Defense`s Feeds

Emilio Fajardo, Spanish Rear Admiral (select), has been appointed EDA Industry, Synergies & Enablers (ISE) Director as of 1 January 2019. He previously held the position of Director for Naval Systems and Head of the Hydrodynamics Research Centre at the National Institute for Aerospace Technologies (INTA) in Madrid. Mr Fajardo’s assumption of office coincides with the entry into force of an organizational reshuffle of the Agency (see new EDA organigramme here). 

The new EDA Director holds a Master in Science as Naval Architect from the Polytechnic University of Madrid. Emilio Fajardo brings with him more than 20 years of experience in international defence cooperation, among others as a member and Director of the NATO CALS Program (Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support), the responsible officer for multilateral cooperation in the National Armaments Directorate of the Spanish Ministry of Defence (where he also managed relations with NATO, EDA and OCCAR) as well as the Armaments Councillor at the Spanish Permanent Representation at NATO and COPS (EU) in Brussels from 2005 to 2009.

“It is a privilege for me to join the European Defence Agency at a particularly challenging time for European defence in general, and for the Agency in particular. EDA plays a central role in implementing the various EU defence initiatives as well as in the prioritization of EU defence capabilities and I look forward to contributing to this important work as the Agency’s Industry, Synergies and Enablers Director, together with its highly qualified and experienced staff”, Emilio Fajardo stated when he took up his new post.
  
As Industry, Synergies & Enablers (ISE) Director, Emilio Fajardo will lead a key directorate in charge of a wide range of topics and crucial enablers for improving cooperative defence capability building and enhancing interoperability in Europe, including standardisation, certification, test and evaluation, airworthiness, training and education, industry engagement and representing the military views on wider EU policies. The newly renamed ISE Directorate – previously known as Cooperation, Planning & Support (CPS) – also develops activities related to European Strategic Autonomy and the identification of Key Strategic Activities (KSA) at EU level. In addition, it provides support to CSDP military and civilian operations and missions and EU Battlegroups, at the request of their Member States. The directorate also facilitates the coordination of military views from and in support of the Member States and the relevant international military organisations in the framework of Single European Sky (SES) and acts as the interface with the EU institutions and related bodies.
 

More information:

Emilio Fajardo - CV  

 

Americas

The US Naval Air Systems Command awarded L-3 Technologies with a $12.6 contract modification to manufacture, test, deliver, manage, and support the common data link Hawklink AN/SRQ-4 systems for the MH-60R aircraft. The Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk multi-mission helicopter is equipped for a range of missions including anti-submarin warfare, anti-surface warfare, search-and-rescue, naval gunfire support, surveillance, logistics support and personnel transfer. AN/SRQ-4 is the shipboard element of a situational awareness system that links the MH-60R helicopter with surface warships in the area. The L3 Technologies’ next-generation AN/SRQ-4 provides Command/Control, sensor data transfer, data link operation and comprehensive built-in test. CDL Hawklink offers real time exploitation of aircraft sensors, extending situational awareness over the horizon. L3 Technologies’ Communication Systems produce network and communication systems, secure communications products, radio frequency components, satellite communication terminals and space, microwave and telemetry products. The products include secure data links that are used to connect a variety of space, airborne, ground and sea-based communication systems and are used in transmission, processing, recording, monitoring and dissemination functions. Work is scheduled to be finished by December 2020.

The US Navy contracted General Dynamics with $91.4 million for the planning and execution of maintenance and upgrades to the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). The George H.W. Bush is a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier of the US Navy, named after the 41st president of the United States, who was a naval aviator during World War II. Northrop Grumman built the aircraft carrier using a modular construction of 161 super-lift sections. The George H.W. Bush is part of Carrier Strike Group 2 and spent 119 days at sea in 2018. It was designed as a transitional ship between the Nimitz Class and the Ford Class. As such, CVN 77 has been a candidate for development, evaluation, and incorporation of a range of advanced technologies and acquisition reform initiatives. The contract funds the 2019 dry-docking planned incremental availability of the vessel, which includes the planning and execution of depot-level maintenance, alterations, and modifications that will update and improve the ship’s military and technical capabilities.

For the first time Chile showcased the Elbit Systems Hermes 900 medium-altitude long endurance UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) that it acquired from Israel in 2011. The Chilean Airforce highlighted the roles of several of its aircraft in fighting recent wildfires. Chile was Israel’s first export customer for the Hermes 900. The UAV was shown on static display at Quintero Air Base. The Hermes 900 is designed for tactical missions, has an endurance of over 30 hours and can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet. It is currently assigned to surveillance and monitoring.

Middle East & Africa

Israel is looking into the loss of a canopy from a Boeing F-15 Eagle Combat aircraft during a training flight at 30,000 feet last week. A twin-seat F-15 ‘Baz’ (Falcon) suffered an explosive canopy separation. The pilots radioed the control tower, slowed their flight, began an orderly descent and landed safely at the Nevatim Airbase east of Beersheba. All training flights on the F-15 are currently on hold. The F-15 Eagle is a twin-engined, all-weather tactical fighter aircraft weighing up to 30 tons. The fighter is armed with air-to-air missiles that can be launched from beyond visual range, and has air-to-ground capability to penetrate hostile air and ground defenses to deliver up to 24,000lb of precision ordnance.

Europe

The Netherlands ended its F-16 mission in the Middle East. Six F-16 aircrafts deployed by the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) operated from Al-Azraq in Jordan since January 2018. They supported troops on the ground and conducted more than 3,000 missions using their weapons about 2,100 times to attack targets such as vehicles, logistic nodes, and weapon positions of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and eastern Syria. The F-16 is a single-engine supersonic multi-role fighter aircraft developed by Lockheed Martin for the US Airfare. The dutch F-16s remain available in support of NATO.

Asia-Pacific

Singapore abandoned its F-15 training plans in New Zealand. The Ministry of Defense was looking to use the uncongested airspace of New Zealand to train Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) crews on the Boeing F-15SG Eagle combat aircraft. The decision follows nearly two years of discussions between the two countries. The training was supposed to be conducted in Ohakea, in Manawatu on the North Island. The Singapore Ministry of Defense gave no specific reasons why the proposal was cancelled.

The Indian Navy establishes a new naval airbase on its Andaman and Nicobar Islands territory. Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba will commission the new Base christened as the INS Kohassa on January 24. The Indian Navy wants to extend the base into a bigger air base in future. The airbase will be able to handle Helicopter and Dornier Aircraft and will initially feature a 1,000 meter long runway, which will later be extended to 3,000 meters to enable operations to be carried out by fighters and other aircraft.

Today’s Video

Watch: Breaking: Israeli F-15 Fighter Jet Loses Canopy at 30,000 Feet

INS Viraat
(click to view full)

India’s dysfunctional political and procurement systems have created another security crisis for its military, by creating a growing risk that a number of its ships will have weakened defenses against aerial attack.

The problem stems from the government’s inability to issue a follow-on contract for Barak-1 missiles, last ordered in October 2000 when India bought 9 systems and 200 missiles in a pair of deals with IAI and RAFAEL worth INR 15.1 billion (then around $326 million). The blockage is delaying key upgrades, and missile stocks for existing ships are critically low and shrinking. As usual, the culprit is a combination of a bureaucratic culture divorced from operational needs, inability to make decisions, and overly rigid rules.

Avoidable Crises, and Invidious Comparisons

Barak Components
(click to view full)

The Indian Navy has repeatedly asked to buy about 262 more Barak-1 missiles, at a reported cost of about $150 million.

They need them because radar-guided Barak-1 missiles now equip India’s lone aircraft carrier INS Viraat, all 6 Project 16/16A Godavari/ Brahmaputra Class 3,850t frigates, 2 of 6 Rajput Class 4,974t destroyers, and the 3 new 6,200t Shivalik Class frigates. Current missile stocks aren’t adequate to cover that, and readiness requires regular training launches against live targets.

Barak-1 missiles are also supposed to be part of upgrades to India’s 3 Delhi Class 6,200t destroyers, in order to remove the hole created by the Russian SA-N-7C ‘Gollum’ air defense missile system’s limited firing arc.

The Barak deal had its Indian critics, most especially in the state’s DRDO defense R&D bureau. They wanted to Navy to keep waiting for their Trishul missile, but it was such a failure that it was eventually discontinued in December 2008, about 25 years after development began.

The Barak’s real problems in India reach back to a 2001 Tehelka magazine investigation, which alleged that 15 defense deals were compromised by kickbacks to public officials, including defense minister Geroge Fernandes. The Barak missile deal was included. An Indian CBI report was submitted in October 2006, and some charges were laid against alleged middlemen in the case, but CBI isn’t getting the responses it wants from Israel and Britain, and hasn’t made much legal headway in 7 years.

The Barak-1’s small space footprint, and dedicated vertical launch system, makes its replacement by other options much more difficult.

A new local missile might offer India a way out for some ships, but it won’t come in time. A joint LR-SAM project with Israel is producing the longer-range Barak-8 for Naval use, but it has fallen behind schedule. Israel will refit its 3 Eilat Class corvettes by the end of 2013, switching from Barak-1 to Barak-8 missiles in response to recent Syrian moves, but India doesn’t expect to even make a decision before 2015. Fielding LR-SAM before 2020 would constitute an achievement by Indian standards, and its ships need to defend themselves in the interim.

While India neglects its Navy’s basic defenses, Pakistan has fielded 3 new Agosta 90B AIP submarines armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles, is equipping its P-3 aircraft fleet with Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles, and bought and fielded 4 F-22P Zulfiquar Class frigates from China that carry C-802 anti-ship missiles.

Recent Events

CARAT 2006: Singapore’s RSS Vengeance launches Barak-1s January 9/19: New Airbase The Indian Navy establishes a new naval airbase on its Andaman and Nicobar Islands territory. Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba will commission the new Base christened as the INS Kohassa on January 24. The Indian Navy wants to extend the base into a bigger air base in future. The airbase will be able to handle Helicopter and Dornier Aircraft and will initially feature a 1,000 meter long runway, which will later be extended to 3,000 meters to enable operations to be carried out by fighters and other aircraft.

Aug 14/14: INS Kolkata. Media reports indicate that India’s new 7,500t air defense destroyer INS Kolkata, which is set to be commissioned on Aug 16/14, will be armed with Barak-1 missiles until the Barak-8s arrive. The article doesn’t explain whether the vertical launchers are compatible, or whether the Barak-1 has been integrated yet with the IAI Elta MF-STAR active array radar that equips the new destroyer class. On the other hand, India is likely to have 3 Kolkata Class destroyers ready to go by the time they’re done testing the Indian LR-SAM, so they’ll need to do something. Needless to say, ordering more Barak-1s becomes even more urgent under this scenario. With respect to the Barak-8s:

“The missile is ready, but [DRDO’s] boosters to propel the missile [upon launch]… have failed.”

The destroyer will also need a towed array sonar to give it proper anti-submarine capability, another issue that India has been struggling with throughout the fleet. The final concern involves the ship’s Ukrainian-built engines, which could create spare parts issues if Ukraine’s war with Russia in its Eastern Provinces deteriorates. On the other hand, India also has excellent relations with Russia, so as long as someone is in control, they should be OK. Sources: oneindia News, “INS Kolkata, the Biggest Naval Destroyer, is the weakest link in Defence”.

Aug 7/14: CCS OK. After an electoral landslide buries the previous Congress Party government, the new Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) directs the Ministry to buy 262 Barak-I air defense missiles and spares from Israel. Early estimates say the contract will cost around INR 10 billion ($167 million). Indian sources also seem to be indicating that INS Vikramaditya may get Barak-1 missiles as an interim step:

“India needs Barak missiles to arm its aircraft carriers and front-line warships against strike aircraft and anti-ship missiles. The Barak will be fitted on at least 14 Indian warships and the newly acquired Vikramaditya,” said a South Block official.”

Then again, this could just be an official in the Prime Minister’s office who doesn’t understand the difference between these Barak-1 short range air defense missiles, and the future Barak-8 LR-SAM. Or between the Barak-1 equipped INS Viraat, and the currently defenseless INS Vikramaditya. Sources: Hindustan Times, “Weeks after UN vote, India seeks Israel missile deal”.

Dec 23/13: DAC OK. AK Antony and the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) clear the Indian Navy’s intent to buy 262 more Barak-1 missiles, in order to replenish their fast-dwindling stocks. So, how are the replacements coming?:

“The naval LR-SAM, approved in December 2005, is now slated for completion by December 2015. The MR-SAM project, sanctioned in February 2009, in turn, has a “probable date of completion” by August 2016.”

Sources: Times of India, “Antony finally clears long-pending controversial deal for Israeli Barak missiles.”

Nov 12/13: Probe closing? The Indian Express reports that the Central Bureau of Investigation is also set to close its Barak missile probe:

“Officials said the paucity of evidence in bribery scandals had been discussed more than once when MoD officials and top CBI officers reviewed defence investigations and that the Barak case figured prominently in the discussions. Sources said a formal closure report in the October 2006 case could be filed as early as the end of this month.”

Sources: The Indian Express, “CBI set to close Barak probe, MoD readies to buy missiles”.

Nov 11/13: Indian defence minister AK Antony and the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC) duck the Barak issue. They bypass the Navy, and require an affirmation of the Barak missile buy’s military urgency from “an independent group” within the Ministry of Defence.

The move could be viewed two ways. One is that it allows the DAC to duck responsibility for a straightforward call on the issue, shortly before elections where widespread ministerial corruption is expected to be an issue. Under this scenario, if the panel’s composition affirms the buy’s military necessity, the DAC is expected to make its decision within a month or so, citing those circumstances. If the review panel reject’s the Navy’s case that shaky air defense capabilities for around 14 ships is a problem, the DAC can defer any decision. Subsequent reports that the CBI may be about to drop the case in a month or so would make for convenient timing either way.

Note… The Times of India refers to 14 Indian ships equipped with the missiles, whereas DID’s count above is just 12, and other media sources report 10. DID is checking further, but the discrepancy could be explained by the progress of the Rajput Class destroyers’ refits. Sources: Times of India, “Antony defers decision on critical but controversial missile deals with Israel” | Defense-Aerospace, “Op-Ed: Corruption Fears Freeze India Acquisitions”.

Sept 9/13: With a pending CBI case, even one that showed no signs of legal movement, the Ministry of Law and Justice had blocked referral of the Navy’s Barak-1 requests to the political Cabinet Committee on Security for approval. To the Navy’s credit, it has continued to push for revised legal opinions, and the Economic Times reports that all legal barriers have now been removed.

The Ministry of Defence can now make a decision on the Navy’s request – but won’t. Sources: Economic Times, “Anti-missile shield for frontline Navy warships fast eroding”

Additional Readings

Note that dollar conversion of the original sale is based on the exchange rate of Oct 23/00 for Rs 1,510 crore: Rs 1,160 crore for the 9 systems, and Rs 350 crore for the 200 missiles. India’s currency has been sliding lately, and as of Sept 15/13, $150 million for the 262 follow-on missiles equals about Rs 947 crore.

• IAI – Barak-1 Ship Point Defense System

• DID – India & Israel’s Barak SAM Development Project(s). MR-SAM for the IAF, and LR-SAM for the Navy, both related to the Barak-8.

Some Other Examples

• DID – India Needs New Maritime/ASW Helicopters. Poor underwater defenses against submarines, and poor aerial defenses against missiles, is not conducive to keeping your navy afloat.

• DID – India’s Project 75 SSKs: Too Late to Save the Submarine Force? Speaking of avoidable crises…

• DID – India’s Light Helicopter Contract Hits Turbulence, Stalls. Yet another example, whose reporting links to further examples.

• DID – Procurement Nadir: India’s Murky, Messed-Up Howitzer Competitions. This one takes the cake for avoidable crises. India has a serious, systemic problem.

Americas

The US Army awarded Avon Protection Systems with a $92.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for the joint service aircrew mask. The deal sees US Air Force pilots wearing the new M69 aircrew mask and includes related accessories and support. The contract runs for an initial five years plus two further one-year option periods. Avon Protection anticipates receiving the first order under this contract shortly with deliveries expected to commence in the second half of the current financial year. Work is scheduled to be finished by December 21, 2024 and locations as well as funding will be determined with each order.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center contracted Fairbanks Morse Engine with $13.6 million for engineering, logistics and program management services in support of the Navy diesel engine systems. Work also includes technical services and engine training. Fairbanks Morse Engine is a subsidiary of Enpro Industries and was previously contracted to build the four main propulsion diesel engines for the LPD-30, the Navy’s first LPD Flight 2 class ship with the engines scheduled to be delivered in the second and third quarters of 2020 to Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Work for the new contract will be performed in Wisconsin, California and Virginia and is expected to be completed by January 2024.

The pentagon assigned the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) global transportation and distribution and North American regional warehousing to The Defense Logistics Agency and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The assignment is based upon data submitted by the F-35 partner nations, Foreign Military Sales customers, and Pentagon Providers and is part of a series of assignments that designated airframe, propulsion, and component repair maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upkeep provides across F-35 Global Solution’s three-region construct. The global F-35 fleet has nine partner nations (US, UK, Turkey, Australia, Italy, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark) and three foreign military sales customers (Israel, Japan, South Korea).

Middle East & Africa

The Indian Airforce (IAF) will construct 108 Next-Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters (NGHAS) for its fighter fleet at several of its bases in northeastern India. The NGHASs cost an estimated total of $788 million and will be built at Tezpur, Chabua, and Hasimara to protect IAF fighters such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKI as well as 18 of the 36 Rafale combat aircraft New Delhi ordered from France in 2016. China has ramped up activity in the Tibet Autonomous Region, which overlooks Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Ladakh. The new hangars are designed to protect the fighters even from a direct hit by a 2,000 lb bomb.

Europe

The Ukraine adds a modernized interceptor vessel to the Azov Sea flotilla, Jane’s reports. On January 2nd an upgraded Project UMS-1000 PC 12 M-2 high-speed interceptor craft entered service with the State Border Guard maritime detachment at the naval and shipbuilding port of Mariupol. The UMS-1000 are Ukrainian vessels. In December it was announced that 20 new boats for the border guard are going to be manufactured in the Ukraine.

Saab’s second GlobalEye Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft successfully completed its first flight on Thursday. The flight lasted three hours, collecting flight-test data and was operated from the company’s airfield in Linköping, Sweden. GlobalEye is a multi-role airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) solution. It consists of a suite of sensors using Saabs’s Erieye Extended Range (ER) radar and mission system. The aircraft has extended detection range, endurance and manages tasks such as search and rescue, border surveillance, and military operations.

Asia-Pacific

The Chinese company Shen Zhou Ming Da High Technology Co Ltd. (SZMID) is looking for export opportunities for its DZ-02 Pro Portable Jammer Gun, Jane’s reports. The Anti-drone weapon is intended to disrupt unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as commercial multi rotor and small fixed-wing UAVS as well as satellite navigation signals BeiDou Galileo, GLONASS, and GPS systems. The system weighs 4.8 kg including the battery and has an overall length of 750 mm with its adjustable stock retracted, a height of 300 mm including the optical sight, and a thickness of 60 mm.

Today’s Video

Watch: Rolling out the first GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft – Saab

Indra Dhanush 2007
(click to view full)

India’s Su-30MKI fighter-bombers are the pride of its fleet. Below them, India’s local Tejas LCA lightweight fighter program aims to fill its low-end fighter needs, and the $10+ billion M-MRCA competition is negotiating to buy France’s Rafale as an intermediate tier.

India isn’t neglecting its high end SU-30s, though. Initial Su-30MK and MKI aircraft have all been upgraded to the full Su-30MKI Phase 3 standard, and the upgraded “Super 30” standard aims to keep Sukhoi’s planes on top. Meanwhile, production continues, and India is becoming a regional resource for Su-27/30 Flanker family support.

India’s Flanker Fleet

SU-30MKs & Mirage 2000s
(click to view full)

India originally received standard Su-30MKs, while its government and industry worked with the Russians to develop the more advanced Su-30MKI, complete with innovations like thrust-vectoring engines and canard foreplanes. The Su-30MKI ended up using electronic systems from a variety of countries: a Russian NIIP N-011 radar and long-range IRST sensor, French navigation and heads-up display systems from Thales, Israeli electronic warfare systems and LITENING advanced targeting pods, and Indian computers and ancillary avionics systems.

Earlier-model Su-30MK aircraft and crews performed very well at an American Red Flag exercise in 2008, and the RAF’s evident respect for the SU-30 MKIs in the 2007 Indra Dhanush exercise is equally instructive. The Russians were intrigued enough to turn a version with different electronics into their new export standard (Su-30MKA/MKM), and even the Russian VVS has begin buying “Su-30SM” fighters.

So far, India has ordered 272 SU-30s in 4 stages:

1. 50 Su-30MK and MKIs ordered directly from Russia in 1996. The Su-30MKs were reportedly modernized to a basic Su-30MKI standard.
2. Another 40 Su-30MKIs, ordered direct in 2007. These machines have reportedly been upgraded to the “Phase 3” standard.
3. A license-build deal with India’s HAL that aims to produce up to 140 more Su-30MKI Phase 3 planes from 2013-2017
4. An improved set of 42 HAL-built Su-30MKI “Super 30s”. A preliminary order was reportedly signed in 2011, but the final deal waited until December 2012.

The Super 30 represents the next evolution for the Su-30MKI. Upgrades are reported to include a new radar (probably AESA, and likely Phazotron’s Zhuk-AE), improved onboard computers, upgraded electronic warfare systems, and the ability to fire the air-launched version of the Indo-Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.

India may eventually upgrade its earlier models to this standard. For now, they represent the tail end of HAL’s assembly schedule, as the assembly of standard Su-30MKIs continues. The big challenge for HAL is to keep that expansion going, by meeting India’s production targets.

The overall goal is 13-14 squadrons by 2017. Based on 3rd party sources, IAF Su-30MKI squadrons currently comprise:

• 2 Wing’s 20 Sqn. “Lightnings” & 30 Sqn. “Rhinos”, at Lohegaon AFS in Pune (W)
  
• 11 Wing’s 2 Sqn. “Winged Arrows”, at Tezpur AFS in Assam (NE, near Tibet)
  
• 15 Wing’s 8 Sqn. “Eight Pursuits” & 24 Sqn. “Hawks”, at Bareilly AFS in Uttar Pradesh (NC, near W Nepal)
  
• 14 Wing’s 102 Sqn. “Trisonics”, at Guwahati/Chabua AFS in Assam (NE, near Tibet)
  
• 27 Wing’s 15 Sqn. “Flying Lancers”, at Bhuj AFS in Gurajat (NW)
  
• 34 Wing’s 31 Sqn. “Lions” & 220 Sqn. “Desert Tigers”, at Halwara AFS in Punjab (NW)
  
• 45 Wing’s 21 Sqn. “Ankush”, at Sirsa AFS in Haryana (NW)

Initial Su-30 MKI squadron deployments had been focused near the Chinese border, but the new deployments are evening things out. There have also been reports of basings in other locations, though the number of active squadrons suggest that these are yet to come:

• Bhatinda AFS in Punjab (NW, currently 34 Wing’s 17 Sqn. “Golden Arrows” MiG-21s)
  
• Jodhpur AFS in Rajasthan (NW, currently 32 Wing’s MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons)
  
• Thanjavur AFS in Tamil Nadu (SE) needs to finish building out, but is expected to permanently house SU-30MKIs by 2018. Its Su-30MKIs will offer India comfortable strike coverage of Sri Lanka, including the major southern port of Hambantota that’s being built with a great deal of Chinese help.

Contracts & Key Events 2013 – 2018

Engine and Fly-by-Wire issues; Industrial issues highlight cost waste; Crash grounds fleet.

IAF SU-30MKI January 8/19: Protection. The Indian Airforce (IAF) will construct 108 Next-Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters (NGHAS) for its fighter fleet at several of its bases in northeastern India. The NGHASs cost an estimated total of $788 million and will be built at Tezpur, Chabua, and Hasimara to protect IAF fighters such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKI as well as 18 of the 36 Rafale combat aircraft New Delhi ordered from France in 2016. China has ramped up activity in the Tibet Autonomous Region, which overlooks Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Ladakh. The new hangars are designed to protect the fighters even from a direct hit by a 2,000 lb bomb.

May 17/18: Will India buy more? The Indian defense contractor Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) has voiced its interest to produce more Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets. The HAL manufactured Sukhoi makes up the backbone of India’s Air Force. Its fleet would grow to 312, if the company’s proposal to produce 40 more planes is accepted by the Ministry of Defense. India originally received standard Su-30MKs, while its government and industry worked with the Russians to develop the more advanced Su-30MKI, complete with innovations like thrust-vectoring engines and canard fore planes. The Su-30MKI ended up using electronic systems from a variety of countries: a Russian NIIP N-011 radar and long-range IRST sensor, French navigation and heads-up display systems from Thales, Israeli electronic warfare systems and LITENING advanced targeting pods, and Indian computers and ancillary avionics systems. HAL is currently producing the Su-30 at a cost of $62.6 million per unit, making it significantly cheaper than the competing Rafale that costs close to $165 million.

June 21/17: Italian firms will collaborate in India’s modernization of its Su-30MKI fleet, according to Russian officials. The announcement was made by Rosoboronexport CEO Alexander Mikheev at this week’s Paris air show, however, no details were made on what work the Italians would be assisting with. Earlier, CEO of Russian United Engine Corporation Alexander Artyukhov said that the Indian version of Su-30MKI after modernization will get the AL-41F turbofan engines designed for 4++ generation aircraft currently being installed on the Su-35 fighters.

April 10/17: It’s been discovered that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has delivered at least 18 Su-30MKI fighters to the Indian Air Force that have been fitted with second-hand engines. A report seen by the Deccan Chronicle stated that “it was noticed while checking the records…that AL 31FP engines fitted in certain aircraft was in Cat B condition at the time of inspection / delivery to Indian Air Force (IAF).” While the Su-30MKI is powered by a pair of AL-31FP turbofan engines, the report found that some of the aircraft were installed with new and old engines. The Indian Defense Ministry has claimed that the second-hand engines were installed by by HAL without its knowledge.

March 20/17: Indian and Russian officials have signed two long-term support contracts for Sukhoi Su-30MKI combat aircraft flown by India. Companies signing the agreement include Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., United Aircraft Corporation and United Engine Corporation, and covers upgraded schedule for delivery of spares from Russia for the jets, local manufacturing of parts, and a proposed logistics hub for the fighter in Bengaluru, India, by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. A second agreement will see the provision of lifecycle support and maintenance of major Russian equipment and platforms for Mi-17 helicopters, MiG-29K aircraft, INS Vikramaditya and T-90 tanks.

February 17/17: India is also being offered United Engine Corporation’s (UEC) AL-41F turbofan engine as part of upgrades connected to the Su-30MKI modernization proposal. The power plant is currently being installed on Russian Su-35 and PAK FA fighters, and is being called significantly superior to its predecessors. India’s air force has a fleet of over 200 Russia-designed Su-30MK aircraft built under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, and is looking to have them overhauled to the MKI standard, making them 4++ generation aircraft.

January 6/17: It’s been reported that a deal is close to being struck for the establishment of a logistic hub in India, providing crucial Su-30 spare parts to the Indian Air Force instead of having them imported from Russia. The agreement, scheduled to be signed in March, will also allow some of the components to be manufactured in India. It is also expected that once the hub is functioning, operational readiness of the IAF Su-30MKI fleet will rise above the current rate of 63 percent.

December 7/16: Vietnamese Su-30 pilots will be trained by India. While the cost of the training is yet to be finalized, the numbers and scope of the program is expected to be resolved quickly after both governments’s defense ministers reached a provisional agreement during bilateral discussions on Monday. Indian sailors have already trained their Vietnamese counterparts in operating the Kilo-class submarines.

July 29/16: Negotiations continued regarding the modernization of 194 Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft operated by the Indian Air Force. A visiting delegation from Russia came to New Delhi to explain their “Super Sukhoi” concept, which if implemented, will give the aircraft near-fifth generation capabilities and effectiveness. With the deal expected to be finalized within four to six months, the project is expected to top $8 billion.

December 10/15: India’s capabilities to maintain its Su-30 fleet quickly and effectively has received a boost after a new deal signed with Russia. The agreement allows for the Indian Air Force (IAF) to receive spare parts of Su-30 aircraft within 30 days instead of the previous 12 months. The five year agreement will cut away red tape such as license, customs clearance and bank guarantees which in the past had to be completed for each part ordered. This will allow for the IAF to keep its Su-30 fleet at optimum levels of operational capacity. For two countries who love bureaucracy, 12 months to 30 days is quite an achievement.

May 27/15: India is to review its SU-30MKI fleet following the loss of one aircraft earlier this month. The high-level safety audit is a response to not only this latest crash, but the loss of six SU-30MKIs since the Indian Air Force received the first batch in 2002, a high attrition rate for a fighter which comprises roughly a third of the IAF’s fast jet force.

Nov 17/14: Air Chief Arup Raha was cited by PTI as saying that the reason for the sudden ejection seat activation in the Oct 14/14 crash isn’t clear, but inspections aren’t showing problems in the remaining fleet. The Court of Inquiry’s report is being finalized, and the fleet should be back in use by Nov 21/14. Sources: Russia & India Report, “India’s Su-30s to be back in use this week”.

Oct 23/14: Readiness. According to India’s Business Standard, the readiness rate for IAF SU-30MKIs has risen from 48% before 2013 to around 55%, meaning that 87 of 193 fighters are grounded at any one time. The paper cites MoD figures and documents that show 20% of the fleet (about 39) undergoing 1st line and 2nd line maintenance by the IAF, another 11-12% (about 22) undergoing overhaul at HAL, and 13-14% (about 26) grounded waiting for major repairs.

What’s interesting is that HAL is beginning to push back against the IAF, offering to take most maintenance off of the IAF’s hands under a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) arrangement that would pay HAL for fighters fit to fly, instead of paying for parts and labor. PBL would threaten a lot of military jobs, so the IAF has resisted such offers for the SU-30MKI and Hawk Mk.132 fleets. But HAL is touting the possibility of a 20% absolute improvement, under a contract structure that directly links pay and performance. That’s 2 full operational squadrons worth.

Meanwhile, the current arrangement continues, with the IAF vastly underspending on spares (INR 500 million per year, vs. INR 34.5 billion at a standard 5%/year rate), and spares worth INR 4 billion stockpiled by HAL at Nashik. Even if the IAF doesn’t adopt PBL, HAL would like to see 5 years worth of spares stockpiled. Most of the spares must still come from Russia, and surge capability is very poor. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Govt takes note of Su-30MKI’s poor ‘serviceability'”

Oct 22/14: Grounded. IAF spokesperson Wing Commander Simranpal Singh Birdi says that the IAF’s SU-30MKIs are all grounded, which removes a substantial chunk of India’s front-line airpower.

“The fleet has been grounded and is undergoing technical checks following the latest accident in Pune. It would be back in air only after a thorough check…. A Court of Inquiry is in progress to ascertain the actual cause of accident…”

Meanwhile, the need to deal with the Sukhoi fleet’s various issues means that HAL needs to ramp up their ability to overhaul India’s SU-30s, from the current pathetic rate of 2 per year to 15 or so. Sources: | IBNS, “India temporarily grounds Sukhoi-30 fighter jets” | Hindustan Times, “Cloud over cause of Sukhoi crash”.

Oct 14-22/14: Crash. An IAF SU-30MKI crashes about 20 km from Pune airbase. Wing Commander Sidharth Vishwas Munje survived the type’s first crash in Indian service as a co-pilot, which was also a dangerous low-altitude ejection. The pilots apparently did quite a job, as Shiv Aroor (incorrectly) reports:

“They grappled to control a doomed fighter and eject only after ensuring it would glide into a sugarcane field, away from a built-up area that may have been the site of impact had the pilots chosen to eject earlier…. The IAF is still piecing together the full sequence of events, though it appears clear at this time that Munje and his junior had mere seconds to take a decision after lift-off.”

Both pilots escaped safely, but Aroor’s account turns out to be completely wrong. The IAF subsequently issues a release that says:

“One Su-30 fighter of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was involved in an accident on October 14, 2014 in which both ejection seats had fired whilst the aircraft was coming in to land.”

The Russian specialists brought into the investigation say that’s impossible without the pilot’s command, but Former IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Major is quoted as saying there have been a few incidents in other air forces. Sources: India PIB, “IAF SU30 Crashed” and “Update on Su-30 Accident” | Livefist, “Twice Lucky: Pilot In Yesterday’s Su-30 Crash Also Survived 1st MKI Crash In 2009” and “Flanker Trouble: Did Fly-By-Wire Glitch Crash IAF Su-30?” | Bangalore Mirror, “No engine failure, pilot error in Sukhoi crash” | Deccan Chronicle, “Cause of Sukhoi-30 crash unclear” | Hindustan Times (Oct 23/14), “Cloud over cause of Sukhoi crash”.

Crash & fleet grounding

Aug 4/14: Engine issues. NPO Saturn has proposed a set of modifications designed to reduce mid-flight AL-31FP engine failures (q.v. July 20/14), and the IAF has accepted it. The modified engines will be tested first, then the refit of India’s 200 plane fleet will be carried out in batches over the next 18-24 months at HAL’s Sukhoi engine plant in Orissa. The Russians will reportedly include modified engines in India’s remaining 72 kits. Sources: Tribune News Service, “Engine rejig to cut Su-30 burnouts”.

July 20/14: Engine issues. Reports indicate that the IAF fleet’s problems aren’t limited to mission computers and displays (q.v. March 15/14). It also has a problem with engine failures in flight. Fortunately, as a 2-engine fighter, it can generally land on 1 engine, and the accident rate is low. The flip side is that this isn’t something you want to happen in a dogfight. Worse, every time this happens, the engine has to be taken out, tested, fixed, and put back. That takes a minimum of 4-5 days, which cuts readiness rates.

“The IAF has so far not arrived at a conclusion of its findings, but as a precautionary step, it has started servicing the engine after 700 hours instead of the mandated 1,000 hours of flying, adding to the non-availability of the aircraft…. The IAF had told Russians after studying each failure in detail that Sukhoi’s engines – AL-31FP produced by NPO Saturn of Russia – had been functioning inconsistently for the past two years (2012 and 2013). The number of single-engine landings by planes in two years is high and not healthy. It lowers the operational ability of the fleet, besides raising questions about war readiness, said sources.”

sources: Tribune News Service, “Su-30MKI engine failures worry IAF; Russia told to fix snag”.

June 16/14: Display fix. HAL chairman R K Tyagi discusses the issue of SU-30MKI display blanking and mission computer failure (q.v. March 15/14):

“The issue has been addressed by upgrading the software by the Russian side and replacing the mission computer and HUD wherever it was found unservicable during service checks [in India].” He further said that following the software upgrade and other service action taken, no problems concerning the Su-30 fighters has been reported from any IAF base.”

Sources: Defense World, “Software Upgrade Solves IAF Su-30MKI’s Display Problem”.

May 5/14: Astra AAM. An SU-30MKI successfully test-fires an Indian Astra BVRAAM (Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile), marking the next stage beyond the avionics integration and seeker tests that went on from November 2013 – February 2014. The firing marks a significant milestone for India.

The SU-30MKI will be the 1st fighter integrated with India’s new missile, giving its pilots an indigenous option alongside Russia’s R77 / AA-12 missiles. It will also be integrated with India’s LCA Tejas light fighter, alongside RAFAEL’s Derby. Sources: The Hindu, “Astra successfully test-fired from Sukhoi-30 MKI”.

April 22/14: Waste. India’s Business Standard discusses HAL’s planned schedule, and explains some of the difficult aspects of their contract with Russia. Deliveries currently sit at 15 per year, but completion of the program will be late. Final delivery is now scheduled for 2019, instead of 2016-17.

The second issue is price, which began at $30 million but rose to $75 million each, even though most work is being done in a lower-cost country now. The key is the contract, which mandates that all raw materials must be sourced from Russia. Of the SU-30MKI’s roughly 43,000 components, there are 5,800 large metal plates, castings and forgings that must come from Russia. Another 7,146 bolts, screws, rivets, etc. have similar stipulations, and Russia also produces major assemblies like the radar and engines. Those plates, castings, and forgings are a source of considerable waste:

“For example, a 486 kg titanium bar supplied by Russia is whittled down to a 15.9 kg tail component. The titanium shaved off is wasted. Similarly a wing bracket that weighs just 3.1 kg has to be fashioned from a titanium forging that weighs 27 kg…. manufacturing sophisticated raw materials like titanium extrusions in India is not economically viable for the tiny quantities needed for Su-30MKI fighters.”

An assembly line that wasn’t state-owned wouldn’t be wasting all that left-over titanium. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Air Force likely to get entire Sukhoi-30MKI fleet by 2019”.

March 29/14: MAFI. India’s Business Standard discusses India’s INR 25 billion “Modernisation of Airfield Infrastructure” (MAFI) project, which is being led by Tata Power’s strategic electronics division. It uses Doppler Very High Frequency Omni-directional Radio Range (DVOR), and Category II Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), allowing direction from 300 km and operations in visibility as low as 300 meters.

Bhatinda is MAFI’s pilot project, and a SU-30MKI was used to test the system on March 25/14. The challenge is that they can only upgrade 5-6 bases at any given time. The eventual goal is 30 IAF and navy bases set up by 2016, including 8 along the Chinese border. By the end of 2019, the goal is to expand MAFI to 67 air bases, including 2 owned by the ministry of home affairs. The larger goal is greater tactical flexibility for all fleets, and the SU-30s will be a major beneficiary. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “First upgraded IAF base commissioned”.

March 15/14: Readiness. India’s Sunday Guardian obtains letters and other documents sent by HAL to its Russian counterparts, pointing to serious maintenance problems with India’s SU-30MKI fleet. Compared with India’s older Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 fleets, whose readiness rates hover near 75%, fully 50% of the SU-30MKIs are considered unfit for operational flying. That’s a strategic-class issue for a country like India, and could provide the missing explanation for reports that India may abandon the joint FGFA/SU-50 5th generation fighter program in order to pay for French Rafale jets.

This isn’t the first time such issues have arisen (q.v. Dec 16/11), and the Russians have general reputation for these kinds of problems. One February 2014 letter from HAL’s Nasik plant reminds the Russians that they’ve been pursuing a critical issue since March 2013, with no reply:

“…multiple cases of repeated failure of Mission Computer-1 and blanking out of Head Up Displays (HUD) and all Multi-Function Displays (MFD) in flight… As the displays blanking off is a serious and critical issue affecting the exploitation of aircraft (it) needs corrective action/remedial measures on priority…”

From a Dec 24/13 letter:

“Due to non-availability of facilities for overhaul of aggregates [aircraft parts], the serviceability of Su-30MKI is slowly decreasing and demand for Aircraft on Ground (AOG) items on the rise…. Huge quantities of unserviceable aggregates [parts] are lying due for overhaul at various bases of IAF…. It appears that Rosboronexport and Irkut Corporation have limited control over other Russian companies [which provide vital parts like engines].”

One reason the MiG-29 fleet is doing better is that India has worked to build infrastructure like local RD-33 engine plants, bypassing the Russians entirely. Russian firms were supposed to set up a SU-30MKI repair-overhaul facility at HAL by December 2013, but that has fallen into a black hole, and so has the posting of aircraft specialists. India itself is often at fault in these scenarios, and indeed they’re reportedly haggling over price – but the specialist support contract reportedly states that they’re to be posted even if price negotiations aren’t finalized. India’s core defense posture demands that they resolve these issues, one way or another. Sources: India’s Sunday Guardian, “Russians go slow, Sukhoi fleet in trouble”.

Serious maintenance & readiness issues

BrahMos brefing

Jan 4/14: Russia and India Report looks at the way the SU-30MKI is changing the IAF’s strategy, citing the huge April 2013 IAF exercise based on “swing forces” in a 2-front war against China and Pakistan. The SU-30MKIs range made them the natural swing force, flying 1,800 km bombing missions with mid-air refuelling. The report also makes an interesting observation:

“There is another ominous angle. India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has asked for 40 nuclear capable strike aircraft to be used conjointly with land-based and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Although it’s not clear whether the IAF or the SFC will operate this mini air force, what is clear is that exactly 40 Su-30 MKIs have been converted to carry the BrahMos. That’s some coincidence.”

Sources: Russia & India Report, “How the Su-30 MKI is changing the IAF’s combat strategy”.

July 11/13: Weapons. Russian BrahMos Aerospace Executive Director Alexander Maksichev promises that 1st test-launch of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile from an Indian Su-30MKI will be scheduled in 2014. Integration is underway, and 2 SU-30MKIs are being adapted for the missile. Sources: Russia & India Report, “First test-launch of BrahMos missile from Indian Su-30MKI in 2014”.

May 27/13: Infrastructure. The IAF has finished modernizing the old WWI vintage airbase near Thanjavur in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, across the strait from Sri Lanka. A pair of SU-30MKIs took off from the runway as part of the ceremonies, and the base is eventually slated to house a full squadron of the type. The airfield last served as a civil airport in the 1990s, and renovations began in 2006.

Thanjavur was used as an emergency airstrip during flood relief in 2008, but the dedication marks its inauguration as a base for high-performance fighters, which will reportedly include a squadron of SU-30MKIs. They will offer India comfortable strike coverage of Sri Lanka, including the major southern port of Hambantota that’s being built with a great deal of Chinese help. While the runway and other facilities are in place for “lily pad” deployments, Thanjavur AFS still needs flight hangers, avionic bays, labs, fuel dumps and other infrastructure before it will be ready to host SU-30MKI fighters on a permanent basis.
Sources: India MoD, “Antony Dedicates to Nation New Air Force Station at Thanjavur” | Defence News India, “Sukhoi-30MKI’s to dominate South India and Indian Ocean” | The Hindu, “Full-fledged IAF airbase at Thanjavur from May 27”.

2011 – 2012

 

SU-30MKI
(click to view full)

Dec 24/12: Super-30s contract. Russia signs over $4 billion worth of defense contracts with India, including the deal for 42 “Super 30” upgraded SU-30MKIs. Key Super 30 upgrades are reported to include a new radar (probably AESA, and likely Phazotron’s Zhuk-AE), improved onboard computers, upgraded electronic warfare systems, and the ability to fire the air-launched version of the Indo-Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.

Russian sources place the Super 30 deal at $1.6 billion, which is significantly below previous figures. The Hindustan Times places its value at Rs 16,666 crore instead, which is about $3.023 billion at current conversions. The Times’ figure is in line with previous estimates, and is the one DID will use. The planes will arrive at HAL as assembly kits, and will be added to HAL’s production backlog. So far, the company says that they have assembled and delivered 119 SU-30MKIs to the IAF.

Other major agreements signed at the 2012 summit include a buy of 59 more Mi-17 helicopters, and a memorandum of cooperation regarding Russia’s GPS-like GLONASS system. India has indicated that it isn’t looking to add to its Flanker fleet after this deal, but they may choose to modernize older aircraft to this standard. That would keep Russian firms busy for quite some time. Indian Ministry of External Affairs | Hindustan Times | Times of India | RIA Novosti || Pakistan’s DAWN | Turkey’s Hurriyet |
Wall St. Journal.

“Super 30” contract?

Nov 23/12: More upgrades? Indian media report that India and Russia may be set to sign a $1 billion deal to upgrade the basic avionics of its existing SU-30MKIs, alongside the $3.8 billion “Super 30” deal. The big deadline date is just before Christmas, when Russia’s Vladimir Putin arrives in India for high-level talks.

The report mentions a SU-30MKI squadron in Jodhpur, near Pakistan, but all other sources offer the same total of 8 current and near-term squadrons without listing this as a Flanker base. 32 Wing’s 32 Sqn. “Thunderbirds”, who are currently listed as a MiG-21bis unit, would be the most likely conversion candidates in Jodhpur. Russia & India Report.

Oct 17/12: Indonesia. During his visit to Jakarta, Indian Defence Minister A K Antony agrees to train and support the Indonesian Air Force’s Flanker fleet. India flies a large fleet of SU-30MKIs, and is conducting manufacturing and final assembly work in India at HAL. They’ve already leveraged that base to provide similar support to Malaysia’s fleet of SU-30MKM fighters, though there are some items like engines that still need to be handled by Russia.

Note that this isn’t a contract just yet. Indonesia needs to firm up its requirements, and a India high-level Indian Air Force team will be sent to finalize the training and spares support package. The move will have an importance that goes far beyond its dollar value, as it’s part of a wider set of enhanced defense cooperation agreements the 2 countries are reportedly pursuing. Indonesia isn’t looking to antagonize China, but China’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea are comparing poorly with India’s support for freedom of navigation, and for multilateral resolution of these disputes under international law. The result is an important Indonesian tilt toward more cooperation with India, which fits very well with India’s own strategic priorities. India MoD | Indian Express | The Jakarta Globe.

Oct 5/12: Infrastructure. Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne offers a window into planned Su-30 deployments:

Code-named Flying Lancers, the process to set up a new 15 Squadron in Punjab would be started in December and become operational by the middle of next year, he said.

“By the end of this year, in December and early next year, we will be inducting a new Su-30 squadron, based in Punjab. That will be the 10th squadron of Su-30s… Two extra squadrons are being raised in the eastern sector…. One more squadron will be based in Punjab and one will be in Thanjavur. Therefore, we will eventually have 13 to 14 squadrons of Sukhois,”

Sources: Hindustan Times, “IAF to modernise, raise four more Su-30MKI squadrons”.

Aug 8/12: Infrastructure. An Indian government response to a Parliamentary question shows that the Thanjavur base is behind schedule:

“Audit Para 2.7 (Inordinate delay in development of Air Bases) of Comptroller and Auditor General Report No. 16 of 2010-11 (Air Force and Navy) had made observations regarding delay in the establishment and activation of air bases at Phalodi and Thanjavur. The delay was due to various factors including change in plans necessitated due to operational requirements of the Indian Air Force, paucity of resources as well as changes in the geopolitical situation.”

Aug 5/12: Air chief NAK Browne confirms that the IAF has identified a “design flaw” with the SU-30 MKI’s Fly-By-Wire system. He says that the planes are still fit to fly, but more checks are being implemented within the fleet, and India has taken the issue up “with the designing agency.”

The implicit but unstated corollary is that the IAF’s fighters will have corresponding flight restrictions and/or changed procedures until the problem is fixed, in order to avoid another crash. Hindustan Times.

March 23/12: Russian order. Russia’s own VVS moves to buy 30 SU-30SM fighters, for delivery by 2015. These planes are a version of the canard-winged, thrust-vectoring SU-30MKI/M variant that was developed for India, and has since been exported to Algeria and Malaysia. Which raises the question: why didn’t Russia buy 30 more SU-35S fighters? A RIA Novosti article offers one explanation:

“Irkut has been churning out these planes for 10 years thanks to its completely streamlined production method. This means that its products are of high quality, relatively cheap… and will be supplied on time.

It is one thing if, in order to make 30 aircraft, you have to breathe life into an idling plant, to fine-tune (or develop anew) your technological method, buy additional equipment, and – still worse – hire personnel. But it’s quite another if you have been manufacturing standardized aircraft for years and years and can easily divert your workforce to produce an “improved” modification for your own country’s Air Force… This approach (buying quickly and on the cheap what can be produced immediately) has been growing in popularity in the Russian military.”

The systems inside will differ, but overall, this is very good news for India. Similar designs have been exported to Malaysia and Algeria, but Russia’s order locks in loyalty within the equipment manufacturer’s home country. Other Russian orders follow, but we won’t be covering them here.

Russia buys

Dec 20/11: Super-30s. Russia has reportedly signed a preliminary deal with India to sell 42 upgraded Su-30MKI “Super 30” fighters, to be added to HAL’s license production backlog. That brings total Indian SU-30 orders to 272. Price was not reported, but Parliamentary transcripts place the budget for this buy at around $2.4 billion.

The Super 30 deal is 1 of 5 trade & defense deals signed in Moscow during the summit meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. A proposed nuclear plant deal was not among them. Assam Tribune | Deccan Herald | AP.

Dec 20/11: Cleared for flight. India’s fleet of SU-30MKIs resumes flying, after being informally grounded in the wake of the Pune crash. As for that crash, Daily Pioneer reports that:

“There was a problem in the fly-by-wire system… This is a new thing. Pilot did not get any warning. There were no indications in the cockpit and the aircraft was out of control,” the IAF chief told PTI here. He said the pilot “tried his best to control the aircraft for 15-20 minutes” before ejecting out along with the Weapon Systems Operator (WSO)…”

Dec 16/11: Readiness. The Hindustan Times reports that perennial problems with Russian spares & reliability have become an urgent issue for the SU-30MKI fleet now:

“Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is expected to red-flag [SU-30] serviceability, product support and pending upgrade… at the annual [Russian] summit meeting… Top government sources said that Air Headquarters has urgently requested the Prime Minister to raise the issue of engine serviceability with his Russian counterpart after few incidents of engine failures… the top brass has conveyed to government that “shaft bearing failures” have occurred in some [AL-31FP] engines. “In peacetime, the fighter can land on the other engine but this can be a life and death situation in adverse conditions, said a senior official.”

Dec 13-15/11: An SU-30MKI crashes 25 minutes after takeoff, in the flying area of the Lohegaon IAF base, in Pune. Both pilots ejected safely. This is the IAF’s 3rd SU-30MKI crash; the 1st crash in 2009 was due to a fly-by-wire fault, and the 2nd also happened in 2009 when foreign matter was sucked into the plane’s engine.

In response, A Court of Inquiry (CoI) has been ordered to look into the reasons behind the crash. India also grounds its SU-30MKI fleet, pending maintenance inspections and some idea of what caused this crash. Rediff | Economic Times of India | IBN Live | Indian Express | Hindustan Times

Crash & grounding

Nov 23/11: Industrial. Minister of State for Defence Shri MM PallamRaju is grilled about SU-30 deliveries by Parliamentarians in Rajya Sabha, and explains both the project history, and HAL’s manufacturing responses. So far, he says that “Out of the total 180 aircraft”, India has received 99 SU-30MKIs “till 2010-11”.

That delivery total and date is very ambiguous. It implies orders with HAL for 180 planes, which would entail a 2nd contract for another 40-42 fighters (vid. Aug 9/10 entry). Earlier reports re: HAL deliveries (vid. June 26/10 entry) pegged them at 74 planes from HAL, and the Russian deliveries are expected to wrap up in 2012; 99 total planes from both sources would fit that model, if the answer is read as “99 by the beginning of the 2010-11 fiscal period.” With expected 2010 production of 28 HAL SU-30MKIs, however, a read of “99 of 180 SU-30MKIs delivered as of November 2011” only makes sense if all the planes he’s referring to are from HAL. HAL’s responses to production delays are said to include:

• Commissioning of additional tooling jigs & fixtures in manufacturing and assembly Shops.
  
• Increased Outsourcing.
  
• Development of alternate vendors.
  
• Improvements in manufacturing processes & Operations in order to reduce cycle time.
  
• Effective monitoring and timely actions through Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP).
  
• Recruitment/Redeployment of manpower in critical work Centers.

Oct 11/11: AESA. India is reportedly looking at fitting its Su-30MKIs with Phazotron’s Zhuk-AE active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, instead of their present Tikhomrov N011M Bars passive mechanically scanned array radars. The switch would improve reliability, radar power, and performance, but the new radars would have to be tied into the combat system, tested for aerodynamic balance and other changes they might create, etc.

The X-band Zhuk-AE can reportedly track 30 aerial targets in the track-while-scan mode, and engage 6 targets simultaneously in attack mode. Aviation Week.

Aug 29/11: Super 30. Russia and India have reached agreement on the technical specification of the Super 30 upgrade, including BrahMos missile integration and an AESA radar. The exact nature of that radar is still in question. Reports to date have discussed an enlarged version of the MiG-35’s Phazotron Zhuk-AE, but Tikhomirov’s NIIP could also be chosen, and the firm demonstrated an improved version at the Moscow Air Show (MAKS 2011). AIN.

2009 – 2010

 

SU-30MKIs
(click to view full)

Aug 18/10: Defence Minister Antony replies to Parliamentary questions about the “Super 30” upgrade:

“There is proposal to upgrade the SU-30 MKI aircraft of the Indian Air Force by M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) with the support of the Russian Original Equipment Manufacturer. The current estimated cost is Rs. 10920 crores and the aircraft are likely to be upgraded in a phased manner from year 2012 onwards.”

Note the word “proposal.” At this point, the estimate in rupees is equivalent to about $2.41 billion.

Aug 9/10: Super 30. Defense minister Antony offers an update re: additional SU-30MKI purchases, in a written Parliamentary reply to Shri Asaduddin Owaisi:

“The Defence Acquisition Council has accepted a proposal for the procurement of 42 Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft from M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India. The proposal is being further progressed for submitting to the Cabinet Committee on Security. The estimated cost of the project is Rs. 20,107.40 crores [DID: about $4.36 billion, or about $104 million per plane] and the aircraft is planned to be delivered during 2014-2018. The proposal is being progressed as a repeat order from M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India under the Defence Procurement Procedure-2008.”

That’s even higher than the estimates in June 2010, when the story broke (vid. June 26/10 entry). The cost of this deal soon attracts controversy, especially given that a 2007 deal for 40 SU-30MKIs cost only $1.6 billion/ Rs 7,490 crore. That prompts speculation that these will be upgraded “Super 30” aircraft. DNA India.

July 4/10: Upgrades. India’s Economic times quotes unnamed sources within India’s MoD:

“As part of IAF’s modernisation programme, we are going to upgrade 50 Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft with help of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) from Russia… The ones to be upgraded are from the first phase [from Russia, before the HAL order, of mixed SU-30MKs and MKIs] and the project is likely to be completed in the next three to four years…”

Details are consistent with earlier “Super 30” reports. Is there, in fact, a contract to do this work? Not yet.

June 26/10: Super 30. The Times of India reports that India’s Cabinet Committee for Security has cleared a nearly Rs 15,000 crore (about $3.3 billion) order for another 42 Sukhoi-30 MKI fighters, for delivery by around 2018:

“The present order for 42 fighters was originally supposed to be 40, but two more were added to the order book to make up for the two crashed fighters. A senior official said that HAL is expected to complete all the SU-30 MKI orders by 2016-17 period… last year it delivered 23 of these fighters, this year it is expected to produce 28. HAL has already supplied 74 of these fighters.”

May 30/10: Super 30. India Today magazine reports that India has placed orders with the Russian defense industry to modernize 40 Su-30MKI Flanker-H fighters to “Super 30” status, with new radars, onboard computers, and electronic warfare systems, and the ability to fire the air-launched version of the Indo-Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. RIA Novosti.

Dec 7/09: Industrial. Defense minister Antony offers an update on the existing program to assemble SU-30MKIs in India:

“In addition to licensed manufacture of 140 SU-30 aircraft by M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a contact for procurement of additional 40 SU-30 MKI was signed with M/s HAL in 2007. Out of these three aircraft have been delivered to the Indian Air Force and delivery of the remaining aircraft is expected to be completed by 2011-12”

Nov 30/09: A SU-30MKI crashes near the firing range at Pokharan, triggering a fleet-wide grounding and investigation. Both pilots eject safely, and initial suspicion focuses on the plane’s engine. MoD announcement | Indian Express re: Grounding | Indian Express.

An SU-30 had also crashed on April 30/09, reportedly due to the failure of its fly-by-wire system. These 2 accidents are the only SU-30 losses India has experienced.

Crash & grounding

Nov 12/09: Sub-contractors. India’s Business Standard reports that the SU-30MKI program is about to include Samtel Display Systems’ multi-function displays; their first delivery will equip 6 Su-30MKIs in lieu of Thales systems manufactured under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd in Nashik. Samtel has a joint venture with Thales, and went forward on its own through the 5-year road to “airworthy” certification from DRDO’s CEMILAC. A public-private partnership with HAL has created Samtel HAL Display Systems (SHDS), which may create wider opportunities for Samtel’s lower-priced displays – if both delivery and quality are up to par on the initial SU-30MKI orders.

The article notes that Samtel has succeeded, in part, by embracing obsolete technology that others were abandoning (CRT displays), even as it prepares to leapfrog LCD displays with Organic Light Emitting Diodes. The road to military certification isn’t an easy one, though:

“Starting with liquid crystal display (LCD) screens, commercially procured from Japan and Korea, Samtel has ruggedised them for use in military avionics. The display must be easily readable even in bright sunlight; it must be dim enough for the pilot to read at night without losing night vision; it must work at minus 40 degrees Centigrade when conventional LCD screens get frozen solid; and it must absorb the repeated violent impacts of landing on aircraft carriers.”

Oct 9/09: Super 30. The Indian Ministry of Defence issues a release regarding the 9th meeting of the Russia-India Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation on Oct 14-15/09:

“The modernisation of the SU 30 MKI aircraft is also expected to come up for discussion in the Commission’s meeting. The aircraft, contracted in 1996, are due for overhaul shortly and the Russia side have offered an upgrade of the aircraft with incorporation of the latest technologies during the major overhaul.”

Obvious areas for modernization would include the aircraft’s N011M Bars radar, now that Russian AESA designs are beginning to appear. Engine improvements underway for Russia’s SU-35 program would also be a logical candidate for any SU-30MKI upgrades. The most important modification, however, might be an upgraded datalink that could reduce the level of coalition fratricide observed in exercises like Red Flag 2008. Indian MoD | RIA Novosti.

Oct 2/09: +50 more? Jane’s reports that India is looking to buy another 50 SU-30MKIs, quoting Air Chief Marshal P V Naik who said that the IAF was “interested.” This comes hard on the heels of comments that the IAF’s fleet strength was 1/3 the size of China’s, coupled with comments that the IAF would eliminate its fighter squadron deficit by 2022.

Interest is not a purchase, but reported prices of $50-60 million for an aircraft that can can equal or best $110-120 million F-15 variants do make the SU-30 an attractive buy, even relative to options like the foreign designs competing for the MMRCA contract. Forecast International offers an additional possibility, citing the context within which that interest was expressed, and wondering if the new SU-30KIs might be tasked with a nuclear delivery role. Their range and payload would certainly make them uniquely suited to such a role within the IAF.

If a purchase does ensue, it would be good news for a number of players, including Indian firms that have contributed technologies to the SU-30MKI design. Samtel Display Systems (SDS), who makes avionics for the SU-30MKI’s cockpit, would be one example of a growing slate of private Indian defense firms with niche capabilities. Construction firms may also benefit; The Deccan Herald reports that:

“The IAF is keeping one squadron of its most advanced Su-30 MKI fighters in Bareilly whose primary responsibility is the western and middle sector of the LAC. Similarly a Su-30 base is being created in Tezpur, Assam, for the eastern sector [near China].”

See: Jane’s | Russia’s RIA Novosti | Times of India | Associated Press of Pakistan | Pakistan’s Daily Times | Avio News | Forecast International | IAF size comments: Daily Pioneer and Sify News | Frontline Magazine on Indian-Chinese relations.

2000 – 2008

 

IL-78 refuels SU-30MKIs

March 31/06: Speed-up +40. India’s Cabinet Committee on Security approves the speeded-up delivery plan. The IAF signs revised contracts for 140 previously-ordered SU-30MKIs, to be delivered by 2014-15. A 2007 contract adds another 40 SU-30MKIs, by the same deadline, but those are ordered direct from Russia. Source.

180 SU-30MKIs

June 2005: Speed it up. IAF Headquarters looks at its fleet strength and planned aircraft retirements, and asks HAL if it could deliver all of the SU-30MKIs by 2015 instead. HAL responds with a proposal that they believe will get them to a full-rate assembly flow of 16 planes per year. Source.

Dec 12/04: Irkut Corp. announces that they have begun delivery of final “3rd phase” configuration Su-30MKIs to the Indian Air Force.

Initial deliveries involved aircraft optimized for aerial combat, while Phase 2 added more radar modes for their NIIP N-011 radars, TV-guided Kh-59M missiles, the supersonic Kh-31A/ AS-17 Krypton multi-role missile, and simultaneous attack of 4 aerial targets by guided air-to-air missiles. Phase 3 Su-30MKIs fully implement all navigation and combat modes in the contract, including laser-guided bombs, weapon launch in thrust-vectoring “supermaneuverability” mode, and engagement of up to 4 aerial targets in front or rear. Ramenskoye Design Bureau (RPKB) is responsible for the avionics and software, and also provide the Sapfir maintenance and mission planning ground suite.

SU-30MKI Phase 3 deliveries begin

Oct 6/04: The SU-30MKI’s Saturn AL-31FP engines have their “Certificate of the AL-31FP life-time” signed by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Central Aviation Engines Institute (CIAM), NPO Saturn, UMPO, SUKHOI Corporation, and IRKUT Corporation.

The statistics are: MTBO (Mean Time Between Overhauls) 1,000 hours, and 2,000 hours assigned life. The thrust-vectoring nozzles take a beating, though, with only 500 hours MTBO. Irkut Corp.

Engines certified

January 2001: Indian government formally approves the SU-30MKI project, with an expected full-rate assembly flow of 12 planes per year, beginning in 2004-05 and continuing until 2017-18. Source.

Dec 18/2000: India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approves the project to assemble the SU-30MKIs in India. Source.

Oct 4/2000: Russia and India sign an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) for transfer of License and Technical Documentation to India, for “production of 140 SU-30 MKI Aircraft, its Engines and Aggregates.” Source.

SU-30MKIs: initial local assembly order

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

The SU-30 MKI

• Wikipedia – SU-30MKI

• Bharat Rakshak – Sukhoi Su-30 MKI [Flanker]. Picture gallery, with some background.

• Bharat Rakshak – Sukhoi-30MKI – Project Vetrivale. By a former director of DRDO’s ADE.

• Vayu Sena – Irkut/HAL Su-30MKI Air Dominance Fighter

• India Defence Projects Sentinel blog – Su-30MKI Acquisition and Upgrade [dead link]. Other history here.

• Defense Update – Phazotron Zhuk AE AESA Radar

• Air Power Australia – Phazotron Zhuk AE/ASE: Assessing Russia’s First Fighter AESA. Written in July 2008.

• Jane’s – N011M Bars (Russian Federation), Payloads

Related IAF Programs

• DID – India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition. Intends to buy 126 aircraft that will be very competitive with SU-30MKI performance, but will cost much more – $18 billion has been mentioned. Dassault’s Rafale is the preferred bidder. Essentially pays more up front to have a SU-30MKI analogue with better electronics, and much better support and readiness.

• DID – PAK-FA/FGFA/T50: India, Russia Cooperate on 5th-Gen Fighter. Will probably become the SU-50. Early read is F-35 class stealth and F-22 class aerial performance, probably slightly less than its cited peers in both areas. SU-30MKI troubles may be affecting India’s willingness to spend the billions of development and acquisition dollars required.

News & Views

• Russia & India Report (March 10/14) – Dissecting a dogfight: Sukhoi vs USAF at Red Flag 2008. The publication is part of state-owned Russia Today.

• Russia & India Report (Jan 4/14) – How the Su-30 MKI is changing the IAF’s combat strategy.

• Flight International (Nov 6/08) – US Red Flag pilot candidly assesses Su-30MKI’s limits, Rafale’s dirty tricks. Compared to US F-15/F-16s, the USAF pilot describes the SU-30MKI as “a bit better.”

• The DEW Line (Nov 5/08) – USAF pilot describes IAF Su-30MKI performance at Red Flag-08. Video Briefing – really enlightening re: tactics, also use of French Rafales for industrial espionage.

• Indian Defence Review (Vol 23.4, Sept-Dec 2008) – Strategic Implications of Exercise Red Flag 2008 By Air Marshal BK Pandey.

• Milavia – Flankers in Eagle’s Realm, 08-04. notes that the SU-30MKI’s Tikhomirov Instrument Bureau (NIIP) radars were restricted to training mode, in order to preserve secrecy, and the only missiles they allowed themselves to simulate were older AA-10s, not short-range AA-11/R-73 Archers or AA-12/R-77 “AMRAAMSKIs”. The exclusion of the AA-11 is odd, since the USA got plenty of training with them from German MiG-29s.

• Livefist (Nov 19/08) – LiveFist Column: Vishnu Som first-hand on what really happened at Red Flag 08.

• Aviation Week (Aug 21/08) – Indian Advanced Su-30MKIs Come to USA [dead link].

• DID (July 17/07) – Typhoon vs. SU-30MKI: The 2007 Indra Dhanush Exercise.

The following article was published as a Strategic Analysis piece by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. It’s an expansion of some of the themes mentioned in a piece I co-authored with Michael Kofman for the Monkey Cage in the immediate aftermath of the Kerch Strait skirmish.

The November 25 naval skirmish between Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Kerch Strait was significant first and foremost as an open military confrontation between the two countries’ armed forces. But it also highlighted the fraught legal status of the strait and the Azov Sea, a status that Russia has been exploiting in recent months to exert political and economic pressure on Ukraine.

A slow march to confrontation

The confrontation began months before the recent events that brought the conflict to worldwide attention. In March 2018, Ukrainian border guard vessels detained a Russian fishing vessel in the Azov Sea for violating exit procedures from the “temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, namely from Crimea. The crew of that vessel remained in detention for several months, until they were exchanged in October for Ukrainian sailors. The captain of the Russian ship remains in Ukraine and is facing prosecution for illegal fishing and “violation of the procedure for entry and exit from the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”. Since that incident, Russia has retaliated by detaining several Ukrainian fishing vessels.

In May, Russia also began to regularly hold Ukrainian commercial ships for inspection before allowing them to pass through the Kerch Strait. The initiation of this inspection regime largely coincided with the opening of a road and rail bridge across the strait. Russia claimed that the inspections were required to ensure the safety and security of the bridge at a time when some Ukrainians had publicly threatened to attack the bridge. The delays caused by the inspection regime, together with ship height restrictions caused by the bridge, have led to a 30 percent reduction in revenues at Ukraine’s commercial ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, raising fears that Russia is trying to strangle the economy of eastern Ukraine.

In the same period, Russia also began to build up its naval presence in the Azov Sea, with at least three missile ships based there since summer 2018. Reports indicate that Russia plans to set up a full-fledged flotilla in the Azov in the near future. Ukraine has also strengthened its naval presence in the region, placing several armoured boats in Berdyansk and seeking to expand the base there.

The transfer of ships from Odesa to Berdyansk that caused the skirmish was part of this effort. Ukraine had moved naval ships through the Kerch Strait as recently as September 2018, but these ships were not armed. In that case, the ships were allowed to pass through without incident, although they were closely followed by Russian border guard vessels. The passage of two armoured boats through the strait in late November was thus the first attempt by the Ukrainian Navy to bring armed ships through the Kerch Strait since tensions began to mount and the bridge was completed in spring 2018.

The legal background

The status of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait is regulated by a bilateral treaty that was signed by Russia and Ukraine in 2003. According to the terms of the treaty, the sea is considered to be internal waters for both countries, and both Ukrainian and Russian commercial and military ships have the right of free passage through the strait. Furthermore, the treaty does not specify any particular advance notice procedures for passage through the strait. Foreign commercial ships are allowed to pass through the strait and enter the sea if they are heading to or from a Ukrainian or Russian port. Military ships belonging to other countries may be allowed passage if they are invited by one of the signatories to the treaty, but only with the agreement of the other signatory. In 2015, Russia unilaterally adopted a set of rules requiring ships passing through the strait to give advance notification to the Russian authorities, ostensibly to assure safety of navigation. These rules have not been accepted by Ukraine.

 

Please follow this link to read the rest of the article.

Americas

The Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman Corp. a $7.7 million contract option modification for the Defense Support Program (DSP) on-orbit satellite and anomaly resolution support. The DSP operates the reconnaissance satellites which form the principal component of the Satellite Early Wing System currently used by the US. The Northrop Grumman-built DSP satellites use infrared detectors that sense the heat from missile plumes against the earth background. The orbiting sentries detect, characterize as well a report ballistic missile launches and see nuclear detonations. Back in September 2018 Northrop Grumman was awarded a $19.2 million modification to the same contract. Work will be completed by September 30, 2019.

The Space and Missile Systems Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, awarded Lockheed Martin with a $52.7 million indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract modification for engineering, development and sustainment services supporting the Air Force Multi-Mission Satellite operation Center (MMSOC). The MMSOC is an operations center focused on forging a one-of-a-kind acquisition team to demonstrate and field emerging space missions and satellite C2 technologies in a rapid, decisive manner. It is structured to operate a variety of satellite missions, including satellite initiatives without a program office, satellite missions of small scale, new missions transitioning from concept toward full-scale operations as well as all research, development, test and evaluation satellites with operational utility remaining after test and evaluation are complete. The increase provides for continuous services to operate experimental and demonstration satellites, support space and missile research, development, test and evaluation and initial operational test and evaluation. The contract modification is for work within scope of the contract.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center contracted Coffin Turbo Pump Inc. with a $15.5 million indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity, firm-fixed-priced contract for up to 33 turbine driven main feed pumps for LHD-1 class main propulsion boilers. The Wasp (LHD-1) Class is the US Navy’s large-deck, multipurpose amphibious assault ship. LHD-1 can accommodate the full range of Navy and Marine Corps helicopters, specifically the tiltrotor MV-22 Osprey, the F-35B Lightning II multi-role fighter, conventional landing craft and amphibious vehicles. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Philadelphia Division requires the production of a non-commercial main feed pump unit that will be driven by steam turbine on a common solid shaft. Work will be executed in New Jersey and is scheduled to be finished by January 2024.

Middle East & Africa

Israel’s Elbit Systems won a contract worth $333 million from the Israeli Ministry of Defense for the supply of ammunitions to the Israeli Defense Forces. Work on the five-year contract will begin in 2026 and it will be a continuation of a multi-year contract. In November, Elbit completed its acquisition of state-owned arms manufacturer Israeli Military Industries (IMI) Systems Ltd..

An example of Turkey’s locally developed Hürkus-C successfully completed flight and firing trials, Jane’s reports. Hürkus-C is the armed version of Hürkus-B training aircraft, both of which were designed and upgraded by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), the country’s pioneering institution in aviation engines. The Hürkus series are being developed to provide close air support to the Turkish Land Forces Command and Gendarmerie General Command in operation areas in addition to meeting the training needs of the Turkish Air Forces. The completion of the trails marks the first flight of the Hürkus-C carrying weaponry and defensive systems to facilitate close air support missions. In 2017 the helicopter conducted its first firing test with a local Roketsan-made Lumtas laser-guided long-range air-to-surface anti-tank missile.

Europe

Boeing is going to upgrade Spain’s fleet of CH-47D Chinook helicopters to the F-model configuration. The CH-47F is an advanced multi-mission helicopter for international defense forces. It includes a fully integrated, digital cockpit management system, Common Aviation Architecture Cockpit and advanced cargo-handling capabilities that complement the aircraft’s mission performance. The CH-47F is primarily used by the US Army and its allied nations to transport troops and large loads. It is capable of operating at speeds faster than 175 miles per hour and over long-range flights. The deal with Spain falls under a $181.3 million contract, which Boeing secured with the uS Defense Department back in July. The contract calls for the US military’s purchase of up to 156 Multi-Year II Block I CH-47F Chinook helicopters.

Asia-Pacific

The Indonesian Ministry of National Defense ordered four additional high-speed KCR-60M attackers from state-owned shipbuilding company PT PAL, Jane’s reports. PT PAL (Penataran Angkatan Laut) manufactures ships for military as well as civilian use. The company builds the Sampari-Class fast attack craft (KCR-60M) operated by the Indonesian Navy. The contract for the four additional vessels is worth $195 million. The first craft will be delivered in 2021. Additional boats will be part of an overall effort to reconstitute the class for lower-speed operations.

Fulcrum IT received $128 million labor-hour contract for intelligence work in South Korea. The five-year contract with the US Defense Intelligence Agency includes all-source analysis and operational support in South Korea. It involves the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Korea, U.S. Forces Korea and six divisions in South Korea. Fulcrum IT is a Virginia-based company that works with the federal government to issue artificial intelligence, cyberinformation, intelligence operations, advanced technology and C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cryptology, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance). The contract was a competitive acquisition and Fulcrum’s was one out of seven offers.

Today’s Video

Watch: CH-147F (CH-47) Chinook Helicopter Engine Startup and Takeoff

DSP-16 Deploys
(click to view full)

Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites have been monitoring the skies as America’s early-warning system for ballistic missile launches since their first launch in 1970. The current Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) consists of 5 DSP satellites; 3 provide frontline operational service, with 2 available as backups should problems emerge with the primary satellites.

The program’s lifetime has seen the launch of 23 DSP satellites, and improvements to DSP via 5 upgrade sets have allowed those satellites to exceed their design lifespan. The USAF’s fact sheet lists the satellites’ unit cost at $400 million, though they do not mention what fiscal year baseline that figure is linked to. While the DSP satellites successfully detected Iraqi SCUD launches during Operation Desert Storm, testimony before Congress has noted that there are some classes of missiles the DSP constellation has trouble with. The USAF’s way over-budget SBIRS program was created to address that, but the DSP constellation will be up for a long time. This entry will be updated to cover new developments, contracts, and more.

The DSP Satellites

DSP Satellite

DSP satellites use an infrared sensor to detect heat from missile and booster plumes against the earth’s background. The first DSP was launched in 1970, and the final DSP bird was orbited in 2007.

The spacecraft and sensor were upgraded several times throughout production to protect against evolving worldwide threats. In 1995, improvements were also made to ground processing systems, in order to improve detection of short-range missiles.

Today’s DSP-I (improved) weighs 5,200 pounds vs. just 2,000 pounds for the original versions, requires 1,275 watts of power vs. 400, uses 6,000 detectors vs. 2,000, and is approximately 33 feet long and 14 feet in diameter. Recent technological improvements in sensor design include above-the-horizon capability for full hemispheric coverage and improved resolution, as well as increased on-board signal-processing capability.

The DSP constellation is being replaced by the SIBRS-High program. Unfortunately, that program has been beset by massive cost overruns, technical challenges that continue to present problems, and uncertain performance. Despite its problems, the U.S. Air Force is proceeding with the program. Until SIBRS-High is ready, however, the DSP constellation will be the USA’s sentinel against ballistic missile launches.

Contracts & Key Events

The development and acquisition of DSP satellites is managed by the Space Based Infrared System Program Office at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (Air Force Materiel Command) at Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA. Contracts usually list the Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA as the issuer.

 

January 07/19: Northtrop tapped for DSP. The Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman Corp. a $7.7 million contract option modification for the Defense Support Program (DSP) on-orbit satellite and anomaly resolution support. The DSP operates the reconnaissance satellites which form the principal component of the Satellite Early Wing System currently used by the US. The Northrop Grumman-built DSP satellites use infrared detectors that sense the heat from missile plumes against the earth background. The orbiting sentries detect, characterize as well a report ballistic missile launches and see nuclear detonations. Back in September 2018 Northrop Grumman was awarded a $19.2 million modification to the same contract. Work will be completed by September 30, 2019.

July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. One item is very consequential to the DSP constellation:

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program [DMSP]. — The budget request includes $87,000,000 for storage, integration, test, launch, and early-orbit checkout of one Defense Meteorological Satellite Program [DMSP] satellite. Air Force analysis indicates this satellite will not be needed on-orbit until 2020, costing an additional $425,000,000 in storage during that period. This amount is excessive for a 1990s technology satellite originally costing approximately $500,000,000. The Committee is aware that only a few of the capabilities provided by this satellite cannot be met by other existing civil and commercial satellites. The Committee questions the Air Force’s current plan to launch this satellite in 2020 at a significant cost to the Government for a capability that may be met through other space-based assets. Therefore, Committee directs the Air Force to reassess its plan for the last DMSP and pursue a least cost approach for the disposition of this satellite. Of the amount requested for DMSP, the Committee provides $30,000,000.

At the same time, however, the SAC votes to allot $125 million to add a competed EELV launch order in FY 2015. The USAF has indicated that they might prefer to launch DSP-20 as soon as possible, rather than scrap it. Especially if this helps to extricate them from the mess created by restricting competitive launches and triggering a lawsuit from SpaceX. Note that the FY 2015 budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. Sources: Senate SAC, “Committee Approves FY 2015 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill – Report: Department of Defense” | DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding” | DID, “Sued from Orbit: SpaceX and the EELV Contract“.

July 15/14: DSP-20 to compete. The USAF got some pushback about the ULA block buy at the House Armed Services Committee hearings on July 10th. USAF Secretary Deborah Lee James is telling reporters that they’re looking to reprogram $100 million, and move the DMSP-20 weather satellite launch into FY 2015 as a competed contract. That would raise the number of purchased FY 2015 launches to 6, but the amount committed strongly suggests that SpaceX would win the deal. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Air Force Seeks $100 Million for Rocket Rivalry” | Space Politics, “DOD official defends EELV block buy, endorses launch competition”.

Sept 27/13: FY 2014. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems in Redondo Beach, CA receives a $19.3 million cost-plus-award-fee contract for FY 2014 DSP on-orbit support and sustainment. This modification provides for another 110,392 labor hour, including factory level operations, DSP spacecraft and sensor management & support, on-site support, and in depth missile threat analysis to the 2nd Space Warning Squadron.

Work will be performed at Redondo Beach, CA, and is expected to be complete by Sept 30/14 (FA8810-09-C-0001, PO 0080).

Sept 26/12: FY 2013. Northrup Grumman Space and Mission Systems in Redondo Beach, CA receives a $41.1 million contract modification for FY 2013 on-orbit support and sustainment of DSP sensors and satellites.

Work will be performed in Redondo Beach, CA until Sept 30/13 (FA8810-09-C-0001, PO 0067).

Sept 23/11: FY 2012. Northrup Grumman Space and Mission Systems in Redondo Beach, CA receives a $39.5 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification, exercising an option for FY 2012 on-orbit support of the DSP sensors and spacecraft bus, under the defense on-orbit support and sustainment contract.

Work will be performed at Redondo Beach, CA (FA8810-09-C-0001, PO 0047)

Oct 8/09: FY 2010. Northrop Grumman Space Technology in Redondo Beach, CA received a $35.4 million contract modification for on-orbit sustainment of the DSP spacecraft, primary infrared sensor and mission analysis (FA8810-09-C-0001, PO 0019).

June 14/09: 20 years. The USA’s DSP Flight 14 satellite reaches 20 years of on-orbit operations, following its June 14/89 launch aboard a Titan IV rocket. USAF.

20 years on-orbit

Oct 1/08: Northrop Grumman Space Technology in Redondo Beach, CA received a cost-plus-award-fee $38.3 million contract to provide on-orbit sustainment support for the DSP spacecraft, primary infrared sensor and mission analysis.

The contract consists of an initial year, plus 4 one-year options. If all options are exercised, the contract would have a maximum value of $206 million (FA8810-09-C-0001). See also NGC release.

Multi-year support contract, FY 2009 – 2013

Nov 11/07: United Launch Alliance launched the DSP-23 satellite aboard the 1st operational Delta IV Heavy expendable launch vehicle for the US Air Force. The DSP-23 launch completes the deployment of the DSP satellite constellation.

DSP-23 launch

Sept 29/06: Post-production. Northrop Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corp. in Redondo Beach, CA received a $41.8 million cost-plus-award fee contract modification. The Defense Support Program will extend the current spacecraft post-production support contract with Northrop Grumman Space Technology from 30 September 2006 thru 30 September 2007, due to a 1-year launch slip. This work will be complete September 2007 (F04701-96-C-0030, PO 0145)

Sept 22/06: Northrop Grumman Information Technology Inc. in Azusa, CA received a $39.2 million cost-plus-award fee contract modification which provides a one-year extension to the defense support program (DSP), sensor post production support contract (Oct. 1 2006 to Sept. 30 2007). Work will be complete September 2007 (F04701-96-C-0031, PO 0180).

Under this contract, Northrop Grumman will provide storage and storage support of the DSP satellites in accordance with satellite environmental requirements, annual testing of stored satellites, trend analysis, integration returns (repair and return failed/ obsolete components), safety analysis, load analysis, maintenance of all launch site safety requirements, multiple readiness reviews and rehearsals, multiple integrated systems test, test and prepare satellites for launch site, launch vehicle integration, sustaining engineering of the on-orbit satellites (multiple block build), early on orbit testing support for newly launched satellites, anomaly resolution and flight operations support for DSP constellation. They will also be tasked with operational performance analysis for performance assessment and mission performance improvement, including recommendation for retrofitting satellites in storage.

Additional Readings

• US Air Force – Defense Support Program Satellites

• Northrop Grumman – Defense Support Program

• GlobalSecurity.org – Defense Support Program

• Missile Threat – Defense Support Program (DSP)

• Federation of American Scientists – Defense Support Program

• Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2000) – America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security – book review. An informative review.

Americas

The Naval Air Systems Command contracted Bell-Boeing with a $23.3 million contract to provide flight test sustainment support to V-22 Osprey test, tiltrotor military aircraft – the MV-22. Bell-Boeing is a joint venture between The Boeing Company and Bell Helicopter. Their primary product, the V-22 Osprey, is a family of multi-mission, tiltrotor military aircrafts with both vertical and short takeoff and landing capabilities. Per the terms of the agreement, Bell-Boeing will offer support and provide analysis of light test for five MV-22 aircrafts. Work will be performed at Naval Air Station Patuxent River and is scheduled to be completed by the end of the year.

Eight companies secured $22.5 million ceiling indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts for the formation of a collaborative working group. The contractors are BAE Systems’ information and electronics systems integration business; Boeing’s defense, space and security business; General Atomic’s aeronautical systems business; Harris; Goodrich; Lockheed Martin; Northrop Grumman Systems and Raytheon. They will develop, manage and update a set of Open Architecture Standards for the US Air Force with the goal to promote adaptability, flexibility and expandability as well as support a variety of missions, simplify integration, reduce technical risk and the cost of ownership of weapon system programs, enable reuse and independent development of system elements, and accommodate a range of cybersecurity approaches. Contracting activity is the Air Force Life Cycle management. Work is scheduled to be completed on December 31, 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Raytheon awarded Israeli company Elbit Systems Ltd.’s US Unit Elbit Systems of America LLC with a contract to provide the Two Color Laser System (TCLS) for the Multi-Spectral Targeting System. TCLS is a production component within the electro-optical surveillance system for military airborne platforms, including the next-generation targeting systems onboard unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Elbit Systems Ltd. is an international high technology company engaged in wide range of defense, homeland security and commercial programs throughout the world. The company operates in the areas of aerospace, land and naval systems, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft systems, advanced electro-optics, electro-optic space systems, EW suites, signal intelligence systems, data inks and communications systems, radio and cyber-based systems.

Europe

The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) contracted Raytheon UK with $316.6 million to support the Royal Air Force’s Shadow aircraft fleet. The deal will provide maintenance, airworthiness management, design organization, and supply chain support for the Beechcraft King Air 350CER-based fleet. It was announced in July 2018 that the Shadow R1 fleet was to undergo an upgrade to take it to the Mk2 standard. Under the new support contract, Raytheon will also support aircraft-modification design and integration that will enable it to ultimately upgrade the fleet to the Mk2 standard.

Asia-Pacific

India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas fighter gets the green light for production in an enhanced, battle standard format. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is mandated to produce the LCAs for the Indian Air Force (IAF). The LCA Tejas is an Indian single-seat, single-jet engine, multi-role light fighter designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency. The completion of production of the first aircraft is scheduled to be in late 2019.

China’s future aircraft carriers will see stealth warplanes on their decks, likely the medium-sized fighter jet FC-31. Requests for proposals and tenders issued by the Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute on a range of equipment suitable for a stealth aircraft have heightened anticipation that a variant of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s (SAC) FC-31 combat aircraft is to be developed as China’s next-generation carrier-borne aircraft, Jane’s reports. The Shenyang FC-31 is a twin-engine, mid-size jet fighter.

Today’s Video

Watch: Proud! UK to double F-35 fleet that makes Royal Navy and RAF more powerful

Tejas LCA
(click to view full)

India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens a global opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.

LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter

Tejas, side view
(click to view full)

Within India’s force structure, the LCA is largely expected to replace its 400 or so MiG-21 aircraft with a more versatile and capable performer. The MiGs are being retired as age claims them, and even India’s 125 or so upgraded MiG-21 ‘Bisons’ are only scheduled to remain in service until 2018. The LCA’s overall performance is expected to be somewhat similar to India’s Mirage 2000s, with lower top speed but more modern electronics.

The Tejas LCA design uses a tailless compound delta plan that’s designed to be unstable, but controllable over an 8g / -3.5g flight range thanks to advanced flight software and quadruplex fly-by-wire technology. Composites are used heavily in order to to save weight, and proper placement can also lower the plane’s radar profile. Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters also made heavy use of composite technologies, but Japanese issues with delamination and cracking required repairs and changes. ADA has conducted Static and fatigue strength studies on finite element models, and aeroservoelastic studies have been performed on the Tejas design; nevertheless, only full testing and actual service will reveal how it fares. So far, composites haven’t become a public problem for the aircraft.

Unfortunately, reports indicate that the lack of early pilot input has compromised several aspects of the design, while a failure to consider maintenance up front has made key components difficult to reach. Barring published comparisons from experienced pilots or evaluating countries, it’s very difficult to pin down the extent or seriousness of these issues, but Tejas has certainly spent a very long time in testing.

The following sub-sections go into more detail about the fighter’s equipment rationales, and that equipment’s specific capabilities. The above list seems straightforward, but getting there has been anything but.

Electronics

The plane’s avionics architecture is configured around a 3 bus, distributed MIL-STD-1553B system, using a 32-bit Mission Computer (MC) and software written in Ada. A “glass cockpit” of colour Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Displays (AMLCDs) provides the pilot with information, and is supplemented by Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display for commonality with other IAF aircraft.

The Mk.II is slated to use a more advanced glass cockpit with better computing and graphics processors behind it, full-duplex cross-Switched Ethernet (AFDX) based back up avionics, and digital maps. Elsewhere on the plane, a Universal Pylon Interface Computer (UPIC) will replace the Pylon Interface Boxes.

Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control Radar Failure & Replacement

EL/M-2032
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The Tejas project’s original radar, like its original engine choice, very nearly sank the project. The state-run Aeronautical Development Agency had originally intended to use Ericsson Microwave Systems’ PS-05/A radar, until they changed their mind and decided to develop their own. India’s Multi Mode Radar (MMR) program was started in June 1991, with a “Probable Date of Completion” of 6.5 years. More than 15 years later, development was still plodding away as a joint effort between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Hyderabad, India’s Electronics and Radar Development Laboratory in Bangalore, and the Centre for Airborne Studies. Even worse, test results for the radar were poor.

By August 2007, over 16 years into the project, even India’s MoD finally had to admit that the MMR faced serious problems. Radar co-development has now been initiated with Israel’s IAI Elta, with the EL/M-2032 as the radar base and interim solution. The EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar was originally developed for Israel’s Lavi fighter, and already equips India’s Sea Harrier fleet and Jaguar IM strike aircraft, and is popular around the world. M-2032s can be found on some F-16s in Israel and elsewhere, Kfir C10s flown by some Latin American customers, Chile’s upgraded F-5s, Romania’s MiG-21 Lancer upgrades, and South Korea’s FA-50 lightweight fighter. The radar features modular hardware design, with software control and flexible avionic interfaces, and a TWT coherent transmitter with a low-sidelobe planar antenna. The M-2032 functions in several air-to-air modes, as well as the air-to-ground, air-to-sea, ground-mapping in RBS, DBM, SAR with moving target tracking, and terrain avoidance modes.

Detection and classification ranges will vary depending on the aperture size. A radar adapted to fit in an F-5’s narrow nose will have lower performance than one that fits into a larger F-16. The Tejas’ dimensions suggest that performance may be near the radar’s claimed 80 nautical mile maximums for detection of fighter-sized objects.

There have been reports that the Tejas Mk.II and operational LCA Naval will fly with IAI’s EL/M-2052 AESA radar instead. That change would roughly double performance, while drastically reducing radar maintenance costs. These reports are unconfirmed, however, and other accounts cite American pressure to prevent Israeli AESA radar exports.

Other Sensors & Defensive

LITENING pod

RAFAEL’s LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pod will give Tejas long-range looks at ground targets, independent laser designation capability, and (rumored) fleet commonality with India’s Jaguars, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000s, and SU-30MKIs. The Mk.II will reportedly be adapted for a more advanced variant of the LITENING pod, but that means the pods would have to be bought and given to the Tejas fleet, rather than the SU-30MKI fleet for example.

The defensive system will be designed in India. Late testing means that it won’t be fully effective in the Mk.I aircraft, which must depend on an external Israel Aerospace Elta ELL/8-2222 jamming pod. The Mk.II is supposed to have a fully effective system of warning receivers, automated decoy dispensing, etc. In advanced western aircraft, these systems can even feed geolocation data from pinpointed threats into the plane’s targeting computers. Time will tell whether the Mk.II also has those capabilities.

Weapons

LCA Tejas, armed
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Unsurprisingly, RAFAEL’s Derby radar-guided fire-and-forget missile will serve as the Tejas’ initial medium range air-air armament. It lacks the range and datalink of Raytheon’s AMRAAM or Russia’s R-77/AA-12, but in practice, positive identification requirements have kept most aerial fights within Derby range. Derby reportedly has good seeker cone coverage, which improves performance. It has already been integrated with the EL/M-2032 on India’s own Sea Harriers, and equips the country’s new SPYDER mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. If India’s own Astra MRAAM continues to progress, it will be integrated later.

For shorter-range engagements, Derby will be complemented by TMC’s infrared-guided Vympel R-73/AA-11 “Archer,” giving Tejas partial weapon commonality with India’s large MiG fleets. The R-73 is known for its exceptional maneuverability and a “wide boresight” seeker cone, a combination that inaugurated the era of 4th generation missiles. There’s even a rear-facing version, which offers enemies a nasty surprise. The jets will also carry RAFAEL’s Python 4/5, which can face forward and still hit targets behind their fighter.

Tejas planes are expected to carry a range of ground attack weapons, from ordinary bombs and unguided Russian S-8 80mm rockets, to precision munitions. Tests for unspecified laser-guided bombs and cluster bombs are expected, though they’re expected to be Russian KAB-1500L and RBK-500 weapons, along with Russian Kh-31/35/59 anti-ship and precision strike missiles. Specifications don’t mention a MIL-STD-1760 electrical interface with carriage stores, which is very helpful when integrating GPS-guided munitions. Time will tell, but the Tejas Mk.I’s initial weapons don’t include GPS guidance.

Engines & Alternatives

F414-GE-400 engine
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With its radar issue solved by a foreign partnership, the fighter’s indigenous Kaveri engine (vid. Appendix B) was left as the project’s biggest unresolved issue. That was resolved with a stopgap, followed by a competition to field a working engine; even so, India’s DRDO continues to pour dollars and time into Kaveri development.

The removal of American arms trade sanctions allowed smooth incorporation of a slightly modified F404-GE-IN20 turbofan in initial Tejas Mk.I production models. Over the longer term, an international competition for the Tejas Mk.II’s engines had 2 shortlisted competitors, 1 unofficial competitor, and 1 winner in GE’s F414.

The winner: F414. GE’s F414 is that company’s more advanced alternative to the F404 family that equips the Tejas Mk.I; it currently equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. India’s F414-GE-INS6 engines will include the same single-engine FADEC modifications as the Gripen’s F414Gs, and may include some components of the F414-EPE research program for enhanced thrust. Standard F414 engines can reportedly produce up to 22,000 pounds of thrust on afterburners.

GE has been remarkably coy about its thrust in normal operation, but the figures it supplied to India were obviously good enough to beat Eurojet’s EJ200, which reportedly revised its bid too close to the deadline to change its fortunes.

Slow fade: Kaveri. This was supposed to be the fighter’s main engine, but India couldn’t develop a world-leading jet engine from a base of no experience. Kaveri was sidelined in 2008 by GE’s F404, in order to allow flight testing to go forward. DRDO finally admitted defeat in 2013 and stopped advocating Kaveri for the Tejas, after around 6 fruitless years of negotiations with French engine maker Snecma. A global re-tender for assistance was proposed, but late 2014 saw DRDO finally admit the obvious and file the paperwork to end the program.

In the Navy… Naval LCA

2011 briefing
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Indian officials were interested in an improved engine for 2 reasons. One is simply better performance, thanks to an improved thrust:weight ratio. Another is the need for additional thrust, in order to operate the Tejas successfully as a naval aircraft.

India will induct the 40,000t INS Vikramaditya in 2013, after extensive modifications to Russia’s former Admiral Gorshkov carrier. The navy is also proceeding with construction of 2 more 35,000t “air defence ship” Vikrant Class carriers, designed in collaboration with Fincantieri and built in India. Orders have been signed for 46 Russian MiG-29Ks, but India also wants to operate navalized LCA fighters from their decks.

These fighters are actually being designed in a trainer variant first, which will then be converted into a naval fighter. Key changes to the Naval LCA include:

• Dropped nose, for better visibility in high angle-of-attack (nose pointed up) landings.
  
• Leading edge vortex controls that can extend from the edges of the main wing. They help the aircraft safely sink faster to land in smaller spaces, and can also improve takeoff response.
  
• Arrester hook to catch landing wires.
  
• Strengthened spine and related systems, to absorb the high impact of carrier landings (7.1 m/s descent vs. 3m/s for IAF).
  
• Longer, strengthened undercarriage. That actually ended up being a bit overdesigned.
  
• Powered nose wheel steering for better maneuverability on deck.
  
• Fuel dump system that can shed 1,000 kg of fuel from the fighter’s wing tanks, in case of an emergency just after take-off. Fuel weighs a lot, and that added weight can imperil attempted emergency landings.

Naval LCA rollout
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The other change will be the engine. India’s military and designers believe that the naval Mk.I derivative, powered by the same F404-GE-IN20 engine in the IAF variant, can be used for training and testing. At the same time, they believe that only the a Tejas Mk.II derivative with its more powerful F414-GE-INS6 engine will be capable of loaded carrier operations from the Vikrant Class’ “ski jump” ramp, in just 200m of takeoff space.

The naval Tejas program began in 2003. Variant paper designs were produced, and an initial order placed in 2009 began turning those designs into prototypes. April 2012 saw the 1st flight of NP-1, and a 2012 decision gave the go-ahead for initial production of 8 planes. The naval variant is expected to receive a different designation than “Tejas.”

LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future The Program

India’s LCA Programs
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The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft program began in 1983, and is currently in Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II, under which India’s DRDO was trying to deliver production fighters to the IAF by December 2010. Initial Operational Clearance wasn’t granted until January 2011, and then only with significant waivers. Limited Series Production aircraft in final configuration have arrived, but IOC wasn’t declared until November 2013, and even that was done under pressure from the ministry. The plane’s core self-protection systems were only installed in October 2013, most weapons haven’t been tested yet, and neither has aerial refueling. The ministry is pushing for Final Operational Clearance as a day/night, all-weather platform, and the official induction of a Tejas squadron at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu near Sri Lanka, by the end of 2014. It isn’t clear that the fighter can actually achieve those performance goals in time.

So far, 40 Tejas Mk.I fighters have been ordered. Current plans call for another 100 aircraft (mostly Mk.II) for the air force, and up to 60 naval variants for the Navy.

When it was originally approved in 1983, the Tejas program’s cost was set at Rs 560 crore (5.6 billion rupees). The cost had risen to over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise since. The Times of India places the 2011 program total at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants. As shown above, subsequent reports show continued cost increases.

LCA Tejas Mk.II: Delhi, we have a problem…

MiG-21bis: Hanging on
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The first test-flight of the improved and re-engined Tejas Mark-II is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Unfortunately for the air force, those markers are looking less and less likely, and switching in a new engine adds design and testing changes that will complicate matters. Engineers must rebalance the aircraft’s weight, adjust fuel capacity for changed consumption rates, etc. It’s already known that the LCA will need to add 0.5m in length to fit the F414, and its air intakes offer inadequate airflow and will have to be redesigned.

One also expects that an LCA Mk.II will add newer technologies in some areas, and there are reports that India intends to upgrade from IAI’s ELM-2032 phased-array radar to the ELM-2052 AESA. India’s avionics industry also continues to advance, leading to potential component swaps and re-testing. Finally, Tejas Mk.I has placed many key components in inaccessible places. Unless significant redesigns are forthcoming in Mk.II, maintenance costs will be high, and readiness will be low.

Redesign processes usually takes several years, even in a best-case scenario. China’s shift to a Russian RD-33 engine for its J-10 fighter was the centerpiece of a redesign that took more than a decade. Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen made a similar shift from Volvo’s F404-derived RM12 in the JAS-39 A-D models, to GE’s F414 for its new JAS-39E/F, over a few years. There was a standing offer to have Saab adopt a significant role in Mk.2 development, with strong support from DRDO, but that offer remains in limbo.

Major delays to Tejas Mk.I production mean that activity probably won’t end until 2018. The delays will buy time for Mk.II testing, at the cost of IAF readiness and force strength. If the Mk.II also runs into testing problems, the LCA program will face a hard choice: produce more than 40 Tejas Mk.Is, or buy Mk.IIs before testing is done, with the accompanying risk of expensive rework and fielding delays.

Meanwhile, India’s MiG-21 fleet continues to age out.

Industrial Team

The Tejas industrial team is weighted toward government participation, which is one of the reasons for its long development cycle. Instead of buying finished and tested equipment from abroad, new designs had to be invented by government research agencies, then tested by themselves until they were ready, followed by integration testing with other elements. These choices were driven by India’s desire for long-term self-sufficiency in many aircraft sub-systems, in order to reduce their dependence of foreign suppliers.

There have also been a wide variety of sub-contracts to Indian firms for Tier 3 or Tier 4 participation to supply tooling, testing equipment, software development, or sub-assemblies. They are not covered in our list.

In late 2013, HAL told India’s Business Standard that it aimed to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I Full Operational Capability variants.

Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, will also compete for production space. An early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a realistic date for Mk.I production to end.

Tejas Prospects: Think Globally, Begin Locally

Tejas: 2 views
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Exports are important to fighter programs. The added buys keep production lines open at no cost to the home country, and drop prices per plane. A combination of profits and paid-for modifications would help keep the design current, allowing the plane to add new technology and remain relevant. On the industrial front, if ADA can move the plane from the current 55% Indian content to around 80% without creating more problems, it would help to insulate prices from currency exchange swings.

The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft’s exact per-plane flyaway price point isn’t known yet, but the goal is an inexpensive fighter in the $20-25 million range, with performance that compares well to early model F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Historically, the low end of the market is where the largest volume of global fighter buys have taken place. In recent years, however, pressure from home-country buyers has pushed the West into a niche of high-end platforms like the F-15, F-35, Eurofighter, and Rafale. Some mid-tier options exist, like new F-16s, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and JAS-39 Gripens, but even those are fairly pricey for emerging economies. As regional tensions rise, it remains to be seen whether the last decade has seen a permanent shift toward mid-level and high-end platforms, or whether traditional buying patterns will reassert themselves through emerging economies.

Long-term Tejas competitors in the $20 – 40 million range include the market for second-hand F-16s, the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, and Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle family of supersonic trainers and light fighters. RAC MiG has received enough work from India and others to retain the MiG-29M family as a viable platform in this bracket; Russia’s chosen pricing approach will determine whether the thrust-vectoring MiG-35 multi-role fighter also becomes a competitor.

click for video

India’s growing geopolitical influence, and the ability to price toward this bracket’s low end, offers the Tejas decent prospects, even in this crowded field. HAL’s problem is that the Tejas must first achieve success in India.

Delays have taken their toll. Bangalore-based Aeronautics Development Agency (MoD ADA) chief R K Ramanathan promised a 2010 in-service date, while touting a reduction from over 30,000 components to around 7,000. Even that was a late milestone, fully 27 years after the program began, but it didn’t come close to happening. Plans to field 40-48 interim aircraft in the first 2 operational air force squadrons won’t take place until 2015 (32 years), and the final “Tejas Mk.II” version will be very hard-pressed to become operational before 2018 (35 years).

A lot can change in 35 years. Official plans still call for 100+ fighters, but the IAF has embarked on a wide set of upgrade and purchase commitments for existing MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, the new mid-tier MMRCA fighter, and a high-end FGFA stealth fighter joint venture with Russia.

Meanwhile, the IAF is now taking something of a “wait and see” approach to a longer term commitment, until the final aircraft is delivered with working systems and the “Tejas Mark II” design has shown what it can do. One the one hand, the project’s long development period, and DRDO’s past performance on defense projects, tend to justify that wait-and-see approach. On the other hand, the project can easily run into danger without adequate military and political backing. On Feb 6/06, The Telegraph in Calcutta reported that:

“Though air headquarters has not said so in public, it is weighing whether it should commit funds because it is anticipating a resource crunch for the big ticket purchases of multi-role combat aircraft – that could cost the exchequer more than $5 billion over 10 years – and other equipment that it has projected as an immediate need.”

The rumored growth of the MRCA foreign fighter program to 170-200 aircraft, naval plans for 32 more ships in the next 10-15 years, submarine construction imperatives, and other planned capital purchases do indeed have the potential to squeeze the Tejas. The reality of limited funds and budget cuts began to hit home in 2013, and another global economic slowdown will press India into harder choices still. Confidence in the Tejas, or the lack of it, will influence India’s choices.

So will other negotiations. India’s choices mean that the MMRCA program will deliver fewer aircraft at a flyaway price tag of $100+ million each. That makes $25-35 million Tejas LCA fighters look more attractive, in order to plus up numbers. Just as long as the LCA can in fact be produced to that cost level, be delivered in time to replace the MiG-21s, and perform at an adequate level.

Unfortunately, every one of those variables is currently in question.

At present, the worst-case scenario for the Tejas program is truncated production at about 40 operational aircraft, which would doom exports. In that scenario, Tejas Mk.I is built, but other expenditures grab priority. The plane’s role is then divided among upgraded MiG-29UPGs, new naval MiG-29Ks, upgraded Mirage 2000s, and possibly even Hawk Mk.132 trainers that are armed in a backup role.

The generally accepted goal for Tejas is 5 IAF squadrons plus 2 Navy squadrons, or about 140-150 planes. Even that is a relatively short production run at full capacity, which is the rate India must use in order to field new lightweight fighters in time.

The best-case scenario would involve full production for the IAF that raises planned order totals beyond 120, a serving STOBAR (Short Take Off via ramps, But Assisted Recovery via arrester gear and wires) naval variant in service by 2020, and export successes that drive up production totals and help finance future upgrades.

Contracts and Key Events 2014-2018

 

ADA Tejas video January 4/19: Enhancement India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas fighter gets the green light for production in an enhanced, battle standard format. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is mandated to produce the LCAs for the Indian Air Force (IAF). The LCA Tejas is an Indian single-seat, single-jet engine, multi-role light fighter designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency. The completion of production of the first aircraft is scheduled to be in late 2019.

April 17/18: 1st combat exercise! India’s indigenous LCA Tejas fighter has participated in its first major combat exercise—Gagan Shakti. The exercise is taking place between April 10 to 23 and will see the Indian Air Force will mobilise more than 1100 combat, transport and rotary wing (helicopter) aircraft in order to practice the real time scenario, to be conducted day and night, of Combat with the enemy encompassing along Pakistan border in the Western areas and along China border in the Northern areas. During the event, the Tejas is expected to take part in both offensive and defensive roles from a forwarding base and will be tested on its air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities.

December 28/17: RFP-Mk-1A Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) has received a request for proposals (RFP) for 83 Tejas Mk-1A light combat aircraft (LCA)for the Indian Air Force (IAF). The RFP comes following the November 2016 clearance for funds for the program by India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), with production orders expected to be placed in late 2018. The Mk-1A variant offers a significantly modified version of the initial Tejas Mk-1 LCA, and will come equipped with the Israeli Elta 2052 AESA radar, podded Electronic Warfare (EW) suite and Cobham in-flight refuelling probe. Also in the mix are the addition of new air-to-air missiles and precision munitions, in addition to the R-73 and Rafael Derby BVRAAM, already integrated on Tejas Mk-1.

November 13/17: Woes Indian Air Force (IAF) officials have listed a number of deficiencies found with the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) as part of efforts to argue for sourcing foreign-made fighter aircraft rather than increasing orders of the indigenous Tejas. Assessments made by the service and presented to government found that when compared to foreign-made fighter aircraft such as Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen and Lockheed Martin’s F-16, the Tejas posted poorer airborne endurance—59 minutes compared to two hours—and could carry less payload—three tons against nearly six tons and seven tons by the Gripen and F-16 respectively. Maintenance requirements were also greater on the Tejas with 20 hours of serving needed for every hour of flying against six hours for the Gripen and 3.5 hours for the F-16. The Tejas’ service life is also half that of the 40 years found in both the Gripen and F-16. While 123 Tejas fighters have been ordered for the IAF, only four have been delivered, and the IAF desperately needs additional single-engine fighter aircraft to fill a 42 fighter squadron requirement to fight a two-front war. Retirements of ageing MiG-21 aircraft is making the issue worse, with a further 11 of 33 available squadrons due for retirement over the next two years.

August 11/17: Deliveries of the LCA Tejas aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF) has been delayed after the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has delivered only four aircraft to the IAF out of 40 ordered in 2005. The four aircraft so far delivered are from a batch of 20 designated for initial operational clearance (IOC), while the remaining 20 aircraft were designated for final operational clearance (FOC). In order to ramp up production, the government has established a second manufacturing line to support “structural and equipping activities. HAL has also altered the production of certain components and has reduced the manufacturing cycle time by improving supply chain management and boosting workforce.

July 13/17: Rafael has completed integration of its I-Derby air-to-air missiles on India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), with test-firing scheduled for the end of 2017. The Israeli firm also confirmed earlier reports that the fighter could be equipped with the latest Extended Range (ER) version of the missile, and is also looking to offer its Spike ER air-to-surface missile to meet an Indian requirement for helicopter-launched weapons. The Spike tender will also come with a new launcher to meet New Delhi’s technical specifications.

June 23/17: Hindustan Aeronautics’ Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) is likely to be one of the first fighters equipped with the I-Darby Extended Range (ER) air-to-air missile, manufactured by Israel’s Rafael. Boasting an extended range of 100km, the missile comes with a new seeker that employs an advanced solid-state software-defined radar and can be carried on either rail launchers or on a “shove” pyrotechnic launcher. The original variant has already been used on the LCA and Su-30 fighter, and the company is now making efforts to have the I-Derby ER successfully integrated on both platforms. In February, Rafael offered New Delhi to locally build its Derby Mk III—the Indian version of the I-Derby ER— under the ‘Make in India’ initiative.

May 15/17: The Indian Air Force has successfully test-fired a Darby radar-guided air-to-air missile from one of its LCA Tejas fighters. Conducted on May 12, New Delhi’s announcement stated that “the missile launch was performed in Lock ON after Launch mode for a BVR target in the look down mode and the target was destroyed,” and that aircraft avionics, fire-control radar, launchers and Missile Weapon Delivery System all performed as required. The test is one of several steps needed to clear beyond visual range (BVR) capabilities for the LCA.

February 17/17: Saab is continuing a defense partnership with Indian industry, offering a sensor package for India’s s LCA Tejas fighter. Included in the technology transfer is the company’s Airborne Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) fighter radar integrated with a compact electronic warfare suite. The package will also have synergies with the systems developed for the Gripen fighter, currently being pitched to New Delhi to fill their Navy requirement for carrier-based fighters.

February 15/17: India’s Defense Minister has announced intentions to start a second production line for the HAL Tejas fighter within the next three months. Valued at $203.47 million, Manohar Parrikar said the line will produce 16 Tejas fighters for the Indian Air Force. News of the second production line points to the Indian government’s commitment to weaning itself from foreign defense products and encouraging indigenous industry, also known as “techno-nationalism.” This, however, hasn’t come without its problems after the Indian Navy rejected the navalized version of the Tejas for being too heavy.

February 10/17: Israel’s Rafael is ramping up efforts to offer their systems to India’s indigenous Tejas fighter. The Indian Air Force is currently evaluating the company’s Python 5 and 54nm (100km)-range I-Derby ER air-to-air missiles for the Tejas, while it is also promoting its Litening 5 targeting pod and BNET secure radio. Yuval Miller, executive vice-president and head of Rafael’s Air and C4I Systems division, stated that the wide cooperation involved on the Tejas’ development could make it easier to bring the Light Combat Aircraft to the 4.5-generation standard.

November 9/16: India’s Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) has approved the purchase of 83 Tejas Mk 1A fighters and 15 Light Combat Helicopters (LCH), marking the first clearances under the Indigenous Design Development and Manufacturing (IDDM) category. However, it was also reported that a hotly expected decision on whether New Delhi would sign off on purchasing 12 US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan was deferred. DAC also cleared India’s new blacklisting policy.

October 14/16: In order to curry favor with the Indian government, Saab will share their Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar with Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology with India they if they select the Gripen fighter. The list of sweeteners also includes the previous offer of co-developing India’s indigenously manufactured fighter aircraft Tejas MK1A by setting up a production line in India under the “Make in India” scheme. Company officials said that both the LCA and the Gripen are of similar class and also share the same General Electric engine citing commonality in maintenance and operation.

May 19/16: Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha became the first chief to fly the indigenous HAL Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas fighter in a short sortie on Tuesday. Raha’s flight came during a visit to meet team LCA in Bengalaru which involved the inauguration of the Tejas’ painting hanger. The only other top IAF officer to have flown the LCA was Deputy chief of Air Staff Air Marshal SBP Sinha, in September 2014.

May 12/16: Ski-jump tests of a naval version of India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) have been successful. The tests involved the aircraft taking off under 200 meters with the aid of a ski-jump while carrying two R-73 air-to-air missiles. Next up for the two prototype LCAs will involve touch-and-go testing on a simulated deck at the Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) in Goa. The navalized versions will be added to the INS Vikrant aircraft carrier after it is commissioned in 2018.

February 9/16: Another milestone was made last Friday for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas fighter. The Indian jet successfully test fired a Derby Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM) for the first time in a non-intercept mode, as part of a series of weapons trials needed to gain Final Operational Clearance (FOC). The trials will also see the Close Combat Missile (CCM) Python-5 missile tested. The Tejas’ weapons system will also include Paveway and Griffin Laser Guided Bombs (LBGs), the Russian made R-73 missile and Gsh-23 gun.

January 13/16: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is making final preparations for their HAL Tejas lightweight fighter debut at the Bahrain Air Show next week. With plans to impress the experts and pick up a few potential customers along the way, HAL’s display apparently “significantly surpasses any aerobatics display the fighter has presented earlier”. The company plans to have gained final operating clearance (FOC) by mid-2016, and has also annouced that it is to test fire the Rafael Derby beyond-visual-range missile (BVRAAM) in March. The Israeli made missile has been bought as a stopgap arrangement as India grapples to make BVR missile Astra, which is still in development, operational.

October 27/15: India has offered Sri Lanka the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft as an alternative to the JF-17 Thunder, co-developed by China and Pakistan. Previous reports in June by the Pakistani press indicated that the Sri Lankans had signed for an undisclosed number of JF-17s, with this subsequently denied by the Sri Lankan Air Force which stated that it was still evaluating possible fighter options. However, Sri Lankan and Pakistani officials are due to meet in November to discuss the possible acquisition of the JF-17, with India likely looking to export the problematic Tejas LCA in an attempt to undermine strategic rival Pakistan.

October 8/15: The Indian government’s recent decision to procure seven squadrons of the heavily-criticized indigenous Tejas Mk.1A was pushed on the Indian Air Force by the Modi administration, according to a report by Reuters on Wednesday. The Indian Air Force had reportedly requested 44 additional Rafale fighters on top of the 36 announced in April turned down by the government, instead the Modi government pushed the Tejas on the IAF despite concern over the aircraft’s performance.

October 1/15: India will induct seven squadrons (112 to 126 aircraft) of Tejas Mk.I-A light combat aircraft, despite the aircraft’s Final Operating Clearance delayed in July until next year. Despite improvements to the heavily-criticized original indigenous Tejas Mk.I design, the Mk.I-A still has a fair share of problems, including issues with the aircraft’s radar and weapon payload. The fighters are slated for delivery from next year and are intended to provide the Indian Air Force with a much-needed air defense capability.

July 22/15: In a characteristic set-back, India’s Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) will see its Final Operating Clearance delayed until next year. The schedule has slipped consistently for the indigenous fighter, with FOC previously pushed back to December this year. The Indian Defense Ministry has blamed the delays on late delivery of components from foreign manufacturers; however the program also came under severe criticism from the Indian government’s principal oversight body in May, with the aircraft’s performance in question after over three decades of development. The new FOC for the aircraft is now reported to be timetabled for March 2016.

May 11/15: India’s indigenously-developed Tejas Mk I light combat aircraft has come under serious criticism from the country’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), with 53 deficiencies cited in a recent report. A major concern is the lack of defensive countermeasure capability, with the jet reportedly failing to meet Indian Air Force (IAF) survivability standards. The LCA achieved initial operating clearance in December 2013, with the project severely delayed from its original scheduled induction date of 1994. The CAG report to Parliament also highlighted how the IAF will likely be forced to induct the aircraft without a trainer variant available for pilot training, with a repair and overhaul facility also yet to be established at manufacturer HAL’s facilities, a requirement previously set out by the IAF.

Nov 18/14: Kaveri. The DRDO is doing something unusual: submitting documents to cancel a major research project, after INR 21.06 billion has been spent by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) in Bangalore. The request to end the GTX-35VS Kaveri program must now be approved by the Ministry of Finance, and receive clearance from the top-level Cabinet Committee on Security. Which also helps explain why so few projects are canceled, but the biggest change required still involves the DRDO’s mentality. Director-General (Aero) Dr. K. Tamilmani indicates that elections do have consequences:

“These are part of the bold stand being taken by DRDO. Whereever we have found bottlenecks for long time, with no realistic solutions, it’s better to move on. It is an honest stand we are taking…. If you are fit to run only for 50 km, why attempt 100 km? DRDO has realized its mistakes of the past and we have no hesitation in taking some bold steps.”

It is an honest stand, and DRDO can take it without giving up on India’s strategic industrial policy to become more self-sufficient in jet engine technologies. The project delays created by Kaveri remain a total waste, but the research itself can be harvested. DRDO intends to press on with jet engine research, and it’s possible to undertake projects that are militarily useful but much less ambitious. INR 3 billion has reportedly been earmarked for such work, and DRDO wants to make progress is 12 identified technical areas. Sources: OneIndia, “OneIndia Exclusive: DRDO to abandon indigenous fighter jet engine Kaveri project”.

All Kaveri research to end

Oct 4/14: Industrial. Defense News quotes an unnamed source, who says that the Indian government has been talking to major private sector industrial players about setting up a full production line for up to 250 Tejas Mk.2s. That would certainly justify the investment.

If carried out, that move would sidestep HAL’s production difficulties (q.v. Dec 9/12) by partly or wholly removing Tejas from HAL’s purview, create a full competitor to HAL in the aerospace sector, and turn the winner into India’s 1st major private sector defense firm. It would also double planned Tejas Mk.2/naval buys, based on past reports (q.v. Jan 11/14).

Since it seems apparent that the Indian government would have to fund a new production line for HAL anyway, funding the line elsewhere and reaping the benefits of diversification and competition is a logical policy option. Especially since the resulting competitor would also be a potential source for programs like India’s light transport competition, which stalled out because the private sector can’t afford to set up a full production facility for just 40 planes.

The challenge is that setting up a production line for modern combat jets isn’t simple, and major problems could really mess with already chancy schedules for Tejas Mk.2 and the planned naval variant. One obvious way to reduce this risk would be to bring in a foreign firm like Boeing, Saab, Dassault, et. al. to help set up the plant, and assist with management for the first few years. If done in conjunction with Mk.2 design assistance (q.v. June 17/14), the Tejas program as a whole could get a substantial boost.

Tata Group, Mahindra & Mahindra and Larsen and Toubro have been mentioned, and L&T Heavy Engineering President Madhukar Vinayak Kotwal has confirmed that discussions are taking place, but that’s all he is prepared to say. Watch this space. Sources: Defense News, “India Offers To Spend $12B To Break Monopoly”.

Aug 17/14: Industrial. HAL and DRDO’s ADA are trying to encourage more small and mid-size manufacturers to make parts for the aircraft:

“They aim to raise the LCA’s indigenous content to 80 per cent in three years, up from the present 50 to 55 per cent…. HAL Chairman R.K. Tyagi told them that starting 2015–16, “we aim to roll out 16 LCAs every year, [increasing] from the initial target of eight a year”.

Currently, 168 of the 344 LCA components are made in the country.

A key defence scientist involved in the programme said HAL and ADA would help manufacturers to pick up at least 10 more simple components and offer the use of government-owned manufacturing and test facilities.”

If they can do that while maintaining quality, and pick manufacturers who are capable of further innovation, they would make future upgrades easier. More local content would also reduce cost shifts based on currency exchange rates, and create a wider base for future programs like the Su-50/FGFA. The bad news? This policy falls into the “simple, but not easy” category. Sources: The Hindu, “A few small production pushes for LCA”.

June 17/14: Saab for Mk.2? As M-MRCA negotiations to buy advanced Rafale fighters stall, and projected costs rise sharply, Saab remains in position with a different offer. Instead of touting their superior JAS-39E/F Gripen, they’ve proposed to take a 51% share of a joint venture company, then leverage their expertise to create the LCA Mk.2. DRDO chief Dr V K Saraswat was enthusiastic, and they issued an RFI in 2012 and an RFP in 2013.

It isn’t a crazy idea. The Indo-Russian BrahMos missile has been very successful using a similar structure, and a 51% share plus freedom from Indian government strictures would remove many of the program’s decision-making and organizational issues. Saab is the only aircraft major with single-engine fighter conversion experience from the F404 to the F414 engine, so tasks like stretching the fuselage 0.5m, changing the air intakes, etc. have already been thought through in another context. Their Gripen has also achieved low operating costs, in part due to maintenance-friendly design. That’s another Tejas weakness, thanks to very maintenance-unfriendly placement of key components.

Since LCA Mk.2 is also expected as a carrier fighter, success already matters to India. they need to complete development successfully. From the IAF’s perspective, replacing M-MRCA with Tejas Mk.2 would simplify their future high-medium-low mix by avoiding a 2nd fighter in the same class as the SU-30MKI, while allowing them to field more squadrons. The flip side is that their high-end capability becomes irretrievably Russian-dependent: SU-30MKIs now, and FGFA/SU-50s later. For Saab, a JV would give them a major new niche in the global marketplace, providing a low-end fighter in a class below the Gripen and its Western competitors.

The catch? Incoming DRDO chief Dr Avinash Chander is more focused on developing the Mk.2 alone, and believed that any foreign partnership would require a global tender. In India, that would take years. Re-opening the opportunity would depend on a failure of M-MRCA negotiations, and continued failure to field Tejas, pushing the new BJP government to take a second look at all of its options. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Rafale contract elusive, Eurofighter and Saab remain hopeful”.

Feb 12/14: Costs. India’s MoD releases another set of official cost figures for the program, leaving out the Kaveri engine but adding a “Phase-III” development period. LCA development costs have now risen from an original INR 71.16 billion to INR 140.33 billion (+97.2%), or INR 168.72 billion (+137.1%) if one properly counts the Kaveri engine. Expected production line investments would push those figures even higher. India’s MoD was savvy enough to compare development costs to Saab’s more advanced Gripen NG:

“Developmental cost of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas is Rs.7965.56 Crore ($1.09 Billion) including building of 15 aircraft and creation of infrastructure for production of 08 aircraft per annum. This compares with the developmental cost of JAS 39 NG Grippen is $1.80 Billion for developing 5 Proto Vehicles.”

That’s actually just the current predicted cost of the IAF’s MK.I/II development, minus the Kaveri engine, and arguably without creating infrastructure that could actually deliver 8 aircraft per year. The Gripen NG figure would need to be checked carefully, to see what it included and excluded. Even so, the simple act of making the comparison shows a greater sense of external awareness than we’re used to seeing from India’s MoD. Source: India MoD/ PIB, “Developmental Cost of LCA Project”.

Feb 10/14: A written reply from Minister of State for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh to Lok Sabha parliamentarians triggers stories about the IAF raising their planned LCA buys from 200 to 300. Unfortunately for the media reporting that story, it rests entirely on an error of logic. Here’s the exact quote, which can’t be linked anymore thanks to MoD web site changes:

“The MiG-21 and MiG-27 aircrafts of the IAF have already been upgraded and currently equip 14 combat squadrons. These aircraft, however, are planned for being phased out over the next few years and will be replaced by the LCA. Steps have been initiated for upgradation of other fighter aircrafts like MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000; transport aircraft like AN-32 and Mi-17/Mi-17 IV helicopters.”

What this statement does not say is that the replacement will happen on an equal basis. It’s perfectly possible to replace existing squadrons with fewer squadrons and fewer planes, if one is so inclined. The Americans have been doing so for decades, and they’re hardly alone. So far, firm IAF commitments involve 126 LCA Tejas planes: 6 squadrons of 21 planes each, with only 96 (16 x 6) as front-line fighters. Each squadron also has 3 rotation aircraft to cover maintenance absences or loss replacement, and 2 twin-seat trainers, to make 21. Beyond those 2 Tejas Mk.I squadrons and 4 Tejas Mk.II squadrons, we’ll have to see. Sources: India MoD, “Modernisation of IAF” | India’s Business Standard, “IAF will buy 14 Tejas squadrons, lowering costs”

Jan 12/14: Budgets. India’s defense budget will drop by INR 78 billion in 2013-14, after a drop of INR 100 billion in 2012-13. A more sluggish economy, and a weakened ruling Congress Party that’s trying to shore up its electoral base, are the issues. At the same time, India is negotiating the MMRCA deal for 126 Rafales, the FGFA deal with Russia for their future high-end stealth fighter, the Project 75i submarine buy that’s becoming an emergency, and attack and heavy-lift helicopter buys with Boeing. They also want to add to their fleet of P-8i long-range maritime patrol planes, buy AWACS early warning jets as a priority, and improve their aerial tanker fleet as a priority. Among other priorities.

That explains why the MoD asked for INR 400 billion more, instead of 78 billion less. Unless this gap changes, future Tejas production will find itself caught in an environment where everything can’t be funded, but big air force commitments have already been made. Sources: Times of India, “Despite budget cut, defence ministry continues with modernization drive”.

Jan 11/14: Pricing. Sources tell India’s Business Standard that HAL has quoted the Ministry a price of INR 1.62 billion (about $26.5 million) per plane for the first 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters. The Ministry wants to know why its 40% higher than the INR 1.165 billion quoted in 2006, and HAL has a good answer. One, inflation over the past 8 years takes a toll. Two, 45% of the plane’s cost involves imported parts, and the Indian rupee is sinking. Three, Tejas is still about half the $45.8 million price of a Mirage 2000 upgrade ({EUR 1.4 billion is now INR 118.3 billion + INR 2.02 billion to HAL}/ 49 jets = INR 2.8 billion or $45.8 million per), and those upgrades are even more dependent on currency rates.

HAL sees eventual purchases of 40 Mk.Is, 84 Mk.IIs, 11 naval trainers, and 46 naval variants (TL: 181), and recent government declaration have used 200 aircraft as a possible figure. Now that Tejas is on surer ground, and the opportunity is clearer, HAL is trying to control costs using longer-term commitments of its own. Step one reportedly involves Long Time Business Agreements (LTBAs) of 3-5 years and 40-50 aircraft sets with key sub-contractors, including clauses that let it vary annual production rates to some extent, a feature also seen in many of the US military’s multi-year purchase agreements. Long lead time components have been identified, and industrial improvements are underway. Practices like having 5-axis CNC machines on hand, and using computerized drilling of 8,000 holes or so in the composite wing skin, are more or less assumed in North America. They’re a step forward for HAL, which needs that kind of long-term investment in its industrial capacity.

Will that investment, and higher production, improve costs enough? Pakistan’s JF-17, which has already delivered 50 planes, is reportedly priced around $23-24 million per plane. If the Tejas Mk.II comes in around $30 million in current dollars, pointing to composite construction and supposedly better avionics isn’t going to cut it in export competitions as a reason for the 25% price difference. An AESA radar might, depending on what Pakistan does for the coming JF-17 Block II, and how much it costs. Sources: Business Standard, “HAL pegs price of Tejas fighter at Rs 162 crore”.

2013

GE F414 engine contract; No Kaveris for Tejas fleet; AESA radar?; Why the multi-year delay for self-protection EW?; IOC at last, but is the plane ready?

LCA Naval
(click to view full)

Dec 20/13: IOC-2. the LCA program achieves Initial Operational Clearance II. This is closer to the F-35’s IOC than traditional American IOC designations: limited capabilities with some initial weapons, and more testing required, but regular air force pilots can now fly it. Sources: Economic Times of India, “Indigenous fighter aircraft LCA-Tejas gets Initial Operational Clearance”.

Dec 19/13: What’s next? Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification Director-General Dr K Tamil Mani explains what’s next for Tejas, whose remaining testing and certification needs show the IOC-2 designation’s limits. The fighter needs to pass 6 milestones in the next 15 months, on the way to G=Final Operational Clearance. They include:

• Integrating the Russian GSH 23mm gun, which also requires certifying the surrounding LRU electronics boxes for much higher vibration levels.
  
• Integration of additional weapons, incl. Python 4/5 short-range air-to-air missiles and Derby medium range air-to-air missiles.
  
• Integrating Cobham’s air refueling probe.
  
• Increasing sustained Angle of Attack parameters from 22 – 24 degrees.
  
• Improved braking system with higher heat tolerance. They might even need to add fans, as they did for some of their MiGs.
  
• Change the nosecone from composite materials to a quartz-based material, in order to remove the current 45-50 km limit on the radar and bring it to its design level of 80+ km.

Sources: Indian Express, “Tejas Needs to Cross 6 Milestones in 15 Months”.

Dec 18/13: IOC process. India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) explains what IOC-2 certification involved to the Indian Express. The bureaucracy takes credit for the plane’s accident-free history, of course, and proudly notes their “concurrent participation in all development activities,” without discussing Tejas’ developmental delays.

The did have a lot to do between the incomplete Initial Operational Clearance on Dec 10/11, and IOC-2 about 2 years later. Full integration and testing of IAI’s ELM-2032 radar, testing of stores integration and release, flight envelope expansion from 17 degrees Angle of Attack to 22 degrees. Maximum flight parameters are now 6gs maneuvering, with a maximum speed of Mac 1.4 and a service ceiling to 50,000 feet. Safety-related work included safe emergency jettisoning of all stores, engine relight, wake penetration, night flying and all weather clearance. Sources: Indian Express, “Clearing Flight Test Parameters was a Challenge, Says Airworthiness Centre”.

Dec 17/13: Updates. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the LCA program. The key takeaways? As on Nov 30/13, they’ve conducted 2,415 flight tests using 15 Tejas Aircraft. A lot of reviews are riding herd on the program, which can add urgency or slow down actual work, depending on how that’s handled. Structurally, the Phased Development Approach has been changed to Concurrent Development Approach, which adds development risk but can cut time if it works, and Quick Reaction Teams have been formed to address design and production issues as they arise.

IOC-2 is still expected on Dec 20/13, but another release makes it clear that the Mk.II project continues to slip. The Probable Date of Completion for LCA Phase-II full-scale engineering design work is now December 2015: 9 months later than the previous March 2015 goal, and 7 years later than the original plan. Sources: India MoD, “LCA project” and DRDO projects“.

Dec 17/13: MiG-21 update. India’s MoD summarizes the state of the IAF’s MiG-21 fleet. The MiG-21FLs are retired now, but the answer shows that the remaining MiGs may have to serve longer than intended:

“254 MiG-21 aircraft are still in service with the Indian Air Force. During the last ten years (2003-2004 to 2012-2013) and the current year (upto 30.11.2013), a total of 38 MiG-21 aircraft have crashed.

Phasing out of aircraft and their replacement with new generation aircraft depends upon national security / strategic objectives and operational requirements of the defence forces and are reviewed by the Government from time to time. This is a continuous process.”

On Dec 12/13, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne confirmed that the LCA Tejas would replace the MiG-21 in the IAF fleet. That may appear to have been obvious, but official confirmation indicates a greater degree of confidence in the program. Sources: India MoD, “MIG-21 Aircraft” | Indian Express, “Tejas to Officially Replace MiG-21 FL”.

Dec 9/13: Defence Minister A K Antony is scheduled to give the Tejas its Initial Operational Certificate (IOC) on Dec 20/13, which would allow Tejas to be flown by regular IAF personnel outside of the test pilot community. Note that IOC doesn’t include key performance parameters like qualification with many of the fighter’s weapons, basic self-protection systems, air-to-air refueling, or finalization of the Tejas Mk.I’s design. Those will have to wait for Final Operation Clearance (FOC), and an increasingly-impatient defense minister has reportedly ordered DRDO to ensure that FOC takes place before 2014 ends.

The first Tejas squadron of 18-20 fighters will be built to IOC standard, and based at Sulur AB in Tamil Nadu, near Sri Lanka. They should be able to handle the minimal threats from that quarter, and one hopes that reported problems (q.v. April 21/13) were either untrue, or have been fixed.

On the industrial front, HAL has told India’s Business Standard that it aims to roll out the first 2 Tejas IOC fighters by March 2014, and deliver 8 more by the end of 2014. The next step after that will be to enhance to production line to 16 fighters per year, a task that might prove challenging without outside aid (q.v. Dec 9/12). That would leave 10 Tejas Mk.I IOC fighters to be built in 2015, whereupon HAL would be able to begin production of 20 Tejas Mk.I FOC variants. Required FOC upgrades to the IOC fleet, and initial naval production orders, could probably keep HAL at a minimum activity level through 2017; but an early 2013 interview with ADA director Shri PS Subramanyam saw 2018 as a more realistic date for Mk.I production to end. That might actually be helpful. If Tejas Mk.II isn’t ready to begin production by time Mk.I is done, India will have an industrial problem on its hands. Sources: Business Standard, “Tejas LCA sprints towards IAF’s frontline squadron” | AeroMag Asia, Jan-Feb 2013 issue.

Dec 7/13: Testing. The LCA’s 1st firing of an AA-11 short range air-to-air missile is successful, as the missile hits a target that was towed by a drone. The demonstration was conducted off the coast of Goa, in the Arabian Sea. Sources: The Hindu Business Line, “Light combat aircraft Tejas fires missile on target”.

Dec 7/13: MiG-21FL retires. After 50 years of service, the IAF is about to phase out its MiG-21FL variant, which is prepping to fly its last sortie on Dec 11/ 13 over Kalaikunda AFS in Bengal. Other MiG-21 variants will remain in service, and current expectations will extend the most modern MiG-21 Bison variants to at least 2018. Sources: The Calcutta Telegraph, “Supersonic jet set for last sortie”.

Aug 7/13: Costs. A Parliamentary reply to Shri S. Thangavelu in Rajya Sabha sets out the costs for each phase of the Tejas program in slightly more detail. Our chart above has been amended to reflect the current figures.

India is still in Full Scale Engineering Development Phase II, which aims to build 3 prototypes and 8 Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft, and establish infrastructure for producing 8 aircraft per year. LSP-8 made its maiden flight on March 31/13, but reports to date suggest that meeting the infrastructure goal will require a significant increase in development costs (q.v. Dec 9/12). India MoD.

BEL on EW, 2011
click for video

Oct 16/13: Why no EW? The DRDO has finally fitted a Tejas fighter (PV-1) with electronic warfare/ self-protection systems, and intends to begin flight tests in November and December. Why has this key development been delayed for 5 years? Believe it or not, they thought it was more important to preserve the plane’s flight safety record:

“For almost eight years, a section of the aeronautical community has been resisting its fitment, anxious that the add-ons may cause a first crash…. They have been very keen on securing the operational clearance, initial as well as final from the Indian Air Force, even if the LCA did not have the electronic system…. no one wished to risk an add-on on the LCA that had not been tried. The idea was to defend the ‘zero crash’ record. This was made known sometimes explicitly to engineers and scientists working on the electronic systems, who, however, had been pressing for very long that the systems ought to be fitted and trials conducted to be able to fine-tune them.”

Unfortunately, PV-1 hasn’t been flying recently, so they may end up introducing risk that way. Tejas Mk.Is will have an Israeli IAI Elta jamming pod available as an external store, with the full RWJ system slated for the Mk.II. Sources: Deccan Herald, “Finally, Tejas gets electronic warfare systems”.

DRDO’s problems, in a nutshell

June 1/13: Excuses. DRDO chief V K Saraswat tries to deflect criticism of Tejas’ continuing delays, by citing the effects of sanctions that ended 13 years ago. Lack of cooperation and foreign help might explain why Tejas was slow to develop from the early 1980s to 2000. It doesn’t explain why DRDO didn’t follow professional practice by working with experienced pilots and the IAF, which created a multitude of poor design decisions that required years of delay to produce only partial fixes. Or the reason DRDO has wasted so much time with engine and radar choices that were obviously inadequate, all well after sanctions had ended. Or why, 13 years after sanctions had ended, Tejas isn’t ready for service yet, while Pakistan’s JF-17 equips 3 squadrons.

Weak excuses do not inspire future confidence. Brahmand Defence & Aerospace.

April 21/13: Tejas a lemon? The Sunday Standard reports that the Tejas is much farther away from viability than anyone is admitting, and says that DRDO’s notional stealth AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) has been put on hold until the LCA project can be made to work. A stealth FGFA/SU-50 is already in co-development with Russia, so AMCA’s value is unclear anyway. With respect to the Tejas LCA, the Sunday Standard’s unnamed sources say:

“The plane cannot fly on its own. It needs a lifeline in the form of support and monitoring of its systems from the ground by technicians…. The common man thinks the plane is doing fine, its engine sounds great and the manoeuvres are perfect. But those flying and weapons firing displays are done with ground monitoring and support. The plane is still not ready to flying on its own”…. the sources noted that LCA was grounded for three months between September and December 2012 following problems with its landing gear. “Normally, a combat plane is ready for its next sortie following a 30-minute [servicing]. In the case of LCA, after a single sortie of about an hour or so, it needs three days of servicing before it can go for its next sortie,” they said.”

These revelations come against a backdrop of pressure from India’s defense minister Antony and India’s government to buy designed-in-India items unless there’s no other choice. He’s selling changes to India’s Defence Procurement Policy as an anti-corruption effort – but what do you call spending billions of dollars on politically-allied state organizations, who don’t deliver on the critical defense projects assigned to them, and never pay any serious penalties for it? Their competitors in China and Pakistan are consistently faster and often better – while doing a better job developing their industries. See also India PIB.

March 20/13: More delays. A Parliamentary reply confirms the obvious, formally extending the scheduled end of the LCA’s Phase 2 Full Scale Engineering Development from December 2012 to March 2015.

The IAF has ordered 20 fighters in “Initial Operational Clearance” (January 2011) status, and another 20 in “Full Operational Clearance” (i.e. combat-ready) configuration. Full Operational Clearance is now expected in December 2014. PTI, via Zee News | India MoD.

Feb 6/13: AESA Radar? At Aero India 2013, Defense Update files a report that adds the short-range Python 5 air-to-air missile to the Tejas’ list of integrated weapons, alongside the Russian R-73/AA-11. It adds:

“The LCA will also carry the EL/M-2052 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar developed by IAI Elta. Originally, the EL/M-2032 was selected but the new 2052 now available with a more compact antenna is best designed to fit the nose cones of LCA and Jaguar, offering enhanced capabilities for both fighters.”

If the Defense Update report is true, it would roughly double the Mk.II fighter’s radar performance, and sharply lower its maintenance costs. DID has been unable to confirm this report, and there have been previous reports (q.v. Jan 14/11 entry) that said M-2052 sales for the Tejas Mk.II had been barred by American pressure. Indeed, the Americans managed to pressure the Israelis not to install the M-2052 in their own F-16i fighters.

Feb 5/13: On the eve of Aero India 2013, Indian defense minister AK Antony tells DRDO that:

“I am happy for your achievements of DRDO but not fully happy. Delay in delivery is a real problem… Try to speed up your process and reduce time for research, development and production. [DRDO is getting ready for a 2nd initial clearance for Tejas, but] I am impatient for the Final Operational Clearance (FOC)….. Antony also expressed his disappointment over reported lack of cohesion between the aircraft development agencies under DRDO and aircraft maker HAL.”

In India, FOC means “ready for combat operations”, which is closer to the US military’s idea of “Initial Operational Capability.” The Pioneer.

Jan 20/13: F414 deal. India Strategic quotes DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat, who says that India’s government has finalized the terms of GE’s F414 contract, including the difficult issues surrounding Indian production. That process took over 2 years, as the engine was picked in September 2010.

The deal is reportedly a Rs 3,000 crore (about $560 million) contract for 99 of the Tejas Mk.II’s F414-GE-INS6 engines, with an option to buy another 100 at fixed terms. IANS via Silicon India | Times of India.

F414 engine deal finalized

Jan 4/13: Kaveri. India’s Business Standard reports that India’s Ministry of Defence has failed in its 6 years of sole-source negotiations with Snecma, and will try a global tender to secure cooperation in developing the Kaveri engine. The engine’s development has hit a technical dead-end, and cannot incorporate key alloys, single-crystal blades, and other manufacturing and design technologies without foreign help. The DRDO’s GTRE department has also conceded defeat with respect to the LCA, according to its chief Dr. C.P. Ramnarayanan:

“We were planning to re-engine first 40 Tejas fighters with the Kaveri. But now they will continue to fly with the F-404 engine.”

DRDO swill use Kaveri for its UCAV, and still holds out hope that a redesigned Kaveri can power a locally designed AMCA twin-engined medium fighter. To power AMCA, the engine would need to improve afterburner performance of about 15,825 pounds thrust. That means foreign help, but DRDO has made global solicitations before, and had no takers beyond Snecma.

2012

Cert & program delays; Naval prototype flies; Kaveri for UCAV; Shaping up HAL – which clearly needs it.

IUSAV: News report
(click for video)

Dec 26/12: Kaveri. India wants to develop a long-range, jet-powered armed drone, powered by a modified Kaveri engine (vid. March 21/12 entry). These are commonly called UCAVs (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), but India refers to their project as IUSAV (Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle). Note that most of the video and pictures in the video are of other countries’ efforts, since India is at a very early stage.

Now DRDO’s GTRE has asked the Ministry for another Rs 595 crore (about $93 million), covering a 48-month program to develop 2 prototypes of a modified Kaveri engine with no afterburner. This includes removing the base design flaws detecting during 2010-11 testing in Russia, ground testing in Bangalore, and confirmatory tests in Russia at the Gromov Flight Research Institute. The program would be capped by flight testing of the 2 no-afterburner prototypes in LCA prototype PV-1.

This idea actually makes sense. The Missile Technology Control Regime makes it problematic for countries to sell India a USAV jet engine, since a cruise missile is also an armed unmanned aircraft. On the Indian side, the Kaveri engine has the most problems adding enough thrust in afterburner, but “dry” statistics of 11,060 pounds thrust are close to the project’s goal of 11,500. Dropping the afterburner sheds engine weight, which has been an issue for Kaveri, and UCAV engines to date don’t have afterburners anyway. Other countries’ UCAV designs have all been sub-sonic drones that rely on stealth or low-threat environments to survive. Business Standard.

UCAV: a good use for Kaveri

Dec 12/12: Naval LCA. India’s Navy is upset by the fact that only 1 naval LCA has been built, and need aircraft to train with. Media reports say they’re about to issue a an Rs 1,000 crore (about $185 million) RFP to produce the first 8 Limited Series Production Tejas naval fighters, which would include both single-seat test aircraft and 2-seat trainers. This would turn the Feb 27/12 approval into a contract after negotiations with HAL, and work is expected to begin in 2013. Whether HAL’s production capacity can handle it (vid. Dec 9/12) is another question.

Business Standard reports the Indian military’s current belief that the navalized Tejas Mk.I can be used for training, and the state-owned ADA is touting a 1st representative takeoff by mid-2013 and a 1st representative landing by the end of 2013. At the same time, they believe that only the Tejas Mk.II will be capable of loaded carrier operations, using just 200m of space and a “ski-jump” ramp. The design has also turned out to be harder than expected. Commodore CD Balaji, who directs the Naval LCA project at ADA told India’s Business Standard that:

“In the paper design it looked feasible [to convert the IAF’s Tejas], similar to what Eurofighter proposed for a navalised Typhoon; or what Gripen proposed for the Sea Gripen [DID: both of which are higher end designs, with better base performance]. But when we started the detailed design and the actual build… we realised the benefits of what Dassault had done with the Rafale. They designed and built the naval variant first, the Rafale Marine. The air force Rafale is just a subset of Rafale Marine. That is the easiest path.”

Dec 9/12: Industrial fail, more $. India’s Business Standard offers a scathing portrait of incompetence at HAL, which has been unable to set up and operate a production line for the LCA, even though many of its projects involve assembling foreign designs on production lines in India. On the other hand, see the March 24/11 entry, where HAL executives point out that it doesn’t make much sense to establish a full modern production line for a program that has only featured limited production orders and an uncertain future.

As a result, Tejas fighters built to date have been custom-built limited-production and prototype aircraft. The immediate consequence is that the Ministry of Defence has to budget another Rs 1,500 crore (about $277 million) to try and set up a modern production line. Air Marshal (ret.) Pranab K Barbora:

“HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”

The paper points out that HAL’s new CEO RK Tyagi has “no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture,” and openly doubts the government ADA’s program manager, P. Subramanyam. He promises that HAL will build 20 Tejas Mk.I fighters in 2.5 – 3 years, with production of the next 20 in just over 2 more years, by 2018. That might be possible if an experienced foreign manufacturer is contracted quickly to help set up production, and the MoD is reportedly studying that idea. By itself, however, HAL hasn’t been able to build even 2 Tejas fighters per year over a prolonged reference period, and India has no operational squadrons. Meanwhile, Pakistan has already fielded almost 3 squadrons of their JF-17 Thunder fighter, which began its design cycle after Tejas.

Note that the Business Standard’s figure of INR 155.470 billion (Rs 14,047 + 1,500 crore) for the entire LCA Tejas program is almost exactly double the Indian government’s official March 2012 figures. The math indicates that they’re probably including the Kaveri engine. DID considers the 2 programs to be separate, and pegs unofficial total Tejas development costs at INR 131.015 billion (Rs 13,101.5 crore, currently about $2.15 billion), including current and forecast costs for the naval variant, and the expected Rs 1500 crore for production line help. With Kaveri included, our figures rise to INR 144.405 billion, and are probably slightly behind actual Kaveri spending. Business Standard.

HAL: Industrial fail

Dec 3/12: Kaveri. India’s state-owned Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) aims to integrate the Kaveri powerplant with a Tejas fighter operated by India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), with the aim of flying it by the end of 2013. Whether it can perform to standard won’t change DRDO’s advocacy, but it may matter to the IAF. As of May 14/12 (q.v.), India’s Minister of Defence said that it couldn’t meet India’s 90kN/ 20,200 pound thrust requirement.

A March 21/12 answer to Parliament (q.v.) pegged the Kaveri’s development cost at INR 28.39 billion ($520 million), nearly 10 times greater than the original INR 3.83 billion. Flight International.

Aug. – Nov. 2012: Testing halted. The Tejas encounters a DASH of trouble, as India discovers that the top of the pilot’s DASH-III integrated helmet display can end up above the top of the Martin-Baker ejection seat. That’s a serious problem, because it means the helmet could hit the canopy as the seat rockets out of the cockpit, killing the ejecting pilot. India had to halt testing for 3 1/2 months before the problem was fixed. Their response was to modify the seat, and to provide a backup mechanism that they calculate will blow the canopy off before the pilot’s head can hit it. They had better be right.

DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat has confirmed to India’s Business Standard that the fixes are done, adding that ADA used the down time to make other modifications as a result of flight test feedback. Even so, a string of setbacks has shifted Tejas’ Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) from a re-baselined end-2010 to mid-2013 – if nothing else goes seriously wrong. Final Operational Clearance (FOC) for combat operations was scheduled for end-2012, and now looks unlikely until 2014-2015.

To the west, Pakistan has already inducted 3 squadrons of its comparable JF-17 fighters, whose joint development with China began 16 years after Tejas. India’s Business Standard.

A DASH of trouble

Oct 18/12: Lessons Learned. Air Commodore Muthanna’s “Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA” [PDF] has some interesting bits in it. The Commodore believes that the fighter deserves to enter service. Unfortunately, Indian officials and firms didn’t involve aviators in the initial design process, either by teaming with the IAF or by the widespread practice of embedding aviators in the design teams. The IAF had to get involved after the 2006 contract, and a lot of the time and cost slippage from then until now has involved RFAs aimed at fixing deficiencies that should have been addressed in design. Beyond that, he cites serious issues in management, manufacturing, and training:

“A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program…. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge….

….[Transitioning from design to manufacture,] the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings…. [is] an elaborate process…. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to mee t DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower.

….With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken…. there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.”

Lessons learned report

May 14/12: Kaveri. Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony replies to Shri Bal Kumar Patel in Lok Sabha. No, DRDO still has no time frame to fully develop its Kaveri engine. Antony reiterates that the engine does not meet requirements for the Tejas, but will be used in UAVs and marine applications. A technology demonstrator may fly in a Tejas Mk.I fighter around 2015. The operative word here is “may”.

April 27/12: Naval LCA. NP-1, the 1st Tejas naval prototype, has its maiden flight. The plane is piloted by chief test pilot of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) national flight test centre (NFTC) Commodore TA Maolankar and co-piloted by the centre’s flight test engineer, Wing Commander Maltesh Prabhu. NP-2 will be the single-seat naval variant. Zee News.

Naval variant flies

March 21/12: Costs. Defence minister Antony answers a Parliamentary question, and provides cost and schedule slips for the LCA Tejas, LCA Naval, and Kaveri engine. Those are reproduced above along with other information. Antony also discusses what’s being done about these slips, which amounts to more oversight and monitoring. That won’t cure a system whose main problem is a lack of accountability or consequences for the state-run development agencies, and whose secondary problem is the system’s own red tape. On the other hand, the answer makes it sound like the government is doing something. Antony adds that:

“Tacit knowledge acquired by the DRDO scientists during this project will also be applied for further aerospace technology. Kaveri spin-off engine can be used as propulsion system for Indian Unmanned Strike Air Vehicle (USAV).”

Readers may note that he is not referring to the LCA Tejas program as a destination for Kaveri, despite DRDO’s wishes in the matter. See also Indian government PIB | Flight International.

March 14/12: Goal – 6 squadrons. Indian minister of state for defence M M Pallam Raju tels the Rajya Sabha upper chamber that the IAF plans to induct 6 LCA squadrons over the next decade or so, including 4 squadrons of Tejas Mk.II fighters. Given current schedules, past performance, and the extent of the redesign and testing involved, India may be lucky to induct any Mk.II fighters by 2022. Deccan Herald.

March 11/12: Naval LCA. India’s Sunday Guardian reports that India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC) has refused flight certification for the Naval LCA, until the new landing gear’s weight is reduced, and its wing leading-edge vortex controls are redesigned. The US Navy and EADS are reportedly being consulted to help fix the problems.

CEMILAC’s decision will add further delays to a program that is already late, and effectively ends hopes for a March 2012 flight. The naval variant’s initial flight was initially slated to happen by the end of 2010, following a July 2010 roll-out. As of Sept 26/11, it had managed only an Engine Ground Run.

March 10/12: Testing. While Tejas continues to make test flights, and has been granted initial certification, final certification and full production continues to face delays, and will not come until late 2013 or even 2014 now.

New test aircraft LSP-7 had a maiden flight, without a chase plane, “to test many indigenously-developed instruments,” as well as the M-2032 radar and DASH helmet. It’s close enough to the final standard that it will be one of the planes offered for IAF user-evaluation trials, but the final-configuration LSP-8 won’t be ready until later in 2012. LSP-8 will be the version presented to CEMILAC for full certification and flight clearance, a necessary step before full production can begin for the two 20-plane orders. The Hindu.

Feb 29/12: HAL, shape up. India’s MoD explains that changes are coming to HAL, and cites the Tejas program as one reason behind the push:

“The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today asked the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to realign its business processes for strategic alliances and joint ventures, as also, to step up R&D efforts to remain globally competitive… Keeping in mind the mammoth role that the HAL would assume in the coming years in the aerospace industry and the challenges that it would face, the government has set up an expert group under the chairmanship of Shri BK Chaturvedi, Member, Planning Commission to suggest measures to strengthen and restructure HAL… the Group will suggest how best the spin offs from HAL order book can be earnest to ensure better involvement of the private industry in the defence sector. It will also suggest measures to enhance the synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and the civilian industry.

“Taking part in the discussion the Members of Parliament appreciated the role played by HAL in the defence arena of the country over the years. They, however, pointed out certain shortcomings such as the delay in the induction of the Light Combat Aircraft in the Indian Air Force, delay in the development of Kaveri Engine, delay in phasing out of Mig-21 aircraft and lack of an aggressive strategy to export HAL products.”

See also March 24/11 entry, The Pioneer | Flight International | IN FOCUS: India advances air force modernisation.

Feb 27/12: Naval LCA. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned the building of 8 Naval LCA aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and reportedly allocated the necessary funds for a contract. That does not mean a contract has been signed yet.

The 8 planes will be built as a mix of single-seat test fighters and twin-seat trainers, and would begin to add production fighters on top of the ordered fleet of 6 test aircraft. The first flight is announced for sometime in March, though talks last year of a maiden flight in July did not pan out. Business Standard.

2011

Tejas initial clearance; RAFAEL Derby picked as MRAAM; Kaveri engine still alive but in limbo; HAL pushed to outsource.

IOC flight
(click to view video)

Dec 21/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony explains the Kaveri engine’s current development status:

“So far 9 prototypes of Kaveri engines and 4 prototypes of Kabini (Core) engines have been developed. Total 2050 hours of testing have been conducted on various Kaveri and Kabini engines at ground and altitude conditions for various requirements including performance, operability, endurance, environmental, etc. Two major milestones viz. successful completion of Official Altitude Testing (OAT) and completion of first block of flights of Kaveri engine in Flying Test Bed (FTB) has demonstrated the technological capability and maturity of this indigenous effort. Kaveri engine prototype (K9) was integrated with IL-76 aircraft at Gromov Flight Research Institute (GFRI), Russia and flight tests have been successfully carried out up to 12 km maximum forward altitude and a maximum forward speed of 0.7 Mach No. Twenty seven flights for 55 hours duration have been completed on IL-76. Critical subsystems and its associated knowledge know-how and know-why has been acquired in association with Indian public & private sector industries, including certification methodologies.”

Nov 23/11: Kaveri. In response to Parliamentary questions, Defence Minister Antony says that nothing has changed with respect to the Kaveri engine’s successor. He doesn’t put it like that, but that’s the reality. India MoD.

Aug 8/11: Kaveri. In response to questions, the Indian MoD clarifies the status of the Kaveri engine project. There is no signed co-operation agreement with SNECMA, but the Air Force has reviewed the draft technical specification and approved it.

“The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has made no agreement with a French firm to develop the Kaveria aero engine to be used for the Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. However, DRDO is negotiating with M/s Snecma, France for co-development and co-production of Kaveri aero engine for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas MK-II. The project proposal will be put up for Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval after the completion of price negotiation… IAF has further suggested that the engine design should have minimal impact on the LCA Tejas airframe for future retrofitment.”

If it succeeds, India’s Tejas fleet would have an alternative engine option, much like the popular F-16. Several countries fly F-16s, and even F-15s, with 2 different types of engine (PW F100 or GE F101) in their fleet, as insurance that keeps their air force flying even if an engine type develops problems. First, however, an agreement must be signed. Then, the development project must succeed at a reasonable cost.

July 20/11: Naval LCA. The naval Tejas will probably get a different name. Meanwhile, an F404-IN20-powered naval variant is undergoing ground integration tests at HAL’s Bangalore facility, followed by engine runs and ground runs in the coming weeks. A 1st flight within 3 months is considered optimistic.

Meanwhile, India’s ADA has asked the US Navy to help it define carrier suitability plans, and the US Navy is assisting. Flight International.

May 23/11: Testing & Weapons. Aviation Week reports that the Tejas Mk.I is due to undergo a 2nd phase of night trials. Aircraft LSP-5 reportedly made 6 night flights in April 2011, which tested avionics, the instrument landing system, and integration involving the IAI ELTA multimode radar, Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display, and RAFAEL’s LITENING pod. The push to finish night operations clearance will also include items waived for the IAF’s initial clearance (vid. Jan 10/11 entry) – waivers that the service does not intend to grant again.

The next 16 months will see assessments of Tejas’ angle of attack, g-forces and sustained turn rate, with limited series production aircraft #6 arriving to help speed things along. It will also see a greater focus on weapons integratiopn tests – so far, only R-73/AA-11 Archer short-range air-to-air missiles and standard bombs have been tested. Still to go: Laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs, and Russian 80mm S-8 rocket pods. RAFAEL’s Derby medium-range air-to-air missile isn’t set to test until mid-2012, and the IAF also expects Russian Kh-31/35/39 anti-ship and precision strike missiles as part of the Tejas Mk.I’s intended configuration.

March 24/11: Industrial. India’s Business Standard reports that the Indian DRDO is pushing HAL to outsource some Tejas production or set up joint ventures, in order to meet required delivery schedules and keep the IAF’s fighter fleet at acceptable numbers. The current line can reportedly produce just 8 planes per year, and a high-level HAL team has reportedly toured Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Eurofighter GmbH facilities.

A request of this nature from the DRDO is nothing short of revolutionary. HAL has 2 serious problems, however, which make such a different approach thinkable for India’s bureaucrats. One is low real orders for Tejas. As one HAL executive put it: “…how much money could we have realistically invested in a production line?… So far, future Tejas orders of 100-120 more fighters are only plans.” The other problem is the load level on the state-owned firm’s Aircraft R&D Centre, which is is simultaneously trying to develop the Tejas Mark II; the Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT); the Sukhoi-HAL Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA); and the Irkut-HAL Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The firm is also developing Dhruv helicopter variants, including a light attack helicopter. That’s a tremendous amount of competition for attention and resources, and HAL will face more strains if/when each project becomes a production demand.

Other likely candidates for partnerships wold have to include France’s Dassault Aviation, Sweden’s Saab, and Israel Aerospace Industries, as well as BAE and Northrop Grumman. The latter 3 firms have considerable experience as fighter program sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman is looking to sell its E-2D AWACS and Global Hawk UAVs to India; while IAI supplies a range of equipment to India already, and has industrial partnerships in place. So, too, does BAE, who is already working with HAL to produce its Hawk advanced trainer jets in India.

Feb 14/11: Tejas runs the Derby. Indian Aeronautical Development Agency director P.S. Subramanya says they have picked RAFAEL’s Derby as the Tejas’ initial beyond visual range air combat missile. He expects a contract by March 2011, with delivery expected in the second half of 2012, in time for the final phase of Tejas Mk.I testing.

Derby has range limitations, and was accepted on India’s Sea Harrier fleet despite not meeting the program’s original range goals. It also lacks a datalink. On the other hand, it offers a fire-and-forget weapon that’s already in India’s inventory, and integrated with Tejas’ EL/M-2032 radar, possessing what’s reported to be a wide boresight cone. It’s also true that given the need to avoid fratricide and positively identify targeted aircraft, most aerial engagements have taken place within Derby’s range, and future conflicts involving India are expected to feature that same limitation.

Long-term plans were to deploy the locally developed Astra missile as the Tejas BVRAAM, but in 2010 India decided to use a foreign missile and get Tejas into operational service. If Astra succeeds, it can always be integrated later. Meanwhile, Tejas gets ordnance commonality with India’s Sea Harriers, which also carry the EL/M-2032 radar, and with India’s SPYDER anti-aircraft systems. Defense Update | Livemint | RAFAEL on Derby | ACIG on Derby.

RAFAEL Derby BVRAAM picked

Feb 3/11: Kaveri. DRDO hasn’t given up trying to force the issue with its long-delayed Kaveri engine. After proposing it as a naval turbine, the newest gambit is to specify it for a proposed twin-engine Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (A-MCA), which would be developed by 2020 and operational by 2025. The proposal is an aircraft somewhat comparable to America’s F-35 – not an encouraging comparison, given that plane’s development costs.

Government acceptance of that plan would buy the engine project another decade, but the question is whether the A-MCA project is even realistic. India’s M-MRCA medium fighter competition hopes to field an advanced 4+ generation plane by 2015, but deliveries will take years, and real operational capability isn’t likely until 2016 or later. Meanwhile, the 2020-2025 time frame is also the expected window for India’s FGFA 5th generation collaboration with Sukhoi. Both are very big budget programs, even as India looks to field a much larger Navy to counter Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean basin, and faces a growing need for expensive ballistic and cruise missile defenses. In that environment, MCA could easily find itself fighting hard to avoid becoming yet another sidelined Indian technology demonstrator project.

DRDO also hopes to muscle the Kaveri v2 engine into the Tejas. They want the Indian government to swap the engines in when the initial 40 GE F404 equipped Tejas Mk.Is come in for their scheduled overhauls, during the 2015-2020 time period. Flight International | The Hindu | UPI.

Jan 31/11: Kaveri. Livemint reports that India’s DRDO expects to close price negotiations for a Kaveri joint venture (JV) with France’s Snecma by the end of February 2011, following over 2 decades and INR 28.8 billion spent on the project in India. DRDO declined to reveal the estimated cost of the Snecma-GTRE project, which reportedly aims to produce a viable competitor to the GE F414 that powers the F/A-18 Super Hornet family, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and will almost certainly power the Tejas Mk.II.

Reports suggest that Snecma will bring in critical technology for the hot engine core, which is key to the 38% thrust gain sought over existing Kaveri models, while DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) will work on the “cold” sections around it. GTRE would be left with complete know-how and intellectual property rights for the engine,which will also need to become lighter.

Jan 10/11: Tejas IOC. The Tejas LCA is given Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force, marking their first induction of an Indian designed and built front line fighter. It has been a long road. The Hindustan Times reports that: “The government has so far pumped Rs 14,428 crore into the LCA programme which was pegged at Rs 560 crore when conceived in 1983.” The program cost was set at over 3,300 crore by the late 1980s, and has continued to rise. At today’s exchange rates, the INR 144.28 billion figure translates into about $3.15 billion. The Times of India places the program total even higher, at 17,269 crore/ $3.77 billion for all variants.

Note that India’s IOC designation is not the same as Initial Operational Capability for America’s military, which represents a combat-ready unit. India doesn’t have that yet, and Tejas receives this designation without all of its advertised capabilities, such as air-air engagements using radar-guided missiles. Indeed, subsequent reports reveal that key criteria for even minimal operations were waived, including wake penetration tests, lightning clearances, and some basic all-weather and day/night items. What India’s IOC does, is allow regular IAF pilots to begin flying it.

Indian Air Force chief P.V. Naik says that Final Operational Clearance for induction and formation of a Tejas squadron isn’t expected until 2013 or 2014, an event that will take place at Sulur Air Base in Tamil Nadu. The first test flight of the Tejas Mark-II version is currently scheduled for December 2014, with production beginning in June 2016. Indian Government | Economic Times of India | The Hindu | Hindustan Times | IBNLive | LiveMint | New Delhi TV | Sify | Times of India | Times of India op-ed || BBC.

Tejas IOC

Jan 14/11: Radar. domain-b reports that American pressure has forced Israel to bar exports of its EL/M-2052 AESA radar to India. The radar was reportedly intended to replace the EL/M-2032 on the Tejas Mk.II aircraft, where it would sharply improve radar performance and sharply lower maintenance costs (q.v. Oct 3/08, Dec 4/09 entries).

Israel wanted to install the radar in its own F-16s and F-15s, but the Americans moved to strangle a potential competitor by telling the Israelis that installing the M-2052 would cut off all manufacturer support for its fighters. On the export front, the USA can use ITAR restrictions to block technologies developed with American assistance, and forced Israel to implement a set of military export controls that add up to unofficial American review. Israel has reportedly sold a limited number of M-2052s to 1 undisclosed customer, but use in the Tejas Mk.II would represent the radar’s 1st major sale anywhere.

2010

GE’s F414 engine for Tejas Mk.2/Naval; 1st Naval LCA prototype rolled out.

EJ200s in Eurofighter
(click to view full)

Nov 21/10: Cost. The Times of India places the cost of India’s Tejas program at 17,269 crore, or over $3.7 billion. The report adds:

“Latest figures also show each of the first 40 Tejas fighters will cost around Rs 150 crore [DID: about $33 million], over and above the huge developmental cost… Tejas, incidentally, has clocked around 1,420 flights with 10 prototypes till date. Its FSED (full-scale engineering development) Phase-I till March 2004 cost Rs 2,188 crore [DID: 1 crore = 10 million rupees]. The Phase-II, to be completed by December 2012, will cost another Rs 5,778 crore. To add to that, there is fabrication of two Tejas Mark-II, with alternate engines, to be completed by Dec 2018 for Rs 2,432 crore, along with development of indigenous technologies for Rs 396 crore. Naval Tejas FSED Phase-I, in turn, is to be completed by Dec 2014 for Rs 1,715 crore, with Phase-II slated for completion by December 2018 for another Rs 1,921 crore.

Tejas will, of course, also be powered by American GE engines, with its indigenous Kaveri engine floundering despite Rs 2,839 crore being spent on its development since 1989. Towards this, India recently finalised a $822-million deal for 99 GE F-414 engines.”

These figures are later shown to fall short of government figures. India’s goal of a $20-25 million fighter at full rate production may still be achievable, but it will bear close watching. It is very normal for the first production sets of a fighter to cost far more than fighters at full-rate production, with figures of double or even triple the price common for aircraft with very long production runs.

Nov 6/10: F414. During President Obama’s visit, the White House provides further details regarding the F414 engine order, which it places at 107 engines:

“…Upon finalizing the contract, General Electric’s facility in Lynn, Massachusetts, and other sites across the United States will be positioned to export almost one billion dollars in high technology aerospace products. This transaction is tentatively valued at approximately $822 million, all of which is U.S. export content, supporting an estimated 4,440 jobs.”

This is strictly true, since any contract with GE would be 100% export content, but the deal itself may still contain provisos for technology transfer and related contracts in India. UK Financial Times Beyond BRICs blog | Hindu Business Line | Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) | NDTV | Sify | WSJ India Real Time blog.

Nov 3/10: At the end of the India-UK “Indra Dhanush 2010” exercise, Indian Air Chief Marshal P V Naik tells the media that LCA Mark-I will be inducted into operational squadrons by the middle of 2011, while the LCA Tejas Mark-II should be operational in the next 2-3 years, as “the process of selection of engine for LCA Mark-II is nearing completion.” It doesn’t happen that way.Deccan Herald.

Nov 1/10: Testing. Aviation Week reports that LSP-5, the 11th test jet and 1st final configuration Tejas Mk I aircraft, is readying for flight trials as the ADA tries to meer a Dec 27/10 deadline for release-to-service certification. Changes include internal cockpit lighting for night flying, a revised internal communication set similar to HAL’s Druhv helicopter, and National Aerospace Laboratories’ auto-pilot mode. Aviation week adds that:

“If the delivery schedules are met, then the Indian Air Force will have LSP-7 and LSP-8 for user evaluation trials by March 2011. LSP-6 will be a test vehicle for high angle of attack. The Tejas squadron is expected to be in Bengaluru by mid-2011 and the first two series production aircraft (SP-1, SP-2) also should be ready by then.”

Oct 25-28/10: Engine II. Report, and denial. After NewsX’s Vishal Thapar broadcasts a reports that a Eurojet consultant has been expelled from India for illegally obtaining information on GE’s bid, trying to substitute a new Eurojet bid by offering a monetary inducement, and then planting media reports that Eurojet was ahead on price. Thapar also claims that this is why the Indian MoD took the unusual step of announcing GE as its low-cost bidder, before a contract was signed.

The follow-on effects could be very severe if true, making it very difficult for India to pick the Eurofighter as its M-MRCA medium fighter. Eurojet’s communication agency subsequently issues the following denial. See Milplex | India Defence:

“Eurojet Turbo GmbH categorically denies unfounded allegations made in the NewsX report titled ” India expels arms dealer”, authored by Vishal Thapar and released on 23 October 2010. The report lacks any factual base and is a work of fiction.”

Oct 1/10: Engine II – F414. India’s Business Standard may want a word with its sources. GE announces that its F414 engine has been picked to power the Tejas Mk.II fighter. India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will order 99 jet engines, with GE Aviation supplying the initial batch of F414-GE-INS6, engines and the rest manufactured in India under transfer of technology arrangements. When questioned by DID, GE sources confirmed that this is not a contract yet, merely preferred bidder status.

The selection of GE’s F414 deepens a relationship that has supplied 41 earlier model GE F404 engines so far, in order to power initial Tejas LCA Mk.I fighters and LCA Naval prototypes. GE describes the F414-GE-INS6 as “the highest-thrust F414 model,” without offering specifics, but is has been working on an F414 Enhanced Performance Engine. The INS6 will add single-engine safety features in its digital controls, something GE also installed in the F414 variant powering one M-MRCA candidate, the JAS-39 Gripen NG.

F414 engine picked for Tejas Mk.2

Sept 20/10: Engine II. India’s Business Standard reports that the European EJ200 engine may have the edge in the competition to supply the Tejas Mk.II fleet’s powerplants:

“Informed sources have told Business Standard that when the bids were opened last week, European consortium Eurojet bid $666 million for 99 EJ200 engines, against US rival General Electric, which quoted $822 million.”

Both engines have been ruled technically suitable, so the lower priced bid will win, but the bidding process isn’t 100% final yet. The paper also quotes Air Vice Marshall Kapil Kak (ret.) of the Indian Air Force’s Centre for Air Power Studies, who draws the obvious conclusion:

“It is as clear as daylight. Selecting the EJ200 for the Tejas would boost the Eurofighter’s prospects in the MMRCA contest. Its engines, which form about 15-20 per cent of the cost of a modern fighter, would be already manufactured in India for the Tejas [after the 1st 10 were built abroad]. For the same reason, rejecting the GE F-414 would diminish the chances of the two fighters [F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and JAS-39NG/IN] that fly with that engine.”

Aug 25/10: Kaveri. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony updates progress in the Kaveri engine in a written reply to Shri N Balaganga of India’s Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament). It’s phrased in terms of what DRDO is doing as development and testing continues, and gives various reasons why the engine is so late. It does not mention that the IAF isn’t interested, except to note at the end that “LCAs are, meanwhile, as decided by user, being fitted with imported engines.” Unlike some Indian programs, the Kaveri program has managed to spend most of its yearly budgets; over the last 3 years, these expenditures have been:

2007-2008: INR 1,525.1 million
2008-2009: INR 1,535.4 million
2009-2010: INR 1,220.6 million

As of Aug 25/10, INR 100 million = $2.15 million, so INR 1.2206 billion = $26.05 million.

July 6/10: Naval LCA. NP1, the first naval Tejas prototype, is rolled out. HAL will build NP1 and NP2 for testing, which will take place at a new facility in Goa. The naval variant adds a tailhook, strengthened undercarriage, leading-edge vortex controllers to slow down landings, auto-throttles, and a fuel dump system.

Naval LCA rollout

May 5/10: Engine II. GE describes 3 of the programs underway to improve its F414 engine. The most relevant is probably the F414 EPE (Enhanced Performance Engine), which has a new fan to increase airflow, and aims to increase thrust by 20%. It’s explicitly “targeted for potential international customers,” which includes India’s Tejas Mk.2.

The US Navy wants the F414 EDE (Enhanced Durability Engine), which uses an advanced high pressure turbine and 6-stage high pressure compressor (HPC) that offers a 2-3X hot-section durability gain, and reduced fuel consumption. F414 EDE forms the base of the EPE engine, but the gains will not be the same in both engines, owing to other design differences.

Crowded India may also appreciate the retrofittable F414 noise reduction kit project, with serrated edges where each “lobe” penetrates into or out of the primary airflow and generates a secondary flow, reducing jet noise by 2-3-decibels. The USN has identified funding for a program to mature the technology and prepare it for incorporation in the USN F414 engine fleet, with work scheduled to continue through 2011. GE Aviation.

Feb 3/10: Engine II. Eurojet says it will share single-crystal engine blade technologies with India if Eurofighter wins MMRCA, or the EJ200 engine is selected for the LCA Tejas Mk2.

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon. The EJ200 weighs about 2,200 pounds and produces 13,500 pounds of thrust in normal operation, or 20,000 pounds with afterburners. There were even rumors of a thrust-vectoring version, to improve Tejas maneuverability, but the engine lost the Tejas MK.II competition, then the Eurofighter was edged out by France’s Rafale in India’s M-MRCA finals.

Feb 2/10: Indian defence minister AK Antony watches flight demonstrations by twin-seat (PV-5), and single-seat (LCP-2) Tejas test aircraft, and declares: “Serious doubts were raised about Tejas… Now I can proudly say we will fly our own fighters.” He states Cabinet Committee of Security approval to add Rs 8,000 crore (about $1.73 billion) to the 27-year program for continued air force and naval development, and development of a new engine for the Mk.2, and expresses confidence in final operational clearance for the Mk.1 version by end of 2012. Antony also agreed that the government is in talks with parties abroad for the development of that Mk.2 engine, but would not be more specific.

The Indian Air Force has already ordered 20 LCAs, and has reportedly expressed interest in ordering another 20 aircraft. Meanwhile, the Navy is building 2-seat trainer (NP1) and a single-seat fighter (NP2) prototypes, with NP1 nearing completion of equipping after the structural assembly. NP1 is scheduled to roll out by April 2010, followed by a hoped-for first flight in June 2010. The single-seat NP2 is scheduled for its first flight by June 2011. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Indian Express | Times of India | Agence France Presse | The Asian Age.

2009

First 6 LCA Naval ordered; Tejas Angle of Attack flight issues; US red tape trips Lockheed Martin; Engine competition to equip Tejas Mk.II.

Tejas test
(click to view full)

Dec 31/09: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been given government permission to accept an offer from France’s Snecma to ‘partner’ with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) to jointly develop a new version of the Kaveri jet engine. Senior GTRE officials tell The Hindu that talks could begin early in 2010. When that might result in a signed contract is anyone’s guess.

This article’s Dec 26/08 entry covers the verdict of a senior Indian committee, which had recommended against the DRDO-Snecma collaboration. The Hindu highlights the Matheswaran team’s criticism that using Snecma’s fully developed ‘Eco’ engine core would not create sufficient transfer or control of technology, but reports:

“Snecma, which indicated that an engine run of at least 250 is required to make their offer economically viable, agrees that an existing core would be at the heart… will take at least five years before the first production engine comes out. Snecma chairman and chief executive officer Philippe Petitcolin told The Hindu: “Yes we first stated a 15-year period to hand over the design technology, but now we have indicated that the technology can be given as fast as the Indians can assimilate it.”

Note that the article does not indicate commitment to use the “Kaveri II” engine for any particular purpose, or offer a likely timeline. Rather, the emphasis seems to be on continuing to develop India’s industrial capabilities, rather than fielding an operational engine. StrategyPage places the cost of that collaboration at $200 million, but this must be an estimate, as no firm deal has been negotiated. See also Sri Lanka Guardian. See also Aug 20/08 entry.

Dec 14/09: Kaveri. In a written Parliamentary reply, Defence Minister Shri AK Antony responds to Shri Gajanan D Babar:

“The proposal on the Kaveri-Snecma engine joint venture for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas is under consideration of the Government. Request for Proposal (RFP) for procuring 99 engines have been sent to two short-listed engine manufacturers, namely GE F414 from General Electric Aviation, USA and EJ200 from Eurojet Germany. The engine houses have responded to the RFP. Both Commercial and technical responses have been received for procurement of 99 engines along with Transfer of Technology.”

Dec 7/09: A Parliamentary response from defense minister Antony offers details regarding the initial Tejas Mk.1 contract:

“A contract for procurement of 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration, along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was signed in March 2006. The total contract cost is Rs. 2701.70 crores.” [currently about $580 million]

Dec 4/09: Radar – AESA? DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) reportedly invites global bids to become the development partner for a Tejas active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This would presumably replace the IAI Elta EL/M-2032 derivative that will requip Tejas Mk.1 fighters.

The Active Array Antenna Unit (AAAU) would be supplied by the development partner. Responsibilities would include “detailed design, development and realisation” of the antenna panel (main antenna, guard antenna and sidelobe cancellation antenna), transmit/receive modules/groups, the RF distribution network (RF manifold/combiners and RF interface), antenna/beam control chain (T/R control and T/R group control), and array calibration/BITE among other areas. Livefist.

Nov 26/09: Testing. Tejas PV-5, a 2-seat trainer version, makes its maiden flight. The Deccan Herald says that commonalities between the 2-seat trainer and Tejas naval version will help that sub-program as well, but it will take hundreds of flights over a year or more before the trainer version can be qualified for use by IAF, as a key step in pilot training and induction of the single-seat fighter into IAF operational service.

Sept 28/09: US red tape. India’s Business Standard reports that Lockheed Martin was selected in June 2009 as a consultant for developing the Naval version of the Tejas. Lockheed Martin has no serving carrier-borne fighters, but they’re developing the F-35B STOVL and F-35C Lightning II for use from carriers.

Unfortunately, delays in US government approval has led DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency to recommend that another consultant be chosen instead; Dassault (Rafale) and EADS (no carrier-borne aircraft) were recommended as alternatives,and EADS was eventually picked. Lockheed Martin is still fighting to get through the red tape and salvage the contract, and may continue trying until V K Saraswat, India’s Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, makes a decision.

This has happened before, and recently. Boeing was the front-runner for a similar role with respect to the main (IAF) version, and would be a logical consultant for any naval version – but the Indian MoD awarded EADS that contract in early 2009, after the US government failed to grant Boeing a Technical Assistance Agreement clearance in time.

Sept 21/09: Naval LCA. India’s Business Standard reports that the Tejas Mk.II is attracting funding from India’s Navy, who believes that a modified, EJ-200/F414 equipped Tejas would have the power required to operate from its future aircraft carriers in STOBAR (Short TakeOff But Assisted Recovery) mode:

“Business Standard has learnt that the navy has okayed the placement of an order for six Naval LCAs. At an approximate cost of Rs 150 crore per aircraft, that will provide a Rs 900 crore infusion into the Naval LCA programme.”

At today’s rates, Rs 900 crore = $187.8 million. Naval LCA fighters would operate from India’s 30,000t-35000t Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), which is being built at Cochin Shipyard with assistance from Italy’s Fincantieri, and is expected to join the fleet by 2014. That creates a potential timing issue, as the Tejas Mk.II’s engine selection and ordering process isn’t supposed to produce new engines before 2013-14. Aeronautical Development Agency director P S Subramaniam told Business Standard that they would fly the modified Naval Tejas airframe with the current GE-404 engine, to test its flight characteristics and structural strength. The new INS Hansa in Goa, with its land-based carrier deck outline and equipment, will be extremely helpful in that regard. If those tests go well, a naval Tejas variant would not operate from a carrier until the new engines were delivered and installed. See also: India Defence

India: 6 Naval LCA.

Aug 4/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet consortium has done tests regarding the EJ200’s fit into the Tejas’ space, and believes itself to be in a strong position for the expected 99-engine order to equip the Tejas Mk.II. The RFP response date is Oct 12/09.

Aug 3/09: Kaveri. India’s DRDO is attempting to resurrect the Kaveri engine project, but the IAF’s lack of enthusiasm is pointed. MoD release:

“Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has offered to co-develop and co-produce 90 kN thrust class of upgraded Kaveri engine with M/s Snecma, France to meet the operational requirement of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas with 48 months from the date of project inception… The proposal for co-development was considered by Indian Air Force. Indian Air Force has suggested a proven engine that is already in production and flight worthy for meeting immediate requirement. Request for Proposal (RFP) has been issued to reputed engine manufacturers.”

A separate MoD release gives December 2012 as the target date for the LCA Tejas Mk.I’s “final Operational Clearance,” adding that project oversight currently involves a high level review by the Chief of Air Staff once per quarter, and by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once per month.

March 4/09: Testing. India Defense reports that a multi-agency team is carrying out 2-weeks of Phase 2 weapon testing for the LCA Tejas. The focus is on safe separation, aerodynamic interference data, and complex weapon release algorithms in different modes of release. Note that the tests still involve aerodynamics, rather than full weapons system integration.

Feb 25/09: Government of India:

“A contract for 20 indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has been signed. One IAF squadron is expected to be equipped with this aircraft in 2010-11. Government is not planning to set up a hi-tech facility at Nagpur costing about Rs. 300 crores [3 billion rupees, or about $60 million] for indigenizing components of these aircrafts. Product support including spare parts will be supplied by the vendor as per the terms of the contract that will be concluded.”

Feb 17/09: Engine II. Flight International reports that the Eurojet engine consortium may be about to change the competitive field for the expected RFP to equip LCA Tejas MkII aircraft. The firm has been working on a thrust-vectoring model of its engine, and the magazine reports that it will be offered to meet India’s expected RFP for up to 150 engines.

The Eurofighter is also an MMRCA medium fighter competitor, and twin wins for Eurojet could offer India important commonality benefits, even as they justified an in-country production line. Thrust vectoring would also offer the Tejas a level of maneuverability and performance that could be a difference-maker in combat, and on the international market. The Eurofighter is considered a long shot to win the MMRCA competition, however, and timelines could become an issue. Flight tests of a thrust vectoring EJ200 engine are not expected to begin for another 2 years.

Feb 6/09: Engine II. The Press Trust of India quotes Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) Director P Subrahmanyam, who says that India’s state-run DRDO is still looking for partners to develop the indigenous Kaveri engine. That hasn’t stopped the Ministry of Defence’s ADA from preparing a competition to equip the LCA Mark II version from 2014 onward, after the initial aircraft are fielded with F404-IN-20 engines:

“We are looking to procure either the GE-414 from US or European consortium Eurojet’s EJ 200 to fly with the LCA Mk II version [after going through offers from various global manufacturers]. Request for Proposals (RFP) is just about to go out and very soon it would be floated.”

Eurojet’s EJ200 equips the Eurofighter Typhoon, while GE’s F414 equips Saab’s JAS-39NG Gripen and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet family. All 3 of these fighters are competitors in India’s MMRCA, which aims to buy at least 126 medium multi-role fighters to fill the gap between Tejas LCAs and India’s top-tier SU-30MKIs.

The article appears to indicate that India would be looking to switch production to the new engines, after low-rate initial production equips the first 2 IAF squadrons with 48 aircraft. In practice, required engineering changes and aircraft testing make such an early switch unlikely.

Jan 29/09: AoA issues. Indopia reports that India’s DRDO/ADA and HAL are proposing a $20 million collaboration with EADS to assist with flight trials, and help to increase the fighter’s flight envelope. Performance at high “angles of attack,” in which a fighter’s nose and wings are tilted at steep angles, will reportedly be the focus for EADS efforts.

At any aircraft’s critical angle of attack, the wing is no longer able to support the weight of the aircraft, causing a tail slide that generally worsens the problem and can lead to an aerodynamic stall. Different aircraft have different critical angles of attack, and design changes can lead to an expanded range for safe, sustained flight maneuvers. In some cases, such as India’s Sukhoi 30MKIs with their modern triplane configuration, the design’s flight envelope can become so large that maneuvers like the near 90 degree “Cobra” become safe and routine.

Jan 23/09: Testing. The Tejas LCA completes its 1,000th test flight since the first 18-minute flight by Technology Demonstrator-1 on 04 Jan 4/01. Frontier India | The Hindu | The Times of India.

Flight #1,000

2009

Why Kaveri was a failure, demonstrated; Kaveri for naval ships?

Inverted flypast
(click to view full)

Dec 26/08: Kaveri. The Hindu reports that a committee set up by the IAF in September 2008 has recommended against Snecma’s offer (see Aug 20/08 entry). The report says that the result would not be a co-designed, co-developed engine, but rather a license production arrangement. The group recommends continued development of the Kaveri engine and its core technologies instead, despite the failures to date.

These conclusions are less surprising when one examines the committee’s composition. Air Vice Marshal M. Matheswaran chaired the group, which included representatives from India’s state-run Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification, and IAF officers posted at ADA, the National Flight Test Centre and the Aircraft Systems and Testing Establishment. All are state-run groups that have been involved in the Kaveri’s ongoing development, and have strong incentives to protect that turf.

Dec 13/08: Testing. A Tejas fighter prototype lands at Leh air base in the high-altitude Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, at an altitude of 10,600 fee. Leh is one of the highest airfields in the world, with a temperature variation ranging from 5 to -20 C/ 41 to -4F. .

That was the whole point, of course: perform cold weather testing, while making an assessment of the aircraft’s performance in high-altitude conditions, without the confounding influence and additional challenge of high temperatures. India Defence

Oct 3/08: Radar. The Hindu newspaper relays news from ADA Programme Director P.S. Subramaniam that the Israeli Elta “EL/M-2052” radar has already undergone tests on the flight test bed and ground rig in Israel, and “airworthy units” are expected to arrive early next week.

There had been some unconfirmed mentions of EL/M-2052s in connection with the Tejas, and it’s possible that ADA is beginning tests related to the Mk.II. It’s more likely that the radars are IAI Eltas M-2032, instead of Elta’s AESA option. The Elta M-2032 multi-mode radar already serves on India’s Sea Harriers and some Jaguars, and was picked as an “interim option” until India’s indigenous radar program performs to the required standard. Because the indigenous radar has failed to perform to standard, the ADA has reportedly been running weaponization tests on the Tejas using a weapon delivery pod, and has been forced to keep critical tests on hold. Past experience suggests that the Tejas’ radar will remain an import.

Aug 20/08: Kaveri & Snecma. The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com has an article that more or less sums up the Kaveri project in a nutshell, and also the DRDO: “In aircraft engine development, you cannot set a timeline.” The article interviews T. Mohana Rao, director of India’s state-run Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). Rao explains why the Kaveri engine is effectively dead as a fighter aircraft engine, leaving GE’s popular F404-GE-IN20 variant to power the Tejas for at least the next 4 years.

Rao quotes the Kaveri’s performance at 11,000 lbs./ 5,000 kg dry thrust at sea level, and 16,500 lbs./ 7,500 kg thrust on afterburners. That’s about 1,000 lbs./ 400 kg short of specifications. The engine is also overweight by 330 lbs./ 150 kg, and has yet to perform long-endurance tests to assess its durability.

The GTRE cannot promise any date for successful delivery, and so political approval was granted to form a partnership with a foreign engine firm on a risk-sharing basis. Russia’s NPO Saturn and France’s Snecma responded, while GE, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt and Whitney declined. After almost 2 1/2 years, the GTRE chose France’s Snecma, but there’s no contract yet. industrial issues need to be settled, and the government requires consultation with the Indian Air Force before any contract and requirements are signed.

Snecma’s proposal involves an engine core (compressor, combustor and high-pressure turbine) called Eco. Snecma would have a workshare of 45%, and GTRE’s would be 55%, with nearly 85% of the manufacturing within India. Snecma says the aircraft could be certified for fitting in the Tejas within 4 years. Assuming that project remains on time, of course. The policy question is whether this outcome was predictable from the outset. As the Live Mint article notes:

“Nearly 20 years after it promised an indigenous engine to power India’s light combat aircraft Tejas, the… country’s sole aero engine design house, is now seeking outside help…”

Aug 13/08: Kaveri KMGT. The DRDO’s GTRE in Bangalore believes it may have found a use for the Kaveri engine, in naval vessels. Using the core of the Kaveri engine, plus a low-pressure compressor and turbine, the engine would become a gas-fired 12 MW propulsion unit in warships up the he Rajput Class, or find uses as on-shore electricity generators. A Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) has been transported to naval dock yard at Vishakapatnam, and installed on to the marine gas turbine test bed there. Yahoo! India | RF Design.

The Rajput Class “destroyers” are modified Russian Kashin-II Class ships, though their top weight of just under 5,000 tons would mark them as large frigates in many navies.

Aug 3/08: Kaveri – And Replacements? The Wall Street Journal’s partner LiveMint.com reports that France’s Snecma will partner with India’s DRDO to develop a new engine, sidelining the Kaveri project.

“GTRE has spent nearly Rs1,900 crore of the Rs2,800 crore that was sanctioned since an engine project Kaveri, named after the river in southern India, began in 1989… Vincent Chappard, a Snecma spokesman in France, said he could not immediately confirm the development.”

While the IAF waits for Snecma’s efforts, reports also suggest that the DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Agency has invited both General Electric and Eurojet Turbo GmbH, a European engine consortium, to bid for higher-powered interim engines. GE offers the F414, and the Eurojet 2000 already has higher thrust, but the engines will have to fit the Tejas’ design – or vice-versa. These engines would be slated for Tejas aircraft produced beyond the initial 48 plane order, but before any indigenous engine is certified. WSJ partner Live Mint | domain-b

March 4/08: Radar. There are reports that Europe’s EADS has offered to co-develop an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar with India, for installation on board the Tejas fighters. Work is currently underway on an AESA radar to equip EADS’ Eurofighter, which is a long shot in India’s 126-190 aircraft MMRCA fighter competition.

The nature of AESA radars makes it possible to scale them up or down while retaining high commonality with larger versions, the main difference being changes to radar power and hence overall performance. Northrop Grumman whose AN/APG-77 AESA radar equips America’s F-22, recently introduced its AESA Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) at Singapore’s February 2007 air show. It’s designed to equip existing F-16 fighters with no modifications required, and is advertised as being scalable to other platforms.

A win for EADS in this area offers to solve a problem for India, while creating a commonality hook for the Eurofighter – or at worst, a supplier diversification option for India that adds external funding to help EADS catch up in this key technology area.

March 3/08: Indian Defence Minister Shri A K Antony responds to a Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) question by saying that the Tejas flight test program is:

“…progressing as per the schedule. So far, 829 flight tests have been completed. Efforts are being made to accelerate the flight tests… Presently, no need is felt for strategic partner. To complete the project at the earliest, a top level review is being conducted by the Chief of Air Staff once in every quarter and review by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff once in every month. So far, Rs. 4806.312 cr [DID: 48.063 billion rupees, or about $1.19 billion at current conversion] have been spent on development of various versions of Light Combat Aircraft.”

2006 – 2008

1st 20 production Tejas ordered; IAI to substitute for MMR radar failure; F404 engines ordered; AA-11 fired; Naval Tejas contemplated.

AA-11/R-73 Archer
(click to view full)

Oct 25/07: Testing. The Tejas fires a missile for the first time: Vympel’s short-range, IR guided AA-11/R-73 Archer air-to-air missile. Test aircraft PV-1 fired the missile at 7 km altitude and 0.6 Mach within the naval air range off the coast of Goa, marking the beginning of weaponization as a prelude to initial operational clearance (IOC) phase of the Tejas program.

The main objectives of test firing were to validate safe separation of the missile, the effect of missile plume on the engine’s air-intake and on composite structures, the workings of the stores-management displays and software, and quality assessment. India DoD release | Times of India.

While the beginning of weaponization is a significant event, the state of the fighter’s indigenous radar development means that the critical weaponization event for the Tejas LCA will be its first successful test-firing of a radar-guided missile.

Aug 13/07: Radar – IAI. Defence Minister Shri AK Antony states the obvious in a written reply to Shri Sugrib Singh and others in Lok Sabha, but adds new information concerning foreign cooperation:

“There has been a time and cost overrun in the said project. The project to develop two MMR systems for ground testing was sanctioned at a cost of Rs.62.27 crore. This activity was completed in 2004 at a cost of Rs.105 crore.

Yes, but see poor testing results in the April 8/06 and May 1/06 entries, below. He does not mention them, but effectively concedes the point by adding that:

A co-development activity of MMR has been initiated for Limited Series Production and Series Production with M/s ELTA Systems Ltd, Israel, which has experience in developing similar types of radars. To expedite the project, close monitoring of activity at the highest level of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) management has been put in place.”

See also India Defence follow-on | Flight International.

IAI Elta radar agreement

April 26/07: Testing. The 1st of the Limited Series Production Tejas jets (LSP-1), makes its successful maiden flight at HAL airport in Bangalore, reaching an altitude of 11 km/ 6.6 miles and a speed of Mach 1.1 during the 47 minute flight.

According to the Indian government release, LSP-1 marks the beginning of series production of Tejas for induction into the Air Force.

1st production flight

March 1/07: India’s Defence Minister Shri AK Antony offers an update re: the Tejas LCA:

“Five Tejas are currently being flight tested for Initial Operational Clearance by the Indian Air Force pilots posted at National Test Centre of Aeronautical Development Agency, Ministry of Defence. So far 629 flights accumulating 334 hours have been completed. Twenty aircraft have been ordered by the Indian Air Force as the first lot.”

Feb 7/07: F404. HAL ordered an additional 24 F404-GE-IN20 afterburning engines in a $100+ million contract, in order to power the first operational squadron of Tejas fighters for the Indian Air Force.

This buy follows a 2004 purchase of 17 F404-GE-IN20 engines, in order to power a limited series of operational production aircraft and naval prototypes.

F404 engine order #2

Jan 25/07: India tries to throw a large monkey wrench into Pakistan’s rival JF-17 project. They almost succeed.

Nov 22/06: Reuters India: “Pakistan set to get eight JF-17 fighter jets next year.” Anxieties are becoming more acute as Pakistan readies its JF-17 fighter developed in conjunction with China and Russia, and prepares to induct them into service in 2007-2008. The JF-17 is a sub-$20 million fighter designed to replace F-7P (MiG-21+) and Mirage 3/5 aircraft in Pakistan’s fleet, and is a comparable peer for the LCA Tejas.

Sept 19/06: India set to induct 28 LCA Tejas aircraft by 2007. They would have GE F404 engines rather than the Kaveri, says former project director Dr. Kota Harinarayana. As it turns out, India has 0 inducted aircraft, 5 years after that stated date.

May 2/06: India Defence reports that the Indian Navy may be interested in a Tejas LCA version of its own.

May 1/06: Radar. More bad news for the radar project. The Vijay Times also notes that that the performance of several radar modes being tested still “fell short of expectations,” and may force acquisition of American or Israeli radars (likely APG-68 or Elta’s EL/M-2032) as an interim measure.

April 8/06: Radar. The Sunday Telegraph reports that the Tejas’ radar, which was also set up as an indigenous project after foreign options like the JAS-39 Gripen’s fine PS05 radar were refused, could only perform at the most basic levels, putting tests on hold:

“According to the IAF, which proposes to buy 220 of the planes when they are ready, the radar is now “marooned in uncertainty”… While two basic radar modes have been tested, the other modes have failed, throwing up serious questions about the system’s fundamentals.

In written replies to queries sent by The Indian Express, DRDO chief M Natarajan said: “Because of the complexity of technologies involved (in the radar project) and the extent of testing to be done, help of specialists in the field may be sought to complete the task… When Natarajan was asked why there was uncertainty over the radar so long after development began, he said: “The radar is under development by HAL and not at LRDE (the DRDO’s lab).” This, even when the signal processor built by the DRDO is the very heart of the radar.

Security analyst K Subrahmanyam has earlier called the dogged refusal to entertain foreign help by the DRDO as reflective of the organisation’s bad project management.”

March 2006: Order #1. India signs a contract with HAL for 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in “Initial Operation Clearance (IOC) configuration,” along with associated role equipment, reserve engines, engine support package, engine test bed and computer based training (CBT) package.

The total contract cost is INR 27.017 billion. Source.

India: 20 LCA

February 2006: Kaveri. Jane’s claims that SNECMA won the contract to assist India in developing the Kaveri.

Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006)

More exportable Kaveri

The complexities inherent in designing a new fighter from scratch are formidable, even for a lightweight fighter like the Tejas. As Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd) notes, India’s industry had significant experience deficits going into this project, which have delayed the project significantly, and raised costs. The insistence on pushing the envelope with a new fighter design, a new engine, and a new radar all at once has had consequences. In the long run, those consequences will lead to a smaller IAF, and could be set to create major force gaps if MiG-21 lifespans can’t be extended long enough.

As experts like Richard D. Fisher have noted, Chinese projects tend to quickly hand off significant components to others and confine the kinds of domestic expertise required. The J-10 has been an example, and the massive changes required when Israeli and Western cooperation ended made the project incredibly challenging. Only a Chinese decision to outsource major components like the engines to the Russians kept the project from failing completely.

As the J-10 shows, delays remain possible, even with extensive foreign cooperation. It’s also true that every new jet engine type can expect teething issues when it is first installed. This may explain why even Sweden, with their long history of indigenous fighter development, chose the less risky approach of adopting the proven GE F404 & F414 engines for the JAS-39 Gripen. They made minor modifications as required in conjunction with the manufacturer, then concentrated their design efforts elsewhere.

All the more reason, then, to bring in foreign partners for components like the engine etc., and minimize the complexities faced by India’s indigenous teams in its state-run organizations.

Sainis and Joseph’s examination of the benefits to Indian industry from the LCA program demonstrate that most industrial benefits would have been retained had India taken this route. So, too, would the project’s timelines, which have suffered instead as India’s fighter fleet dwindles.

In India’s case, these added complexities can also spill over onto the export front. If potential Tejas export customers aren’t offered a common, fully tested international engine like the GE F404, with a broad network of support and leverage across multiple aircraft types, risk calculations will get in the way of some sales. When deciding on their buy, potential customers will have to evaluate the Kaveri engine’s prospects for future spares, upgrades and support, available contractors with relevant skills in maintaining them, etc. This tends to make potential buyers more cautious, and is likely to reduce Kaveri’s odds when competing against options like the Chinese/Pakistani JF-17, which uses a modified version of the engine that equips many MiG-29s around the world.

As the French have found with the Rafale, lack of exports for a limited production indigenous fighter equals rising maintenance and upgrade burdens that hit right in the home budget, and make it that much harder for the design to keep up with contemporary threats over its lifetime. Which in turn affect export prospects in a vicious circle.

Will India’s decision to proceed with the Kaveri engine offer short-term customization benefits, at the expense of long-term pain? Or can HAL maintain the Tejas airframe design, and field a lightweight fighter that offers its customers a choice of engines?

Appendix B: The Kaveri Saga – Keystone, or Killer?

Kaveri prototype
(click to view full)

The GTRE GTX-35VS Kaveri was envisioned as a variable cycle flat-rated engine, in which the thrust drop is compensated by increased turbine entry temperature at the spool. The variable cycle flat-rated engine would be controlled by a Kaveri full authority digital control unit (KADECU/ FADEC). The goal was a powerplant with slightly more thrust than GE’s F404 engines, whose characteristics were uniquely suited to India’s hot and humid environments.

India’s frequent goal of “100% made in India content” has derailed a number of its weapon projects over the last few decades, but foreign decisions also played an important role in the Kaveri project’s genesis. In 1998, India’s nuclear tests prompted the US to place sanctions on military exports, including GE’s F404 turbofans and Lockheed Martin’s assistance in developing the Tejas’ flight control system. In response, India began its program to develop an indigenous engine. As the Rediff’s Feb 5/06 report notes:

“DRDO scientists had kept the development of the Kaveri engine under wraps, exuding confidence that India had developed the technological edge to develop its own aircraft engine, so far confined to handful of developed countries.”

The prospect of ending that dependence is a powerful lure, but some of the reasons for that small club are technical. Modern jet engines are far more complex than even Vietnam-era engines like the GE J79 that equipped the F-4 Phantom. Producing a working, reliable engine that can operate at these high pressures and thrust ratings isn’t easy, and weaking and troubleshooting a new and unproven jet engine always involves a great deal of work and expense. The Kaveri engine’s climate performance targets added even more challenges to an already-full plate. That proved difficult for the program when the program’s entire context changed.

Eventually, the USA lifted its weapons export restrictions on India. In contrast, the natural barriers to developing an advanced engine from scratch, in a country with no past experience doing so, to technical specifications more challenging than current market mainstays, were not lifted so easily. The complexities inherent in this challenge belied DRDO’s apparent confidence, forcing India to bring in turbine experts from Snecma in France and from US firms like Pratt and Whitney.

In the end, the Indian DRDO was finally forced to look for a foreign technology partner, and issue an RFP. Even then, acceptance of program realities was slow in coming. In the initial stages, DRDO secretary M Natarajan referred to it as an effort to “add value and look for a partner to stand guarantee,” and stated that any partners would have to work to India’s terms. A committee in which IAF experts would be included would evaluate the bids to decide on:

“…how much to take and from whom… But Kaveri is and would remain an Indian project… We have gone this way to shorten time for making the engine airborne, as we don’t wont to delay the LCA induction schedule.”

GE F404

Those goals did not prove to be compatible.

US engine manufacturer General Electric, who supplies the F404 jet engines that power initial Tejas models, seemed unenthralled with those proposed terms. They declined to respond to the RFP for foreign assistance. Eventually, India’s state agencies were forced to concede that they could not develop an engine with the required specifications, and that seeking foreign help to improve the basic design was also unlikely to produce a design that met the required specifications.

With no engine in production as late-stage aircraft testing began, and none forthcoming in the forseeable future, India’s drive to develop an indigenous “Kaveri” jet engine had become a key roadblock for the Tejas program in India – and very possibly, beyond India as well.

In contrast to the Kaveri, F404 family engines are already proven in a number of aircraft around the world including Saab’s 4th generation JAS-39 Gripen lightweight fighter, the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, models A-D of the F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft in service around the world, South Korea’s T/A-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer & light attack aircraft, and Singapore’s soon to be retired A-4SU Super Skyhawk attack jets. Kaveris equipped with F404/F414 engines would present a lower risk profile to potential export customers, due to the engines’ long-proven performance, GE’s global support network, and the number on engines in operation around the world.

Kaveri would offer none of these important benefits, in exchange for one offsetting feature: foreign sales would not require US military export approval for the engines.

India has not been a major weapons exporter, so export realities didn’t carry a lot of weight. On the other hand, the technical and timeline difficulties experienced by the main Tejas program created a potential natiional defense crisis that could not be ignored. By August 2008, the Kaveri program had effectively been sidelined, in order to get the Tejas into service within an acceptable time frame and preserve India’s operational fighter strength. While political changes may resurrect the Kaveri program as a political exercise, the Tejas program’s technical procurement path has been moving in the other direction.

This kind of vague drift away from an indigenous option is common in India’s procurement history. It usually ends with off-the-shelf “interim” buys becoming permanent; and an indigenous program that’s either shelved, or bought in very low numbers alongside a much larger foreign purchase of similar equipment.

GE’s F404-IN20 will be the Tejas’ initial powerplant, to be followed by the F414-GE-INS6, which beat the Eurojet EJ200 as the Tejas Mk.II’s planned engine.

Even so, DRDO continued to fund and back its long-delayed project. By January 2013, they had abandoned negotiations with France’s Snecma to create a Kaveri 2.0 version using key Snecma engine technologies, and resolved to try yet another global tender. A Kaveri without an afterburner would power a notional UCAV strike drone, and DRDO specified a pair of Kaveri engines for a proposed “Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft” project.

These pursuits would have kept the Kaveri development project consuming defense funds for another decade. In May 2014, however, Narendra Modi’s BJP Party scored a crushing landslide victory, and vowed to shake up the way government was run. DRDO felt the change, shifted their prioritization methods, and decided in November 2014 that the Kaveri program should be abandoned entirely.

\Additional Readings & Sources Background: LCA Tejas

• Indian Government – Tejas: India’s Light Combat Aircraft.

• India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment – Main site. Government agency developing the LCA family.

• DRDO – Light Combat Aircraft.

• Aerospace Web – Hindustan (HAL) Tejas / Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Light Multi-Role Fighter.

• Air Force World – LCA. Chinese site.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).

• MILAVIA – ADA Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft).

• Wikipedia – HAL Tejas. Detailed and well footnoted.

Background: Ancillary Technologies & Weapons

• General Electric – F404 engine family.

• IAI – EL/M-2032 – Multimode Airborne Fire Control Radar.

• ACIG Database – Kfir C.10. Includes a great deal of information concerning IAI Elta’s EL/M-2032 radar, and looks at the Derby missile.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – R-73E/R-73EL. AA-11 Archer short range air-to-air missile in the West.

• RAFAEL – DERBY Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – KAB-1500LG-Pr-E, KAB-1500LG-OD-E, KAB-1500LG-F-E. Laser guided bombs.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-59MK2 Air-Launched Missile. Short-range strike, similar to Raytheon’s AGM-65 Maverick.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-31A Medium Range Airborne Missile. AS-17 Krypton in the West, has several variants including the Kh-31P radar-killer.

• Tactical Missiles Corp. JSC – Kh-35E – Tactical Anti-Ship Missile. Sub-sonic, similar to Boeing’s Harpoon.

Background: Tejas Mk.II Technologies

• General Electric – F414 engine family. In Mk.II.

• Eurojet – EJ200. Lost Mk.II competition.

• India’s DRDO – Kaveri Engine. The state-owned R&D agency grudgingly abandoned their push to put this on the Tejas. For now.

• IAI – EL/M-2052 – Active Phased Array Airborne Fire Control Radar. Reportedly slated for Mk.II.

Official Reports

• India MoD (March 20/13) – Delay in Manufacturing of Tejas by DRDO.

• Air Commodore Muthanna (Oct 18/12) – Challenges In Design To Deployment: Critical Lessons From the D&D of LCA.

News & Views

• DID FOCUS – India’s MMRCA Fighter Competition. Covering the MRCA foreign competition, whose choices and success will affect the Tejas LCA project.

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Contains an extensive set of links to articles covering India’s defense sector and its organizational/ program issues. One of which is Tejas.

• Bharat Rakshak (Feb 11/13) – Interviews with LCA program test pilot Cmde Jaydeep Maolankar and N-LCA Deputy Project Director Cmdr Sukesh Nagaraj. Claimed. DID can’t confirm their authenticity, but we have no reason to disbelieve this account.

• AeroMag Asia – Jan-Feb 2013 issue [PDF] includes “LCA-Tejas: Sky is not the limit” | “TEJAS Programme is dashing towards the completion of IOC: Subramanyam” | “LCA-Navy can be a replacement for Sea Harrier: Balaji”.

• The Indian Express (Nov 15/06) – 23 yrs and first fighter aircraft hasn’t taken off. Says the LCA Tejas may face further delays, and the entire project could even be forced into a joint-venture in order to successfully deliver the aircraft.

• Vijay Times (May 1/06) – Glitches in LCA radar.

• The Sunday Express (April 8/06) – ‘Indigenous’ aircraft needs foreign lift, for its radar.

• Rediff (Feb 5/06) – Kaveri Engine – Reignited Hopes, Technological Edge?. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Press Trust of India (Feb 2/06) – Light Combat Aircraft project to be completed in 2010. Scroll to the right if necessary.

• Frontier India (March 6/05) – Light Combat Aircraft – Tejas Testing. By Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd). Good description of the issues encountered trying to design and build the aircraft.

• Bharat Rakshak Monitor (March-April 2001) LCA Development and Costs. By Sunil Sainis and George Joseph. Contains the most detailed cost and industrial participation information we have found.

I have a new policy memo out with PONARS Eurasia. Here’s the first half.

Since the Ukraine crisis, the dominant Western perspective on Russian foreign policy has come to emphasize its increasingly confrontational, even revanchist, nature. Experts have focused on discontinuities in Russian foreign policy either between the ostensibly more pro-Western Yeltsin presidency and the anti-Western Putin presidency or between the more cooperatively inclined early Putin period (2000-2008) and the more confrontational late Putin period (2012-present). In this memo, I argue that Russian foreign policy preferences and activities have been largely continuous since the early 1990s. These preferences have focused on the quest to restore Russia’s great power status and maintain a zone of influence in states around its borders as a buffer against potential security threats. Throughout this time, Russian foreign policy has been neither revanchist nor expansionist in nature. Instead, it has been focused on first stopping and then reversing the decline of Russian power in the late 1980s and the 1990s and on ensuring that Russia was protected against encroachment by the Western alliance led by the United States. However, perceptions of Russian foreign policy during the post-Soviet period among other powers and outside observers have changed markedly as a consequence of a gradual increase in the extent of Russian relative power vis-à-vis its neighbors and especially vis-à-vis Western powers.

The Discontinuity Argument

The argument that Russia’s foreign policy has changed markedly over time comes in two versions. The first version of the discontinuity argument paints a sharp contrast between the pro-Western foreign policy followed by Russia in the 1990s under President Boris Yeltsin with the anti-Western foreign policy preferred by Vladimir Putin after he took over the presidency. In this reading, Russia under Yeltsin was in the process of transitioning to democracy and generally supportive of Western foreign policy initiatives despite some occasional disagreements. Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, has been committed to countering U.S. interests in the world, especially when it comes to the spread of democracy.

This narrative overstates the continuity of Russian foreign policy under Putin while understating continuities between the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, Russian support for the United States’ intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, which included putting pressure on Central Asian states to accept U.S. bases on their soil and a 2009 agreement to allow for the transit of military goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan through Russia, is downplayed in favor of a focus on Russian opposition to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Serious disagreements during the Yeltsin period, particularly regarding Western interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, are seen as aberrations in agenerally pro-Western Russian foreign policy, while Russian involvement in the early 1990s in internal conflicts in neighboring states such as Moldova and Georgia is ignored altogether.

The second version of the discontinuity argument runs counter to the “good Yeltsin, evil Putin” narrative. It focuses on the very aspects of Putin’s first two terms as president that the first narrative elides. This narrative highlights differences between Russian foreign policy in 2000-2012 and the period after Putin’s return to the presidency. Here, Russia is described as a status quo power until the Ukraine crisis and a revisionist power thereafter. The episodes of cooperation in the 2000s are contrasted with Russia’s confrontational statements and actions after 2012. Meanwhile, the confrontational aspects of Russian foreign policy during Putin’s first two terms in office, such as efforts to divide the Euro-Atlantic alliance over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, to force the United States military out of Central Asia after 2005, and to highlight the consequences of Western recognition of Kosovo independence in 2008, are downplayed. The result is a picture of Russian foreign policy under Putin that gradually slides from cooperation with the United States and Western institutions early in his presidency to all-out confrontation in recent years. While this trajectory is largely accurate in terms of the overall relationship, I argue that it is less the result of changes in Russian foreign policy goals and more a consequence of changes in Russia’s relative power in the international system.

The Argument for Consistency in Russian Foreign Policy Goals

While the two readings of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy presented above are at odds with each other, they both overstate the extent of discontinuity. In reality, with the possible exception of the very beginning of the Yeltsin period, Russian foreign policy goals have been largely consistent throughout the post-Soviet period. The main driver of Russian foreign policy both under Yeltsin and under Putin has been the effort to restore respect for Russia as a major power in world affairs. From the Russian point of view, this respect was lost as a result of Russia’s political and economic weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Evidence for this lack of respect in the 1990s included disregard for Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement to Central Europe and NATO’s interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. When NATO chose to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1997, Russian politicians condemned the move as a betrayal of Russian trust and a sign that Western leaders and military planners still perceived Russia as a potential military threat. Russian leaders also felt betrayed and humiliated by the lack of consultation by NATO and Western state officials during the process leading up to the decision to bomb Serbia to stop its ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. They argued that NATO enlargement and the Kosovo War showed that Russia had become so weak that its opinion no longer mattered in determining world reaction to regional crises. Further confirmation of this point of view came in the early 2000s, when Russian opinion was ignored in the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The response, both in the 1990s and under Putin, was to seek to restore Russia’s great power status while maintaining a zone of influence in states on Russia’s border as a buffer against potential security threats. As early as 1993, Russia’s Security Council promulgated a foreign policy concept that included “ensuring Russia an active role as a great power” as a key foreign policy goal and asserted a special role for Russia in the former Soviet republics.

Please click here to read the rest of the policy memo.

Americas

The US Army has awarded BAE Systems Ordnance Systems Inc. an $89.5 million contract modification for operations and maintenance of Radford Army Ammunition Plant. The plant is the core propellant manufacturer of the US Department of Defense and was originally built in the 1940s to support the war effort. Today it is the primary supplier of solventless propellant to support direct fire, indirect fire and rocket applications. It is also the only north american manufacturer and supplier of nitrocellulose. Work will be performed in Radford, Virginia and is scheduled to end on December 31, 2019. The US Army has also contracted BAE Systems Ordnance Systems Inc. with an $74.8 million modification for building G-3 NQ/RDX recrystallization construction at Holston Army Ammunition Plant. The Holston Army Ammunition Plant is the major supplier of explosive materials to the U.S. Department of Defense. Work will be performed in Kingsport, Tennessee. The estimated date of completion is November 31, 2021.

The 11th Contracting Squadron, Joint Base Andrews has contracted DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, Texas with $75 million for rotary wing aircraft maintenance. The contract provides for services to support all management, personnel, equipment and services needed to perform 811th Operations Group rotary wing flight line maintenance.  The 811th Operations Group provides continuous rotary-wing contingency response capability. Work will be performed at Joint Base Andrews Maryland and is scheduled to be completed by the end of June, 2024.

Airbus’ Brazilian subsidiary Helibras has given its third and final H225M helicopter in the combat search and rescue configuration (CSAR) to the Brazilian Navy. The H225M is a long-range tactical support military helicopter, equipped with Saab’s RWS-300 radar warning receiver, LWS-310 laser warning receiver, MAW-300 missile warning receiver and BOP-L chaff and flare dispensers. The helicopters are delivered as part of the Brazilian H-XBR Program which will see Helibras deliver a total of 50 H225Ms to the Brazilian Armed forces.

Middle East & Africa

The Israeli companies Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd. and Aeronautics Ltd. will develop and manufacture advanced drones based on Aeronautics’ Orbiter family of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The five-year agreement involves joint marketing nasals of the systems, starting in Israel with the goal to receive authorization to expand overseas. Rafael is able to cancel the cooperation agreement in case Aeronautic’s ownership structure changes. Aeronautics reported to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) that the new agreement constitutes anchoring and extension of an existing agreement in principle signed 30 months ago.

Europe

The german company GIWS (Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme mbH) has confirmed that qualification of its relaunched SMArt 155 artillery projectile will be undertaken between 2022 and 2024, Jane’s reports. GIWS is a joint venture company between Diehl Defense and Rheinmetall Weapons. SMArt 155, manufactured by GIWS, is a 155 millimeter artillery round and only one of two 155 mm top attack munitions currently in production in the West. The SMArt carrier shell contains two submunitions with infrared sensor and millimeter wave radar. Extensive trials by the German Army confirmed that SMArt 155 has a dud rate of less than 1 percent. After the end of the qualification period in 2024, there will be a Phase 4 production program until 2027, under which a considerable number is to be procured to replenish supplies.

Asia-Pacific

South Korea’s Army launches a new research institute on artificial intelligence. The AI Research and Development Center under its Training & Doctrine Command will consist of about 50 military and civilian personnel with expertise in AI, big data and other new technologies. The new team will have four offices in charge of developing the concept for the military AI utility, the potential demand for technological applications and collaboration with relevant civilian research institutes and industries.

Today’s Video

Watch: Sikorsky – Boeing Future Vertical Lift: The Way Forward

Brazilian Navy EC725
(click to view full)

Brazil’s “Project H-X BR” medium transport helicopter competition featured 3 established players: AgustaWestland’s EH101 has found success in Britain, Europe, and Japan, and was chosen as the base for the USA’s VH-71 Presidential helicopter before that program was canceled. Eurocopter’s EC725 Cougar is an updated version of the popular AS332/532 Super Puma, and has been ordered in limited quantities by the French and Mexican governments. An up-to-date version of Russia’s widely used Mi-17 was the 3rd contender; like the Super Puma, Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters are already in wide use within Latin America.

In truth, however, Eurocopter always had an edge. The Brazilian Army’s Aviacao do Exercito already uses the AS532/”HM-3″ Super Puma, basing them in the Amazon at Manaus. Its Navy also uses Super Puma variants: AS332s and AS532s both serve in the Navy as the UH-14, flying from Brazil’s NAe Sao Paulo aircraft carrier, and from the southeastern base of Sao Pedro da Aldeia in support of Brazil’s Marines. Now, Eurocopter’s offering will become Brazil’s medium-lift helicopter across all services… thanks to a new contract.

The Cougars and the Opportunities

Brazilian Super Puma
(click to view full)

By 2007 Brazil’s was showing a surprising boost in its defense budget, as well as a revived fighter competition in the works, the selection of a medium transport helicopter and of an attack helicopter, and other programs to follow. After decades of neglect, Brazil appeared set to reconstitute both its armed forces, and a defense industry that once offered an array of competitive products on the global stage.

A few years later, Brazil’s F-X2 is on hold, but it did buy Russia’s Mi-35M as its attack helicopter, to go with its H-XBR EC725 Cougar medium utility helicopters. That “Cougar” designation can be confusing. While Eurocopter itself uses the Cougar designation primarily for its new EC725 and the EC225 civilian version, Helibras’ pages refer to the AS532 as “Cougar,” in line with Aerospatiale marketing efforts since 1990. Compared to the AS532, the EC725 Cougar is a bit larger, and uses more advanced modular design, more composite materials, state of the art avionics, and prognostic monitoring systems for key components.

Brazil’s Navy and Army will each receive 16 helicopters to support their missions. The Air Force will receive 18: 16 for general tasks, and 2 configured as VIP transports.

EC725 Cougar
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, the deal itself offers important benefits to both parties. The Brazilians make some progress in the area of fleet standardization, though they will continue to operate helicopters from Bell and Sikorsky. They also strengthen a key defense industry relationship, and build national capability with the upgraded Helibras facility. There are rumors that Snecma’s Turbomeca will also set up an “industrial facility” in Rio de Janeiro for helicopter engines. All of these moves will make a difference to Brazil’s long term costs, and may even provide a base for more government buys. Local production of Cougar helicopters in Brazil also creates a local source for state firms like Petrobras, who may need long-range helicopters for their offshore oil rigs, as well as “para-public” agencies like law enforcement.

EADS Eurocopter gains, too.

The global medium helicopter market is currently very tight, with demand outstripping supply. EH101 production is backlogged to the point that Britain moved to buy Denmark’s fleet, rather than wait for factory deliveries of extra machines for the front lines. NHI/Eurocopter’s smaller NH90 is in an even worse state, and is backlogged by years; so is Boeing’s heavy-lift CH-47F Chinook production line. Sikorsky’s medium-heavy CH-53K will not be a realistic option before 2016 or so. Its smaller H-92 Superhawk has yet to be delivered, has not been ordered in a military transport version, and currently has just one small military customer in Canada. This leaves Russia’s Mi-17, which has its own steady flow of demand, and attracts questions about its Rosoboronexport’s support and negotiating approaches. Or, there’s Eurocopter.

An additional production line, and firm orders for the EC725, offer Eurocopter additional capacity to meet global demand, while fulfilling their existing commitments. It also offers them a key reference customer beyond France, giving their new model credibility as a viable long-term choice for existing Puma and Super Puma operators.

On the other hand, the deal doesn’t quite establish production in a dollar zone, which has been a goal of EADS’ leadership. Brazil’s Real has increased in value from about $0.35 in January 2004 to test peaks of around $0.65 in both 2008 and 2011; and even increased in value relative to the Euro, rising from EUR 0.28 to reach EUR 0.40 and above since 2010. Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega famously said in 2010 that a currency war was going on. The Real may have come down a bit from recent peak values, but with Brazil moving away from the US dollar as a reference currency in international trade, Brazilian production will have to compete on its own economic merits, rather than benefiting from currency externalities.

Contracts & Key Events

Brazilian EC725
(click to view full) Jan 3/19: Helibras gives H225M to Brazilian Navy Airbus’ Brazilian subsidiary Helibras has given its third and final H225M helicopter in the combat search and rescue configuration (CSAR) to the Brazilian Navy. The H225M is a long-range tactical support military helicopter, equipped with Saab’s RWS-300 radar warning receiver, LWS-310 laser warning receiver, MAW-300 missile warning receiver and BOP-L chaff and flare dispensers. The helicopters are delivered as part of the Brazilian H-XBR Program which will see Helibras deliver a total of 50 H225Ms to the Brazilian Armed forces.

Sept 17/13: ECM. Eurocopter announces that they’ve tested a Brazilian-designed missile warning & countermeasures system, using an existing Brazilian Navy AS332 L1 Super Puma as a surrogate. The system was developed by Helibras’ Engineering Center, and the 6 flight tests were performed at Santa Cruz Air Base near Rio de Janeiro. Eurocopter adds that:

“To date, seven EC725s for the Brazilian armed forces produced by Eurocopter in France have been delivered in the first phase of Brazil’s acquisition and an eighth will be delivered before the end of the year. The next batch of helicopters already is in Itajuba, with some of them undergoing partial build-up on the Helibras final assembly line. After testing and acceptance, they will be delivered beginning in early 2014…. and one EC725 will be used for the development and integration of systems.”

Sources: Eurocopter, “Eurocopter technology transfer sees Brazilian-made countermeasure system integrated on military aircraft”.

Jan 5/12: Eurocopter’s Helibras subsidiary gets a 5-year, BRL 150 million (about EUR 62.2M/ $80.5M) contract to provide central supply and management for EC725 spare parts, stocks and related technical support. It will serve all 3 military services, which is a first for the country.

Activities will include helicopter inspection, overhaul and repair, as well as the deployment of teams to provide on-site base services. Eurocopter’s release adds that “The first three EC725s delivered to the Brazilian armed forces in December 2010 are now being operated by the country’s army, navy and air force.”

Dec 20/10: Eurocopter delivers the first 3 Brazilian EC725s. The helicopters were manufactured in France and delivered in a standard configuration, for final outfitting in Brazil by its Helibras subsidiary. Brazilian Armed Forces personnel have been in training since May 2010 to operate and maintain the EC725s, and conducted the acceptance tests.

Brazilian assembly of EC725 will begin in 2012 at Helibras’ new Itajuba production facility, and their Brazilian-supplied content will increase to a minimum of 50% through 2016. Eurocopter.

May 26/10: The first flight test of the first EC725 helicopter is performed at Eurocopter’s facility in Marignane, France. It’s intended for the 1st Squadron of the Brazilian Air Force’s 8th Aviation Group. FAB release.

May 22/10: Eurocopter subsidiary Helibras holds the ground-breaking ceremony for their new rotary-wing center of excellence in Itajuba, Brazil, where they will produce, assemble and maintain Brazil’s EC725 helicopters. Eurocopter release.

French Cougar SAR/SOF
(click to view full)

Sept 2/09: Brazil’s Ministerio Do Defesa announces [in Portuguese] Senate approval of the long term budgets for Brazil’s helicopter and submarine programs. The H-X BR program’s budget is EUR 1.847 billion, (about 5.1 billion Brazilian Reals, or $2.65 billion). Budgeting will begin in 2009 and end in 2017, while EC725 deliveries will begin with 3 helicopters in 2010, and finish in 2016.

Brazil’s annual delivery schedule is oddly staggered: 3, 1, 4, 11, 9, 14, and 8. That may create capacity flexibility, and the MDD release adds that Brazil will become the manufacturing source for all EC725s exported to Latin America and Africa. The inclusion of Mexico, who has already ordered 6 EC725s and has a prominent Eurocopter subsidiary in country, is uncertain.

Dec 23/08: French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva sign the EUR $1.9 billion (about $2.7 billion) contract in Rio de Janeiro. French government | EADS Eurocopter | Bloomberg

Dec 18/08: Brazil releases a new National Defense Strategy that sets out broad range of goals, including the rebuilding of Brazil’s defense industry. AP report | Estrategia Nacional de Defesa [Portuguese].

June 30/08: Brazil and France sign an agreement in principle for Eurocopter to build helicopters in the South American country via its subsidiary Helibras. Brazil’s Defense Minister Nelson Jobim reportedly said that the country intended to buy 50 “Super Cougar” models, the first of which would be delivered in 2010. The deal’s value was initially reported as $1.2 billion, but reports put the signed contract at $2.7 billion equivalent.

Under the agreement in principle, France would transfer technology and help Brazil expand the export capacity of its aviation industry by aiding the assembly of helicopter components such as engines and electrical systems. Eurocopter will also invest $300-400 million in Helibras Minas de Gerais plant in central Brazil, in order to prepare it for production.

Both countries are expected to also sign a broader strategic defense alliance in December, whose terms could have some influence on Brazil’s choice of fighter for its F-X2 competition. See: India’s Economic Times | Forbes | Reuters | Rotor & Wing short bulletin.

Additional Readings

• Airforce Technology – EC725 Cougar – Mi-17 – EH101: the 3 original contenders.

Americas

Lockheed Martin has been awarded a valued $712.5 million order by the US Navy to work on the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter. The Lightning II is a single-seat, single-engine fighter aircraft designed to perform ground-attack and air-superiority missions. Under the agreement Lockheed Martin will develop the aircraft’s Technology Refresh 3 (TR3) System, which will update the computer systems on board the F-35 Lightning II. The TR3 will be designed with full flightworthy certification, production readiness review and fleet release to support low-rate initial production of the 15th Lot of F-35 jets. Work will be carried out in Fort Worth, Texas and is scheduled to be over by March 2023. The F-35 is Lockheed Martin’s largest program, generating 27% of its total sales in the third quarter of 2018.

In order to improve the landing areas within Marine Corps Base Hawaii properties Kiewit Infrastructure West Co., Honolulu is awarded a $15,419,280 firm-fixed-price contract. The landing areas are used for training maneuvers by the MV-22 Osprey aircraft. Th V-22 Osprey is a multirole, tiltrotor combat aircraft combining the vertical performance of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft. The Osprey uses two engines positioned on fixed wing tips housed in nacelles that rotate to allow the MV-22 to land and take off vertically, but achieve much faster flight than a helicopter by tilting the nacelles forward while in flight in a configuration similar to a fixed-wing aircraft. Work on the landing areas will take place in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. provides for the converting of the existing landing helicopter assault pad into a landing helicopter dock pad, the construction of a new landing platform dock pad, and the construction of four new concrete landing pads. Work is expected to be completed by August 2020.

Middle East & Africa

The Royal Jordanian Air Force announced that the second of four Mil Mi-26 ‘Halo’ heavy-lift helicopters has been delivered to Jordan from Russia, with two more set to arrive before the end of 2019. Originally developed to respond to containment work after the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986, the Mil Mi-26T Halo is the largest helicopter in the world. Its maximum take-off weight is 56 tons and it carries up to 82 troops. Jordan ordered four of the current production-standard Mi-26T helicopters in September 2016.

Israel Aerospace Industries started production of the F-35 stealth fighter components for the outer wings, making the fighter jet invisible to radar. Deliveries of the outer wing sets are expected to start as soon as the beginning of 2019. The sets will be manufactured using a unique composite layer of materials called Automated Fiber Placement. The threads, which are three millimeters thick, are what give the wings the ability to escape detection by radar. The contract between IAI and Lockheed Martin to create this production line was signed in 2013. According to an 2016 statement by the company, the production line is scheduled to build a total of 811 pairs of F-35A wings by 2034.

Europe

French naval fighter squadron Flottile 17F has completed its transition to the Dassault Aviation Rafale M, Jane’s reports. Flottile 17F, nicknamed “La glorieuse“, previously operated the Super Étendard Modernisé (SEM) aircraft until it was withdrawn from service in 2016. Now the Flottile 17 F has officially joined the French Navy’s two other fighter squadrons, 11F and 12F, in operating the Dassault Aviation Rafale M. The Dassault Rafale is a French twin-engine, multirole fighter aircraft. It has been tasked with fleet air defense, close air support, anti-ship strikes, and air-to-air refueling.

Asia-Pacific

South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) has received a contract for the renovation and repair of three KDX-I class destroyers. The Gwanggaeto the Great Class (KDX-I) destroyers, Designed as multimission surface combatants, were built by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) for the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN). Three destroyers replaced the older ex-US Navy ships of the ROKN. DSME also unveiled a contract for the construction of one LNG carrier for an unnamed Oceania company. The total value of the contracts is about $230 million.

HMAS Hobart, Australia’s first-of-class warfare destroyer demonstrated its ability to conduct co-operative fleet-area air defense operations. The destroyer, which was commissioned in September 2017, was deployed to the coast of San Diego to test its combat and weaponry system, including a series of at-sea trials known as the combat system qualification trials (CSSQT). The trials confirm the Royal Australian Navy’s capacity to cooperate with the US Navy in high-intensity combat operations.

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Americas

Raytheon is being contracted to integrate its Standard Missile-2 onto the Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyers. The contract modification is priced at $17 million and exercises an option for providing the DDG 1000 ships with design agent support. The Zumwalt-class destroyers are the Navy’s next-generation guided missile destroyers featuring enhanced stealth capabilities and advanced war fighting technology. The program is a topic of contention considering its cost overruns and complications with its stealth features. SM-2 missiles are designed to engage enemy missiles and aircraft to ranges of up to 100 miles. Work will be performed at Raytheon’s factories in Tucson, Arizona; Andover, Massachusetts; Mountain View, California; San Diego, California; Chandler, Arizona; Hudson, New Hampshire and Redmond, Washington. The contract will run through March 2022.

The US Navy is continuing with its Aegis modernisation efforts. Raytheon is being awarded with a $72.5 million contract that sees for the production of the systems’ fire control system. The Mk 99 Fire Control System (FCS) is an essential component of a ship’s Aegis combat system. The FCS gives Aegis its deadly punch by controlling the loading and arming of the used weapon, it launches the weapon and provides terminal guidance for anti-air-warfare missiles. Work will be performed at multiple locations – including, but not limited to – Andover, Massachusetts; San Diego, California and Chesapeake, Virginia. Performance is scheduled for completion by April 2022.

Middle East & Africa

Alliant Techsystems is being awarded with a contract modification in support of Iraq’s Cessna 208 fleet and the 208/172 Trainer fleet. The modification is priced at $36.6 million and exercises Option Year Three for contractor logistics support. The AC-208 Combat Caravan is a light attack combat aircraft manufactured by the US-based aerospace and defense company Alliant Techsystems (ATK). The Cessna variant is a counter insurgency (COIN) aircraft converted from a cargo / ISR plane. It was developed under the Combat Caravan program of the US as part of the government’s effort to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force. Work will be performed at Iraqi Air Force bases and is expected to be completed in December 2019.

Qatar is tapping Boeing to maintain the country’s fleet of AH-64E Apache helicopters. Awarded by the US Army Contracting Command, the $49.2 million Foreign Military Sales contract provides for Maintenance Augmentation Team services for the Qatari Air Force. Qatar ordered 24 Apache Guardians in 2016, and expects to receive the aircraft from 2019 through to mid-2020. The helicopters will be equipped with AGM-114R Hellfire laser-guided missiles, FIM-92H Stinger missiles with air-to-air launchers, and 70 mm Hydra air-to-surface rockets. Work will be performed at Boeing’s factory in Mesa, Arizona, with an estimated completion date of July 31, 2024.

Europe

The Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) is allocating more funds for Gripen E combat aircraft production. The $48 million contract boost allows Saab to build the Gripen Es from new parts instead with parts from salvaged Gripen Cs. The Swedish Air Force currently has 60 Gripen Es on order and is expected to cost just short of $7 billion in total. The JAS-39 Gripen is an excellent lightweight fighter by all accounts, with attractive flyaway costs and performance. Its canard design allows for quick “slew and point” maneuvers, allowing it to take advantage of the modern trend toward helmet-mounted displays, and air-air missiles with much wider boresight targeting cones.

Asia-Pacific

The Kazakh army is taking delivery of more Su-30SM fighter aircraft from Russia. The Su-30SM fighter was designed in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Air Force. It is being manufactured by IRKUT, a company based in Russia. The multirole Su-30SM can be deployed in counter-air strikes, counter-land and counter-sea missions. It can conduct electronic counter-countermeasures and early warning tasks. The aircraft also acts as a command-and-control platform within a fleet of combat aircraft performing joint missions.

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Americas

Bath Iron Works is being contracted to start production on the US Navy’s fifth DDG 51 Flight III destroyer. The awarded contract modification is priced at $910 million and exercises the FY2019 option for construction of DDG 132. Included in the contract are engineering proposals, design budgeting requirements and some post-delivery availabilities. Work will be performed at BIW’s shipyard in Bath, Maine and at several other locations including Cincinnati, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; York, Pennsylvania; Coatesville, Pennsylvania; Falls Church, Virginia; South Portland, Maine; Walpole, Massachusetts; Erie, Pennsylvania and Charlottesville, Virginia. DDG 132 is expected to launch in May 2026.

The US Navy is modifying a support contract with Raytheon. Valued at $38 million, the modification provides for design-agent and in-service support as well as for technical engineering support services which support Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) production. ESSM missiles are designed to protect Navy ships from incoming missiles and aircraft. Work will be performed at Raytheon’s factory in Tucson, Arizona and at facilities in the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and Australia. The contract is paid with FY2019 Navy and Foreign Military Sales funds.

Middle East & Africa

URS Federal Services is being contracted to support the US Army’s Prepositioned Stock Five (APS-5) located in South Korea. The $14.8 million contract modification covers the provision of logistics support services until January 2020. APS-5 is located in Kuwait and Qatar and supports the Middle-Eastern theatre with two armored battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The Army maintains a strategic inventory of sustainment supplies as part of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). These stocks sustain forward-deployed and initial follow-on ground forces, and include major end items such as engines, repair parts, medical supplies, packaged petroleum products, barrier/construction materials, operations rations, and clothing required to sustain combat operations. The APS-5 is located at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait and in Doha, Qatar.

Kuwait is buying four F/A-18E trainers from Boeing under the Foreign Military Sales program. Awarded by the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, the contract provides for the design, fabrication, installation, test and delivery of two F/A-18E Tactical Operational Flight trainers (TOFT) and two F/A-18E low cost trainers. TOFTs are built on Boeing’s and L-3’s F/A-18 simulator common hardware and software baseline. The simulators are integrated with a 360° display, image generator and training system. The mission computer emulation simulates radar, electronic countermeasures and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System. The trainers enable aircrews to prepare for the full range of force multiplier capabilities that the platform can support during rapidly changing battle scenarios. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri; New Orleans, Louisiana and Kuwait City, Kuwait. The contract is valued at $76.5 million and will run through February 2022.

Europe

Czech airrcaft manufacturer Aero Vodochody completes its first test flight of the new L-39NG jet trainer. The flight was conducted on the 22nd of December, just two months after the jet trainer’s rollout ceremony. The company anticipates to achieve type certification by the end of 2019. The L-39NG is based on the aerodynamic concept of the current L-39 but utilizes the latest technologies and equipment. Powered by a Williams International FJ44-4M turbofan engine, the new generation aircraft will be used to train future pilots of 4th and 5th generation aircraft.

Leonardo concludes the first test round of its new TH-119 training helicopter. The TH-119 is manufactured in the USA and could replace the US Navy’s TH-57 training fleet. The initial flight test marks an important milestone, bringing the helicopter one step closer to achieve full FAA IFR certification in early 2019. Leonardo says that its TH-119 will be the only single-engine IFR-certified helicopter in production in decades. The new trainer is built upon the company’s AW119 light single-engine utility helicopter and features a high-resistance airframe with a four-blade main rotor and a two-blade tail rotor. The platform is equipped with four primary flight display (PFD) and multi-function display (MFD) units and a low-profile instrument panel. Powered by a PT6B-37A turboshaft engine, the TH-119 can achieve speeds of 152k and a cruise speed of 138k. The TH-119 is manufactured and supported at Leonardo’s existing FAA Part 21 production facility in Philadelphia.

Asia-Pacific

Media reports suggest that Russia has started underwater trials of its new ‘Poseidon’ drone. The Poseidon is a is a new intercontinental, nuclear armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo. Formerly know as Kanyon, the drone is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. If equipped with a nuclear warhead the drone could be used to attack coastal cities or create tsunamis. The drone is included in Russia’s state armament program for 2018-2027 and the Poseidon is expected to enter service before the program ends, a source told Russian media agency TASS.

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Americas

Northrop Grumman is being contracted to support the US Air Force. The $1.3 billion IDIQ contract covers sustainment, modernization and development efforts of the LITENING advanced targeting pod. Designed to improve both day and night attack capabilities, AN/AAQ-28 pods provide pilots with advanced image processing for target identification and coordinate generation, a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, charge-coupled device television (CCD-TV) sensors, a laser spot tracker/ range finder, and infrared laser marker/ designators. It is fully operational 24 hours a day and in adverse weather conditions. Work will be performed at Northrop Grumman’s factory in Rolling Meadows, Illinois and is expected to be completed by the end of 2023.

The Space and Missile Systems Center at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado is awarding an IDIQ contract to Lockheed Martin. The order is priced at $462 million and covers for Global Positioning Systems Control-Segment Sustainment II work. Lockheed will provide the service with depot-level software maintenance; organizational-level hardware and software maintenance; systems engineering; Technical Order Management Agency support; maintenance and sustainment of the consolidated test environment as well as support to and integration of GPS Acquisition Category III programs onto the operational control system platform. The GPS III ground control segment is equipped with ground hardware and software that offers command and control for global satellite operations centres’ networks, ground antennas and monitor stations used to control the massive satellite constellation. DOD’s first most powerful satellite was launched to space with a SpaceX provided rocket on December 23, 2018. Work will be performed at Lockheed’s facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado and is expected to be completed by December 31, 2025.

The US Air Force is ordering support and services for its fleet of MQ-9 Reapers from General Atomics. The cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract is valued at $291 million and provides for program management efforts, logistics support, configuration management, technical manual and software maintenance, contractor field service representative support, inventory control point management, flight operations support, depot repair, and depot field maintenance. The MQ-9 can serve in multiple roles like surveillance and support of ground troops as well as emergency search and rescue and other missions. Work will be performed at GA’s Poway, California factory. Performance is expected to be completed by December 31, 2019.

Middle East & Africa

The Nigeria Air Force (NAF) is buying two AW109 helicopters from Leonardo. The helicopters are the first batch ordered from Italy and arrived in Nigeria earlier this month. The NAF expects to officially induct the AW109s into service sometime in March 2019. The AW109 is a light-weight, twin-engine eight seat multi-purpose helicopter powered by two side-by-side Pratt & Whitney PW-206C engines, allowing for a climb rate of 9.8m per second and a maximum speed of 311 km/h. The AW109 Power can be configured for a range of missions, including search and rescue, law enforcement, air ambulance, coast guard, border patrol, surveillance, passenger transport, advanced training, and emergency medical services. The helicopters can be armed with 70mm rocket pods, a twin 7.62mm machine gun pod or a single 12.7mm gun pod. The AW109s will support Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram in the country’s Northeast.

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is making good use of its new A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft. As reported by Jane’s, the A-29s conducted a number of night sorties over the past two weeks. Just in September this year, Afghanistan bought several A-29s at a cost of $1.8 billion. Designed to operate in high temperatures and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 is a highly maneuverable fourth-generation weapons system capable of delivering precision guided munitions. The aircraft is being used by the Afghan Air Force (AAF) for close-air attack, air interdiction, escort and armed reconnaissance. The aircraft’s slow speed and better visibility allow for more precise targeting make it suitable to deploy many kinds of ‘cheap’ non-precision bombs.

Europe

Fligth Global reports that Leonardo’s first production-standard M-345 jet trainer successfully performed it first test flight, bringing it one step closer towards service entry with the Italian Air Force in 2020. The M-345 is a training jet aircraft with costs comparable to those of a turboprop aircraft, however it features superior performances compared to other airframes. The aircraft is powered by one Williams International FJ44-4M turbofan engine accelerating it to speeds of up to 460 mp/h. The trainer is equipped with five hardpoints supporting up to 2.205 lbs of external stores in the form of drop bombs, rocket pods, and gun pods. Rome currently has five M-345s on order and could request another 40 in the future. The new jet trainers will replace Italy’s fleet of Aermacchi MB-339s.

Asia-Pacific

South Korea’s Army is again flying its fleet of KUH-1 Surion helicopters. The Army suspended all flying missions of its Surions after a navy version crashed in July this year, killing five of the six Marines aboard and injuring the other. To ensure the safety of the aircraft the Army conducted a comprehensive inspection of the helicopter’s rotor mast and several test flights. The Army has so far checked about a third of its fleet of 90 Surions.

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Sniper on F-16
(click to view full)

At the end of September 2010, the USAF dropped something of a bombshell. Under their $2.3 billion Advanced Targeting Pod – Sensor Enhancement (ATP-SE) contract, the service that had begun standardizing on one future surveillance and targeting pod type decided to change course, and split its buys.

This decision is a huge breakthrough for Northrop Grumman, whose LITENING pod had lost the USAF’s initial 2001 Advanced Targeting Pod competition. As a result of that competition, the USAF’s buys had shifted from LITENING to Sniper pods, and Lockheed Martin’s Sniper became the pod of choice for integration onto new USAF platforms. Since then, both of these pods have chalked up procurement wins around the world, and both manufacturers kept improving their products. That continued competition would eventually change the landscape once again.

In January 2015, Rafael announced that their upcoming upgrade that they call G-4 Advanced outside the U.S., and “G-5” for the Americans will have air-to-air targeting capabilities.

In addition to more diverse targeting, the pods are said to feature inter-asset communications and sensor sharing capabilities – in essence some of the whiz-bang features touted in the F-35 platform that is supposed to push the F/A-18 into obsolescence.

ATP-SE: Evolution in Action

British Harrier GR9,
over Afghanistan
(click to view full)

In Desert Storm, aircraft using precision weapons typically used just 2 bombs to destroy targets which would have required 9,000 bombs in World War II, and 300 in Vietnam. The targeting pods used in Desert Storm were expensive single purpose systems, however, which required multiple pods to perform various missions. The Laser Infrared Targeting and Navigating (LITENING) pod changed that in 1992, combining multiple sensors for maximum flexibility in a single pod, at comparatively low cost.

That combination made LITENING popular, and a partnership between RAFAEL and Northrop Grumman extended its reach. Between the 2 firms, LITENING was sold to customers around the world, including the US military. Other pods eventually followed in its footsteps: Raytheon’s ATFLIR became the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet’s designated pod within the US Navy, and Lockheed Martin took a big step forward when its Sniper/Pantera pod won the USAF’s 2001 competition. Then all targeting pods took a big step forward after the 9/11 attacks, as they proved their effectiveness so well that troops and air forces alike began clamoring for more. For older fighters, an advanced surveillance and targeting pod became the ultimate accessory. For newer fighter designs, targeting pods’ fast improvements and quick-change modularity have made them a standard fixture.

At the moment, core sensors on modern pods include a day camera, thermal imaging, laser rangefinding, laser designator, laser spot detection, inertial navigation, and GPS geolocation. This integrated array enables a pilot to effectively detect, recognize, identify, track and engage ground targets in day, night and under adverse weather conditions. Modern pods are so good that they’ve been used to watch individual people enter or exit a building.

Ball, LITENING
(click to view full)

While the USAF was progressively standardizing on the AN/AAQ-33 Sniper, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard continued to be steady AN/AAQ-28 LITENING AT customers, alongside the US Marines. Northrop Grumman’s approach of steady improvement gave them an opportunity to show those customers the new G4 pod they had been developing. Interest apparently spread to the USAF, as they were brought into flight testing by US Air Force Reserve Command.

With the 2001 ATP contract expiring in 2009, the USAF decided to compete the follow-on order. Work on an RFP that could result in a new competitive landscape for targeting pods began in April 2008. The USAF hasn’t discussed its motives publicly, but new technological developments were given added impetus by the acquisition reforms that surfaced in December 2008. These aimed to institutionalize more competition for ongoing contracts, and the ATP-SE framework fits that mold.

By August 2009 the USAF had issued a draft RFP, with the formal ATP-SE RFP issued in January 2010. The split order was issued in September 2010.

Note that these pods’ modular construction means that existing LITENING AT pods can be upgraded to G4/SE status, and existing Sniper ATPs can be enhanced to the SE configuration. The Air Force’s ATP-SE contract doesn’t include upgrade kits at this point, however, just complete pods. The US military appears to have chosen to buy SE configuration upgrade kits under other contracts (vid Aug 29/09, Nov 7/11 entries) instead, and could modify its ATP-SE umbrella contract if it wished.

ATP-SE: The Competitors

Raytheon’s ATFLIR is only integrated with Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and foreign options like the Damocles pod by France’s Thales suffer from the same integration limitations. That left only 2 realistic contenders for the USAF’s ATP-SE.

Lockheed Martin’s Aerial Sniper

CF-18 w. Sniper
(click to view full)

Lockheed Martin’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper ATP was designed to be a major step-change from the firm’s twin-pod LANTIRN systems, making use of a low radar signature profile and an advanced array of sensors and electronics, in order to offer longer range detection and identification. It also has an important time and money-saving feature: a sort of universal interface, which self-detects the plane type it’s on and automatically load the appropriate Operational Flight Program. It’s a simple change that saves a lot of money on testing and re-certiciation, as shown by the structure of the respective ATP-SE contracts.

Sniper ATP has also won competitions on straight performance. The British, for instance, explicitly cited the pod’s stand off detection and identification ranges as the reason they chose to equip their Harriers with Sniper pods for Afghan missions, rather than buy more of the LITENING-III pods that already equipped their Tornado and Eurofighter jets.

Key changes to the ATP-SE competition’s Sniper pods include new sensors (1k FLIR, HDTV), an evolution of the 2-way Compact Multi-Band Datalink (CMDL) that’s compatible with ROVER 3-5 per USAF requirements, and “automated capabilities” (all they’re allowed to say) to help the pilot perform ISR missions with less workload. Under the USAF’s NET-T Quick Reaction Capability contract, a point-to-multipoint data link architecture can provide an extended range “beyond line-of-sight” capability with the right positioning or infrastructure.

The USAF’s 2001 selection made Sniper a safe choice for international buys, and the LITENING pod’s Israeli origins has opened doors for Lockheed Martin in a number of Islamic countries. Sniper is currently integrated on the A-10A+/C, F-16 Block 25+ aircraft, F-15E/K/S/SG Strike Eagles, F/A-18A-D Hornets, and the B-52H and B-1B bombers. They were integrated with Harrier II GR7/9s, before Britain sold its fleet to the USMC for use as spare parts. Britain didn’t sell its Sniper pods, though, and Lockheed Martin says they’ve done some work on the Tornado GR4 (flight tests, but not operational yet), and on the Eurofighter Typhoon in cooperation with BAE.

As of June 2012, Sniper customers include the USAF (A-10C, F-15E, F-16, B-1B, B-52H), Belgium (F-16 MLU), Britain (Harrier GR7/9, all now sold to the USMC), Canada (“CF-18” F/A-18 AM/BM), Egypt (F-16), Morocco (F-16), Norway (F-16), Oman (F-16), Pakistan (F-16), Poland (F-16), Saudi Arabia (F-15S), South Korea (F-15K, phase 2 buy from earlier LANTIRN pod contract), Singapore (F-15SG, F-16s), and Turkey (F-16).

Northrop Grumman: LITENING in a Pod

LITENING III on GR4
(click to view full)

Northrop Grumman representatives informed DID that their pod will be an enhanced “LITENING SE” variant of their new LITENING G4, which has demonstrated both air-ground and air-air capabilities in testing. LITENING SE changes include an all-digital 1024 x 1024 pixel forward-looking infrared sensor (compared to the AT’s 640 x 512 pixel system); a similar 1K charge-coupled device TV sensor for daytime imaging; a Laser Target Imaging Program imaging system providing improved target recognition across a wide range of conditions; and a “plug and play” data link system that enables them to accept a variety of data links without further modifications to the pod or aircraft. Among other things, PNP-III (Plug N Play 3) is aligned with the ROVER 5 standard for 2-way transmissions with ground forces.

Northrop Grumman has sold its AN/AAQ-28 LITENING pods to a number of customers, for use on a number of different aircraft types. When looking at global coverage and customer bases, however, it’s important to note that Northrop Grumman is only 1 of 2 firms producing LITENING pods. Israel’s RAFAEL invented the LITENING, and has pursued parallel development and sales of their own LITENING I/II/III/EF models within the framework of their formal agreement with Northrop Grumman. At present, however, G4/SE technology is proprietary to Northrop Grumman, who is working on export clearances but hasn’t yet received them.

Overall, platforms known to have integrated at least one LITENING pod variant to at least the tested level include the AV-8B Harrier II, EA-6B Prowler, F-4E/F Phantom, F-5E variants, F-15E Strike Eagle, F-16 Block 15+, F/A-18 Hornet, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, JAS-39 A-D Gripen, MiG-21, Sukhoi/HAL SU-30MKI, Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, HC-130H Hercules, and B-52H. There are also reports of Jaguar IM, Mirage 2000 (reportedly used during the 1999 Kargil War), and/or MiG-27 integration work in India; and photos of Brazilian A-1/AMX and Colombian Kfir C10 fighters with LITENING pods.

A-10 in Iraq
w. LITENING AT
(click to view full)

In terms of Northrop Grumman’s sales, Israel flies a handful of older LITENING ER models on some of its F-16s. The US military’s pods are all at least LITENING AT standard, even those that began life as LITENING-IIs or LITENING ERs. They’re complemented by a handful of even more advanced LITENING G4s, and Northrop Grumman’s pods serve with the USAF, AFRC, US ANG, and USMC on A-10A/C, AV-8B, EA-6B, F-16 Block 30+, F/A-18 C/D, F-15E, and B-52H aircraft. The A-10Cs, B-52s, F-15Es, and F-16s are all slated to become compatible with the new G4s.

Northrop Grumman LITENING AT pods also serve with the Italian (AV-8B Harrier II), and Spanish (AV-8B) navies. The LITENING AT Block 2 pod, which is somewhere between the AT and G4, serves with Australia (F/A-18 Hornet HUG), Finland (F/A-18 C/D), the Netherlands (F-16 MLU), and Portugal (F-16 A/B Block 15 and F-16AM MLU). In 2012, Denmark added itself to the customer list, buying G4 pods for its F-16 MLUs.

By the time the ATP-SE contract was issued, the US military already had about 10-30 LITENING G4 pods in the field, from about 50 ordered in 2009 by the USMC/ US ANG/ USAF Reserves under existing contract vehicles (see section below). That lot of pods was slated to finish delivery in 2011, and did so.

The Israelis are notoriously tight lipped about their customers, but known sales from RAFAEL have occurred to the IAF (F-16s), as well as exports to Britain (Eurofighter, Tornado GR4), Germany (Eurofighter, Tornado IDS, possibly F-4F); and Greece (“Peace Icarus 2000” F-4E AUPs). There have also been reports of sales to Brazil (F-5BR), Chile (F-16); Colombia (Kfir C10), India (slated for Tejas LCA, on Mirage 2000, SU-30, others), Hungary (JAS-39), Singapore (F-16), South Africa (JAS-39, via Zeiss), Sweden (JAS-39), Romania (MiG-21 Lancer), Turkey (F-16, F-4E 2020), and Venezuela (F-16), among others.

Contracts & Key Events: ATP-SE FY 2013-2018

 

Net-T, pre-flight
(click to view full)

December 26/18: LITENING work Northrop Grumman is being contracted to support the US Air Force. The $1.3 billion IDIQ contract covers sustainment, modernization and development efforts of the LITENING advanced targeting pod. Designed to improve both day and night attack capabilities, AN/AAQ-28 pods provide pilots with advanced image processing for target identification and coordinate generation, a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, charge-coupled device television (CCD-TV) sensors, a laser spot tracker/ range finder, and infrared laser marker/ designators. It is fully operational 24 hours a day and in adverse weather conditions. Work will be performed at Northrop Grumman’s factory in Rolling Meadows, Illinois and is expected to be completed by the end of 2023.

March 16/17: Denmark has placed an order with Northrop Grumman to provide additional LITENING advanced targeting pods for their F-16s. First delivered in 2013, Denmark was the first international buyer of the LITENING G4 pod, and they are now looking to expand the use of the pod within the Royal Danish Air Force. Technologies found on the fourth generation pod include digital, high definition video, 1K forward-looking infrared and charge-coupled device sensors, laser imaging sensors and advanced data links. These advances deliver more accurate target identification and location at longer ranges than previous targeting pod systems, while also reducing pilot workload. It has been integrated on the A-10, AV-8B, B-52, C-130, F-15, F-16 and F/A-18.

October 9/15: Integration testing is underway to install a LITENING targeting pod onto the B-52H bomber, with ground laser testing recently taking place at Edwards AFB. The testing stems from calls by B-52H aircrews for additional targeting capability, with the LITENING pod using infrared and TV imagery along with three lasers to provide enhanced designation for weapon systems. The testing is due to move into flight testing next year.

September 22/15: Airbus Defence & Space is marketing the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Litening 5 targeting pod as an option for future Eurofighter Typhoon customers. The pod will be installed on a company aircraft to demonstrate the improved capability. The system is reported to have already been purchased by a European Eurofighter operator. The Litening 5 was unveiled at the Paris Air Show earlier this year and uses two FLIR systems and a CCD HD-TV camera to improve target acquisition at long ranges. The pod is expected to becoming operational by the end of next year.

June 19/15: Lockheed Martin has been contracted to supply ten Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods to the Royal Jordanian Air Force, with the country currently engaged in airstrikes against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The company was awarded a $485 million contract by the US Air Force in March, with a portion of this allocated for Foreign Military Sales. Jordan become the sixteenth Sniper ATP customer in 2013.

March 30/15:Lockheed Martin was awarded a $485 million IDIQ contract Friday for advanced targeting pods, a portion of which are earmarked for FMS. The Sniper pod is operational on the F-15, F-16, F-18, B-1, B-52 and A-10 platforms. Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Canada, the UK and Belgium are previous export customers. A separate $8.9 million contract will also see Lockheed provide the Jordanian Air Force with 10 of the targeting pods, through the UK as a third party.

Jan 15/15: In January 2015, Rafael announced that their upcoming upgrade that they call G-4 Advanced outside the U.S., and “G-5” for the Americans will have air-to-air targeting capabilities.

Jan 18/13: Net-T. The USAF is testing a wireless router addition to ATP-SE pods called Net-T, which would work in the background and help troops on the ground communicate with each other. ROVER systems already allow communications with the aircraft, and Net-T works with ROVER 5 to share voice, real-time information videos, images, maps, coordinates, or any other file type, without having to resort to satellite links and their scarce bandwidth. That’s very helpful in urban environments, mountains, dense vegetation, etc., where troops have a clear path to an aircraft, but don’t have line of sight to each other.

This high priority developmental test began in October 2012 with the A-10Cs, F-16s, and F-15Es of the 40th Flight Test Squadron, along with some visiting B-1 bombers. Beyond testing key metrics like effective distances, bandwidth, etc., they wanted to be sure Net-T wouldn’t interfere with the LITENING and Sniper pods’ other functions: day/night surveillance, laser illumination and tracking, automatic target searching and tracking, and automated target reconnaissance. Fortunately, once the frequencies and data rates are configured, it’s just a 1-button push for the pilot to initiate transmit-in-Net-T mode.

The goal is to send the testing report to the USAF’s Precision Attack Systems Program Office at Wright Patterson AFB, OH by February 2013, to be followed by operational testing with the 53rd Wing – and hopefully by fielding on ATP-SEs in February 2014. Eglin AFB.

Jan 16/13: Sniper. Lockheed Martin announces USAF approval to begin full-rate production of the Sniper-SE. At this point, Sniper-SE remains the only ATP-SE pod that’s integrated and operational on the F-15E Strike Eagle, and B-1 and B-52 bombers.

Sniper FRP

Nov 12/12: LITENING. Northrop Grumman Corporation announces a $71.5 million order from the USAF to begin full-rate production of LITENING SE advanced targeting pods and spares, under the ATP-SE program.

LITENING FRP

FY 2010 – 2012

ATP-SE award. Litening G4 for F-16s.

LITENING modularity
(click to view full)

Feb 13/12: LITENING. Northrop Grumman Corporation announces 2 follow-on Low Rate Initial Production delivery orders totaling a combined $66 million, to provide additional LITENING SEs. The orders were made under the Sept 30/10 contract.

Oct 24/11: LITENING. Northrop Grumman announces that the US Air National Guard Air Force Reserve Command Test Center (AATC) has recommended full fielding for LITENING G4 Advanced Targeting Pods on its F-16 C/D Block 25/30/32 aircraft, after a successful operational utility evaluation (OUE).

This is one of the plane sets mentioned in Northrop Grumman’s Sept 30/10 order, which included funds for testing and OUE. The pods, on the other hand, stem from the Oct 1/09 award noted in the “ATP-SE Lead Ins” section.

During the September 2010 – May 2011 OUE, LITENING G4 pods flew 530 sorties and accumulated more than 825 flight hours. According to the fielding recommendation issued by AATC to Air Combat Command:

“LITENING G4 provides a significant improvement in F-16 Block 30 mission area execution over baseline targeting pods. The addition of a short wave infrared sensor provides a unique capability to capture images in shadows where FLIR(Forward Looking InfraRed) or CCD [regular cameras] were ineffective.”

G4 OK for F-16s

Oct 18/10: LITENING. At a special event attended by senior members of Israel’s defense establishment, customers, and representatives of foreign militaries and airforces, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. marked the sale of the 1,000th Litening Pod, including all partner sales. The event also included RAFAEL business partners Northrop Grumman from the USA, British firm Ultra Electronics, and Germany’s ZEISS.

According to Northrop Grumman sources, by early October 2010 they had total orders for 611 pods, and had delivered 523.

The RAFAEL release adds that “Litening pods have been procured by 26 countries. Litening pods have compiled, totally, more than a million flight hours.” Note that if all countries listed above as possible LITENING customers are included, it only adds up to 22. DID is certain of Northrop Grumman’s sales, but not of RAFAEL’s.

Sniper production
(click to view full)

Sept 30/10: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL (FA8626-10-D-2133) and Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Meadows, IL (FA8626-10-D-2132) will split a $2.3 billion contract to provide new advanced targeting pods and associated support equipment, spares and product support. At this time, $23.7 million has been committed to Northrop, and $23.5 million has been committed to Lockheed Martin, in order to provide test pods for the government. The ASC/WNQK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH manages this contracts.

Lockheed Martin later announces that the USAF has picked its Sniper ATP as the winner of the 60% share of its Advanced Targeting Pod-Sensor Enhancement (ATP-SE) competition.

Under the terms of this contract, Lockheed Martin says that the Government has options to buy up to 670 pods through 2017, with Lockheed Martin’s share of the program totaling more than $1 billion. Asked which platforms were covered in testing, Lockheed Martin personnel said that no additional per-platform testing was needed, just general performance testing.

LITENING AT: US F-16C
(click to view full)

Northrop Grumman later announces that if the government exercises all of their options, the firm’s LITENING SE would pick up approximately $920 million in orders for up to 670 pods through 2017. The USAF’s initial order encompasses flight testing of the targeting systems on Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve F-16 Blocks 25/30/32, USAF F-16 Blocks 40/50, and A-10C aircraft, and the firm says this represents potential orders for as many as 250 targeting pods plus spares, training and logistics support. If the USAF wants to add additional platforms qualified for LITENING-SE, additional testing contracts will be required.

Northrop Grumman representatives tell DID that they can produce about 8-9 LITENING pods per month at the moment, but production is expected to rise to 12+ per month if budgets and orders under ATP-SE require it. They expect ATP-SE Production Lots 1 & 2 to finish delivery by early 2012.

ATP-SE award

Contracts & Key Events: ATP-SE Lead-Ins FY 2011 – 2012

VANG LITENING G4
(click to view full)

May 14/12: Northrop Grumman announces a $103 million delivery order from US Naval Air Systems Command, to equip the USMC’s aircraft with LITENING G4 pods. They’ll also provide G4 upgrade kits and spares to the US Air National Guard, to bring their earlier-model LITENING pods to the G4 configuration.

Northrop Grumman says that they’ve delivered more than 200 LITENING G4 systems so far, adding that all of its LITENING pods put together have achieved over 1.5 million flight hours.

June 19/15: Lockheed Martin has been contracted to supply ten Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods to the Royal Jordanian Air Force, with the country currently engaged in airstrikes against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The company was awarded a $485 million contract by the US Air Force in March, with a portion of this allocated for Foreign Military Sales. Jordan become the sixteenth Sniper ATP customer in 2013.

March 13/12: LITENING G4 #100. Northrop Grumman announces the delivery of the 100th LITENING G4 targeting pod to meet a combination of USAF Lot 1/2 and US Marine Corps Lot 2/3/4 LITENING G4 production contracts. USAF Lot 2 will include the first LITENING-SEs.

Feb 6/12: LITENING G4 in combat. Northrop Grumman announces that its LITENING G4 has embarked on its first combat deployment, aboard US Air National Guard A-10Cs, and F-16C/D Block 30 aircraft. The pods will be used in Afghanistan.

Dec 5/11: LITENING. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Rolling Meadows, IL receives a $690.1 million firm-fixed-price, fixed-price-incentive-firm, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-firm, time-and-materials LITENING Targeting Pod System post-production support contract, which will run until Sept 18/18. It will:

“…address supply requirements centered on hardware and software upgrades and associated host platform integration, initial spares, technical manual and technical orders, repair data, studies, spares recapitalization and support for the standup of organic depot repair requirements for the sustainment of the legacy LITENING pod fleet.”

Queries to Northrop Grumman and the USAF established that this contract doesn’t cover support for LITENING-SE pods as the USAF takes delivery. It covers existing LITENING AT/G4 stocks, including integration and certification of the new LITENING G4s with US ANG F-16C/D Block 30-50s, USAF active duty F-16C/D Block 40-50s, F-15E Strike Eagles, the A-10C close-support plane, and the B-52H heavy bomber. The USAF also confirmed that the contract may fund upgrades of existing pods to the LITENING-SE standard. This was a sole-source acquisition by the ASC/WNQK at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (FA8626-12-D-2137). See also Northrop Grumman’s mid-March 2012 release.

LITENING support & upgrades

Nov 7/11: Sniper. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Orlando, FL receives an $841.5 million firm-fixed-price post-production support contract for Sniper targeting pods. Work will include “sensor enhancement on hardware and software upgrades and associated host platform integration, initial spares, technical manual and technical orders, repair data, studies and spares recapitalization, and support the standup of organic depot repair requirements…” The ASC/WNQK at Wright Patterson AFB, OH manages the contract (FA8626-12-D-2138), and when queried, they had this to say:

“The contract will include a five-year base ordering period [to 2016] and two, one-year options [which could extend it to 2018]. This new effort will provide for hardware, software, and associated updates for 375 Sniper targeting pods delivered to Combat Air Forces (CAF) under a prior contract. Updates may include Sniper pod upgrades to the Sniper advanced targeting pod-sensor enhanced (ATP-SE) standard.”

See also Lockheed Martin’s March 2012 release.

Sniper support & upgrades

Oct 19/11: LITENING G4. Northrop Grumman finishes delivering the 1st Lot of 50 LITENING G4s, under the 2009, $227.8 million US ANG contract. Production Lot 2 will begin production of the USAF’s LITENING-SEs, and the USMC’s ordered G4s. Northrop Grumman.

FY 2004 – 2010

ATFLIR on F/A-18F
(click to view full)

Sept 13/10: Sniper. Lockheed Martin announces a $13 million contract to upgrade the Sniper ATP’s existing data link with an enhanced digital Compact Multi-band Data Link (CMDL), improving secure digital transmission of high definition imagery and metadata at extended ranges. CMDL communicates seamlessly with the fielded ROVER family of ground stations, including ROVER 5.

Lockheed’s final ATP-SE Sniper offering will build on this work, and this CMDL upgrade follows the S3.5 software upgrade of U.S. Air Force and coalition Sniper pods operational on F-16 Block 30/40/50, A-10C, F-15E and B-1 aircraft. The S3.5 added emerging aircraft interfaces to Sniper ATP and provides new capabilities in air-to-air and air-to-surface tracking and designation, selectable ground-stabilized fragmentation circles, unpowered built-in-test data download capability, and video data link metadata and symbology enhancements.

March 10/10: LITENING G4. Northrop Grumman announces that it successfully demonstrated its LITENING pod on the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet at the US Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA, during a 1.5 hour flight under operationally representative conditions. DID has confirmed from a reliable source that the pod was a LITENING G4.

To this point, the Super Hornet has only been fielded with Raytheon’s ATFLIR surveillance and targeting pods; even LITENING customer Australia picked ATFLIR for its F-18F Super Hornets.

Super Hornet test

Oct 1/09: LITENING G4. Northrop Grumman announces a $153 million contract from the USAF to provide LITENING G4 targeting and sensor systems and related equipment. Under the terms of the agreement, Northrop Grumman will deliver LITENING G4 targeting and sensor pods to the active U.S. Air Force, as well as kits for the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard to upgrade existing LITENING AT pods to the G4 configuration, and additional data links for the Air National Guard and active U.S. Air Force.

This contract modification under an existing agreement marks the first updates of existing Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) LITENING pods to the G4 configuration, and the first sale to the USAF.

This order turned out to be a big deal, because it was part of the process of re-introducing competition to the USAF. The LITENING G4 sold here also forms the baseline for the company’s USAF Advanced Targeting Pod – Sensor Enhancement product.

LITENING G4 for US ANG/AFRC

Aug 29/10: Expeditionary/ TopLITE. Northrop Grumman Systems in Rolling Meadows, IL receives a $98.7 million ceiling-priced indefinite-delivery/ indefinite quantity contract for the procurement of Expeditionary Litening Pods (LPODs), upgrades to existing pods, and integration of LPODs into AV-8B Harriers (domestic and allied), F/A-18 Hornets (domestic and FMS), EA-6B Prowlers, C-130 Hercules, and Air Force platforms, including related parts and services. In addition, this contract provides for associated engineering and technical support and technical data.

Work will be performed in Rolling Meadows, IL, and is expected to be complete in June 2011. $16.1 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages this contract (N00019-09-D-0025).

They’re “Expeditionary” G4s because this is the US Marines and Navy contract, which is separate from USAF orders. With respect to the C-130, LITENING has been integrated on a US Coast Guard C-130 as a demo, but nothing ever came of it. The USMC contract is related to a program called Toplite, a surveillance oriented version of LITENING that’s similar to RAFAEL’s RecceLITE. Northrop Grumman sees this as an opportunity to explore integration on lower-g aircraft by separating the turret out, and moving the backing electronics out of a pod configuration and inside the plane.

LITENING G4 & TopLITE for USMC

Feb 12/04: Sniper Adapter. Lockheed Martin announces a contract to integrate the Sniper XR targeting pod on the A-10 aircraft in support of the A-10 Precision Engagement (PE) Program. The contract award follows a successful demonstration of the Sniper system during the A/OA-10 Precision Engagement upgrade program’s critical design review.

Some existing A-10s do fly with targeting pods, but they’re earlier models of Northrop Grumman’s LITENING pod. The USAF picked Sniper as its future targeting pod in 2001, and the current contract will ensure that Sniper pods work seamlessly with the A-10’s upgraded stores management systems, pilot displays, weapon targeting, etc.

As part of the integration effort, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control will develop the Pilot Vehicle Interface (PVI), pod Operational Flight Program (OFP) software, and pod interface adapter hardware for the A-10. Upon completion of this effort, the Sniper XR pod will self-detect and automatically load the appropriate Operational Flight Program when installed on either the A-10, F-16 or F-15E airframes. That work would pay dividends for a long time, by ensuring that new versions of the Sniper pod would remain compatible with certified jets. Otherwise, that certification takes months, and costs a lot of money (vid. ATP-SE award).

Additional Readings

• FedBizOpps (began April 2008) – 16–ASC/647 AESS ATP-SE IDIQ Task Order Contract FA8626-10-R-2098. Solicitation PIXS5613.

• Lockheed Martin – Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod. See also Sniper ATP micro-site.

• Northrop Grumman – AN/AAQ-28(V) LITENING Low Risk, Next Generation Targeting Pod

• DID (Nov 27/07) – $18M Prepares Datalinks for Next-Gen LITENING

KHP/Surion rollout
(click to view full)

South Korea currently owns around 700 helicopters, but more than half are considered outdated, and they need to be replaced. December 2005 marked the endgame for a South Korean competition to produce about 245 utility transport helicopters, which would be developed and produced as a semi-indigenous program. The KHP/ Surion is in the 8-tonne class, and is designed to carry 11 troops. Industrial offsets were also important, as the program is designed to boost Korea’s ability to design and build its own rotary-wing aircraft. EADS Eurocopter was chosen as the cooperating partner.

The Korean government gave its final approval of the contract in June 2006, and the project is underway. Note that while company releases place the program’s value at $6-8 billion, the program hasn’t reached that level yet. The initial contract was for KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion), and is for research and development only. That development finished in April 2013, and the main production contract is next. It will proceed in parallel with additional contracts to develop Surion specialty versions for Korea’s federal police and Marine Corps, and all of these models will be offered for export through a joint venture with Eurocopter.

The KHP (now KUH) Program

In February 2005 the Ministry of National Defense announced that would launch a multi-billion-dollar procurement project to build utility helicopters in December 2005. A total of 5 trillion won ($4.5 billion) was budgeted for this Korean Helicopter Program (KHP), including research and development expenditures.

The project is aimed at producing hundreds of “Korean Utility Helicopters” (KUH) to replace the aging UH-1H Hueys currently in service. Industrial offsets are also important considerations, as the program is designed to boost indigenous industrial manufacturing capability for rotary-wing aircraft.

Making Surion
click for video

This was a cut-down project from the original effort, which aimed to create a core platform that could have utility or attack helicopter sections built onto it, creating a pair of helicopter types with significant commonality. That original effort was not necessarily an overstretch; the US Marine Corps new UH-1Y Hueys and AH-1Z attack helicopters already embody a high-commonality approach.

The KUH/attack approach does add complexity risk, however, and South Korea ended up buying the AH-64E Apache to address their attack helicopter needs. At the lower end, KAI is developing a Light Armed Helicopter, but commonality is limited to “utilizing technology acquired through KUH development.”

Program and Industrial

DAPA: KUH
click for video

The KUH programme was formally launched in 2006. As of October 2007 the KHP project began to take the name “Korean Utility Helicopter,” and its July 2009 rollout saw reports that began to refer to it as the “Surion” (suri = eagle, on = perfection).

Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) is the prime contractor. As the primary partner, EADS Eurocopter will provide technical assistance, and supply the rotor mast, transmission, and autopilot subassemblies. Eurocopter has a stake of 30% in the development phase, and 20% in the production phase.

The initial contract was worth KRW 1.3 trillion ($1.3 billion at the time), and covered research and development only. By the time development finished in 2013, it had spent just KRW 1.2 billion, despite running a bit more than a year past its deadline.

Contracts for the KRW 4.1 trillion production project will be struck separately. Full scale production was expected to begin in 2012, but development wasn’t finished until April 2013.

Initial market expectations were stated as 250 helicopters, indicating a very limited market beyond South Korea’s order. Eurocopter later revised this to 300 machines, and the business plan changed again when the partnership decided that they would offer a civilian version after 2011. This was a significant move, as the design would compete with existing Eurocopter offerings like the new 7 tonne EC 175. By 2013, expectations had grown again, to 400 civil government and military machines in South Korea alone.

In the military market, South Korea’s Yonhap News agency quoted an anonymous government source in July 2009, who said that:

“Seoul also aims to win 300 overseas orders for the KUH in the next 25 years, a government official said on condition of anonymity. That is roughly 30 percent of the projected global demand for Surion-type choppers, which are larger than the UH-1 Iroquois but smaller than the UH-60 Black Hawks.”

As of April 2013, KAI is still using those figures as its export target, even though the competitive field has become more crowded. That’s a tall order if you’re up against competitors like the AW189, Bell 525, and EC175, plus slightly larger de facto competitors like the EC Puma family, Mi-17, NH90, and Sikorsky H-60 family.

KAI’s Surion

KUH Surion
(click to view full)

Some initial sources indicated that their KHP project bid would be based on the Dauphin-derived EC155/ AS 565 Panther, and the diagram initially provided in local media reports appeared to bear that out. The final design bears some similarities to the EC155 and the Puma family, but many differences.

The KUH Surion is 15m long x 2m wide x 4.5m high, with a maximum takeoff weight of 8.7 tonnes. It’s powered by 2 of GE’s popular T-700 turboshaft engines, and incorporates HUMS prognostics throughout the helicopter to provide constant monitoring and advance warning of mechanical issues. Range is reportedly around 480 km.

The cockpit and frame will be armored to handle 7.62mm strikes, while the fuel tanks will be armored up to resist 12.7mm or 14.5mm rounds. More active warning and protection systems are provided by a partnership between EADS Cassidian and South Korea’s LigNex1, and include the widely used AN/AAR-60 MILDS missile warning system.

Expected personnel capacity is 2 crew plus up to 9 fully-armed soldiers. There are some online sources that give the helicopters 4 hardpoints and weapons up to wire-guided TOW missiles, but KAI’s own materials say nothing about that, and there have been no reports of weapon trials.

Contracts & Key Events 2016 – 2018

 

Surion ATH
(click to view full)

December 26/18: Army resumes Surion flights South Korea’s Army is again flying its fleet of KUH-1 Surion helicopters. The Army suspended all flying missions of its Surions after a navy version crashed in July this year, killing five of the six Marines aboard and injuring the other. To ensure the safety of the aircraft the Army conducted a comprehensive inspection of the helicopter’s rotor mast and several test flights. The Army has so far checked about a third of its fleet of 90 Surions.

April 5/18: De-icing tests The Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) KUH-1 Surion helicopter has wrapped up several months of de-icing tests in the US, with the helicopter on its way back to South Korea. Testing took place at Sawyer International Airport, Michigan, with staff from both KAI and the South Korean Army joining US Army personnel for the work. This is the second year in a row that Seoul has brought aircraft to Sawyer for testing.

January 12/18: Deliveries South Korea’s Marine Corps has received delivery of its first two MUH-1 multi-role utility helicopters. Based on KAI’s KUH-1 Surion, the new variant has been cleverly/lazily dubbed the Marineon—Marine, Surion, Marineon, get it?—and features an external fuel tank, specialized radio equipment, flotation devices, as well as a folding main rotor that will allow the helicopter to operate from Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships. 32 units have been ordered as part of efforts to create an independent aviation unit for the marines, while an additional eight will go to the South Korea’s navy. Deliveries are expected to continue to until 2023, at least.

July 24/17: Ha Sung-yong, the CEO of Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), has offered to step down after Korean prosecutors raided his company’s offices to gather evidence as part of the Surion utility helicopter scandal. Allegations levelled at the firm include that charge that the company inflated expenses for the development of the Surion military helicopter and pocketed illicit gains—to the tune of $21 million—in the process. Ha, who last year said he would resign if KAI’s T-50 was not selected for the USAF’s T-X trainer program, offered to resign again during a board of directors meeting, and a successor will be chosen at an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, to be arranged for as soon as possible.

July 18/17: Prosecutors in South Korea have raided the offices of the nation’s only aircraft manufacturer, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), after allegations that the firm inflated the research and development costs of a weapons program. Although the project in question has yet to be officially revealed, South Korean media believe that the wrongdoing occurred during the development of the Surion helicopter, where KAI allegedly defrauded the state-run Defense Acquisition Program Administration out of $41.8 million. This marks the first investigation since reformist prosecutor Yoon Seok-yeol was appointed as head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors‘ Office. Yoon was a member of an independent counsel team involved in the probe that impeached former President Park Geun-hye and her administration on corruption charges.

January 4/17: Korea Aircraft Industries (KAI) has secured a $523 million contract to provide KUH-1 Surion transport helicopters to South Korea’s marines. The deal covers the production and delivery of 30 helicopters, expected between 2017-2023. Modifications found on the marine variant include foldable blades, emergency floats that can deploy with the press of a button, optional long-range fuel tanks, as well as the ability to carrying nine fully equipped marines in addition to four crew members.

September 26/16: It’s back to the drawing board for KAI’s KUH-1 Surion as the Korean-made utility helicopter failed a number of extreme climate tests in the USA. If successful, the testing would have given the Surion an international standard and boosted export chances. Several parts will now be redesigned to rectify the defects found during the testing, which puts the helicopter through very challenging humid and freezing temperatures.

2012 – 2013

ROK certifications; Development complete; ROK orders maritime version.

Oct 16/13: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces a follow-on contract for full production of improved ANVIS/HUD 24 Helmet Mounted Displays to equip production Surion helicopters. The initial order that made them part of the project (q.v. March 25/09) was for the system development phase, which ended in March 2013. Sources: Elbit Systems: ANVIS/HUD 24T brochure [PDF] | Oct 16/13 release.

April 16/13: Surion ATH. South Korea’s DAPA procurement agency announces a KRW 800 million (about $733 million) project to develop the ROK Marine Corps’ transport and utility helicopter, which will be a Surion variant. KAI is scheduled to complete development by the end of 2015.

The helicopters will serve on the ROKS Dokdo LHD, and the ROKN also possesses LST ships whose helicopter decks may be able to accomodate the 8-ton class machines. DAPA projects that the Surions “will help double the Korean military’s independent landing operation capability,” while offering greater range than their existing UH-1 Hueys.

KAI’s release is optimistic, forecasting a potential Korean demand of up to 400 helicopters over the 20 years for the ROK’s Army, Marine Corps, Police (vid. 2011 entry), a future MEDEVAC variant, and orders/variants for South Korea’s Coast Guard, Fire Department and Korea Forest Service. They’re also holding to their original forecast of 30% share within global segment demand of over 1,000 helicopters, even though several competitors have entered this segment since the Surion began development.

If KAI’s accompanying graphic looks realistic, that’s because they photoshopped a Surion on top of a real 2010 picture, replacing the USN SH-60F Seahawk that was actually flying over ROKS Dokdo. But they didn’t strip the picture’s metadata, which is actually kind of honest. KAI.

Surion naval utility: system development

March 28-29/13: KAI announces that the KUH/ Surion has completed its development, making South Korea the 11th country in the world to develop a helicopter. The firm says that total investments from KAI, DAPA, and the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy totaled KRW 1.2 billion (around $1.1 billion). The program involved a combination of KAI, Eurocopter, and government research bodies; and included 98 local vendors, 49 foreign partners, and 28 colleges/research institutes. Overall, about 62.5% of the KUH project budget was “localized” in Korea.

The 4 prototypes successfully completed around 2,700 hours of flight tests, and checked about 7,600 test requirements. KAI.

Surion base model development complete

Feb 21/13: Testing. The Surion finishes low-temperature testing in Alaska, USA. South Korea gets plenty of its own cold weather, but you might as well go where you’re guaranteed ultra-frigid conditions. The tests involved about 50 flights. KAI.

June 2012: Certified. South Korea bestows airworthiness and military certifications on Surion. That seems like an odd thing to do before development is complete. Even if it’s necessary to allow deliveries, certification often means that subsequent fixes are the government’s responsibility. Source: KAI.

2008 – 2011

Surion rollout and 1st flight; Police version SDD; Export JV established.

KUH Surion-Police
(click to view full)

2011: Police version. KAI’s English press release is unclear, but they refer to an apparent agreement with the Korea Police Agency to develop a Surion version for them. The KNPA is a national police force under the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, and they have 10 “squadrons” of SWAT teams whose tasks include counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. Source: KAI | Shephard Media.

Police version

July 13/11: Sub-contractors. EADS Cassidian announces a “multi-million euro” contract from Korean Aircraft Industries to supply 24 of its AN/AAR-60 MILDS (Missile Launch Detection System) missile warning systems, with deliveries continuing until 2013. Each system uses about 4 passive sensors, which detect the ultraviolet radiation signature of approaching missiles. Cassidian was working with Korea’s Lig Nex1 to develop the helicopter’s overall electronic countermeasures system, and delivered 36 sensors during the development phase.

MILDS is widely used on a number of helicopter and aircraft models, and EADS’ cooperation in the Surion’s design made it an almost certain choice here.

May 3/11: KAI-EC. Korean Aerospace and Eurocopter establish the KAI-EC joint stock company, based in Seoul to export the Surion helicopter. KAI.

KAI-EC export JV

June 22/10: Official maiden flight. The official maiden test flight is conducted at KAI’s facility in Sacheon, South Chungcheong. Another 3 test helicopters will be built, and test flights will continue through September 2010. This will be followed by “mass production” beginning in March 2012, and “full-scale production” beginning in June 2012. DAPA Commissioner Byun Moo-keun reiterated the program’s core rationale during his speech:

“Despite the fact that our military ranks in seven in the world in operating the number of military helicopter, we have been relying on foreign countries in importing major technologies in developing functions and maintenance… The successful development of Surion has not only led in operating the military tactics efficiently but also formed the basis in improving our own aerospace industry technology.”

See: South Korean MND.

March 10/10: Fly! The Surion has its 30-minute 1st flight at Sacheon, including taxi, hover turns, and a stationary hover at 30 feet. KAI says the flight test program will see the helicopter flying at 140 knots and 2,000 feet by April 2010, and an official ceremony of the first flight will take place in May 2010. Defense News | Shephard Group.

1st flight

ANVIS/HUD
(click to view full)

Nov 2/09: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems announces that KAI has named them as one of their top 4 Elite Suppliers for the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH) program, during the firm’s supplier symposium. Elbit supplies the helicopter’s ANVIS/HUD Helmet Mounted Displays, Vehicle Information systems (VIS) and a Data Transfer Systems (DTS). They’re also a subcontractor to KAI for systems engineering and integration of the entire KUH avionics system.

Oct 1/09: KAH delayed. The South Korean government decides to delay its proposed Korean Attack Helicopter program, which was expected to share some 60-70% commonality with the KUH/ Surion. Flight International.

July 31/09: KAI formally unveils the first KUH helicopter, at a ceremony in the southwestern city of Saechon. Attending dignitaries include South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. The new helicopter will be called the “Surion,” and the Yonhap News report says that it sources 60% of its parts from local manufacturers, including the rotor blades and its prognostic health and usage monitoring systems (HUMS). The prototype is due to fly early in 2010, and will eventually be joined by another 3 flight test aircraft. Lee Jae-hong, head of the South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy’s machinery, aerospace and defense industry division, adds that:

“Even though it is a military helicopter, the KUH already satisfies 96% or 2,363 of the 2,460 international operational standards for civilian helicopters.”

KAI and Eurocopter also plan to pursue civilian sales beginning in 2011, in order to improve their return on investment. Yonhap | The Korea Herald | The Korea Times | Flight International | Rotorhub.

KUH rollout

March 25/09: Sub-contractors. Flight international reports that Elbit Systems has received a contract from Korea Aerospace Industries to supply “advanced helmet-mounted display systems” for the KUH program. The initial contract covers those development aircraft due to be delivered in 2009-10, but continued cooperation could lead to follow-on orders to equip the entire KUH fleet, and possibly other Korean helicopters as well.

Elbit’s ANVIS/HUD combines day and night vision goggles with key flight symbology, allowing “head up, look-out flying at all times. It has been used by the US military since the mid-1990s, and has equipped more than 5,000 helicopters belonging to 20 countries. Integrated platforms include the H-60 series, CH-53, CH-47, CH-46, V-22, AH-1, UH-1, Super Puma, Cougar, and others. Elbit’s HeliDASH system is a higher end choice.

The KUH HMD fits somewhere in the middle. Elbit personnel describe the Korean order as “…the ANVIS-HUD24 with additional capabilities which I am not at liberty to specify.”

2005 – 2007

Eurocopter wins deal; Contract approved; MoU for joint venture; Innovative fuel bladders; Defensive suite picked.

Later KHP concept
(click to view larger)

Oct 18/07: Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Eurocopter sign of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to create a Joint Venture (JV) Company for the worldwide sales and marketing of the Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH). It will be in operation by 2010. With a shareholding structure of 51% for KAI and 49% ownership for Eurocopter. Eurocopter role is to provide technical assistance for the development of the helicopter as well as certain sub-assemblies, the transmission, and the autopilot. About 40 Eurocopter engineers are housed at Sacheon (Korea) with KAI.

The Eurorcopter release sets expected Korean orders at about 250 KUH helicopters, while estimating KUH production at “an order of 300 helicopters.”

Oct 15/07: Sub-contractors. EADS Defence & Security announces that it will equip the KHP helicopter with its MILDS AN/AAR-60 self-protection system. Over 5,000 AN/AAR-60 units have been produced and installed aboard a wide variety of rotary wing and wide body aircraft, often as part of a multi-spectral suite of sensors; a version for fighter aircraft is under development.

This advanced, passive imaging sensor detects and tracks the ultraviolet emissions of approaching missiles. All approaches have advantages and disadvantages. As Aramada Magazine’s “Fighting an Invisible Threat” explains, ultraviolet seekers tend to be more effective at lower and slower targets, and are less vulnerable to false acquisitions such as decoys. The sensors are also smaller, lighter and require less cooling. On the flip side, they are more vulnerable to atmospheric conditions, and tend to have poorer sensitivity and resolution than other options such as infrared.

EADS DS will provide the equipment for the development phase, but from 2008 onward the sensors will be integrated by the Korean company LIGNex1 into the KHP self-protection system.

Oct 15/07: KOIS reports that a real-size model of the KHP/KUH transport helicopter will be on display at the Seoul 2007 air show that opens in Seongnam Oct 16-21/07. This will be the first time the helicopter’s form and interior design will be unveiled publicly. The development program is now code-named “Korean Utility Helicopter (KUH),” and aims to produce a prototype in 2009 and begin mass-production in 2012. KOIS adds:

“Under the 1.3-trillion-won ($1.38 billion) program, Korea aims to produce 245 advanced transport helicopters. The DAPA also expects exports of the envisioned helicopters, each priced at around 15 billion won. The 14.7-meter helicopter can carry two gunners and nine other troops, along with two pilots.”

March 1/07: Sub-contractors. GKN Aerospace announces that they have been selected by Hanwha Corporation to supply fuel bladders for the Korean Helicopter Programme (KHP). This contract, awarded by Hanwha Corporation, has a value approaching $3.5 million and is the culmination of a lengthy collaboration. Phase 1 of the contract involves completing the development activity which will be finalized this year, followed by testing and initial production during 2008. Phase 2 commences in 2009, with preparation and first assembly activities at Hanwha’s facilities in Korea.

The fuel bladders will be manufactured using a GKN developed, MIL spec material, which is far more flexible than current materials. This flexibility eases and speeds installation and greatly reduces the potential for damage to the bladder during the installation process. The material is also lighter than current products and, critically, offers a faster self-sealing capability in the event of damage during helicopter operations. GKN release.

Initial KUH Concept
(click to view full)

Oct 31/06: MEP solicitation. KAI release:

“For the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP) propelled by Republic of Korea Government, notice of solicitation for korean/foreign industries participation is hereby issued in the area of Mission Equipment Package (MEP) whose development efforts will be led by Agency for Defense Development and procurement activities will be led by Korea Aerospace Ind., Ltd. (KAI) or Nex1 Future Co., Ltd.”

Full solicitation [PDF].

June 2/06: Final approval. The Korean government gives its final approval of the KHP/KUH contract.

Approval

April 12/06: DAPA OK. South Korea’s DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration) formalizes the decision to acquire 245 utility helicopters to be developed by Korea Aerospace Industries Limited in partnership with Eurocopter, and produced as from 2011 onwards. EADS release.

Dec 12/05: Korean Aeronautics Industries (KAI) announces that it has wrapped up KHP negotiations with the French-German manufacturer Eurocopter, as opposed to Bell Helicopter of the USA or the Anglo-Italian firm AgustaWestland. The Chosun Ibo reports that “The Defense Ministry will finalize its decision after consulting a committee on the KAI recommendations and investigating the potential for technology transfer.” The next day, EADS Eurocopter’s release confirmed a win on the 245 helicopter contract, adding:

“The 6-year KHP development phase will run from 2006 to 2011; In the following 10-year production phase, 245 helicopters are to be manufactured… The KHP helicopter is in the 8 metric ton class and is capable of carrying 2 pilots and 11 troops with an endurance of well over two hours. The helicopter is equipped with the very latest technological advances.

Eurocopter and KAI have agreed to set up a 50/50 subsidiary to market the export version of the KHP helicopter. Forecasts needs for this utility helicopter on the world market are set at 250 machines over 20 years.”

Development actually takes until April 2013.

Eurocopter wins KHP

Additional Readings & Sources

• KAI – KUH-Surion

• Army Technology – KAI Surion Light Utility Helicopter, South Korea

• GlobalSecurity.org – Korean Helicopter Program

• Wikipedia – General Electric T700

• DID (Dec 14/05) – Korean E-X & Helicopter Competitions Reaching Endgame?

• The Dong-A Iibo (Dec 1/05) – As Ties Wane, So Does Taste for US Arms

Americas

Boeing is being awarded with a seven-year maintenance contract supporting US Special Operations Command aircraft. The IDIQ, firm-fixed-price, cost reimbursable contract is valued at $1.1 billion and allows for life cycle contractor support the MH-6, MH-47, and MH-60 aircraft. Boeing will provide SOCOM with support program management, field service representatives and sustaining engineering. The company will also deliver spare and repair parts. MD’s H-6 Little Bird serves in versatile roles, like quickly moving special forces troops into confined areas, or acting as light helicopter gunships. MH-47s are the special operations variant of the combat proven Chinook and serve as heavy assault helicopters. The majority of work will be performed at Boeing’s factory in Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

The Naval Sea Systems Command is modifying a contract with Lockheed Martin. Priced at $184 million, the modification exercises a contract option that sees for full-rate production a SEWIP subsystem. The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) is and electronic countermeasure system that uses radar warning receivers, and in some cases active jamming, contributing to a ships’ self-defense system. SEWIP Block 2 is the most recent version of the system, which aims to expand upon the receiver and antenna groups necessary to support threat detection and improved system integration. Work will be performed at multiple locations – including, but not limited to – Liverpool, New York; Brockton, Massachusetts and Lansdale, Pennsylvania. Performance is scheduled to run through June 2021.

The US Army is buying more sniper rifles for its troops. Knights Armaments will deliver an unspecified number of M110 semi-automatic sniper rifles at a cost of $16.5 million. The M110 is a lightweight, semi-automatic, air-cooled, gas-operated, magazine-fed, shoulder-fired weapon that fires NATO-standard ammunition. The M110 Semi-Automatic Sniper System (SASS) has been in service since 2008. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order. Deliveries are expected to end by November 20, 2024.

Middle East & Africa

Saudi Arabia is continuing its shopping spree and buys more Blackhawk kits. The Foreign Military Sales contract is worth $59 million and procures UH-60M kits from Sikorsky. The UH-60M incorporates a number of new features, such as a fly-by-wire flight control system, a glass cockpit with with a Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), and a fully authorized digital engine control (FADEC). Work will be performed at Sikorsky’s facility in Stratford, Connecticut; and has an estimated completion date of May 31, 2022. The contract is entirely paid with FY2019 Army operations and maintenance funds.

Lockheed Martin is being contracted to supply US allies Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with Patriot missiles. The Foreign Military Sales contract is priced at $3.4 billion and sees for the delivery of PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE interceptors. The PAC-3 family provides protection from threats like tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft. Work will be performed at facilities in Huntsville, Alabama; Camden, Arkansas; Ocala, Florida; Chelmsford, Massachusetts; Grand Prairie, Texas; and Lukin, Texas. The contract is expected to end in December 2024.

Europe

The Hellenic Air Force is upgrading its fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft. Awarded to Lockheed Martin, the contract provides for the upgrade of 84 F-16s to the V-configuration at a cost of $996 million. The Viper is the latest variant of the Fighting Falcon fourth generation, multi-role, fighter aircraft. It integrates advanced capabilities as part of an upgrade package to better interoperate with fifth-generation fighters, including the F-35 and the F-22. The F-16V variant includes an AESA radar, a new mission computer and electronic warfare suite, automated GCAS, and various cockpit improvements. Half of the contract is paid with Foreign Military Sales funds.

Raytheon is being awarded with a contract modification in support of Sweden’s air-defense system acquisition. The modification is valued at $568 million covering the production of a Patriot missile system. Sweden plans to purchase a package of four Patriot Configuration-3+ Modernized Fire Units, that include radar sets, engagement control systems, antenna mast groups and 300 missiles. Work will be performed at Raytheon’s facilities in Andover, Massachusetts; Pelham, New Hampshire; Tewksbury, Massachusetts; Marlborough, Massachusetts; Portsmouth, Rhode Island; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania; Merrimack, New Hampshire; and Dallastown, Pennsylvania. Performance is estimated to be completed by October 30, 2025.

Asia-Pacific

The Philippine Air Force will start the new year by concluding three big defense procurement contracts. Early in 2019 the PAF will receive 16 US-supplied Blackhawks, six T-129 ATAK helicopters from Turkey and three ground based air defense systems from Israel. The helicopter acquisition is estimated to cost $240 million. Conclusion of these three contracts is just a small part of Manila’s 2019 procurement plans. The Philippine Air Force expects to take delivery of 2 Cobra attack helicopters supplied by Jordan, two fixed-wing C2 aircraft, 6 Brazilian Super Tucanos, 2 Israeli-made radar system and 13 Hermes UAVs. In addition the country will receive 2 C-130s and 4 OV-10 attack aircraft from the US. “The year 2019 is particularly sweet, a giant leap in our quest to defend our precious skies, and keep our nation free,” former Air Force chief Lt. Gen. Galileo Gerard Kintanar Jr. said on Friday.

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