Amir Saeid Iravani, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, addresses the Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías
By Oritro Karim
NEW YORK, Apr 10 2026 (IPS)
The past several weeks have marked a significant escalation in hostilities across the Middle East, with tensions rising among Israel, Lebanon, Iran, and the United States following large-scale exchanges of bombardment. Recent statements from U.S. President Donald Trump, including threats of extensive destruction in Iran, have further inflamed regional tensions and complicated ongoing diplomatic efforts. Humanitarian experts warn that these developments risk further destabilizing cross-border relations and could trigger a broader regional conflict.
“Every day this war continues, human suffering grows. The scale of devastation grows. Indiscriminate attacks grow,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “The spiral of death and destruction must stop. To the United States and Israel, it is high time to stop the war that is inflicting immense human suffering and already triggering devastating economic consequences. Conflicts do not end on their own. They end when leaders choose dialogue over destruction. That choice still exists. And it must be made – now.”
In late February, Israel coordinated a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, triggering retaliatory drone and missile strikes from Iran. According to figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 3.8 million Iranians have been impacted by the war in Iran as of early April. Iran’s Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) reports that over 2,100 civilians have been killed as of April 3, including 216 children, 251 women and 24 health workers. Over 1,880 children, 4,610 women, and 116 health workers have been injured in that same period.
The scale of destruction to civilian infrastructure across Iran has been particularly severe. The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) estimates that roughly 115,193 civilian structures have sustained significant damage, including at least 763 schools. Israeli airstrikes have targeted numerous densely populated areas and critical civilian infrastructures, including airports, residential areas, hospitals, schools, industrial facilities, cultural heritage sites, water infrastructure, and a power plant in Khorramshahr, as well as nuclear facilities in Khonab, Yazd, and Bushehr.
Iran’s healthcare system has borne a massive toll, with damage to over 442 health facilities across the nation, disrupting access to lifesaving care for over 10 million people, including 2.2 million children. The Pasteur Institute of Iran—one of the oldest research and public health centers in the Middle East, and a critical source of vaccines for infectious diseases—has been severely damaged, leaving thousands of children increasingly vulnerable. Tofigh Darou, a key producer of pharmaceutical products for chronic conditions such as cancer, has been destroyed, raising broader concerns of a severe, nationwide health crisis.
These challenges are especially pronounced for Iran’s growing population of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which has swelled to approximately 3.2 million since the escalation of hostilities. Iran also currently hosts over 1.65 million refugees. These vulnerable communities are in dire need of access to basic services, many of which have been severely disrupted. IDPs and refugee communities face significant protection risks, alongside critical shortages of healthcare, food, clean water, and financial support for basic needs and relocation assistance.
“Unprovoked attacks by the US and Israel — launched amid diplomatic negotiations and without authorisation from the Security Council — violate the fundamental prohibition on the use of force, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the duty to peacefully settle disputes under Article 2 of the UN Charter. They also violate the right to life,” said a coalition of UN experts on April 4. “The targeting of civilians, educational facilities, and medical institutions constitutes a grave violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law….Calls by the US and Israel for Iranians to seize control of their own government are reckless and put countless civilian lives at risk.”
On April 8, the U.S. brokered a two-week ceasefire with Iran, mediated by Pakistan, in an effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway and one of the world’s most prominent oil and gas passes, and to de-escalate tensions in the 2026 Iran War. Immediately following the implementation of the ceasefire, Israel launched a series of large-scale airstrikes in Lebanon targeting Hezbollah sites, resulting in widespread damage to civilian infrastructure and a significant loss of human life.
Attacks across Lebanon have been widespread, with Israeli authorities reporting that they had carried out approximately 100 strikes across the country within 10 minutes. Southern Lebanon has experienced immense destruction, along with the southern suburbs of Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley, all reporting significant damage to civilian infrastructures. Attacks have been reported in the vicinity of the Hiram Hospital in Al-Aabbassiye near Tyre, as well as on an ambulance on the Islamic Health Authority in Qlaileh, causing three civilian deaths.
Figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) show that more than 1,500 people had been killed by Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon between early March and April 8, including over 200 women and children. Additional figures from the UN reveal that the attacks on April 8 alone resulted in more than 200 deaths and over 1,000 injuries across Lebanon. Many victims are believed to be still trapped beneath the rubble of destroyed infrastructure, as hospitals and rescue teams struggle to respond amid the overwhelming scale of casualties and urgent humanitarian needs.
“The scale of the killing and destruction in Lebanon today is nothing short of horrific,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk. “Such carnage, within hours of agreeing to a ceasefire with Iran, defies belief. It places enormous pressure on a fragile peace, which is so desperately needed by civilians. The scale of such actions, coupled with statements by Israeli officials indicating an intention to occupy or even annex parts of southern Lebanon, is deeply troubling. Efforts to bring peace to the wider region will remain incomplete as long as the Lebanese people are living under continuing fire, forcibly displaced, and in fear of further attacks.”
On April 7, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a series of posts on social media in which he warned of potential large-scale destruction in Iran, which elicited significant concern and outrage from regional and international actors. His subsequent partial withdrawal of these comments did little to ease concerns and only further underscored the volatility of the U.S.’s role in foreign affairs.
“Today, the President of the United States again resorted to language that is not only deeply irresponsible but profoundly alarming, declaring that ‘the whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back’,” Amir Saeid Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, told the Security Council on April 7. He added that Trump’ s comments only acted as an open declaration of “intent to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity”, underscoring the troubling precents that the U.S. is setting for international conflicts.
“The announcement of a two-week ceasefire is a welcome step but it is partial, fragile, and incomplete. Most urgently, it does not include Lebanon, where I visited IRC programs last week and where airstrikes, evacuation orders and active hostilities not only continue to threaten civilians but intensify. A ceasefire that leaves one front of the conflict burning risks prolonging the crisis, not resolving it,” said David Miliband, President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee.
“The war in Iran has already triggered a dangerous domino effect, spreading humanitarian need, economic shock, and instability across the region and beyond. This moment must be used to expand the ceasefire, ensure the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and other critical routes remain open to allow scaled-up humanitarian aid and essential supplies to reach those in need, and to stabilize economies under strain. Without that, the gap between rising needs and shrinking resources will only deepen. Civilians must be given the space to begin rebuilding their lives with dignity which can only happen if there is a permanent cessation in hostilities,” he continued.
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Implementing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda and mainstreaming gender have the potential to make UN peacekeeping operations more operationally effective, including by improving situational awareness and strengthening mission planning. Within this effort, military gender advisers (MGAs) play a central role in integrating a gender perspective across the military components of UN missions.
This policy paper examines the role of MGAs in UN peacekeeping operations, drawing on interviews and survey data from gender advisers and focal points across missions.
It discusses how MGAs are situated within the UN Peacekeeping Gender Architecture, variations in recruitment and training of MGAs, and the wide range of roles and responsibilities of MGAs. Furthermore, the paper identifies persistent challenges, including unclear job descriptions, short deployment cycles, limited training, and difficulties in coordination with civilian counterparts. The paper finds that the effectiveness of MGAs is shaped by factors such as leadership support, professional background, gender and cultural dynamics, and resource constraints. It underscores that as peacekeeping operations face financial pressures and structural reforms, ensuring that gender advisers are adequately trained, resourced, and integrated into mission planning will be critical to maintaining operational effectiveness.
The post The Role of Military Gender Advisers in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational Effectiveness and The Future of Peacekeeping Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.
John Mitchell (no relation) was Richard Nixon’s Attorney General during his first term. Mitchell then served as Nixon’s campaign manager in 1972, a role that, naturally, led him to become enmeshed in the Watergate Scandal. In 1975, a few months after Nixon resigned, Mitchell was found guilty of perjury, obstruction of justice and conspiracy. He served 19 months in a federal penitentiary.
When it comes to being a disgrace to the Department of Justice, Mitchell had nothing on Pam Bondi.
À téléchargerL’article The Department of Justice After Pam Bondi est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Depuis plus d’un siècle, la Russie – d’abord soviétique, puis post-soviétique – conçoit l’information non comme un simple vecteur de communication, mais comme un instrument stratégique à part entière. Dès les années 1920, la propagande bolchevique ne se limitait pas à convaincre : elle visait à structurer les perceptions, à orienter les comportements et à fragiliser la cohésion des sociétés adverses. La désinformation n’était pas un artifice périphérique du pouvoir, mais l’un de ses fondements.
Avec l’effondrement de l’Union soviétique et l’irruption du numérique, cette logique n’a pas disparu ; elle s’est transformée. À partir des années 1990, les stratèges russes ont intégré une réalité nouvelle : la domination ne se joue plus uniquement sur les champs de bataille matériels, mais dans les représentations mentales. La vérité elle-même devient alors un espace de confrontation. C’est dans ce contexte qu’émerge ce que Moscou qualifie successivement de guerre informationnelle, puis de guerre cognitive : une conflictualité diffuse, sans ligne de front, où l’objectif n’est plus de vaincre l’ennemi, mais de le désorienter, de l’épuiser psychologiquement, de fragmenter son rapport au réel.
De Lénine à Poutine, une même ambition traverse les ruptures de régime : façonner la perception du réel afin de contraindre l’action de l’autre. Face à cette stratégie, les réponses les plus décisives ne relèvent plus exclusivement de la puissance militaire, mais de la rapidité de l’information, de la transparence des institutions et de la résilience cognitive des sociétés.
L’article De la désinformation soviétique à la guerre cognitive russe : un siècle d’art de la guerre des esprits est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
« Les entreprises ukrainiennes travailleront avec les forces armées de ces pays pour protéger certaines installations », a déclaré Zelenskyy
The post L’Ukraine se lance dans l’exportation de son expertise militaire au Moyen-Orient appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Das Bosman-Urteil von 1995 hat die Europäische Union auf eine Bühne gezogen, auf der sie anfangs gar nicht spielen wollte: den Sport. Seitdem hat der Europäische Gerichtshof durch seine Entscheidungen die EU-Sportlandschaft mehr geprägt als jede politische Erklärung aus Brüssel. Doch welche Rolle spielt die Sportpolitik in der EU wirklich – und wie weit reichen die Kompetenzen der Union tatsächlich?
Von der rechtlichen Leerstelle zur europäischen Zuständigkeit im SportLange Zeit existierte keine rechtliche Grundlage für eine EU-Sportpolitik. Das klingt paradox, wenn man bedenkt, dass Millionen Europäer täglich Sport treiben und der Profisport Milliardenumsätze generiert. Doch genau so war es: Bis 2009 füllte nicht die Politik, sondern die Rechtsprechung dieses Vakuum. Auch angrenzende Bereiche wie Sportwetten Österreich legal zeigen, wie wichtig klare gesetzliche Rahmenbedingungen im europäischen Sportumfeld sind.
Die historische Entwicklung lässt sich in klaren Etappen nachzeichnen. Der Adonnino-Bericht von 1985 und der Larive-Bericht des Europäischen Parlaments von 1988 erkannten den Sport erstmals als Integrationsmittel und Wirtschaftsfaktor. 1991 gründete die Europäische Kommission das Europäische Sportforum, eine Austauschplattform für staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure. Der Pack-Bericht von 1997 forderte dann explizit, Sport im europäischen Vertragswerk zu verankern. Die Verträge von Amsterdam (1997) und Nizza (2000) erwähnten den Sport – aber nur unverbindlich.
Der eigentliche Wendepunkt kam mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon 2009. Artikel 165 AEU-Vertrag gab der EU erstmals echte Kompetenzen im Sportbereich. Doch Vorsicht: Diese Kompetenzen sind bewusst begrenzt. Gemäß Artikel 6 AEU-Vertrag beschränken sie sich auf Koordinierungs-, Förderungs- und Unterstützungsfunktionen. Eine Harmonisierung nationaler Sportgesetze bleibt ausgeschlossen. Die Hauptzuständigkeit liegt weiterhin bei den Mitgliedstaaten – und der neue Sportartikel setzt Binnenmarkt- oder Wettbewerbsrecht keinesfalls außer Kraft.
Konkrete EU-Maßnahmen: Finanzierung, Doping und soziale DimensionWas tut die EU konkret mit ihren Sportkompetenzen? Meiner Einschätzung nach: weniger als viele erwarten, aber mehr als oft wahrgenommen wird. Am 8. November 2011 vergab die EU-Kommission Zuschüsse zwischen 125.000 und 200.000 Euro an zwölf transnationale Projekte – für basisorientierte Kampagnen zur Förderung körperlicher Bewegung, sozialer Eingliederung und Dopingbekämpfung. Das ist symbolisch wichtig, finanziell aber bescheiden.
Dass es für 2012 und 2013 kein EU-Sportförderprogramm geben würde, stand bereits im Dezember 2010 fest – schlicht wegen fehlender Haushaltsmittel. Das EOC EU-Büro reagierte mit einem Positionspapier, das von zahlreichen Sportverbänden mitgetragen wurde. Praktisch bedeutete dies zu regulieren oder nationale Sportinfrastrukturen zu finanzieren blieb Ländersache – die EU spielte allenfalls eine flankierende Rolle.
Die Arbeitspläne für den Sport 2014–17 und 2017–20 definierten klare Schwerpunkte:
Auf der Ratssitzung vom 20. Mai 2011 stimmten die Sportminister der Mitgliedstaaten einem Arbeitsplan zu, der neun Maßnahmen entlang drei Prioritäten beschrieb. Sechs Expertengruppen wurden für drei Jahre bis 2014 berufen. Der Rahmen existiert also – ob der politische Wille folgt, ist eine andere Frage.
Der EuGH als eigentlicher Motor der europäischen SportpolitikFrankly gesagt: Nicht Brüsseler Bürokratie, sondern Richtersprüche aus Luxemburg haben den europäischen Sport am stärksten geprägt. Das Bosman-Urteil 1995 revolutionierte den Transfermarkt. Die ISU-Affäre – zwei niederländische Eisschnellläufer klagten gegen ein faktisches lebenslanges Startverbot bei nicht-genehmigten Wettbewerben – endete mit einer EuGH-Entscheidung gegen den Weltverband wegen Verstoß gegen EU-Wettbewerbsrecht.
Der spektakulärste Fall war die geplante Super League im April 2021: Zwölf Top-Clubs aus England, Spanien und Italien wollten eine geschlossene Eliteliga gründen. Das Projekt scheiterte schnell. Der EuGH stellte aber klar, dass die UEFA ihr Monopol nicht nutzen darf, um solche Initiativen schlicht zu verbieten. Folker Hellmund, der das Brüsseler Büro des Europäischen Olympischen Komitees leitet und den Deutschen Olympischen Sportbund auf EU-Ebene vertritt, analysiert: Das Urteil habe die Möglichkeit offengelassen, die Monopolstruktur fortzusetzen – aber der Druck auf Verbände, neue Governance-Strukturen einzuführen, sei real gestiegen.
Albrecht Sonntag, Professor für Europa-Studien an der ESSCAR Management Schule in Angers, bringt es auf den Punkt: Die EU-Institutionen seien lange hin und hergerissen zwischen dem Schutz des Marktes und der Bewahrung der soziokulturellen Funktion des Sports. Diese Spannung bleibt ungelöst. Künftig werden vermutlich mehr Verbände vor dem EuGH nachweisen müssen, dass wettbewerbsbeschränkende Regelungen allen Akteuren Vorteile bringen. Wer die Sportpolitik der EU verstehen will, muss deshalb vor allem die Gerichtsurteile lesen – nicht die Parteiprogramme, in denen Sport ohnehin kaum vorkommt, wie das Beispiel der Europawahl 2024 deutlich gezeigt hat.
Der Beitrag Sportpolitik der EU: die Rolle der Europäischen Union im Sport erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.
« La trahison n'est pas un exploit », a déclaré le chef de cabinet d'Orbán
The post Le Fidesz se fissure alors que la perspective d’une défaite plane sur Orbán appeared first on Euractiv FR.
This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.
This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.
This paper investigates the determinants and dynamics of labour demand and specifically informal labour in Egypt’s manufacturing sector, using nationally representative firm-level data from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey. Applying ordinary least squares and fractional logit models, we analyse total employment, the share of informal labour, and its average annual change over the firm life cycle. Three key findings emerge. First, employment is positively associated with capital, exporting, innovation, industrial zones, worker training, and managerial education, and negatively associated with sole proprietorships, wages, and total factor productivity. Second, informal employment is more common among private sector firms, sole proprietorships, and firms using more part-time workers, and less prevalent among firms adopting technology or led by more educated managers. Third, changes in informality over time are modest: most formal firms exhibit no change in the share of informal workers. Notably, formal firms that did not initially employ informal labour tend to increase their informal share, while firms that formalised continue to rely heavily on informal employment. Together, these findings underscore the persistence of informality and limited transitions toward full formalisation within Egypt’s formal manufacturing sector.