny

Anyone who accepts the premise that all political initiatives are the works of one interest group or another can comfortably accept the suspicion that his counterpart is engaging in a self-serving conspiracy; even if the counterpart were to deny.

A healthy dose of skepticism is good so long as one maintains a balance and not goes off the rails with it. Runaway skepticism leads to a dangerous state of mind- uncompromising cynicism. It is in that psychological state of profound fatalism where conspiracy theories and theorists thrive.

There is a difference between skepticism and cynicism. The former is the obligation and moral duty of every professional journalist, law enforcement, and public official whereas the latter is an endless emotional wave of doubt, distrust, and pessimism.

In the course of the next four years, institutional attempts to derail or repress genuine discourse and debate on fault-line issues that could add fuel to a global burning fire is very likely. Here is where the non-conglomerate media could assume heroic roles. They should be loyal to the public and not the corporate interest or those in power.

Let us face it, it is not by sheer coincidence that man often performs his very best on stages and under spotlights, and his most vile in darkness or behind veils of secrecy. Keep the lights bright.

The post ‘Reality Presidency’ and New Diplomacy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

After a series of skirmishes, frantic deal making now looks to have brought about the surprise return to force of Libya in the oil export market.

However Libyan oil coming back online could jeopardize a fragile production cut deal orchestrated by producers cartel OPEC to rebalance the global supply glut driving down prices and squeezing the revenues of oil-dependent economies.

A spokesman from the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) has confirmed that Libya will be sharply increasing its oil output in the near future, raising its total production to 900,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd).

Prior to the 2011 death of long-time dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the north African country exported some 1.6m barrels per day of sweet crude that required only slight refining. Output collapsed after Libya lapsed into revolution and then civil war.

While the new production level remains significantly lower than during Gaddafi-era heights it still represents a significant increase in Libyan output, which had already doubled to about 600,000 bpd since September.

The latest rise in production comes after two of Libya’s warring factions agreed to cooperate to raise output. A group within Libya’s Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) agreed to lift two blockades on oil pipelines which have been in place since 2014 and 2015 respectively as they realign themselves with the Libyan National Army (LNA), one of Libya’s strongest militia groups.

The LNA had held onto two crucial oil ports during factional fighting with the PFG in September, which may have convinced breakaway PFG members to strike the new deal.

Libya’s state-run National Oil Corporation (NOC) has recently prepared to restart oil exports from these ports. With the end of the blockade on pipelines to Libya’s Sharara and El Feel oil fields, national oil officials believe they can add 365,000 bpd to Libya’s production, though they caution this is dependent on the agreement holding.

However the prospect of a Libyan production surge comes shortly after OPEC members finally managed to negotiate a reduction deal.

Despite being members of the cartel, both Libya and Nigeria have been exempted from OPEC’s recent agreements because of their ongoing security and economic problems. However a rapid increase in crude exporting from Libyan fields might change this calculus.

The reopening of the two blockaded pipelines could even bring Libya above its official 0.9m bpd target, potentially straining OPEC deals and the cartel’s willingness to allow Libya to continue producing at pace to get back on its feet.

“OPEC’s agreement granted a Libyan exemption despite this stated production target… but this exemption is not likely open-ended,” warns Jonathan Lang, an analyst for Global Risk Insights.

Production increases will likely only be gradual as Libya’s technical issues and tenuous security situation put a damper on production potential. But if production reaches or even exceeds Libya’s target they could begin to hear sharp protests from other oil producing countries, whose economies are feeling the strain of sustained low prices.

“Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Fali, after the conference with non-OPEC producers, gave a very strong statement to the effect that he was willing to cut the Kingdom’s production even more than agreed in order to restore market balance. If Libyan output does increase more, he may need to do that,” says Bryan Plamondon, Middle East and Africa  director at IHS Market Economics.

“A return of Libyan production to world oil markets…on a sustained basis would hamper OPEC’s plan to restore oil markets to equilibrium and move prices upward. It is a serious issue for the organization.”

This article originally appeared in the Financial Times’ This Is Africa service and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Libyan Oil: A Bittersweet Return? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

I have known Kelly for several years and have had the privilege of working with him and having him speak on several occasions at my day job.

The U.N. declares Israeli settlements illegal as United States defies its own past and calls from Trump and Netanyahu for a veto.

Singapore proves that holidays in a multiethnic country don’t have to be occasions for divisiveness.

Violent drug cartels and Islamic terror networks increasingly cooperate.

A last-ditch effort to avert what could be a massive political crisis came to an impasse on Friday — though the deal’s not dead yet.

Ukraine and the U.S. ask Russia to make sure this attempt at peace holds.

The president-elect wants a shiny, new nuclear football to play with. But he doesn’t realize what it’s going to cost him.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes with his Iran’s counterpart Hassan Rouhani. (Alexey Druzhinin/AFP/Getty Images)

As Iran’s economy is likely to become a bonanza for foreign companies in the upcoming years, Russia is preparing to secure its share. In early December, Tehran became the gathering spot for the executives of top Russian corporations seeking to extract commercial benefits, as Iran—a country of almost eighty million people and an economy worth more than $400 billion—is set to open up to the world.

The meetings were carried within the frameworks of two major events: the Intergovernmental commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Russia-Iran Business Forum.

While the permanent Russo-Iranian Commission has taken place in the past, this year’s business forum by all accounts is an unprecedented event, highlighting the growing bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. By various estimates, the Russian delegation to Iran consisted of almost 200 business representatives, making it the largest group of Russian businessmen to ever visit the Iranian capital.

The diversity in businesses represented was one of the peculiarities of the delegation. In addition to the expected representatives from major Russian oil and defense corporations, there were also members of the top banks, agricultural companies, as well as governors and even the head of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, an influential organization directly controlled by the Russian President. Overall, Russian and Iranian companies have signed nine deals that are potentially worth almost $10 billion, according to Bloomberg. Moscow and Tehran also signed agreements to construct a heat and power plant, and railway electrification worth more than €2.2 billion.

There are good reasons behind this. Year-on-year trade between the two nations has increased by almost 80%, according to the statement by Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak. Novak has also stated that the amount of bilateral financial payments has tripled in 2016 alone. Hence, both sides are hoping to further commercial ties, increasing bilateral trade from $1.6 billion in 2014 to around $10 billion in the upcoming years.

Interestingly, the trade dynamics between Iran and Russia indicates one of the largest increase throughout all international Russian commercial ties, percentage-wise.

As the West maintains its sanctions regime against Moscow—even though the sanctions might be removed or softened in the upcoming years—many Russian businesses are desperate to find new “friends” abroad. Therefore, as Iran gradually opens up to the world, many in Russia perceive it as an opportunity and, in contrast to Western counterparts, are not afraid of repercussions of such “friendship” in the foreign policy arena.

Indeed, the growth in bilateral trade is easier to achieve due to Moscow’s and Tehran’s similar views on a number of key foreign policy issues, in particular regarding the Middle East. The Kremlin supports the Assad regime in Syria and maintains friendly ties with the current government in Iraq. Most people that I personally spoke to in Tehran were enthusiastically pointing out to the fact that Russia and Iran were each other’s “best friends” at the moment.

Walking in the streets of Tehran, the abundance of Chinese cars and Korean electronics is striking. For Russians, who are seeking to diversify their trade, the success of these Asian countries in Iran shows the path for their own trade expansion. While the West is more timidly entering the Iranian market, Moscow has the opportunity to take a lead in areas where it has sufficient competence and even a modest competitive advantage.

For instance, one of the proposals during the business forum was to promote a Russian alternative to Visa payments technology called “MIR”. Furthermore, many Russian banks look for opening exchanges with Iranian counterparts and even establishing headquarters in Tehran. Russia’s attempt might be particularly fruitful, taking advantage of the fact that Iran is still cut off from the SWIFT network.

Indeed, Moscow is specifically interested in banking, an industry that is potentially worth several trillions of dollars. As Russia is just beginning to expand its influence within the area, Iran’s experience might be helpful in boosting Islamic banking in the southern Russian territories in particular.

The future of the Iranian economic and its growth potential remain uncertain, even more so in the light of the statements of President-elect Trump and his hawkish rhetoric against the Iran Deal. Nevertheless, Russians do not seem to be bothered.

The post As Sanctions are Lifted, Russia Eyes Trade Opportunities with Iran appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President-elect Donald J. Trump and National Security Adviser-designate Michael T. Flynn. Flynn at the Republican National Convention in July.

Since the election, commentators have repeatedly voiced concern over the uncertainty of a Donald J. Trump administration’s foreign policy direction. This is true despite the fact that Trump focused on foreign policy issues during the campaign more than most presidential candidates. Even his proposed solutions to domestic problems—such as spurring economic growth by opposing foreign trade treaties and limiting immigration—have strong foreign policy implications.

Why, then, is there so much confusion about his intentions? I can suggest a couple of reasons.

Trump’s Statements Are Not Reliable

The first problem is that Trump’s statements are not reliable. It is important to note that most politicians running for office try to be consistent in their statements and, once elected, try to fulfill their promises (although they may not always succeed in doing so or may be forced to make compromises). I know that is not the common wisdom, but it is generally true.

Also, most presidential candidates are closely tied to their party, share their party’s basic outlook and policy agendas, and will be encouraged and supported by their staffers and their party colleagues in Congress. This tends to bolster consistency.

Trump, however—as he and his supporters regularly boast—is not a politician, and he does not think like a politician. Part of not being a politician is that, instead of fretting about what the voters will say next election if he doesn’t pursue his stated agenda, he may very well believe the common wisdom that campaign promises are meaningless.

Indeed, in the days following the election he appeared to change his position suddenly on a number of seemingly essential campaign promises (although, to be sure, the new statements have often been vague and conditioned and may be just as easily dropped the next time he addresses a different audience).

He has little concern for consistency. NBC News has listed 141 positions that Trump took on 23 issues in the course of the campaign. His statements do not conform to any conventional ideological schema. As one political analyst put it:

“We probably know less about what the Trump administration will be like than any incoming administration in modern American history. Trump could end up being one of the most moderate presidents in a generation, or he could be one of the most extreme. He might be both.”

Moreover, members of his campaign staff have advised foreign dignitaries not to take everything he says about their countries, or about his intended policies toward their countries, literally. Overall, one cannot assume that he is strongly committed to anything he has said.

His supporters may not care—as The Atlantic’s Salena Zito quipped, “. . . the press takes him literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.”

The people in Trump’s entourage have taken that perspective and run with it. Corey Lewandowski, Trump’s former campaign manager (who, somehow, continued to receive $20,000 a month from the campaign after allegedly being fired and becoming a paid commentator on CNN) castigated the press for believing what Trump had said during the campaign.

“You guys took everything Donald Trump said so literally. The American people didn’t. They understood it. They understood that sometimes—when you have a conversation with people, whether it’s around the dinner table or at a bar—you’re going to say things, and sometimes you don’t have all the facts to back it up.”

Leaving aside the question of whether comments made around the dinner table or at a bar constitute an accetable standard of truth for a presidential campaign, this leaves it up to all commentators, all citizens, all foreign observers to decide for themselves what Trump really meant. To suggest that they will all come to the same conclusion because that conclusion is so obvious is ridiculous.

Regarding his ties to his party, Trump regularly took stances opposed to standard Republican positions and occasionally denounced the party as dishonest and corrupt. Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wisc., drew up his own legislative agenda as an alternative to Trump’s proposals, and despite his denunciations of the party, Trump has suggested that he may defer to Ryan on legislative matters. So, at least with regard to legislation, there may be a basis for predictability—based on Ryan’s positions rather than Trump’s.

Nevertheless, Trump, as president, will have the power to intervene on issues as the mood strikes him, and Ryan will have to deal with the relatively small but intimidating Freedom Caucus within his own party conference, which introduces whole new vectors of unpredictability. Beyond that, foreign policy is not like legislation; the president often has a freer hand to act without regard for the wishes of Congress.

Finally, we have to remember that Trump simply lies a lot. For some reason, many voters came to view him as more honest than Hillary Clinton, but in the hundreds of statements that it reviewed, Politifact found that Trump made more than three times as many “mostly false,” “false,” or “pants on fire” statements as Clinton. He regularly makes false statements of fact, such as the notion that “the murder rate in the United States is the highest it’s been in 45 years” (although there was an uptick in 2015, 2014 had the lowest rate in 54 years and 2015 was still among the lowest) or the notion that Trump won “one of the biggest Electoral College victories in history” (of the 54 presidential elections using the current Electoral College system, i.e., since 1804, his outcome ranked 44th, in the bottom fifth).

A reputation for lying will not benefit him in the conduct of foreign policy. Whether you hope to deter aggression through threats or solicit cooperation through promises, your efforts will be hindered if no one believes you mean what you say.

His Positions Never Made Much Sense

While Trump has exhibited considerable flexibility on policy details, however, he has shown greater consistency in a few underlying aspects of his worldview. For instance, his view of politics is highly personalized, highlighting the role of individuals. He sees dependence as weakness. His view of international relations is extremely transactional, suggesting that nothing should be done unless it generates a profit in real terms.

The abhorrence of dependence and the transactional view of politics promote a preference for isolationism. Based on this, he is skeptical of the value of alliance commitments. He is highly skeptical of the value of free trade.

Finally, he admires authoritarian leaders, not because we need them as allies in particular situations (a common justification for supporting authoritarian regimes in the past), but precisely because of their authoritarian characteristics. These perspectives have appeared consistently in Trump’s statements not only throughout the campaign but over the course of decades. While consistent, however, this worldview does not necessarily lead to a sensible foreign policy.

First, although it should not be necessary to point it out, I must say that the notion that it is vital to say the words “radical Islamic terrorism” is such utter nonsense that it barely deserves the minimal effort required to refute it. Even the people who repeat this assertion have not come up with a reason why it matters, nor have they even tried. It is simply something to say when you have nothing of substance to offer.

Moreover, it is practically designed to offend Muslim allies (the ones who do the actual fighting on the ground in the Middle East, including ones whom some might consider radical) and the millions of Muslims who may be sitting on the fence. In any event, “moderate” and “radical” are our terms, not theirs, and the notion that we can decide who is a moderate Muslim and that moderate Muslims will not be offended by all this is simply wrong. The suggestion that the terrorists represent Islam offends them. Constantly repeating this assertion amounts to doing the terrorists a favor.

Now, let’s examine just one of the positions rooted in Trump’s consistent worldview. In an interview with the New York Times in July 2016, Trump discussed his position on NATO. He stressed that he did not want to say whether he would come to the assistance of NATO members under attack, regardless of treaty obligations, because he saw it as better to keep the Russians guessing about his intentions.

He also complained: “Many NATO members are not making payments, are not making what they’re supposed to make. That’s a big thing. You can’t say forget that.” He then suggested that the United States should come to their assistance only if “they fulfill their obligations to us.”

There are problems with this on many levels. It is true that the issue of burden-sharing has been argued and debated within NATO for as long as NATO has existed. The current standard is that each NATO member should contribute 2 percent of its GDP to its own defense budget, and nearly all—not all, but nearly all—fall short of the mark.

The burden-sharing issue is rooted in the common problem of collective goods: The smaller countries in a deterrent, or collective-defense, alliance often invest suboptimal amounts in their own defense if they believe that a large ally is going to defend them anyhow. They will often argue that they have other fiscal obligations, cannot afford large military outlays, and could not contribute enough to have a meaningful impact on the collective defense in any event. This has given rise to years of debate, negotiation, and deal-making within NATO and other U.S. alliances.

Trump seems to be addressing this issue, and many analysts view his statements from this perspective. Yet, while it is often difficult to ascertain what Trump is thinking from what he says, that does not appear to be what he means here. In this and related statements, he seems to expect allies to make cash payments to the U.S. Treasury in return for our defending them. If they don’t make those payments, we will not be there for them.

This questioning of commitments undermines the very purpose of a deterrent alliance. (Without any evident recognition of the irony, in a speech in April, right after making this argument—“The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”—he then went on to complain that under Obama, “our friends are beginning to think they can’t depend on us.”)

Elsewhere he has spoken more specifically of how much the United States spends on bases overseas to defend allies and has suggested that we should bring those troops back home to save money.

Yet even as a narrow fiscal calculation, this argument does not make sense. He is not talking about demobilizing those troops; he intends to expand the military, so they would have to be stationed here in the United States. According to a 2013 RAND report, it does cost $10,000 to $40,000 extra per person per year to station troops abroad, but the host countries cover most of it.

Regardless of what Trump suggests, countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea (the countries where most U.S. overseas bases are located) actually do spend considerable amounts to defray the costs of the U.S. military presence, albeit in the form of free land, tax and fee waivers, or in-kind payments of services, supplies, and facilities, not direct payments to the Treasury. Last April, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, all things considered, it is actually cheaper to keep our troops in Korea than to bring them home.

Yet all of this still misses the main point. There is a reason for stationing troops overseas—even if it were to cost more. The purpose is to show a commitment to the common defense; the purpose is deterrence. A single U.S. battalion stationed in, say, Poland or a Baltic state, cannot defeat a Russian invasion directly, but it can convince the Russians that an attack on that state automatically means a larger war with the United States—something best avoided.

The United States benefits from the maintenance of peace and stability. It costs far less not to fight a war because it never happened then to let it happen and then get dragged into it. (See World Wars, I and II.) If Putin were to consider Trump’s frequent praises of him, put them together with Trump’s questioning of the U.S. commitment to NATO, and then conclude—mistakenly—that he could intervene with impunity in the Baltic states, you could very well end up with World War III.

As a businessman, Trump is accustomed to negotiating about dollars, maximizing revenues and minimizing expenditures, but national security, and politics more generally, is a different kind of beast. The goal is rarely in the form of dollars or anything else that can be quantified and calculated in the same way. Nor can success be measured easily or precisely when success means the absence of action (e.g., not being invaded).

Deterrence, stability, peace—these are valuable goals, but they are achieved through perceptions and other amorphous psychological processes as much as through hardware; and the key perceptions, being the perceptions of the other side, cannot be precisely manipulated. Trump may think he is being clever and improving his bargaining leverage by keeping his commitments vague and fostering an image of unpredictability, but such tactics can easily backfire.

Remember, in 1950 Kim Il Sung had been pestering Stalin for a year to let him invade South Korea, claiming both that he had prepared uprisings in the south and that his military could seize the entire peninsula before anyone had time to react. Stalin put him off repeatedly—until a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops and a speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson put into doubt our commitment to the south’s defense.* The result was the Korean War. Would something similar happen in the Baltics today? We should make an effort to assure that we never find out, and Trump’s approach is not the best way to go about it.

So, in conclusion, it is worth repeating: It is difficult to know what Trump will actually do as president. On the one hand, it seems that he doesn’t really mean many of the things he says. On the other hand, the underlying beliefs of his worldview have such dangerous implications that they might never get through the foreign-policy bureaucracy. At least, that’s what I like to tell myself.

*Other factors were the failure of the United States to intervene in the civil war in China, which was generally considered more significant than Korea, and the Soviet testing of its first atomic bomb.

The post The Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Enigma appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

La revue Politique étrangère est présente sur Cairn, le portail des revues francophones, depuis plusieurs années maintenant. Un nouveau record a été établi grâce à vous, chers Lecteurs, avec plus de 523 000 articles en accès libre consultés en 2016 ! Découvrez en exclusivité la liste des 10 articles de la revue les plus lus sur Cairn cette année !

10e  place : Abdou Diouf, « Afrique : l’intégration régionale face à la mondialisation »
(PE n° 4/2006)

9e place : Alice Ekman, « Asie-Pacifique : la priorité de la politique étrangère chinoise » (PE n° 3/2014)

8e place : David M. Faris, « La révolte en réseau : le « printemps arabe » et les médias sociaux » (PE n° 1/2012)

7e place : Archibald Gallet, « Les enjeux du chaos libyen » (PE n° 2/2015)

6e place : Boris Eisenbaum, « Négociation, coopération régionale et jeu d’influences en Asie centrale : l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai » (PE n° 1/2010)

5e place : Mohammad-Reza Djalili et Thierry Kellner, « L’Iran dans son contexte régional » (PE n° 3/2012)

4e place : Pierre de Senarclens, « Théories et pratiques des relations internationales depuis la fin de la guerre froide » (PE n° 4/2006)

3e place : Pierre Jacquet, « Les enjeux de l’aide publique au développement »
(PE n° 4/2006)

2e place : Thierry Kellner, « La Chine et la Grande Asie centrale » (PE n° 3/2008)

1ère place : Asiem El Difraoui et Milena Uhlmann, « Prévention de la radicalisation et déradicalisation : les modèles allemand, britannique et danois » (PE n° 4/2015)

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