Under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia has positioned itself internationally as a leader in climate action and in pursuing a just transition away from fossil fuels. Among other things, Petro’s climate and energy policy relied on supply-side measures to limit the exploitation of fossil fuels – a unique approach among those countries in the Global South that, like Colombia, export fossil fuels. At the same time, Petro has had only limited success in implementing this agenda within his own country. With the election victory of the right-wing opposition candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, the future of this reform course is now being renegotiated. Whether the transformation in Colombia succeeds without jeopardising short-term economic stability, security of supply, and social cohesion is relevant for many countries that export fossil fuels and have only limited fiscal space. They are therefore closely watching whether, and under what conditions, Germany and the European Union (EU) provide support for Colombia’s transformation. Failure would have political implications beyond Colombia.
Une chaleur d’une brutalité rare continue de s’abattre sur l’Algérie. L’Office national de la météorologie (ONM) a publié un bulletin météorologique spécial (BMS) de niveau […]
L’article Canicule en Algérie : vigilance « rouge » jusqu’au 17 juillet avec des pics à 49 °C dans plusieurs wilayas est apparu en premier sur .
Le président de la République du Bénin, Romuald Wadagni, a foulé le sol tchadien ce mercredi 15 juillet 2026. Il prend part à N'Djamena au Forum africain de l'eau, une rencontre continentale de haut niveau coorganisée par la République du Tchad et le Groupe de la Banque mondiale autour des défis liés à la gestion durable de l'eau en Afrique.
Accueilli à son arrivée à l'aéroport international de N'Djamena par le Premier ministre tchadien Allah-Maye Halina, Romuald Wadagni rejoint plusieurs dirigeants africains, responsables institutionnels, experts internationaux et partenaires au développement réunis dans la capitale tchadienne pour deux jours d'échanges.
Placée sous le thème « De la vision à l'action », cette rencontre vise à transformer les engagements politiques en réalisations concrètes afin d'améliorer la sécurité hydrique sur le continent. Les participants abordent notamment l'accès universel à l'eau potable, le financement des infrastructures hydrauliques, l'irrigation, la résilience climatique ainsi que la coopération autour des ressources en eau partagées.
Au cœur des discussions figure la nécessité de mobiliser davantage de financements pour accélérer les investissements dans le secteur de l'eau. Le forum ambitionne également de renforcer les partenariats entre États africains, institutions financières, secteur privé et acteurs du développement, avec l'objectif de faire émerger des projets capables de répondre durablement aux besoins des populations.
Cette rencontre s'inscrit dans le cadre de l'initiative Water Forward portée par le Groupe de la Banque mondiale et ses partenaires, qui encourage la mise en place de cadres nationaux intégrant réformes, planification des investissements et renforcement des capacités institutionnelles dans le secteur de l'eau.
La participation de Romuald Wadagni à ce rendez-vous continental traduit l'engagement du Bénin à contribuer aux réflexions africaines sur les grands enjeux environnementaux et de développement durable. À travers ce forum, les dirigeants africains cherchent à faire de l'eau un véritable levier de croissance, de résilience et d'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations.
Parmi les chefs d'État attendus à ce Forum, il y a le président de la République gabonaise, Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema ; le président de la République démocratique du Congo, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo ; le président de la République centrafricaine, Faustin-Archange Touadéra ; le président de la République du Sénégal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye ; le président de la République de Gambie, Adama Barrow ; le président de la République islamique de Mauritanie, Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani ; le président de la Transition de la République du Mali, le général d'armée Assimi Goïta ; le président de la République du Niger, le général d'armée Abdourahamane Tiani ; ainsi que le président du Faso, le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré.
À travers cette rencontre, le Tchad entend affirmer son rôle dans la promotion de la coopération africaine autour de la gestion durable de l'eau, un défi majeur pour le développement du continent et particulièrement pour les pays du Sahel.
On 15 July 2016, factions within the Turkish military attempted to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the government. The coup failed due to resistance from the public, opposition from the political leadership and divisions within the army itself. For Erdoğan, this presented a valuable political opportunity. Citing the need to avert further danger, he initiated far-reaching purges across the state apparatus and began a fundamental restructuring of the political system.
Purges and institutional restructuring under a state of emergencyOn 21 July 2016, Parliament approved a state of emergency declared by the government. It remained in force until mid-July 2018. Erdoğan used it to carry out comprehensive purges across the state apparatus with 32 emergency decrees. Around 130,000 public-sector employees were dismissed. By the end of 2016, the authorities had arrested around 125,000 people, including 36,000 to 40,000 who were placed in pre-trial detention – with 149 journalists among them. By the end of 2022, the number of arrests and detentions in connection with the coup attempt had risen to around 332,000, with 4,000 judges and prosecutors losing their posts. Thousands of private schools, universities and foundations were closed by decree. A further 131 media companies were shut down, including 45 newspapers, 16 television stations, 23 radio stations and 3 news agencies. The authorities also revoked the passports of tens of thousands of people.
Extensive repression and the resulting climate of fear significantly restricted political competition and public debate. In this environment, the government initiated a restructuring of Turkey’s institutions.
The decisive step was the constitutional referendum held in April 2017, in which a narrow majority voted to introduce a presidential system that significantly expanded the president’s powers. International election observers reported irregularities and concluded that the referendum was not free or fair. The legitimacy of the result remained controversial, not least because the Supreme Electoral Committee subsequently admitted around two million improperly stamped ballots on election night, thereby pushing the referendum to a narrow victory.
The constitutional amendment strengthened executive power and largely concentrated it in the hands of the president. He was given extensive executive and appointment powers, while Parliament’s oversight and veto rights were restricted. In addition, the growing influence of the executive has weakened judicial independence. Numerous political scientists initially classified Turkey as a “competitive authoritarian” regime, with more recent analyses increasingly assessing it as an “autocracy”.
International governance indices document this development. Turkey’s score in the Liberal Democracy Index nearly halved within a few years. Freedom House downgraded Turkey from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in 2018. Since the state of emergency, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index has also shown significant deficits in the rule of law and judicial independence.
The economic consequences of autocratisation in TurkeyAutocratisation was accompanied by a significant erosion of the central institutional framework of the Turkish economy. The weakening of democratic institutions, the rule of law and the protection of property rights, as well as the loss of central bank independence, increased uncertainties about economic policy. The growing concentration of power and the dismantling of institutional constraints on government action have negatively impacted the predictability of economic policy. This was reflected in key economic indicators, which pointed to a marked economic slowdown from 2016 onwards.
In the first five years following the coup attempt, average annual real GDP growth fell from 6.5 in the preceding five-year period to 3.5 per cent, despite expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. At the same time, nominal GDP per capita fell from around $11,000 to $9,700. Foreign direct investment inflows also declined from an average of $15 billion to $11 billion. Export growth slowed from 5 to 3 per cent, while inflation rose from 7 to 14 per cent. The Turkish lira also depreciated significantly and became more volatile.
There are currently no signs of a sustained economic recovery. The ongoing repression against the opposition party CHP and its mayors, as well as the government’s renewed efforts to amend the constitution to secure its hold on power, are increasing political instability and impacting the investment climate.