By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Dec 16 2025 (IPS)
The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Changing courseQuietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.
Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.
It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.
New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.
It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.
K Kuhaneetha Bai
Even if the Supreme Court overrules the President’s tariffs, the US has already secured many concessions from governments fearful of their likely adverse impacts.The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.
Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.
They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.
Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.
MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.
White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.
MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.
For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).
The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.
Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.
Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.
Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.
Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.
Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.
China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.
Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.
The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.
Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.
The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.
With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.
The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.
Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.
The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.
Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.
The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.
As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.
Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.
While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.
IPS UN Bureau
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A snowy Christmas might be something that fades into a memory in many places if we don't avoid severe climate change. Credit: Shutterstock
By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)
As each Christmas approaches, one song permeates the airwaves across the United States and elsewhere: White Christmas. According to the Guiness Book of World Records, “White Christmas” is the #1 selling physical single of all times with over 50 million copies sold.
Many know those iconic opening lyrics:
“I’m dreaming of a white Christmas,
Just like the ones I used to know.”
This American holiday classic, written by Irving Berlin and recorded by Bing Crosby in 1942 during the depths of World War II, conveyed in its time the nostalgia of a simpler past and the hope for a better future.
But contexts change and, with them, so can meanings. Today, we face a new and different type of global menace, severe climate change which, according to a recent World Economic Forum report, could result in an additional 14.5 million deaths and $12.5 trillion in economic losses by 2050.
What might soon stand out most about the lyrics of White Christmas is the nostalgia for an earlier period when there was actually snow on the ground in late December, an experience which is now projected to become rarer in many regions because of climate change.
Obviously, not this December 2025 in the United States which is living through the blistering cold of a polar vortex. But other parts of the globe are seeing their warmest December in decades amidst what is set to be the world’s second hottest year on record as atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations driven by greenhouse gas emissions track upwards, altering our climate.
And while there may be Christmas snow on the ground in 2026 or 2027 or 2028, that would, according to current climate predictions, become rarer and rarer over the medium to longer term. A snowy Christmas might be something that fades into a memory in many places if we don’t avoid severe climate change.
As a result, the song White Christmas presently conveys a new message. Those lyrics originally written to invoke a feeling of nostalgia and hope should now be read more literally. “I am dreaming of a white Christmas, just like the ones I used to know” is a warning about the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the aberrations and destruction that severe climate change would cause.
White Christmas, this holiday classic from the past, should today be heard as a clarion call for climate change action.
Philippe Benoit is managing director at Global Infrastructure Advisory Services 2050 specializing in climate change.
Après avoir conquis le public européen et séduit le jury de Séries Mania, la production franco-algérienne « El’Sardines » franchit une nouvelle étape décisive. Sélectionnée […]
L’article La série algérienne « El’Sardines » sélectionnée au Red Sea Film Festival et débarque sur TV5 MONDE+ est apparu en premier sur .
Currently, more than half of all countries and areas worldwide have a fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. Credit: Shutterstock
By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Dec 15 2025 (IPS)
Will low fertility rates return to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman any time soon? A simple answer to this vital demographic question is: unlikely.
A detailed answer about future fertility rates involves the complex interaction of various economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors that influence fertility levels.
Among those factors are economic insecurity, financial pressures, marriage rates, childbearing ages, child mortality levels, contraceptive use, higher education, labor force participation, lifestyle choices, personal goals, concerns about the future, and finding a suitable spouse or partner for family life.
During the recent past, the world’s fertility rate declined significantly from 5.3 births per woman in 1963 to 2.3 births in 2023.
Currently, more than half of all countries and areas worldwide have a fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. Among these low fertility countries are the world’s ten largest national economies (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations.
In contrast to countries with low fertility rates, sub-Saharan African countries have high fertility rates. Together these countries account for about one-third of the world’s current annual births, with that proportion projected to increase to nearly 40% by the mid-century.
Currently, two dozen countries in sub-Saharan Africa have fertility rates of 4 or more births per woman, with half of them having rates of 5 or more births per woman. Some of these countries, such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia, have the world’s highest fertility rates at about 6 births per woman (Figure 2).
Source: United Nations.
In countries with low fertility, many young adults choose to prioritize economic security over starting a family. This shift in priorities reflects the financial burden that comes with household expenses, such as housing, food, transportation, childcare, and education.
The average annual costs of raising a child can vary significantly from country to country because of differences in income, family structures, living expenses, and government subsidies. However, couples generally perceive raising children as a challenging and costly endeavor, given the expenses associated with housing, food, childcare, and education.
Besides the increasing age at which couples are choosing to marry, there has been a global decline in early childbearing. In more developed regions and in many less developed countries, such as China and India, the mean age of childbearing has risen by approximately three years since 1995.
Decreases in teenage pregnancies have also played a role in contributing to low fertility rates in many countries. For example, between 1994 and 2024, the worldwide adolescent birth rate declined from 74 to 38 births per 1,000 females aged 15 to 19 years.
Considering recent global trends and significant economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors, it appears unlikely that today’s low fertility rates will return to the replacement level any time soon
In addition to delaying childbearing, many women are having fewer babies, with a significant number choosing not to have children at all. Although figures vary by region and generation, childlessness levels are rising, with approximately 40% or more of women by age 30 in developed countries remaining childless.
Using contraceptive methods is another significant contributor to low fertility rates. Various contraceptive options are available to prevent unintended pregnancy, including temporary or reversible and permanent methods. Worldwide, about half of women of reproductive age in 2022 were estimated to be using contraceptives, with 90% of them using a modern contraceptive method.
Higher education and increased female labor force participation are two additional factors contributing to low fertility rates. These factors raise the opportunity costs of childbearing, encourage delayed marriage and childbearing, and shift personal life priorities to career and personal development.
Over the past fifty years, the enrollment of women in higher education has increased worldwide. Women currently make up the majority of higher education students in 114 countries, while men out-number women in 57 countries. With respect to earning a bachelor’s degree, women have reached parity with men.
In many low fertility countries, there has a notable rise in the number of women joining the workforce. This trend is clear in more developed nations, where the percentage of economically active women has seen a significant increase in recent times. For instance, in Spain, the proportion of women in the labor force has more than doubled over the last fifty years, growing from around one in four to over half.
Another major factor contributing to low fertility rates is the significant global declines in infant and child mortality. Over the past fifty years, the global infant mortality rate has decreased from approximately 90 deaths per 1,000 births to 27 deaths and the mortality rate of children under age 5 has decreased from 132 deaths per 1,000 live births to 36 deaths.
Because of low fertility rates, many countries are experiencing more deaths than births, resulting in negative rates of population growth. These sustained negative rates of population growth are leading to population decline and demographic ageing.
The governments of many low fertility countries are implementing pro-natalist policies, incentives, and programs to increase birth rates. While these policies and programs may have some success in increasing low fertility rates slightly, historical data show that once a fertility rate drops below the replacement level, particularly to 1.5 births per woman or less, it remains low.
Population projections for countries with low fertility rates do not expect a return to the replacement level in the near future.
The world’s fertility rate is expected to continue declining throughout the 21st century. By 2100, the global fertility rate is projected to be below the replacement level at 1.8 births per woman.
The country population projections made by national governments and international organizations assume that fertility rates will remain below the replacement level. Consequently, many countries are projected to experience population decline by the mid-century (Figure 3).
Source: United Nations.
In 50 countries and areas, immigration is expected to help reduce the projected population decline caused by low fertility rates. However, without international migration, some countries, like Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are also projected to see a decrease in population by 2050.
While many countries are experiencing a demographic struggle over international migration, the proportions of immigrants in these countries are reaching record highs. In the European Union, for example, the proportion of the foreign-born population is about 14%, a significant increase from 10% in 2010.
Similarly, in the United States, the foreign-born proportion is at a record high of nearly 16%, several times greater than the low of 5% in 1970. Additionally, in Canada, the foreign-born proportion has risen to a record high of close to a quarter of its population, surpassing the previous record of 22% in 1921. Australia also has a significant foreign-born population, especially recently from India and China, reaching close to a third of its population, substantially higher than the 24% in 2004.
Along with population declines, coupled in many instances with increased immigration, countries are also experiencing demographic ageing. The once youthful populations of the recent past are now being replaced by much older populations with increasing proportions of these individuals in retirement. Once again, as with population decline, the projected populations of many countries by the middle of the century would be older without international migration (Figure 4).
Source: United Nations.
In summary, considering recent global trends and significant economic, social, developmental, cultural, and personal factors, it appears unlikely that today’s low fertility rates will return to the replacement level any time soon.
As a result, ongoing low fertility rates are leading to population decline, demographic ageing, and, in many instances, the politically contentious issue of increased levels of the foreign-born population. Instead of hoping for a return to the demographics of the recent past, countries need to recognize the probable future demographics and confront the many challenges that arise from them.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population matters.