Die durch Putsche etablierten Militärregime in Mali (2020), Burkina Faso (2022) und Niger (2023) stellen Deutschland und seine europäischen Partner vor Zielkonflikte und Dilemmata. Entsprechend viel Zeit benötigen die Europäer, einen angemessenen Kurs gegenüber den Militärregimen abzustecken. Dabei geht es letztlich um die Frage, ob und welche Kooperationsangebote politisch vertretbar und in ihrer Wirkung aussichtsreich sind oder ob eher eine Politik der Isolierung und Konfrontation angezeigt wäre. Der eigentliche Klärungsbedarf besteht aber vor allem bei der Frage, welche Probleme und Ziele vorrangig sein sollen. Geht es darum, Putsch-Regime zurückzudrängen, den wachsenden russischen Einfluss einzudämmen, oder stehen die sicherheitspolitischen Probleme der Region selbst im Vordergrund (illegale Migration, Terrorismus, Instabilität)? Die deutschen und europäischen Handlungsoptionen sind ohnehin schon begrenzt. Umso wichtiger sind transparente Grundannahmen und klare Zielsetzungen.
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IPI in partnership with the Life & Peace Institute and the Permanent Missions of the Republic of Kenya, Norway, and Sweden to the UN, cohosted a policy forum on March 21st assessing lessons learned from Kenya’s Peacebuilding Architecture Review.
The pursuit of peace, a foundational goal at the establishment of the UN in 1945, requires member states to assume primary responsibility for conflict prevention through initiatives that are nationally owned and people-centered, respect human rights, and enhance inclusivity and social cohesion. Its implementation requires a constant refreshing of peacebuilding and conflict prevention and resolution methods. This year, determining a way forward on these issues will be key to the impact hoped for in the Pact for the Future.
In 2023, in line with the push for national governments to take the lead in “identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies, and activities for peacebuilding and sustaining peace,” the Government of Kenya commissioned a review of its national peacebuilding architecture. The initiative was spearheaded by the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and assisted by an Independent Panel of Advisors (IPA), with support from the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office and other partners. Resulting from the highly consultative process involving Kenyans from diverse backgrounds, the IPA submitted to Kenya’s political leadership a report with a comprehensive set of observations and recommendations, structured around four pillars: (1) defining a national agenda for peace, (2) promoting political inclusion, (3) enhancing conflict prevention and resolution, and (4) proposing a new institutional architecture for peacebuilding. By pursuing an independent assessment that values the insights and contributions of local peacebuilders and civil society, Kenya demonstrates national ownership and leadership.
The audience heard from the IPA reflecting on its experiences on the review journey and the key findings and recommendations, with a particular emphasis on partnership opportunities in the implementation phase.
Opening Remarks:
H.E. Andreas Løvold, Chargé d’affaires and Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN
Elizabeth Mary Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
Shamsa Abubakar, Deputy Chair for the Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review
Speakers:
Raymond Omollo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Interior and National Administration, Government of Kenya
Lesley Connolly, Team Leader, Global Policy, Life & Peace Institute
Rana Taha, Peace and Development Advisor, United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office, Kenya
Sheikh Abdullahi Abdi, Independent Panel of Advisors for the Peacebuilding Review
Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute
Closing remarks:
H.E. Martin Kimani, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the UN
H.E. Anna Karin Eneström, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN
Seit April 2023 herrscht Krieg in Sudan. Er ist Ausdruck grundsätzlicher Veränderungen in den politischen Machtverhältnissen. Der vorher dominierende Sicherheitssektor ist tief gespalten und die ehemals schwach vernetzte Zivilgesellschaft hoch mobilisiert. Einerseits ermöglichte die Konkurrenz innerhalb des Sicherheitssektors, eine zivil-militärische Übergangsregierung zu bilden. Andererseits erhöhte der weitere Aufstieg der Rapid Support Forces zur Macht das Risiko eines bewaffneten Konflikts, erst recht nach dem Putsch 2021. Seit Bashirs Fall 2019 haben die Sicherheitskräfte zweimal vergeblich versucht, eine alleinige Militärherrschaft zu errichten. Gleichwohl scheiterte auch die zivil-militärische Übergangsregierung, weil das Militär nach wie vor über erhebliche Machtressourcen verfügte. Sudans politische Elite trug zu diesem Ausgang bei, indem sie sich zu wenig um den Aufbau rechtsstaatlicher Institutionen und zu viel um die eigene Sichtbarkeit kümmerte. Internationale Akteure, die Sudans Übergangsprozess stärken wollten, hätten die Sicherheitskräfte entschiedener zurückdrängen können, statt sie reflexhaft einzubinden. Viele internationale und sudanesische Bemühungen krankten daran, dass sie entweder nur auf Einbindung oder nur auf Ausschluss der Sicherheitskräfte abstellten. Ein neuer Elitendeal allein mit Sudans Gewaltunternehmern wird keinen Frieden bringen, solange keine zivilen Kräfte am Tisch sitzen. Sudans beste Chance liegt vielmehr im Sozialkapital des freiwilligen Engagements seiner Bürger:innen für humanitäre Versorgung, Demokratie und lokale Versöhnung.
As the demands on German foreign and security policy increase in a Europe characterised by multiple crises, so do the demands on the German armed forces. In order for the Bundeswehr to become more assertive and effective as a deterrent, despite limiting factors such as personnel and materiel shortages, it must be able to employ new technologies more quickly and extensively. The faster and more effectively these technologies are harnessed, the more advantages they will bring on the battlefield. The current political will for change, the pressure to adapt due to the evolved security situation and the increase in financial resources are creating an unprecedented momentum.
Turkey’s popularity in the MENA region has increased since the AKP’s rise to power in 2002. People-to-people contacts, economic progress, and a perceived European lifestyle have contributed to Turkey’s popularity in the MENA region. Turkey’s seemingly competitive political system and strong participation in elections are sources of appreciation. However, the meanings attributed to the Turkish political system have changed over time. Ankara’s confrontational rhetoric on the perceived double standards of Western states and its calls for reform of the international system are welcomed. Turkey’s increased popularity does not easily translate into broad regional influence. Ankara’s credibility has deteriorated in the eyes of the region’s elites. Its support of Sunni Islamists in the of the Arab uprisings antagonised the region’s autocratic elites, ushering in a period of isolation between 2013 and 2020. Turkey’s recent efforts to reintegrate in the region have thawed relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but incurred reputational costs vis-à-vis Sunni Islamists. Authoritarian practices and rising xenophobia against Syrian refugees and other Arab citizens also constrain Turkey’s influence in the region.
The Hamas terrorist attack on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military intervention in the Gaza Strip marks a turning point in relations not only between the two parties to the conflict but also between Egypt and Israel. Under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, those ties were steadily being expanded in the areas of economic and security policy right up until the events of last October. Now they are characterized by mutual recriminations: while Egypt accuses the Israeli leadership of working towards the expulsion of the population of the Gaza Strip to Sinai, Israel criticizes Egypt for its alleged support of Hamas. Neither accusation is unfounded and both should be taken very seriously by Germany and its European partners. In fact, the Europeans should stand alongside Egypt in rejecting expulsion, which implies putting pressure on Israel to ensure the protection of the civilian population in Gaza. At the same time, it is important to support Israel’s insistence that going forward, the security of the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip cannot be left to Cairo alone.
No Russian election since Soviet times has been manipulated to the extent we are seeing in the 2024 “presidential election”. The political context is dictatorial, the regime’s power grab comprehensive. The media are subject to wartime censorship, and there is not even a pretence of political competition. The death of Alexei Navalny has only heightened the atmosphere of fear. Yet although the vote is an authoritarian plebiscite, a rubber stamp, signs of popular criticism of the regime and the war should not be overlooked. Germany and Europe should unequivocally state that this election is undemocratic and illegitimate. But even more importantly, contacts with critics of the war inside Russia must be maintained.
This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.
This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.
This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.
The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.