Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

The Sustainable Development Goals, and analyses of the same, have highlighted multiple linkages between different goals (Nilsson et al. 2016) and, in particular, underscored the link between social protection and health (Nunes et al. 2016). This chapter will look at the effect of social protection on health.

Revenue mobilisation and social protection systems are intrinsically intertwined. It is impossible to think carefully about either independently of the other. People want to know what they can expect to get in exchange for the taxes and fees; governments can only provide social protection if there is enough funding. This last aspect is commonly the most prominently highlighted. Revenue is needed in order to finance more ambitious social protection systems and secure their sustainability. This issue is particularly salient in low- and middle-income countries where funding is particularly scarce and donors contribute non-trivial amounts of finance, especially in the area of social safety nets. However, looking at revenue collection only as a source of funding comes too short. The distributional impacts of a fiscal system depend on both, the revenue and the spending side. This is obvious and widely recognized in principle, but largely ignored in practise. Experts tend to focus on “their” side. Similarly obvious, where the funding comes from (who pays taxes and fees) will limit what programmes design are politically feasible. All these aspects need to be considered more prominently when discussing the scope for reforms in the social protection system. This chapter discusses these interlinkages and calls for a more integrated perspective of social protection and tax policy not only as a desirable step but as a necessary one.

Climate change is the most urgent challenge of our time. It is also strictly linked to the core objectives of social protection. On one side, if not properly addressed, the effects of climate change may push millions in poverty. On the other hand, policies to mitigate climate change may also exacerbate current vulnerabilities. The chapter explores the critical role that social protection can play in both climate change mitigation and adaptation. By broadly summarizing different research streams, it outlines: i) the channels through which the impacts of climate change, as well as the policies to mitigate it, may increase poverty and vulnerability; ii) the ways in which different social protection instruments and functions address climate change; iii) the steps to further mainstream climate change in social protection, as well as the challenges to be faced. The main message is that urgent action is needed to avoid that climate change undermines past poverty reduction achievements and further complicates social protection objectives.

This paper analyses the European Union’s (EU) evolving motivations, priorities and current approaches to development cooperation under the label of “Team Europe”, following its introduction in April 2020 as the European Union’s global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It assesses what Team Europe is, to what extent and how the Team Europe approach has changed the EU’s development cooperation, which effects it has on EU initiatives to support partner countries, and discusses the implications of Team Europe on the EU’s development policy in the medium and long term. The paper analyses the Team Europe approach along four dimensions, which are traditionally emphasised in the EU’s development policy: (i) visibility, (ii) effectiveness, (iii) ownership and (iv) integration. It concludes that Team Europe primarily seeks to increase the visibility of EU’s actions in support of partner countries and prioritises European ownership of cooperation priorities over developing country ownership. Although ‘effectiveness’ efforts focus on improving efficacy of the intra-EU-MS coordinated processes, it remains unclear whether Team Europe promotes more programmatic collective action among member states.

Die Verständigung zwischen der EU und Kenia über die bilaterale Umsetzung des ursprünglich mit der gesamten Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft geplanten Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens löst zwar kurzfristig den gordischen Knoten zwischen dessen Befürwortern und Gegnern unter den afrikanischen Partnerländern, birgt aber zugleich langfristige Folgen, die über die Divergenz der Zölle gegenüber der EU hinausgeht, schreibt Frederik Stender.

Anything that jeopardises progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals – such as a global pandemic and how governments react to it – is thus a major source of concern, in particular for least developed countries (LDCs).
The first half of 2020 witnessed governments imposing dozens of export curbs on essential medical goods and foods that the LDCs, among other nations, depend upon. Although some of those curbs have subsequently been removed, there is a substantial risk of a permanent reduction in essential goods supplied to LDC markets, as current multilateral trade disciplines on export controls do not specifically require a return to the pre-pandemic status quo.
Let us not forget that the G20 trade and investment ministers declared on 3 November 2020 that “any emergency trade measures designed to tackle COVID-19, including export restrictions on vital medical supplies and equipment and other essential goods and services, if deemed necessary, are targeted, proportionate, transparent, temporary, reflect our interest in protecting the most vulnerable, do not create unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains, and are consistent with WTO rules” (G20, 2020). Evidence on resort to export restrictions suggests, however, that G20 fealty to this pledge was uneven.
The purpose of this Briefing Paper is to outline the key policy developments implicating the trade in essential goods during the first nine months of the COVID-19 pandemic before drawing out the implications for development policy and trade policy cooperation. These lessons need to be taken on board quickly if the mistakes made in 2020 are not to be repeated in 2021, when policymakers and the private sector around the world face the imperative of the equitable and efficient global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Recent export controls on such vaccines suggest important lessons from last year have not been taken on board universally.
The key findings and policy recommendations are:
• Permanent disruption to trade routes in medical goods and medicines cannot be ruled out as a result of temporary export curbs.
• Revisit the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that allow export curbs during emergencies.
• LDCs should increase their buying power by joining together to buy medical goods and medicines from a diversified set of production locations.
• Such buying power would be multiplied if LDCs joined forces with leading development agencies and the multilateral development banks.
Stockpiling in advance of any future pandemic offers no cast-iron guarantee, as no-one can know for sure what medical goods will be in high demand.

Am 14. Juli 2021 hat die EU-Kommission den CO2-Grenzausgleichsmechanismus (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, CBAM) als Teil ihres klimapolitischen Fit-for-55-Pakets vorgestellt. Die EU-Kommission hatte dieses handelspolitische Instrument 2019 im Rahmen des Green Deals angekündigt, um ambitioniertere klimapolitische Ziele umsetzen zu können, ohne dass energieintensive Sektoren ihre Emissionen ins Ausland verlagern (Carbon Leakage). Die CBAM-Vorlage sieht vor, Einfuhren in bestimmten energieintensiven EU-Sektoren mit einer zum CO2-Gehalt proportionalen Abgabe zu belasten: Der CBAM-Entwurf erweitert das bestehende EU-Emissionshandelssystem dahingehend, dass Importeure für im Ausland erworbene Güter aus besonders energieintensiven Sektoren (Stahl, Zement, Strom, Dünger und Aluminium) zum Kauf von CO2-Zertifikaten auf Basis von Emissionsdaten aus dem Ausland verpflichtet werden. Der CBAM soll vor allem eine ambitionierte Klimapolitik der EU befördern. Doch die aktuelle EU-Vorlage erweckt den Eindruck, dass es in erster Linie um die Verbesserung der heimischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit geht – auf Kosten klimapolitischer Effektivität und auch auf Kosten einer entwicklungspolitischen Perspektive.
Die Gesetzesvorlage muss nun im Detail durch die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und das Europäische Parlament ausbuchstabiert werden. Dabei müssen neben der klimapolitischen Effektivität und der Vereinbarkeit mit WTO-Recht die Auswirkungen auf die europäischen Handelspartner und insbesondere auch die armen Entwicklungsländer berücksichtigt werden. Für viele Entwicklungsländer sind infolge des CBAM zusätzliche Exportkosten zu erwarten. Die EU sollte die damit verbundenen Nachteile für Entwicklungsländer sorgfältig bewerten und auf eine entwicklungsfreundliche Ausgestaltung des CBAM hinwirken. Der CBAM sollte im weiteren Gesetzgebungsverfahren der EU entsprechend nachgebessert werden.
• Die EU muss sicherstellen, dass arme Länder nicht negativ vom CO2-Grenzausgleich belastet werden. Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) sollten vom CBAM ausgenommen bleiben.
• Die EU sollte die vom CBAM betroffenen Entwicklungsländer gezielt unterstützen, z. B. durch Kapazitätsaufbau in Bezug auf die Umsetzung des CBAM und Möglichkeiten der CO2-Minderung in den betroffenen Sektoren.
• Die EU sollte Partnerländer mit niedrigen und mittleren Einkommen bei der Dekarbonisierung ihrer Fertigungsindustrien unterstützen.
• Die EU sollte die Einnahmen des CO2-Grenzausgleichs im Sinne eines revenue recyclings überwiegend für klimapolitische Zwecke im Ausland verausgaben.
Bei der Weiterentwicklung des CBAM sollten die betroffenen Länder durch Konsultationen und diplomatischen Austausch zukünftig stärker eingebunden werden.

2021 is proving to be a key year for cooperation between Europe and its neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As the European Union (EU) launches its new multiannual budget, the COVID-19 pandemic has demanded a rethink of the political, economic and social priorities that the EU and its member states should pursue with MENA countries. Europe’s potential for positive influence on state–society relations in MENA countries has yet to be realised.
The latest European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) South Communication, published in February 2021, promises a “new agenda” for cooperation with MENA countries. It does not, however, address conflicts between its own objectives, especially between liberal–democratic political and economic reforms, accountable government and respect for human rights on the one hand, and restrictive trade practices, migration management and security cooperation on the other. Furthermore, there is little bilateral policy coordination among EU member states.
Focussing cooperation on social contracts would help overcome such conflicts, which are inherent in cooperation targeting short- to medium-term goals, such as migration management, resilience and private investment. In authoritarian contexts, these measures tend to strengthen the state at the expense of society, and thereby increase prospects for conflict, rather than the stability they promise.
The social contract perspective is long-term. Social contracts rely on the state’s delivery of the “3 Ps”: protection (of citizens), provision (of economic and social services) and participation (in decision-making).
The social contract provides an analytical tool and a set of organising principles for joint EU and member state priorities and activities. The social contract lens shows how the 3 Ps work together as a framework for social cohesion, peaceful relations and political stability. In practical terms, its use would help improve the effectiveness, coherence and coordination of EU and member state cooperation with MENA countries. Some EU member states prefer to focus on trade and economic cooperation, some on political reform and human rights, and others on migration management. If all take a more long-term perspective, they will realise that sustainable social contracts in MENA countries are good for all of their aims.
All European actions should support reforms in MENA countries that aim to make social contracts more acceptable to the contracting parties – governments and social groups. Ideally, such reforms result from negotiations of social contracts between parties on equal terms. In practice, how¬ever, the negotiation power of social groups is often limited – one reason why Europe should ensure that its programmes strengthen societies at least as much as governments.
This paper discusses four key cooperation areas which are potential drivers of change for social contracts:
• Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconstruction;
• Post-COVID-19 recovery: health and social protection;
• Participation at local, regional and national levels; and
• Mutually beneficial migration and mobility.
The EU and its member states, by working together on the 3 Ps in these four areas, can influence positive change in the MENA region.

Wir sehen die folgenden Handlungsfelder und konkreten Schritte, um Fischerei in Entwicklungspolitik und internationaler Zusammenarbeit den heutigen Herausforderungen besser zu positionieren:
1) Gezielter Abbau von Subventionen für die Industriefischerei. Die OECD beziffert den Anteil der Official Development Assistance (ODA), der 2013-2018 für eine Nachhaltigkeits-orientierte Weiterentwicklung der Blue Economy eingesetzt wurde, auf durchschnittlich 2,9 Mrd. Dollar pro Jahr (1,6 Prozent dergesamten ODA). Dies steht den 35,4 Mrd. Dollar gegenüber, die allein 2018 global für Fischereisubventionen bereitgestellt wurden (Skeritt & Sumaila 2021), mit dem zu erwartenden Versagen im Kampf gegen Überfischung.
2) Verbot jeglicher Fischereiaktivitäten in der Hohen See. Sie sollten in Zukunft auf Küstenmeere innerhalb der Ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszonen reduziert werden. Neben dem Schutz der Ökosysteme der Hohen See, würde es die Position der Kleinfischerei gegenüber der Industriefischerei im Kampf um die Fischbestände von Entwicklungsländern stärken (Sumaila et al. 2015).
3) Institutionelle Stärkung und Kapazitätsentwicklung von regionalem Fischereimanagement. Gezielte Förderung regionaler Kooperation und Verständigung zu nachhaltigem Fischereimanagement in Verbindung mit guter Regierungsführung und Prinzipien der Rechtsstaatlichkeit mittels der Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.
4) Gezielte Förderung der Klein- und Küstenfischerei in Entwicklungs- und Mitteleinkommensländern mit Zugang zu traditionell reichen Fischereigründen und entlang der Small-scale Fisheries Guidelines der FAO (FAO 2015).
5) Gezielter Ausbau von lokalen fischverarbeitenden Industrien und (trans-)regionaler Vermarktung, inklusive gender-diverser Arbeitsplatzförderung, Sozial- und Umweltstandards, Kapazitätsentwicklung und Ausbildung.
6) Förderung von cross-sektoraler Kooperation und Koordination im weiteren Kontext ozeanbasierter Wirtschaftszweige. Sicherstellung von Nachhaltigkeitsstandards (ökologische, soziale, ökonomische, kulturelle) im weiteren Ausbau der ‚Blue Economy‘ mittels der gezielten Unterstützung integrierter Ansätze (wie z.B. die Integrated Maritime Strategy der Afrikanischen Union).

While social protection has become an important policy field in many low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs), 55 per cent of the world’s population are still not even covered by one social protection benefit, with 87 per cent of people uncovered in Sub-Saharan Africa and 61 per cent in Asia and the Pacific (ILO 2017). Next to undercoverage, there are other factors that lower the efficiency, effectiveness and social justice of social protection in many countries, such as the lack of a joint vision and policy strategy, fragmented social protection programmes, duplication of administrative systems and efforts and irrational prioritisation in spending. These all call for a stronger systems approach to social protection. This handbook is therefore dedicated to social protection systems, highlighting the relevance but also the challenges that are related to a harmonised and coordinated approach across different social protection instruments, institutions, actors and delivery mechanisms. It takes the reader through all possible aspects of social protection systems.

The negotiations and implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the 79 countries forming the Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) – a group of developing countries largely sharing a colonial past with EU members – were conflict-ridden from the beginning. Transforming a decades-long system of unilateral tariff preferences into quasi-reciprocal trade agreements, at the heart of controversies are the potentially adverse effects of the EPAs inflicted on African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. In our recently published article we explore this allegation by providing an early ex-post assessment of the EPAs’ effects on two-way trade flows between the European Union and the ACP countries. An empirical assessment is key to inform the heated discussions on EPAs and EU-ACP trade relations and to also shed new light on the debate on the European Union as a potentially normative trade power which uses its economic strength to advance non-trade objectives such as sustainable development.

This part of the Handbook discusses the importance of harmonizing similar social protection instruments and coordinating different social protection instruments as well as linking up social protection with other sectors. The analysis of links between sets of social protection programmes is crucial given the proliferation of social protection programmes in low- and middle-income countries in the last two decades. This is also represented by the call for integrated social protection systems. In parallel, the need for enhanced coordination between social protection and other sectoral policies is given by the multidimensional nature of poverty and vulnerability. This means that the goals and activities of many social protection programmes are linked with other sectors. For example, to successfully enhance human capital accumulation, social protection programmes (such as conditional cash transfer programmes) need to be linked with educational and health sectors. Similarly, it is argued that social protection should be better linked with agricultural policies.

This  part  of  the  handbook  deals  with  some  of  the  questions  that  have  to  be  answered  when social  protection  programmes  are  designed,  and  which  have  been  mentioned  in  the  general introduction to this handbook already: why social protection should be provided, who should benefit, who should provide it and how it can be financed. Of course, the list that follows is far from exhaustive.

Almost  two  decades  ago,  the  notion  of  micro-insurance  raised  a  new  wave  of  attention among  practitioners  and  researchers  in  many  world  regions  but  the  concept  is  much  older. In fact, a large part of today’s insurance companies in Europe and North America started as mutual  insurance  unions  in  the  nineteenth  century  with  low  contribution  rates,  i.e.  informal micro-insurance  arrangements.  Since  about  the  year  2000,  the  concept  was  sparked  in  the international  development  debate  by  the  fact  that  an  increasing  number  of  academics  and practitioners  had  understood  that  more  conventional  social  protection  strategies  (social insurance and assistance) had obviously failed at covering larger shares of people in low- and middle-income countries. A majority of the world population remained vulnerable to manifold risks such as bad health, work disability and unemployment. Of course, the failure was at least partly due to the fact that many governments had tried only half-heartedly to extend the outreach of their social insurance and assistance schemes but there was little reason to hope that governments would change in the short term. New avenues had to be sought in order to extend the overall coverage of social protection systems at a faster pace.the overall coverage of social protection systems at a faster pace.

Ethiopia is the second largest refugee-hosting country in Africa; it accommodates around 700,000 refugees, mostly from neighbouring countries. Humanitarian and development actors are increasingly highlighting the local integration of refugees as a durable solution to protracted refugee situations. Hosting states are called upon to include refugees in their national public services, rather than to sustain a parallel (humanitarian) system, and to empower refugees to secure their own livelihoods as part of the local community. The international community has endorsed this idea by adopting the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and vowing financial support. Ethiopia is one of the pilot countries implementing this framework. However, the execution of the ambitious approach faces many challenges. This paper focusses on the role of local governments within the CRRF implementation process; they have not yet been the focus of attention even though sustainable solutions largely depend on them. Results show that the CRRF implementation process has slowed down considerably in the past years, mostly remaining on a project base. Shifting political priorities, a lack of leadership and coordination at the national level as well as the unclear role and low capacities of local governments are major barriers to the local integration of refugees.

Education is a high priority in all societies. Nevertheless, the amount of attention families in the Republic of Korea (RoK) are paying to the education of their children is truly amazing. Long school and study days are quite common. To ensure students’ health, authorities have enacted rules for after-school programs to close by 10 pm in some provinces or at midnight in other provinces.

The paper examines the effects of social protection on food consumption and nutrition, two central variables in the Sustainable Development Goal 2 of the 2030 Agenda. First, it discusses the theoretical mechanisms through which different social protection schemes can influence the various indicators of food consumption and nutrition. Major attention is given to cash benefits programmes – non-contributory cash transfers (CTs) and contributory social insurance cash benefits – and food transfers. Then, the paper illustrates the empirical evidence concerning CTs in nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis reveals that social protection schemes paying sufficient attention to key design and implementation features, play a major role in improving food consumption and are often successful in improving diet diversification. In contrast, these programmes do not reach the last mile, i.e. improving final nutritional outcomes, when they are not integrated with other interventions addressing nutrition knowledge and behaviour, or tackling malnutrition of vulnerable groups.

The expanded presence of multinational enterprises in the world raises questions about how a country benefits from foreign direct investment. I review the evidence on global value chains (firms organising production across multiple countries) and “superstar firms”, those accounting for a large share of overall economic activity, with market concentration. I find that governments might have to adopt firm-specific policies, weighing the benefits and drawbacks of providing subsidies to attract multinationals.

This part of the handbook discusses the multiple, potential and actual, effects of social protection. We start with more immediate impacts, namely those on income poverty and inequality, and then gradually move to more indirect ones: nutrition, health, economic development and finally social cohesion.

The EU-Kenya agreement to implement the Economic Partnership Agreement originally planned with the entire East African Community unties the Gordian knot between its supporters and opponents among African countries in the short term, but has long-term consequences beyond the divergence of tariffs towards the EU, writes Frederik Stender.