Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die meisten Experten sind sich hinsichtlich des russischen Truppenaufmarsches an der Grenze zur Ukraine Anfang November einig: Russland geht es ähnlich wie schon im Frühjahr um eine Drohgebärde gegenüber der Ukraine und dem Westen, nicht um einen Einmarsch in das Nachbarland. Diese Interpretation hat einen entscheidenden Vorteil: Sie ist bequem und zwingt westliche Regierungen nicht zum entschiedenen Handeln. Während angesichts der Krim-Annexion 2014 eine generelle Vorsicht gegenüber Russland geboten sein sollte, wird zum einen außer Acht gelassen, dass sich die Eskalationsspirale im russisch-ukrainischen Konflikt seit dem Frühjahr immer schneller dreht. Zum anderen wird ignoriert, dass das russische Ziel einer vollständigen Kontrolle über die Ukraine auch ohne die immer wieder erwähnten unangemessenen Kosten erreicht werden kann. Aus diesem Grund können extreme Szenarien wie ein russischer Einmarsch in Teile der Ukraine aktuell nicht ausgeschlossen werden. Vielmehr sollte das Worst-Case-Szenario einer abgestuften Invasion, bei der Russland mit gezielten Interventionen einen Vorwand für den Einmarsch schafft, und dessen mögliche Konsequenzen ernsthaft diskutiert werden.

Der Westen verkennt Russlands Befindlichkeiten

Russland hat es seit Beginn des Ukrainekonflikts trotz der Krim-Annexion, Besetzung von Teilen des Donbass und weiterer Destabilisierungsversuche nicht geschafft, sein strategisches Ziel der mittelbaren Kontrolle des Nachbarlandes zu erreichen. Vielmehr ist es der Ukraine gelungen, sich vom Konflikt im Osten zu isolieren, ihre Staatlichkeit zu stärken und näher an den Westen zu rücken. Selbst der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj, der 2019 als Friedensstifter angetreten war, hat nach einigen diplomatischen Experimenten die Rolle des anti-russischen Kriegsherrn eingenommen. Mehr noch: Seit dem Sommer zeigen sich Selenskyj und dessen Militärführung forsch, lassen öffentlichkeitswirksam die Abwehr von russischen Invasionsversuchen üben und Drohnenangriffe gegen die Separatisten fliegen. In Russland schwindet die Hoffnung, dass sich mit den bisher angewandten Druckmitteln ein Politikwechsel oder gar eine russlandfreundliche Führung in Kiew installieren lässt.

Im Westen wird unterschätzt, wie empfindlich Moskau auf die schwierige Lage im Donbass und das zur Schau gestellte ukrainische Selbstbewusstsein reagiert. Anders als in Washington oder Brüssel, wo die Ukraine nüchtern als klar unterlegene Partei in einem stark asymmetrischen Konflikt gesehen wird, ist die Perspektive Moskaus auf Kiew durch Reputationsfragen bestimmt – was Kiew mindestens zu einem großen Ärgernis und maximal zur Bedrohung »aufwertet«. Jedenfalls muss der Effekt, den die trotz sieben Jahre kriegerischem Konflikt zwischen den einstigen Bruderstaaten anhaltende ukrainische Unnachgiebigkeit auf Moskau hat, in die Analyse der russischen Politik einbezogen werden. Die nachhaltige Unterminierung des Normandie-Formats und Moskaus Insistieren auf die für Kiew inakzeptable Forderung, direkt mit den Separatisten zu verhandeln, ist so auch als Eingeständnis der eigenen Frustration angesichts eines Pyrrhussieges zu werten. Russlands Präsident Putin und sein ehemaliger Premier Medwedew haben Kiew und dem Westen ihre maximalen Absichten in der ukrainischen Frage und auch den eigenen Unglauben an eine Verhandlungslösung mehrfach klargemacht. Wenn diese Interpretation zutrifft, hätte der russisch-ukrainische Konflikt eine unberechenbare Phase erreicht, weil sie durch von Statusfragen getriebene Eskalationsbereitschaft und den fehlenden Zugriff westlicher Diplomatie gekennzeichnet ist.

Möglichkeit der abgestuften Invasion

Beobachter attestieren der ukrainischen Armee heute eine bessere Verteidigungsfähigkeit als in den Jahren 2014 und 2015. Aufgrund der Kampferfahrungen der vergangenen Jahre, der Stabilisierung der Kontaktlinie durch die Truppen und die anhaltende Modernisierung des gesamten Verteidigungssektors ist tatsächlich eine graduelle Verbesserung eingetreten. Die ukrainische Armee bleibt gegenüber ihrem russischen Pendant aber vor allem mit Blick auf die Luftstreitkräfte klar unterlegen.

Diese Tatsache begünstigt bisher wenig diskutierte Szenarien, bei denen die russische Armee in einer von den Kosten her überschaubaren abgestuften Strategie in der Ukraine intervenieren und deren Führung über immer neue taktische Lagen zu politischen Zugeständnissen zwingen könnte. Denkbar wäre beispielsweise, dass Russland die jüngsten Drohnenangriffe auf Stellungen der Separatisten als Vorwand nutzt, um erneut »zum Schutz der lokalen Bevölkerung« in den besetzten Donbass einzumarschieren. Obwohl diese Form eines russischen Einmarsches keinen Einfluss auf die existierende territoriale Situation der Ukraine hätte, würde ein solches Szenario die Führung in Kiew massiv unter Druck setzen. Das Kräfteverhältnis an der Kontaktlinie würde sich stark zu Ungunsten der Ukraine verändern, wobei Russland dann jeden weiteren Vorfall als Vorwand für ein weiteres Vorgehen nutzen könnte, zum Beispiel durch Luftangriffe auf Stützpunkte der ukrainischen Armee in der nicht besetzten Ostukraine. Kiew hätte darauf kaum eine wirksame Antwort. So könnte Moskau seine konkreten Nahziele auf militärischem Wege erreichen, darunter der Sonderstatus für die »Volksrepubliken« in der Ostukraine ohne die in den Minsker Vereinbarungen festgehaltenen Vorbedingungen.

Die westlichen Partner der Ukraine und damit auch die neue Bundesregierung sollten sich klar darüber werden, dass Rechtfertigungen und Varianten einer möglichen russischen Eskalation vielfältiger sind als gemeinhin angenommen. Auch das sich durch die weitere Integration von Belarus in den russischen sicherheitspolitischen Orbit andeutende Destabilisierungsdreieck eröffnet dem Kreml zusätzliche militärische Optionen gegenüber Kiew. Um Moskau von derlei Schritten abzuhalten, sollte sich auch der Westen strategisch auf eine Eskalation einstellen und Sanktionen gegenüber Moskau und Minsk vorbereiten. Diese sollten auch die Möglichkeit vorsehen, Nord Stream 2 vorerst nicht in Betrieb zu nehmen. Darüber hinaus könnte die EU im Schwarzen Meer aktiv Präsenz zeigen, um die Südflanke der Ukraine zu entlasten und existierende bilaterale Militärhilfe in einer effektiven Ausbildungs- und Beratermission zu bündeln. In jedem Fall bedarf es neben Sanktionen auch einer sicherheitspolitischen Präsenz.

In discussing the overexploitation of our oceans, the role of the latter in food and nutrition security and the livelihoods of millions of people, especially in the Global South, is often forgotten. The authors appeal to actors in international cooperation to devote more attention to fisheries in their policies and address the challenges which this sector is facing in a more determined manner.

In discussing the overexploitation of our oceans, the role of the latter in food and nutrition security and the livelihoods of millions of people, especially in the Global South, is often forgotten. The authors appeal to actors in international cooperation to devote more attention to fisheries in their policies and address the challenges which this sector is facing in a more determined manner.

In discussing the overexploitation of our oceans, the role of the latter in food and nutrition security and the livelihoods of millions of people, especially in the Global South, is often forgotten. The authors appeal to actors in international cooperation to devote more attention to fisheries in their policies and address the challenges which this sector is facing in a more determined manner.

Ricardo López-Aranda. Comentario Elcano 32/2021 - 24/11/2021

En esta cumbre se aboradarán tres áreas principales: combatir la corrupción, defenderse del autoritarismo y el respeto de los derechos humanos.

The Africa Yearbook covers major domestic political developments, the foreign policy and socio-economic trends in sub-Sahara Africa – all related to developments in one calendar year. The chapter reviews the partnership between Africa and Europe over the course of 2020, with a special view to peace and security, trade relations, and investments as well as a regional focus.

The Africa Yearbook covers major domestic political developments, the foreign policy and socio-economic trends in sub-Sahara Africa – all related to developments in one calendar year. The chapter reviews the partnership between Africa and Europe over the course of 2020, with a special view to peace and security, trade relations, and investments as well as a regional focus.

The Africa Yearbook covers major domestic political developments, the foreign policy and socio-economic trends in sub-Sahara Africa – all related to developments in one calendar year. The chapter reviews the partnership between Africa and Europe over the course of 2020, with a special view to peace and security, trade relations, and investments as well as a regional focus.

Den Koalitionsvertrag von SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP haben mit dem Koalitionsvertrag einen vielversprechenden Start hingelegt. Die Harmonie und der Zusammenhalt der drei Parteien nach außen sind beeindruckend und scheinen eine gute, vertrauensvolle Basis für die Regierungsarbeit zu sein.

Der Koalitionsvertrag ist ausgewogen und ambitioniert. Er ist ausgewogen, da er dem Dreiklang an Aufgaben – dem Klimaschutz, der digitalen Transformation und der sozialen Erneuerung – gleichermaßen großes Gewicht gibt. Er ist ambitioniert, da er eine Fülle von Maßnahmen vorsieht, die nicht nur das Erreichen der Klimaschutzziele bis 2030 ermöglichen, sondern auch konsistent mit dem 1,5-Grad-Ziel sind. Damit würde Deutschland eine Vorreiterrolle in Europa einnehmen und ein wichtiges Signal an die Nachbarn senden.

Neben dem Kapitel zu Nachhaltigkeit und Klimaschutz ist vor allem die soziale Agenda überzeugend. Der Koalitionsvertrag verspricht eine große Palette an Maßnahmen, um Bildung und Forschung, soziale Absicherung, Familien und Inklusion zu stärken. Ob dies gelingt, hängt nicht nur von der neuen Bundesregierung, sondern auch von den Bundesländern ab.

Die wirtschaftspolitische Agenda halte ich für zu wenig ambitioniert. Die Ampel-Koalition will zwar eine schnelle digitale Transformation und eine Entbürokratisierung, die Maßnahmen sind jedoch zu wenig konkret oder nicht immer realistisch. Der Schwerpunkt scheint zu sehr auf einer rückwärtsgewandten Wirtschaftspolitik zu liegen, den Hauptfokus auf die Industrie und Automobilbranche halte ich für ein schlechtes Signal.

Ich hätte mir auch einen wesentlich stärkeren Fokus auf Europa und Multilateralismus gewünscht, denn fast alle der besprochenen Bereiche werden eine engere Koordination auf europäischer Ebene verlangen.

Der Koalitionsvertrag beinhaltet massive Zukunftsinvestitionen. Es bleibt jedoch offen, wie diese finanziert werden sollen. Der Koalitionsvertrag löst den Widerspruch von Steuersenkungen, Einhaltung der Schuldenbremse ab 2023 und höheren Staatsausgaben nicht nur nicht auf, sondern verschärft ihn.

Ungelöst bleibt auch die Finanzierung der Sozialsysteme, vor allem der gesetzlichen Rente, deren Kosten in Zukunft explodieren werden und ein frühzeitiges Gegensteuern erfordern. Hier sollte die Koalition in den kommenden Monaten nachbessern.

Connecting Ukraine to the continental European power grid and the EU’s electricity market is on the political agenda. However, establishing the necessary grid connec­tions is technically complicated and also requires profound reforms to the Ukrainian electricity sector. But it is not only Ukraine that has to deliver; the EU and its member states will also have to make far-reaching and hugely significant geopolitical decisions. The project needs a politically coordinated roadmap that defines clear criteria and conditions for a common electricity grid.

To support UN Security Council members in their reconsideration of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) mandate this year, the Global Center on Cooperative Security (Global Center) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) undertook an extensive research and consultation process. This brief outlines findings and recommendations for the upcoming renewal of CTED’s mandate, building on this research and consultation process.

A broad range of stakeholders were consulted, including current CTC members and other UN member states, UN representatives, and civil society actors. Information was gathered through a widely distributed survey, bilateral interviews, three focus-group discussions, and two workshops held on 28 July and 3 November 2021. Along with providing analysis of the implementation of CTED’s mandate, the intention was to provide an informal Track II setting for member states and other stakeholders to engage on priorities for the mandate renewal and to solicit input into the formal negotiation process from underrepresented parties, including civil society.

The current mandate of CTED is due to be renewed by 31 December 2021. This takes place a few months after the UN General Assembly’s consensus adoption of the seventh review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The renewal of CTED’s mandate coincides with a change in leadership; after four years, CTED’s Executive Director, Assistant Secretary-General Michèle Coninsx, will be leaving by the end of the year. It also coincides with the December renewal of the mandates of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1526 and 2253 and the Office of the Ombudsperson to the sanctions committee. The conjuncture of these processes occurs shortly after the 20th anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the adoption of Resolution 1373, the council’s seminal counterterrorism resolution that created the CounterTerrorism Committee (CTC), which CTED was established to support.

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The (im)possibility of governance of the transformation to sustainability (T2S) is driven by how the related multiple transition processes as well as the various functional, institutional and bargaining interactions among relevant agents or stakeholders can be steered. Like other transformation processes, T2S is an immediate response to threats and risks behind structural changes. In addition, T2S is a “purposive new normal” because it seeks ways to achieve a new equilibrium whereby the system is able to effectively confront or prevent imminent threats and risks. At the same time, this paper claims that there can be more than one version of the new equilibrium for each state or society. This paper argues against the “ahistoricity” (Geschichtslosigkeit) approach of much of the literature on T2S and contends that each country has a distinct set of socio-political (e.g. quality of institutions) and economic resources (e.g. gross national income) available, depending on its current standing.
The academic debate on transformation has re-emerged with intensity due to it increasingly being linked to the discourse on sustainability. One important thread of this transformation–sustainability nexus is the role of governance. While the academic literature on governing T2S can already build on decades of work, the debate on the three-fold interfacing of governance, transformation and sustainability still has major gaps to fill. This paper articulates an integrated approach in understanding the governance of T2S by bringing together perspectives from sociology, political science and economics (and their sub-disciplines) as puzzle parts. Connecting the different puzzle parts contributed by the different disciplines, this paper conceptualises the four types of resources needed to make governance conducive to T2S: vision, performance, social cohesion and resilience. The next step for this paper is to use these puzzle parts to form a framework to introduce three sets of scenarios of pathways for sustainable futures, the “SDG-aligned futures”. The three pathways leading to these SDG-aligned futures are political-transition-driven (or strong), societal-transition-driven (or cohesive) and economic-transition-driven (or efficient).
The three scenarios for SDG-aligned futures serve on one hand as the basis for the contextualisation of transformation for a more strategic application of appropriate solutions by focussing on what governance structures, levels, processes and scales are conducive to T2S. At the same time, this approach resolves the “ahistoricity” dilemma in many concepts of T2S by highlighting that countries have different entry points when initiating T2S. The perspectives on the scenarios towards a sustainable future provide multiple entry points for each country by specifying the departing stage for a specific country that consists of a set of path dependencies resulting from the country’s (1) historical experience (e.g. colonialism) and (2) national discourse (e.g. debate on the sustainable energy transition). As countries utilise the potentials of their already existing governance structures and implement policy reforms that occur within existing institutional and politico–legal structures as well as through social upheavals and fundamental changes (hence, resilience is fundamental to T2S), these pathways are aligned by the Sustainable Development Goals, leading to coherent societal priorities and policy mixes.

The (im)possibility of governance of the transformation to sustainability (T2S) is driven by how the related multiple transition processes as well as the various functional, institutional and bargaining interactions among relevant agents or stakeholders can be steered. Like other transformation processes, T2S is an immediate response to threats and risks behind structural changes. In addition, T2S is a “purposive new normal” because it seeks ways to achieve a new equilibrium whereby the system is able to effectively confront or prevent imminent threats and risks. At the same time, this paper claims that there can be more than one version of the new equilibrium for each state or society. This paper argues against the “ahistoricity” (Geschichtslosigkeit) approach of much of the literature on T2S and contends that each country has a distinct set of socio-political (e.g. quality of institutions) and economic resources (e.g. gross national income) available, depending on its current standing.
The academic debate on transformation has re-emerged with intensity due to it increasingly being linked to the discourse on sustainability. One important thread of this transformation–sustainability nexus is the role of governance. While the academic literature on governing T2S can already build on decades of work, the debate on the three-fold interfacing of governance, transformation and sustainability still has major gaps to fill. This paper articulates an integrated approach in understanding the governance of T2S by bringing together perspectives from sociology, political science and economics (and their sub-disciplines) as puzzle parts. Connecting the different puzzle parts contributed by the different disciplines, this paper conceptualises the four types of resources needed to make governance conducive to T2S: vision, performance, social cohesion and resilience. The next step for this paper is to use these puzzle parts to form a framework to introduce three sets of scenarios of pathways for sustainable futures, the “SDG-aligned futures”. The three pathways leading to these SDG-aligned futures are political-transition-driven (or strong), societal-transition-driven (or cohesive) and economic-transition-driven (or efficient).
The three scenarios for SDG-aligned futures serve on one hand as the basis for the contextualisation of transformation for a more strategic application of appropriate solutions by focussing on what governance structures, levels, processes and scales are conducive to T2S. At the same time, this approach resolves the “ahistoricity” dilemma in many concepts of T2S by highlighting that countries have different entry points when initiating T2S. The perspectives on the scenarios towards a sustainable future provide multiple entry points for each country by specifying the departing stage for a specific country that consists of a set of path dependencies resulting from the country’s (1) historical experience (e.g. colonialism) and (2) national discourse (e.g. debate on the sustainable energy transition). As countries utilise the potentials of their already existing governance structures and implement policy reforms that occur within existing institutional and politico–legal structures as well as through social upheavals and fundamental changes (hence, resilience is fundamental to T2S), these pathways are aligned by the Sustainable Development Goals, leading to coherent societal priorities and policy mixes.

The (im)possibility of governance of the transformation to sustainability (T2S) is driven by how the related multiple transition processes as well as the various functional, institutional and bargaining interactions among relevant agents or stakeholders can be steered. Like other transformation processes, T2S is an immediate response to threats and risks behind structural changes. In addition, T2S is a “purposive new normal” because it seeks ways to achieve a new equilibrium whereby the system is able to effectively confront or prevent imminent threats and risks. At the same time, this paper claims that there can be more than one version of the new equilibrium for each state or society. This paper argues against the “ahistoricity” (Geschichtslosigkeit) approach of much of the literature on T2S and contends that each country has a distinct set of socio-political (e.g. quality of institutions) and economic resources (e.g. gross national income) available, depending on its current standing.
The academic debate on transformation has re-emerged with intensity due to it increasingly being linked to the discourse on sustainability. One important thread of this transformation–sustainability nexus is the role of governance. While the academic literature on governing T2S can already build on decades of work, the debate on the three-fold interfacing of governance, transformation and sustainability still has major gaps to fill. This paper articulates an integrated approach in understanding the governance of T2S by bringing together perspectives from sociology, political science and economics (and their sub-disciplines) as puzzle parts. Connecting the different puzzle parts contributed by the different disciplines, this paper conceptualises the four types of resources needed to make governance conducive to T2S: vision, performance, social cohesion and resilience. The next step for this paper is to use these puzzle parts to form a framework to introduce three sets of scenarios of pathways for sustainable futures, the “SDG-aligned futures”. The three pathways leading to these SDG-aligned futures are political-transition-driven (or strong), societal-transition-driven (or cohesive) and economic-transition-driven (or efficient).
The three scenarios for SDG-aligned futures serve on one hand as the basis for the contextualisation of transformation for a more strategic application of appropriate solutions by focussing on what governance structures, levels, processes and scales are conducive to T2S. At the same time, this approach resolves the “ahistoricity” dilemma in many concepts of T2S by highlighting that countries have different entry points when initiating T2S. The perspectives on the scenarios towards a sustainable future provide multiple entry points for each country by specifying the departing stage for a specific country that consists of a set of path dependencies resulting from the country’s (1) historical experience (e.g. colonialism) and (2) national discourse (e.g. debate on the sustainable energy transition). As countries utilise the potentials of their already existing governance structures and implement policy reforms that occur within existing institutional and politico–legal structures as well as through social upheavals and fundamental changes (hence, resilience is fundamental to T2S), these pathways are aligned by the Sustainable Development Goals, leading to coherent societal priorities and policy mixes.

Social contracts and state fragility represent two sides of one coin. The former concept highlights that governments need to deliver three “Ps”—protection, provision, and political participation—to be acceptable for societies, whereas the latter argues that states can fail due to lack of authority (inhibiting protection), capacity (inhibiting provision), or legitimacy. Defunct social contracts often lead to popular unrest. Using empirical evidence from the Middle East and North Africa, we demonstrate how different notions of state fragility lead to different kinds of grievances and how they can be remedied by measures of social protection. Social protection is always a key element of government provision and hence a cornerstone of all social contracts. It can most easily counteract grievances that were triggered by decreasing provision (e.g., after subsidy reforms in Iran and Morocco) but also partially substitute for deficient protection (e.g., by the Palestinian National Authority, in pre-2011 Yemen) or participation (information campaign accompanying Moroccan subsidy cut; participatory set-ups for cash-for-work programmes in Jordan). It can even help maintain a minimum of state–society relations in states defunct in all three Ps (e.g., Yemen). Hence, social protection can be a powerful instrument to reduce state fragility and mend social contracts. Yet, to be effective, it needs to address grievances in an inclusive, rule-based, and non-discriminatory way. In addition, to gain legitimacy, governments should assume responsibility over social protection instead of outsourcing it to foreign donors.

Social contracts and state fragility represent two sides of one coin. The former concept highlights that governments need to deliver three “Ps”—protection, provision, and political participation—to be acceptable for societies, whereas the latter argues that states can fail due to lack of authority (inhibiting protection), capacity (inhibiting provision), or legitimacy. Defunct social contracts often lead to popular unrest. Using empirical evidence from the Middle East and North Africa, we demonstrate how different notions of state fragility lead to different kinds of grievances and how they can be remedied by measures of social protection. Social protection is always a key element of government provision and hence a cornerstone of all social contracts. It can most easily counteract grievances that were triggered by decreasing provision (e.g., after subsidy reforms in Iran and Morocco) but also partially substitute for deficient protection (e.g., by the Palestinian National Authority, in pre-2011 Yemen) or participation (information campaign accompanying Moroccan subsidy cut; participatory set-ups for cash-for-work programmes in Jordan). It can even help maintain a minimum of state–society relations in states defunct in all three Ps (e.g., Yemen). Hence, social protection can be a powerful instrument to reduce state fragility and mend social contracts. Yet, to be effective, it needs to address grievances in an inclusive, rule-based, and non-discriminatory way. In addition, to gain legitimacy, governments should assume responsibility over social protection instead of outsourcing it to foreign donors.

Social contracts and state fragility represent two sides of one coin. The former concept highlights that governments need to deliver three “Ps”—protection, provision, and political participation—to be acceptable for societies, whereas the latter argues that states can fail due to lack of authority (inhibiting protection), capacity (inhibiting provision), or legitimacy. Defunct social contracts often lead to popular unrest. Using empirical evidence from the Middle East and North Africa, we demonstrate how different notions of state fragility lead to different kinds of grievances and how they can be remedied by measures of social protection. Social protection is always a key element of government provision and hence a cornerstone of all social contracts. It can most easily counteract grievances that were triggered by decreasing provision (e.g., after subsidy reforms in Iran and Morocco) but also partially substitute for deficient protection (e.g., by the Palestinian National Authority, in pre-2011 Yemen) or participation (information campaign accompanying Moroccan subsidy cut; participatory set-ups for cash-for-work programmes in Jordan). It can even help maintain a minimum of state–society relations in states defunct in all three Ps (e.g., Yemen). Hence, social protection can be a powerful instrument to reduce state fragility and mend social contracts. Yet, to be effective, it needs to address grievances in an inclusive, rule-based, and non-discriminatory way. In addition, to gain legitimacy, governments should assume responsibility over social protection instead of outsourcing it to foreign donors.