Central Europe

392135 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

A two-day seminar organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat on how to develop a module on freedom of expression for journalism faculties in Turkmenistan concluded on 29 August 2018. It brought together journalism instructors, representatives of national media and officials from relevant institutions.

The seminar covered international and regional documents addressing access to information and freedom of expression as well as principles of professional ethics of journalists.  International experts presented approaches to media regulation and self-regulation, elaborating on information reliability as a principle of media regulation.

The rights and duties of journalists and information transparency of state institutions were also discussed. Further topics included trends in journalism education, its concept and factors affecting the methods of teaching legal basis of journalism and other related subjects. The seminar participants analysed case studies relating to freedom of expression and journalism ethics.

“The National Human Rights Action Plan of Turkmenistan (NHRAP) for 2016-2020 envisages a number of provisions related to the freedom of the media, including the development of a module on freedom of expression for journalism faculties at institutions of higher education,” said the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, Natalya  Drozd.

“As freedom of expression is a cornerstone of a democratic state, the OSCE is undertaking various activities to safeguard the rights of journalists and freedom of expression across the region. The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat welcomed the inclusion of the activities aimed at promoting the freedom of the media in the NHRAP and stands ready to continue its support during their implementation,” Drozd said.

SKOPJE, 29 August 2018 – The OSCE Mission to Skopje’s first interim report on the activities and cases of the Special Prosecutor’s Office provides a detailed analysis of, and recommendations for the work of the Office, highlighting the challenges encountered and the successes achieved.

The report is the result of the Mission’s trial monitoring observations of SPO cases, focusing primarily on the 20 cases in which the SPO filed indictments by the statutory deadline of 30 June 2017.

During the presentation of the report, the Acting Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Jeff Goldstein said that the trial monitoring of high-profile cases has proven to be an effective tool for promoting the implementation of domestic and international fair trial standards and supporting judicial reform.

“The presence of monitors in the courtroom often leads to better adherence to international human rights standards,” said Goldstein. “We also believe that the recommendations of the monitors could contribute to the improvement of the legal system.”

Special Public Prosecutor Katica Janeva said: “This project is of particular importance to us as it gives for the first time a detailed account of the entire process starting from the establishment of the Office. It outlines the stages of institution-building through the work done and the results achieved, the challenges and obstacles faced.”

Janeva added that the report also strengthens the Office in its commitment to carry on:  “Our aim is to accomplish the mission entrusted, tackling impunity and upholding the rule of law,” said Janeva.

The report, available online here is part of a project financed through extra-budgetary contributions provided by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported two-day regional workshop on operating Special Economic Zones (SEZs) concluded in Aktau, Kazakhstan on 29 August 2018.

SEZs are government-designated special territories within a country established to promote trade and create jobs by offering special incentives. They include preferential tax rates, customs fees and quotas.

Forty-five officials from Kazakhstan’s central and regional customs authorities, business associations and the private sector attended the event. Participants discussed different practices employed in operating SEZs internationally. A Danish expert, whose travel was supported by the OSCE, delivered a presentation on the evolution of free trade areas into logistics hubs and identified critical success factors for operating ports in free trade areas.

Customs authority and SEZ representatives from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan shared experiences of operating free trade areas and ports in their respective countries and identified main impediments to attracting investments. The participants also discussed customs controls administration in connection with the enactment of Kazakhstan’s new customs code.

The workshop was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with Kazakhstan’s State Revenue Committee’s Training Centre.  It is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to assist the host country in promoting good governance and facilitating trade in the region.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission confirmed three civilian casualties in Zaitseve and Horlivka. It saw fresh damage from gunfire to a civilian property in a residential area of Staromykhailivka. The SMM saw a new position and trench inside the Zolote disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It heard ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as again in Zaichenko and near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Vodiane. The Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk remained closed. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region as well as repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions).

On the evening of 26 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 36 undetermined explosions, about 100 projectiles in flight, three bursts and an illumination flare, all 1-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening of 26 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-8km east and south-east. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions 2-6km east and south-east.

On 27 August, positioned in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-east assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations and no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about ten explosions).

The SMM confirmed three civilian casualties in Zaitseve and Horlivka from May and June 2018. In the first case, medical staff at hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) from Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) had been admitted on 8 June with a bullet wound to his chest. The SMM spoke by telephone with the man who said he had been injured in the afternoon of 8 June in the garden of his house on Yesenina Street in Zaitseve. A neighbour of the injured man told the Mission by telephone that on 8 June he had seen his neighbour lying on the ground in the garden of his house.

In the second case, on 4 July, a representative of the local community in Zaitseve told the SMM that on 15 June a woman (in her eighties) had sustained injuries outside her house during shelling. On the same day, the woman’s daughter told the Mission by telephone that her mother (in her eighties) had been injured outside her house on Brusylova Street in Zaitseve during shelling on the evening of 15 June and had been subsequently taken to no. 2 hospital in Horlivka. On 27 August, medical staff at hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the SMM that the above-mentioned woman had been admitted on 15 June with multiple shrapnel wounds on her face, right shoulder, right thigh and left shin.

In the third case, on 27 August, medical staff at hospital no. 2 in Horlivka told the SMM that a man (in his forties) had been admitted on 13 May with a fractured right shoulder. A neighbour of the injured man told the SMM that on 13 May he had seen the man and his family entering the basement of their house on Polosukhina Street in the north-western part of Horlivka during shelling, when a shell had hit the western side of the roof, parts of which had subsequently fallen on the man causing injuries. On the site of the incident, the Mission saw that the front part of the house was damaged.

In the last two months, medical staff at hospital no. 2 in Horlivka repeatedly refused to share information with the SMM.

The SMM observed fresh damage to a civilian property in a residential area of Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). At 101 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a 30-cm hole in a brick wall on the west-facing corner of a one-storey house. The SMM assessed the fire to have come from a westerly direction but it was unable to determine the type of weapon. A man who introduced himself as a neighbour told the Mission that there was shelling in the area on the evening of 24 August. (See also SMM Daily Report 27 August 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 25 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three men in military-style clothing inside the Zolote disengagement area, about 160m from its southern edge and 780m from its eastern edge. On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a new position and a 15m-long trench system west of road T1316 inside the disengagement area, about 1km from its northern edge (not visible in imagery from 19 August 2018), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 27 August, the SMM saw newly built defensive positions surrounded by sandbags about 100m south of the bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On the road between the bridge and the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint the Mission saw for the first time four concrete road barriers spaced approximately 3m apart.

Positioned on the eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 23 August an SMM mini-UAV spotted three tanks (T-72) and three towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Manhush (111km south of Donetsk). On 25 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) and five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Verkhnokamianka (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 25 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-2) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Zaitseve, an ACV (type undetermined) and two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) as well as an ACV (type undetermined) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). On 27 August, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) in Popasna, three IFVs (BMP-2) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Vodiane.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 25 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) and four ACVs (type undetermined) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed demining-related activities. About 500m from the north edge of Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk) the Mission saw two trucks parked next to the road and, in a field, ten members of the armed formations wearing clothes with “MChS” written on them. The Mission saw that the area was fenced off by tape.

The SMM continued to follow up on the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) since 23 August (see SMM Daily Report of 27 August 2018). It saw no traffic through the checkpoint in either direction. At the checkpoint in Horlivka, across the contact line from the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the Mission saw six people (four women and two men, in their fifties and sixties) waiting for the checkpoint in Maiorsk to be re-opened. One woman told the Mission she had been coming to the checkpoint to try to cross for the last four days and one man said he needed to travel to government-controlled areas as otherwise he would lose his pension.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska as well as a water pipeline near Zolote. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and demining on the western edge of Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 12 cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates), one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates, a bus with “DPR” plates and nine pedestrians (six men and three women, age 30-50) exiting Ukraine. During the same time period, the Mission saw five cars (one with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Armenian license plates, and one with “DPR” plates), and a bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw 15 cars (seven with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, it saw 13 cars (four with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “the SMM’s security”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation in the area”. The SMM saw civilian cars passing the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka, a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed to the village of Staromykhailivka (see above) on the condition that the SMM vehicles would be escorted.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported two-day training seminar on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) concluded on 28 August 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Some 80 representatives from accounting and auditing entities, casinos and payment organizations learned about money laundering and terrorism financing typologies, best practices in identifying suspicious transactions and mitigating risks. The training seminar was conducted by representatives from the Financial Monitoring Committee and experts from Austria and Great Britain, whose participation was financed by the OSCE.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with Kazakhstan’s Financial Monitoring Committee.

The seminar is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to promote good governance and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

391724 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Twenty domestic violence care professionals from Transdniestria and Gagauzia learned how to break the cycle of abuse in a co-dependent relationship at an OSCE-supported workshop in the left-bank city of Tiraspol from 23 to 25 August 2018.

During the training session, psychologists, social workers, and shelter staff discussed causes of co-dependency in relationships, the psychological profiles of persons inclined to co-dependency, and counselling methods for dependent and abusive partners. The leader of the workshop – a family counsellor and a former shelter psychologist - used coaching techniques and role play exercises focusing on self-control and self-awareness to empower training participants better help individuals trapped in abusive relationships.

“The trainer was able to establish an open conversation and was sensitive towards the learning needs of the trainees. She taught us how to understand the feelings of one another, which is a very important technique in working with our beneficiaries,” says Olga Purakhina, Director of the NGO ”Vialex” from Ribnita, which was a co-organizer of the workshop.

This capacity-building effort built upon a series of workshops last year, when the Mission trained around 110 shelter staff from both banks, namely psychologists, social assistants, and other members of district multi-disciplinary teams from Chisinau, Comrat, Drochia, Causeni, Ribnita, and Tiraspol. The positive feedback from participants and requests for more training opportunities from other maternal centres and shelters prompted the Mission to further enlarge the number of trained specialists working to counsel victims of domestic violence across Moldova, including the left bank.

The activity falls under the Mission’s mandate and seeks to raise awareness about rights of disadvantaged and minority groups by strengthening the capacities of specialists working with such groups from the left bank and the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia.

VIENNA, 28 August 2018 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, will address the OSCE Permanent Council on Thursday, 30 August in Vienna.  In his address, Moavero Milanesi will take stock of the activities and achievements of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship during the past eight months. 

Journalists are invited to cover the speech, set to begin at 11:30 on 30 August at the Hofburg’s Neuer Saal, 2nd floor.

A press conference with Chairperson-in-Office Moavero Milanesi will take place after the PC address at 13:00 in the Hofburg’s Bibliotheksaal, 5th Floor.

Journalists wishing to attend the address and/or press conference are required to send e-mail confirming their attendance to press@osce.org, no later than 29 August at 18:00.

A video recording of the Chairperson-in-Office’s speech will be available on the OSCE website as of 31 August 2018:  https://www.osce.org/chairmanship

Italy took over the Chairmanship of the Organization from Austria on 1 January 2018.

Following the General elections of 4 March 2018 and the subsequent formation of the Government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, Enzo Moavero Milanesi was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on 1 June 2018. 

Updates and the latest news from the Italian Chairmanship can be followed via https://www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @ItalyatOSCE.

The OSCE Permanent Council is a decision-making body gathering representatives of all 57 participating States of the Organization and 11 Partners for Co-operation. It convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions.

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SARAJEVO, 28 August 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened an election observation mission for the 7 October general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mission’s deployment follows an official invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Peter Tejler and consists of a core team of 12 election experts, based in Sarajevo, and 22 long-term observers to be deployed in teams of two across the country. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 300 short-term observers to monitor proceedings on election day.

The mission will observe the elections for their compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor the voter registration process, campaign activities, the work of the election administration and relevant governmental bodies, election-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of election-related disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state and entity authorities, of the election administration and political parties, as well as with individual candidates. It will also meet with representatives of civil society, the media and the international community.

On election day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results. For election day, the ODIHR election observation mission will join efforts with delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

A statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued on the day after the elections. A final report on the observation of the entire electoral process will be published approximately two months after the completion of the electoral process.

The ODIHR Election Observation Mission and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina operate separately under their respective mandates.

For further information please visit https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/389537 or contact Kira Kalinina, Media Analyst of the EOM, on +387 671 301 035 (mobile) or at kira.kalinina@odihr.ba

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, on + 48 609 522 266 (mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported training seminar on improving efficiency and combating corruption in public procurement concluded on 28 August in Astana.

The two-day event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anticorruption (ACA) and the Academy of Public Administration.

The event brought together some 50 representatives of the ACA and municipal administrations. Participants explored best practices in developing transparency mechanisms and in identifying corruption risks in public procurement. The seminar addressed topics such as developing terms of reference for bids, applying public procurement techniques, the distribution of authority among agencies and addressing fraud risks. It was conducted by an expert from the Russian Federation, whose participation in the seminar was made possible through OSCE financial support. The presentations were complemented by practical assignments during which participants attempted to identify corruption risks and offered proposals to improve the process.

The event is part of the multi-year efforts of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana to promote good governance by focusing on anti-corruption activities in Kazakhstan.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 25 and 26 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM followed up on a civilian casualty in Vrubivka. The Mission saw fresh damage caused by shelling to civilian properties in residential areas of Vrubivka and Staromykhailivka. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as in Marinka, Zaichenko, Yasne and close to Novoazovsk, Izvaryne and Voznesenivka near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk remained closed. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Zolote, repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka, as well as demining in Berezove.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 240 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). Between the evenings of 25 and 26 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 24-25 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions and 47 projectiles in flight, all 0.8-2.5km south, south-south-east and south-south-west. On the evening and night of 25-26 August, the same camera recorded 13 undetermined explosions and 51 projectiles in flight, all 1-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

On the evening of 24 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 17 undetermined explosions, 67 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

On the evening and night of 24-25 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 47 undetermined explosions and about 120 projectiles in flight, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north to south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), recorded two undetermined explosions, 49 projectiles in flight and two illuminations flares, all 1-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 24 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km south-east and south-south-east. On the evening of 25 August, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and about 120 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-6km south-east.

During the day on 25 August, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions and about 110 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km at directions ranging from east to south.

During the day on 25 August, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions and about 70 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-3km south-west and west.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 24 and 25 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions). Between the evenings of 25 and 26 August, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about ten explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 25 August, medical staff at a morgue in Lysychansk (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that the body of a man (aged 35), a resident of Vrubivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk), had been brought to the morgue on the morning of 24 August. Medical staff added that the man had died on the morning of 24 August due to wounds to his lower abdomen and severe damage to internal organs following a blast. Medical staff also told the SMM that relatives of the deceased had recounted that the man had sustained his wounds during shelling while he had been at his house at 2/1 Shkilna Street in Vrubivka and had died in an ambulance while on the way to a hospital. In Vrubivka, a representative of the local administration told the SMM that the man had died during shelling, which had occurred in the area on the morning of 24 August. (See impact site section below.) 

The SMM followed up on reports of fresh damage caused by shelling to civilian properties in residential areas of Vrubivka and Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk). On 24 August, at 2/1 Shkilna Street in Vrubivka (see above), the SMM saw fresh damage to the roof of a one-storey house, which had collapsed, and that four south-western-facing windows had been shattered. The SMM could not assess the calibre of the weapon used or the direction of fire. A resident of 14/1 Shkilna Street told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the area at around 05:00 on 24 August.

In a field about 10m north-east of the house at 2/1 Shkilna Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction. At 5 Shkilna Street, about 15m west-south-west of the aforementioned crater, the SMM saw two shattered north-facing windows and fresh shrapnel damage to the west-facing outer wall of a two-storey residential house. The SMM could not assess the calibre of the weapon used or the direction of fire.  

At 7 Shkilna Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the tarmac about 15m north-east of a two-storey residential house, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM also saw fresh shrapnel damage to the south-western-facing outer wall of the aforementioned house and 12 shattered south-facing windows. 

The SMM saw a military compound about 1km south of the aforementioned impact sites in Vrubivka.

On 24 August an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted fresh damage to a residential house with a destroyed roof and chimney, assessed as caused by the impact of an artillery (probable 152mm) round, in Vrubivka, the same area where the SMM saw fresh impact sites (see above). 

On 26 August, in Staromykhailivka, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a yard about 20m west of a church at 7 Kalinina Street and 4m south of a one-storey building adjacent to the church. The SMM saw fresh holes in the west-facing outer wall of the church. It also saw that three south-facing windows of the one-storey building had been shattered and that a south-facing door of the same building had sustained fresh shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a projectile of an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) fired from a south-westerly direction.

At 29 Lenina Street in Staromykhailivka, the SMM saw that three south-facing windows of a one-storey house had been shattered. It also saw fresh shrapnel damage to the furniture inside the house. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a projectile of an IFV (BMP-2) fired from a south-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 24-25 August, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east and south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 25 August, positioned inside the disengagement area south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and a shot of small-arms fire 300-500m south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 25-26 August, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire 2km south-east and an undetermined explosion 5km south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 25 August, positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

During the day on 26 August, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 26 August, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In two sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 11 towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm). It also noted that six towed howitzers (one 2A65 and five D-30), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and four MLRS (BM-21) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 24 August an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two APCs (BTR-80) near Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Pavlopil (84km south of Donetsk). On 26 August, the SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 August an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) and 11 APCs (MT-LB) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Staromykhailivka.

The SMM observed fresh craters. On 24 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about 40 craters, about 20 of which appeared to be fresh, assessed as caused by mortar (82mm and 120mm) and artillery (122mm and 152mm) rounds on Marshala Konieva Street, in a residential area on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 August an SMM long-range UAV spotted a residential house on fire on Lohozinskoho Street in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) and a fire in a multi-storey apartment building on Stratonativ Street, adjacent to a heavily damaged industrial area in the north-western outskirts of Donetsk city. (See SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2018.)

The SMM observed the presence of mines and mine hazard signs. On 25 August, the SMM saw for the first time an anti-tank mine (TM-62) near the southern edge of a road leading from the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) to a checkpoint 700m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

On 26 August, the SMM saw for the first time a square mine hazard sign near a road on the south-eastern edge of Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the freedom of movement of civilians. The SMM followed up on the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk since 23 August (see SMM Daily Report of 25 August 2018). On 25 and 26 August, the SMM saw no traffic in either direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer to the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the entry-exit checkpoint would temporarily remain closed due to recent shelling.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and near Zolote. The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka and again demining to a 100-square-metre area on the western edge of Berezove.

The SMM visited four border areas not under government control. On 25 August, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 73 cars (26 with Ukrainian, 29 with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), 14 covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw nine cars (one with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates), eight covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and three tank trucks with “DPR” plates and a bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine.

On 25 August, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no traffic in either direction.

On 26 August, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52 km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw 55 cars (13 with Ukrainian, 37 with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian license plates, as well as three with “LPR” plates), 16 covered cargo trucks (13 with Ukrainian license plates and three with “LPR” plates), and 22 pedestrians (11 men and 11 women, aged 40-50) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw a bus with “LPR” plates and a group of children on board entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On 26 August, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw 32 cars (16 with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian license plates and one with “LPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian license plates, and eight pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM observed ten pedestrians (eight men and two women, aged 30-40) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 and 26 August, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “orders not to allow the SMM passage”.
• On 25 August, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• On 25 August, on road H15 near the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka, a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that it could not conduct a UAV flight over the area, citing that “his superiors had not received notification about the work of the SMM or UAV flights in the area.”
• On 26 August, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a street in Yasne, citing “orders from his superiors”.
• On 26 August, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing “orders from his superiors”. 
• On 26 August, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing “orders from his superiors”. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 25 and 26 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[4]
• On 25 and 26 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.5
• On 25 and 26 August, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed to the village on the condition that the SMM vehicles followed behind his car.

Other impediments:

On 25 August, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini UAV flying over an area near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. The SMM landed the UAV safely.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position. 

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391652 Kunduz Rysbek

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek staff members have undergone a rigorous gender training course conducted by the Kyrgyzstani non-governmental organization Women Support Center, from 19 to 24 August 2018 in Bishkek.

Women Support Center is one of Kyrgyzstan’s leading non-governmental organizations, founded in 1996 by Rozetta Aitmatova, a pioneering gender equality activist in the country.

The Gender School, held for 30 staff members, focused on the gender equality movement and issues in Kyrgyzstan, as well as on the mechanisms to better gender mainstream within the Office’s projects and activities.

The topics covered included: gender stereotypes, gender statistics, gender budgeting, women’s political participation, women’s economic empowerment, gender-based violence, results-oriented management of projects, gender analysis and indicators, Kyrgyzstan’s national action plans in the gender sphere, the study of international documents that support gender equality such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNSC resolution 1325 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 

“The Gender School allowed me to profoundly reflect upon the state of gender equality in Kyrgyzstan and helped me to overlay a gender lens across any action I will undertake in the future,” said Kunduz Rysbek, Programme Office Gender Focal Point and National Press and Public Information Officer.

Rimma Sultanova, Gender School Director, said: “Gender roles are very different in Kyrgyzstan and our course aimed at helping the OSCE staff get a deeper understanding of the root causes of these roles, how they affect our institutions and the outcomes of both these institutions and the social constructions they are built upon.”

The Gender School was initiated by Head of Mission Pierre von Arx and is a part of a larger capacity building program for the Programme Office staff.  

VIENNA, 27 August 2018 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Italy’s Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero Milanesi, will address the OSCE Permanent Council on Thursday, 30 August in Vienna.

In his address, the Chairperson-in-Office will take stock of the activities and achievements of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship Chairmanship during the past eight months. 

Journalists are invited to cover the speech set to begin at 11:30 on 30 August at the Hofburg’s Neuer Saal, 2nd floor.

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send e-mail confirming their attendance to press@osce.org, no later than 29 August at 18:00.

The speech will be available on the OSCE website as of 31 August 2018:  https://www.osce.org/chairmanship

Italy took over the Chairmanship of the Organization from Austria on 1 January 2018.

Following the General elections of 4 March 2018 and the subsequent formation of the Government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, Enzo Moavero Milanesi was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on 1 June 2018. 

Updates and the latest news from the Italian Chairmanship can be followed via https://www.osce.org/cio and the Twitter account @ItalyatOSCE.

The OSCE Permanent Council is a decision-making body gathering representatives of all 57 participating States of the Organization and 11 Partners for Co-operation. It convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions.

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SKOPJE, 27 August 2018 – The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) today formally opened a referendum observation mission (ROM) for the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mission’s deployment follows an invitation from the country’s authorities.

The mission is led by Ambassador Jan Petersen and consists of a core team of 13 experts based in Skopje and 20 long-term observers, who will be deployed throughout the country in multinational teams of two from 5 September. In addition, ODIHR will request that OSCE participating States provide 250 short-term observers, who will arrive several days before the referendum.

The mission will assess the referendum for its compliance with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards, as well as with national legislation. Observers will closely monitor voter registration, campaign activities, the work of the referendum administration and relevant government bodies, referendum-related legislation and its implementation, and the resolution of referendum-related disputes. As part of the observation, the mission will also monitor the media coverage of the campaign.

In the course of its observation, the mission will meet with representatives of state authorities, political parties, civil society, the media and the international community.

On referendum day, observers will monitor the opening of polling stations, voting, the counting of ballots and the tabulation of results.

The mission will publish an interim report in the course of its work. The day after the referendum, a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions will be issued at a press conference. ODIHR will issue a final report on the observation approximately two months after the end of the referendum process.

The ODIHR referendum observation mission and the OSCE Mission to Skopje operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

For further information, please visit www.osce.org/odihr/elections/fyrom/390806 or contact Marek Mracka, Media Analyst, at + 389 72 443 647 (Skopje mobile), or at marek.mracka@odihr.mk

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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VIENNA, 27 August 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir and Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Bruce G. Berton strongly condemned the severe beating of journalist Vladimir Kovačević that took place in Banja Luka, BiH, on the evening of 26 August.

“I strongly condemn the brutal assault against journalist Kovačević. The negative rhetoric being used against the media must end, in order to prevent further such attacks against journalists. I urge the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to swiftly investigate this attack and bring its perpetrators to justice,” Désir said.

Vladimir Kovačević, a journalist from BN TV, was attacked and beaten by two unknown assailants. The journalist sustained several injuries, for which he was then hospitalized. The attack was reported to the police and an investigation has been launched.

„The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has spoken often about the negative rhetoric and atmosphere in BiH, especially in an election year, which creates unfavorable conditions for journalists to perform their crucial function, as evidenced by this series of recent attacks,” said Berton. “We call for the authorities to ensure that journalists enjoy safe working conditions. They must be able to do their job in an environment free of intimidation and threats, either verbal or physical,” he added.

“It is of the utmost importance that the authorities increase their efforts to ensure the safety of journalists,” Representative Désir said. “Any attack on the media is an attack on democratic values as well as citizens’ right to be informed.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission saw fresh damage caused by small-arms fire to the administration office at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and Shchastia, as well as again in Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Zhelanne Druhe. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and demining in Berezove. The SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day in several locations, which took place without incidents.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 70), compared with the previous reporting period (about 55 explosions).

On the evening and night of 23-24 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 60 projectiles in flight and an illumination flare, all 0.5-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 20 undetermined explosions, 75 projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km north, north-north-east and north-east.

On the evening of 23 August, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded six undetermined explosions and about 55 projectiles in flight, all 1-2km east-south-east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 24 August, positioned in Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 12 explosions (six assessed as outgoing and six assessed as impacts) and six bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-5km east.

Positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and 15 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km at directions ranging from south to west-north-west. Positioned at the same location, the SMM heard over an hour of uncountable shots of small-arms fire 2km south-east, assessed as live-fire training within the security zone, in breach of the 3 March 2016 Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on the full cessation of live-fire exercises.

Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 21 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-east, assessed as live-fire training within the security zone, in breach of the 3 March 2016 Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on the full cessation of live-fire exercises.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (at least 510 explosions).

During the day on 24 August, positioned 4km south-west of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 23 explosions (six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and the remainder undetermined) and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-east. On the same day, positioned in Muratove, the SMM heard 18 explosions (four assessed as impacts of artillery rounds and the remainder undetermined), all 3-5km south-south-east.

The SMM saw fresh damage to the administration office at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM saw a bullet hole in the south-facing window of the administration office, assessed to have been caused by small-arms fired from a southerly direction. A member of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service told the SMM that the damage had occurred at 15:45 on 23 August (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018). The SMM noted that the checkpoint had not been opened on the morning of 24 August and did not observe any civilians queueing during the day.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 23 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 1-1.5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 24 August, positioned in Zolote, the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, the SMM again saw a man in military-attire with a machine gun, assessed as a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, near the bridge inside the Zolote disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed eight self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) and noted that eight towed howitzers (2A35 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), anti-aircraft guns[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled-areas, on 23 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) and a probable self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), two ACVs (type undetermined) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), an APC (BTR variant) and nine IFVs (five BMP-1, two BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Dacha (53km north of Donetsk) and four IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

On 23 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a series of fires over an approximately 180m stretch of land about 3km north-east of Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk). On 17 August, an SMM long-range UAV had spotted at least 16 houses engulfed in fire in an eastern part of Zholobok (see SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 23 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) near Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mines. On 23 August, the SMM saw, for the first time, two anti-tank mines on road M04 at a newly constructed checkpoint, about 2km north-east of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to a water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and demining to a 100-square-metre area on the western edge of Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. At the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka, a group of about 150 people (mostly women, aged 50-70) stood in front of an SMM vehicle and prevented it from passing. They told the SMM that they had been waiting for over two hours in the heat due to the absence of a public bus that was supposed to come from a checkpoint on road H-15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). About ten minutes later, the SMM was able to proceed. At the checkpoint east of Kreminets, the SMM noted a large number of vehicles in a queue towards government-controlled areas. Two members of the armed formations told the SMM that the number of vehicles was unusually high due to the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (see above).

On 23 and 24 August, the SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day and Ukrainian Independence Day (see SMM Daily Report 24 August 2018) in Chernivtsi, Dnipro, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kramatorsk, Lviv, Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Pokrovsk (55km north-west of Donetsk), Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk) and Zaporizhzhia; the SMM observed no incidents during the events which gathered, on average, between 200 and 3,000 people. In Kyiv, the SMM saw at least 15,000 people gathered. The SMM also monitored a gathering of at least 2,000 people in Kharkiv marking the liberation of the city in August 1943.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “orders not to allow the SMM passage”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. It heard at least 500 explosions assessed as both outgoing artillery rounds and impacts thereof 4-15km north-east of Kadiivka. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and it was again restricted in Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region on both sides of the contact line, and of residential houses in Avdiivka. In Kherson, the SMM monitored an appeal court hearing on an acid attack case during which the court acquitted a suspect. In Kyiv, Lviv and Chernivtsi, the SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including a similar number of explosions (about 55), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions).

On the evening and night of 22-23 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded about 110 projectiles in flight, the majority from south to north, 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east. At around 15:45 on 23 August, the camera recorded checkpoint personnel appearing to be taking cover. On the afternoon on 23 August, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk had been closed and would also remain closed on 24 August.

During the day on 23 August, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts, and heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 260 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north. About 140 of the above-mentioned shots and bursts and a total of 12 minutes of uncountable overlapping shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south were assessed as live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

On the same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 55 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including at least 510 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (70 explosions).

On the morning of 23 August, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at least 500 explosions assessed as both outgoing artillery rounds and impacts thereof, 4-15km east-north-east. It also heard 15 bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire 14-16km east-north-east. The SMM repeatedly engaged with the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC and the armed formations to facilitate a ceasefire. Despite the SMM’s dialogue facilitation, the firing lasted for about three hours.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 22 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 0.5-1km south-east assessed as outside the disengagement area, as well as an undetermined explosion and about 55 projectiles in flight, all 1-5km south-east and south-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 23 August, the SMM saw a man with a machine gun, assessed as a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, near the bridge inside the Zolote disengagement area.

On the same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area and inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 22 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 1km west of Shumy (41km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled-area, on 23 August, the SMM saw a tank (T-80) on the western outskirts of Mariupol city (102km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Teple (formerly Krasnodon, 33km south-east of Luhansk) and, on 23 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six tanks (T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). The same UAV spotted 24 tanks (12 T-72 and 12 T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), ten towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), ten mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area the UAV also spotted about 75 armoured combat vehicles[3]). (See also: SMM Daily Report 23 August 2018).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled-areas, on 22 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a combat engineering vehicle (BAT-2) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) in a compound in southern parts of Luhansk city and an IFV (BMP variant) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). On 23 August, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted atop a military truck east of Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Luhansk city.

On 22 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) west of Shumy as well as an APC (BTR variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) north of Shumy (see also: SMM Daily Report 23 August 2018).

The SMM observed fresh craters. On 22 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted about ten fresh craters, assessed to have been caused by 82mm mortar rounds, on the north-western edge of Maiorsk, about 150m from the nearest residential property. The same UAV also spotted about 12 fresh craters, assessed to have been caused by 82mm mortar rounds on the eastern edge of Shumy, as well as 12 fresh craters, assessed to have been caused by 82mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds, on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed demining-related activities. In a field on the northern edge of Nikishyne (non-government-controlled, 60km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed five members of the armed formations with metal detectors. In the field, the SMM saw that one object was marked as unexploded ordnance (UXO).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska as well as the installation of a new segment of a water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka.

In Luhansk city, the SMM saw a convoy of 11 vehicles with Russian Federation licence plates, including seven covered cargo trucks (two dark blue, one black, one metallic and the remainder white) with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” in Cyrillic written on them, two technical support trucks, one minibus and one car driving into a compound at 1 Rudnieva Street. The convoy was followed by ten cars with “LPR” plates. At the compound’s gate, the Mission saw two armed members of the armed formations and, inside the compound, it saw ten pallets (1x1m) of blue boxes being unloaded from the trucks by two men in civilian clothing and carried into a warehouse.

The SMM followed up on reports of the detained Mekhanik Pogodin tanker moored in a port in the south-western outskirts of Kherson city. (See SMM Daily Report 20 August 2018.) At dock no. 4 of the oil terminal on Marii Fortus Street, the SMM saw that the tanker remained moored and that the area was secured by armed Ukrainian State Border Guard Service personnel. A man who introduced himself as the captain of the tanker, together with three male crew members, told the SMM that their vessel had been held at the dock since 10 August 2018.

Also in Kherson, the SMM monitored an appeal court hearing against a pre-trial detention order of one of the suspects in an acid attack on a city council official (see also: SMM Daily Report 7 August 2018). The court ruled to rescind the order on pre-trial detention and acquitted the suspect of the charges pressed under Article 115 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

On 23 August, the SMM monitored gatherings on the occasion of National Flag Day. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a flag hoisting ceremony in front of the Kyiv City Hall (36 Khreshchatyk Street) where it saw around 300 people (men and women, mixed ages). It also monitored similar events in Lviv and Chernivtsi. At all events the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Dnipro.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, nongovernment-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “lack of orders allowing the SMM passage”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (nongovernment-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, saying that “an operation was ongoing in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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SKOPJE, 24 August 2018 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the referendum observation mission deployed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 30 September referendum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the mission will hold a press conference in Skopje on Monday.

Ambassador Jan Petersen, Head of the ODIHR referendum observation mission, will introduce the role of the mission and its upcoming activities. The mission's deployment follows an invitation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The ODIHR referendum observation mission and the OSCE Mission to Skopje operate separately and independently under their own mandates.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 27 August, in Congress Hall 2 of the Aleksandar Palace Hotel, at Prohor Pcinjski, Skopje 1000.

For further information, please contact Marek Mracka, Media Analyst with the referendum observation mission, at +389 72 443647 or at Marek.Mracka@odihr.mk,  

or

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile), or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

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391559 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Thomas Rymer

Approaches to integrating human rights issues into the education system in Belarus was the focus of a workshop for Belarusian experts in educational policy development and planning, which took place in Minsk from 22 to 24 August 2018.

The workshop was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Belarusian Ministry of Education. It involved 15 participants, 11 women and 4 men. The workshop was based on the Curriculum Development and Review for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education toolkit, published jointly by ODIHR, UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States.

“This workshop is a stepping stone in our efforts to assist Belarus in integrating quality human rights education in the national education system in line with international standards and good practices,” said Marc van Gool, Human Rights Adviser at ODIHR. “Using their improved skills, ODIHR will work with the participants to review and develop educational planning documents and teaching curricula in the months to come.”

“The workshop was very practical. We now have a better understanding of how we can develop and improve programmes and methods for educating our citizens about human rights,” said Liudmila Kozhuhovskaya from the National Institute for Higher Education.

The workshop is part of the ODIHR project Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus, which is funded by the European Union. The project was launched in June 2018 to assist Belarus in meeting its OSCE commitments in the areas of the rule of law, human rights and the equal participation of women in democratic processes.

391535 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

From 9 to 24 August 2018, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe conducted three workshops aimed at enhancing communication between police and the general public and media. The workshops were held in Romit, Guliston and Nurek districts of Tajikistan.

40 mid- to senior-level officials from Tajikistan’s interior ministry and 30 journalists attended the workshops, which focused on different aspects of police community relations including how to organize the work of press-centres and communication with the mass media. Participants were familiarized with the role of social media in the context of community policing and with effective ways of conducting informative and transparent press-conferences by law enforcement agencies.

The participants also reviewed national and international legal frameworks related to mass media activities and gained further understanding about the importance of interaction between law enforcement agencies and the mass media.

Aleksandr Shikhanov, a trainer from the Russian Federation, said: “The workshop participants are highly motivated professionals who are interested in the mass media practices used in OSCE countries. They expressed their willingness to learn modern methods and techniques to interact with mass media and the public, in full compliance with international standards and approaches.” 

“Learning about worldwide practices and studying international standards will now help the participants to improve their professional skills,” said Shahlo Akobirova, a trainer from Tajikistan. “They will apply the obtained knowledge in their day-to-day activities and share their experience with colleagues in the respective agencies.”

391475 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Fifty seven teachers from vocational schools throughout Moldova successfully completed a training-of-trainers workshop on gender equality organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The event was organized in partnership with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Research and the NGO “Gender-Centru” from 21 to 24 August, 2018 in Chisinau. The aim of the training was to improve the teachers’ skills in promoting gender equality and contribute to enlarging the pool of teachers able to challenge gender stereotypes and create a gender-sensitive educational environment. 

“Teachers impart a great deal of values and knowledge to students and contribute to developing their potential and skills. Therefore, gender mainstreaming should begin at school,” said Valentina Bodrug-Lungu, a leading gender expert and a professor at Moldova State University. 

During the two-day workshop, teachers learned new tools for integrating gender equality and concepts of non-discrimination into curricula and how to debunk gender stereotypes in the field of education. They also discussed guidelines on gender equality, which were developed by local experts and tested during the training. 

“This   workshop offers a unique opportunity to learn new gender-sensitive teaching methods and exchange best practices with our peers. I am proud to be part of a select group of vocational school teachers who will work with vulnerable youths in the remote regions of the country upon completion of this course,” said Valentina Albu, a teacher from the Vocational School in Ceadir-Lunga.

These capacity-building efforts are demand-based and prompted by positive feedback received during last year’s training sessions on gender mainstreaming. The sessions aimed to consolidate a national platform of teachers from vocational schools throughout the country able to promote gender equality among vocational training students from both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River. It is also part of the Mission’s confidence-building measures targeting professional communities on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River.