Central Europe

VIENNA, 8 August 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed serious concern over the detention of journalists with the Belarusian Tut.by and BelaPAN news agencies, as well as raids of newsrooms and journalists’ homes by law enforcement agents, and the seizure of their equipment.

According to reports, on 7 August, at least five journalists: Maryna Zolatava, Hanna Kaltyhina, Halina Ulasik, and Ganna Ermachonak of Tut.by, and Tatsiana Karavenkova of BelaPAN, were detained by the Investigative Committee of Belarus on suspicion of “unauthorized access to computer information” of the state-owned BelTA news agency. If convicted, the journalists may face up to two years in prison. Reportedly, at least five other journalists were interrogated. Both the Tut.by and BelaPAN news agencies deny that their staff members were involved in any alleged criminal activity. 

“The highly disproportionate measures taken by law enforcement against two independent news agencies raises serious concern about the respect for the independent media in Belarus,” Désir said, echoing the concern expressed by the Belarusian Association of Journalists. “I call on the authorities to immediately release all detained journalists and ensure that both media outlets may continue their work unhindered.”

The Representative continues to closely follow developments around this case, including the ongoing searches at the premises of Tut.by Media, and similar searches at the home of independent journalist and media expert Paulyuk Bykowski.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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390044 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office of the United States Embassy in Astana organized a visit to London from 24 to 26 July 2018 for eight officials from Kazakhstan to study the United Kingdom’s experience in introducing the Advanced Passenger Information Exchange System (API) and the Passenger Name Recorder (PNR).  

The visit for officials of Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service, National Security Committee, Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Justice Civil Aviation Committee of the Ministry of Investment and Development and Foreign Affairs Ministry aimed to familiarize them with best practices in passenger identification and safety, as well as in relevant border security issues including countering human trafficking, immigration and customs enforcement. The delegation saw the practical application of the information-sharing system at Heathrow Airport and learned about the technical capabilities and requirements.  

The officials also met with senior officials of the UK Home Office and discussed possible interagency co-operation opportunities between the two countries and the next steps in promoting the exchange of passenger information at Kazakhstan’s border checkpoints. The delegation was briefed by the Carrier Engagement and Data Analysis Team on the methods for processing and analysis of incoming advance passenger information,

OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/16 Enhancing The Use Of Advance Passenger Information specifies that OSCE participating States commit to establishing national Advance Passenger Information (API) systems in accordance with the provisions contained in ICAO’s Annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention) and aligned with the WCO/IATA/ICAO Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information (API), including those on privacy and data protection, in order to effectively collect passenger and/or crew data from airlines operating in their territories.

The visit is a part of the Office’s long-standing activities intended to enhance the host country’s border security and law enforcement capacity.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 12,510 to 12,341 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings occurred into the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 117 for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 32 persons (compared to 22 last week); 12 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 20 into Ukraine (79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when six families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (468 compared to 434 observed during the previous week). There were 245 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 223 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Stakhanov-Kharkiv; Stakhanov-Sevastopol, Luhansk-Sevastopol, and Luhansk-Yalta.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a significant increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 682 to 807 (248 at the Gukovo BCP and 559 at the Donetsk BCP); 459 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 348 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                         

Among them, the OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 53 (compared to 45 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 65 to 116: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 77 trucks (66 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 39 trucks (34 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 119 to 176 vehicles; 87 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 89 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions, compared to 38 last week; the OTs assessed that 17 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 13 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Belarusian and Lithuanian licence plates. 

On 31 July, at 09:15, at the Gukovo BCP, the OT observed a fire engine entering the BCP from the Russian Federation and going towards Ukraine.

During the same day, at 14:08, the OT heard a sound similar to a detonation or explosion coming from a westerly direction. The OT did not see a fire or visual sign of the supposed explosion. Following this, the BCP traffic flow was closed on both directions. At 14:25, traffic was restored and the BCP resumed its ordinary procedures. At 14:26, the abovementioned fire engine crossed back into the Russian Federation. A few minutes later, at 14:28, an ambulance followed the fire engine.On 7 August, at 07:29, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates. The vehicle entered from the Russian Federation with a driver and two more medical staff on board and parked near the BCP facilities. Afterwards, the medical officers entered the building and came back with a patient. All of them (including the patient) boarded the vehicle and drove back into the Russian Federation at 07:37.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 July to 7 August 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the last 24 hours. Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle in Artema. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, as well as near Bezimenne, Zaichenko, Novoazovsk and Hranitne.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Artema, Stanytsia Luhanska, Novotoshkivske, in Zolote-3 and Zolote-5. The SMM monitored a pre-trial hearing in Kherson, a planned appellate court hearing in Odessa and observed a public gathering in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 87 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (93 explosions).

On the evening and night of 5-6 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 11 undetermined explosions and 102 projectiles in flight (including 21 from east-north-east to west-south-west assessed as multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and 25 in vertical flight assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On 6 August, positioned 1.1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and 66 bursts shots of small-arms fire, all 3-4km south-west.

The same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions, three bursts of heavy-machine-gun and ten shots of small-arms fire, all 1km south-south-east. 

On the evening and night of 5-6 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 12 undetermined explosions, 169 projectiles in flight (109 from west to east, 59 from east to west and one in vertical flight), four illumination flares (three in vertical flight and one from west to east) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-east, south-south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 5-6 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 11 undetermined explosions, 84 projectiles in flight (64 from north to south, 18 from north-west to south-east and two from south to north) and a muzzle flash, all 1-2km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with previous 24 hours but did not register any explosions.

Positioned near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire assessed as directed at the UAV.* At the time of incident, the UAV was flying at an altitude of approximately 200m about 500-700m south-east of the SMM’s position. The SMM recalled and safely landed the UAV. The SMM had flown the UAV to monitor and facilitate ongoing repair works at the Petrivske water pumping station. On 23 July, shots of small-arms fire were directed at an SMM UAV in the same area (see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM visited two such sites and observed two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and noted that the following weapons continued to be missing: nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (one BMP-2 and one undetermined variant) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk) and four IFVs (three BMP-2 and an undetermined variant) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to a water pumping station in Artema, as well as to water distribution infrastructure in multiple locations, including in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled 53km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3 (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5 (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited three border areas outside government control.* While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars queuing to exit Ukraine (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and no traffic entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM did not observe any cross-border traffic at the crossing point.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed six cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine and six cars (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with a sign that read route Moscow to Donetsk, about 50 passengers, mixed gender and ages) entering Ukraine.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored the pre-trial hearing of a suspect detained in relation to an acid attack on a city council official (see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018). The suspect (man, 40 years old) appeared in handcuffs and was represented by a lawyer (man, 50 years old). The SMM saw members of the media and National Corps present, as well as six National Guard officers and six police officers. The presiding judge postponed the pre-trial hearing until 1 October.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored a planned appellate court hearing of 19 individuals previously acquitted of participating in mass disturbances in the city on 2 May 2014. The hearing was rescheduled, allegedly due to technical difficulties. (See SMM Daily Report 5 May 2014.)

In Kyiv, on 5 August, the SMM observed a public gathering of about 20 people (men and women, 35-75 years old) in front of the International Centre of Cultural and Arts at 1 Heavenly Hundred Heroes Alley, three of whom were carrying Ukrainian flags and one carrying the flag of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists. Five media crews were also present. Some of the participants laid flowers at a nearby memorial to victims of Holodomor and political repressions, and told members of the media present that the gathering was being held in memory of the Great Terror. The SMM saw two police officers in the area.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to road E58.
• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing an “order from superior command”.
• Three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), citing “ongoing anti-terrorist operations” in the area.
• At a checkpoint about 2km northwest of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from entering the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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390002 Detail from the cover of ODIHR and PRI's Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published a new tool on 9 August 2018 to support the effective implementation of minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. The resource, produced jointly with Penal Reform International (PRI), was launched initially online.

The Guidance Document on the Nelson Mandela Rules – Implementing the United Nations revised Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners is a practical tool that explores the main human rights issues that arise in prison settings and examines how these can be addressed by implementing the Nelson Mandela Rules.

“Respect for human rights and the dignity of all in prisons is indispensable to achieving a safe and secure environment,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “This publication will support prison managers and staff in ensuring that standards for the treatment of prisoners are in place to protect their human rights and, in particular, prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in prison settings across the OSCE region.”

The publication builds on existing international legal and practical tools, “soft law” principles and opinions of authoritative bodies, as well as promising national-practice examples from the OSCE region and beyond. It provides comprehensive guidance for the interpretation and effective implementation of the revised Rules in areas such as prison management; safety, security and dignity for all; incident prevention and response; restrictions, discipline and sanctions; contact with the outside world; healthcare; and external monitoring.

“The Nelson Mandela Rules are an excellent and comprehensive guide for managers and staff of penal institutions. However, the reality of prison life means that complex situations arise on which more in-depth and detailed guidance is needed to interpret and implement the Rules,” said Alison Hannah, PRI Executive Director. “This guidance document fills this gap with expert practical advice and examples of good practice.  The whole range of actors involved in the treatment of prisoners, including those working with them on a daily basis, will find this an invaluable resource in fulfilling their important role.”

First adopted in 1957, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were revised and adopted again, unanimously, as the Nelson Mandela Rules by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The addition of the reference to Mandela was both to highlight the major support South Africa provided in the revision process and to honour the legacy of the late South African president, who spent 27 years in prisons in the course of the struggle against the apartheid regime.

Kunduz Rysbek

Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Muhammetkaliy Abylgaziev and the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek Pierre von Arx discussed bilateral co-operation and the implementation of the OSCE programme and project activities in the country, including priority efforts in supporting reforms in the area of anti-corruption and economic development on 2 August 2018, at the Office of the Prime Minister in Bishkek.

Prime Minister Abylgaziev said that Kyrgyzstan appreciates OSCE’s continued support in the democratic reform process and socio-economic development and expressed his appreciation for the realization of various projects. He particularly emphasized support in the area of preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism, as well as economic and environmental activities.

The Prime Minister also noted that the country has recently joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) programme, which aims to build a resilient and open society, as well as to strengthen transparency and increase the efficiency of the public administration. “The success of Kyrgyzstan’s path in fulfilling its OGP goals depends also on its co-operation with the OSCE,” said Prime Minister Abylgaziev, stressing that the Government is looking forward to achieving positive results in the future, which are in line with its OSCE commitments.

Highlighting the 20-year history of the OSCE’s presence in Kyrgyzstan and its successes in supporting the country through the OSCE’s comprehensive security model, Head of Mission von Arx reaffirmed the organization’s readiness to continue assisting reform efforts.

The sides discussed upcoming priority activities and events, such as the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek’s further support in the development of a two-year National Action Plan in the framework of Kyrgyzstan’s OGP membership, the Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the planned International eBusiness and eCommerce Conference to be held in Bishkek in October and November respectively.

Based on the successful creation of a constructive model of co-operation between the host State and the Programme Office, both sides expressed their willingness to continue strengthening joint efforts in realizing programmatic activities and increase their future co-ordination.

389921 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A five-day train-the-trainer course on disability rights, organized and conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, concluded on 3 August 2018.

This course was attended by 15 country’s human rights experts from civil society organizations. Experts from different disability rights’ organizations also attended the course to assess and comment on the programme.

Vafo Safarzoda, the OSCE National Human Rights Officer said that the aim of the course is not just about further development of the trainers, but also about raising awareness about disability rights. “We need to look at our language, at how we transmit information and at our own facilities and to what extent are we able to include persons with disabilities in our own workshops and seminars.”

The training modules developed by the trainees are suitable for training persons with disabilities, for the broader public, as well as for government officials in order to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.

“This training is a good sign that more and more people are aware of us, people with disabilities,” said Sitora Kurbonova, representative of “Safoi Konibodom”, an organization of women with disabilities in Tajikistan. “In the past, we mainly had training courses and events within our own circles, but now we feel more part of the wider civil society.”

“Focusing on the topic of disability, we gained a large amount of new knowledge, learned of new methods as trainers and as human rights specialists,” said Jaffarbek Yuldashev, member of the NGO Coalition against torture.

This course is part of a range of activities conducted by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe to support Tajikistan’s access to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

This is the third training of trainers for the group of young human rights experts conducted at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe over the last two years.

This report is for the media and the general public.

Between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period,and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. Between the evenings of 4 and 5 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous 24 hours, and for the third consecutive day, no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it observed no ceasefire violations. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as near Bezimenne, Zaichenko, Novoazovsk and Yasynuvata, and in Donetsk.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 87 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (88 explosions). Between the evenings of 4 and 5 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 93 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 3-4 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 69 projectiles in flight (including 16 from north-east to south-west and 38 in vertical flight, all assessed as multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) salvos) 1-5km south and south-south-west. The following evening and night, the camera recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, 30 projectiles in flight from west to east and 41 projectiles from east to west (assessed as MLRS salvos), followed by a total of five undetermined explosions, 36 projectiles (the majority from east to west) and two illumination flares, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from south to west. Two additional undetermined explosions were recorded 10m-50m south-west.

On the evening and night of 3-4 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, six projectiles in flight from south to north, an explosion assessed as an impact of an artillery round, two projectiles from south to north and two projectiles from north to south, followed by a total of two explosions assessed as impacts artillery rounds, six undetermined explosions, 53 projectiles (the majority from south to north) and seven illumination flares, all 0.7-4km east and east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east and 45 projectiles from west to east, all assessed as MLRS salvos, an undetermined explosion and two projectiles from north-east to south-west, followed by a total of 13 undetermined explosions and 97 projectiles (three from west-north-west to east-south-east and ten from west to east assessed as MLRS salvos; the remainder mostly from east to west) and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south. The following evening and night, the camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, three projectiles from east to west and three projectiles from west to east, followed by a total of ten undetermined explosions, 201 projectiles (the majority from east to west) and eight muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south. 

On the evening and night of 3-4 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from north-east to south-west, an undetermined explosion and three projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east, all 2-4km east-north-east, east and east-south-east. This was followed by a total of nine explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and MLRS salvos, 21 undetermined explosions and 59 projectiles (including 14 from north-east to south-west and ten from east to west, all assessed as MLRS salvos, and the remainder mostly from north to south), all 2-3km east-north-east, east and east-south-east. The following evening and night, the camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east-south-east to west-north-west, eight projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east and two undetermined explosions, followed by a total of 15 undetermined explosions, 56 projectiles (the majority from north to south) and two illumination flares, all 1-2km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

On the evening and night of 4-5 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government- controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 37 projectiles in flight from west to east, three projectiles from east to west and 17 projectiles from west to east, followed by a total of three undetermined explosions and 153 projectiles (the majority from west to east), all 1-4km north-east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and about 140 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east, south and south-west. During the day on 4 August, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east and south-south-east. The following evening and night, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 210 shots and bursts of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east and south. On the morning of 5 August, the SMM heard four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 3 and 4 August, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 4 and 5 August, the SMM also recorded no ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and in the Zolote disengagement areas on 4 and 5 August, the SMM observed calm situations. On 5 August, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 27 July, the SMM saw seven self-propelled artillery pieces (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 3 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted at least eight MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk). On 4 August, the SMM saw eight howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 27 July, the SMM saw three tanks (type undetermined) at a training area south-east of Ternove.

On 4 August, the SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-80 and two MT-LB) near Bezimenne (100km south of Donetsk).

On 5 August, the SMM saw that the anti-tank mine spotted on 1 August in Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) had been removed (see SMM Daily Report 2 August 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire, on 4 and 5 August. Positioned in areas near the DFS on both days, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

On 4 August, the SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (non-government-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 70 minutes, the SMM saw 80 cars (31 with Russian Federation, 17 with Ukrainian, one with Polish and one with Georgian licence plates, and 30 with “DPR” plates), 11 covered cargo trucks (seven with Ukrainian, one with a Russian Federation and one with a Belarussian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. It also saw 12 cars (eight with Russian Federation and two with Ukrainian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 4 August, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “security reasons”. (See SMM Daily Report 30 July 2018.)
• On 4 August, near the railway station in Donetsk city, two members of the armed formationswith assault rifles (AK74) and in balaclava masks requested the SMM to immediately leave the area as it was “close to combat positions”.
• On 4 August, at a checkpoint 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2018) stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons and ongoing demining activities in the area”. The SMM saw a car and a military truck pass through the checkpoint. At the same checkpoint, on 5 August, two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage to Sakhanka.
• On 5 August, three armed members of the armed formations again (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2018) denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), citing “ongoing operations” in the area.
• On 5 August, two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) prevented the SMM from flying its UAV over the area of the DFS, unless approved by his superior.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 4 and 5 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 4 and 5 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.
• On 4 and 5 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. 

[2]Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]  The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period and none in Luhansk region. The Mission followed up on a civilian casualty in Zalizne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed a recently fortified position in the disengagement area near Zolote. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Novoazovsk (where the SMM was turned back after waiting for five hours, preventing it from accessing Novoazovsk and the nearby border crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation) and at two border crossing points on the border with the Russian Federation in Luhansk region.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi, Mius, Vuhlehirsk and Debaltseve. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to a pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions).

On the evening and night of 2-3 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions, 97 projectiles in flight (about half from north-westerly directions to south-easterly directions) and five bursts, all 0.3-4km south.                                                                                                          

On the evening and night of 2-3 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 22 undetermined explosions, 175 projectiles in flight (most from west to east), four illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km north.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded four explosions.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 3 August, in Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), a woman (80 years old) told the SMM that on 8 June at around noon, she felt a sharp pain in her right shoulder and went to her neighbour, who called her an ambulance. The woman showed the SMM a scar on her shoulder as well as a hole in a south-east-facing window in the living room of her ground-floor apartment on Papanina Street in Zalizne. On 10 June, medical staff at a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that the woman had been admitted on 8 June with a non-penetrating bullet wound to her right shoulder.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM did not observe any ceasefire violations. Inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces position which was recently fortified with sandbags and logs, as well as three green small-arms-ammunition-type boxes nearby.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas on 2 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) travelling north in convoy near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk), six MLRS (BM-21) driving south on road M03 near Mius (65km south-west of Luhansk), six towed howitzers moving in convoy (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled area on 2 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela‑10, 120mm) near Hranitne (78km south-west of Donetsk). On 3 August, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Rivnopil (86km west of Donetsk) as well as eight MLRS (BM-21) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area on 2 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six towed howitzers (D-30) and a tank (T-64) near Khrustalnyi.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas on 2 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variants) near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a mine hazard sign approximately 200m from houses in Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), at the edge of a road near a field. The sign was a red rectangle displaying a white skull-and-crossbones and the text “Danger Mines!” in English. Local residents told the SMM that these houses were inhabited and the nearby fields had been mined since 2014.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a gathering of approximately 50 people (mainly elderly women) in Stanytsia Luhanska. Some of them told the SMM that they were upset about lengthy waiting times required to cross the nearby entry-exit checkpoint. According to a commander of the State Border Guard Service, 11,000 people cross the entry-exit checkpoint daily – well above its capacity of 3,000.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for two minutes, the SMM saw a covered cargo truck (with “LPR” plates) and two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine before a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw two women and six men (in their early thirties) entering Ukraine and two women and two men (in their fifties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for five minutes, the SMM saw a man and a woman (in their fifties) exiting Ukraine before a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

• Armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), citing orders from a “superior,” thus preventing the SMM from accessing Novoazovsk and the nearby border crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation (approximately 10km east of the checkpoint). The SMM waited at the checkpoint for over five hours before turning back. The SMM observed numerous civilian cars passing through the checkpoint, including, at one point, two SUVs with rotation lights and two sedan vehicles, none bearing licence plates, which passed through the checkpoints in the direction of the border.
• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne, a man in military style clothing again demanded that the SMM leave the area.
• At the border crossing point near Sievernyi, a man in military style clothing again demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]   The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as well as new firing positionsinside the Zolote disengagement area assessed as belonging to Ukrainian Armed Forces. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Siedove, Rivnopil and Novoazovsk.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM observed an anti-tank mine for the first time near Novotroitske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Artema, Novotoshkivske, Popasna and Stanytsia Luhanska. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a ceremony organized by the Roma community commemorating the victims of the 1941-1943 massacres at Babi Yar. In Lviv, the SMM again observed vandalism of tombs at a Second World War memorial.  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions).

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 24 explosions (21 assessed as undetermined, two as outgoing and one as an impact of an artillery round), 100 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west and west to east, and one from south-east to north-west assessed as from a rocket-propelled grenade), two muzzle flashes, an illumination flare in vertical flight and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all 0.5-4km south.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and 294 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north), all 1-4km east. 

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km NE of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions, 65 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east and from south-south-east to north-north-west) and two bursts of an undetermined weapon, all 1-3km east-north-east.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 25 undetermined explosions, 103 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east and from south-south-east to north-north-west), seven illumination flares in vertical flight and two muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east. 

On the evening of 1 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east), four illumination flares (three in vertical flight, one from south-west to north-east) and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km north.  

On the evening and night of 1-2 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint inPyshchevyk recorded nine explosions, 121 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from east to west) and six bursts of an undetermined weapon, all 2-7km south.  

During the day on 2 August, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-10km south-east and south. 

During the day on 2 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions and about 110 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-12km north as well as at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations (four explosions). In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. 

On 1 August, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three new firing positions (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018) assessed as belonging to Ukrainian Armed Forces, attached to a previously observed 40m-long trench (see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018) on the southern side of the railway line inside the Zolote disengagement area, about 600m south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The UAV also spotted a path cleared of trees and vegetation leading about 200m further north, across the railway line and through tree lines, as well as over 100 logs deposited on the ground near positions on the northern side of the tree lines (not visible imagery from 26 July 2018).

The same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the UAV spotted an area cleared of grass (not visible in imagery from 26 July 2018) near a previously observed trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, about 900m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1.4km west of its eastern edge (see SMM Daily Report 25 July 2018). 

Near to a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint just outside the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a light armoured vehicle (Cougar KRAZ) with a heavy-machine-gun mounted on top, outside the disengagement area, travelling north. 

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. 

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 2 August the SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk). On 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and two 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in a residential area in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) travelling from Lozivskyi (32km west of Luhansk) to Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk). The UAV also spotted 12 tanks (six T-64 and six T-72) near Khoroshe.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas in a government-controlled area, on 2 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Kremenivka (78km south of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and observed that 23 self-propelled howitzers (21 2S1 and two 2S3) were missing. 

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[3]and other signs of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 2 August, the SMM saw a command post and communication ACV (BTR-60 R-145 BM) moving north on road H-20 nearHranitne (25km north of Mariupol).On 1 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two ACVs (BMP variants) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 1 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top of an APC (MT-LB) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-1) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-80) and an IFV (BMP-2) on the western edge of Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) near Lozivskyi and 19 IFVs (six BMP-2 and four BMP-1, the remainder undetermined) near Khoroshe.

The SMM continued to observe the presence ofmines and mine hazard signs. In Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed an anti-tank mine for the first time, assessed as fused, partially concealed by branches and rocks on the eastern edge of a paved road about 850m from road H20. A woman (60-70 years old) living 100m from the mine told the SMM that she was not aware of its presence. About 30-50m further down the road, the SMM observed a red mine hazard sign attached to barbed wire hanging across the road. On 1 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 14 anti-tank mines on a road between Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Novoluhanske (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water system near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and to a fibre-optic cable 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

In Kyiv, at the Babi Yar ravine in the north-west of the city, the SMM monitored a ceremony organized by the Roma community commemorating the victims of the massacres that took place at the site from 1941-1943. The SMM saw about 50 members of the Roma community in attendance, including musicians and dancers that performed in front of the monument dedicated to the Roma victims who were killed there. A speaker also paid tribute to the young Roma man killed in an attack in Lviv on 23 June (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018). The SMM saw six police officers present during the ceremony. 

In Lviv, the SMM again saw vandalism of tombs at the Memorial of Glory to Heroes Fallen in Second World War on Pasichna Street, including the Ukrainian national symbol. One of the tombs was spray-painted with yellow and purple, while another had a political slogan on it (see SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018).  

The SMM continued monitoring in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments– which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

• Two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces members denied the SMM access to a military compound near Peredove (governmentcontrolled, 68km south-west of Donetsk), saying that they would not provide it access until their commander arrived.
• Two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces members denied the SMM access to a military compound near Rivnopil (governmentcontrolled, 86km west of Donetsk), with one member telling the SMM that the “instruction from their superior command is not to allow anyone to enter the compound”. 
• At a checkpoint on the western edge of Siedove (nongovernment-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, saying they had “no order” from the  armed formations in Donetsk city to allow the SMM through the checkpoint. The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing the need for permission from the armed formations in Donetsk city. The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint and earlier that day experienced no restrictions passing through the same checkpoint. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

- At the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM noted that one of three stabilizer steel lanyards of the SMM camera there had been removed from its concrete recess. The SMM assessed that this removal may cause destabilization of the camera pole.

- At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the western edge of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces member asked the SMM if there was a person with a specific name travelling in one of the SMM vehicles, saying that he was a “correspondent” of the OSCE and that they had orders not to let the person through the checkpoint.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 3 August 2018 – The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine is implementing nationwide training campaign to help the personnel of the police emergency service – “102 Emergency Service” – to better address calls coming from victims of domestic violence.

Eleven two-day training courses are conducted this year in five regions of Ukraine, including Lviv, Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Uzhgorod and Lutsk. The sessions involve both operators receiving emergency calls and dispatchers organizing the response of police units.

The emergency service staff participating in the courses learns to identify cases of gender-based violence, including domestic violence, and familiarizes themselves with tools for responding and communicating effectively, providing necessary information to the victims.  Media are invited to attend part of the training session taking place in Zhytomyr, at 5/35 Stary Bulvar Street (the Oblast National Police Headquarters) on Wednesday, 8 August 2018.

The press opportunity, starting at 11:00, will provide insights into lecturing and practical exercises, as well as an opportunity to get acquainted with operations of the Emergency Service call center.

Vaidotas Verba, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator of Ukraine, Vyacheslav Pechenenko, Head of Zhytomyr Oblast Chief Department of National Police and Oleksandr Kupriyanov, Head of 102 Call Service Department will be available for comment.    

Zhytomyr-based media representatives are kindly requested to confirm participation, by calling (0412) 40 73 73 or sending an e-mail to zmi@zt.npu.gov.ua by 18:00 on Tuesday, 7 August 2018.

For Kyiv based media transfer available to the training venue and back (start at 8:30 from 16 Striletska St., Kyiv with return to Kyiv at around 16:00). Number of transfer seats is limited, to make use of transfer please notify by e-mail andrii.dziubenko@osce.org  by 14:00 on Tuesday, 7 August 2018, for additional information please contact Andrii Dziubenko, National Programme Co-ordinator at  +380506767734.

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389675 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Some 240 district law enforcement officers and social workers completed training courses on combating domestic violence organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in eight southern districts of Moldova, including the Autonomous Territorial District of Gagauzia from 18 July to 2 August 2018.

Under the guidance of local experts in combating gender-based violence, the participants reviewed national legislation and international best practices on handling domestic violence cases and discussed the long-term effects of domestic violence on victims. The participants also learned about recent amendments to the law on domestic violence, which authorize police officers to issue emergency protection orders. These amendments enable police officers to react immediately in order to protect survivors without waiting for a court decision.

The interactive nature of the training sessions allowed law enforcement officers and social workers to develop a mechanism of co-operation at the district level in order to effectively intervene at all levels of the domestic violence cycle and deepen their knowledge of victims’ rights.

"During our training sessions we continuously emphasized the crucial role of timely intervention to prevent physical abuse of a domestic violence victim and their children,” said Simion Sirbu, an expert from the Centre for Aggressors in Drochia. “As a result of the training sessions held in previous years, we have registered a growing number of referrals made to our centre by police officers investigating domestic violence cases.”

Over the past three years, more than 400 district law enforcement officers and social workers from northern and central parts of Moldova have participated in OSCE-supported training sessions.

These activities by the Mission, which bring together professional communities from both banks to address issues of common concern, are also in line with the priorities of the joint Moldovan and Transdniestrian Human Rights sub-Working Group. 

VIENNA, 2 August 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir today in a letter to the Turkish authorities expressed his concern over recent judicial action launched by the country’s prosecution against two journalists of the Turkish Cypriot daily Afrika. 

“I am very concerned over the judicial action initiated by the Turkish prosecution against Turkish Cypriot journalists,” Désir said in a letter to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. “Threatening journalists with criminal lawsuits for their work weakens pluralistic debate in societies, can lead to self-censorship among journalists and to the overall deterioration of media freedom… The right to freedom of expression encompasses views that may offend, shock, and disturb.”

The two journalists, editor-in-chief Şener Levent and Ali Osman, face criminal charges based on articles critical of Turkish politics published by the newspaper on 21 January 2018 and 1 February 2018.

The Representative recalled that the Nicosia-based newspaper Afrika has been under significant pressure for an extensive period of time. He mentioned the attack against Levent and the newspaper’s offices on 22 January, and stressed that violence and intimidation of journalists is unacceptable.

“It is essential for the public authorities to refrain from initiating lawsuits against journalists for their work, including when they express differing views on sensitive affairs. I urge them to drop the lawsuits against Levent and Osman,” Désir said.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske where it observed a situation of calm while positioned there. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema and Malynove. In Kherson, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on a city council official. The SMM saw anti-Semitic graffiti in Odessa and monitored gatherings in front of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions).

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 37 undetermined explosions, 169 projectiles in flight (mostly from east to west, west to east and in vertical flight), six illumination flares in vertical flight and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 0.1-3km south.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded seven undetermined explosions, 112 projectiles in flight (mostly from south to north and north to south), nine illumination flares in vertical flight and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 0.8-3km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 13 undetermined explosions, 354 projectiles in flight (274 from north to south and 80 from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-3km east.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east. On the following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and 14 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, including one explosion.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas and near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a situation of calm.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 31 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two tanks (T-72) travelling north-east on a dirt track approximately 3km south of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) near Kurdiumivka (54km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Vesele (87km north of Donetsk), 11 tanks (six T-64 and five of unknown type) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Verkhnokamianka (84km north-west of Luhansk), two self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S, 152mm) near Zvanivka (93km north of Donetsk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Rozdolivka (87km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm). It also noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing and three tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 26 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). In government-controlled areas, on 31 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-60) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On 1 August, the SMM saw an APC (type undetermined) near Zolote.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In the north-eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed UXO at the edge of the tarmac road, about 315m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, assessed as a fragmentation grenade (VOG-25, 40mm).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a gas pipeline near Malynove (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Luhansk).

For the first time since 9 July, the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass through a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and proceed to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). Citing order from his superiors, an armed member of the armed formations said the SMM would be allowed to cross the checkpoint and enter the villages in the area until 3 August.

In Kherson, the SMM followed up on media reports of an attack on 31 July on a city council official. On 1 August, at the Kherson Regional Hospital, medical staff told the SMM that she had been admitted to the hospital in the afternoon of 31 July with acid burns on 30 per cent of her body on the afternoon of 31 July. On the same day, the SMM saw about 20 people (men, aged 20-30), known to the Mission as members of the National Corps, Svoboda political party and the public formation “Buzkyi Guard”, gathered in front of the Kherson regional police headquarters. A participant told the SMM that they had gathered to demand a swift response from the police to the attack. The SMM saw ten police officers present. On 2 August, a representative of the Kherson regional police department told the SMM that forensic experts had confirmed sulfuric acid had been used in the attack and that a criminal investigation had been launched and that a suspect had been identified and was being sought.

In Odessa, on 31 July, the SMM saw anti-Semitic graffiti and a swastika scrawled in black spray paint on the exterior wall of a residential building at 16 Osypova Street, across the street from a synagogue. According to the synagogue’s chief rabbi, the graffiti had appeared on the evening of 29 July. On 2 August, a representative of the Odessa national police regional department told the SMM that an investigation into this incident, as well as two similar previously reported incidents (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 24 July 2018) had been launched under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“Violation of citizens' equality based on their race, nationality or religious preferences”).

In Kyiv, on 1 August, the SMM monitored two gatherings. In front of the Ministry of Justice at 10 Rylskyi Lane, the SMM observed some 250 people (35-70 years old, 70 per cent women) carrying signs demanding the registration of a political group as a party and asserting the rights of farmers. The SMM observed four police officers nearby.

In front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street, the SMM saw about 25 people (25-50 years old, mixed gender), some of whom said that they had gathered to demand effective investigations into recent cases of physical attacks against public activists in Ukraine, including among others the attack on a city council official in Kherson on 31 July (see above). The SMM saw ten police officers, as well as ten communications police officers. Both gatherings ended without any incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, the SMM had to wait for about 40 minutes before being granted access to the site.

Other impediments:

• An SMM midrange UAV experienced signal interruptions while flying over an area near Zaitseve (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM landed the UAV without any damage.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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KYIV, 2 August 2018 – Alexander Hug, the Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), will hold a news briefing on Friday via video link from eastern Ukraine.

Hug will talk about the Mission’s recent activities and the general security situation throughout Ukraine.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 3 August, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng.

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Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe facilitated plenary discussions on the implementation of Tajikistan’s 2020 National Strategy and Action Plan on Prevention of Violent Extremism on 27 July 2018 in Dushanbe.

The Office of the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan, the country’s lead government agency on countering violent extremism (CVE), briefed the participants on the strategy’s progress.

The discussion aimed at bringing together both national and international stakeholders to deliberate on the implementation modalities of the National Action Plan on CVE, and at identifying further support areas for civil society and government institutions, in line with international human rights standards and best practices.

The event also served the purpose to present the reframed matrix projects on the strategy, as well as to share the findings and developments of community resilience activities of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe over the course of June and July 2018.

“We brought together 20 ministries and agencies of Tajikistan in charge of the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan on Prevention of Violent Extremism, to inform the international community and civil society representatives on the progress of this important government policy,” said Manuchehr Mahmudzoda, Head of the International Co-operation Department of the Office of Prosecutor General.

Mahmudzoda expressed hope that by end of the plenary discussions, the international organizations, diplomatic missions and civil society actors participating would come up with further ideas and proposals for how to achieve tangible results in this area.

“We are glad to see civil society representatives around this table,” said Guljahon Bobosadykova, a civil society representative. “Co-ordination of the strategy’s work plan is well-organized on the national level, but the same should be done on the local (district) level, in order to mobilize other layers of society.”

Tuula Yrjola, Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, said that today’s plenary discussions will lay a solid foundation for developing effective measures on preventing violent extremism and terrorism. “We are here to assist the government and civil society actors of Tajikistan. We ask them to identify further support areas for the strategy in 2019, in line with the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security.”    

Representatives of various diplomatic missions and international organizations, accredited in Tajikistan, shared their ideas on implementation modalities of the strategy and agreed to co-ordinate their efforts on a bi-monthly basis. The next meeting has been tentatively scheduled for 28 September 2018.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as near Zaichenko, Siedove and Shevchenko; at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near Dovzhanske at the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, including multiple launch rocket systems in the centre of Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Zolote-3 and Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 245 explosions).

On the evening and night of 30-31 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two explosions assessed as impacts 0.8-1km south and 39 projectiles in vertical flight 2-3km south, followed by totals of 48 explosions (two assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 1-2km south, an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon 2-3km south and the remainder undetermined) and 212 projectiles (including 90 from east to west, about 50 from west to east and about 40 from south-east to north-west), all 0.5-4km south.

On the evening of 30 July, the SMM camera about 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in vertical flight, two projectiles from south to north and six projectiles from north to south, followed by totals of seven undetermined explosions, 132 projectiles (80 from north to south and 52 from south to north) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km east.

On the evening and night of 30-31 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, nine projectiles in flight from west to east, two undetermined explosions, 34 projectiles from west to east and two projectiles from east to west, all 1-5km north.

On the evening and night of 30-31 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and about 170 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-8km at directions ranging from east to south.

During the day on 31 July, positioned about 2km west-south-west of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 1-2km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (22 explosions).

During the day on 31 July, positioned in Holubivka  (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard nine bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km north-north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 30 July, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 31 July, positioned at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a car with military licence plates entering the disengagement area carrying a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier (not visibly armed). The SMM also saw four Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers (not visibly armed) walk into a field inside the disengagement area from a road between the checkpoint and Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

The same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 30 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122m) at a compound in the centre of Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and an additional six MLRS (BM-21) north of the city. The same UAV also spotted five towed howitzers (three 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and two 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in a compound south of Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk), eight MLRS (BM-21) south-west of Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) as well as, again, four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 30 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 towed howitzers (2A65) and an anti-tank guided missile system (undetermined variant) north of Khrustalnyi and three tanks (T-64) near a training area about 3km west of Markyne (94km south of Donetsk). On 31 July, the SMM saw a tank (T-72) heading east in a field about 100m north of a road between Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) and Siedove (106km south of Donetsk), as well as three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in firing positions and at least 14 tanks (T-72 and T-64), some of which were in firing positions, at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 July 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 31 July, the SMM saw 15 stationary tanks (T-64) in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk) and a stationary anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm, and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) were again missing. In government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM observed five towed howitzers (2A65) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) and noted that 34 howitzers (26 2A65 and eight 2A36) and 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 18 tanks (ten T-72 and eight T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 30 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) east of Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol). On 31 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 30 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at a compound near Vilkhivka and four IFVs (BMP variant) and three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-70 and two MT-LB) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The same UAV also spotted seven IFVs (four BMP-2 and three BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) in Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

On 27 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two recent craters (not visible in imagery from 19 July 2018) assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds (unable to assess the direction of fire), about 400m south of the south-eastern edge of Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and a water channel in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (four with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and three buses (all with Ukrainian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. After ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Three men in militarystyle clothing (one armed) in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area, citing the need for “permission” from a senior member of the armed formations.
• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”. (See SMM Daily Report 31 July 2018.)
• At a checkpoint at the western entrance of Siedove, near the border with the Russian Federation, two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it access into the village, citing “security reasons”. The SMM saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint.
• At the eastern entrance of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (one armed) prevented the SMM from proceeding west towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), saying that they had “no orders” from their superior to allow the Mission access to either of the villages.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 1 August 2018 – The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug, will travel to eastern Ukraine from 1 to 3 August to assess the security situation along the contact line and its impact on civilians.

Hug will hold a press briefing, the exact time and locations of which will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmm).

He will also join OSCE monitors as they patrol locations along the contact line.

Journalists interested in covering these patrols should contact: Liudmyla Palamar: +38 050 387 93 98; liudmyla.palamar@osce.org; smm-press@osce.org.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). On 26 July, the seventy-seventh Russian convoy of 21 vehicles crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk Border Crossing Point.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). During the reporting period, one first responder[1] left the mission on 27 July 2018. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

During the reporting period, the OM did not receive the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs decreased to 22 persons (compared to 52 last week); 10 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 12 into Ukraine. All of these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, six families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when nine families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another eight into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (434 compared to 432 observed during the previous week). There were 232 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 202 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Kyiv, Rovenky-Kyiv, Kyiv, Luhansk-Yalta and Luhansk-Sevastopol.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian license plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 756 to 682 (237 at the Gukovo BCP and 445 at the Donetsk BCP); 348 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 334 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian license plates issued in the Luhansk region.    

Among them, the OTs continued to also observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 45 (compared to 48 from the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP went from 85 to 65: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 35 trucks (54 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 30 trucks (46 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian license plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 205 to 119 vehicles; 55 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 64 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 38 occasions, compared to 37 last week; the OTs assessed that 21 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 17 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian license plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation license plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with Belarusian and Georgian license plates; vehicles with “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border. 

On 26 July 2018 at 08:15 at the Donetsk BCP, the OT observed an ambulance which entered the BCP from the Ukraine side and went into the Russian Federation. The duration of the crossing was less than one minute and during that time the OT could not observe any more details about the ambulance.

On 27 July at 13:10 at the Donetsk BCP, an ambulance with Russian Federation license plates, carrying one driver and one paramedic on board came to the BCP from the Russian Federation and parked close to the main building. At the same time two women who were crossing the border from the Russian Federation to Ukraine on foot reached the ambulance and got inside. Shortly thereafter, at 13:20, the ambulance returned in the direction of the Russian Federation. The OT was not able to observe if the ambulance took any patients with it.

On 30 July at 09:03 at the Gukovo BCP, the OT observed a fire vehicle entering the BCP from the Russian Federation and going towards Ukraine. A few minutes later, at 09:08, an ambulance also entered the BCP from the direction of the Russian Federation and travelled towards Ukraine. From its position, the OT was not able to see whether the vehicles actually crossed the border to Ukraine, or whether they remained at the “blind spot” behind the main building of the BCP, where the OT does not have permission to move. At 12:40, another fire vehicle arrived at the BCP from the direction of the Russian Federation, stopped in the outbound lane to Ukraine, and returned shortly thereafter at 12:57 to the Russian Federation. Later that night, at 21:07, the OT observed an ambulance with Russian Federation license plates, coming from the direction of Ukraine and crossing the border into the Russian Federation. A few minutes later, at 21:13, a fire vehicle followed the ambulance. The OT could not confirm whether these were the same vehicles observed in the morning or not.

In addition, on the same day in Gukovo at 17:58, an ambulance with Russian Federation license plates entered from the Russian Federation and went towards Ukraine at the BCP. At 18:05, it returned back to the Russian Federation. 

On 31 July at 04.12 at the Donetsk BCP, a group of four men and one woman entered the BCP from the Russian Federation on foot, carrying a coffin (by hands) and a big funeral wreath. They underwent border formalities and crossed to Ukraine. The OT from its position could not ascertain whether the coffin was opened and if there was a body inside or not.

Convoy

On 26 July at 06:35 (Moscow time), the seventy-seventh[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 21 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 21 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 15:55 on 26 July (see the OM Spot Report of 26 July 2018: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk/389102).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 3 July to 31 July 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[3]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-ninth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-seventh convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it observed no ceasefire violations. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as again near Bezimenne and Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kalynove. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Stanytsia Luhanska, Artema, Novotoshkivske and Zalizne

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations[1], including about 245 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 29-30 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, nine undetermined explosions, one projectile in flight from west to east, six undetermined explosions and a projectile from north-west to south-east, followed by a total of 102 undetermined explosions, 337 projectiles (the majority from east to west and west to east), 16 muzzle flashes (including two assessed as outgoing mortar rounds) and two illumination flares (one in vertical flight and one from west to east), all 0.2-3km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 29-30 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 138 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-south-east to north-north-west), six illumination flares (three in vertical flight, two from north-east to south-west and one from east-north-east to west-south-west) and a burst of an undetermined weapon, all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 29-30 July and during the day on 30 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and its subsequent impact 3-4km south-east, as well as 83 undetermined explosions and about 450 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-east and south.

During the day on 30 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and at least 480 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-10km at directions ranging from south-south-east to north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 22 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 29 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a towed mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 30 July, the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft guns[3] and trenches in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk), three ACVs (types undetermined) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk), three ACVs (types undetermined) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as two APCs (MT-LB) and five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote. On 30 July, the SMM saw four IFVs (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 180m-long trench about 2km east-south-east of the south-eastern edge of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) and a 120m-long trench in Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 23 May 2018).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 28 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote 5 (Mykhailivka) (61km north-west of Luhansk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk). On 29 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2), three APCs (MT-LB variants) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23-2) mounted atop military trucks near Kadiivka (50km west of Luhansk).

At 171 Shevchenko Street in Ilovaisk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-east of Donetsk), on the eastern side of the street, the SMM saw a metal object partially buried in a cavity in the pavement, which it assessed as a 122mm projectile. The SMM marked the object with red paint and a warning sign reading “Do not approach” in Russian, and asked a member of the armed formations present on the site to facilitate its removal.

The SMM observed demining activities in non-government-controlled areas. It saw at least eight members of the armed formations, some of them with metal detectors, in a field west of a road 0.6km north of Nikishyne (60km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission saw that the area was marked with white tape. Approximately 1.5km west of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) and 300m east of road T0517, the SMM observed at least four members of the armed formations in military-style clothing with demining sticks on both sides of the road.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the water distribution network in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the Nyzhnie-1-Novotoshkivske-Svetlichanska water system (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne. Imagery from an SMM mid-range UAV on 28 July indicates that the level of phenol sludge in the reservoir has not increased, compared with previous imagery from May, June and July 2018. The imagery also showed new soil deposits on the reservoir’s western and eastern banks, likely due to ongoing repair and maintenance work, and it revealed no changes to military positions, compared with previous imagery (see SMM Daily Report 18 July 2018).

The SMM visited three border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and an undetermined number of passengers and one with Ukrainian licence plates and 25 passengers on board), three covered cargo trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates), 11 cars (five with Ukrainian, three with Lithuanian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and ten pedestrians (five women, five children) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates and 25 passengers on board), seven covered cargo trucks (four with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and 12 cars (three with Russian Federation licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM saw 45 cars (16 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, and 13 with “DPR” plates) and five pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 26 cars (12 with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates, 43 and 38 passengers respectively) and eight pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a male pedestrian (in his thirties) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from superiors” (for previous denials see, for example, SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018 or SMM Daily Report 30 July).
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for SMM’s safety due to ongoing operations in the area” (see SMM Daily Report 30 July).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While preparing to launch its midrange UAV flight near Novotroitske (governmentcontrolled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), the UAV experienced a continuous loss of GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM cancelled the flight.[5]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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