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Washington souhaite que chaque pays nomme un envoyé spécial ou un ambassadeur de haut niveau chargé de lutter contre l'antisémitisme

The post Les États-Unis estiment que la Belgique a besoin d’un haut responsable chargé de la lutte contre l’antisémitisme appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Pyongyang fired “surface-to-surface” missile launches roughly one month before U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing. 

Donald Trump, Xi Jinping und Wladimir Putin lehren: Wer im Umgang mit Großmächten souverän und in Würde sein will, sollte selbst eine sein. Für Deutschland heißt das: Mitführung für europäische Kollektivmacht.

China should avoid treating long-established external economic ties as instruments that can be readily deployed or withdrawn.

The Regional Ecological Summit could kickstart a wider climate activism campaign in the greater Central Asian region, or it could just be a short-term, pro-green mirage.

Heute spricht 'fossilfrei' Host Wolf-Peter Schill mit Kai Wehnemann darüber, ob Deutschland seine Klimaziele erreicht und welche Rolle dabei die von ihm betreuten Treibhausgas-Projektionen des Umweltbundesamts spielen. Als Hintergrund erklärt Kai Wehnemann, wie aufwändig, aber auch wie transparent ...

Was einst reine Science-Fiction war, rückt zunehmend in den Fokus globaler Machtpolitik: ein möglicher Krieg im Weltall. Wie gut ist die Bundeswehr auf solch ein Szenario vorbereitet?

“Multipolarity” has become a central but, at the same time, highly am­biguous point of reference in debates about the future world order. The term is used descriptively, that is, to describe shifts in the distribution of power; and it is also used normatively, as an aspirational construct for a more just international order. However, as the following comparative analysis of seven countries shows, there is no coherent understanding of the term even in those countries that are pushing for multipolarity. Sharp dividing lines are evident between the United States, which has long understood the construct of multipolarity as being at odds with its strategic interests, and Russia and China, which both associate it with challenging US hegemony. However, while Russia is striving for a disruptive and violent transformation, China is aiming for an evolutionary one. Other states – above all, India and South Africa – hope that multipolarity will provide them with greater foreign-policy room for manoeuvre. And some derive their own reform proposals at the multilateral level from their understanding of the construct. Germany and the EU must rigorously examine the various interpretations and uses of the construct of multipolarity. They should not dismiss the term as irrelevant or inherently anti-Western as it can provide a common frame of reference on international politics. At the same time, its unreflec­tive use carries risks, as the term is highly politicised and associated with what are at times the conflicting goals of a broad range of international actors. Rather than simply participating in conceptual debates, Germany and the EU should take concrete steps towards reforming the international order in policy areas such as trade, health, energy and climate. At the same time, they should regard the call for multipolarity as an indicator of the need for broad reforms of the international system and initiate negotiation processes with other states. To this end, they must first establish their own reference points with regard to the future international order so that they can identify suitable partners and institutions.

La BBC a mis au jour un réseau de passeurs qui fait payer des milliers de livres aux migrants pour les aider à contourner le système d'asile.

Le fonds souverain allemand met fin aux restrictions qui lui interdisaient d’investir dans des entreprises liées au secteur de la défense. Le fonds connu sous le nom de « Kenfo », pourra désormais acheter des actions et obligations émises par des fabricants d’armement.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

« Les fabricants auront dès cette année des contrats pour l'année prochaine », a déclaré le ministre de la Défense, Mykhailo Fedorov

The post Ukraine vise une chaîne d’approvisionnement 100 % robotisée avec 25 000 drones terrestres appeared first on Euractiv FR.

China’s Xiamen bid ups the stakes in the the battle over the secretariat host.

Canberra and Tokyo continue to build closer links with each other, with a shared understanding of the strategic environment, and a high degree of trust

Les appels à l'« internationalisation » de la monnaie unique sont confondus avec un besoin plus urgent : réduire la dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis

The post Les dangers d’un euro mondial appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Sebastian Clapp.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine turned out to be merely the opening salvo in a deteriorating global security scenario. Security has become a top concern for Europeans – and this concern has deepened. More than two thirds of Europeans (68 %) believe their country is under threat, and 52 % trust the EU to strengthen security and defence. The European Parliament has called for the EU to move towards a more unified defence stance, based on credible deterrence, operational readiness, and continued support for Ukraine.

To ensure all EU countries are able to rely on a robust defence against attack, the EU roadmap to defence readiness by 2030 aims at overcoming defence industry fragmentation and a dependence on non-EU suppliers through coordinated investment, collaborative spending and encouraging a robust industrial and technological base. While EU countries increased their defence spending in 2025, Parliament is keen to see EU governments work together more closely to unlock the economies of scale that joint defence procurement could bring. Such coordinated defence spending could benefit the EU’s rapidly-expanding defence industry, with several new financial and legislative initiatives promoting cross-border cooperation in the industry.

Four years into Russia’s war, Parliament still stands firm with Ukraine. Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session in February 2026, marking this sombre anniversary, with President Metsola remarking ‘Ukraine’s security is Europe’s security’. Parliament also voted in favour of a €90 billion support loan package to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and economy. As the loan guarantee requires an amendment to the EU multiannual financial framework, the file requires a unanimous decision in the Council – which to date has been blocked by Hungary.

Presciently, the EU already launched its first approach to boosting defence with the European Defence Fund in 2021. To increase cooperation between EU countries, this €8 billion fund promotes joint defence research and capability development, defence innovation and cross-border industrial cooperation through over 160 collaborative projects. However, the interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) highlighted the need for funding to be faster, more flexible, and for better definition of projects for real strategic impact.

The EDF is just one way in which the EU aims to tackle the European defence industry’s high fragmentation, where Member States take national positions that nevertheless undermine overall efficiency, interoperability and competitiveness at the EU level. Today’s goal to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of EU defence spending is to develop a true common market for Europe’s security and defence industry. Less red-tape and greater defence alignment between EU countries could lead to governments enjoying the advantages of economies of scale in both industrial processes and procurement. Companies operating in the European defence technological and industrial base (known as EDTIB) could expand, and less funding would be lost to procurement from non-EU firms. Parliament is a strong supporter of a competitive EU defence market, which would lead to improved deterrence and resilience, and help EU countries better protect their sovereignty in today’s unpredictable geopolitical environment.

In a resolution on its 2025 annual report on the implementation of the EU common foreign and security policy, Parliament reiterated that the EU must defend its interests and called for increased support for Ukraine, an expanded presence in the Middle East, and underlined the need for close coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As many EU countries are also members of NATO, they are subject to Article 5, the collective defence clause. The armed forces of one or several EU Member States may therefore be called on to defend a border or a NATO Ally and so need to be able to move swiftly across EU territory. However, military mobility today faces considerable barriers – outdated, inadequate or missing infrastructure (such as bridges) and inconsistent legislation. While some improvements have already been seen on customs and transport procedures, tackling the under-investment and regulatory barriers in this area as a collective could lead to benefits almost three times higher than when EU countries do not coordinate their investment.

Returning to the situation in Ukraine, military drones are the main cause of casualties among both civilians and troops. The EU is already using EDF funding to develop drone technology and countermeasures, with EU governments already investing heavily in drone production. Parliament is monitoring the situation carefully to ensure robust ethical guardrails and strong accountability – and is particularly concerned that military drone innovation should not lead to development of lethal autonomous weapons.

Finally, to help Ukraine defend its borders and its people, the question of how to use Russian central bank assets, frozen by Western countries because of Russia’s attack, to sustain Ukraine against its aggressor(s) has not been resolved. While legal opinions on the lawfulness of confiscating Russia’s money diverge, G7 countries have already agreed to use the extraordinary revenues generated by the assets to service and repay a US$50 billion G7 loan to Ukraine. The EU channels its support for Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, and has already allocated €6.1 billion to address military and defence needs (2022-2024). This funding adds to military support directly provided by EU Member States, leading to an estimated €63.2 billion in total support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Fully behind the principle that Russia should pay for the damage it has inflicted, Parliament remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine.

Further reading:

• European defence readiness roadmap
• EU defence funding
• EU joint defence procurement
• European defence industry
• EU support for Ukraine for 2026–2027
• The interim evaluation of the European Defence Fund
• Building a common market for European defence
• Military mobility
• Towards a comprehensive and beneficial approach to military mobility
• Military drone systems in the EU and global context: Types, capabilities and regulatory frameworks
• Confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets: State of play, arguments and scenarios
• European Peace Facility – For Ukraine, but not only

Wegen des Iran-Kriegs wächst die Sorge, dass es zu Engpässen bei der Kerosin-Versorgung kommt. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin:

Deutschland steht derzeit nicht vor einem akuten Kerosin-Blackout, aber vor einer ernsthaften Stressprobe. Die Versorgung ist noch stabil, doch anhaltende geopolitische Spannungen treiben Preise und erhöhen den Druck auf die Infrastruktur. Am Ende zahlen vor allem Verbraucher*innen die Rechnung dieser fossilen Krisenabhängigkeit. Das ist der Preis der verschleppten Energiewende.  

Aktuell ist Deutschland noch mit Kerosin versorgt, aber die Lage ist angespannt. Ein Großteil des Kerosins stammt aus heimischen und europäischen Raffinerien, insbesondere aus dem Nordwesteuropa-Raum rund um Rotterdam. Gleichzeitig ist Europa stark importabhängig und globale Lieferketten, etwa über die Straße von Hormus, spielen eine zentrale Rolle. Das macht das System krisenanfällig, auch wenn es aktuell noch stabil wirkt. 

Ein Kerosin-Mangel kann abgewendet werden, wenn schnell gegengesteuert wird. Entscheidend sind zusätzliche Importe, etwa aus den USA, eine höhere Auslastung der Raffinerien sowie der Zugriff auf strategische Reserven. Die Bundesregierung kann hier koordinierend eingreifen, Importwege flexibilisieren und die Verteilung priorisieren. Letztlich ist das aber eine europäische Aufgabe, die enge Abstimmung erfordert.

Reisende müssen sich derzeit eher auf höhere Preise als auf flächendeckende Ausfälle von Flügen einstellen. Airlines könnten bei anhaltender Knappheit einzelne Verbindungen reduzieren, vor allem weniger profitable Strecken. Ein genereller Zusammenbruch des Flugverkehrs ist aber nicht zu erwarten. Die Entwicklung wird sich zunächst über Preise und punktuelle Anpassungen im Flugplan zeigen.  

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Confédération des États du Sahel (AES) ont échangé avec les responsables de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), le vendredi 17 avril 2026 à Lomé. Cela, en vue d'explorer des perspectives de coopération au bénéfice des populations ouest-africaines.

Cette rencontre, tenue en marge de la réunion sur la stratégie Togo-Sahel, a réuni notamment le chef de la diplomatie togolaise, Robert Dussey, ainsi que ses homologues de l'AES, Abdoulaye Diop, Bakary Yaou Sangaré et Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré. Les discussions ont également impliqué le président de la Commission de la CEDEAO, Omar Alieu Touray, et le négociateur en chef récemment désigné, Lansana Kouyaté.

Initialement informelle, la rencontre a permis de présenter le négociateur en chef aux ministres de l'AES, avant que ces derniers ne l'auditionnent afin de s'assurer d'une convergence de vues sur les objectifs et le contenu de sa mission. Les échanges ont mis en avant la nécessité de préserver les acquis de l'intégration régionale et de promouvoir le bien-être des populations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

« L'AES reste dans un esprit d'ouverture conformément à son engagement pris lors de la réunion de Bamako, car le plus important est de préserver l'essentiel pour le bonheur des populations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest dans sa globalité », a affirmé Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Burkina Faso, pays qui assure la présidence en exercice de la Confédération AES.

Les parties prenantes ont convenu de travailler à la mise en place rapide d'un cadre formel de coopération, devant servir de base juridique aux relations entre l'AES et la CEDEAO. Les ministres de l'AES ont réaffirmé leur ouverture au dialogue, dans le respect des orientations de leurs plus hautes autorités.

À cette occasion, le Togo a exprimé sa volonté de jouer un rôle de facilitateur en servant de passerelle entre les deux entités, en vue de favoriser un rapprochement durable et constructif au service de la stabilité régionale.

Lefaso.net
Source : Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Burkina

Le chef de l'Etat, le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré, a accueilli le président en exercice de l'Union africaine, Évariste Ndayishimiye, ce lundi 20 avril 2026, à l'aéroport international de Ouagadougou. Cette visite s'inscrit dans le cadre du renforcement des relations entre la Confédération des États du Sahel (AES) et l'Union africaine.

Elle est une étape importante dans le dialogue entre les deux entités, dans un contexte régional marqué par des enjeux sécuritaires et de développement. Au cours de son séjour, le président en exercice de l'Union africaine aura des échanges avec son homologue burkinabè sur des questions d'intérêt commun. Il effectuera également des visites d'infrastructures socio-économiques dans la capitale burkinabè.

À travers cette visite, les deux parties entendent consolider leur coopération et explorer de nouvelles perspectives de partenariat au service de la stabilité et du développement de la région ouest africaine.

Lefaso.net
Source : Présidence du Faso