Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy – specifically QE – on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. Our results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis. However, contrary to the predictions of banking theory, the effects of QE seem to come mostly through undercapitalized banks. These findings suggest that bank balance sheet problems and regulatory pressure continue to be important factors impairing the credit channel.

This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy – specifically QE – on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. Our results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis. However, contrary to the predictions of banking theory, the effects of QE seem to come mostly through undercapitalized banks. These findings suggest that bank balance sheet problems and regulatory pressure continue to be important factors impairing the credit channel.

This chapter discusses the declared exchange-rate policies of East Asian central banks and compares these with the de facto policies. Central banks that officially proclaim a fixed or managed exchange rate tend to intervene more in foreign exchange markets than central banks which officially follow a floating regime. However, even central banks that have implemented inflation-targeting frameworks with floating rates appear to carry out interventions. Several countries that self-describe their exchange-rate regime as “managed floating” appear to have been heavily engaged in foreign exchange-market interventions.

This chapter discusses the declared exchange-rate policies of East Asian central banks and compares these with the de facto policies. Central banks that officially proclaim a fixed or managed exchange rate tend to intervene more in foreign exchange markets than central banks which officially follow a floating regime. However, even central banks that have implemented inflation-targeting frameworks with floating rates appear to carry out interventions. Several countries that self-describe their exchange-rate regime as “managed floating” appear to have been heavily engaged in foreign exchange-market interventions.

This chapter discusses the declared exchange-rate policies of East Asian central banks and compares these with the de facto policies. Central banks that officially proclaim a fixed or managed exchange rate tend to intervene more in foreign exchange markets than central banks which officially follow a floating regime. However, even central banks that have implemented inflation-targeting frameworks with floating rates appear to carry out interventions. Several countries that self-describe their exchange-rate regime as “managed floating” appear to have been heavily engaged in foreign exchange-market interventions.

This paper empirically examines the link between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk for 40 advanced and emerging economies. Controlling for a large set of domestic and global factors, the paper shows that both vulnerability and resilience to climate risk are important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global level. Overall, we find that vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more than climate risk resilience in terms of the implications for sovereign borrowing costs. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is progressively higher for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Impulse response analysis from a set of panel structural VAR models indicates that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate vulnerability and resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, with high risk economies experiencing larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups.

This paper empirically examines the link between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk for 40 advanced and emerging economies. Controlling for a large set of domestic and global factors, the paper shows that both vulnerability and resilience to climate risk are important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global level. Overall, we find that vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more than climate risk resilience in terms of the implications for sovereign borrowing costs. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is progressively higher for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Impulse response analysis from a set of panel structural VAR models indicates that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate vulnerability and resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, with high risk economies experiencing larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups.

This paper empirically examines the link between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk for 40 advanced and emerging economies. Controlling for a large set of domestic and global factors, the paper shows that both vulnerability and resilience to climate risk are important factors driving the cost of sovereign borrowing at the global level. Overall, we find that vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more than climate risk resilience in terms of the implications for sovereign borrowing costs. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is progressively higher for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Impulse response analysis from a set of panel structural VAR models indicates that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate vulnerability and resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, with high risk economies experiencing larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups.

This paper empirically examines the reaction of global financial markets across 38 economies to the COVID-19 outbreak, with a special focus on the dynamics of capital flow across 14 emerging market economies. Using daily data over the period 4 January 2010 to 30 April 2020 and controlling for a host of domestic and global macroeconomic and financial factors, we use a fixed effects panel approach and a structural VAR framework to show that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than advanced economies. In particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have experienced the sharpest impact on stocks, bonds, and exchange rates due to COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial capital outflows. Our results indicate that fiscal stimulus packages introduced in response to COVID-19, as well as quantitative easing by central banks, have helped to restore overall investor confidence through reducing bond yields and boosting stock prices. Our findings also highlight the role that global factors and developments in the world’s leading financial centers have on financial conditions in EMEs. Importantly, the impact of COVID-19 related quantitative easing measures by central banks in advanced countries, which helped to lower sovereign bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, extended to EMEs, notably in relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. Going forward, while the ultimate resolution of COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty declines, our impulse response analysis suggests that there may be some permanent effects on financial markets and capital flows as a result of COVID-19, particularly in EMEs.

This paper empirically examines the reaction of global financial markets across 38 economies to the COVID-19 outbreak, with a special focus on the dynamics of capital flow across 14 emerging market economies. Using daily data over the period 4 January 2010 to 30 April 2020 and controlling for a host of domestic and global macroeconomic and financial factors, we use a fixed effects panel approach and a structural VAR framework to show that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than advanced economies. In particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have experienced the sharpest impact on stocks, bonds, and exchange rates due to COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial capital outflows. Our results indicate that fiscal stimulus packages introduced in response to COVID-19, as well as quantitative easing by central banks, have helped to restore overall investor confidence through reducing bond yields and boosting stock prices. Our findings also highlight the role that global factors and developments in the world’s leading financial centers have on financial conditions in EMEs. Importantly, the impact of COVID-19 related quantitative easing measures by central banks in advanced countries, which helped to lower sovereign bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, extended to EMEs, notably in relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. Going forward, while the ultimate resolution of COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty declines, our impulse response analysis suggests that there may be some permanent effects on financial markets and capital flows as a result of COVID-19, particularly in EMEs.

This paper empirically examines the reaction of global financial markets across 38 economies to the COVID-19 outbreak, with a special focus on the dynamics of capital flow across 14 emerging market economies. Using daily data over the period 4 January 2010 to 30 April 2020 and controlling for a host of domestic and global macroeconomic and financial factors, we use a fixed effects panel approach and a structural VAR framework to show that emerging markets have been more heavily affected than advanced economies. In particular, emerging economies in Asia and Europe have experienced the sharpest impact on stocks, bonds, and exchange rates due to COVID-19, as well as abrupt and substantial capital outflows. Our results indicate that fiscal stimulus packages introduced in response to COVID-19, as well as quantitative easing by central banks, have helped to restore overall investor confidence through reducing bond yields and boosting stock prices. Our findings also highlight the role that global factors and developments in the world’s leading financial centers have on financial conditions in EMEs. Importantly, the impact of COVID-19 related quantitative easing measures by central banks in advanced countries, which helped to lower sovereign bond yields and prop up stock markets at home, extended to EMEs, notably in relation to stabilizing capital flow dynamics. Going forward, while the ultimate resolution of COVID-19 may be expected to lead to a market correction as uncertainty declines, our impulse response analysis suggests that there may be some permanent effects on financial markets and capital flows as a result of COVID-19, particularly in EMEs.

This collection provides a comprehensive review of the tools and methodologies for Environmental Risk Analysis used by a few dozen financial institutions, including banks, asset managers and insurance companies. These tools and methodologies cover a wide-range of environmental/climate scenario analyses and stress tests as well as environmental, social and governance analysis and natural capital risk assessment, that can be used to analyze the potential impact on financial institutions from transition and physical risks associated with climate and other environmental factors.

This collection provides a comprehensive review of the tools and methodologies for Environmental Risk Analysis used by a few dozen financial institutions, including banks, asset managers and insurance companies. These tools and methodologies cover a wide-range of environmental/climate scenario analyses and stress tests as well as environmental, social and governance analysis and natural capital risk assessment, that can be used to analyze the potential impact on financial institutions from transition and physical risks associated with climate and other environmental factors.

This collection provides a comprehensive review of the tools and methodologies for Environmental Risk Analysis used by a few dozen financial institutions, including banks, asset managers and insurance companies. These tools and methodologies cover a wide-range of environmental/climate scenario analyses and stress tests as well as environmental, social and governance analysis and natural capital risk assessment, that can be used to analyze the potential impact on financial institutions from transition and physical risks associated with climate and other environmental factors.

Increasing resilience needs to be one of the main guiding principles when rebuilding our economies and societies after the crisis. We need to ensure we are better prepared to withstand future pandemics but also the other major looming threat to humanity—climate change.

Increasing resilience needs to be one of the main guiding principles when rebuilding our economies and societies after the crisis. We need to ensure we are better prepared to withstand future pandemics but also the other major looming threat to humanity—climate change.

Increasing resilience needs to be one of the main guiding principles when rebuilding our economies and societies after the crisis. We need to ensure we are better prepared to withstand future pandemics but also the other major looming threat to humanity—climate change.

We call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of the outbreak of COVID-19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that emerging market and developing countries (EMDEs) need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (i) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (ii) issue at least $500 billion of Special Drawing Rights through the IMF; (iii) improve the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; (iv) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (v) increase the resources and geographic coverage of Regional Financial Arrangements; (vi) coordinate capital flow management measures; (vii) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (viii) request that credit-rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that beyond these immediate measures, leaders should swiftly move to address the following structural gaps in the GFSN: (i) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (ii) create an appropriate Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime; (iii) expand surveillance activity; and (iv) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these immediate and intermediate reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy

We call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of the outbreak of COVID-19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that emerging market and developing countries (EMDEs) need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (i) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (ii) issue at least $500 billion of Special Drawing Rights through the IMF; (iii) improve the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; (iv) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (v) increase the resources and geographic coverage of Regional Financial Arrangements; (vi) coordinate capital flow management measures; (vii) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (viii) request that credit-rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that beyond these immediate measures, leaders should swiftly move to address the following structural gaps in the GFSN: (i) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (ii) create an appropriate Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime; (iii) expand surveillance activity; and (iv) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these immediate and intermediate reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy

We call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of the outbreak of COVID-19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that emerging market and developing countries (EMDEs) need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (i) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (ii) issue at least $500 billion of Special Drawing Rights through the IMF; (iii) improve the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; (iv) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (v) increase the resources and geographic coverage of Regional Financial Arrangements; (vi) coordinate capital flow management measures; (vii) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (viii) request that credit-rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that beyond these immediate measures, leaders should swiftly move to address the following structural gaps in the GFSN: (i) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (ii) create an appropriate Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime; (iii) expand surveillance activity; and (iv) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these immediate and intermediate reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy