¿Cuál es el estado de la economía cubana en tiempos del COVID-19 y qué políticas de recuperación se prevén?
Covid-19 hat die Staaten des postsowjetischen Raums in unterschiedlicher Weise getroffen, doch die Persistenz etablierter wirtschaftspolitischer Strukturen zeigt sich überall – auch dort, wo Reformen unternommen werden. Die russische Führung sieht sich durch die Krise in ihrem Kurs bestätigt und strebt keine strukturellen Reformen an. Usbekistan ist zwar weiter auf Erneuerungskurs, doch im Bestreben, krisenbedingte Verluste zu kompensieren, wird ein Rückfall in Mechanismen erkennbar, die den Reformzielen widersprechen. In der Ukraine ist die Nachhaltigkeit eines eilig umgesetzten Reformpakets gefährdet, das dem Land einen dringend benötigten IWF-Kredit verschafft hat. Georgien wiederum versucht, mit seinem bisherigen Wirtschaftsmodell durch die Krise zu steuern, obwohl Covid-19 dessen Vulnerabilität verdeutlicht hat.
Deutschlands Energiesouveränität wird durch die US-Sanktionen gegen die Gaspipeline Nord Stream 2 beschnitten. Damit rücken Fragen der strategischen Handlungsfähigkeit in der Energiepolitik in den Fokus, die bisher in Deutschland kaum diskutiert werden. Die Auseinandersetzung mit strategischen Interessen, Handlungsmaximen und Gestaltungsoptionen wird immer wichtiger angesichts der fundamentalen Umbrüche in der internationalen Politik, insbesondere der strategischen Rivalität zwischen China und den USA. Chinas Industrie- und Konnektivitätspolitik, die Rolle der USA auf den Energiemärkten und die Energietransformation verändern die globale Energielandschaft und die Machtverhältnisse rasant. Die Corona-Pandemie beschleunigt und vertieft die Trends zusätzlich. Deshalb tut es not, Fragen der Energiesouveränität in die politische Debatte darüber zu integrieren, wie eine nachhaltige und resiliente Energieversorgung ausgerichtet werden sollte. Nicht zuletzt gilt es, den Zusammenhalt in der Europäischen Union (EU) zu stärken.
Die massiven Mobilitätsbeschränkungen in der Schengen-Zone, die die EU-Staaten infolge der Corona-Pandemie verhängt haben, sollen ab Mitte Juni aufgehoben werden. Wenn in der Zeit danach keine zweite Infektionswelle ausbricht, kann unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft der Ausstieg aus allen verbliebenen Binnengrenzkontrollen gelingen. Die Reform der Schengen-Verordnung, die seit der Migrationskrise überfällig ist, kann neu angestoßen werden. Der Zusammenhang zwischen sicheren Außengrenzen und interner Freizügigkeit ist spätestens seit diesem Frühjahr neu zu bewerten. Zudem müssen gesundheitlich begründete Personenkontrollen besser abgestimmt werden. Es dürfte jedoch schwerer werden, für den kommenden EU-Pakt für Migration und Asyl einen Kompromiss zu finden. Der Zugang zu Asylverfahren ist trotz der nationalen Verantwortung für die öffentliche Gesundheit unbedingt zu gewährleisten.
Die Eindämmungsmaßnahmen im Zuge der Corona-Ausbreitung haben das Leben vieler Menschen in Deutschland grundlegend geändert. Welche Konsequenzen dies neben ökonomischen Folgen auch für die psychische Gesundheit der Bevölkerung hat, darüber wurde in den vergangenen Wochen viel spekuliert. Die ökonomische Unsicherheit, die Mehrbelastung durch Homeoffice oder Kinderbetreuung und die fehlenden sozialen Kontakte – all dies könnte zu einem wesentlichen Anstieg der psychischen Belastung in der deutschen Bevölkerung führen. Aktuelle Ergebnisse der SOEP-CoV-Studie zeigen nun, dass die Menschen hierzulande den ersten Monat des Lockdowns besser verkraftet haben als erwartet. Zwar steigt die subjektive Einsamkeit im Vergleich zu den Vorjahren erheblich an, andere Indikatoren für psychische Belastungen (Lebenszufriedenheit, emotionales Wohlbefinden und Depressions- und Angstsymptomatik) sind jedoch bisher unverändert. Dies deutet auf eine starke Resilienz der Bevölkerung hin. Einigen Bevölkerungsgruppen sollte dennoch besondere Aufmerksamkeit zuteil werden.
This paper addresses a largely overlooked actor in China’s foreign relations, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC). Using publicly available documentation, we systematically analyze the patterns of the CPC’s external relations since the early 2000s. Building on an intense travel diplomacy, the ID-CPC maintains a widely stretched network to political elites across the globe. The ID-CPC’s engagement is not new; but since Xi Jinping took office, the CPC has bolstered its efforts to reach out to other parties. We find that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China’s foreign policy interests. Since President Xi has come to power, party relations also emerged as a key instrument to promote China’s vision for reforming the global order. Moreover, China increasingly uses the party channel as a vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing experiences of its economic modernization and authoritarian one-party regime. The cross-regional analysis of the CPC’s engagement with other parties helps us to better understand the role of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy-making, pointing to a new research agenda at the intersection of China’s foreign relations, authoritarian diffusion, and transnational relations.
This paper addresses a largely overlooked actor in China’s foreign relations, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC). Using publicly available documentation, we systematically analyze the patterns of the CPC’s external relations since the early 2000s. Building on an intense travel diplomacy, the ID-CPC maintains a widely stretched network to political elites across the globe. The ID-CPC’s engagement is not new; but since Xi Jinping took office, the CPC has bolstered its efforts to reach out to other parties. We find that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China’s foreign policy interests. Since President Xi has come to power, party relations also emerged as a key instrument to promote China’s vision for reforming the global order. Moreover, China increasingly uses the party channel as a vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing experiences of its economic modernization and authoritarian one-party regime. The cross-regional analysis of the CPC’s engagement with other parties helps us to better understand the role of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy-making, pointing to a new research agenda at the intersection of China’s foreign relations, authoritarian diffusion, and transnational relations.
This paper addresses a largely overlooked actor in China’s foreign relations, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC). Using publicly available documentation, we systematically analyze the patterns of the CPC’s external relations since the early 2000s. Building on an intense travel diplomacy, the ID-CPC maintains a widely stretched network to political elites across the globe. The ID-CPC’s engagement is not new; but since Xi Jinping took office, the CPC has bolstered its efforts to reach out to other parties. We find that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China’s foreign policy interests. Since President Xi has come to power, party relations also emerged as a key instrument to promote China’s vision for reforming the global order. Moreover, China increasingly uses the party channel as a vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing experiences of its economic modernization and authoritarian one-party regime. The cross-regional analysis of the CPC’s engagement with other parties helps us to better understand the role of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy-making, pointing to a new research agenda at the intersection of China’s foreign relations, authoritarian diffusion, and transnational relations.
Future cooperation with African societies will have important implications for the European Union (EU)’s political and economic position in the world. We argue that setting democracy as a core principle of the EU’s foreign relations can contribute to sustainable development in Africa and beyond. Furthermore, it is in the EU’s own economic, security and political interests, as we will outline in this paper. It concludes with proposals on how EU democracy support could be further reformed and adapt-ed in response to changing context conditions:
Proposal 1: Bring democracy support and protection to the core of EU external action and implement this strategic priority in EU foreign relations with Africa (and worldwide).
Proposal 2: Develop a new narrative and more strategic approach to democracy support in a geopolitical context where democracy is increasingly being undermined from within in (former) democratic countries and challenged from the outside by powerful authoritarian regimes.
Proposal 3: Address the impacts of demographic change, urbanisation, digitalisation and climate change on political regimes through EU democracy support.
Proposal 4: Invest more in intermediary organisations (media, parties, CSOs, trade unions, business councils) and in the democratic accountability of sectoral policies.
Proposal 5: Intensify support for civic education and launch new initiatives to strengthen transnational relations between African and European societies.
Proposal 6: Engage more strategically in contexts where authoritarian regimes suddenly open up or where elector-al autocracies gradually close political spaces.
Proposal 7: Continue and deepen cooperation with Afri-can regional organisations and put more emphasis on joint learning and practices for defending democracy.
Proposal 8: Create a different institutional set-up that al-lows the EU to engage more strategically in democratic re-forms.
Proposal 9: Increase the capacities of the European Exter-nal Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) to work on democracy support.
Proposal 10: Develop a joint European approach towards democracy support that is sustained by all European countries.
Future cooperation with African societies will have important implications for the European Union (EU)’s political and economic position in the world. We argue that setting democracy as a core principle of the EU’s foreign relations can contribute to sustainable development in Africa and beyond. Furthermore, it is in the EU’s own economic, security and political interests, as we will outline in this paper. It concludes with proposals on how EU democracy support could be further reformed and adapt-ed in response to changing context conditions:
Proposal 1: Bring democracy support and protection to the core of EU external action and implement this strategic priority in EU foreign relations with Africa (and worldwide).
Proposal 2: Develop a new narrative and more strategic approach to democracy support in a geopolitical context where democracy is increasingly being undermined from within in (former) democratic countries and challenged from the outside by powerful authoritarian regimes.
Proposal 3: Address the impacts of demographic change, urbanisation, digitalisation and climate change on political regimes through EU democracy support.
Proposal 4: Invest more in intermediary organisations (media, parties, CSOs, trade unions, business councils) and in the democratic accountability of sectoral policies.
Proposal 5: Intensify support for civic education and launch new initiatives to strengthen transnational relations between African and European societies.
Proposal 6: Engage more strategically in contexts where authoritarian regimes suddenly open up or where elector-al autocracies gradually close political spaces.
Proposal 7: Continue and deepen cooperation with Afri-can regional organisations and put more emphasis on joint learning and practices for defending democracy.
Proposal 8: Create a different institutional set-up that al-lows the EU to engage more strategically in democratic re-forms.
Proposal 9: Increase the capacities of the European Exter-nal Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) to work on democracy support.
Proposal 10: Develop a joint European approach towards democracy support that is sustained by all European countries.
Future cooperation with African societies will have important implications for the European Union (EU)’s political and economic position in the world. We argue that setting democracy as a core principle of the EU’s foreign relations can contribute to sustainable development in Africa and beyond. Furthermore, it is in the EU’s own economic, security and political interests, as we will outline in this paper. It concludes with proposals on how EU democracy support could be further reformed and adapt-ed in response to changing context conditions:
Proposal 1: Bring democracy support and protection to the core of EU external action and implement this strategic priority in EU foreign relations with Africa (and worldwide).
Proposal 2: Develop a new narrative and more strategic approach to democracy support in a geopolitical context where democracy is increasingly being undermined from within in (former) democratic countries and challenged from the outside by powerful authoritarian regimes.
Proposal 3: Address the impacts of demographic change, urbanisation, digitalisation and climate change on political regimes through EU democracy support.
Proposal 4: Invest more in intermediary organisations (media, parties, CSOs, trade unions, business councils) and in the democratic accountability of sectoral policies.
Proposal 5: Intensify support for civic education and launch new initiatives to strengthen transnational relations between African and European societies.
Proposal 6: Engage more strategically in contexts where authoritarian regimes suddenly open up or where elector-al autocracies gradually close political spaces.
Proposal 7: Continue and deepen cooperation with Afri-can regional organisations and put more emphasis on joint learning and practices for defending democracy.
Proposal 8: Create a different institutional set-up that al-lows the EU to engage more strategically in democratic re-forms.
Proposal 9: Increase the capacities of the European Exter-nal Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) to work on democracy support.
Proposal 10: Develop a joint European approach towards democracy support that is sustained by all European countries.
El COVID-19 ha puesto a prueba la capacidad de las grandes plataformas tecnológicas para controlar la desinformación que se incluye en sus servicios.
El Estado de Derecho debe conciliar la legalidad y eficacia de sus decisiones, sujetas a la convicción humana, con las ventajas prácticas de la inteligencia artificial.
In May, Germany’s parliament approved the country’s continued military participation in two missions in Mali and the Sahel. As part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and the EU Training Mission EUTM Mali, up to 1,550 German soldiers can be deployed. Given the scale of these engagements, which are currently Germany’s largest, German discussions on Sahel policy, like those elsewhere, have been sluggish and unproductive. One reason for this is that buzzwords and false certainties determine the debate, which is largely detached from strategic considerations.
This study investigates the transmission channels of intergenerational social immobilityin low- and middle-income countries. Using a rich longitudinal survey dataset on Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam, we analyze through which factors socioeconomic status is passed on between generations. We reduce the information elicited throughout children’s youth to certain latent factors of their development process, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills as well as the characteristics of their social environment and the social opportunities they face. We then analyze to what extent each of these factors is explained by parental socioeconomic status, and how much each factor in turn determines the outcome of the children. Next, we combine these results in order to decompose the immobility into the different pathway factors. The findings indicate that children’s aspirations and their cognitive skills can each account for around 20 percent of the correlation between parental and children’s education. Starting a family while still a minor, and the need for child labor also play important, but smaller roles, explaining 10 percent and 6 percent of the immobility, respectively. While children’s health, parent’s attentiveness and the local school infrastructure only have small but still significant roles, parents’ spending on education, children’s social environment, and particularly children’s non-cognitive skills have no significant part in the transmission of socioeconomic status in the sample of developing countries, once all other factors are taken into account.
This study investigates the transmission channels of intergenerational social immobilityin low- and middle-income countries. Using a rich longitudinal survey dataset on Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam, we analyze through which factors socioeconomic status is passed on between generations. We reduce the information elicited throughout children’s youth to certain latent factors of their development process, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills as well as the characteristics of their social environment and the social opportunities they face. We then analyze to what extent each of these factors is explained by parental socioeconomic status, and how much each factor in turn determines the outcome of the children. Next, we combine these results in order to decompose the immobility into the different pathway factors. The findings indicate that children’s aspirations and their cognitive skills can each account for around 20 percent of the correlation between parental and children’s education. Starting a family while still a minor, and the need for child labor also play important, but smaller roles, explaining 10 percent and 6 percent of the immobility, respectively. While children’s health, parent’s attentiveness and the local school infrastructure only have small but still significant roles, parents’ spending on education, children’s social environment, and particularly children’s non-cognitive skills have no significant part in the transmission of socioeconomic status in the sample of developing countries, once all other factors are taken into account.
This study investigates the transmission channels of intergenerational social immobilityin low- and middle-income countries. Using a rich longitudinal survey dataset on Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam, we analyze through which factors socioeconomic status is passed on between generations. We reduce the information elicited throughout children’s youth to certain latent factors of their development process, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills as well as the characteristics of their social environment and the social opportunities they face. We then analyze to what extent each of these factors is explained by parental socioeconomic status, and how much each factor in turn determines the outcome of the children. Next, we combine these results in order to decompose the immobility into the different pathway factors. The findings indicate that children’s aspirations and their cognitive skills can each account for around 20 percent of the correlation between parental and children’s education. Starting a family while still a minor, and the need for child labor also play important, but smaller roles, explaining 10 percent and 6 percent of the immobility, respectively. While children’s health, parent’s attentiveness and the local school infrastructure only have small but still significant roles, parents’ spending on education, children’s social environment, and particularly children’s non-cognitive skills have no significant part in the transmission of socioeconomic status in the sample of developing countries, once all other factors are taken into account.