Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Carlos Malamud y Rogelio Núñez. ARI 6/2020 - 24/1/2020

Electoralmente hablando, 2020 no va a ser un año intrascendente en América Latina. Esto en una región que vive bajo la incertidumbre y la desafección política, la parálisis económica y un creciente malestar y movilización social.

International wird eine breite Debatte darüber geführt, ob die gezielte Tötung des iranischen Generals Qasem Soleimani durch eine US-Drohne völkerrechtlich zulässig war. Dabei hat die Trump-Administration bislang kaum Anstrengungen unternommen, diese Operation juristisch plausibel zu begründen. Daran zeigt sich einmal mehr, dass völkerrechtliche Erwägungen für Präsident Donald Trump selbst bei derart wichtigen Entscheidungen keine Rolle spielen. Staaten, die wie Deutschland für eine starke regel­basierte internationale Ordnung eintreten, sollten sich daher umso mehr darum bemühen, dem Völkerrecht Geltung zu verschaffen. Dazu gehört auch, Zweifel an der Rechtmäßigkeit solcher Aktionen gegenüber den Verantwortlichen klar zu benennen, auch wenn es dadurch zu politischen Unstimmigkeiten kommt.

 

An immediate backlash followed the interview that Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu gave to the German newspaper Bild the day before German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Turkey on 24 January to discuss the future of the EU-Turkey Statement as well as the situations in Libya and Syria. At the core of the controversy was Cavusoglu’s criticism against the EU for not keeping its promises in the context of the EU-Turkey Statement: incomplete financial aid, no progress in the modernisation of the Customs Union, and not opening new chapters in the accession negotiations. “Already only for these reasons”, Cavusoglu noted, “Turkey could have opened the borders. We have the right to do this, but we have not done it.”

For Ankara, threats to open the borders have increasingly become a not-so-uncommon diplomatic practice that has led to public anxiety in Germany. The important question here is, however, not whether Ankara would halt the Statement or not. The signals that it is sending to the EU are clear: Ankara wants to keep the cooperation over migration and border security intact. From the perspective of the ruling elites in Ankara, this makes sense for a couple of reasons. First and foremost, Turkey needs the financial and logistical support of the EU to continue improving its capacity for the social and economic participation of refugees into Turkish society. Turkey currently is hosting around 3.5 million Syrian refugees and approximately 600,000 non-Syrian refugees – the largest number of refugees compared to any country in the world. Most are likely to stay, not only because Syria remains in conflict, but also because the decision to return becomes more difficult once children start going to school.

Turkey–EU partnership: Transactionalism

Second, the EU-Turkey Statement is one of the only remaining instruments for Turkey (and also Europe) to continue its partnership. The importance of the Statement has arguably become even greater, especially since the EU’s General Affairs Council decided in June 2018 that accession negotiations with Turkey were effectively frozen. Despite the common perception abroad about Turkey’s increasing level of de-Westernisation, according to a recent survey conducted by Kadir Has University, 51 per cent of those who were surveyed stated that they supported EU membership for Turkey. Except among the supporters of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), more than half of the AKP, CHP, HDP, and Iyi Party constituencies support Turkey’s EU membership.

Last, but not least, the refugee card as a bargaining tool is too precious for Turkey to relinquish. Given the anti-immigrant sentiments in Europe and the lack of unity among member states over a common asylum policy, the EU remains limited to externalisation policies, that is, to outsourcing migration governance to third countries. This naturally comes at the cost of prioritising transactionalism over rule-based cooperation. Turkey is aware of this. In fact, this awareness lies at the core of the controversy that Ankara deliberately created prior to its bilateral and multilateral meetings with European leaders – in an effort to get the most out of the negotiations. The controversy about the transfer of EU funds should also be interpreted in this context. Part of this controversy stems from disagreements over how and when the payments are made. The EU transfers funds on a project basis and in phases. Projects that are contracted as part of the first €3 billion will be complete by 2021, and those that are contracted as part of the second €3 billion will be done by 2025. By the end of 2019, both tranches had been combined, all operational funds were committed, €4.7 billion was contracted, and more than €3.2 billion was disbursed.

Modernisation of the Customs Union: A chance for re-emphasising issues of rule of law?

Given these factors, it is in Ankara’s interest to continue the EU-Turkey cooperation over migration management and border security. The situation seems to be not so different for the EU either, especially because the member states are still divided about common asylum policy and responsibility-sharing. In the likely continuation of the Statement, however, the EU should implement political conditionality on firmer grounds. Two issues are important. The first is that the EU should remind Turkey that the continuation of the Statement is dependent on Turkey’s commitment to the non-refoulement principle under international law. To this end, the EU should consider taking an active role in supporting cooperation with UNHCR and human rights organisations in monitoring the deportation allegations against Turkey. The second is that the EU should also consider the possibility that a stronger emphasis in a renewed Statement on the modernisation of the Customs Union might be an effective instrument to closely link the implementation of the Statement to issues of rule of law.

Si vous êtes un fanatique de photographie, il est préférable de disposer de votre studio photo à domicile. Cela vous permettra de réaliser vos photos à tout moment et à toute heure.

Il faut savoir que contrairement à ce que vous pouvez penser, l’installation de votre studio photo n’est en rien complexe. Il vous suffit de disposer des matériels nécessaires et de suivre les différentes étapes. Découvrez ces dernières !

Étape 1 : le choix de la bonne salle

La première des choses, lorsque vous voulez installer un studio photo maison, est de prévoir une pièce adaptée. Ainsi, il vous faut opter pour une salle offrant une bonne exposition à la lumière.

L’idéal serait de disposer d’une pièce présentant une baie vitrée. Toutefois, cela n’est pas toujours évident de trouver des pièces avec une disposition de ce genre. A défaut donc, la pièce d’installation devra laisser passer assez de lumière, afin d’optimiser vos photographies.

Dans le cas où vous n’auriez pas accès à ce type de pièce, vous pouvez choisir n’importe quelle pièce. Il vous faudra dans ce cas de figure, corriger cela avec l’acquisition d’un ring light.

Étape 2 : le choix du matériel adéquat

Comme cela est le cas pour toute chose, il est impératif de disposer d’un matériel de qualité pour obtenir de meilleurs résultats. Il en est de même pour vos photographies. Ainsi, au nombre du matériel dont vous aurez besoin, figurent ceux-ci :

• Un fond
• Un support pour le fond
• Un appareil photo
• Des flashs ou à défaut, une lumière continue

Il va de soi que pour obtenir une meilleure qualité de photo, il vous faudra vous procurer d’autres matériels supplémentaires. Il s’agit entre autres des parapluies, des cages de lumières ou encore des réflecteurs que vous pouvez pliés au besoin. Cependant, les matériels cités sont suffisants pour débuter.

À savoir : Mémoire – Prendre trop de photos efface les souvenirs.

Étape 3 : L’installation de vos matériels

Il vous faut commencer l’installation de vos matériels par le support de fond. Ensuite, passez à l’installation de la toile. Pour cela, il vous suffit de le placer avec des pinces en faisant en sorte qu’il n’y ait pas de plis. En effet, mal positionnés, les plis de votre toile pourraient se voir sur vos photographies.

Lire aussi : Les différents types de cuit œufs.

Il vous faut courber légèrement votre toile au niveau de sangles tout en évitant que cette dernière ne soit trop tendue. Il vous faudra ensuite placer vos flashs ou votre ring light dans la position, qui vous convient le mieux. Vous pouvez aussi installer un support à chacun de ces niveaux pour disposer d’une exposition idéale. Enfin, placez votre appareil photo sur le support ou gardez-le dans vos mains. Vous pouvez dès à présent faire de bonnes photos.

Étape 4 : La prévision des accessoires

Pour des séances de photos réussies, il vous faut disposer de divers accessoires. Vous devez disposer d’un tabouret pour vos modèles et des accessoires comme des fleurs, des ballons, des tables, des draps pour les photos en été. Il faut savoir que vous pouvez déterminer les accessoires dont vous aurez besoin en fonction du type de shootings que vous souhaitez faire.

L’article Comment installer un studio photo maison ? est apparu en premier sur RMES.

Le 22 janvier 2019, la Chancelière Angela Merkel et le Président Emmanuel Macron signaient à Aix-la-Chapelle un "traité de coopération et d’intégration franco-allemand". Un an plus tard, l’Institut Montaigne a reçu à Paris Franziska Brantner, Députée au Bundestag, porte parole pour l’Europe des Verts allemands. Alors que les Verts apparaissent comme la force montante de la vie politique allemande,le point sur leur vision de l’Allemagne et sur la fragilité d’une…

Si la question des réfugiés a largement dominé le débat européen ces dernières années, la réalité des flux migratoires qui se développent à l’intérieur de l’Europe reste largement méconnue. Ces derniers temps, de nombreuses voix se sont cependant élevées pour dénoncer les conséquences de l’…

Die heutige Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) und die getroffenen geldpolitischen Beschlüsse kommentiert DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher wie folgt:

Die EZB setzt mit dieser Entscheidung ihren stabilitätsorientierten Kurs fort. Zudem erweist sich die in Deutschland stark kritisierte Entscheidung für eine weitere geldpolitische Lockerung vom September als Erfolg. Nicht nur die Fortsetzung des Anleihenkaufprogramms, sondern auch der gestaffelte Einlagezins haben einen Beitrag zu einer Verbesserung der Kreditvergabe und der Preisstabilität geleistet. Damit werden einige der Einwände der Kritiker widerlegt. Es ist jedoch zu früh für eine Entwarnung. Ich erwarte, dass die EZB ihren geldpolitischen Kurs noch mindestens bis Mitte 2021 fortsetzen wird und dass auch danach die Zinsen nur langsam steigen werden. Die wirtschaftlichen Risiken bleiben hoch. Ein Handelskrieg mit den USA, geopolitische Konflikte und eine Abschwächung der Weltwirtschaft würden vor allem Deutschland hart treffen. Christine Lagarde und ihr neues Team haben einen guten Start hingelegt. Die schwierigste Herausforderung für die EZB wird es in diesem Jahr sein, nicht nur ihre Strategie zu überdenken, sondern vor allem Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Deutschland von den Vorteilen der EZB Geldpolitik zu überzeugen. Die angekündigte Überprüfung der Strategie ist sinnvoll. Die schwierigste Herausforderung hierbei wird die Kommunikation und die Frage sein, wie die EZB abweichenden Meinungen eine konstruktive Stimme verleihen kann.

Mit der Reform des Staatsbürgerschaftsrechts treibt die regierende Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) von Premierminister Modi ihre hindu-nationalistische Agenda weiter voran. Die Reform wurde notwendig, um die Defizite des Bürgerregisters des Bundes­staats Assam zu beheben und den Weg für ein landesweites Staatsbürgerregister zu ebnen. Kritiker werfen der Regierung vor, dass die Vorhaben vor allem Muslime und Musliminnen diskriminieren, einer großen Zahl von Personen den Anspruch auf die Staatsbürgerschaft entziehen könnten und Grundwerte der Verfassung unter­graben. Die beiden Maßnahmen sind auch international auf viel Kritik gestoßen, unter ande­rem aus den USA und von den Vereinten Nationen. Der indische Außenminister hat die Reformvorhaben verteidigt und auf Chinas Umgang mit innenpolitischen Pro­blemen verwiesen. Sollte Indien dauerhaft einen solchen Weg einschlagen, könnte dies auch eine Diskussion in Gang setzen, ob und inwieweit ein zunehmend hindu-nationalistisch geprägtes Indien noch als ein Wertepartner des Westens gelten kann.

Policy science has developed various approaches, such as agenda-setting and goal-setting theory, aimed at explaining the emergence of policy shifts and behavioural changes. The 2030 Agenda sets an ambitious vision for human development in times of global environmental change and makes for an interesting subject to study the explanatory power of these approaches. While the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) enshrined in the 2030 Agenda resulted from a process of intergovernmental negotiations, they will ultimately have to be implemented by national governments. Using the case of Mexico, we take the governance of water as a starting point to investigate whether the 2030 Agenda has indeed become a focusing event for sustainability transformation. Building on data from 33 expert interviews and findings of a Social Network Analysis of communications between water stakeholders from different sectors in the Cuautla River Basin, we conclude that major paradigm shifts in water governance in Mexico are thus far rather attributable to domestic focusing events and windows of opportunity than to the motivating impact of globally set goals. The Mexican case also illustrates that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is strongly dependent on political will at the highest level. Ensuring the continuity of its implementation across administrations will, therefore, require mainstreaming and anchoring the SDGs into the sectorial strategies that determine activities at the lower working level of government.

Policy science has developed various approaches, such as agenda-setting and goal-setting theory, aimed at explaining the emergence of policy shifts and behavioural changes. The 2030 Agenda sets an ambitious vision for human development in times of global environmental change and makes for an interesting subject to study the explanatory power of these approaches. While the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) enshrined in the 2030 Agenda resulted from a process of intergovernmental negotiations, they will ultimately have to be implemented by national governments. Using the case of Mexico, we take the governance of water as a starting point to investigate whether the 2030 Agenda has indeed become a focusing event for sustainability transformation. Building on data from 33 expert interviews and findings of a Social Network Analysis of communications between water stakeholders from different sectors in the Cuautla River Basin, we conclude that major paradigm shifts in water governance in Mexico are thus far rather attributable to domestic focusing events and windows of opportunity than to the motivating impact of globally set goals. The Mexican case also illustrates that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is strongly dependent on political will at the highest level. Ensuring the continuity of its implementation across administrations will, therefore, require mainstreaming and anchoring the SDGs into the sectorial strategies that determine activities at the lower working level of government.

Policy science has developed various approaches, such as agenda-setting and goal-setting theory, aimed at explaining the emergence of policy shifts and behavioural changes. The 2030 Agenda sets an ambitious vision for human development in times of global environmental change and makes for an interesting subject to study the explanatory power of these approaches. While the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) enshrined in the 2030 Agenda resulted from a process of intergovernmental negotiations, they will ultimately have to be implemented by national governments. Using the case of Mexico, we take the governance of water as a starting point to investigate whether the 2030 Agenda has indeed become a focusing event for sustainability transformation. Building on data from 33 expert interviews and findings of a Social Network Analysis of communications between water stakeholders from different sectors in the Cuautla River Basin, we conclude that major paradigm shifts in water governance in Mexico are thus far rather attributable to domestic focusing events and windows of opportunity than to the motivating impact of globally set goals. The Mexican case also illustrates that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is strongly dependent on political will at the highest level. Ensuring the continuity of its implementation across administrations will, therefore, require mainstreaming and anchoring the SDGs into the sectorial strategies that determine activities at the lower working level of government.

The negotiations for the next EU budget are in full swing. Between now and the end of 2020 the EU must come to a conclusion on how much money it seeks to spend over the next seven years. Yet, Member States, the Commission, and Parliament are still divided both on the overall spending ceilings and the funds' distribution. In this blog post we outline the biggest challenges standing in the way of a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations.

The negotiations for the next EU budget are in full swing. Between now and the end of 2020 the EU must come to a conclusion on how much money it seeks to spend over the next seven years. Yet, Member States, the Commission, and Parliament are still divided both on the overall spending ceilings and the funds' distribution. In this blog post we outline the biggest challenges standing in the way of a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations.

The negotiations for the next EU budget are in full swing. Between now and the end of 2020 the EU must come to a conclusion on how much money it seeks to spend over the next seven years. Yet, Member States, the Commission, and Parliament are still divided both on the overall spending ceilings and the funds' distribution. In this blog post we outline the biggest challenges standing in the way of a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations.

Le septième débat de la primaire démocrate, tenu dans l’Iowa, s’ouvre sur une scène étrange. Interrogé sur ses qualités de futur "Commander in Chief", Bernie Sanders met en avant sans hésiter son vote contre la guerre en Irak en 2002. Joe Biden rétorque qu’il est davantage qualifié puisque, s’il a certes voté en faveur de l’intervention américaine…

Event Video: 
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A number of European countries have deployed to United Nations missions in Africa after years of absence from the continent, and on January 21st IPI hosted a policy forum to discuss this renewed engagement and launch a policy paper on the subject. Co-sponsored by IPI, the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN, and the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, the event featured experts including the authors of the paper, Non-resident IPI Senior Adviser Arthur Boutellis, and Major General (ret.) Michael Beary, former Head of Mission and Force Commander, UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Gen. Beary introduced the subject by outlining several of the key reasons why countries like Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden— as well as Canada—had reengaged. Northern Africa and the Sahel are strategically important for Europe, he said, peacekeeping contributions are weighed heavily in bids for seats on the Security Council, and after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) drawdown in Afghanistan, NATO and the European Union (EU) members need to participate in international operations to keep their capabilities operational and funded. Of note, he added, is that individual countries pursued reengagement in different ways. “We would emphasize in our report that the return is not a monolithic bloc, and reasons for return are based on different national interests, military traditions, and historical backgrounds.”

Among the challenges for these troop-contributing countries (TCCs), he singled out the “trust deficit” among mission staff—he described it as “who controls what?­”—and compliance with the UN’s rigorous “10-1-2” medical support rule which calls for enhanced first aid within ten minutes, enhanced field care within one hour, and damage-control surgery and acute medicine within two hours.  Meeting those standards was “vital” to maintaining public support, he explained.

Going forward, Gen. Beary said that the UN planning process should allow for more input from the European TCCs and that European forces should be prepared for longer deployments that extend beyond one year. Alluding to another goal that needed to be addressed urgently, he said, “We also must meaningfully engage uniformed females in all segments of UN peacekeeping.”

Mr. Boutellis, in comments made via video, said that the European TCCs added great value to UN peacekeeping through their top-tier technology, adaptive vehicles, and the financial support they attract. “The presence of European TCCs helps keep the attention of Brussels and of the Security Council,” (on these peacekeeping missions) he added. On the down side, he noted that there were problems associated with the Europeans not accepting UN command and control, which created “trust and confidence concerns… Also, sometimes the European TCCs want to be treated differently,” he remarked. “In some missions, they refuse to paint their vehicles or aircraft white.” They may also have their own camps, dividing them away from the rest of the mission, which creates further security concerns.

He pointed out that the part of the paper that dealt with how the other TCCs viewed the European TCCs was reassuringly entitled “not so bad after all.” For example, he said, they valued the air coverage and the training capabilities that the Europeans brought and “understand the imperative to satisfy the political concerns of their capitals.” He stressed, however, that the UN had to “engage European capitals more strategically, be up front about mission expectations, and keep working to gain the trust of the European TCCs.”

Col. Richard Gray, Counsellor, Military Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN, said his country had absented itself from UN peacekeeping for eight years and that “this interlude from peacekeeping had some consequences, including a loss of capabilities for how to deploy within UN peacekeeping. We had to relearn, and thankfully, the UN system helped with that.” He asserted that its experience with NATO in Afghanistan did furnish Sweden with some fresh capabilities that helped when it participated in the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali. He credited requests from Canada and EU countries with leading to the development of better Medevac (medical evacuation) policies. “Capacity building of TCCs goes both ways,” he said, “and all TCCs can learn from each other.”

Adam Smith, Team Leader, Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell, UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), said he took heart from the title of the report Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping. “‘Sharing the burden’ encapsulates what we’re trying to do,” he said. “We’re engaging the Europeans because we realize that peacekeeping has changed, and Europeans have high capabilities which need to keep up with changing peacekeeping contexts… Much work remains to be done to educate European TCCs and Canada about what UN peacekeeping is and how it has changed.”

Madalene O’Donnell, Team Leader for Partnerships, Divisions of Policy, Evaluation, and Training, UNDPO/DPET listed five objectives that guide her office’s efforts to facilitate member states’ contributions to UN peace operations:

• Encouraging member states to establish informal coordination among themselves and to create a mechanism to enable collective action;
• Positioning these dialogues within the broader conversation about the state of the multilateral system;
• Increasing the participation of women;
• Conducting greater joint diplomacy so as to “tell a better story” about UN peacekeeping; and
• Using the “new EU mechanisms and priorities to garner better EU participation in peacekeeping.”

Closing remarks were offered by Col. Richard Decombe, Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of France to the UN, and Brian Flynn, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN.

Col. Decombe said the characteristics essential to good multilateral peacekeeping were “credibility” to attract support and funding, “solidarity” to enable European countries to work in concert with other countries, and “complementarity.” Elaborating on the last point, he said, “This is not a question of competition or making useless comparisons but making the most of how the TCCs complement each other.”  

Ambassador Flynn noted that Ireland had an “unbroken record” of 60 years of participating in UN peacekeeping. “How we can support our European partners to contribute to UN peacekeeping is something that we prioritize,” he said. “We recognize that the burden of peacekeeping has for some time not been shared evenly, and we must all be ready to step up and play our role, and we have to look at how we can help and encourage other countries to do so.”

The discussion was moderated by Jake Sherman, Director of IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.

Since 2013, after years of near absence from the continent, a number of European countries, along with Canada, have again deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The European presence in UN peacekeeping in Africa is now nearly at its largest since the mid-1990s. These countries provide much-needed high-end capabilities, as well as political and financial capital, to UN peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, securing and sustaining European contributions to these types of peacekeeping operations remains an uphill battle for the UN.

This paper draws lessons from this renewed engagement by European countries and Canada, both from their point of view, as well as from that of the UN Secretariat, UN field missions, and other troop contributors. It aims to explore how these bodies and other countries can best work together in a collective endeavor to improve UN peacekeeping’s efficiency and effectiveness. Toward this end, the paper recommends a number of actions to the UN Secretariat:

• Build peacekeeping operations around first-class medical systems;
• Focus on improving processes for casualty evacuation;
• Strengthen the UN’s capacity to foster partnerships among troop-contributing countries;
• Engage Europe strategically and politically;
• Be flexible and make European contributors (and others) feel included in planning;
• Continue educating European contributors about UN peacekeeping;
• Do not limit engagement with European contributors to high-end capabilities;
• Ensure European contributors adhere to UN standards; and
• Encourage European contributors to commit to longer deployments.

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The role of the state as an agent of earth system governance has become more complex, contingent, and interdependent. − Although participatory and collaborative processes have contributed to more effective, equitable, and legitimate environmental governance outcomes in some instances, analyses of these processes should be situated within a broader governance perspective, which recasts questions of policy change around questions of power and justice. −The complexity and normative aspects of agency in earth system governance requires new forms of policy evaluation that account for social impacts and the ability of governance systems to adapt. − Many of the core analytical concepts in ESG–Agency scholarship, such as agency, power, authority, and accountability, remain under-theorized. In addition, some types of actors, including women, labor, non-human agents, those who work against earth system governance, and many voices from the Global South, remain largely hidden. − ESG–Agency scholars need to develop research projects and collaborations in understudied regions while also recruiting and supporting scholars in those regions to engage with this research agenda.

The role of the state as an agent of earth system governance has become more complex, contingent, and interdependent. − Although participatory and collaborative processes have contributed to more effective, equitable, and legitimate environmental governance outcomes in some instances, analyses of these processes should be situated within a broader governance perspective, which recasts questions of policy change around questions of power and justice. −The complexity and normative aspects of agency in earth system governance requires new forms of policy evaluation that account for social impacts and the ability of governance systems to adapt. − Many of the core analytical concepts in ESG–Agency scholarship, such as agency, power, authority, and accountability, remain under-theorized. In addition, some types of actors, including women, labor, non-human agents, those who work against earth system governance, and many voices from the Global South, remain largely hidden. − ESG–Agency scholars need to develop research projects and collaborations in understudied regions while also recruiting and supporting scholars in those regions to engage with this research agenda.