Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Bernabé López García. Comentario Elcano 26/2021 - 30/07/2021

El presidente de Túnez cesa al primer ministro Hichem Mechichi activando el artículo 80 de la constitución que le permite tomar “medidas excepcionales” ante una situación de peligro inminente para el país.

European Union (EU) funding for United Nations (UN) organisations has expanded significantly over the last two decades. The EU’s partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an important example of EU-UN cooperation, and UNDP was the fourth-largest UN recipient of European Commission funds in 2018. Against the backdrop of UN and EU reforms that aim to strengthen multilateralism and promote more integrated development cooperation approaches, this paper outlines priority areas in EU-UNDP cooperation and modes of cooperation. The term “added value” provides an entry point for identifying the rationales for EU funding to UNDP. In EU budgetary discussions, added value is a concept used to inform decisions such as whether to take action at the EU or member state levels or which means of implementation to select. These choices extend to the development cooperation arena, where the term relates to the division of labour agenda and features in assessments of effectiveness. The paper explores three perspectives to consider the added value of funding choices within the EU-UNDP partnership relating to the division of labour between EU institutions and member states, the characteristics of UNDP as an implementation channel and the qualities of the EU as a funder. On the first dimension, the large scale of EU funding for UNDP sets it apart from most member states, though EU funding priorities display elements of specialisation as well as similar emphases to member states. On the second dimension, UNDP’s large scope of work, its implementation capacities and accountability standards are attractive to the EU, but additional criteria – including organisational cost effectiveness – can alter the perception of added value. Finally, the scale of EU funding and the possibility to engage in difficult country contexts are key elements of the added value of the EU as a funder. However, the EU’s non-core funding emphasis presents a challenge for the UN resource mobilisation agenda calling for greater flexibility in organisational funding. Attention to these multiple dimensions of added value can inform future EU choices on how to orient engagement with UNDP to reinforce strengths of the organisation and enable adaptations envisaged in UN reform processes.

European Union (EU) funding for United Nations (UN) organisations has expanded significantly over the last two decades. The EU’s partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an important example of EU-UN cooperation, and UNDP was the fourth-largest UN recipient of European Commission funds in 2018. Against the backdrop of UN and EU reforms that aim to strengthen multilateralism and promote more integrated development cooperation approaches, this paper outlines priority areas in EU-UNDP cooperation and modes of cooperation. The term “added value” provides an entry point for identifying the rationales for EU funding to UNDP. In EU budgetary discussions, added value is a concept used to inform decisions such as whether to take action at the EU or member state levels or which means of implementation to select. These choices extend to the development cooperation arena, where the term relates to the division of labour agenda and features in assessments of effectiveness. The paper explores three perspectives to consider the added value of funding choices within the EU-UNDP partnership relating to the division of labour between EU institutions and member states, the characteristics of UNDP as an implementation channel and the qualities of the EU as a funder. On the first dimension, the large scale of EU funding for UNDP sets it apart from most member states, though EU funding priorities display elements of specialisation as well as similar emphases to member states. On the second dimension, UNDP’s large scope of work, its implementation capacities and accountability standards are attractive to the EU, but additional criteria – including organisational cost effectiveness – can alter the perception of added value. Finally, the scale of EU funding and the possibility to engage in difficult country contexts are key elements of the added value of the EU as a funder. However, the EU’s non-core funding emphasis presents a challenge for the UN resource mobilisation agenda calling for greater flexibility in organisational funding. Attention to these multiple dimensions of added value can inform future EU choices on how to orient engagement with UNDP to reinforce strengths of the organisation and enable adaptations envisaged in UN reform processes.

European Union (EU) funding for United Nations (UN) organisations has expanded significantly over the last two decades. The EU’s partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an important example of EU-UN cooperation, and UNDP was the fourth-largest UN recipient of European Commission funds in 2018. Against the backdrop of UN and EU reforms that aim to strengthen multilateralism and promote more integrated development cooperation approaches, this paper outlines priority areas in EU-UNDP cooperation and modes of cooperation. The term “added value” provides an entry point for identifying the rationales for EU funding to UNDP. In EU budgetary discussions, added value is a concept used to inform decisions such as whether to take action at the EU or member state levels or which means of implementation to select. These choices extend to the development cooperation arena, where the term relates to the division of labour agenda and features in assessments of effectiveness. The paper explores three perspectives to consider the added value of funding choices within the EU-UNDP partnership relating to the division of labour between EU institutions and member states, the characteristics of UNDP as an implementation channel and the qualities of the EU as a funder. On the first dimension, the large scale of EU funding for UNDP sets it apart from most member states, though EU funding priorities display elements of specialisation as well as similar emphases to member states. On the second dimension, UNDP’s large scope of work, its implementation capacities and accountability standards are attractive to the EU, but additional criteria – including organisational cost effectiveness – can alter the perception of added value. Finally, the scale of EU funding and the possibility to engage in difficult country contexts are key elements of the added value of the EU as a funder. However, the EU’s non-core funding emphasis presents a challenge for the UN resource mobilisation agenda calling for greater flexibility in organisational funding. Attention to these multiple dimensions of added value can inform future EU choices on how to orient engagement with UNDP to reinforce strengths of the organisation and enable adaptations envisaged in UN reform processes.

The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a separately funded research-driven infrastructure at DIW Berlin. Data from the SOEP survey are made available to researchers worldwide and also used in research carried out at DIW Berlin.

The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) at DIW Berlin is looking for a

Postdoctoral researcher

for the multi-disciplinary research project “The consequences of SARS-CoV-2 for societal inequalities,” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The position is limited to 36 months of the project’s funding period.

The aim of the project is to examine how the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic affects distinct social and at-risk groups in Germany, what the consequences of the pandemic are for societal inequalities, and what role welfare state measures play. The interdisciplinary project team will apply descriptive and causal statistical methods and use a unique integrated dataset, comprising the SOEP, SOEP-CoV (a survey of a subsample of the SOEP during the pandemic lockdowns), and blood and saliva tests from SOEP respondents (in collaboration with the Robert Koch Institute).

The candidate is expected to take a leading role in the research activities of the project. We are especially interested in candidates who have a strong background in empirical quantitative methods, panel data analysis, and causal estimation and are willing to apply advanced methods to understand the interplay between the pandemic and societal inequalities.

Wie das Statistische Bundesamt heute mitgeteilt hat, lagen die Verbraucherpreise im Juli 2021 um voraussichtlich 3,8 Prozent über dem Vorjahresmonat - deutlich mehr als im Juni und zum ersten Mal seit Sommer 2008 über der Drei-Prozent-Marke. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Es gibt keinen Grund, Angst vor Inflation zu haben. Die erhöhte Inflation im Vergleich zum Vorjahr war zu erwarten und ist eine gute Entwicklung, denn sie ist letztlich eine Normalisierung der Preise nach einer pandemiebedingt viel zu schwachen Preisentwicklung im vergangenen Jahr. Die Inflation dürfte in den kommenden Monaten hoch bleiben – das  ist jedoch temporär der Fall und vor allem das Resultat des Auslaufens der Mehrwertsteuersenkung und des starken Verfalls der Energiepreise im vergangenen Jahr. Eine zu geringe Inflation wäre ein größeres Risiko als eine zu hohe Inflation.

Eine dauerhaft erhöhte Inflation entsteht zum Beispiel in einem Wirtschaftsboom, in dem die Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten viel Geld ausgeben und Unternehmen stark investieren. Dafür gibt es in Europa und auch in Deutschland zurzeit aber keinerlei Belege. So gesehen wäre eine erhöhte Inflation ein Luxus-Problem für Deutschland. Die ungleich größere Sorge ist der starke Anstieg von Mieten in den Städten, der vor allem Menschen mit geringen Einkommen trifft. Die Verantwortung dafür liegt jedoch nicht bei den Zentralbanken, sondern bei der Politik.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing vaccination process calls for decisive, internationally coordinated and forward-looking action. We propose short-, medium- and long-term actions and emphasise that the political pressure for action should not only focus on short-term management, but on building long-term structures that are crucial to prepare for future epidemics or pandemics. Four key challenges need to be addressed in order to achieve global control of COVID-19 by using vaccines. First, vaccines need to be produced at scale; second, they should be priced affordably; third, they have to be allocated globally so that they are available where needed; and fourth, they have to be deployed and utilised in local communities. Challenges in production are producing some of the main bottlenecks, but the others – in particular vaccine scepticism and utilisation – need to be considered early enough to enable smooth global vaccination campaigns. Addressing the four key challenges, we recommend the following short, medium- and long-term actions. In the short term, we advise accelerating global vaccination efforts by scaling up financial support for the COVAX initiative. In the medium term, we suggest establishing regional production centres in priority countries, providing the necessary intellectual property through voluntary patent pools and fostering information campaigns and civil society participation to increase vaccination willingness and utilisation. In the long term, we recommend establishing Global Pandemic Centres of Excellence in all world regions – analogous to the CGIAR system in the agricultural sector – that are responsible for medical research, vaccine production, distribution and delivery.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing vaccination process calls for decisive, internationally coordinated and forward-looking action. We propose short-, medium- and long-term actions and emphasise that the political pressure for action should not only focus on short-term management, but on building long-term structures that are crucial to prepare for future epidemics or pandemics. Four key challenges need to be addressed in order to achieve global control of COVID-19 by using vaccines. First, vaccines need to be produced at scale; second, they should be priced affordably; third, they have to be allocated globally so that they are available where needed; and fourth, they have to be deployed and utilised in local communities. Challenges in production are producing some of the main bottlenecks, but the others – in particular vaccine scepticism and utilisation – need to be considered early enough to enable smooth global vaccination campaigns. Addressing the four key challenges, we recommend the following short, medium- and long-term actions. In the short term, we advise accelerating global vaccination efforts by scaling up financial support for the COVAX initiative. In the medium term, we suggest establishing regional production centres in priority countries, providing the necessary intellectual property through voluntary patent pools and fostering information campaigns and civil society participation to increase vaccination willingness and utilisation. In the long term, we recommend establishing Global Pandemic Centres of Excellence in all world regions – analogous to the CGIAR system in the agricultural sector – that are responsible for medical research, vaccine production, distribution and delivery.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing vaccination process calls for decisive, internationally coordinated and forward-looking action. We propose short-, medium- and long-term actions and emphasise that the political pressure for action should not only focus on short-term management, but on building long-term structures that are crucial to prepare for future epidemics or pandemics. Four key challenges need to be addressed in order to achieve global control of COVID-19 by using vaccines. First, vaccines need to be produced at scale; second, they should be priced affordably; third, they have to be allocated globally so that they are available where needed; and fourth, they have to be deployed and utilised in local communities. Challenges in production are producing some of the main bottlenecks, but the others – in particular vaccine scepticism and utilisation – need to be considered early enough to enable smooth global vaccination campaigns. Addressing the four key challenges, we recommend the following short, medium- and long-term actions. In the short term, we advise accelerating global vaccination efforts by scaling up financial support for the COVAX initiative. In the medium term, we suggest establishing regional production centres in priority countries, providing the necessary intellectual property through voluntary patent pools and fostering information campaigns and civil society participation to increase vaccination willingness and utilisation. In the long term, we recommend establishing Global Pandemic Centres of Excellence in all world regions – analogous to the CGIAR system in the agricultural sector – that are responsible for medical research, vaccine production, distribution and delivery.

German municipalities are getting increasingly involved in development policy work in Germany and abroad, with the nature of that involvement becoming ever more diverse. However, very little is known about the background or the type of these activities.
Against this backdrop, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) has conducted a study of municipal development policy (MDP) in Germany. Financed by the Service Agency Communities in One World (SKEW) of Engagement Global, this research drew upon a previous study carried out by DIE in 2009 (Fröhlich & Lämmlin, 2009) with the aim of identifying the current status of and trends in development for this policy area. To this end, DIE collaborated with the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) to conduct a survey of municipalities throughout Germany. In addition, semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with representatives of municipalities and relevant national and federal-state institutions.
As the results show, involvement in MDP on the part of German municipalities is increasing in the context of enabling national policies and changing frameworks for international cooperation (e.g. 2030 Agenda). Large municipalities engage far more often in development policy than small municipalities. The latter often focus on low-threshold activities with fewer requirements for project management, such as the promotion of fair trade. In a number of cases, small municipalities carry out projects based on inter-municipal cooperation.
MDP covers many different topics, from information and education work to diverse forms of partnerships with municipalities in the Global South. The number and variety of stakeholders involved in the municipal administration partnerships are increasing, along with the functions they carry out. Municipalities serve as implementing agents, facilitators and networkers. They are partly motivated in their international work and corresponding activities by self-interest. Their involvement, for instance, may allow them to take on international responsibility or increase their appeal as an employer to new recruits.
Development policy is a shared responsibility of the German national government, federal states and municipalities. MDP is a voluntary municipal activity and is thus not practised everywhere. Human resources are often insufficient and the required knowledge is difficult to obtain. In some cases, municipalities consider the expenditure associated with the management of MDP projects to be too high.
Nonetheless, municipalities make a key contribution to transnational sustainability policy through their work, most especially by enabling global objectives to be localised and/or contextualised. One of the specific benefits of MDP is its proximity to citizens and direct contact with local stakeholders in Germany and abroad. However, when measured using conventional metrics and indicators for development cooperation (such as Official Development Assistance, ODA), the municipal contribution is still insufficiently discernible. It is important to continue providing support to municipalities, with as little red tape as possible, in order to fully exploit the potential MDP has in municipalities that are already involved in this work and those which are not yet involved.

German municipalities are getting increasingly involved in development policy work in Germany and abroad, with the nature of that involvement becoming ever more diverse. However, very little is known about the background or the type of these activities.
Against this backdrop, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) has conducted a study of municipal development policy (MDP) in Germany. Financed by the Service Agency Communities in One World (SKEW) of Engagement Global, this research drew upon a previous study carried out by DIE in 2009 (Fröhlich & Lämmlin, 2009) with the aim of identifying the current status of and trends in development for this policy area. To this end, DIE collaborated with the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) to conduct a survey of municipalities throughout Germany. In addition, semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with representatives of municipalities and relevant national and federal-state institutions.
As the results show, involvement in MDP on the part of German municipalities is increasing in the context of enabling national policies and changing frameworks for international cooperation (e.g. 2030 Agenda). Large municipalities engage far more often in development policy than small municipalities. The latter often focus on low-threshold activities with fewer requirements for project management, such as the promotion of fair trade. In a number of cases, small municipalities carry out projects based on inter-municipal cooperation.
MDP covers many different topics, from information and education work to diverse forms of partnerships with municipalities in the Global South. The number and variety of stakeholders involved in the municipal administration partnerships are increasing, along with the functions they carry out. Municipalities serve as implementing agents, facilitators and networkers. They are partly motivated in their international work and corresponding activities by self-interest. Their involvement, for instance, may allow them to take on international responsibility or increase their appeal as an employer to new recruits.
Development policy is a shared responsibility of the German national government, federal states and municipalities. MDP is a voluntary municipal activity and is thus not practised everywhere. Human resources are often insufficient and the required knowledge is difficult to obtain. In some cases, municipalities consider the expenditure associated with the management of MDP projects to be too high.
Nonetheless, municipalities make a key contribution to transnational sustainability policy through their work, most especially by enabling global objectives to be localised and/or contextualised. One of the specific benefits of MDP is its proximity to citizens and direct contact with local stakeholders in Germany and abroad. However, when measured using conventional metrics and indicators for development cooperation (such as Official Development Assistance, ODA), the municipal contribution is still insufficiently discernible. It is important to continue providing support to municipalities, with as little red tape as possible, in order to fully exploit the potential MDP has in municipalities that are already involved in this work and those which are not yet involved.

German municipalities are getting increasingly involved in development policy work in Germany and abroad, with the nature of that involvement becoming ever more diverse. However, very little is known about the background or the type of these activities.
Against this backdrop, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) has conducted a study of municipal development policy (MDP) in Germany. Financed by the Service Agency Communities in One World (SKEW) of Engagement Global, this research drew upon a previous study carried out by DIE in 2009 (Fröhlich & Lämmlin, 2009) with the aim of identifying the current status of and trends in development for this policy area. To this end, DIE collaborated with the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) to conduct a survey of municipalities throughout Germany. In addition, semi-structured qualitative interviews were held with representatives of municipalities and relevant national and federal-state institutions.
As the results show, involvement in MDP on the part of German municipalities is increasing in the context of enabling national policies and changing frameworks for international cooperation (e.g. 2030 Agenda). Large municipalities engage far more often in development policy than small municipalities. The latter often focus on low-threshold activities with fewer requirements for project management, such as the promotion of fair trade. In a number of cases, small municipalities carry out projects based on inter-municipal cooperation.
MDP covers many different topics, from information and education work to diverse forms of partnerships with municipalities in the Global South. The number and variety of stakeholders involved in the municipal administration partnerships are increasing, along with the functions they carry out. Municipalities serve as implementing agents, facilitators and networkers. They are partly motivated in their international work and corresponding activities by self-interest. Their involvement, for instance, may allow them to take on international responsibility or increase their appeal as an employer to new recruits.
Development policy is a shared responsibility of the German national government, federal states and municipalities. MDP is a voluntary municipal activity and is thus not practised everywhere. Human resources are often insufficient and the required knowledge is difficult to obtain. In some cases, municipalities consider the expenditure associated with the management of MDP projects to be too high.
Nonetheless, municipalities make a key contribution to transnational sustainability policy through their work, most especially by enabling global objectives to be localised and/or contextualised. One of the specific benefits of MDP is its proximity to citizens and direct contact with local stakeholders in Germany and abroad. However, when measured using conventional metrics and indicators for development cooperation (such as Official Development Assistance, ODA), the municipal contribution is still insufficiently discernible. It is important to continue providing support to municipalities, with as little red tape as possible, in order to fully exploit the potential MDP has in municipalities that are already involved in this work and those which are not yet involved.

Washington and Berlin have settled their differences over the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. For the time being, this has halted the spiralling energy security dilemma. While Washington is sending a clear signal that constructive relations with Berlin are important, the German government is now called upon to implement a variety of measures. Still, the project remains a political issue. Kyiv and Warsaw have already signalled their opposition. A grand bargain that is not only bilaterally agreed upon but also involves Ukraine and commits Russia has not yet been achieved.

Between 2020 and 2021, Israel concluded normalisation agreements with four Arab states. They were celebrated internationally as a breakthrough. Meanwhile, since 2018, and largely unnoticed by the public, Arab states have started repairing their relations with Syria. Finally, in January 2021, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ended their boycott of Qatar during the meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. Changing assessments of the regional security situation and converging interests have enabled these rap­prochements. However, these developments do not mean that the region is moving towards peace and stability; on the contrary, long-lasting conflicts remain unresolved and the threat perceptions of third actors are being exacerbated. Germany and its partners in the EU should avoid being co-opted by local and regional conflicting par­ties and should instead focus on supporting regional conflict management.

Pavel Vidal Alejandro. ARI/71 - 27/7/2021

Impulsada por la devaluación del peso, Cuba avanza hacia un modelo de economía mixta, al menos en términos de empleo.

Zusammenfassung:

Inwieweit darf oder muss der Staat in die Wirtschaft eingreifen? Dies ist seit jeher die zentrale Frage in der Debatte um die richtige Industriepolitik. Dass die Industrie in Deutschland ein entscheidender Faktor für Wohlstand ist, bleibt unbestritten. Diverse Krisen der letzten Jahre wie die Finanz- und Schuldenkrise, der Klimawandel oder die Corona-Pandemie, aber auch der wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel wie die Digitalisierung haben gezeigt, dass es ohne staatliche Intervention nicht geht. Uneinigkeit besteht darin, wie der Staat zur Mobilisierung der dringend notwendigen Investitionen und Innovationen beitragen kann. In den aktuellen Parteiprogrammen zur Bundestagswahl spiegelt sich die ganze Bandbreite der industriepolitischen Debatte, jede Partei mit eigenen Vorstellungen und Prioritäten. Eine praktikable Möglichkeit, staatliche Investitionshilfen flexibel zu bündeln und transparent zu verwenden, wären Technologiefonds, die – richtig ausgestaltet – den Transformationsprozess der Industrie endscheidend voranbringen könnten. Dafür müsste die künftige Bundesregierung einen zweistelligen Milliardenbetrag aufbringen.

Die Klimakrise und die durch die Covid-19-Pandemie bedingten Krisen müssen gemeinsam bewältigt werden. Viele Staaten arbeiten an Strategien zur Umsetzung des Pariser Übereinkommens. Auf der Klimakonferenz in Glasgow gilt es daher, kurz- und langfristige Ziele und Maßnahmen in Einklang zu bringen. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat den deutschen Gesetzgeber verpflichtet, Klimaschutz langfristig zu planen. Die Erstellung von Langfriststrategien sollte auch international verpflichtend werden, über Klimaneutralität hinaus auf Klimastabilisierung abzielen und Mehrgewinne mit anderen Nachhaltigkeitsdimensionen anstreben. Dazu sollten sie erstens den schnellen und vollständigen Ausstieg aus der Nutzung fossiler Energieträger vorsehen. Zweitens sollten Schutz und Wiederherstellung von Ökosystemen sowie ihre nachhaltige Nutzung zum Schwerpunkt
werden. Drittens sollte die Entfernung von CO2 aus der Atmosphäre strategisch vorbereitet werden. Als starken Impuls sollten sich Staaten auf der COP 26 dazu bekennen, ihre COVID-19-Stimulusprogramme im Sinne der Langfriststrategien zu nutzen.

Die Klimakrise und die durch die Covid-19-Pandemie bedingten Krisen müssen gemeinsam bewältigt werden. Viele Staaten arbeiten an Strategien zur Umsetzung des Pariser Übereinkommens. Auf der Klimakonferenz in Glasgow gilt es daher, kurz- und langfristige Ziele und Maßnahmen in Einklang zu bringen. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat den deutschen Gesetzgeber verpflichtet, Klimaschutz langfristig zu planen. Die Erstellung von Langfriststrategien sollte auch international verpflichtend werden, über Klimaneutralität hinaus auf Klimastabilisierung abzielen und Mehrgewinne mit anderen Nachhaltigkeitsdimensionen anstreben. Dazu sollten sie erstens den schnellen und vollständigen Ausstieg aus der Nutzung fossiler Energieträger vorsehen. Zweitens sollten Schutz und Wiederherstellung von Ökosystemen sowie ihre nachhaltige Nutzung zum Schwerpunkt
werden. Drittens sollte die Entfernung von CO2 aus der Atmosphäre strategisch vorbereitet werden. Als starken Impuls sollten sich Staaten auf der COP 26 dazu bekennen, ihre COVID-19-Stimulusprogramme im Sinne der Langfriststrategien zu nutzen.