Defense Industry Daily

Mi-28N with MMR
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In August 2012, Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev pledged that the state would buy 60 Mi-28UB attack and training helicopters by 2020. That would be good news for the VVS, as well as the Rosvertol plant at Rostov on Don.

Russia is slowly modernizing its military, and its attack helicopter force is one of the areas being given priority. New Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-28N Night Hunter machines are beginning to replace the VVS’ 240 or so old Mi-24 gunships, but training has been an issue for the nascent Mi-28 fleet.

The Mi-28 Attack Helicopter Aerobatics video

Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 places the VVS’ Mi-28N inventory at 51 machines, with another 19 on order. The new Mi-28UB model, introduced in 2013, includes an enlarged cockpit for the instructor, and a larger canopy for the pilot. It can be flown from either the pilot’s cockpit or the second seat, and it retains full attack helicopter functionality.

Implementation of Bondarev’s promise would give Russia 130 Mi-28s by 2020, alongside 140+ Ka-52s. That would more than replace the current Mi-24 Hind fleet, and Russia has also ordered 60+ modernized Mi-35M Hinds to help fill in the gaps.

The Mi-28N is most often compared to the American AH-64, as it shares the same basic heavily-armed attack helicopter layout. The specifications above illustrate some of the basic differences between the 2 machines, but the bigger differences relate to concept of employment, and are reflected in harder to see areas like onboard electronics.

Russia is the largest Mi-28 operator, with 70 machines delivered or on order. Flight International’s World Air Forces 2013 also lists 16 Mi-28s ordered by Kenya, with 5 delivered, and Iraq is reportedly in the process of buying about 30 Mi-28NEs. If a deal is done, the Iraqi helicopters’ configuration may serve as a proxy for assessing the state of the platform’s development.

Rosvertol stated in a June 6/10 investors announcement that Algeria had expressed interest in up to 42 machines, and that became a contract in December 2013. Iraq has also purchased 15, and a Rostvertol report cited serious prospects in Egypt, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

India trialed the Mi-28N against the AH-64D, and chose the American helicopter in 2011. Indian media reported that the AH-64D displayed better maneuverability, more multi-role capability, and better capacity to accept upgrades.

Contracts & Key Events Mi-28UB, 1st flight
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The Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant developed the Mi-28N Night Hunter, and they’ve been produced at the Rosvertol aviation plant since 2005.

August 1/16: The latest version of the Mi-28NM has been spotted at the Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, with pictures capturing the attack helicopter on its first hover. In development since 2008, a prototype first flew in 2015 with further tests to continue before delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry later this year. The improved version comes equipped with surveillance radar, an advanced suite of optical-electronic sensors mounted in the new nose turret, and a dual control system which allows the navigator-operator to operate the machine if required.

April 26/16: Russia has placed an order for 24 Mi-28UB attack and two 26 transport helicopters. Contracts were signed between Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Berisov and Director General of Russian Helicopters Alexander Mikheyev. The Mi-28 are to be the first procured to come with dual controls and improved flight crew ergonomics. Improvements to the helicopter come as the Russian military aims to improve combat training speeds for crews alongside increasing the helicopter’s operability, safety and combat capabilities.

June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Deliveries to Russia are confirmed at 14 Mi-28Ns and 1 Mi-28UB. Evidence is conflicting, but the report also cites a 2013 prototype launch for the of Mi-28UB OP-1, and the helicopter and its and its mast mounted radar enclosure are photographed.

Iraq [foreign customer K-8] has its October 2012 order confirmed at 15 machines, and Algeria [foreign customer 012] is confirmed to have ordered 42 Mi-28NE attack helicopters on Dec 26/13. That Mi-28NE order makes them the type’s 2nd export customer after Iraq (15), but they are the largest. Other serious prospects include Egypt [customer 818], Turkmenistan [customer 795], and Uzbekistan [customer 860].

The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. They decided to continue operations with an upgraded set of main gears in the 1st stage. Sources: Rostvertol PLC, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’, ZA2013 Year | LiveJournal bmpd [in Russian, incl. photos].

Dec 25/13: Russian Helicopters JSC announces that:

"The Mi-28N Night Hunter combat helicopter, made by Russian Helicopters a subsidiary of Oboronprom and part of State Corporation Rostec, has officially entered into service with the Russian Defence Ministry under an order signed by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu."

This is a formality. The Russians have of course been flying them for several years now, and the Mi-28N has served as the mount for Russia's Golden Eagles (Berkuty) helicopter aerobatics team since 2012. Sources: Russian Helicopters, "Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopter enters into service with the Russian Defence Ministry".

Aug 10/13: Mi-28UB. Russian Lt. Gen. Viktor Bondarev says that they intend to buy 60 Mi-28UB helicopters by 2020, with a dual training and attack role. The intent is "4-6 [Mi-28UB] helicopters for each unit that has Mi-28N in service," allowing in-unit training while retaining combat power. Source: RIA Novosti, "Russian Air Force to Get 60 Mi-28UB Helicopters by 2020".

Aug 9/13: 1st flight. The Mi-28UB training and attack helicopter conducts its official maiden demonstration flight at the Rostvertol subsidiary in Rostov-on-Don. That plant manufactures Mi-28NE and Mi-35M attack helicopters, as well as Mi-26T super-heavy transport helicopters. The Mi-28UB model is distinguished from the Mi-28N by its dual pilot controls, in order to allow for training.

The Mi-28UB's next destination will be the Zhukovsky airfield near Moscow, for its public unveiling during MAKS 2013. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC Aug 9/13 release.

Dec 26/12: Mi-28NM. A Russian air force (VVS) official says that draft tactical and technical specifications for a modernized Mi-28NM have passed preliminary approval by VVS General Command. A commission on modernization of the Mi-28N had been set up in 2009.

The question is what might be in that modernization. The VK-2500-02 engine could be switched for the VK-2500-03 used in the Ka-52K, which has slightly higher maximum power. There have been some external questions regarding the operational readiness of the type's Arbalets mast-mounted radar, which is seen very rarely on photos of deployed helicopters, so improvements in that area are another possibility. Another obvious improvement area would involve communications technologies, and there's always room for improving an attack helicopter's weapons array. It will be interesting to see what choices they make. Source: RIA.RU [in Russian].

Nov 15/12: Deliveries. Interfax-AVN reports that Russia's Western Military District received 20 Mi-28N helicopters this year, and expects about 20 more in 2013. Deliveries are clearly picking up. Source: Russian Helicopters JSC.

June 2012: Radar. Take-off magazine reports that the helicopter's Arbalets radar may have appeared in pictures for over 7 years, but it's still a work in progress:

"The mast-mounted radar being developed for the Mi-28N by the Ryazan State Instrument-Making Plant cleared a number of test hurdles this spring. In March, the radar's interdepartmental performance tests were completed... April 2013 saw the completion of the radar-equipped Mi-28N's preliminary trials in the Moscow Region and the release of the acceptance report recommending the radar's employment as part of production-standard helicopters of the type. The last hurdle remaining is the joint special flight tests of the helicopter equipped with the radar. Depending on the outcome of the tests, a decision will be made to launch the radar's production.... Concurrently, the radar's export version, designated as N025E, is being developed to equip the Mi-28NE export model..."

Feb 15/11: Grounded. The VVS reportedly grounds its Mi-28 fleet after a crash near Starvopol kills the pilot. Source: Washington Post [dead link].

Additional Readings Background: Helicopter

• Russian Helicopters JSC - Mi-28N

• Take-off (June 2012) - New Mi-28N versions in the pipeline. Also deals with the state of the Arbalets radar.

• DID (July 20/06) - Russia Commits to Multi-Year Buy of 67 Mi-28 Attack Helicopters

• DID - Baby Come Back: Iraq is Buying Russian Weapons Again. Including Mi-28NEs.

Competitors

• DID - Russia’s Ka-52 Alligator Scout-Attack Helicopters

• DID - AH-64E Apache Block III: The Once and Future Attack Helicopter

• DID - Turkey Finally Lands Its Attack Helicopters. The T129 ATAK, formerly the A129 Mangusta.

• DID - Tiger, Tamed? Eurocopter’s New EC665 HAD Helicopters

Americas

• While Canada’s government continues to flounder on its CF-18 fighter replacement, it still continues to contribute to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Since the Liberal Party’s campaign promise to ditch the F-35 and launch a new replacement competition, they continued paying $33 million into the program. Meanwhile, consultations have taken place with fighter manufacturers which some see as simply giving the Liberals political cover to buy a plane other than the F-35 without holding a competition. If a fair and free competition were to include Lockheed Martin, a fair bet would be on the F-35 winning.

• Officials from South Korea and the US have met in Washington for their first set of talks to discuss the transfer of technologies for the former’s upcoming KF-X indigenous fighter. Approval had been given for the transfer of 21 technologies as part of Seoul’s commitment to purchase 40 F-35s, however Washington refused on four core technologies, saying they would need to be developed domestically by South Korea. The meeting saw further discussion of the core technologies in question as well as technologies related to the development of the medium-altitude UAV.

• A growth in Paveway guided bomb sales has resulted in Raytheon posting better than expected quarterly revenues for 2016. The sales saw the company’s missile division posting a 6% increase in the second quarter. International sales accounted for a third of all guided munitions with half of exports coming from governments in the Middle East and Africa.

Middle East North Africa

• The Israeli Air Force has announced that its first F-35I “Adir” fighter has flown in the USA and the flight of a second jet is expected shortly. A pilot from lead manufacturer Lockheed Martin will conduct a number of further tests prior to the fighters’ delivery to Israel on December 12. As with its existing fleets of F-15 and F-16s, Israeli F-35As will be heavily customized to suit the IAF’s needs.

Europe

• Despite Bexit, a falling Pound Sterling and a whole lot of uncertainty, BAE Systems has claimed recent events have not resulted in a short-term impact on their business. The company’s statement comes as it rolls out first-half results that show a small rise in revenues compared to 2015. Overall company revenues continued to be dominated by the US with 36 percent of revenues in the first half. Britain and Saudi Arabia remain the company’s other major markets.

Asia Pacific

• Plans for October? Mitsubishi’s X-2 stealth demonstrator is to go on public display at Gifu Air Base, Japan, on October 30. This will be one of the first times regular punters can get up close and personal with the new jet following its maiden flight in April. For those rushing to check those dates, authorities have advised to leave the cars at home and come via rail.

• The Indian government has backtracked on a plan to procure six A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) aircraft for the Indian Air Force. This marks the second time that India has scrapped the aircraft’s tender which is estimated at $2 billion. But Airbus, already in the midst of financial hits due to its A400M transporter, seems to be remaining confident with an official saying the company “will engage with the Indian government in finding a way to bring the A330 MRTT’s capabilities to the IAF.”

• Negotiations continued regarding the modernization of 194 Sukhoi Su-30MKI aircraft operated by the Indian Air Force. A visiting delegation from Russia came to New Delhi to explain their “Super Sukhoi” concept, which if implemented, will give the aircraft near-fifth generation capabilities and effectiveness. With the deal expected to be finalized within four to six months, the project is expected to top $8 billion.

Today’s Video

India’s Super Sukhoi upgrade:

CF-18, 20-year colors
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Canada’s 138 “CF-18s” were delivered between 1982-1988, but accidents and retirements have reduced the fleet to about 103, with only 79 upgraded F/A-18 AM/BM Hornets still operational. The CF-18s are expected to be phased out between 2017 – 2023. Maintenance and upgrades will remain necessary until then, and possibly beyond.

Canada has been an active Tier 3 partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, participating in both the Concept Demonstration Phase ($10 million) and the System Development and Demonstration Phase ($150 million). This USD $160 million has included funding from both the Department of National Defence, and from Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC). In the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development Phase of the F-35 program, it is estimated that Canada’s contribution will exceed C$ 550 million (about the same in USD) over 44 years. As of September 2011, the government had disbursed about C$ 335 million toward participation in the JSF Program, and related support to Canadian industry.

Now, 65 new CF-35As are Canada’s official choice to replace its Hornets – and estimates of the cost range from $17 billion to $45.8 billion. This article covers efforts to keep existing CF-18s fit for service, as well as Canada’s replacement fighter buy. As timelines continue to slip, these 2 programs have become more interdependent – and the F-35’s selection less certain.

Canada and the F-35 Timelines: The F-35’s, and Canada’s

Here’s the timeline as it has unfolded so far, along with Canada’s plans out to 2050. The timeline will change, but it’s unlikely to move F-35 fielding up to an earlier date. That’s a problem, because the CF-18s have a limited number of hours for safe flight, and they will reach those limits soon. Any delays to the F-35s will either raise costs again by forcing a major refurbishment of Canada’s CF-18s, or leave Canada with serious gaps in its fighter fleet.

(click to view full) From Canada’s OAG, 2012
(click to view full) F-35: Canadian Industrial Partners

The F-35 has been designed on 3 levels: operational, industrial, and political. The tiered partnership model created initial commitments by member governments, and a sub-contracting model that spread industrial benefits among committed partners was designed to create constituencies that would lobby for the F-35’s selection and production.

That approach has generally worked. It isn’t a coincidence that these industrial benefits have been the main defense used by Canadian governments whenever the F-35 purchase has been questioned, even though any other winner would also have to commit to a similar sort of arrangement. Existing recipients of public money will always fight harder, because the beneficiaries of any switch are only potential winners, who haven’t made big commitments that would be painful to undo. This political engineering approach saved the Dutch F-35 buy in the face of determined political opposition, even though the plane’s cost is forcing them to cut their planned fighter fleet by almost 2/3. Canada seems headed for a similar fate, and their industrial participants include:

According to the government’s Industry Canada, contracts as of summer 2013 totaled C$ 503 million, while total future contracts are estimated at C$ 9.429 billion: C$ 8.261 billion if existing contracts are extended over the scheduled number of fighters, plus another C$ 1.168 billion in identified production & service opportunities.

Given the sharp order cuts we’re seeing in even Tier 2 partners like Britain and the Netherlands, and the USA’s long-term fiscal situation, Lockheed Martin might be lucky to produce half of the expected number of F-35s. Lockheed Martin would argue that one can only publish official figures using official estimates, and they’d have a point, but an honest debate can’t be blind to reality. This is a dilemma for all F-35 partners, and it needs to be kept in mind when reading estimates of the program’s long-term industrial value.

A Word on Stealth The Stealthy Mosquito F-35A & F-22A
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Military discussion in Canada has been almost non-existent, beyond hand-waving and the grossest generalizations. The strategic requirements for new fighters, and whether the choices available can do those jobs at acceptable cost, doesn’t much concern Canada’s governing class. Such references as have been made generally revolve around the need for stealth, without explaining the concept.

The thing to remember is that stealth isn’t invisibility, just a shorter detection distance. To use a very simplified and very Canadian analogy, a mosquito will have to be a lot closer to you before you’ll see it, compared to a sparrow. Hence all those “surprise” bites, as they exploit the gaps in your perception and get in close enough to strike. They aren’t invisible, though you might swear otherwise at times. On the other hand, if you use other parts of the spectrum by employing your ears, even a tiny mosquito can be detected at uncomfortably long distances in a quiet room.

That’s just the beginning of your problem, of course. Awareness must be followed by pinpointing and tracking its location, and then it must come within your killing range.

It’s basically the same sequence for enemy systems. A fighter can survive by defeating any one link in the detection – tracking – reach – kill chain. Stealth complicates all 3 areas, shortening detection ranges, making tracking more difficult, and frustrating or weakening final stage radar guided missile locks.

Other manufacturers are correct when they respond that modern jets without the stealth marketing have much better radar cross sections that Canada’s existing CF-18s. Even so, the CF-35’s stealth will be a step beyond other fighters on offer to Canada, albeit a step below the USAF’s F-22A Raptors and F-35s. The thing is, modern fighters, missiles, and radars have been making their own parallel improvements over the last decade. To the point where even the F-35’s ability to prevail against high-end enemy air defense systems, and against fighters fielded after 2030, is a matter of controversy.

Design Choices: America vs. Europe Eurofighter & Meteor
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The Americans had better hope that stealth continues to work in practice. They’ve placed their entire future fighter bet on stealth, and are paying the accompanying financial and operational costs.

The Europeans, in contrast, looked askance at the added construction and maintenance costs of stealth, and at the huge expense of aerodynamic changes once a stealth design is set. They opted instead for radar cross-section reduction that stopped short of full stealth, plus high kinematic performance. Advanced electronic warfare and defensive systems integrated into the planes, non-standard sensors like Infra-Red Search & Track, and long-reach weapons like the Meteor air-to-air missile and stealthy cruise missiles, would all improve protection in other ways.

Who is right?

The answer to this question is very consequential to Canada, but it’s hard to say at this point, because the respective approaches haven’t been fully tested against top-end enemy systems. American stealth worked very well against Iraq, twice. Modern European fighters were more than sufficient over Libya in 2011, however; and the stealthless Israelis sliced through dense Syrian air defenses in 2007, using planning, jammming, and well-chosen weapons to destroy a nuclear reactor.

If stealth remains fully or mostly relevant, even as a matter of faith rather than proof, Europe’s high-end jets will be unable to compete with American stealth fighters. Worse, the F-35’s full-rate production costs beyond 2020 would make it lethal in export competitions.

On the other hand, if jamming keeps pace, or if stealth’s advantages can be beaten or watered down, the European approach can create cheaper planes with better aerodynamic performance.

Changing the Game? PIRATE IRST:
B-2, ICU
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Right now, modern ground radars are lengthening the ranges at which stealth aircraft can be detected, and AESA fighter radars are getting better. Those trends will continue, but neither will invalidate stealth on its own. With that said, there are at least 2 key technologies that could significantly change stealth design’s cost:benefit ratio.

Infrared Search & Track (IRST) systems on planes like the Eurofighter and Rafale, on the F-35 itself, and on most Russian-designed fighters, already offers a potential alternative to radar in aerial engagements. The B-2 picture above was taken by a Eurofighter’s PIRATE IRST system, and used in a presentation to the Norwegian government. The mechanics of fuel circulation in the F-35 are intended to make heat-based lock-ons harder to achieve, and there are pilot-activated additives that can even frustrate locks from tailpipe exhaust, but processors will continue to improve, and so will infrared detection arrays. IRST will remain a potent and improving solution for detection and location, and the mere friction of an airplane cutting through the atmosphere at high speed is very hard to hide completely.

The greatest long-term threat to stealth is probably a combination of “passive” radars that collect input from wider slices of the spectrum. They’d need to be paired with ever-expanding processing power that can separate anomalies from the clutter by collating multiple input types, and with networked analysis that collates multiple sensor systems. Early research and tests have begun in this area, courtesy of firms like Saab and EADS.

Canada’s Choice Does Canada Have a Plan B? Canadian Parliament
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At present, it does not. One could even say that it took until 2013 for the government to offer a Plan A.

There’s an argument that Canada has no strategic need for a fighter in the F-35’s class, and might be better off spending the same amount of money on the same number of cheaper 4+ generation fighters, plus assets like MQ-9 UAVs that would deploy abroad with its troops, maritime patrol aircraft to improve surveillance, etc. To date, however, Canada’s military, governments, and media have all diligently avoided a strategic discussion that could separate, evaluate, and prioritize spending options. Instead, the debate has revolved around economic concerns, and the military’s wants.

A rigid and secretive procurement system has only exacerbated these tendencies. In the wake of the 20+ year rolling fiasco of its Maritime Helicopter Program competition, multi-billion dollar, single-source buys have characterized almost all Canadian defense procurements over the last 5-7 years. Canada’s choice of the F-35 has been no different, and the only real debate has taken place in the realm of federal elected politics. Opposition critics have cited significant cost uncertainties for the F-35, the shift toward UAVs, and the availability of cheaper aircraft on the global market as reasons to avoid a sole-source purchase. In its place, they’ve alternated between favoring an open fighter competition with public criteria, and making noises about avoiding a fighter buy altogether.

A 2011 election seemed likely to decide the issue, and the F-35 became a campaign topic. The results were indeed decisive, as the governing Conservative Party finally won its long-sought majority.

F-35A: open doors
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That result left the F-35 with a number of elements in its favor.

One is the structure of the Canadian Parliamentary system, in which a majority government has no meaningful checks and balances. If the current majority Conservative Party government wants a plane, it can force the sale through, easily. The Conservatives in particular will bear little political cost for doing so, because they have become the only party in the country with serious security credentials. The national security constituency largely lives within that party, and will be happy that something is being done after decades of neglect. The rest of the population isn’t overly interested. The Liberal Party found this out to their sorrow when they tried to make the F-35 an election issue in 2011, and watched the attempt fizzle. They had a solid case, but the messenger had no credibility with people who were interested in the issue.

Another point in the F-35’s favor is its industrial program. It’s working as intended, by creating industrial constituencies with a strong interest in keeping the purchase. The power of that constituency is partly offset by the fact that Boeing, Canada’s largest aerospace player, is on the other side of the dispute. But only partly. Organizations billing actual dollars will always fight harder that those who might benefit at some future date. Which is why the F-35’s industrial benefits are the current focus of the government’s F-35 defense.

A third point in the Lightning’s favor is the commitment of senior DND members, who have gone public with a very absolute commitment. Never mind the fact that this commitment seems to mask some shoddy work underneath. In that circumstance, there’s little alternative to a no-compromise stonewall defense, until and unless senior leadership at DND changes.

Average flyaway cost estimates
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Barring a reversal in the next elections, therefore, only a large external shock can change Canada’s commitment to the F-35A. The F-35 program is busy providing that, as costs continue to rise, and major partner countries like the USA, Britain and Italy move to delay or cut their buys. Those moves will keep the plane at lower rates of production for a longer period of time, which makes each plane more expensive.

Unfortunately, Canada wants to begin replacing its CF-18s by 2017 – 2018. Which means that it needs to place an initial order by 2014 – 2015. The net effect is a fighter whose purchase costs are uncertain, but are clearly set to stay very high in the near term. Worse, at the time of purchase, the operating and maintenance outlays that comprise 2/3 of total lifecycle costs will be extremely vague.

The Harper government’s response has been to insist that the procurement budget is C$ 9 billion, period, and higher prices will just mean fewer planes bought. At some point, however, a low enough number of planes bought makes it impossible for them to cover their assigned missions. Canada’s air force is already close to that margin in asking for just 65 aircraft, in order to cover the 2nd largest country in the world and participate in international missions.

Politically, a “wait and see” strategy makes a lot of sense under these circumstances. Which is exactly what we’re seeing. Statements by ministers like Julian Fantino telegraphed that approach, without changing Canada’s underlying commitment. Perhaps some sort of “group buy” approach by the partners will bring purchase costs down, or program news may improve. If so, the purchase goes forward easily.

If the math continues to look grim, on the other hand, the difficult decisions can always be made later. The government’s shift of program leadership to the Public Works ministry, following a scathing 2012 auditor’s report, makes backtracking easier. The 1st real indication of cracks in the facade didn’t come until November 2012, when the government backed away from DND’s original tailored-for-F-35 fighter requirements. Would it matter?

What If… Potential Competitors EA-18G & F/A-18F
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The F-35 offers Canada the best stealth, the most advanced array of on-board sensors, and the best “user interface” for presenting all that information to its pilots. Strategy has been absent from all Canadian discussions, so if Canada is forced away from its commitment to the F-35, it’s going to be a decision driven by costs. Handicapping for any prospective replacement needs to reflect that.

The strongest competitor would be Boeing, with its twin-engine F/A-18E/F Super Hornet family. Its F-15E Strike Eagle family is arguably a far better fit for Canada’s military needs, but the Super Hornet is significantly cheaper at about USD$ 60 million flyaway cost, and offers perceived continuity with the existing CF-18 fleet. A Super Hornet buy also offers long-term commonality with the US Navy, ensuring that upgrades and improvements will be financed outside of Canada.

Australia also flies the Super Hornet, and a 3rd option would be for Canada to take a leaf from their playbook, buying a mix of Super Hornets and F-35As. Australia is about to take the next step in their approach, and fit out 12 RAAF Super Hornets as EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. That capability is unique to the Super Hornet platform, and it will always be in demand among international coalition partners. Fortunately, Canada is one of just 3-4 countries that could get EA-18G export clearance from the USA.

Eurofighter
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Canada’s large and remote territories have traditionally pushed their air force toward twin-engine fighters, and the Europeans offer a pair of advanced options. Of the two, EADS/BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon has far better odds, because it’s compatible with the American weapons that Canada’s air force currently stockpiles, and is used by a number of NATO countries who will help to modernize it over time. The cockpit’s sensor fusion and voice commands got high marks from Canadian evaluators, and Libyan operations demonstrated their ability to Mach 1.2 supercruise at 40,000 feet with air-to-air weapons mounted. On the industrial front, Eurofighter’s connections with firms like Airbus and Thales offer it a good starting point to fulfill industrial offset requirements.

The Eurofighter’s flip side includes a cost that’s at or above current totals for the F-35A. It also has a very limited set of integrated weapons, with significant gaps in key areas like suppression of enemy air defenses and naval attack. Fortunately for Eurofighter, Canada’s arsenal is pretty basic, but the cost issue won’t go away as easily. Based on sales to date, Eurofighter costs are comfortably above USD$ 100 million. That will make it difficult for them to position themselves as a better deal than Canada’s existing F-35 commitment.

Rafale with MICA
missiles, Reco-NG pod
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Dassault’s Rafale is a capable, combat-proven multi-role plane, but it comes with a number of problems from Canada’s point of view. Industrial presence and offsets may prove to be a challenge for Dassault, and the plane has no confirmed export sales yet, despite promising signals from India and the Middle East. Unless that promise turns into orders by the time Canada needs to make a decision, long-term modernization costs must also be a serious concern for the Rafale.

Then, there’s the question of absolute purchase cost. The Rafale was judged to be slightly cheaper than the Eurofighter by India’s evaluators, but it’s still a high-end fighter in the $100 million range. Worse, weapon incompatibilities mean that Canada would need either new stocks of missiles, or an expensive integration program. The combined purchase cost would be unlikely to beat the Eurofighter, let alone the F-35.

JAS-39 Gripen Demo
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Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen could certainly beat the F-35 on price. It’s compatible with Canada’s existing weapons, has the requisite cold-weather pedigree, can be bought for around $60 million, and is built for very low maintenance costs compared to competitors like Eurofighter. It’s a single-engine fighter, like the F-35, but offsets that slightly with an exceptional reliability record in service. Saab’s undeveloped industrial presence in Canada will be a challenge, but using the same GE F414 engine as the Super Hornet helps, and their international record for industrial offset programs is good. The plane is fully NATO-compatible, and earlier model JAS-39C/D Gripens already serve with NATO countries Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The Gripen’s problem is that its JAS-39E/F models won’t be available in numbers until 2023 or so, which is too late for Canada. The Swiss and Brazilians are solving a similar problem by getting leased JAS-39C/D aircraft on very attractive terms, until their more advanced JAS-39Es arrive. Sweden has cut its own active fleet size quite sharply, so there may be enough Gripens in storage to meet Canada’s needs. If not, a life extension program similar to the US Navy’s Hornet SLEP plans could keep 65 CF-18s flying for another 5 years, at a cost of about $1 billion. If the F-35’s schedule continues to slip, that may be necessary anyway.

There are reports that Saab pulled out of the competition in June 2013. Saab’s issue, if it gets an opening, is how to compete with a Super Hornet option whose production volume gives it a similar price, plus twin engines, long-term modernization assurance, local allied and expeditionary commonality, and lobbying from Canada’s biggest aerospace firm?

Contracts and Key Events 2014 – 2016

CF-18 & VVS MiG-29
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July 29/16: While Canada’s government continues to flounder on its CF-18 fighter replacement, it still continues to contribute to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Since the Liberal Party’s campaign promise to ditch the F-35 and launch a new replacement competition, they continued paying $33 million into the program. Meanwhile, consultations have taken place with fighter manufacturers which some see as simply giving the Liberals political cover to buy a plane other than the F-35 without holding a competition. If a fair and free competition were to include Lockheed Martin, a fair bet would be on the F-35 winning.

July 12/16: A total of five defense manufacturers have expressed an interest in supplying the replacement to Canada’s CF-18 fighters. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Eurofighter and Saab all took part in a conference call with Canadian officials last week, with Dassault planning to meet and discuss the matter at the Farnborough International Airshow this week. Lockheed, whose F-35 was dropped by the Canadian government, welcomed the meetings as a first step towards a new competition.

July 8/16: Canadian Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan has called for a return to the drawing board on Canada’s CF-18 replacement by reaching out to fighter manufacturers for consultations this summer. The news comes amid reports that Canada was going to purchase Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornets as a stop gap (or kicking the can down the road) without the new competition promised by the Liberals during the election campaign. However Sajjan refused to commit to a new competition or independent oversight raising concerns that the bold promises made to ditch the F-35 is causing a capability crisis.

May 31/16: A new sense of urgency has been injected into Canada’s CF-18 fighter replacement by Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan, saying that the issue “needs to be dealt with quickly.” Speaking at the CANSEC defence and military trade show in Ottawa last week, Sajjan didn’t forget to remind reporters that the issue was inherited from the previous government while seemingly forgetting that it was the current Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau’s promise to ditch its participation in F-35 procurement in favor of a more affordable aircraft.

June 5/14: Decision, under wraps. Reuters reports from 3 unnamed sources that Canada’s NFPS report recommended sole-sourcing the F-35, but adds that the Conservative Party government is waiting until Parliament is dismissed for the summer before announcing the decision. That’s one way to try and avoid criticism.

The next question becomes how quickly the government signs a contract. If the government buys the jets before the 2015 elections after all (q.v. April 6/14), the F-35 will become an election issue again, and this time it could hurt the Conservatives. That’s Lockheed Martin’s best situation, because high cancellation costs would likely force the next government to keep the contract in place. If the Conservative Party government doesn’t sign a contract, on the other hand, the election issue loses its bite, but the F-35 buy would be at very grave risk if the Liberal and/or NDP parties win. Sources: Reuters, “Exclusive: Canadian review will recommend buying Lockheed F-35 fighter jet – sources”.

April 13/14: NFPS done. The Harper government has accepted the “options analysis” report from its National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) panel, after more than 18 months. As noted earlier (q.v. April 6/14), Canada won’t be able to order F-35s until 2015, and probably won’t do so until after the 2015 elections, if they place any orders at all. Sources: Postmedia News, “F-35 decision back in government’s court as air force completes major study”.

April 11/14: Stealth risks. The December 2012 report concerning Canada’s F-35 buy had a lot of cuts, including passages that highlighted ongoing problems with the program.

“But the Citizen has obtained more than a dozen earlier drafts of the report showing defence officials had originally laid out many of the issues surrounding the F-35’s development, and their potential impact on Canada [only to have them removed later].”

Issues that were removed from the Canadian report included fuel consumption that’s 26% higher than the CF-18s, problems with the Helmet-Mounted Display that have been cited in multiple US GAO and US DOT&E publications, and serious software delays involving the fighter’s 8+ million lines of code. That last item was the subject of a March 2014 report from the US GAO. Canada.com, “Final report on F-35 dropped references to fuel, IT problems”.

April 7/14: CF-18 Engines. Magellan Aerospace has been responsible for F404 engine maintenance & repairs for over 30 years, and that isn’t changing. Their latest contract is a C$ 55 million, 1-year award with an option for an additional year. Sources: Magellan Aerospace, “Magellan Aerospace Awarded Engine Maintenance Contract for CF-188 F404”.

April 6/14: Stall. Canada’s “buy profile” for the F-35 has been moved from 2017 to 2018, which means there won’t be a decision before the 2015 elections. That’s a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives the Conservative Party plausible deniability to say that it hasn’t made any decisions, which will keep the F-35 from becoming an issue again. On the other hand, the process itself has so alienated the other parties that unless the Conservatives win a majority, the F-35 buy will probably be canceled. Sources: Defense News, “Canada: No F-35 Buys Before 2018”.

Jan 22/14: Rafale. Dassault SVP of NATO affairs Yves Robins is quoted as saying that they’re offering Canada unrestricted transfers of technology if it picks the Rafale, including software source codes for servicing the planes. That’s something Canada won’t get with the F-35, and it’s being touted as a long-term cost savings that will let Canadian firms do more of the required maintenance. They’re also pushing the government to declare a competition.

CBC goes on to show that they don’t really grasp the issues, asking about the Rafale’s ability to operate alongside the USAF. France replies that this worked over Libya, but that isn’t the real question. The question is whether Canada could use its American weapons with the Rafale, without having to buy new weapons or conduct expensive integration and testing programs. In most cases, the answer is no. Sources: CBC News, “Dassault Aviation ramps up CF-18 replacement pitch”.

Jan 15/14: DND’s former assistant deputy minister for procurement, Alan Williams, explains why he thinks the entire review is a sham. The government hasn’t released its requirements for the fighter buy, and hasn’t solicited the full cost and performance data that would be required for an informed comparison. Williams is probably correct in his conclusion, but full price data would only come about as a result of an RFP – which is to say, after a competition is declared. Sources: Embassy magazine, “Feds haven’t changed perspective on F-35: Williams”.

Jan 2/14: Paperwork in. According to documents posted on a federal website on Thursday, the Canadian Forces have already prepared draft reports to the “National Fighter Procurement secretariat” on the price, the technical capabilities and the strategic advantages of the 4 fighter jets considered (F-35A, Eurofighter, Rafale, Super Hornets). Actually, the price isn’t included, except as a rough order of magnitude. That information wasn’t forthcoming from all manufacturers, and even Boeing would likely be quoting an Advanced Super Hornet model that isn’t being bought under its current multi-year Navy contract. A competition would be necessary in order to really know, and the key question from the start has been whether the Conservative government has ever had any genuine interest in a competition.

The RCAF is also reportedly finishing up its “Integrated Mission Risk Assessment,” though the quality of their work has been less than stellar in the past. Source: The Globe and Mail, “Military’s fighter-jet reports to put ball in Ottawa’s court on F-35s”.

2013

EA-18G: key systems
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Dec 10/13: Industrial. The federal government’s Industry Canada department releases a report detailing Canadian contracts to date from the F-35 program, explaining their calculation approach, and estimating future opportunities.

Contracts to date as of summer 2013 amount to C$ 503 million, while total future contracts are estimated at C$ 9.429 billion: 8.261 billion if existing contracts are extended over the scheduled number of fighters (a very dubious proposition, based on order cuts to date), plus another 1.168 billion in identified production & service opportunities. Sources: Canada IC, “Canadian Industrial Participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program”.

Nov 7/13: Sub-contractors. One modification shared by Canada and Norway’s F-35As will be drag chutes, which help with landings on short and/or ice-covered runways. Airborner Systems, “Airborne Systems Canada Supports Development of F-35 Drag Chute Program”:

“Airborne Systems is currently providing technical assistance to Lockheed Martin during the F-35 drag chute development. Their experience and expertise have contributed to the drag chute concept development which has led to the baseline design currently being finalized for the F-35A. Airborne Systems plans to continue supporting the drag chute development, flight test, certification and eventual production for the F-35 fleet.”

June 4/13: This headline from the [Parliament] Hill Times sums it all up, which is good, because the rest is subscription-only: “Prime Minister Harper, Cabinet to decide on F-35 fighter jets without advice from Public Works Procurement Secretariat, say Public Works officials.”

Saab’s decision looks very rational if this is true. Hill Times.

May 31/13: No Saab. “Senior government officials” confirm to Quebecor’s QMI news agency that Saab has decided not to participate in Public Works Canada’s market analysis phase.

That doesn’t keep Saab from entering a competitive process later, if there is one. Saab has told QMI that they will re-evaluate the decision once there’s a clear way forward in Canada. QMI, via Sun News.

April 28/13: Expected losses. Canada’s Postmedia News reports:

“In December 2011, the Defence Department’s research arm, Defence Research and Development Canada, published a report in which it said “that the probability of having 63 or more (F-35s) remaining at this time (when the last one is delivered) is approximately 54 per cent.”

Canada plans to order 65 F-35As, for delivery from 2017-2022. Their expectation is 7-11 destroyed aircraft over the fleet’s expected 42-year lifespan, with losses fitting the standard fighter pattern and being heavier in the early years. So they’re claculating a 46% chance that 2 or more F-35As are crashed or lost in the first 6 years. Not unusual, or unreasonable.

Where the math becomes more questionable is the expectation that Canada can order 65 F-35As plus accompanying spares, training equipment, etc. with its budgeted funds, while placing orders in the program’s early production years from 2014-2020.

March 3/13: RFI. Canada’s issues its official RFI/ “Industry Engagement Request”:

“Five identified companies with aircraft in production—The Boeing Company, Dassault Aviation, EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin and Saab Group—were previously sent a draft of the questionnaire on January 25, 2013, for comment. The National Fighter Procurement Secretariat received input from all five companies and their feedback is reflected in the final questionnaire, which the companies are being asked to complete within six weeks. A second questionnaire to obtain information on costs will be sent in draft form to the five companies for comment at a later date.”

See: Release | Final Industry Engagement Request: Capability, Production and Supportability Information Questionnaire.

Feb 27/13: Lifetime costs. Media traction for the Super Hornet, as Boeing has an opportunity to publicly tout their Super Hornet in a CBC TV report, which feature Boeing’s (Canadian) lead Super Hornet test pilot. The report also brings sustainment costs into Canada’s public debate for the first time, claiming $23 billion in lifetime savings from a Super Hornet buy:

“[Half] sounded too good to be true – so CBC News dug into Boeing’s figures to see how credible they are. According to the GAO, the Super Hornet actually costs the U.S. Navy $15,346 an hour to fly. It sounds like a lot – until you see that the U.S. Air Force’s official “target” for operating the F-35 is $31,900 an hour. The GAO says it’s a little more – closer to $32,500. CBC also asked Lockheed Martin to say if it had any quarrel with these numbers – and it did not…. Super Hornets, which Boeing says are 25 per cent cheaper to run than Canada’s “legacy” CF-18s.”

At this late point in the CF-18’s life, that’s certainly possible. At Lockheed Martin, they won’t publicly argue with the GAO, but they’re hopeful that its estimate will drop as the jet gains experience. At the same time, F-35 program manager Lt. Gen Bogdan has publicly pegged F-35 support projections as “just too high”, and vowed to bring them down.

With that said, the math using KPMG’s F-35 estimate as a starting point, and the GAO’s figures as the relative baselines, is that a Super Hornet buy might save Canada around $19.53 billion in ownership costs to 2042 ($37 – 17.47 billion operations). It will actually be less than that, because upgrades should be assumed to factor in at the same cost. So let’s say $15 billion. CBC also mistakenly assumes that an F/A-18E/F purchase price of around $60 million would also save half of the F-35 program’s $9 billion maximum purchase price, but it wouldn’t. Rather, it would allow Canada to buy all 65 fighters that the RCAF says are the minimum required, including 12 EA-18G electronic attack aircraft, instead of buying fewer than 65 F-35As. Of course, even $15 billion is a large enough figure to make a dent in the public debate. CBC article | CBC video: The Super Hornet.

Feb 14/13: More estimates. Canada’s government orders another cost estimate connected to their fighter replacement program:

“In December 2012, KPMG presented the Next Generation Fighter Capability: Life Cycle Cost Framework to the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat—a life-cycle cost framework for the F-35 program. The purpose of this new review is to ensure that the framework is appropriately applied by National Defence and that the cost estimates in the upcoming 2013 Annual Update are sound…. The notice of proposed procurement about the review is posted on the Government of Canada’s tendering system hosted on MERX. The contract is expected to be awarded in the coming weeks.”

Feb 13/13: Library of Parliament Report. Canada’s Library of Parliament issues “Estimating the Cost of Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets,” which chronicles the various cost estimates submitted to Parliament and in major published reports. One interesting change is noted by The Globe and Mail:

“The amount National Defence has set aside for weapons has been cut to just $52-million for the estimated 30-year operational life of the jets, compared with estimates in two previous reports of $270-million and $300-million.”

The key driver is a December 2012 Public Works report that said existing weapons in Canadian stocks wouldn’t be adequate over the fighter’s full 40-year life cycle. Which is reasonable. Compatibility with American weapons saves money in the near-term, but doesn’t change the need to buy items over the long term. Paveway laser-guided bombs last a long time, but existing AIM-120 missiles will need upgrades at the very least, and new weapons will become necessary over the next 40 years. Hence the statement that “over the life cycle of the replacement fleet, the acquisition of newer weapons will be considered and funded as separate projects.”

So, on the one hand it’s reasonable. On the other hand, weapons are a reasonable part of a fighter fleet’s cost, and the sudden change in terms is an obvious way to lower the published cost by a quarter billion dollars. Sources: Library of Parliament, Estimating the Cost of Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets”, Globe and Mail, “National Defence to buy fewer bombs if F-35 selected as new air force fighter”.

Feb 12/13: Whitewashed report? Comparing a Nov 1/12 copy of the draft Parliamentary Public Accounts committee report with the final November 2013 product shows the removal of important information that was shared during Spring 2011 hearings. Opposition members are incensed.

CP chronicles omissions including references to the F-35’s selection without competition, a caveat that the price tag per aircraft could almost double from the claimed USD $75 million to $138 million, and passages critical of the F-35’s industrial benefits program. More explosively, it dropped Auditor General Michael Ferguson’s testimony that the Conservative Party government had seen the full cost of the plan, as opposed to the final report that blamed DND for omissions. Ferguson’s stated concern that F-35 ownership costs could create problems for future defense budgets was also edited out, along with a passage of cost-related testimony from Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page, who has an unfriendly relationship with the current government. Sources: CBC News, “F-35 committee report strategically edited, draft suggests”.

Feb 11/13: Postmedia obtains documents from Canada’s 2005-2006 look at its fighter options, and discovers what DND thought of each option.

Eurofighter: “Remarkable” sensor fusion and fine cockpit, a powerful aircraft with effective air-to-air capabilities and reduced RCS, though it isn’t a full stealth aircraft. Might even be considered a borderline “5th generation” plane. The report worried about interoperability, and it also talked more bluntly about buying aircraft from anyone other than the USA. Relayed contents don’t mention Eurofighter’s low variety of integrated weapons and sensors, which is still an issue in 2013.

F/A-18 Super Hornet: Credible option with a lot of integrated weapons and bolt-on sensors, seen as a smaller shift for Canadian CF-18 maintainers. It seems to be the default backup for many nations that were considering the F-35 – and since then, the USN and Australia have proven them right. On the other hand, “It makes several compromises between approach speed, weight and structure.” The EA-18G electronic warfare option pursued by Australia is not reported, and seems not to have been mentioned.

JAS-39 Gripen: A “fairly stealthy” platform due to its small size, design, and use of radar-absorbing materials, but not a full stealth aircraft. They also liked its low maintenance costs. Its system for emergency landings and landings on short airfields is different from Canada’s, which would require changes. Doesn’t seem to have discussed the new JAS-39E/F, but then, the design was unclear at that time. It’s a lot clearer now.

Rafale: Seen a fast and maneuverable, with above-average range that’s a plus for Canada. Weren’t so impressed with the cockpit, and wondered about the Snecma M88 engine’s cold-weather performance. Relayed report contents didn’t focus on Rafale’s unique weapon incompatibilities with the American gear that fills Canada’s existing stores, and which can be diverted from US stocks for emergencies and joint efforts. That’s a big omission, but the relayed contents also missed Rafale’s strong SPECTRA electronic protection system, which proved itself over Libya 5 years later.

F-35: Saw its stealth features as unique. Flip side of this is that security at Canadian bases would become more elaborate and expensive. Worried that “many of the capabilities and performance features (of the F-35) such as signature, payload, speed, range and manoeuvrability, could change due to the U.S. focus on keeping the costs down.” Which is indeed happening. On the other side of the coin, F-35 sensors and sensor fusion are uniquely excellent, but that isn’t in the relayed report contents.

Canada’s competitor conclusions

Jan 29/13: Bridge buy? Canada’s Hill Times reports that Canada is considering a short-term bridging fighter buy. The key piece of information comes from the letter announcing the Industry Engagement Request, which also asked respondents to talk about options in to the 2020-2030 frame, and then options beyond 2030:

“The evaluation of options will review and assess all available fighter aircraft and will result in a comprehensive report with the best available information on the capabilities, costs, and risks of each option, including bridging and fleet options…”

That would put them in the same boat as Australia’s RAAF, which also flies upgraded F/A-18 Hornets. They’ve already received 12 F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters as a bridge, plus 12 more that will be converted to EA-18G electronic warfare and air defense suppression planes. Australia is finding that F-35 delays are creating the need for a longer bridge, and the RAAF could end up with a 50/50 long term split between the Super Hornet family and the F-35. In practice, a similar logic is likely for Canada: every “bridging” fighter bought is 1 fighter subtracted from their eventual F-35 order. Hill Times | CDFAI.

2012

F-35A, eh?
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Dec 16-17/12: Trust busted? An article in the Hill Times magazine quotes former DND assistant deputy minister for procurement Alan Williams, who says that “We know that the fiasco certainly started by the bureaucrats hijacking the process,” while ministers simply went along and didn’t ask questions.

The British TV hit “Yes, Minister” was based on that very premise, but this instance doesn’t seem to have the same comic value. Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page has had a publicly hostile relationship with the Conservative Party government, and he has been very critical of the CF-35 decision process (q.v. May 3/12), but it still matters when he says things like:

“Trust is broken. I don’t think you get, in terms of a reset, that trust back until you have that debate in front of Parliament…. From my view, the (F-35) process that we had up to date, certainly our experience in 2010-11, was a complete failure, and, I think, a lack of leadership both politically and I think by public servants as well…. There were numbers that existed at DND (Department of National Defence) that were much higher than what was presented to Parliament. Canadians saw the lower set of numbers… So in that sense, they were misled”

Dec 7/12: KPMG’s cost estimate. The precise figure for KPMG’s cost estimate is reported to be C$ 45.802 billion, based on an in-service life of 42 years. Current F-35 industrial participants are becoming worried, and a soon-to-be released companion study will take a second look at real figures for industrial benefits. Those estimates have already been quietly scaled back from C$ 12 billion to C$ 9.85 billion, and may drop further. The government defends their 20-year cost estimates, and they do have a point. Former treasury board official Michelle d’Auray:

“Going beyond 20 years is considered too high-risk to ensure that the value in contracting with industry would be sustained, or the costs would be going beyond the 20-year mark… So that, for us, is considered to be reasonable, and as the deputy minister of National Defence indicated, all of the submissions to date have been presented to the Treasury Board have used a 20-year cost estimate.”

Periods over 20 years are chancy for contracts, and wide potential variations in core inputs like fuel prices makes those estimates little better than guesses. Even guesses can still be of value, but only if they’re comparing components like fuel costs with other alternatives, using the same baseline pricing assumptions. See: Canadian Press | CTV | The Globe and Mail | National Post.

KPMG’s F-35A lifetime cost estimate

Dec 6/12: Not cancelled. Postmedia, which usually has good sources within the government, says Canada will pull out of the Joint Strike Fighter program. It turns out not to be true. Canada is about to analyze its options, and as noted earlier, Public Works has thrown out the specifications straightjacket. Early reports indicate that Boeing (Super Hornet) and Eurofighter have been approached for detailed information, with the possibility of broadening the invitation.

The other revelation in their article is that KPMG is done with their audit, which exceeds even the $29 billion maximum estimate from previous studies. Reports are pegging the potential 36-year lifecycle cost at C$ 40+ billion, though that involves a longer service life than previous estimates, and includes fuel costs. CBC | The Globe and Mail | National Post | Flight International.

Nov 30/12: Stealth. Gen. Tom Lawson, a former fighter pilot and Canada’s new chief of defence staff, tells a Parliamentary committee that the F-35 isn’t the only aircraft able to meet stealth requirements. The F-35 is better, he says, but when asked by Liberal defence critic John McKay whether there is only 1 airplane that can meet the Canadian military’s requirements in this area, Lawson said “no.” He later added, correctly, that “Fourth and fifth generation is not a very helpful way of looking at that aircraft.”

Canada’s exact “low observability” requirements, such as they are, have never been made public. It is true that even 4+ generation fighters like the Eurofighter, Gripen, Rafale, and Super Hornet will all have significantly smaller radar cross-sections that the current CF-18 fleet, even though several of them are bigger aircraft. The F-35 will be smaller again. See above for a more detailed discussion of “stealth.” CBC.

Nov 22/12: 1st cracks. Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose tells Canada’s House of Commons that Canada’s “review of options will not be constrained by the previous statement of requirements.” That seems minor, but it isn’t. DND’s requirements had been crafted to make the F-35 the only available choice, per the department’s standard pattern over the last 7-8 years. Breaking that lock opens up other options for consideration.

A serious analysis hasn’t been performed yet, but this statement is a sign that it could start. Much will depend on the exact people chosen to do the analyzing. CBC | CDFAI | iPolitics.ca.

Oct 22/12: New RCAF chief Lt.-Gen. Yvan Blondin tells the Canadian Press that DND hasn’t really begun looking at other fighter options beyond the F-35. A thorough examination of other possible aircraft would require a more detailed study by military planners, and he said that the order hasn’t been given. Blondin was asked twice during the interview whether other aircraft had been considered, and he replied: “No.”

That examination was central to the government’s promises after the negative 2011 Auditor General Report, so the government replied by saying that “work continues on the evaluation of options… The options analysis is a full evaluation of choices, not simply a refresh of the work that was done before.” None of which actually means that a serious evaluation is underway.

DID’s verdict: Lt-Gen. Blondin told the truth, and the government is being dishonest. There isn’t a serious analysis taking place. To date, any analysis has been a hasty and less-than-professional justification for a decision that’s already made. There is no sign yet that this pattern is changing. Canadian Press | Canada DND.

Sept 28/12. Requirements. Canada’s CBC obtains a redacted copy of Canada’s official Statement of Requirements for its next-generation fighter, and makes it available for download. As they explain:

“The Statement of Operational Requirements for Canada’s next jet fighter was produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force Directorate of Air Requirements in June, 2010. It wasn’t submitted to Canada’s Public Works department until after the government announced its decision to purchase 65 F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft in July, 2010. Normally Public Works is responsible for procuring hardware for the military after they have submitted their statement of requirements. [CBC Program} The Fifth Estate obtained this highly redacted copy through an Access to Information request.”

Sept 7/12: Auditor hired. KPMG has been given a $643,535 to review/audit projections for the CF-35. Their offer was 1 of 2 bids reviewed by Treasury Board and Public Works and Government Services Canada. CBC.

Aug 9/12: Delayed audit. Almost 2 months after its self-imposed deadline, Public Works quietly re-issued a tender, asking for an audit firm to come forward and take on the politically explosive task of verifying the F-35 figures provided by DND. The minister’s office tells Postmedia that the original tender was the problem, as it didn’t give accounting firms enough flexibility to sub-contract portions of the project. This might be important, in order to gain in-depth expertise in defense procurement.

The new tender doesn’t close until the end of August, which means the review might not even arrive in 2012. Postmedia.

May 24/12: Industrial. Lockheed Martin vice-president Steve O’Bryan talks to Canada’s Postmedia News about the F-35. They’re working on the understanding that Canada will place a production order in FY 2014

“Right now we will honour all existing contracts that we have. After that, all F-35 work will be directed into countries that are buying the airplane… What we have is the official statement out of the government and we’re working with the government. They’re committed to the F-35, they’ve selected it, and we haven’t had any change in that official position.”

That commitment has underpinned the JSF program’s work with Canadian firms, which the National Post reports as C$ 435 million to 66 Canadian companies since 1997. Even if those partnerships stop, however, Canadian procurement policies will require industrial offsets from the winner worth 100% of purchase value. The industrial question for the F-35 involves the perceived long term technical and financial value of their work to Canada’s aerospace industry, vs. the offsets their competitors might offer. That makes for a complex evaluation, but it’s often a component of big-ticket defense competitions around the world. Postmedia.

May 15/12: Gone Rogue? Following a round of Parliamentary hearings, in which senior DND bureaucrats are grilled about their CF-35 program estimates and conduct, NDP MP Malcolm Allen goes so far as to say that:

“This is a department that’s really gone rogue… [the minister] has totally lost control of that department… There’s no faith in this department anymore. None whatsoever.”

Allen is the Official Opposition party’s shadow minister for Agriculture, but he’s involved in the F-35 issue through his role on Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee. It’s expected that opposition members will oppose the government of the day, and the NDP’s socialism has always been coupled with an aversion to the military. With that said, for an MP in his position to level that kind of criticism at a government department, and use words like “no faith” and “out of control,” is a very rare thing. No political party rules forever, and if DND is seen as institutionally untrustworthy and dishonest by Canada’s other major parties, they will have created very dire future for themselves. Postmedia.

May 3/12: Was DND honest? Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page tells its Public Accounts Committee that the government withheld key information about the full costs of the F-35 in 2011, against explicit requests, in an effort to present a lower price tag to Canadians.

“Over the past few weeks, it has become clear that the Department of National Defence provided the PBO with figures that did not include all operating costs… The PBO understood that it had been provided with full life-cycle costs from DND as required… It seems difficult to understand how there could have been any confusion as to whether or not the PBO included operating costs within its estimate.”

DND officials say they understood that operations and maintenance costs should be excluded, but Page drew attention to the November 2010 committee motion that prompted PBO’s report. It specifically called for the release of all documents that outline life-cycle costs. Postmedia.

April 3/12: Auditor General report. The office of the Auditor General of Canada delivers its 2012 Spring report, including a chapter covering Canada’s process for selecting and then budgeting for the F-35. Based on previous stories concerning leaked drafts, the report has been softened and made more vague.

On the one hand, it describes how the F-35 program itself was built to circumvent normal procedures in participating governments, and make any subsequent competitions difficult to execute fairly. This is true, and beyond Canada’s influence. On the other hand, the report describes a number of instances where Canada’s DND has deliberately misled Parliament, a situation that past OAG reports have now detailed in almost every major Canadian defense procurement program over the last 5 years. Beyond deliberate deceptions, DND also made repeated assertions about both the F-35’s costs and its air needs that were not backed by any substantive analysis. Public Works Canada, which is supposed to serve in an independent oversight role, utterly failed in this duty, and was often hampered by DND’s refusal to provide information when it did attempt to act.

In response, the government “accepts the Auditor General’s recommendation and conclusions,” and commits to a number of steps. None of them imperil the F-35 program yet, or punish past misconduct, but the government is leaving themselves an official out.

The biggest apparent commitment is a freezing of funding at C$ 9 billion procurement and C$ 7 billion for support, followed by a statement from Associate Minister of National Defence Fantino that they “will acquire the F-35 only if and when we can operate within that budget.” This is less of a concession than it seems. First, it reiterates stated policy. Second, it freezes only the purchase cost. Support costs are even more likely to see serious cost inflation, but are the easiest to falsely assume away in advance. If they double to C$ 14 billion in real costs, Canada would have no option but to pay. Finally, it offers no other fighter options, or even preparation to make another fighter option feasible. Canada’s DND will “continue to evaluate options,” but the C$ 16 billion is still described as an F-35 acquisition budget, not a fighter acquisition budget. Likewise, the program’s new coordinating Secretariat in Public Works Canada is the F-35 Secretariat, though the effect clearly shifts authority out of the Department of National Defence, and away from Minister for National Defence Peter Mackay.

Annual updates to Parliament have now been promised, to be delivered within 60 days of receiving revised costing forecasts from the USA’s F-35 program. The question is whether these Parliamentary reports will continue to omit pertinent information that is not mentioned by the US office, or will otherwise improve the past record of incomplete and misleading reports. It’s more encouraging that Canada’s Treasury Board Secretariat will have to commission an independent review of DND’s acquisition and sustainment project assumptions and potential F-35 costs, and make that public, before a purchase contract is signed. OAG 2012 Spring Report. | Canada PWGSC/DND response | Canada’s CBC: video of OAG presentation.

OAG criticizes the program

April 3/12: F-35 schedule & costs. Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman takes a deep look into the Pentagon’s latest Selected Acquisition Reports, which was released on March 30/12. Some of the conclusions are very relevant to Canada’s choices:

“Another three-year slip to initial operational test and evaluation, the culmination of system development and demonstration, which now is due to be complete in 2019 – the target date is February but the threshold date is October… it appears that the main culprit is software and hardware, mainly in terms of… sensor fusion and emission control – that take place in the fighter’s main processor banks… In what follows, I’m going to use average procurement unit cost (APUC)… recurring flyaway is the lowest cost, but neither the US nor anyone else can put an aircraft on the ramp for that money. And all numbers are base-2012… The APUC for the F-35A in 2013-14 is $184-$188 million, versus $177m (2009 dollars) for the last F-22s. And that is at a much higher production rate.”

Most ominously for the F-35’s future cost structure:

“Although the basis of the numbers has been changed, the SAR still compares the F-35A with the F-16, and shows that the estimated CPFH [DID: Cost Per Flight Hour] for the F-35A has gone from 1.22 F-16s in the 2010 SAR to 1.42 today – versus 0.8 F-16s, which was being claimed a few years ago. Where is that operations and support money going to come from?”

March 20/12: Plan B? As Canada’s government gives conflicting signals about its F-35A commitment, and braces for a scathing Auditor General report about their pledged buy, other planes may get an opening:

” The likeliest contenders, should there be a competition, are U.S.-based Boeing, maker of the F-18 Super Hornet, and Dassault of France, maker of the Rafale… “In our world we’re already in a competition,” one industry insider said. “(Associate Defence Minister) Fantino himself said we’re basically looking at our options. There’s a team at (Department of National Defence) looking at the market. So it’s already on.”

Despite this report, Canada’s considerable stockpile of American-made air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons adds huge additional switching costs to an already-expensive Rafale aircraft, and makes it a very unlikely challenger. Post Media.

March 15/12: Auditor General. Canada’s Auditor General is carving out a respected niche in Canadian politics, and that may be bad news for the F-35. The office is due to deliver a report on Canada’s F-35 plans by April 3rd, and a draft copy has been circulating. It reportedly says that the air force relied more or less exclusively on Lockheed Martin for all key pricing and performance assertions, even as government officials failed to follow procurement rules. Globe and Mail | Macleans magazine | National Post | Post Media | UPI.

March 13/12: If? Deputy defense minister Julian Fantino tells the House of Common Defence Committee that Canada has made no commitment to the F-35A, and uses the word “if” with respect to any proposed buy. While he maintains Canada’s interest in the aircraft, the comments are seen as a marked change in tone. A later release by Canada’s DND highlights Fantino’s March 16/12 CADSI speech, in which he affirms the industrial benefits of the F-35 program. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. | Globe and Mail | iPolitics.ca | Toronto Star | Reuters || Canada’s DND.

March 2/12: Canada hosts a meeting of international F-35 program partners in its Washington Embassy, to discuss the future of the program. Canada’s DND | Canadian Press | Post Media | Reuters.

F-35 summit

2011

CF-18 ACES sim
(click to view full)

Nov 24/11: Norway’s costs. Norwegian MP Roger Ingebrigtsen [Troms, Labour Party], and Rear Admiral Arne Røksund, head of their Department of Defence Policy and Long-Term Planning, visit Canada. They respond to Canadian MP Christine Moore [Abitibi-Temiscamingue, NDP], who asks about Norway’s planned F-35 purchase:

“Mr. Roger Ingebrigtsen: It’s about $10 billion U.S. That’s for 51 or 52 air fighters. That’s $10 billion today…

RAdm Arne Røksund: …The life cycle costs will be, I think, about–this is not public yet, so I have to be careful – $40 billion U.S. over 30 years. So that’s life cycle costs over 30 years, all included.

Ms. Christine Moore: …So the $10 billion is simply to purchase the aircraft themselves.

RAdm Arne Røksund: That is for the planes, initial logistics included, repair kits, and so on, for the first few years.”

The purchase figures are consistent with accounts of NOK 61 – 72 billion, but the 30-year sustainment costs are new. Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch.

Oct 28/11: Canada’s National Post reports that Canada’s F-35A purchase may not be a sure thing, even though the majority government could easily force the sale through. Excerpts:

“This minister has a knack for projecting blithe confidence. But in this instance he is increasingly offside with other members of the cabinet and with the Prime Minister’s Office, sources familiar with the situation say… Indeed in defence circles, it is believed that Julian Fantino was installed as under-minister in charge of procurement partly to offset MacKay’s tendency to defer to the senior military brass… “The reaction is, where’s the competition, where’s the bidding, and what do you mean you don’t know the price?” acknowledges Senator Colin Kenny, former chair of the Senate defence committee and a strong proponent of the F-35… there are three elephants in the room…”

One is Canada’s 20-year, C$ 33 billion national military shipbuilding strategy, which is politically untouchable. The 2nd and 3rd issues refer to the effect of a possible slowdown and/or cut of F-35 buys in America and in Europe, which would raise the price for Canada’s planes. Our analysis: it’s too early to call Canada’s F-35 deal into serious question. On the other hand, if these reports are true, it’s no longer the sure thing that it seemed to be when Prime Minister Harper won his majority government.

Oct 23/11: Communications frozen? A Global TV News article reveals that the F-35 will have issues communicating during arctic patrols, because its satellite communications capability will be worse than the current CF-18 fleet’s when it’s delivered:

“Military aircraft operating in the high Arctic rely almost exclusively on satellite communications… The F-35 Lightning will eventually have the ability to communicate with satellites, but the software will not be available in the initial production run, said a senior Lockheed Martin official, who spoke on background… It is expected to be added to the aircraft when production reaches its fourth phase in 2019, but that is not guaranteed because research is still underway.”

Sept 6/11: CF-18 Sims. L-3 Link Simulation & Training announces a foreign military sale contract through US NAVAIR’s Training Systems Division, to upgrade Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CF-18 flight simulators located at Cold Lake, AB; Bagotville, PQ; and Ottawa, ON. The contract’s value was not disclosed.

L-3 Link is the original supplier for Canada’s 6 existing CF-18 Air Combat Emulators (ACEs), and 10 CF-18 Part Task Trainers, plus instructor/operator stations and brief/debrief systems. They will be upgraded with the latest F/A-18 training system capabilities, creating a common F/A-18 training solution with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps’ Tactical Operational Flight Trainers. Key upgrades to the trainers will include a new photo-texture visual system database, and enabling the Mission Operation Center to conduct multi-plane training. The CF-18 training systems will also include Canada-specific modifications.

Aug 31/11: CF-18 support. Canada adds up to C$ 111 million (currently around $112 million) to its CF-18 Primary Air Vehicle contract with L-3 Military Aviation Services (L-3 MAS), converting the previous arrangement to a full Optimized Weapon System Support program.

The contract breaks down as another C$ 80 million to 2017 in the base contract (now C$ 547 million), plus a set of extension options that could extend the additional work out to 2020 and raise the total by C$ 111 million, taking the overall contract to C$664 million (currently $676 million). OWSS adds new items to the previous contract’s list of maintained components (vid. Sept 1/10), consolidating them under this 1 contract, but doesn’t change contract length or other particulars. Public Works Canada | L-3 MAS [PDF].

CF-18 support extensions

May 2/11: Election. Canada’s Conservative Party wins an election forced by the opposition parties, and ends a string of minority Parliaments by taking 167 seats and gaining a Parliamentary majority.

The structure of the Canadian system ensures nearly complete party discipline. The Prime Minister can refuse to sign the nomination papers for any party candidate, forcing them to run as an independent or quit. Canada also requires whole-party leadership conventions to remove a party leader or Prime Minister, as opposed to the British tradition where it can be done by a majority of party MPs. In other words, Canada will buy any jet the Prime Minister approves. That means the F-35A. CBC Election Day coverage.

Majority government

DND shoots back
(click to view larger)

March 10-21/11: As Canada’s upgraded CF-18s join allied operations over Libya, Canada’s government and Department of National Defence exchanges fire with the Parliamentary Budget Officer over the F-35 report, in the media and via detailed statements. Bottom line? Both parties are standing firmly by their figures. The Canadian DND’s F-35 mini-site includes release and comparison of figures table, among others. See also PBO’s detailed rebuttal [PDF] | Macleans magazine | Ottawa Citizen’s “Let’s be honest about the price tag on those planes“, written by the person who signed the F-35 Phase 2 MoU on Canada’s behalf.

March 10/11: PBO F-35 report. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer releases its independent report on the F-35 buy. Its conclusion: that the government’s figures for buying and maintaining the plane were based on essentially no research, and that instead of costing $16 billion ($9 billion to buy 65, and $7 billion for 20 years of operations and maintenance at $350M/year), the total will be more like $29.3 billion. They forecast $9.7 billion or more for 65 fighters, plus $19.6 billion in operations and maintenance over 30 years ($1.7 billion initial logistics and setup, $14 billion O&M, plus $3.9 billion upgrades & overhaul over 30 years, or about $650M/year). That works out to a total package cost of about $450.75 million per fighter over 30 years, exclusive of weapons and other ancillaries. This passage was especially interesting, with implications well beyond the F-35, or Canada:

“There has been an exponential increase in the cost to manufacture one kilogram of fighter jet over the last six decades. This cost has risen from under US$ 1,000/kg in 1950 to approximately US$ 10,000/kg today (both in 2009 dollars). This represents a real [DID: inflation-adjusted] annual rate of increase of approximately 3.5%.

During the same period, the average weight of jet fighter aircraft has increased by about 0.5% per year. Given this, the cost of fighter aircraft has increased 4% per year in real terms since 1950 – doubling roughly every 18 years.”

The report’s impact is magnified in 3 ways. One is that it states that its own purchase and maintenance figures are likely to be revised upward if its 75% confidence level fails, based on program trends and official reports from the USA, as well as elimination of the competitive dual-engine program. The 2nd is that an election is now imminent in Canada, and the F-35 purchase is a key source of differences between the minority Conservative Party government and its opposition parties. On the flip side, Parliament’s dissolution will end opposition attempts to see the program’s statement of operational requirements justifying the F-35’s sole-source choice, which was classified by the DND in 2010, around the time the F-35 became a major political controversy. The 3rd factor is that the report was peer reviewed by a panel of experts that included the US Congressional Budget Office and Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The unintended result of that peer review has been wider publicity and impact around the world. “An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter” | Liberal Party release and pre-election ad | CTV News | Globe & Mail | Postmedia’s Canada.com | SunMedia’s Canoe | Aviation Week.

C$ 29.3 billion?

Jan 6/11: As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates states that he is placing the Marine Corps’ F-35B on the equivalent of a 2-year probation, extends the program’s development phase again to 2016, and cuts production of all models over the 2012-2016 time period, including 47 fewer F-35As. During the low-rate initial production phase, cuts in the number bought mean that the price for each plane doesn’t drop as quickly, making purchases more expensive. Canada’s DND responds directly to these changes, saying:

“Canada is not purchasing the STOVL variant. Canada will order the conventional take off and landing (CTOL) variant, which is the lowest-cost option that the majority of JSF partners will also acquire. The CTOL variant is progressing very well. Canada does not anticipate the announcement by the US Government regarding the STOVL variant will affect the schedule or cost of Canada’s Joint Strike Fighter Program.”

See also: Pentagon release re: overall plan | Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | F-35 briefing hand-out [PDF] || Aviation Week | Fort Worth Star-Telegram’s Sky Talk blog.

2010

F-35A
(click to view larger)

Oct 14/10: CF-18 support. The Canadian government has contracted Calgary-based Harris Canada Inc. to continue avionics and electronics maintenance of its CF-18 fighter jets, until their replacements are ready to fly. The contract is worth up to C$ 273.8 million (currently at rough parity with American dollar) until 2020, and covers nearly 2,300 components.

It is more focused than the larger L-3 MAS contract (q.v. Sept 1/10), which covers the entire aircraft, but it’s a similar sort of extension. Public Works Canada | Canadian Press | The Globe and Mail.

Sept 20/10: According to 2009 Defence Department documents obtained by the Ottawa Citizen, Canadian officers working on the Next Generation Fighter Capability project called for a “competitive process” for both the aircraft and the long-term maintenance contract. The aircraft competition was to be run in 2010, with a contract to be awarded by 2012, aircraft delivery in 2015-16, and operational fighters between 2018 – 2023. The revelations will place further pressure on the Conservative government to justify their sole-sourcing decision, which has become the crux of a political controversy. Postmedia News via Montreal Gazette.

Sept 15/10: Hearings begin in Parliament, as the Standing Committee on National Defence calls witnesses to discuss the F-35. SCND/NDDN page | Canadian Press, via Winnipeg Free Press | CBC | CTV News (incl. video) | The Globe and Mail | Postmedia interview with Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose | Toronto Sun.

Sept 12/10: Sitting MP Laurie Hawn [Cons – AB – Edmonton Centre] will be an important voice in the upcoming Parliamentary fighter debate. He’s a former CF-18 pilot. Postmedia, via Montreal Gazette.

Sept 1/10: CF-18 Support. Canada needs to keep its existing fleet flying, and that cost money, too. A late F-35 means a longer set of support contracts, and so the Prime Minister’s Office announces the extension of its CF-18 Systems Engineering Support Contract to L-3 Communications MAS of Mirabel, Quebec, until at least 2017. This 7-year contract extension is valued at C$ 467 million, and 3 additional 1-year extension optionscould add another C$ 86 million (C$ 553 million total). the options would also stretch the contract until the end of the fleet’s estimated service life in 2020.

The contractor’s primary responsibility for the CF-18 Hornet fleet is development and maintenance work that includes mission software, structural testing, depot-level inspections and repairs, technical support teams, and other engineering services. In addition to their Canadian maintenance work, they’ve also been involved in Australia’s HUG [PDF] Hornet upgrade and life-extension program. Canadian PMO | L-3 MAS [PDF] | CBC | National Post.

CF-18 support

July 16/10: Sole-source F-35, eh? Canada’s Conservative Party government declares that it will buy the F-35A, without a competitive process. The jets would begin to enter service around 2016, and the initial budget is C$ 9 billion for 65 F-35 aircraft and associated weapons, supporting infrastructure, initial spares, training simulators, contingency funds and project operating costs. That budget has not been confirmed by an actual contract, however, something that reportedly led to unpleasant surprises when Canada bought C-130Js from Lockheed Martin. DND statements indicate that an F-35 contract would not be negotiated until about 2014-2015.

The government’s defense of its decision revolves around economic and industrial benefits:

“To date, Canada has invested approximately CAD$168 million in the JSF program. Since 2002, the Government’s participation in the JSF program has led to more than CAD$350 million in contracts for more than 85 Canadian companies, research laboratories, and universities – meaning that Canada has already seen a two-to-one return on its investment.

Now that Canada has committed to purchasing the F-35, Canadian industrial opportunities could exceed CAD$12 billion for the production of the aircraft. Sustainment and follow-on opportunities for Canadian industry are emerging and will be available over the 40-year life of the program. For instance, in accordance with the industrial participation agreements, all 19 Canadian companies manufacturing items for the F-35 will also repair and overhaul those components for the entire global fleet.”

The government needs that defense. They’re a minority government, and the opposition Liberal Party objects to the lack of competition and the cost. The Liberals are promising to freeze the agreement if they take power, and an election will be due by 2013 at the latest. This sort of thing has happened before, when an incoming Liberal government froze Canada’s EH101 helicopter contract, leading to a 20 year delay in fielding Sea King replacements. See: DND backgrounder | DND release | Lockheed Martin | Magellan Aerospace | Canadian Press (CP) | CTV TV | Toronto Star | Winnipeg Free Press re: local industry | BBC | NY Times | Reuters || Political angle: CBC | National Post | Toronto Star.

F-53A, yes. Competition, no.

June 11/10: The Globe & Mail newspaper reports the contents of secret documents it has acquired related to Canada’s F-35 purchase. For starters, the purchase price is expected to reach C$ 16 billion once 20 years of maintenance are factored in. The report adds:

“According to secret cabinet documents obtained by The Globe and Mail, officials are well aware that any move to open up the process to a competition could push the manufacturers of rival jets, such as the Boeing Super Hornet and the Eurofighter Typhoon, to lower their prices. In addition, the government is expecting a “negative reaction” to the fact that the contract is set to be awarded without a competition… One of the government’s major arguments is that a competition could hurt Canada’s reputation among the other countries that have been involved in Lockheed-Martin’s massive Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program since the 1990s…”

June 7-8/10: Canadian media reports indicate that the government is about to launch single-source negotiations to buy up to 65 F-35A fighters, at a cost of about C$ 9 billion. The government says that its rationale is to “lock up the cost,” but the jet’s maintenance costs would be a moving target. Canada had a similar experience with Lockheed Martin and maintenance costs when it sole-sourced its C-130J buy.

The move is politically controversial, to the point that the topic was removed from the cabinet committee on economic growth’s June 9 agenda, then reinstated. CP | The Globe and Mail | The Globe and Mail re: controversy | Winnipeg Free Press | UPI.

Jan 4/10: Reporter David Pugliese’s sources say that Canada’s Harper government, which is currently running a $55 billion deficit, is not moving to start the CF-18 replacement program, or to make a sole-source commitment to Lockheed Martin’s F-35. Boeing, which has a substantial industrial presence in Canada, continues to lobby for a competition.

According to Canadian Air Force documents, any competition needs to start no later than 2010. That allows a contract with the winning aircraft manufacturer to be signed by 2012, in order to receive initial deliveries in 2015-2016, and reach initial operating capability in 2018. That would be 38 years after the F/A-18 Hornet won Canada’s last fighter competition, and 36 years after initial Hornet deliveries. Under this timeline, full operating capability for the Hornet’s successor would be achieved by 2023.

2009 and Earlier

Sniper pod on CF-18
(click to view full)

Oct 8/09: Canada’s Ottawa Citizen newspaper reports that Boeing has stepped up its lobbying to create a competition:

“Some DND officials are concerned that a competition would drag on for too long and because of that Canada would not have new fighter aircraft in place when the current fleet of CF-18s is ready to be retired starting in 2017.

But representatives with U.S. aerospace firm Boeing are arguing that it makes more sense to hold a competition and let the best aircraft win. It has been involved in meetings with defence officials.

In addition, Canadian industry representatives who support Boeing have approached government officials to question the idea of a sole-source deal.”

Aug 22/09: Canada’s Ottawa Citizen newspaper reports that the government is preparing a presentation to cabinet for approval of a sole-source, multibillion deal to to buy 65 F-35s, even though military leaders had earlier claimed that a competitive process would be followed in any replacement of Canada’s F/A-18A/B Hornets.

The Ottawa Citizen cites Lockheed Martin officials who say they expect Canada to make its decision over the next 12 months. Canada is currently a JSF Tier 3 member, who has committed $150 million to the project thus far. Meanwhile, officials from Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet) and Gripen International (JAS-39NG) are interested in competing for Canada’s follow-on order.

Dec 11/06: F-35 Production MoU. In a ceremony at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, Canada’s Department of National Defence formalizes their continued partnership in the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program. Canada was the 2nd of 8 partner nations to sign the MoU for the Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development phase. The Department of Industry also signed MoUs with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Pratt & Whitney and the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team.

The Canadian Department of National Defense had this to say regarding the F-35’s status as the follow-on to its current CF-18 (F/A-18A) fighter fleet:

“While participation in this next phase does not commit the Department to purchasing the multi-role aircraft, it is helping to define and evaluate DND’s future requirements for the next generation of fighter aircraft to replace the CF-18 and its capabilities. It is also contributing to improved interoperability between Canadian, American and allied forces and is enhancing the competitiveness and technological capability of Canada’s aerospace sector.”

See: DID coverage | Pentagon DefenseLINK | Canada’s DND: release | Canada’s DND: Backgrounder.

F-35 Production MoU

Additional Readings The Program

• JSF Program Office – JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development MoU [PDF], update 4. From 2010.

• Canada Public Works – Evaluation of Options to Sustain a Fighter Capability. Includes the 4 people appointed to the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat (NFPS) panel in 2013. Just 1 has military experience.

• Canada NFPS (March 3/13) – Final Industry Engagement Request: Capability, Production and Supportability Information Questionnaire.

• Canada DND – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Next Generation Fighter Capability

• Canada DND – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Next Generation Fighter Capability Mandatory Capabilities / Requirements. Vague to the point of making the title misleading. “Flying long distances” is not a requirement. “Unrefueled range of at least 1,500km at full load” would be.

The Fighters

• Canadian DND – CF-18 Hornet

• Wikipedia – CF-18 Hornet

• DID – Boeing Leads Phase 2 Upgrade of 79 CF-18 Fighters. Referred to as CF-18AM or CF-18BM. The last one was delivered in March 2010.

• Canada DND – Joint Strike Fighter: Technical Briefing. See slide 23: “F-35-The only option that met all CF Mandatory Requirements…” Presented March 17/10.

• F-35.ca – Official lobbying site

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Lightning: The Joint Strike Fighter Program, 2012-2013

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: 2009-2010

Competitive Possibilities

• DID – Eurofighter’s Future: Tranche 3, and Beyond

• DID – Super Hornet Fighter Family MYP-III. The F/A-18E/F, Advanced Super Hornet, and EA-18G.

• DID – EA-18G Program: The USA’s Electronic Growler. A very specialized variant that performs high-power jamming and air defense suppression.

• DID – Lightning Rod: F-35 Fighter Family Capabilities and Controversies. Free-to-view article covers the base F-35 platform, with links to related coverage.

• DID – The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4+ Generation Wild Card

• DID – France’s Rafale Fighters

Official Reports/ Presentations

• US GAO (March 24/14, #GAO-14-322) – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Problems Completing Software Testing May Hinder Delivery of Expected Warfighting Capabilities. Something known for some time, but left out of Canada’s official reports.

• Industry Canada Dept. (Dec 10/13) – Canadian Industrial Participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. Includes current totals and an estimate of future opportunities.

• CBC (Sept 28/12) – More on the SOR Report. Redacted copy of Canada’s official Statement of Requirements for its next-generation fighter. “The Statement of Operational Requirements for Canada’s next jet fighter was produced by the Royal Canadian Air Force Directorate of Air Requirements in June, 2010. It wasn’t submitted to Canada’s Public Works department until after the government announced its decision to purchase 65 F35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft in July, 2010. Normally Public Works is responsible for procuring hardware for the military after they have submitted their statement of requirements. [CBC Program} The Fifth Estate obtained this highly redacted copy through an Access to Information request.”

• Canada DND (August 2013) – Next Generation Fighter Capability Annual Update.

• Canada DND (Aug 5/13) – 2013 Department of National Defence Annual Update on Next Generation Fighter Capability Life Cycle Costs. No major changes. Conducted by Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton Consulting Inc.

• Auditor General of Canada (April 3/12) – 2012 Spring Report of the Auditor General of Canada: Chapter 2 – Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets

• Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (March 10/11) – An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter [PDF]. Followed by a detailed March 23/11 statement, in response to DND’s public disagreement with their study: Comparing PBO and DND Cost Estimates on Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Some Preliminary Questions and Answers on Key Issues [PDF].

• Canada DND (March 17/11) – Next Generation Fighter Capability: Comparison of Costing. With the PBO. See also the accompanying Narrative document.

News & Views

• Airbus Defence and Space – Passive Radar: to see without being seen [PDF]. In frequencies that may not be stealth friendly.

• Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch (March 8/14) – Just Face It – The F-35 Is A “Bomb Truck”

• James Hasik (Oct 1/13) – Less stealth, more agility, and more certainty: what the Super Hornet has, and whether that will matter in Canada

• Canadian Skies (May 12/13) – Fighter Focus: Eurofighter and Gripen

• Canada.com (Dec 6/12) – Canada’s involvement in the F-35. A timeline.

• Aviation Week (April 3/12) – JSF – SAR Discloses Another Three-Year Slip. Not to mention some costs.

• Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch (Sept 19/11) – Canadian Forces Never Did Full Examination of the Super Hornet, the F-35 Competitor

• Aviation Week (March 23/11) – JSF Cost Predictions Rattle Foreign Customers [dead link]. “Canada’s report – “An Estimate of the Fiscal Impact of Canada’s Proposed Acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter” – came out March 10. The report predicts that average unit production cost for its F-35s will be $148 million with an additional $15 million for the engine, which brings the total to $163 million per aircraft. Cost estimates given to Congress last week say the fourth low-rate initial production batch, with engines, will cost $127 million per aircraft for the F-35A, $141 million for the F-35B and $158 million for the F-35C…. [Lockheed] officials contend their estimates… predict that each Canadian aircraft will cost $70 to 75 million when deliveries begin in 2016. “It is not immediately obvious, given the available evidence, how the cost can be reduced to estimates predicted by Lockheed Martin over 10 years ago,” the Canadian report says…. Unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to see prices reducing to their original estimated level,” it concludes…. The Canadian study also lists a number of additional opportunities for cost escalation that could inflate Ottawa’s F-35 bill.”

• Ottawa Citizen’s (March 23/11) – Let’s be honest about the price tag on those planes.” Written by Alan Williams, who signed the F-35 Phase 2 MoU on Canada’s behalf.

• The Dominion (Feb 28/11) – Under the Radar: Diplomatic cables raise concerns of US influence in F-35 jet campaign

• Embassy Magazine (Feb 23/11) – DND Claims key F-35 Document is ‘classified’. Which is odd because, as the article points out, at least 4 other documents of that type have been released via DND’s own web site.

• US CDI (Jan 21/11) – F-35 Testimony to Canada’s House of Commons. CDI.org no longer resolves; alternate link to a transcript.

• Ottawa Citizen’s 3-part Series on Canada’s F-35 Buy (Dec 11-13/10) – Maintenance tab may send cost of new fighter soaring to $21B | The untold story of Canada’s JSF deal | Selling Canada on the need for fighters

• Ottawa Citizen (Dec 13/10) – Can the F-35 win a charm offensive?

• Aviation Week Ares (Nov 1/10) – Uh-O Canada

• Vancouver Sun (Oct 13/10) – Scrap F-35s for cheaper drones, defence analyst argues. Additional context: the defense analyst in question works for the left-wing Rideau Institute, and the study is publicized by the socialist CCPA (q.v. release).

• Wikileaks (Dec 16/08) – cable 08OSLO670, LESSON LEARNED FROM NORWEGIAN DECISION TO BUY JSF. May have a lot of relevance for Canada.

• DID (Sept 7/08) – Canada Investing in F-35 Related R&D

• DID (June 23/08) – Canada Lays Out Future Defense Plans

• Wings Magazine – The F-35 and Canada’s Aviation Future

Americas

• The US Navy has cleared Lockheed Martin’s VH-92A program Critical Design Review (CDR). Tasked with transporting the president and vice president of the United States and other officials, the VH-92 will see initial fielding in 2020, and production continuing until 2023. First flight is expected next year.

Middle East North Africa

• Two years since the commencement of deliveries, Israel has received the last of its M-346 Lavi jets from manufacturer Leonardo-Finmeccanica. The $1 billion deal sees the 30 jet trainers delivered to replace the 1960s-era Douglas TA-4 Skyhawk. Equipped with the Elbit Systems Targo helmet, the Israeli Air Force can provide synthetic on-board training for pilots transitioning onto the full range of the IAF’s frontline combat aircraft fleets which will soon include the F-35.

• As US and Israeli officials move to finalize talks over the upcoming military aid package, a former IDF general has warned against his government looking to increase the amount sent. Maj. Gen. (Res) Gershon Hacohen called the increased dependence on US financing as suiting and expanding US interests and a reduction in such dependence would be better for all over time. Lamenting what he sees to be an addiction to advanced US platforms, US aid merely institutionalizes IDF reliance on air power, at the expense of innovative and daring ground maneuver warfare.

Europe

• French aerospace laboratory Onera has released details on their test of the A400M transporter. The company had been contacted by manufacturer Airbus to conduct the studies of a new hose and drogue configuration designed to permit helicopter refueling from the airlifter. Customers involved in the A400 program’s development have experienced frustration over the lack of helicopter refueling capabilities, with France having already bought two Lockheed Martin KC-130J tankers to perform the task, and Germany considering a similar acquisition.

• Greece’s P-3B Orion aircraft are to undergo a $142 million mid-life modernization program. Work to be carried out as highlighted in the deal include the reactivation of one of the navy’s P-3Bs and the procurement of software and hardware kits for the upgrade and modernization of a total of four aircraft. Greece operates six of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) P-3Bs.

• Leonardo-Finmeccanica is expecting to deliver the first of its ATR-72 maritime patrol aircraft to the Italian Navy within the next few weeks. A total of four will be delivered and are to conduct missions including aiding navel vessels searching for migrants crossing the Mediterranean. The $397 million deal does not give the Navy any ASW capabilities, with budget shortfalls after the 2008 economic crash causing Rome to ditch plans to look at Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon.

Asia Pacific

• China has hailed the US deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) batteries to South Korea as harming the “foundation of their trust.” THAAD’s presence on the Korean peninsula as a counter to North Korean nuclear missile testing also caused Chinese officials to warn that the government in South Korea “should think twice about the deployment and value the good momentum of ties between Beijing and Seoul.” Meanwhile, the North moves ahead with the construction of fortified submarine pens for its ballistic missile submarines.

• Larsen & Toubro (L&T) is to partner with South Korean giant Samsung to produce 100 tracked 155mm howitzer guns at Indian facilities. The contract, at $700 million, constitutes India’s largest ever order for the domestic private sector, and could lead to further orders of wheeled guns for the Indian Army. Offering the K-9 Vajra-T gun, the winning team beat out Rosoboronexport’s MSTA howitzer.

Today’s Video

• Coming soon the the Indian Army, the K-9 Vajra-T:

Israeli A-4Ns
(click to view full)

After more than 40 years operating the A-4 Skyhawk, a maintenance scandal led Israel to conclude that its remaining Skyhawk’s needed to be replaced as advanced trainers. That triggered a $1 billion advanced trainer competition, and a major geo-political decision.

In 2012, Israel made up its mind. The Italian M-346 “Lavi” will be their new trainer.

IAF Replacement Candidates IAF F-16B
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After a long competition, a 2-way military deal was signed with Italy in July 2012. Israel should begin receiving its M-346 trainers and simulators at Hatzerim Air Base, beginning in mid-2014.

Candidates to replace the Skyhawks reportedly included converted IAF early-model F-16Bs, Boeing’s license-produced T-45TS Goshawk used by the US Navy, Finmeccanica’s M346 variant of the Yak-130, and Korea’s supersonic T-50.

Winner: Alenia’s M-346 Elbit simulators

Militarily, the chosen M346’s performance profile, and theoretical ordnance-carrying capability in a pinch, are probably the closest to the Skyhawk’s. It was also designed with Italy’s F-35A/B purchase in mind, which reportedly gave it an advantage in Israel. Unlike its Russian Yak-130 counterpart, however, the M346 hasn’t been built and tested in a light attack version. Some Israeli systems will be added to the IAF’s trainers, in order to allow full pilot training, but the public-private TOR (IAI/Elbit joint venture) arrangement creates barriers to re-purposing the jets for operational missions.

Beyond the military sphere, Finmeccanica has had to overcome doubts regarding Italy’s long-term political stability as a supplier, and its long-term economic stability as a customer. The latter is especially relevant, as future Italian purchases of Israeli equipment were the key to winning the deal. The Israelis believe that they have negotiated appropriate safeguards for that risk, and the July 2012 deal featured signed contracts for specific offsetting military purchases by the Italian government.

The jets will offer just one part of the training system. The new flight syllabus will use more Ground Based Training System (GBTS) training for both fighter pilots and back-seat Weapon Systems Operators, with a “high” percentage of training done at the GBTS on a “daily” basis up to advanced weapon/mission training. Israel’s Flight Training Center at Hatzerim AB will use a simulator network based on Elbit’s SkyBreakerTM concept and technology, with 2 Full Mission Simulators and 2 Operational Flight Simulators all linked together to provide full multi-participant mission simulations. Similar systems equip Israel’s active fighter squadrons, in line with global trends among advanced militaries.

IAI/Elbit’s joint “TOR – Advanced Flight Training” consortium has picked Elbit Systems to provide GBTS support for the center over 20 years, though they’ll need to call on expertise from their build partners Alenia Aermacchi and Selex ES, and Canada’s CAE simulator firm.

Other Candidates T-45 Goshawks
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The F-16s were reportedly a low-ranking option, because of the difficulty of transitioning pilots from a primary jet trainer like the Fouga Magister or its T-6A turboprop replacement. They did not make the shortlist.

The T-45 Goshawk would have offered a welcome boost for Boeing’s closing production line, and could have been purchased with American military aid dollars. The flip side is that the US Navy hasn’t invested in giving them secondary mission capabilities beyond their training role. This option didn’t make the shortlist, either.

KAI T-50
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South Korea’s supersonic T-50 family came in 2nd, even though it offered the best aerodynamic performance of the available planes, with existing weapons integration that gave it the ability to operate as an “F-16 Lite” beyond its training role.

It also had the apparent advantage of building on a wider base of defense industrial cooperation. Italy may hold aerial exercises with the IDF, but Israeli firms have made notable inroads into the Korean market with their UAVs, missiles, and radars. A TA-50 order could have represented the next step for both countries, initiating deeper cooperation, and mutual trade that might have included Israeli cooperation toward a TA-50 with even broader light attack capabilities. An improved TA-50 trainer & light fighter would has the potential to carve out a strong place in the global arms market, and would have aligned Israel with both KAI and Israel’s close supplier Lockheed Martin. That high potential upside would have come with a corresponding cost, however, as this would have been Israel’s most expensive option.

See Appendix B for more in-depth coverage of Israel’s decision, and its attendant military and geo-political considerations.

Contracts and Key Events 2013 – 2016

1st jets arrive; Ground-based center opens. M-346
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July 27/16: Two years since the commencement of deliveries, Israel has received the last of its M-346 Lavi jets from manufacturer Leonardo-Finmeccanica. The $1 billion deal sees the 30 jet trainers delivered to replace the 1960s-era Douglas TA-4 Skyhawk. Equipped with the Elbit Systems Targo helmet, the Israeli Air Force can provide synthetic on-board training for pilots transitioning onto the full range of the IAF’s frontline combat aircraft fleets which will soon include the F-35.

December 17/15: The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has just retired their fleet of A-4 Skyhawks after 48 years of service. The aircraft have taken part in every single military campaign since 1967. In total, 236 have been in operation over the years and after their replacement as active fighters by the F-15s and F-16s, they remained as trainer jets. Thirty of the jets remained in service until they were retired from service on December 13.

Sept 29/14: A team led by Elbit systems opens Israel’s Flight Training Center at Hatzerim AB, whose simulator network is based on Elbit’s SkyBreakerTM concept and technology that’s used in Israel’s active fighter squadrons. The new flight syllabus will use more Ground Based Training System (GBTS) training for both fighter pilots and back-seat Weapon Systems Operators, with a “high” percentage of training done at the GBTS on a “daily” basis up to advanced weapon/mission training.

The new center includes 2 Full Mission Simulators and 2 Operational Flight Simulators, all linked together in order to provide full multi-participant mission simulations when necessary. Similar systems equip Israel’s active fighter squadrons, in line with global trends among advanced militaries.

IAI/Elbit’s joint “TOR – Advanced Flight Training” consortium has picked Elbit Systems to provide GBTS support for the center over 20 years, though they’ll need to call on expertise from their build partners Alenia Aermacchi and Selex ES, and Canada’s CAE simulator firm. Sources: Elbit Systems, “Israel Air Force Inaugurates Flight Training Center for the M346 Advanced Trainer”.

Ground-based FTC opens

July 9/14: Delivery. The first 2 M-346 Lavis produced for the Israeli Air Force (IAF) arrive at Hatzerim Israeli Air Force Base. Another 6 IAF M-346s are completing final assembly, and 5 are in the process of structural part assembly. All 30 aircraft are expected to be delivered by the end of 2016. Sources: Alenia Aermacchi, “First two M-346 aircraft delivered to the Israeli Air Force”.

Deliveries begin

Rollout

March 20/14: Rollout. Rollout of the 1st Israeli M-346 Lavi (q.v. July 19/12) at Venegono Superiore, Italy. Official delivery is scheduled for summer 2014. Sources: Finmeccanica, “Roll-Out of first M-346 for Israeli Air & Space Force” | Varese News, “Il traino dell’M346 dopo il RollOut” [YouTube].

Nov 7/13: The IAF’s 1st M-346 aircraft has begun final assembly in Italy. Alenia says that the program is on time and budget so far, and delivery is still scheduled for mid-2014. Sources: Alenia, Nov 7/13 release.

July 2/13: “Lavi”. Flight International reports that the IAF has designated its new M-346s as “Lavi.” That name was last used for an advanced 4+ generation fighter project that was canceled in 1987, but the name is also appropriate to the new platform. Translated, it means “lion cub,” which fits a lead-in fighter trainer jet very well. Sources: Flight International, “Israel’s Lavi reborn as renamed M-346” | IAF Picture Gallery: IAI Lavi (Lion-cub).

IAF M-346 becomes “Lavi”

Jan 7/13: Support. Alenia Aermacchi announces a $140 million sub-contract from Elbit Systems, Ltd./ TOR, covering Alenia’s share of logistics support (CLS) services for Israel’s 30 M-346I advanced trainer aircraft.

The CLS services include supply, maintenance and overhaul of spare parts, and will be performed jointly with Elbit Systems.

2012

M-346 deal. TOR joint venture. Winner.
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Nov 27/12: Skyhawks for sale. The Israeli MoD’s SIBAT department is advertising and promoting the sale of the country’s 44-plane T/A-4 Skyhawk fleet.

Some of those planes have been used in combat recently, though their latest service during the 2010 Gaza skirmish saw them dropping leaflets over the Gaza Strip. Israel will reportedly withdraw them from service in 2013, and if there’s no response by 2018, the aircraft will be scrapped. Israel’s SIBAT, incl. Presentation [PDF] | Israel Defense

Nov 7/12: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces that its LISA-200 Attitude Heading Reference System (AHRS) has been picked by prime contractor Alenia Aermacchi to equip Israel’s M-346 trainers. They’ve been an M-346 supplier for 5 years, but this contract with Northrop Grumman Italia reportedly builds on the existing arrangements.

“The LISA-200 uses fiber-optic gyro technology, with additional features like high-speed data refresh rates and output. Northrop Grumman Italia has delivered more than 4,000 LISA-200 systems worldwide. NGC.

Sept 10/12: TOR. The Israeli Ministry of Defense reaches a $603 million agreement with the IAI/Elbit TOR consortium, which will operate and maintain the Future Trainer Program’s M-346 jets and associated facilities. Overall, the workshare breaks down to about $420 million for Elbit, and (by inference) $183 million for IAI.

Elbit has received an initial $27 million interim purchase order to get things moving, and the full contract will be signed in the next few weeks, once the government finishes lining up the financing. During the program’s Establishment Phase, Elbit Systems will set up the support and maintenance infrastructure, as well as the simulators and the rest of the ground training array. They will also provide the jets’ advanced avionics systems. Total value for this phase is $110 million over 3 years.

During the operational phase, Elbit Systems will provide about $310 million (current dollars) of support services over the agreement’s 20-year lifespan. Elbit Systems.

O&M contract with TOR JV

July 19/12: M-346 Deal Finalized. Italy and Israel sign a set of 2-way defense deals. Israel will get 30 M-346 trainers, for delivery beginning in mid-2014. It’s a $1 billion deal, with Alenia’s share announced at around $600 million. Israel will join Italy and Singapore as M-346 operators.

Going the other way, Israel’s IAI will supply 2 Gulfstream 550 “Eitam” Conformal Airborne Early Early Warning & Control (CAEW) planes, which can monitor airspace and even maritime areas in a wide radius around the aircraft,while performing ESM geo-location of emitters and ELINT communications interception. IAI’s share is 750 million, while Finmeccanica’s SELEX Elsag will supply $41 million worth of NATO standard C4 equipment. Italy is familiar with these aircraft, which have participated in a number of multi-national exercises at Decimommanu AB in Sardinia. Italy will join Israel and Singapore as G550 CAEW operators.

The last component of the deal is a shared IAI/Finmeccanica project for a high-resolution Italian OPTSAT-3000 surveillance satellite. Finmeccanica’s Telespazio is the prime contractor, with a $200 million contract to deliver the high-resolution optical OPTSAT-3000 satellite and ground segment, manage launch services, test the satellite on orbit and then operate it. IAI’s share is $182 million, to supply the core OPTSAT satellite. Read “Italy & Israel: A Billion-Dollar Offer They Didn’t Refuse” for full coverage and details.

Deals signed: M-346, G550 CAEW, Satellite.

July 1/12: Ministers approve. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Avigdor Lieberman visits Alenia Aermacchi in Varese, Italy, ahead of this week’s expected signing of a deal for 30 M-346, and sees a demonstration of the aircraft. Meanwhile, an Israeli ministerial committee has reportedly approved the deal. Arutz Sheva | China’s Xinhua.

Feb 16/12: M-346 picked. Technically, Alenia is just the preferred bidder to IAI & Elbit’s TOR joint venture, with governmental approval required, and a contract award for 30 planes scheduled for later in 2012. If the expected billion-dollar contract is signed, deliveries would be expected to begin in the middle of 2014.

Globes sums up the situation:

“[Israeli MoD] director general Uri Shani made the decision to buy the M-346, and that Minister of Defense Ehud Barak still has to approve it… The Air Force found that the M-346 cost less, and a defense official said that it better meets the Air Force’s needs. The defense establishment said that the officials responsible for the deal were well aware of Italy’s shaky economic conditions, and that measures for dealing with this have already been coordinated with the Ministry of Finance to prepare a package of guarantees for reciprocal procurements.”

With respect to those “reciprocal procurements”, Italy is rumored to have pledged to buy IAI’s CAEW 550 AEW&C jets, and to jointly develop a new reconnaissance satellite with Israel. The IAF adds its own comments:

“I flew the Korean plane and it’s a lot like the F-16. In that aspect it has many advantages, seeing as it is easy to get used to the plane and… [move] directly to the F-16… The Italian plane is a combination. It integrates the F-16, the F-15 and the Eurofighter. It’s a dual-engine aircraft while the Korean plane has one engine, which is an important security aspect, but has less experience than the Korean aircraft… the conclusion that in spite of the lack of experience, the Italian plane… already looks on to the F-35 and can be compatible with training for it. It prepares us better for the future… We’re planning on adapting the plane to our needs, as well as adding Israeli systems that the cadets can get to know and practice on before they are acquainted with operational combat planes”.

There never was a formal RFP, and South Korea is reportedly quite unhappy. IAF in Hebrew | English || Finmeccanica release | Arutz Sheva | Israel’s Globes | Italy’s AGI | Chosun Ilbo || Flight International | Reuters.

M-346 picked

Feb 10/12: South Korea. Flight International reports that South Korea is upset at the process being used for the Israeli trainer deal – or rather, the lack of same:

“Speaking on 9 February, a South Korean source said officials from the country will use the meeting to express their anger at what they have defined as an “unfair” competition between the Korea Aerospace Industries T-50 and Alenia Aermacchi M-346. The South Korean government will demand that Israel’s defence ministry issue a formal request for proposals before making a selection, and that the latter is made according to the “known and fair practice”, the source said.”

Jan 19/12: Competition. Flight International:

“The South Korean government has been given until 28 January to update its industrial cooperation package… A South Korean source said on 17 January that Israel had received a “very generous” offer from Italy and that his country would make an effort to match it.”

Jan 17/12: Competition. UPI is cautious about relaying a report that Italy has won the deal:

“Israel’s air force has reportedly recommended buying Italy’s M-246 Master advanced jet trainer, rather than South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle… The Israeli Defense Ministry is expected to announce which aircraft it has chosen “within a few weeks,” the Haaretz daily reported… The contest has taken bizarre twists, so it might be premature to consider that the Italians will win the contract.”

The article correctly notes that just a couple of weeks ago, the T-50 was being talked about in similar terms. To the mix of geopolitical calculations underway, Israel must now add economic and financing prospects for Italy and the Eurozone, which could put a large dent in future cooperative deals.

2010 – 2011

TOR JV. Delayed RFP. KAI’s TA-50
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Oct 10/11: T-50. The Jerusalem Post reports that KAI has formally partnered with Lockheed Martin in its bid to sell T-50 trainers to Israel, citing the advantage of being able to use American military aid funds. That possibility has been a live option since September (vid. Sept 15/11 entry), but this makes it official.

Oct 7/11: Italy. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Italian government is making an interesting offer of its own: 23-35 M-346 trainers, in exchange for 2 Israeli AWACS aircraft. The exact type of AWACS plane is not clear. IAI makes the Gulfstream 550 Nachshon CAEW jet, currently in service with Israel and Singapore. They can also convert existing passenger jets into Phalcon AWACS planes, as they’ve done for Chile (Boeing 707) and India (IL-76).

The Post quotes South Korea’s Ambassador to Israel Isloo Kim, who denied reports that South Korea would end a wide range of military deals with Israel if its planes loses:

“This is a commercial deal and the companies involved are negotiating. It will not affect the relations between our countries.”

Sept 19/11: Late RFP. The expected RFP is late, as it was expected in August. Flight International:

“Sources said on 19 September that the delay is “of a few weeks”, but added that a bigger delay may follow. This could be a result of pressure to shrink Israel’s defence budget and allocate money to solve social issues, the sources said.”

Sept 15/11: T-50. The Korea Herald reports that Lockheed Martin is setting up a T-50 final assembly plant in the USA. That makes perfect sense as it competes for the USA’s pending T-X trainer competition, and it also affects Israel’s buy. If the T-50 series can be considered an American product, that means Israel could buy it with American foreign aid dollars. The M-346 is unlikely to be able to offer that, which would give the Korean jet a significant edge.

The existing T-50 Golden Eagle contract reportedly states that KAI takes 70% percent of the production work, while Lockheed takes the rest.The firms would not address speculation that this ratio might be adjusted for the US T-X and /or Israeli competitions.

March 16/11: TOR JV. Elbit Systems Ltd. and Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. sign a founder’s agreement, establishing a 50/50 joint venture called TOR to buy and maintain advanced training aircraft for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The joint firm would:

“…supply the MoD with the products and services required for the Project’s execution… in accordance with a work sharing plan determined by the two sides. To the best of Elbit Systems’ knowledge, the MoD is currently reviewing contractual possibilities with regards to the Project, and in this context has provided to Elbit Systems and IAI a request for information (RFI). It is the intention of the two companies to submit a response to the RFI in the coming days through the Joint Entity.”

IAI is 100% state owned, so while it’s fair to call TOR a public-private partnership, there’s more state ownership here than meets the casual eye. See Elbit Systems.

TOR JV

Nov 24/10: Finalists. Flight International reports that Israel’s shortlist is down to the KAI/Lockheed T-50 and Alenia’s M-346. Both firms have received RFIs, but the planes would be bought and operated by an IAI/Elbit joint venture that would sell flight hours on the type to the IAF. The companies “also want to assemble parts of the chosen type in Israel and equip it with some locally made systems.”

2008 – 2009

Skyhawks will be retired. M-346 “Master”
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Sept 21/09: Flight International reports that Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 Master and the Korea Aerospace Industries/Lockheed Martin T-50 have emerged as the leading candidates to replace the Israeli Cheyl Ha’avir’s TA-4 Skyhawk advanced jet trainers.

Aug 2/09: T-50. As reports of Israeli radar cooperation to equip KAI’s TA-50 and F/A-50s swirl around the media, Israel has sent a formal delegation to evaluate and test-fly the T-50 as a potential replacement for its Skyhawks. During their 5-day stay, the delegation will test-fly the advanced trainer at the KAI headquarters in Sacheon, and visit an air force base in Gwangju to check a ground-based flight training system.

The 20-30 plane Lead-In Fighter Trainer order marks the first time in 40 years that Israel is considering purchasing a fighter jet not made either locally, or in the United States. Ha’aretz | Korea Times | Korea’s Dong-a Ilbo | China’s Xinhua.

Dec 10/08: Skyhawk. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Air Force has finally decided to retire its Skyhawks. It quotes a “top IAF officer”:

“The plane is old and we are discovering problems… Because of its age we are finding ourselves investing a lot of attention and resources and therefore we have started the process of searching for a new plane to replace the Skyhawk.”

Skyhawks to go

Oct 5/08: Scandal. Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reportes that:

“TheMarker found that the contractor failed to conduct checks on the system responsible for maintaining the aircraft’s altitude, as well as its exhaust and brakes systems. Moreover, when technicians found tire and wheel fractures, they were instructed to cover them with lubricant rather than mend the rifts.”

It is, perhaps, a testament to the aircraft’s ruggedness that no Skyhawk has yet been grounded, or suffered an accident, due to a safety malfunction. Nevertheless, the IAF isn’t about to push its luck. The service conducted a surprise inspection of the maintenance facility following the media reports, and in early October 2008 IAF chief Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan grounded the Skyhawk fleet based on what they had found.

IAI says they have offered complete cooperation with the government since the matter was brought to their attention. The situation remains in limbo, with no reports as yet of charges laid, other punitive action, or the lifting of the flight ban.

Appendix A: On Wings of Skyhawks – Service in Israel IAF A-4N – note
extended tailpipe
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McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter” (Navy) or “Dog” (Top Gun school) is best known for its long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft; Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam.

It also had a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force. Beginning in late 1967, the IAF used this simple, pilot-friendly aircraft as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth. In one engagement during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky.

The little A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, which made it a popular and reliable choice through several wars. The type’s last frontline role was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli fleet took correspondingly heavy loses: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks. Per mission losses in 1973 were actually just 0.6%, which was lower than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt. Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall.

Israel’s induction of F-16s was a turning point for the Skyhawk, which declined in importance, but never vanished entirely from service. Some A-4s participated in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s, almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators like BAE and ATSI.

M-346 in Singapore
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A number of Israeli A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, some planes have been used as electronic warfare support aircraft, and others have been sold or leased to contractors like ATAC.

Meanwhile, the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training. Those planes needed maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka, via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match. A combination of time’s wear and questionable maintenance performance grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet – and forced a replacement buy.

Appendix B: A Geo-Political Decision IAF Mirage IIIC:
A cautionary tale?
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Israel’s finalist list narrowed its jet trainer options, but expanded the political considerations involved in the deal.

On the one hand, there’s South Korea. Israeli firms are cooperating with South Korea on a wide range of defense projects, from mini-UAVs to ballistic missile defense radars. The ROK is quietly emerging as a significant military export market for Israeli firms, and that cooperation has the potential to grow further, via South Korean interest in Iron Dome rocket interceptors and other products. Unlike Europe, South Korea has good prospects for economic growth, and the country is steadily building a very credible defense industry of its own.

Israel needs military exports to keep its military industries strong, and to lower prices for Israeli equipment through volume production. That means acquiring at least 1 new client per decade who looks… well, a lot like South Korea.

On the other side of the deal, the T-50 Golden Eagle is an important national project for the Koreans. Their initial export sale to Indonesia took some of the pressure off, but they’re still very keen on exporting their jet to gain credibility abroad, and want to pick up momentum in America ahead of the USAF’s possible T-X decision. An Israeli “yes” would add credibility to their American ambitions, and would also help in places like Europe (vid. Poland). Israel is known as a careful buyer who insists on quality, and Israeli jets with offensive capabilities have good odds of gaining the coveted “combat proven” label. That, too, has value in the global market, especially when one of your jet’s key selling points is its high-end capabilities.

The ROK ambassador has said that this relationship would survive an Israeli “no”. The arms it buys from Israel are needed, and there’s an unexpected cultural connection in South Korea through the Jewish Talmud, of all things. The question is whether the relationship would remain as strong. Or, whether other relationships might grow to supplant it.

There is no shortage of candidates. Turkey is South Korea’s biggest arms export customer, and its Ottomanist Islamic government is hostile to Israel. Indonesia became the first export buyer for the T-50, and followed that purchase by buying Daewoo-built U209 submarines. The United Arab Emirates is still seen as a possible destination for the T-50. Etc. If the bilateral relationship with Israel doesn’t keep growing, and defense relationships with countries hostile to Israel do keep growing, that’s likely to begin affecting South Korea’s foreign policies, as well as its defense ties.

That prospect must concern Israel, as it contemplates both potential partners.

Even if Israel does buy Korean, their experiences with France in the 1960s taught them that the risk of partner flips needs to be taken seriously. France went from Israel’s top weapon supplier to an arms embargo, as the country decided to seek favor and contracts with hostile Arab regimes instead. Lockheed Martin’s role as a co-bidder means that Israel needn’t worry about a T-50 embargo, as was the case with their Mirages – but Israel could conclude that a T-50 buy wouldn’t really change their future with South Korea.

Hydrocarbon rights
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On the other hand, there’s Italy. Under former Prime Minister Berlusconi, relations were friendly, and Italy has been a supportive ally. Israel needs allies in Europe, which is not a great future defense market, but is their main market for general economic exports. Europe becomes even more important following Israel’s discovery of huge gas fields off its Mediterranean coast. That gas must be exported, and Europe would be the prime destination. Currently, Russia and Turkey are key supply chokepoints for natural gas pipelines to Europe, though Italy’s pipeline to Algeria and Libya has some offsetting value. A pipeline through Turkey doesn’t make much sense for Israel, and even its plans to cooperate with Cyprus/Greece still leave Italy and Germany as next-step distribution hubs.

Berlusconi has stepped down, but even out of office, he will retain significant influence through Italy’s media. Israel will want long-term relations with Berlusconi, and Italy, to remain good. That could become tricky, given the European Left’s growing hostility toward Israel and Jews, but it’s not impossible.

Berlusconi’s exit removed some of that pressure, because it weakens the case for, and expectation of, a reward for long-standing ties. On the other hand, Italy has reportedly taken steps to expand the potential deal. A reported swap of M-346 trainers for Israeli AWACS jets is one way to strengthen those long-term ties, by making Israel both a high-profile export client, and the supplier of strategically important military hardware. The agreement reportedly included joint development of satellite projects, and the sale of Israeli UAVs. In the end, the AWACS and satellite rumors proved to be true.

Reports in Ha’aretz suggested that Israeli MoD Director-General Udi Shani inked a preliminary deal with his Italian counterpart in May 2011. That upset the Koreans, as did the lack of a formal RFP process before the Israelis announced the M-346 as their choice in February 2012. There were consultations, bids, and deadlines to improve offsetting industrial packages, but never a formal RFP.

Before the decision, DID wrote that:

“If Israel decides that their South Korean relationship is worth fighting for, the question may come down to whether or not they can find a way to keep the Italians close, and retain Berlusconi as a friend, while keeping the Koreans closer. If not, a hard choice lies ahead.”

Israel has made that hard choice, and must now wait to see if it was a wise choice. For all anyone outside the process knows, the decision may have been made on straight economics, based on the countries’ respective industrial commitments. There are early indications, however, that the decision is not being seen that way in South Korea. What happens next will bear close scrutiny, extending far beyond the confines of a single jet deal.

Additional Readings

Thanks to Mark Chen for his authorization to use his M-346’s Singapore photo.

Background: The Deal

• DID – Italy & Israel: A Billion-Dollar Offer They Didn’t Refuse. Details the final sale’s offsetting deals.

• DID FOCUS – Finmeccanica’s M-346 AJT: Who’s the Master Now?

• IDF – IAF to switch to new instructional airplane

Background: Other Aircraft

• Israeli Air Force – McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk – Hebrew nickname: ‘Ayit’ (‘Eagle’).

• IAI – A-4. Covers the maintenance program.

• DID FOCUS – Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings. Reports indicate that advanced F/A-50 versions are likely to include EL/M-2032 derived radars, developed with Israel Aerospace Industries.

• DID – T/A-50 Golden Eagles for Iraq? Israel isn’t the only Middle Eastern country considering it – Iraq ended up buying FA-50 fighter variants as their high-end jet trainers.

• DID FOCUS – US Carrier Pilots’ T-45 Training System

News & Views

• IAF (Feb 5/14) – Coming Soon: M-346 Simulator

• UPI (Nov 14/11) – Israel, South Korea scrap over jet deal. More specifically, over allegations that Israel has already signed a preliminary deal with Italy.

• DID (Feb 25/09) – UAE Gives M346 a LIFT. UAE = United Arab Emirates. The M346 beat the T-50 in the finals, but the UAE hasn’t signed a contract yet.

Greek P-3B
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Greece’s Hellenic Air Force currently operates 4 older P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, which were delivered to the HAF from 1993 – 1996. They are reaching the limits of their airframe life, but Greece is nearing the end of their fiscal rope. In 2008, the odds appeared to tilt toward new aircraft, with at least EUR 250 million (then about $350 million) reportedly set aside for the winner of a 5-aircraft maritime patrol competition. In 2014, it became clear that Greece was considering another option…

Greece’s Options P-8A Poseidon: cutaway
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In May 2005, “P-8A MMA Could Become a Multinational Program” said that:

“European nations operating the P-3 may gravitate toward smaller maritime patrol aircraft … Initial designs are even appearing in this class for executive jet aircraft equipped with maritime surveillance radars and related gear. Given that many nations’ maritime surveillance and attack requirements make the P-8’s range and endurance parameters unnecessary, it’s very possible that the EU’s moves will successfully bifurcate the global maritime patrol category into a broad class of nations who buy smaller aircraft, and an elite few with more extensive requirements who buy aircraft in the P-8A [Poseidon] class.”

Greece seemed to be firmly in that broad class who could buy smaller aircraft, and expected competitors are described in Appendix A. A different option also existed. The Orion has upgraded to P-3C designation, and has received a slew of updates since the P-3Bs were fielded. Efforts like Lockheed Martin’s reopening of P-3 wing production have made it possible for countries like Norway to keep upgraded P-3 aircraft in service.

In 2008, Greece had reportedly decided not to buy P-8s, or refurbish the Orions. By 2014, they had changed their minds.

Contracts & Key Events Wing replacement
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July 27/14: Greece’s P-3B Orion aircraft are to undergo a $142 million mid-life modernization program. Work to be carried out as highlighted in the deal include the reactivation of one of the navy’s P-3Bs and the procurement of software and hardware kits for the upgrade and modernization of a total of four aircraft. Greece operates six of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) P-3Bs.

Oct 7/14: P-3 overhaul. The Greeks have changed their minds. The US DSCA announces Greece’s official export request for modification and reactivation of 2 stored P-3B aircraft (bringing the fleet to 6), and the upgrade of up to 5 P-3Bs that will include structural Mid Life Upgrades (MLU) to provide 15,000 more flight hours, Phased Depot Maintenance (PDM), Mission Integration and Management Systems (MIMS), and new flight avionics. Not to mention the usual spare and repair parts, repair and return, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $500 million.

That’s quite the shift in policy, considering that it ends up costing Greece more than the previous budget for new acquisitions. The P-3s will also be more expensive to operate. On the other hand, their range will be very useful if Greece wants long patrol times over Cyprus’ offshore gas fields. Then, too, the DSCA statement suggests that things have become dire:

“The proposed sale for overhaul and upgrade would allow the Hellenic Navy (HN) to resume operations of its P-3B aircraft for land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance, surveillance and protection of areas of national interest.”

Airbus performs these kinds of upgrades, and did so for Brazil. In this case, however, the principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Marietta, GA. If a contract is signed, the sale will require “multiple” trips to Greece by U.S. Government and contractor representatives for a period of 7 years for delivery, system checkout, training, and program reviews. Sources: US DSCA #14-47, “Greece – P-3B Aircraft Overhaul and Upgrade”.

DSCA request: P-3 reactivation and upgrades

S-3B Viking
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Oct 14/08: Competition. Flight International reports on the expected Greek Maritime Patrol Aircraft competition, and the expected competitors. See Appendix A for even more background. Boeing won’t be offering the P-8, and the magazine also reports that Greece has rejected American offers of refurbished P-3s or of second-hand S-3B Viking jets.

The S-3 is a twin-engine carrier jet whose mission is described simply as “sea control.” Their range fits well with Greece’s needs, and they come armed with advanced surveillance equipment plus the ability to carry torpedoes, missiles, sonobuoys – even refueling pods that let them act as aerial refueling tankers. The US Navy plans to phase out the S-3 by 2010, and is replacing them with MH-60R helicopters whose slow speed and reduced range will shrink the protective anti-submarine “bubble” around American carrier forces.

For Greece, the planes’ age and hard usage in carrier landings creates issues with spares, training, and operational costs. These issues combine to make an S-3B transfer unattractive as a long-term solution. If the current financial crisis pinches Greece’s defense procurement budgets sharply enough, however, a cheap enough S-3 transfer offer might begin to look attractive as a stopgap solution that would compete with P-3 re-winging and/or refurbishment.

Appendix A: Greek MPA Competitors, 2008 ATR-72 ASW
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Greece’s naval focus is limited to the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, a sphere that is well within the capabilities of smaller and less expensive aircraft. A budget of about $350 million might buy 2 P-8As, plus spares and fielding support. It could not buy 5. In October 2008, Flight International reported that the budget for this purchase could increase, but:

“Boeing does not expect to offer its 737-based P-8A multi-mission maritime aircraft, but is promoting a Boeing Business Jet solution for a separate requirement for three VIP and presidential transports.”

An RFP was expected by the end of 2009, and viable candidates for the maritime patrol requirement reportedly included:

ATR-72MP (Alenia/EADS). This large twin-turboprop regional passenger aircraft has been developed into a maritime patrol variant that includes both integrated surveillance equipment and weapons carriage. Its use in civilian capacities creates an independent source of potential upgrades, troubleshooting, service networks, and trained personnel opportunities. In 2006, Turkey ordered ATR-72ASWs; picking this aircraft would give Greece assured platform parity with its rival.

Be-200
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Be200 (Beriev). Greece buys a lot of Russian defense equipment, from armored personnel carriers, to hovercraft, to advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The Beriev jet would be an interesting choice because it is a true amphibian that can land on water. It also comes with a fire-fighting mission module, something that might offer an attractive supplement to Greece’s Bombardier aircraft after the infamous 2007 fires. Beriev does not advertise a full maritime patrol variant, just a search and rescue variant.

If the competition involved only search and rescue aircraft, the Be-200 would have an exceptionally strong case. The Greek request also requires anti-submarine, anti-surface, and surveillance duties, however, which may prove problematic for the Russian design. There have been reports of a Be-40/Be-42 variant for maritime patrol since 1986, but the project’s status remains uncertain. Given Greece’s requirements for NATO commonality, it would also be fair to characterize a Greek Be-40 as a new variant when assessing development and delivery risks.

C-295-MPA concept
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C-295 MPA (EADS). Chile has ordered the C-295MP, a larger derivative of the CN-235MP Persuader surveillance-only aircraft that serves with a number of air forces. These aircraft offer good endurance in a small plane, and economical operating costs. The C-295 MPA version comes with an advanced surveillance system, and can carry torpedoes or Harpoon/ Exocet missile on underwing pylons. It does not appear to carry sonobuoy launchers.

The CN-235/C-295 family is in widespread use with a number of militaries as light transport aircraft, and versions of the smaller CN-235MP maritime patrol aircraft are already in service with 7 countries and the US Coast Guard. Greece doesn’t currently operate the C-235 family, however; it ordered Alenia’s C-27J as its light tactical transport instead.

P-99 MPA concept
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P-99 (Embraer). Like the ATR-72, Embraer’s offer leverages an in-service, popular civilian platform. An unarmed variant of this ERJ-145 based martime patrol aircraft serves with Mexico. Greece currently operates the R-99A Erieye airborne early warning derivative, and uses the ERJ-145 as a VIP transport. Embraer can also be expected to compete in Greece’s VIP/Presidential transport solicitation, where they will offer a potent challenge to Boeing.

A P-99 purchase would offer fleet commonality, and a jet solution offers greater speed and hence coverage at the expense of sustained low-level flight. Greece’s preferences in this regard will either tip it toward the ATR/EADS turoprop solutions, or give the Embraer aircraft a strong advantage. Embraer’s site touts the new P-99 variant as being capable of carrying weapons, and their concept art even shows sonobuoy launchers; but Greece would be the armed version’s launch customer. That creates customization opportunities, but it also makes that first buyer the guinea pig and bill-payer for platform development and integration issues.

Additional Readings

• DID – Meltem-III: Turkey’s New ATR-72 Maritime Patrol Planes. Includes 6 TMPAs, and 2 TMUA transports.

• Balkan Analysis (May 31/12) – Greece and Turkey: Offensive and Defensive Balance of Naval Power in 2012.

• Balkan Analysis (Feb 19/12) – Greece and Turkey: Offensive and Defensive Balance of Air Power in 2012.

• Flight Global (Oct 14/08) – Greek navy prioritises maritime patrol aircraft contest.

Aborted landing
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In January 2005, the U.S. Navy selected the US101 as the new “Marine One” baseline helicopter, for use by the President of the United States. The US101 is an American variant of AgustaWestland’s successful AW101 multi-mission medium helicopter; it beat out Sikorsky’s S-92 Superhawk, which is already in use as a government VIP transport in countries like South Korea.

That $1.7 billion victory was first endangered, and then destroyed, by ongoing changes from the White House staff. In 2008, the program’s ballooning costs and requirements got a temporary reprieve when US Navy agreed to proceed with the VH-71, despite a cost per aircraft equal or greater than the President’s Air Force One 747s. By June 2009, however, the VH-71 program had shot itself down.

Another round of competition is on the way, and back in 2009 the Pentagon said it was considering buying 2 different helicopters in the VXX follow-on program. Faced with an initial Analysis of Alternatives deemed too expensive, the OSD accepted the Navy’s revised approach in May 2012, setting things in motion for a new program of record.

The New Marine One Helicopter Programs: A Quick History VH-3D (top), VH-60N
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The Marine Corps currently operates 11 VH-3D Sea Kings, and 8 smaller VH-60N Black Hawk helicopters. The VH-3Ds were originally placed in service in 1974 and 1975, and the VH-60s entered service in the 1980s. They’re safe and reliable due to low and careful use, but they no longer had the growth capability to incorporate the equipment that George W. Bush’s White House believed was required in a post 9/11 environment.

The new “Marine One” helicopter, expected to be in service for up to 4 decades, was officially designated VH-71A in July 2005. The platform never made it into service. The Presidential office kept adding requirements, the Navy couldn’t or didn’t refuse, and eventually the entire project crashed. Each helicopter had become more expensive than a VC-25 “Air Force One” Boeing 747.

What Now?

When the VH-71 program was terminated, in 2009, the question was what to do with the 9 delivered machines. The President and Pentagon believed that the 5 pilot production VH-71s wouldn’t be useful, long-lived, and cost-effective enough to join the Presidential fleet, while some in Congress still believed the 5 should be fitted out and pressed into service. By September 2011, however, all 9 VH-71 airframes had all been shipped to Canada, for use as spare parts.

In its place, the US DoD plans with a revised “VXX” program that aims to field 21 operational helicopters, divided between Presidential helicopters and associated supply helicopters. In 2012 the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed on a cost-effective revised Analyses of Alternatives, setting things in motion to restart a program of record that won’t be in a position to replace the current fleet until 2020 at the earliest.

The VXX RFP was issued in May 2013. During the EMD phase, the selected contractor will provide 6 test helicopters, 4 of which will transition to front-line service in HMX-1. They’ll join another 17 production helicopters: 4 from LRIP Lot 1, 5 from LRIP Lot 2, and 8 from “full-rate production”. Flight and maintenance training systems and contractor support will also be part of the contract, and the level of security around the project will be very tight.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon moved ahead with a program to refurbish the existing VH-3/VH-60 helicopter fleet, while adding 12 V-22 tilt-rotors that will carry cargo, support staff, and media members. The 1st HMX-1 V-22 was inducted in May 2013.

VH-3/ VH-60 Refurbishment VH-3D
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This section covers efforts underway to improve existing VH-3D/ VH-60N helicopters, or extend their lifespans.

The VH-3D Lift Improvement program consists of the operational level installation of 55 composite main rotor blades on all 11 VH-3Ds. Sikorsky and their partner Carson Helicopters have been working on upgrades to the VH-3D’s commercial S-61 counterpart, using a 5-blade upgrade of new composite main rotor blades, while strengthening the helicopter’s tail pylon and transmission mounts. This costs just $1.25 million per aircraft, while boosting lift capacity by 2,000 pounds (910 kg), increasing speed by 15 knots at regular power, stretching range by 15%, and doubling service life to 20,000 hours.

The Structural Enhancement Program consists of efforts to redesign the VH-3D’s cabin redesign to reduce total gross weight, replace critical aircraft structure on the VH-60N, upgrade the safety of the fuel system on the VH-3D, and perform Service Life Extensions on the VH-3D and VH-60N.

The VH-3D and VH-60N Cockpit Upgrades consists of an upgrade to LCD panels, replacing mechanical dials and gauges. The Communication Suite Upgrade consists of Demand Assigned Multiple Access Satellite Communication radio upgrade, Digital Frequency Modulation radio upgrade, High Frequency radio upgrade, the Presidential redundant secure communications upgrade, Data Transfer capability upgrade, and Crypto Modernization Upgrade.

The Obsolescence Management Program will manage impending Executive Helicopter obsolescence issues. A variety of factors will be addressed including communication, navigation, operational weight, safety, and engine upgrades to remain mission relevant. An H-3 and H-60 will be converted to TH-3D and TH-60N training helicopters, in order to reduce wear on the operational fleet. The addition of VH-22 Osprey tilt-rotors to the squadron as of May 2013 will also help in this regard, though they’re never used to carry the President.

A Sept 15/14 contract aims to refit the VH-3s with new cabin interiors and air conditioning.

Note that other contracts exist for something called “Special Progressive Aircraft Rework.” These are not upgrades, just an enhanced version of the helicopters’ Standard Depot Level Maintenance that occurs after a set number of flight hours or months, whichever comes first. It includes partial disassembly of the airframe, replacement of components, refurbishment of interior furnishings, and repainting the aircraft.

VH-71/VXX Marine One: Contracts & Events

US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD manages these contracts; exceptions are noted in the text below. Note that this article covers the Presidential fleet only. Ancillary planes like the Presidential squadron’s supporting VH-22 Ospreys will have milestones mentioned, but won’t receive full coverage.

FY 2016

Preliminary Design Review for VH-92A S-92 VIP

July 27/16: The US Navy has cleared Lockheed Martin’s VH-92A program Critical Design Review (CDR). Tasked with transporting the president and vice president of the United States and other officials, the VH-92 will see initial fielding in 2020, and production continuing until 2023. First flight is expected next year.

June 21/16: Sikorsky has announced that its VH-92A Marine One helicopter is on track to fly by Spring 2017. The company was selected to design a replacement for the aging fleet of current presidential helicopters in 2014 after a cancelled attempt by Lockheed Martin/AgustaWestland which saw ballooned costs and requirements running out of control. Up next for the VH-92A program is the subsystem critical design review of the helicopter at the end of next month, and that is expected to take place earlier than scheduled.

November 6/15: Sikorsky has completed a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for its new Presidential transport helicopter, the VH-92A. The company was awarded a $1.2 billion engineering & manufacturing development contract in May 2014 for development of the helicopter, with options covering 21 operational and 2 test helicopters. The Presidential Helicopter Recapitalization Program (or VXX) saw Sikorsky become the only bidder after other competitors dropped out. The VH-92A is scheduled for fielding in 2020, with the PDR allowing Sikorsky to move into a Critical Design Review (CDR) stage.

FY 2014

VXX development contract; final VH-71 settlement.

Sept 16/14: VH-3s. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $9.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price delivery modification for one-time efforts redesigning the VH-3D’s cabin interior and environmental control system, including VIP seats, a cabin interior kit, and special tooling. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 US Navy aircraft budgets.

Work will be performed in Stratford, CT, and is expected to be completed in August 2016. US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD manages the contract (N00019-14-G-0004, DO 4010).

May 7/14: VXX Contract. Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $1.245 billion fixed-price-incentive-firm target contract for the Presidential Helicopter Replacement program’s Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. The EMD Phase includes 6 VH-92 test aircraft and associated support equipment, with “mature government-defined mission systems” integrated, flight training and maintenance training devices/ simulators, and various forms of support.

$42 million is being committed immediately, using FY 2014 RDT&E funding. Work will be performed in Stratford, CT (62.22%); Owego, NY (19.38%); Coatesville, PA (14.25%); Orlando, FL (1.44%); Phoenix, AZ (.86%); Cedar Rapids, IA (.85%); Vergennes, VT (.53%); and Torrance, CA (.47%), and is expected to be complete in October 2020. US NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD received 1 offer (N00019-14-C-0050).

VXX EMD contract

Jan 27/14: VH-71 Termination. Inside Defense reports that Lockheed Martin and the US government finalized the end of the VH-71 helicopter program on Dec 19/13 with a final $91.1 million payout: $38.5 million for completed work and $51.6 million in termination fees. That brings the termination total to about $203 million (q.v. June 2/11).

The contract was terminated on June 2/09, and the total amount paid to Lockheed over the entire contract ends up costing the taxpayer about $2.2 billion. The biggest reason for all that waste is a President’s own office that couldn’t stop adding requirements (q.v. Dec 13/07, Jan 19/08), but enforcing Navy certification requirements on a helicopter designed to commercial aviation standards wasn’t helpful, either (q.v. March 14/08). Sources: Inside Defense, “DOD, Lockheed Settle On Final $2.3 Billion Tab For Terminated VH-71 Program”.

FY 2013

VXX RFP out; 1st V-22 joins HMX-1; 2014 budget highlights VH-3/VH-60 upgrade costs. HMX-1’s V-22
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Sept 6/13: GAO Report. The GAO releases a short report that looks at the Navy’s rationale for waiving competitive prototyping requirements for either the base VXX helicopter, or its equipment suite. That’s normally required by The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, but prototyping can be waived with a justification to the US Comptroller General.

As VXX hit Milestone B, the US Navy had calculated that competitive prototyping would delay fielding by 16 months, and raise development costs by somewhere between FY11$ 782 million – 3.38 billion. At best, spending in the higher end of this range would save FY11$ 542 million in lifetime costs, which is a poor deal.

The helicopter justification is straightforward this time, because the program is insisting on an off-the-shelf helicopter, without huge modifications to change performance. For the mission sub-systems, most of the components are known, and prototyping wouldn’t be a big help to integration. GAO did note that this aspect of the program is likely to be challenging, and may be more challenging than the Navy thinks, but the question is whether competitive prototyping would help. GAO thought the Navy’s documentation and analytical rigor around that question was good, and accepted the Navy’s rationale. That’s good news, if the Navy wants to go ahead with just the VH-92. Sources: US GAO Report #GAO-13-826R.

Aug 2/13: VXX. Reuters quotes “Defense officials” who say that the pullout of AgustaWestland and Boeing won’t change their plans to proceed, “and said there were procedures in place to ensure competitive pricing even in cases involving a single bidder.”

These procedures include re-use of existing equipment in the new airframe, and could involve the CRH search and rescue helicopter approach of requesting more price data from Sikorsky. Sources: Reuters, “UPDATE 1-U.S. Navy defends presidential copter bid format as firms bail out”.

S-92
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July 29/13: VH-92 left. Boeing and AgustaWestland both confirm to Aviation Week that they don’t intend to bid on the VXX RFP. That leaves only Sikorsky & Lockheed Martin’s VH-92. The S-92 is widely used as a head-of-state VIP helicopter, but this probably isn’t the outcome the Navy was looking for. AgustaWestland:

“After a comprehensive analysis of the final RFP…. There are fundamental proposal evaluation issues that we believe inhibit our ability to submit a competitive offering, and that provide a significant advantage to our likely competitor…. we believe we have the best, most suitable aircraft for the President.”

Eurocopter never stepped in. Then there’s Boeing, whose response also removes Bell Helicopter:

“The Boeing Company will not submit a bid for the U.S. Navy’s VXX Presidential Helicopter program. While both the Boeing H-47 Chinook and the Bell Boeing V-22 are often used to transport military and government leaders in theaters of operation, we do not believe these aircraft would be competitive for this program as it is currently structured.”

The downwash issues on the White House lawn made those machines rather improbable from the get-go, and you can’t transport a V-22 in a C-17, unless you remove the wings. Leaving the question: now what? Sources: Aviation Week, “VXX Becomes One-Horse Race”.

May 4/13: VH-22. The 1st of 12 MV-22B Ospreys is delivered to the HMX-1 Presidential Squadron. These Ospreys will never carry the President, just cargo, support staff, and media members.

V-22 flight operations at HMX-1 technically began on April 26/13, but flights with support staff and news media representatives won’t begin until later in 2013. Sources: USMC | US NAVAIR.

V-22 joins HMX-1

May 3/13: VXX RFP. The US Navy issues their VXX RFP. Proposals for the 23 helicopters are due in 90 days with a goal to award a fixed-price incentive engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) contract, with production options, by mid-calendar year 2014. Proposals will be evaluated on “best value,” which means a more expensive proposal can win, and technical factors are “slightly more important” than cost. Vendors can gain an extra 10% for assessed strengths in some or all of Fully-outfitted Performance with Overall Weight Growth Margin; Transportability – C-17 Load/Unload Timeline; Cabin Reconfiguration Timeline; and Reliability. Another 5% premium can be gained by offering risk reduction benefits, for a maximum of 15%.

The government will define the mission systems, which is what crashed the program last time, and choose the interior aesthetics from among options offered by the contractor. One hopes that past lessons have been learned. They do have a cost target, which may seem low:

“The affordability target for unit recurring flyaway VXX Integrated Air Vehicle and support equipment, provided for guidance, is $41M. Unit recurring flyaway is defined as that which is associated with the “end item” (excluding GFE hardware) and is comprised of the Prime Mission Equipment including airframe, propulsion, avionics, and it is also comprised of the Software, Integration, and Systems Engineering / Program Management (SEPM) to repeat build of the end item…. The affordability target for Production Support, provided for guidance, is $12M per option year.”

The thing to remember is that most of the helicopter’s total cost will be tied up in the Government Furnished equipment. The difficult interactions happen when the amount of equipment starts forcing overall design changes to the helicopters that can’t be met by off-the-shelf technologies. Having said that, some requirements like the ability to safely land in very small landing zones, with minimal damage to the surroundings, are non-negotiable. Sources: FBO.gov | US NAVAIR.

VXX RFP

May 4/13: H-92. Sikorsky reiterates that they’ll be submitting a variant of their S-92 for VXX, in partnership with Lockheed Martin. They’ll compete against Northrop Grumman and AgustaWestland (AW101), and Boeing (TBD). Sources: Sikorsky, May 4/13 release.

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

Planning changes from FY 2013 to FY 2014 are “directly related to the reprogramming of funds to support the unplanned requirements associated with keeping the existing fleet of Presidential VH-3’s and VH-60’s [sic] safely operating beyond their originally planned service life until replaced by VXX. Requirements include obsolescence issues and safety improvements such as weight reduction efforts, and structural improvements.” Overall, life extension and modernization work on the current fleet of 11 VH-3Ds and 8 VH-60Ns amount to about $708.7 million from FY 2012-2018.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. The VXX program gets a short 1-page entry, which notes an April 2012 VXX analysis of alternatives (AOA) study:

“The program plans to leverage existing avionic and mission systems and it uses less stringent requirements than those developed for VH-71. In addition, the acquisition approach includes integrating a government developed communication package and mission systems…. A May 2012 Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) memo certifying the AOA study states that the analysis demonstrates that the proposed approach to avoid [requiring flight recertification of the final helicopter] is feasible for a number of options and, if adopted, offers potential for reduced cost and schedule.”

The tradeoff involves reduced requirements from the VH-71 program, and GAO says that the final Capabilities Development Document didn’t make any changes that would destroy the assumptions of the AOA study.

Nov 29/12: Program Support. Engility Corp. in Mount Laurel, NJ received a $9.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide technical and engineering support services. They’ll help with requirement specification, design, implementation, test, management, and maintenance of laboratory/information system and project/program related software in support of the MH-53 program for minehunting helicopters, the existing VH-3/60 Executive Transportation Program, the VXX program, and general Avionics System Integration.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (95%), and Lexington Park, MD (5%), and is expected to be completed in November 2013. $2.4 million is committed immediately, and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by the US Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-13-C-0006).

Nov 29/12: VXX. US FBO:

“The VXX Program will conduct a Pre-solicitation Conference on 10 December 2012 at the Southern Maryland Higher Education Center located at 44219 Airport Road, California, MD 20619, from 1:00p.m. to 5:00p.m. EST. The purpose of this event is to provide a brief status update of the VXX Program, inform industry of program requirements, receive industry’s feedback on the draft RFP, and provide a Question & Answer/networking opportunity.”

Nov 23/12: VXX. FBO.gov releases NAVAIR’s draft for the VXX competition, #N00019-12-R-0063. Once the RFP is refined and released, it will be about designing, building, testing, qualifying, and delivering 25 helicopters. The 2 VXX Engineering Development Model (EDM) machines would be delivered within 30-36 months, and 4 System Demonstration Test Article (SDTA) helicopters would be delivered within 42-52 months. They would be followed by 11 Low Rate Initial Production lots, and 8 “Full-Rate Production” lots. Each lot is actually 1 helicopter.

On the one hand, NAVAIR is trying to keep development costs down:

“Offerors will be highly encouraged to propose an existing, in-production helicopter platform from which the VXX will be derived. It is the Government’s desire to hold development to an absolute minimum on the VXX Program and focus the program effort on integration of mature subsystems on a mature platform. While minor changes to the platform to accommodate integration of subsystems are inevitable, change to major components such as drive train, rotors, engines and basic structure is highly discouraged. In keeping with this approach, the Offerors will be encouraged to not propose any design elements that contain immature technology or that might be deemed Critical Technology Elements (CTEs).”

Announced competitors Finmeccanica/Northrop Grumman (AW101) and Sikorsky/Lockheed (S-92) both fit the basic requirements. On the other hand, the VH-71/AW101 fiasco involved an in-production, C-17 transportable platform, led by a US contractor. It needed so many changes to its engine, rotors, etc. because of the program’s equipment and range requirements, which couldn’t be met by any existing helicopter. These aspects of VXX have yet to become public. A pre-solicitation conference will be held in Maryland on December 10. Sources: US FBO.gov, “Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VXX) Contract” | Aviation Today, “NAVAIR Sets Ball Rolling (Again) for Presidential Helicopter (VXX) Replacement” | Reuters, “Navy moves ahead to replace presidential helicopters”.

FY 2011 – 2012

VXX Analysis of Alternatives; VH-71s sold to Canada as spares. CH-149 Cormorant SAR
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August 2012: AoA. Navy Public Affairs Officer Capt. Cate Mueller tells DID that the revised Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was approved back in May. The focus for the program is set on “affordability, cost control and risk reduction” which reflects adjustments asked by the Pentagon after the original AoA was deemed to set an unaffordable path.

The next step in the acquisition process is work on a Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the key deliverable of the Technology Development (TD) phase. This is expected to be submitted for approval to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in 2013. Once that is approved, an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) has to be made before moving to Pre-Engineering & Manufacturing Development and issuing an RFP.

All told, this puts the program at least “8 years away from when a new helicopter could replace the current fleet” according to Mueller. The Congressional Budget Office, in its July 2012 assessment of the FY 2013-2017 FYDP, assumes a replacement for Marine One will happen “in the second half of this decade.”

Feb 27/12: GAO Report. the Government Accountability Office publishes its second report on DOD’s handling of the VH-71 cancellation aftermath and VXX follow-on. (The first report was released in March 2011.) The GAO conducted a performance audit from March 2011 to February 2012 that reviewed work on the Navy’s AOA and a number of high-level Pentagon and Navy briefings.

The AOA submitted by the Navy in March 2011 was not approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) because of a lack of a cost-effective solution. At least that was OSD’s perception as it is relayed in the GAO report. The Navy apparently believed it had been faithful to DOD guidance in its analysis. OSD then provided additional guidance in December 2011. There won’t be a Milestone A, nor an official program, until that is resolved. The revised AOA is expected to be presented to OSD in March 2012.

Feb 13/12: 2013 Budget. The US Navy is asking for $61M in FY2013 for V-XX program definition.

Sept 12/11: Off to Canada. HW Farren Company announces that it has finished transporting the USA’s 9 VH-71 helicopters to Canada’s Department of National Defence, for use as spare parts to Canada’s CH-149 Cormorant fleet. The CH-149s have had readiness issues, and have been consuming spares at a rapid clip. Hence the mention that the 9 helicopters were “in care of” maintenance contract holder IMP Aerospace in Enfield, NS.

The first 4 VH-71s were broken down for transport, but the last 5 could not be disassembled, and HW Farren had to designed and fabricate special wheel cradles for them. They were loaded on a barge, transported to Baltimore, off-loaded, placed on an Atlantic Container Line Roll-On Roll-Off Vessel for transport to Halifax, then re-loaded onto barges, for transport to Canadian Forces Depot Bedford. CFAD Bedford is technically part of CFB Halifax, but the “Bedford Magazine” is its own major property occupying the entire northern shore of Bedford Basin. It houses all of the weaponry and ammunition for MARLANT vessels, and has a loading jetty and several nearby anchorages. HW Farren | CASR.

VH-71s to Canada as spares

June 2/11: Termination fees. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Owego, NY receives a $53.4 million modification to the previously awarded cost-plus-award-fee VH-71 system development and demonstration contract, which was terminated for the convenience of the government. This modification provides funding for post-termination related expenses, including, but not limited to: physical inventory of contractor acquired property; proposal preparation; security; disposition of contract inventory; subcontractor settlement costs; and termination management activities. When combined with the June 2010 contract, it raises termination expenses to $112 million.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (36%), and at various subcontractor facilities located within the United States and in the United Kingdom and Italy (64%), and is expected to be complete no later than September 2012 (N00019-05-C-0030).

FY 2010

Teaming for VXX VH-71/ EH101 concept
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June 21/10: Termination fees. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego, NY receives a $58.6 million modification for termination-related expenses. The cost-plus-award-fee VH-71 System Development and Demonstration contract (N00019-05-C-0030) was terminated for the convenience of the government, but there are still some associated costs that the government must pay. This modification provides funding for post termination related expenses, including, but not limited to, the physical inventory of contractor acquired property; proposal preparation; security; disposition of contract inventory; subcontractor settlement costs; termination management activities; and applicable fees.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY (36%) and at various subcontractor facilities located within the USA, and in the United Kingdom and Italy (64%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10 (N00019-05-C-0030).

June 7/10: AW101. The EH101 is back, as Boeing teams with AgustaWestland. Finmeccanica’s subsidiary has produced several Boeing helicopters under license in England and Italy (WAH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinooks), and now Boeing will return the compliment with the AW101. The license will give Boeing full intellectual property, data and production rights, making its version of a Presidential AW101 bid a Boeing aircraft, built by Boeing personnel, at one of its U.S. facilities. Boeing says that it will respond to the current VXX RFI by the June 18/10 deadline.

This decision is likely to create several ripples. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute points out that:

“Boeing’s bid could create some embarrassing moments for both itself and Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin spent years arguing that the AgustaWestland airframe was superior to the Sikorsky product it now supports… By the same token, Boeing is engaged in a bitter dispute with Airbus concerning European aircraft subsidies, and [the AW101 has received them]… As Christopher Drew noted in today’s New York Times, the government will be selecting between the same two rotorcraft in the new competition that were offered the first time around, albeit with different teams behind them. Whether the government ultimately saves any money… will depend on how it re-writes its performance specifications… the more likely outcome is that… the greater capacity of the EH101 will once again prevail.”

See: Boeing | Finmeccanica [PDF] | AgustaWestland | DoD Buzz | Lexington Institute.

April 20/10: V-22? Boeing and Bell Helicopter are reportedly considering a VV-22 tilt-rotor bid for the VXX competition.

The V-22 offers significant speed and range advantages, but there’s a reason the V-22 didn’t make the finals the first time. Massive downdrafts too strong for the White House lawns didn’t fit the RFP, and a low-ceilinged cabin design didn’t fit the idea of a President walking in without stooping. Not to mention continued jitters concerning its safety, though that can cut both ways as a political statement. DoD Buzz.

April 19/10: H-92. Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin team for VXX. This day, the 2 companies also jointly submit a response to the U.S. Navy’s VXX request for information, detailing how they would design and manufacture the next Marine One. The agreement has Sikorsky as the prime contractor, offering its H-92 Superhawk medium-lift helicopter, with Lockheed Martin as the major integrator of all required electronic subsystems.

In addition to the VXX teaming agreement, the firms also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore business opportunities involving “other Sikorsky programs” beyond VXX, or their existing 38-year partnership surrounding the US Navy’s SH-60/MH-60 Seahawk naval helicopters. Sikorsky | Lockheed Martin | Aviation Week Ares.

Feb 16/10: VXX. The USA releases a 27-page RFI for new “VXX” Presidential Vertical Lift Platform(s). Interested parties are asked to provide a 5-page response by March 3/10. The responses will be used to support a new analysis of alternatives, the first step toward a formal Request for Proposal.

One change is that VXX would feature at least 2 versions of the new helicopter: an executive model for VIP transport and a passenger-cargo variant for support. Total buy for both models will track closely with VH-71 plans, at 23-28 aircraft. FedBizOpps #VXX-RFI | Defense News.

“VXX” RFI

Oct 14/09: Politics. US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates sends a letter to Congress [PDF], in advance of House/Senate efforts to reconcile their defense bills into a single agreed budget. It includes the following excerpt:

“The conference bill should not provide funding for weapons that are not working or are no longer needed. To that end, the Department strongly objects to the House’s addition of $400 million to make operational five partially-completed VH-71 helicopters and appreciates that the Senate did not add funds [for the VH-71] to the President’s [budget] request. These helicopters currently have no mission equipment and would require in excess of $2 billion to complete and operate as Presidential helicopter. Even with these funds, they would not meet full operational requirements for the mission. The Department [of Defense] and the White House are conducting a requirements analysis, and the outcome of this effort should not be pre-empted. If the final bill were to include funds that continue the existing VH-71 program, or would pre-judge the plans to re-compete the Presidential helicopter program, I would recommend that the President veto the bill.”

FY 2009

VH-71 cancellation VH-71 MSB simulator
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June 2/09: It’s official: Arrivederci, VH-71. A Pentagon press release states that:

“The Navy today announced that it will terminate the VH-71 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program contract. The announcement follows a Department of Defense (DoD) decision to cancel the existing presidential helicopter replacement program… Navy contract N00019-05-C-0030 and associated work with Lockheed Martin Systems Integration – Owego (LMSI-O), Owego, N.Y., awarded Jan. 28, 2005, for the SDD of the VH-71 program, has been terminated for the convenience of the government. The under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics issued a VH-71 program acquisition decision memorandum on May 15, 2009, which directed the program be cancelled, to include both Increment 1 and Increment 2.”

VH-71 terminated

June 1/09: Arabian Aerospace quotes Sikorsky VP of Business Development Frank DiPasquale, who says that:

“We have worked very hard to establish the S-92 in a Head of State role in the Middle East and that has been a great success. The aircraft is performing that mission in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and in Saudi Arabia where the royal family is now flying in the S-92.”

May 21/09: What Next? One of the big problems with the new helicopters was the need to pack all of that communications gear, into a helicopter that can fly nearly 300km without refueling to an emergency airbase at Andrews AFB or Camp David, while remaining small enough to avoid damaging the White House lawn.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that the Pentagon is now considering a request for 2 different helicopter types: one for routine shuttle trips, and a more capable escape aircraft designed for use in emergencies. This would allow a much lower-budget fleet of standard helicopters for everyday use, and a much smaller fleet built on a larger design that didn’t have to care about the White House lawn.

May 15/09: Stop work. The VH-71 program receives a stop work order from the Pentagon. Another 225 layoffs are expected at Lockheed Martin’s Owego, NY facility before the end of the month.

The 5 production and 4 test aircraft would still be the property of the US Navy, but many have not had their advanced systems integrated yet. It will be up to the US Navy to decide what to do with the helicopters.

The US Navy said that the $85 million 2010 budget request includes money to cover termination costs, government efforts to develop options for a replacement program, and service life extensions for the current presidential helicopter fleet. Some estimates place termination costs as high as $500 million, but that figure remains to be negotiated between Lockheed Martin and the federal government. Elmira Star Gazette | Ithaca Journal | NY Times op-ed | Wall Street Journal on local impacts | WICZ Fox 40 news | bNet | The Hill magazine | Wall Street Journal on cancellation.

April 28/09: Testing. The 9th and final (4 test + 5 pilot production) VH-71 to be built under “Increment 1” of the US Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program leaves AgustaWestland’s Yeovil, UK facility. It will be sent to the United States for completion by prime contractor Lockheed Martin. AgustaWestland release.

April 28/09: Politics. In a Reuters interview, AgustaWestland CEO Giuseppe Orsi takes issue with the Pentagon’s characterization of the VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters’ expected lifespan. Orsi says that even with the additional armor and modifications, the new VH-71 helicopters are certifiable for a minimum 10,000 flight hours of operation, or about 30 years of service in the Presidential fleet. The firm has agreed to tests with the US Navy to verify that performance.

Those tests may be important, because Orsi also backed a compromise plan being floated in Congress. It would revert to the original budget of $6.8 billion, in exchange for sticking to the VH-71 Increment 1 specifications. Note the March 17/08 entry, below, which explains that a number of original requirements were deferred from Increment 1 to improve affordability.

Since the Increment 2 specifications are not realistic or cost-effective, the question going forward must be which specifications can be cut, even if the competition is re-started. The question is whether the Increment 1 helicopters can serve for the required length of time, and are close enough to the reduced requirements, to justify continuation of the program. The alternative involves termination costs that could run to $200 million, in exchange for a renewed competition and a helicopter that offers a more exact match for the new requirements. Reuters | New York Times.

April 27/09: Layoffs. Lockheed Martin Corp. announces an initial round of 225 job cuts at its Owego, NY plant, with further layoffs expected. About 800 of the plant’s 4,000 workers are dedicated to the VH-71 program, and others have been working on an EH101 derivative for the USAF’s CSAR-X search and rescue competition. AP, via Forbes.

April 6/09: Stop. In an unusual move, American Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations to the President. He recommends full cancellation of the VH-71 program, on the grounds that the Increment 2 helicopters will cost more than an Air Force One 747, and “Increment One helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five- to 10-year useful life.”

New options for the future Presidential helicopter are to be developed for a replacement program that’s expected to begin in FY 2011.

March 5/09: Bloomberg reports that the latest estimate and 15-page report, prepared for congressional defense committees, revises the VH-71’s program cost from $11.2 billion to $13 billion – 113% above the original baseline of $6.1 billion. Based on 28 helicopters built, the allocated R&D and purchase cost would be $464.3 million per helicopter.

The report adds that instead of having the first 5 helicopters ready no earlier than September 2010, there would be a delay of 18 months (April 2012), and that the upgraded version with more sophisticated communications and the most advanced defenses would slip from December 2017 – December 2019.

The US Navy would not confirm these changes or comment, because Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has yet to provide a formal certification of cost and justification for the program to Congress, per the Nunn-McCurdy legislation’s review process. Bloomberg News | Congressional Quarterly | Washington Post | Ithaca Journal | Britain’s The Independent discusses the effect in Britain.

Costs rise again

Feb 27/09: Hacked. P2P Intelligence firm Tiversa claims that in Oct/Nov 2008, it traced a file that contains details regarding the VH-60N Presidential Helicopter’s CAAS avionics architecture, and some program financial data, on public-access peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks. On Feb 25/09, the file was found on the IP address of an Iranian computer.

The CAAS avionics architecture is slated for use in the VH-71 as well. Read “P2P Network Leaks: The VH-60N Helicopter” for full treatment of this breach, its implications, and the underlying trend at work.

Feb 23/09: Arrivederci? Disparaging comments at the White House fiscal summit by President Obama, and by his Republican Party opponent Sen. John McCain, cast doubt on the VH-71 program’s future. From The Australian’s report :

“Yesterday Mr Obama, as if playing both speaker and leader in the Westminster style, first called on Senator McCain in this version of question time.

“Thank you for doing this,” said Senator McCain, “your helicopter is now going to cost as much as Air Force One. I don’t think that there’s any more graphic demonstration of how good ideas have cost taxpayers an enormous amount of money”.

“I’ve already talked to (Secretary of Defence Robert) Gates about a thorough review of the helicopter situation,” he said.

“The helicopter I have now seems perfectly adequate to me,” he said, generating laughs before adding “of course, I’ve never had a helicopter before … maybe I’ve been deprived and I didn’t know it.”

He said it was an example of the “procurement process gone amok. And we’re going to have to fix it”.

Those comments by both men were widely reported, and triggered a drop in Finmeccanica’s share price. AgustaWestland USA chief executive Stephen C Moss stated his belief that the program will go forward, with changes, and pointed out that in 63 cases of Nunn-McCurdy cost overruns, only 2 programs have been canceled. Changes have been proposed to the VH-71, including reducing the number of helicopters, and removing some of the troublesome requirements. Other proposed changes include putting the program up for rebid, building new VH-3s with updated communications, or simply canceling the program without replacement.

In the current economic environment, more extreme solutions become more likely. Given that the existing VH-3/ VH-60 fleet is not suffering from flying hour fatigue, these comments from Obama and McCain will make the required Nunn-McCurdy justifications to Congress very problematic. See also: Washington Post | CNN Money with Moss statement | MSNBC re: Connecticut delegation’s rebid push | The Hill | AP | Helciopter Association International | Flight International | WIRED Danger Room.

Jan 29/09: Cost breach. The US Navy announces that the VH-71 program is more than 50% over budget, triggering “Nunn-McCurdy” legislative provisions and stopping work on development of the VH-71’s Increment 2 design.

Under those provisions, the Defense Department either must end the program, or certify that it is essential for national security, that the new unit costs are reasonable, that management structure can control future growth, and that no substitutes exist that provide equal or greater military capability at less cost. Reuters, via Forbes.

Nov 26/08: SDD. Another $500 million in System Development and Demonstration (SDD) funds to Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY. Work on this modification to the existing cost-plus-award-fee contract (N00019-05-C-0030) will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (28%); Owego, NY (26%); Yeovil, UK (20%); Cascina Costa, Italy (15%); Rolling Meadows, IL (3%); Lynn, MA (3%); Clifton, NJ (2%); Denton, TX (1%); Grand Rapids, MI (1%); and Rancho Santa Margarita, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete in December 2014.

Oct 9/08: SDD. Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY receives a $173 million modification, raising the January 2005 cost plus award fee contract (N00019-05-C-0030) for the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) of the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (28%); Owego, NY (26%); Yeovil, United Kingdom (20%); Cascina Costa, Italy (15%); Rolling Meadows, IL (3%); Lynn, MA (3%); Clifton, NJ (2%); Denton, TX (1%); Grand Rapids, MI (1%); and Rancho Santa Margarita, CA (1%), and is expected to be complete in September 2011.

FY 2008

Price inflation; pilot helo. VH-71 Demonstrator
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Sept 22/08: Testing. The first operational pilot production helicopter (PP-1) completes its maiden flight at AgustaWestland’s facility in Yeovil, England. Lockheed Martin release.

March 14/08: New deal. The Pentagon reaches an agreement with the White House re: the VH-71 program, and confirms that the cost of the 28 helicopter program has jumped to $11.2 billion – from $6.1 billion when the contract was signed in 2005. Increment 1 rose from $2.3 billion to $3.7 billion, and Increment 2 jumped from $4.5 billion to $7.5 billion. The price of the Increment 2 helicopters would be over $325 million each – comparable to the current Air Force One 747 fleet, even when adjusted for inflation since 1990.

The original VH-71 program planned to rely on an existing commercial helicopter and make modest modifications, but Pentagon acquisition chief John Young has now acknowledged that no existing medium-lift helicopter can meet all of the requirements crammed into VH-71 Increment 2:

“The Navy and industry team did not clearly realize the full implications of the White House requirements… These issues were further complicated by the enforcement of Navy certification requirements on a helicopter designed to commercial aviation standards.”

That’s a rather startling admission. Now, the Navy and industry teams are will complete a “substantial” redesign of the EH-101 base helicopter to meet Increment 2 requirements. The Day Paper, CT | Aviation Week | Defense News

New deal, costs rise

Feb 27/08: Testing. Test Vehicle 3 makes its initial flight in Yeovil, England marking the 4th program helicopter to enter flight test. TV-3 will be the first vehicle tested that is outfitted with mission systems, which means it will be able to validate in-flight performance data for the helicopter’s equipment, instead of relying on lab tests.

TV-3 is due to arrive at the Presidential Helicopter Support Facility here on March 17/08 and will then travel to Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY for final assembly and mission systems integration. TV-3 will join TV-1, TV-2 and TV-5, which have accumulated more than 650 total hours of flight test so far. One additional test vehicle is scheduled for flight testing and missionization after TV-3, before the initial lot of production aircraft are delivered to Patuxent River. NAVAIR release | Flight International.

Jan 19/08: VH-71 stays. Defense Technology International reports that After considering alternatives to the Lockheed Martin VH-71 presidential helicopter – including upgrading the Sikorsky H-3s – the Navy has reportedly decided to stick with the US101 aircraft and fund an additional $1 billion in modifications in “Increment 2,” on top of the program’s initial $6.1 billion price tag, on the grounds that other alternatives wouldn’t be any better.

DTI reports that White House and Navy requirements are essentially turning the helicopter into another “Air Force One” (Presidential 747), which involves hundreds of specifications not included at the program’s outset. In addition to extra electronics, the changing specifications will include structural modifications to the US101 helicopter, in order to extend its range beyond what the current airframes can deliver.

Adding hundreds of new performance requirements in mid-stride does make successful program delivery very difficult – and being on that ride has cost Lockheed Martin before, during evaluations of another modified US101 for the $10-15 billion CSAR-X combat search and rescue helicopter.

Jan 10/08: Testing. The first 2 VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters (TV-2 and TV-5) have entered the flight test phase with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD. They are the first of 4 Increment 1 test aircraft; TV-3 and TV-4, will undergo additional assembly and missionization at Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY, before being transferred to NAS Patuxent River in 2008 for testing. NAVAIR release.

Jan 3/08: Cancellation? Inside Defense reports that the VH-71 program may face significant cuts:

“The fate of the VH-71 presidential helicopter program is hanging in the balance as senior defense officials privately weigh the elimination of the bulk of the program, according to sources tracking the issue inside and outside the Pentagon…”

Dec 13/07: Cancellation? Gannett’s Marine Corps Times reports that cost increases and schedule problems, “driven in part by nearly 2,000 requirement changes,” (vid. April 2007 entry) forced a meeting with the White House Military Office to discuss the program’s fate.

Rumors of cancellation began shortly after that, though the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation Programs later said that there “has been no decision to terminate the program… We’re continuing to look at all the options. We’ve looked at almost every conceivable option…”

Nov 14/07: Industrial. Lockheed Martin announces that its VH-71 Systems Integration Lab (SIL) is now operational at the Navy’s Presidential Helicopter Support Facility at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, in preparation for the arrival of the first aircraft built for the VH-71 program. The new SIL at Patuxent River will allow engineers to test VH-71 avionics and mission systems prior to installation aboard the aircraft – for instance, ensuring that the President can communicate with several government agencies simultaneously. It consists of test benches to evaluate individual subsystems currently in development. The SIL at Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY, which became operational in August 2007, includes a master systems bench full-scale functional mockup of the VH-71 cockpit and cabin that allows the Navy-Lockheed team to run mission scenarios of the final integrated systems.

Test Vehicle 2 (TV-2) is scheduled to arrive at Patuxent River in mid-November 2007 to commence a comprehensive testing program. Another 3 test vehicles are scheduled for delivery to the U.S. this winter, followed by 5 production aircraft during 2008. Capt. Don Gaddis, the U.S. Navy’s Presidential Helicopters program manager, said that:

“A Systems Integration Lab at the Presidential Helicopter Support Facility will enable the Marine Corps to test the integrated systems more quickly during the flight test phase… Having this on-site test capability is critical to meeting our requirements.”

FY 2006 – 2007

Maiden test flight, full flight. VH-71 1st flight
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July 3/07: Testing. The 1st VH-71 pilot production helicopter makes its maiden flight at AgustaWestland’s facility in Yeovil, UK. Before that TV2 model is delivered to the test facility in Patuxent River, MD in fall 2007 for structural testing, the aircraft will complete initial shake-down flying and embark on flight trials to test the integrated avionics systems and aircraft systems. Lockheed Martin release | GE release.

April 2007: 2,000 changes? A systems requirements review reveals that nearly 2,000 design changes will be needed to meet Pentagon requirements for the VH-71 Increment 2 model – the first model intended to offer the President full command and control capability while in flight. The changes reportedly included a new tail, transmission and rotor blades. Source.

Oct 24/06: Sub-contractors. GE Aviation officially opens its new Presidential Helicopter engine facility at the Lynn, Massachusetts, plant. The dedicated area in Lynn Product Development & Delivery will house the assembly and shipment operations of CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines for the next-generation “Marine One” helicopter that will be used by the President of the United States.

Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY awarded GE a $65-million contract to provide CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines for use during the system development & demonstration (SDD) phase of the Presidential Helicopter Replacement program. GE Aviation release.

June 12/06: Industrial Lockheed Martin formally opens the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Integration Facility. The new 176,000-square-foot facility features aircraft integration hangars, program management and engineering office space, systems integration laboratories, aircraft parts storage, and maintenance and helicopter paint facilities. The complex also includes a new helicopter flight operations area. Lockheed Martin release.

October 2005: First test flight of the VH-71.

1st test flight

FY 2003-05

VXX/US101 dubbed VH-71A US101, 1st test flight
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July 7/05: VH-71. The next generation US presidential helicopter sheds its generic “VXX” placeholder and contractor’s “US101” moniker and received its mission design series designator of “VH-71A.” A popular name for the VH-71A is still under consideration. NAVAIR release.

VH-71 designation

May 19/05: Politics. The House Armed Service Panel approves the FY 2006 defense appropriations bill, including the Presidential helicopter. Money for the project now is included in the House version of the Defense Appropriations bill. Congressional maneuvering had left this result in some doubt, along with about 750 jobs at the Lockheed Martin Systems Integration plant in Owego, NY. Government Executive.

April 2005: Politics. Sikorsky’s home-state Sen. Christopher Dodd [D-CT] inserts an amendment to a State Department authorization bill that would have prohibited any European companies in “countries that do business with terrorist-sponsoring states” from producing components of the US101 helicopter. The amendment was crafted to target AgustaWestland, but Lockheed Martin home-state Sen. Chuck Schumer’s [D-NY] objections to the amendment kill it. Towanda, PA Daily and Sunday Review

Jan 28/05: Winner! U.S. Navy NAVAIR selects the US101 as the new “Marine One” helicopter for the President of the United States, issuing a $1.7 billion System Design & Development (SDD) contract.

The US101 is a derivative of AgustaWestland’s 3-engine EH101. The reason for such a large contract is that the helicopter may be a tested platform, but there’s a lot of gear to position, integrate, and test, including expensive propositions like electronic interference testing. Team US101 release | Lockheed Martin release.

US101 wins, gets SDD contract

Dec 1/03: US101. The US101 Team competing to provide the president of the United States with a new Marine One helicopter fleet selects GE Aircraft Engines (GEAE) to supply American-made CT7-8E engines for the US101 Presidential helicopter. At more than 2,500 shaft horsepower, the CT7-8E is one of the newest and most powerful derivative of GEAE’s successful T700/CT7 family of helicopter engines. Lockheed Martin release.

Appendix A: VH-71 – The Plan, and the Problems Air Force One
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Given the immense complexity of the electronics involved, the plan was for VH-71 deliveries to involve 2 separate “increments” that separated the full electronics suite from the airframe and basic functions.

In the Increment 1 phase, 4 test aircraft and 5 pilot production VH-71 aircraft were to be delivered through 2009. Increment 1 would answer the urgent need for an air system with enhanced performance over existing VH helicopters, but would not include many of the desired technologies.

Increment 2 was supposed to see a significant increase in helicopter performance, and communications, for the operational helicopters that would remain for many years as America’s Presidential fleet.

According to the Pentagon’s Selected Acquisition Reports, these 28 VH-71 aircraft were initially expected to cost a total of of $6.145 billion, including both R&D and production. Even that worked out to about $219.5 million per helicopter, a sum that could purchase a new civilian 747 jumbo jet.

Tier one of the program’s problems began when it rushed the schedule.

The original schedule for the Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program, known as VXX, had called for an initial operating capability in 2014. That schedule was accelerated by 4 years after the 9/11 attacks, even though it had taken several years to award the contract. Based on the contract schedule, the first US101 that was equipped to transport the President was expected to be available in 2009. The entire fleet of 28 US101s was scheduled for delivered to the Marine One squadron by late 2015.

Tier 2 of the program’s problems are a common refrain in US Navy acquisition programs: a long stream of requirements changes mid-process, creating technical specifications that current technologies cannot meet, with production starting long before a final design is agreed upon. In this case, however, many of the changes were driven by White House staff, not by the Navy.

By March 2008, the Pentagon confirmed a new figure of $11.2 billion, or $400 million per helicopter – comparable to a new buy of the USAF’s VC-25 “Air Force One” 747s. Their next SAR was forced to incorporate that jump, and report the VH-71 program as being in breach of American Nunn-McCurdy regulations. Those laws require cost increases of over 25% to re-justify the program to Congress. That proved to be a very difficult exercise, amidst the meltdown of the global financial system.

VXX 1.0 – Team Lockheed’s “US101” US101 Demonstrator
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This competition had some unique requirements, including rotor wash and helicopter weight that had to avoid being too hard on the White House landscaping. Those requirements had reportedly washed out Bell Textron and Boeing’s V-22 tilt-rotor, which meets a number of the program’s challenging range requirements and offers speed advantages. Aside from its downwash effect on the local flora, the Osprey also had a very low-ceilinged cabin and safety questions, and was never seriously considered for presidential use. Bell Helicopter joined Lockheed’s US101 team.

In 2005, after a long competition, a modified AgustaWestland EH101 beat out Sikorsky’s smaller S-92, which already operates as a head-of-state helicopter in other countries. Team US101 lead Lockheed Martin received a $1.7 billion contract from the Navy for the VH-71 Marine One program’s systems development and demonstration phase.

Team US101 was led by Lockheed Martin as system integrator. AgustaWestlandBell, a joint venture between AgustaWestland and Bell Helicopter Textron, was the principal American subcontractor to Lockheed Martin. Despite being a subcontractor, they would have responsibility for the basic helicopter design, production build, and basic air vehicle support.

While most European EH101s use a Rolls Royce/ Turbomeca RTM322 engine, The VH-71/US101s will be powered by 3 of GE’s CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1 engines, derived from the T700 series that powers many US military helicopters. The CT7-8 delivers 2,520 shp at sea level, and subsequent models were expected to surpass that.

Other key suppliers included ITT, Northrop Grumman, Kaman Aerospace, and Palomar Products. Aircraft final assembly will be by Bell Helicopter in Amarillo, TX, with mission equipment installation and final integration by Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in NY.

New engines, and a rotor downwash that wouldn’t mess the flowers, were only the beginning of the changes to the basic airframe and systems. Another key modification for the new US101 a 6-foot-tall main cabin airstair door, instead of the shorter opening on regular EH101s. Why? It makes for better TV. The taller door matches the height of the cabin, and so the President needs only a tip of the head to get into Marine One, instead of having to duck down.

The VH-71 would retain the EH101’s active control system, which cancels out rotor and transmission vibration to create an airliner-like ride. Sound-absorbing material was also installed throughout, to provide a better work environment. All this would be present in the Initial Increment 1 helicopters.

Increment 2 would add other technical features, including head-up displays in the cockpit, a more robust tail rotor design, a higher power gearbox, slightly redesigned rotor blades for better flight characteristics, and higher performance engines.

The Presidential helicopters’ most important technologies, however, involved an array of EMP (Electro Magnetic Pulse, created by nuclear blasts) resistant communications systems. While VH-71 Increment 1 helicopters would have limited capabilities in this regard, the full production VH-71 Increment 2 birds were expected to feature a wide array of new capabilities, allowing the President of the United States to work while in transit, and exercise command while en route to longer-term crisis transportation. From a temporary transport with some communications capabilities, Marine One was morphing into a platform that began to resemble the USA’s “Air Force One” VC-25s/ 747s.

In VH-71 Increment 2 helicopters, the 4th aircrew member would operate an elaborate, state-of-the-art, open architecture communications suite providing secure access to the White House communications network, along with technical enhancements designed to give the President full command and control capability while in flight.

Unfortunately, advanced EMP-resistant systems of this type are expensive, proprietary, inherently bulky, and draw a lot of power when aggregated together. In a 747, that isn’t a show-stopping problem. It’s a serious engineering problem in a very confined space, however, and also creates weight issues that will bite especially hard with a less-efficient helicopter aircraft. They bite even harder if that helicopter must also have truly unusual range, something that’s rather difficult to do if it’s loaded to the gills with gear, power generators, and other weight-creating equipment.

The 1st flight of a VH-71 pilot production helicopter took place in Yeovil, England on July 3/07.

In March 2008, Pentagon acquisition chief John Young acknowledged that no existing medium-lift helicopter could meet all of the requirements crammed into VH-71 Increment 2, adding the startling admission that “The Navy and industry team did not clearly realize the full implications of the White House requirements…” Following a program reorganization, the Navy and industry teams worked to complete a “substantial” redesign of the EH-101 helicopter to meet those Increment 2 requirements. It was this redesign that drove costs so high, as the helicopter was required to carry tons of extra gear and up to 15 passengers, while flying farther than current VH-3 and VH60 helicopters.

No problem is insoluble, if enough dollars and engineering resources are applied. Projects can and will be killed, however, if those dollars and resources climb too high. In the end, that’s what happened to the US101.

Additional Readings Background: Helicopters & Program

• FBO.gov – Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (VXX). Solicitation Number: N00019-13-R-0060.

• AgustaWestland – AW101

• Bell Textron – The Bell-Boeing V-22. Didn’t contend in either phase, but VH-22s are becoming HMX-1 Squadron’s associated utility platform, carrying cargo and VIPs other than the President. They’ll eventually supplant the VH-60s.

• Sikorsky – S-92 Superhawk

• GE – CT7-8E and CT7-8CE1. This engine also equips the S-92 Superhawk, and Spanish NH90 helicopters. GE CT7-6 variants power Italian EH101s.

• Lockheed Martin Code One Magazine (Q4 2004) – Landing on the Lawn

Background: Legacy Helicopters

• Wikipedia – VH-71 Kestrel. They were eventually sold to Canada as spare parts for the CH-149 (AW101) search and rescue fleet.

• Lockheed Martin, via WayBack – US101. They’re now part of Sikorsky’s S-92 team.

• Team US101, via WayBack. This was Lockheed Martin’s collaboration with AgustaWestland, for the VH-71.

• GlobalSecurity.org – VH-60 Marine-1

• GlobalSecurity.org – VH-3D Marine-1

Official Reports

• US GAO (Sept 6/13, #GAO-13-826R) – Department of Defense’s Waiver of Competitive Prototyping Requirement for the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program

• US GAO (Feb 27/12, GAO-12-381R) – Effort Delayed as DOD Adopts New Approach to Balance Requirements, Costs, and Schedule. This is about VXX.

• US GAO (March 25/11, GAO-11-380R) – Application of Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the Presidential Helicopter Program

• Congressional Research Service (Dec 2009) – VH-71/VXX Presidential Helicopter Program: Background and Issues for Congress

News & Views

• Defense News (Feb 7/05) – Lessons of US101 [PDF format]

• IEEE Internet Computing (6(1), February 2002), via – Mapping the Gnutella Network: Properties of Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems and Implications for System Design [PDF]. Explains the system behind the VH-60N avionics leak.

• US Navy, via GlobalSecurity (November 2001, N88-NTSP-A-50-0008/A) – Navy Training System Plan for the VH-60N [PDF]

F-15s: Note Kill Stickers
(click to view larger)

F-15s and F-16s make up the backbone of Israel’s potent fighter force. The IDF’s main fighter is the F-16 Fighting Falcon, including aging F-16 A/B Netz (“Falcon”), plus F-16C Barak (“Lightning”) and 2-seat F-16D Brakeets (“Thunderbolt”), and now the heavily customized two-seat F-16I Block 52+ Soufa (“Storm”). The Israelis fly the largest contingent of F-16s outside the United States, alongside longer range, higher performance F-15s. F-15A-D Baz (“Eagle”) models have greatly distinguished themselves in IDF service, and the customized two-seat F-15I Ra’ahm (“Thunder”) Strike Eagle is optimized for advanced ground attack and long range interception. All of these aircraft are heavily modified from the US versions, with Israeli avionics, self-protection systems, weapons, and sometimes radars as well.

While Israel’s F-16A/B Netz inventory may well be sold on the international market, their F-16 C/D and F-15 A-D planes were expected to serve the Air Force Corps until at least 2020. Unfortunately, Israel’s new F-35As won’t even start arriving until 2016 or 2017. To keep their edge, Israel began spending money in 2006 to improve and upgrade its legacy fighter fleet…

Cheyl Ha’Avir: Upgrading the Fleet F-16C Barak, Sardinia
(click to view full)

Announced improvement for the “Barak 2020” F-16 C/Ds will include an command and control upgrades to match the systems in the newer F-16I Soufas, replacement of the screens in the cockpit with more advanced color displays and head up displays, and other undisclosed upgrades. A follow-on program is expected to add improved flight control systems, high resolution displays, and Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display.

Announced improvement of the F-15 A-D Eagles will include a “replacement of electronic war systems” and an “improvement in the ability to carry advanced bombs” via integration of new weapons. Israeli F-15s had already been modified to carry smart bombs, unlike their American counterparts, but new weapons require new efforts. While the release wasn’t specific, JDAM compatibility is likely to be a priority for Israeli planes. Tamir Eshel of Defense Update writes us to add that integration of RAFAEL’s “Spice”, a kit similar to JDAM but improved via a combination of electro-optical and GPS guidance, will also be included.

DASH Gen-III display
(click to view full)

This is actually the second modernization wave for the F-15 A-Ds, following close on the heels of the 1995-2001 Baz Meshopar (“Improved Eagle”) program. Israeli-Weapons.com notes that the Baz Meshopar package resembles the US Air Force (USAF) F-15 Multi-Stage Improvement Program, although it was implemented with a significant element of Israeli-built electronics and avionics integrated around the MIL-STD 1553 and MIL-STD 1760 data buses. The latter are required in order to add compatibility with GPS-guided weapons, and key elements of the F-15I Ra’am Strike Eagle variant include a modernized cockpit with Elbit multifunction displays, Elbit’s DASH (Display And Sight Helmet), a GPS-INS navigation system, AIM-120 AMRAAM and Python 4 missile capability, plus software upgrades delivered via the USAF’s Warner Robins Air Logistics Center avionics management directorate software division. The upgraded aircraft are known as Baz Meshopar (Improved Eagle) but are also referred to as the F-15 AUP (Avionics Upgrade Program).

Meanwhile, back in North America, US budget crunches and procurement cutbacks around the F-22 and F-35 JSF programs will intensify the need to keep its TacAir fleet up to acceptable strength via supplemental measures. As such, Israel’s upgrades could hold future interest as a template for upgrades that would turn the USA’s F-15C dedicated air superiority fighters into modernized multi-role aircraft at a reasonable cost.

Contracts & Key Events Israeli F-15s

July 26/16: Rafael’s SPICE 1000 EO/GPS-guided munitions are to be adopted by the Israeli Air Force as the weapon enters into its final development stage. Integration will take place on all fighter squadrons with F-16C/D “Barak” aircraft first in line. Features of Spice include being camera operated with real time maneuver and response abilities when facing fixed and mobile targets.

September 4/15: Israel announced that it is upgrading its F-16 variants to be able to handle the vaunted Russian S-300 anti-aircraft system. Iran is perennially about to receive shipments of the system.

March 6/13: F-15s. Israel Defense:

“In several months, the project for upgrading all Israeli F-15I “Ra’am”, considered to be the IAF’s strategic fighter aircraft, is meant to come to a conclusion. Lt. Col. Tzahi Alia, head of the systems and armaments field in the maintenance squadron at the Israeli Hatzerim airbase….”

Dec 26/11: The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel is looking for ways to bolster its fleet before the F-35s arrive. Phased elections in Egypt, which are beginning to hand significant power to Taliban-style Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, are creating a new strategic situation. Meanwhile, the possibility of slowdowns to the F-35 program or further cost increases leaves their affordability and timeliness in question.

Beyond upgrades to existing platforms, the Israelis are reportedly considering scenarios in which used planes might be available for a bargain price, as American budget cuts lead to retirement of serving F-15s and F-16s. The question after that would be whether to operate them as-is, or upgrade them to a common Israeli configuration.

Dec 12/11: Delays to the F-35 program appear to be pushing Israel toward further F-16C/D upgrades, and may even trigger new aircraft buys if the multi-national program’s delivery dates slip beyond 2017.

The Jerusalem Post reports that the IAF has now decided to extend their F-16C/D “Barak” (Lightning; oddly, also the American name for the F-35) to add flight-control system upgrades, high-resolution displays, and Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted displays. Of the 3 upgrades mentioned, the DASH will make the biggest difference to the fighters’ long-term effectiveness. Helmet-mounted displays are quickly becoming standard equipment in modern fighters, because they allow the pilot to take full advantage of new datalinked, wide-angle seeker aerial and ground weapons.

Feb 19/11: F-15s. Flight International reports that Israel’s F-15 Eagle upgrades are expanding to add its oldest F-15 A/B aircraft. Reports vary, with estimated totals of in-service F-15 A/Bs ranging between 26-45. One prototype has already been completed.

The upgrade will give all of Israel’s F-15s some level of long-range strike capability, and reportedly includes fuselage strengthening (which may be informed by the USAF’s recent fleet grounding), MIL-STD-1760, and unelaborated “improvements to the aircraft’s radar,” among others.

Israel’s F-15A/Bs carry the APG-63 mechanically scanned radar, which was introduced in the 1970s. Its first set of 25 F-15A/Bs were reportedly early production USAF airframes, and would definitely have been delivered without the APG-63’s key 1979 upgrade: a software programmable signal processor. Note that the AN/APG-63v1 is actually a major redesign introduced in the early 1990s, which currently serves on a number of USAF aircraft, and on South Korea’s F-15K Slam Eagles. The v1 does not have an AESA front end like its v2 and v3 counterparts, but is compatible with adding one later. Switching APG-63s for their APG-63v1 counterpart, or for an Israeli radar like the EL-M/2032, would be a big change.

Feb 16/11: Retired IAF Brig-Gen. Assaf Agmon of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, says Israel is likely to re-assess the importance of its air force, in the wake of Egypt’s unrest and uncertainty surrounding the future of their peace treaty with Egypt. He sees the reassessment as broader than just the air force, but that has been Israel’s traditional bulwark against conventional threats. Agmon is suggesting additional buys of F-35A medium stealth fighters, but delivery timing and program issues could also push the IAF to focus on quickly-delivered fleet upgrades instead. Flight International.

Jan 24/11: F-16s. After the first “F-16 Barak 2020” prototypes pass initial inspections, a ceremony takes place at the IAF’s Hatzor AB. It marks the decision to start upgrading all Barak (F-16C/D) planes to Barak 2020 configuration, giving them avionics commonality with the Sufa (F-16I) fleet. Sources: IAF, “Barak 2020″ Takes Off”.

F-15 Baz Meshopar
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Nov 30/10: F-16s. Flight International reports that the Israeli air force has upgraded its first F-16C/D to the “Barak 2020” configuration. Modifications are being performed at the squadron level, under the supervision of the air force’s central maintenance depot (technical unit number 22).

May 12/09: F-16s. Flightglobal reports that the Israeli air force plans to upgrade its F-16C/D aircraft to the ‘Barak 2020’ upgrade package so this portion of fleet can serve till 2020. Sources: F-16.net, “IDFAF launches F-16C/D upgrade program”.

April 20/06: USAF F-15s. David Axe of DefenseTech notes that the USAF is preparing its own modernization roadmap for its single-seat F-15C Eagle air superiority fighters, and that conversion to multi-role status is part of that roadmap. Up to 200 F-15Cs may eventually be involved, and a new AN/APG-63v3 AESA radar is the 1st step. Defense Tech, “Eagles Forever”.

Jan 25/06: The F-16C/D Barak and F-15A-I upgrade programs are announced, with few details. The IDF news release did not mention what the further-upgraded F-15s would be called. Perhaps “Baz Meshopar Me’oht” (Very Improved Eagle)? IDF | DefenseTalk copy.

Upgrades announced

Oct 1/03: F-16 ACE. IAI is still trying to convince Israel to upgrade its F-16A/B “Netz” fighters with their F-16 ACE package. ACE would swap the old APG-66 radar for IAI Elta’s ELM-2032, replace the core avionics and mission computer, and add features like a wide-angle HUD, LCD displays, GPS navigation with moving maps, electronic warfare upgrades, LITENING targeting pod capability, etc.

“There has been concern in Israeli industry that without the home air force ordering the ACE package, it will be difficult to market the upgrade to overseas air forces. IAI heads a consortium of ACE participant companies, which includes Astronautics, Elop and Elta. The upgrade is based around an open architecture mission system to allow carriage of a wide variety of weapon systems and sensors without hardware changes.”

Sources: IAI, “Military Aircraft Upgrades: F-16” (ACE) | F-16.NET, “IAI bids to upgrade Israeli F-16s”.

Additional Readings

• DID – Israeli Plans to Buy F-35s Moving Forward

Americas

• The Pentagon’s chief weapons tester Michael Gilmore has blasted the Army’s Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) just as the service prepares to make a production decision for the system. Gilmore described the MNVR, saying the radio “did not meet commanders’ operational needs for a mid-tier network solution.” and “provided no value added in mitigating the significant impacts to communications and mission execution experienced in a satellite communications (SATCOM)-denied environment.” Only time will tell if the report affects the Army’s production decision.

• Lockheed Martin projects slow but steady growth in the international sale of its missile- and air-defense systems. Products such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) interceptor have all been garnering interest from European and Middle East governments and the company expects to win various competitions over the next few years. Missile and fire control division is responsible for about 50 percent of their international purchases.

Middle East North Africa

• The Algerian Navy has commissioned their third C28A-class corvette after delivery from China. Featuring a displacement of 3,000 metric tons, the 360-foot-long stealth-guided missile ship can conduct offshore defense operations and long-distance combat missions. The three vessels, ordered in 2011, come as part of a wider naval modernization by Algeria which includes orders for two Meko A-200AN frigates, and two Project 636 Varshavyanka (Kilo class) diesel electric submarines from Russia, which are due in 2018.

• Rafael’s SPICE 1000 EO/GPS-guided munitions are to be adopted by the Israeli Air Force as the weapon enters into its final development stage. Integration will take place on all fighter squadrons with F-16C/D “Barak” aircraft first in line. Features of Spice include being camera operated with real time maneuver and response abilities when facing fixed and mobile targets.

Europe

• Thales Deutschland has been contracted to upgrade German Army training simulators. The work, due for completion in 2017, includes all small arms/handheld anti-tank weapons shooting simulator training devices in use with the German army. A total of 185 AGSHP shooting simulators are covered under the $5.5 million contract.

Asia Pacific

• A series of human errors has been blamed for the torpedoing of a fishing vessel by the Taiwanese Navy. A draft report of the investigation seen by media sources found that the patrol vessel was loaded with live missiles, and to enable drills to be carried out, a simulator box was supposed to be installed between the missile control and launch tube. Only two of the four missiles, however, were installed with the simulators. Petty Officer 2nd Class Kao Chia-chun, unsupervised, had selected salvo fire of two missiles and one of those missiles was not connected to a simulator. As a result, the missile fired when activated.

• Policemen and soldiers in the Afghan Army are said to be cashing in spent ammunition to scrap dealers amid corruption, poor pay and conditions experienced. With average pay at around $200 per month, a kilo of scrap can be sold for $2.55 with soldiers happy to spend 5-10 minutes firing until merchants have what they need. Other reports found troops in Helmand and Kunduz provinces firing 7,000 artillery shells in May alone. Commenting on the issue, an Afghan official said “We asked army commanders about it and said if each shell killed only one person, we should have 3,500 Taliban dead in each province….It’s very clear they fire aimlessly and collect the shell casings for copper and sell them.” $300 million worth of ammunition was given by the US to Afghan security forces last year.

• The world’s largest amphibious aircraft has rolled off the production line in China. Developed by state aircraft maker Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the AG600 is about the same size as a Boeing 737, and plans are to use it to perform marine rescue missions and fight forest fires. The aircraft has a maximum flight range of 4,500 km and can collect 12 tons of water in 20 seconds.

Today’s Video

• Rafael’s SPICE munitions:

Americas

• In just six months, Saab has spent almost all of its investment funding for the upcoming USAF T-X trainer program. Partnered with Boeing, little is known about the aircraft’s design except that it is based on a clean sheet design. The team face off against a Lockheed Martin/KAI proposal based on the latter’s T-50, a Raytheon/Leonardo offer of the M-346-derived T-100 and a new platform being developed by Northrop in association with BAE Systems. Formal requirements for the program will be released by the USAF either by year’s end or early 2017.

• Two new close air support aircraft to complement and eventually replace the A-10 are being sought by the USAF. Beechcraft’s AT-6 and Embraer’s A-29 Super Tucano are being looked at for an off the shelf procurement while an initial order of 20 light attack OA-X aircraft could deliver as early as next year. For the OA-X, the service is looking for a medium-altitude aircraft with some level of precision strike capability, such as the BAE Systems Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System laser-guided rocket.

• Boeing has announced the latest in an ongoing saga of cost overruns with the company taking a $393 million hit on the KC-46 tanker program. Well published issues such as the fault with the aircraft’s refueling boom have resulted in delays to the aircraft reaching an important program milestone prior to initial production. The charges are to be formally announced on July 27 and brings the total value of penalties to almost $1.9 billion. Don’t worry Boeing, the next round of drinks are on us.

Middle East North Africa

• Never mind the coup, it’s the F-35! Despite the recent attempt at political overthrow by certain cadres of Turkey’s military, Lockheed Martin is forging ahead with its planned production of the first two F-35As for Turkey. Assembly of the aircraft is expected to commence within the next six to twelve months and delivery scheduled for 2018. But could further political instability in an already volatile region put the deal into doubt, only time will tell.

Africa

• Germany is to lease three Heron 1 UAVs for upcoming operations in Mali. Operated by Airbus, with military missions flown solely by military personnel, the Israeli-built surveillance drones will see operations commence in November and last until February 2018. The deal is worth $100 million.

Europe

• Dassault’s six-month financial review has revealed new defense orders worth $662 million. Of that, almost $500 million has come from the French military’s contract for the Mirage 2000D upgrade with the remainder from international business. The company also announced the delivery of six Rafale fighters and a production backlog of 76 aircraft.

Asia Pacific

• Lockheed Martin and Swiss firm Pilatus have successfully completed the initial production test flight of the first PC-21 aircraft destined for the Australian Defence Force under the AIR 5428 Pilot Training System program. The first of the ordered aircraft is expected to be delivered to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in June 2017 upon the completion of testing. 49 of the turbo-prop trainers were ordered back in September 2015 as part of the RAAF’s new pilot training program.

• Bye-bye Viraat. India’s second aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, left harbor on its last voyage on Saturday under escort from Indian Navy Sea King Helicopters. The “Grand Old Lady” is en route to Kochi for essential repairs and dry docking. Due for decommissioning later this year, Viraat holds the esteemed honor of being the Guinness World record for the oldest serving warship after spending 29 years sailing under the flag of India and 27 years in the British Royal Navy.

Today’s Video

• F-35s at Red Flag for the first time:

Americas

• A B-52 has dropped the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) precision-guided bomb from its internal bomb bay for the first time. The test was carried out to certify the new Conventional Rotary Launcher being developed for the legacy bomber. Following the successful drop, testers will now continue with dropping the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Miniature Air Launched Decoy, and the MALD Jammer from the launcher.

• Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $241 million US Navy contract modification for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Under the deal, Lockheed will provide replacement electronic components for the aircraft with work to be completed by December 2018. The contract combines purchases for the USAF, USMC, Navy, foreign military sales customers and international partners.

Middle East North Africa

• Pakistan is looking to secure second-hand F-16 fighters from both Jordan and European nations via the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) route. The renewed searching comes as the deal to secure the planes from the US collapsed after members of Congress opposed to the fighters being procured under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program to subsidize the deal. Instead, Islamabad is now looking for a Third Party Transfer of the F-16s, if someone is willing.

Africa

• South Korea’s KAI has just broken into the African market with contracts signed to provide four KT-1 trainers to Senegal. The West African nation is the forth export customer for the basic trainer following Turkey, Peru, and Indonesia in adopting the aircraft. A spokesperson for KAI has claimed that the Senegal sale will help make further inroads for the company in the African market.

Europe

• Speculations have arisen over who has ordered a number of MiG-35 jets following an earlier story that 46 turbofan engines were being ordered for the fighter. The contract is worth at least $2 billion. While the customer is being kept a secret, Egypt is being touted as the most likely customer following a string of defense buys from Russia. Further down the list includes Syria, whom Moscow has been aiding in the ongoing civil war, and Iran, although any offensive weapons sold to Iran can be vetoed by the UN Security Council for the next five years.

Asia Pacific

• Saab has sent a proposal to Indonesian authorities to sell Gripen C/D fighters to their air force (TNI-AU). If selected, the Gripens would replace a well-seasoned fleet of Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighters, in service since 1980. The government’s replacement program initially seeks to procure 16 aircraft at a cost of $1.5 billion, but this could be expected to increase if territorial disputes in the region require Indonesia to beef up its capabilities further.

• It’s been reported that restrictions placed on Japan’s RQ-4 by the US is limiting Tokyo’s capabilities. Ideally, Japan wanted the RQ-4 to provide round-the-clock surveillance against neighboring North Korea and China. Now the Defense Ministry has discovered that the drone can only loiter for at most three times a week. Washington is only willing to supply optical sensors for Japanese Global Hawks, AIS tracking of ships and electronic emissions gathering sensors will not be provided at the outset. As a result, Japan may look to Israeli industry to supplement its UAV requirements with the IAI Heron.

• Boeing is to deliver four P-8 Poseidon aircraft to the Australian government. A US Navy contract modification awarded Boeing a $100 million order to produce and deliver the aircraft by June 2017. Once delivered, the P-8s will engage in long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

Today’s Video

• The KT-1 Basic Trainer.:

Americas

• A KC-46A fitted with its brand new modified boom has successfully managed a mid-air refueling of a C-17 with the previous axial loading issues no longer present. The testing was carried out on July 12 and the USAF also refueled an F-16 on July 8. Refueling attempts with the F-16 earlier this year were successful, although a higher than expected axial load on the boom was detected. The higher load was again present during the initial attempt with the C-17 which necessitated installation of hydraulic pressure relief valves in the boom.

• Saab is aiming to carve out a market in South America following their export coup to Brazil. Cash conscious governments from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina could all find a cost effective replacement for their aging fleets in the Gripen fighter. The company has brought a mock-up of its latest model to the Farnborough Air Show alongside an older model for nations that don’t need the kinds of capabilities the new jet brings to an air force.

Middle East North Africa

• Turkish munition firm Rokestan has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Airbus to integrate a variety of weapons from Roketsan’s existing product range on the Airbus C295W. Existing products in the Rokestan inventory include the 70mm laser-guided missile “CIRIT”; laser-guided long-range anti-tank Missile “LUMTAS”; and laser-guided bomb “TEBER”. With the C295W already used as a transport and maritime patrol aircraft, the weapons integration is part of of Airbus’ expansion plan to increase the capabilities of the plane.

Europe

• Boeing and MBDA have conducted successful life-fire testing of the Brimstone missile on the AH-64E attack helicopter. Funded by the UK MoD, the nine month integration project saw both companies collaborate on a leased AH-64E from the Pentagon. The weapon’s Semi-Active Laser (SAL), Dual Mode SAL/millimetric wave (mmW) and fully autonomous mmW guidance modes were tested while the helicopter was hovering, moving and maneuvering/banking.

• A UK operated Eurofighter Typhoon has commenced flight testing of the E-scan radar following successful ground trials on the aircraft. The trials are designed to ensure the radar and weapons system reach the required capability in time for first deliveries to the Kuwait Air Force, which became the aircraft’s eighth customer earlier this year. Development of the new radar underpins the Typhoon’s current and future capability evolution.

Asia Pacific

• Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) has chosen Thales’ Scorpion helmet-mounted sight and display (HMSD) to go into the Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase of the South Korean Light Armed Helicopter (LAH) program. Once completed, Thales will provide 400 of the HMSD to KAI. The program will see 200 LAHs introduced into service in the early 2020s.

• Lockheed Martin is to undergo a large upgrade project of some 500 in-service F-16 fighters with 300 upgrade orders already gained from South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. The F-16V format will see the inclusion of Northrop Grumman’s SABR electronically scanned radar, as well as a new 6 by 8 inch center pedestal display, a Link 16 data link, enhanced data processing and a Sniper advanced targeting pod. A push to sell upgrade packages comes as the company reaches the end of its F-16 orders, which at the current rate, will see production halt in 2017.

• US experts believe that North Korea will be capable of carrying out full-range testing of the KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile within the next year. The hermit kingdom’s latest test last week ended in failure after exploding mid-air. Analyst Joseph Bermudez stated that the biggest challenges to Pyongyang are quality control and system integration.

Today’s Video

• MBDA’s Brimstone on the AH-64E Apache:

Americas

• The first upgrade of Argentine Air Force C-130H aircraft has been delivered back by L-3 to the service. A 2011 Foreign Military Sale contract saw for the provision of commercial-off-the-shelf avionics upgrades for a total of five aircraft, with the remaining four aircraft to be upgraded at FAdeA’s (Fábrica Argentina de Aviones) modification facility in Córdoba, Argentina. Under the program, L-3 installed new communication, navigation and air traffic management systems avionics capabilities, as well as a reliability upgrade on critical environmental and power systems to increase mission availability.

• US foreign military sales projection for 2016 is expected to reach $40 billion, down from $46.6 in 2015. The forecast was announced by US Navy Vice Admiral Joe Rixey, who heads the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at the Farnborough Air Show. Rixey said the total could still fluctuate, depending on what happens in the fourth quarter, but maintained that global demand for US helicopters and other weapons remain strong.

Middle East North Africa

• Patriot anti-missile systems operated by Saudi Arabia have had a 100% success rate according to manufacturer Raytheon. The system has seen service as part of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen intercepting missile attacks from Houthi rebels. Iran is believed to be arming the rebels with small arms and munitions including scud missiles.

• Production has commenced on Embraer A-29 Super Tucanos destined for Lebanon from the start of 2017. The US government agreed to a $173 million foreign military sales contract in November that will see Embraer’s US partner Sierra Nevada deliver six of the light-attack turboprops to the Lebanese air force by 2019. Once in service, the aircraft will support Lebanon’s fleet of intelligence and reconnaissance Cessna 208B Caravans.

Europe

• A consortium of Thales and Qineteq have chosen the Textron Airland’s Scorpion light attack aircraft for their part of the Air Support to Defense Operational Training (ASDOT) program. The live flying training program will see the government procure a red air and electronic warfare (EW) training service, replacing a number of individual contracts with a single umbrella contract with a single operator. With the deal to last 15 years, the winner is set to earn $1.5 billion over the contract’s lifespan.

• Lockheed Martin has dismissed fears that its joint proposal with MBDA to supply the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) to Germany could slip into difficulty. While negotiations could well run into 2017, an election year, officials said lawmakers could still approve the deal as long as it was done in the first three months of the year, before the German national election cycle kicks off in earnest ahead of the September vote. MBDA is expected to have its final proposal submitted very soon.

Asia Pacific

• The US and South Korean governments have agreed to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Seongju County in North Gyeongsang Province. A HAWK ground-to-air missile battery is already operated at the site and is likely to be moved to make way for the new system. Seongju was chosed as it is out of range of North Korea’s multiple rocket launchers deployed along its border with South Korea, and THAAD can protect key US facilities in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province and Daegu.

• India is to launch its first “Make in India” initiative for the development of a tactical communication system (TCS) next year. The competition will see two domestic development agency (DA) consortiums awarded contracts to build one TCS prototype each at a cost of $150 million, in 18 months, with the government providing 80% of the prototype’s funding. Once the two prototypes are handed over to the Indian Army, they will undergo technical evaluation, be tested on the ground, and then shortlisted for production. The winner will provide seven TCS systems for plains and desert areas at a cost of $4 billion in the next 10 years.

Today’s Video

• The F-35 at the Farnborough Air Show:

THAAD: In flight
(click to view full)

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is a long-range, land-based theater defense weapon that acts as the upper tier of a basic 2-tiered defense against ballistic missiles. It’s designed to intercept missiles during late mid-course or final stage flight, flying at high altitudes within and even outside the atmosphere. This allows it to provide broad area coverage against threats to critical assets such as population centers and industrial resources as well as military forces, hence its previous “theater (of operations) high altitude area defense” designation.

This capability makes THAAD different from a Patriot PAC-3 or the future MEADS system, which are point defense options with limited range that are designed to hit a missile or warhead just before impact. The SM-3 Standard missile is a far better comparison, and land-based SM-3 programs will make it a direct THAAD competitor. So far, both programs remain underway.

The THAAD System THAAD operations concept
(click to view full)

An ideal multi-layered anti-ballistic missile system should have both land and naval options, as well as theater-level and point defenses backed by a 3rd tier of longer ranged midcourse-defense missiles (q.v. GBI) and/or space-based weapons that can hit the missile during its boost phase. THAAD is a land-based, theater-level, terminal phase defense.

THAAD consists of 4 segments defined as (1) Missile round, (2) Launcher (3) Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence – BM/C3I, and (4) Radar. The THAAD system can work in centralized mode, in a decentralized group, or fully autonomous launcher mode.

THAAD is designed to be mobile on the ground, in order to react quickly to emerging threats and priorities. This also makes the system much more difficult to take out with preemptive attacks. A THAAD battery will typically operate 3-6 Oshkosh HEMTT-ALS heavy trucks as launch vehicles, each carrying 8 missiles (TL 24-48), complete with an automatic Load Handling System that lifts the missile packs onto the truck. The rest of the system involves Raytheon’s AN/TPY-2 Ground-Based Radar (GBR) for long-range scans, and a mobile Tactical Operations Center (TOC/TFFC) developed by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon.

The size of the HEMTT trucks means that the full THAAD system requires C-17 Globemaster III or C-5 Galaxy aircraft for air transport. It can also be sent aboard ship, of course.

AN/TPY-2
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The THAAD Ground-Based Radar (GBR), now known as the AN/TPY-2, is an X-Band, phased array, solid-state radar developed and built by Raytheon at its Andover, MA Integrated Air Defense Facility. The TPY-2 is employed for surveillance at ranges of up to 1,000 km (600 miles) as well as target identification and target tracking, thanks to its high power output and beam/waveform agility. Targeting information is uploaded to the missile immediately before launch, and continuously updated during the flight.

The TPY-2 is deployed with THAAD, but it’s its own system, with modules for the radar, power, cooling, electronics, and operator control. It can also be used independently as part of a ballistic missile defense infrastructure, and is steadily carving out a wider role beyond THAAD.

THAAD components
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Lockheed Martin’s THAAD missile is powered by a single stage solid-propellant rocket motor with thrust vectoring. After burnout, the booster is separated from the kill vehicle, which continues to the interception point. For exo-atmospheric (outside the atmosphere) maneuvering, the kill vehicle is equipped with a Boeing-developed liquid Divert and Attitude Control System. In the terminal intercept phase, the kill vehicle is guided by a BAE Systems staring focal plane array infrared seeker made with iridium antimonide, whose window is protected in the initial flight phase by a clamshell protection shroud. Once it reaches its target, the THAAD missile uses “hit to kill” technology, as opposed to blowing up a warhead nearby and sending clouds of shrapnel at a target to disable it.

THAAD missiles have an estimated range of 125 miles/ 200 km, and can reach a maximum altitude of 93 miles/ 150 km. By comparison, the Patriot PAC-3 has an estimated range of 12 miles/ 20 km, while the Boeing-Israeli Arrow 2 has an estimated range of 54 miles/ 90 km and can reach a maximum altitude of 30 miles/ 50 km. The naval SM-3 Standard missile, chosen as the theater defense weapon for the US-Japan ABM research program, has an estimated 300 statute mile/ 500 km range, but is believed to have a lower altitude maximum than THAAD.

THAAD 1.0 is deployed as the initial system, with 2 batteries active. THAAD 2.0 development work continues, with a projected finish date of 2018. The Army wants to improve THAAD performance in a high debris environment, add advanced discrimination algorithms, improve engagement coordination with Patriot and Aegis BMD, initiate THAAD engagements using sensor data from other BMDS sources like C2BMC, and perform other upgrades. Unfortunately, delays to the back-end theater-level C2BMC command system mean that some THAAD 2.0 capabilities won’t be fully operational until after 2020.

There have been proposals to more than double THAAD’s range by adding a 21″ diameter booster stage to the current 14.5″ missile, turning it into a 2-stage weapon with increased velocity and maneuverability. Tests were undertaken in 2006, and Lockheed Martin submitted a funding proposal for the FY 2011 budget. Nothing came of that, and the FY 2014 cancellation of the Navy’s next-generation “Next-Generation Aegis Missile” competition appears to have closed that door.

The THAAD Program THAAD: Schedules and Tests

THAAD has been around for a long time, and was originally envisaged as a system that could be fielded on an emergency contingency basis by 1999. Problems with the system made initial fielding over a decade late, but demand from theater commanders remains high.

Launch!
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Between April 1995 and August 1999, there were a total of 11 THAAD flight tests that validated propulsion and seeker systems, and even attempted missile interceptions. The first attempt occurred during the 4th flight on December 13, 1995, but tests 4-9 all failed for mechanical/quality reasons and the first successful intercept did not occur before the 10th flight (FT-10) on June, 10 1999. See this CDI table for further details. In response, notes GlobalSecurity.org:

“Studies done by the military and independent sources cited the following problems in the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Program: First, the program’s compressed flight-test schedule did not allow for adequate ground testing, and officials could not spot problems before flight tests. The schedule also left too little time for preflight testing, postflight analysis, and corrective measures. Second, the requirement that an early prototype system be deployed quickly has diverted attention from the normal interceptor development process and resulted in interceptors that were not equipped with sufficient instruments to provide optimum test data. Third, quality assurance received too little emphasis and resources during component production, resulting in unreliable components. Fourth, the contract to develop the interceptor was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, which placed all of the financial risk on the government and did not hold the contractor accountable for less than optimum performance.”

THAAD recorded one more positive test (FT-11) in August 1999. There were no further flight tests before June 2000, when Lockheed Martin received a $3.97 billion Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract. Testing would eventually resume in November 2005. It was conducted cautiously, and went well.

The most common opponent for the THAAD in tests is the Hera, which marries the 2nd and 3rd stages of the Minuteman II ICBM, with the guidance section of the exceptionally accurate Pershing II medium range ballistic missile.

Early THAAD missile
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In December 2006, Lockheed Martin received a $619.2 million contract for initial THAAD fire units that could be usable in an emergency as the upper-tier complement to the Patriot PAC-3 in the Army’s TBMD (Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) system. The expected fielding date for Initial Operational Capability was 2008-2009, fully 10 years after initial hopes for this capability. In the end, technical issues have forced formal IOC back to 2013.

Full acceptance by the US Army and Full Operational Capability is expected in 2017.

THAAD: Budgets and Exports

The US Army was eventually expected to acquire 80-100 THAAD launchers, 18 ground-based radars, and a total of 1,422 THAAD missiles. Two THAAD battalions were planned, each with 4 batteries, plus an additional battery to make 9. Issues with missile production cut order number sharply in 2012 and 2013, and by the time they were resolved, the 2014 budget’s response to spending reductions was to cut the program total to 6 batteries and 11 TPY-2 radars.

Those order cuts may be replaced by THAAD exports.

In September 2008, the UAE requested permission to buy 9 THAAD launchers and associated radars and communications equipment, 147 missiles, etc., in order to field 3 THAAD fire units. A scaled-down contract was agreed at the end of December 2011. In November 2012, Qatar requested 2 fire units of its own.

THAAD’s role in the UAE ansd Qatar will mirror its role in the USA, alongside the Patriot PAC-3 as the UAE’s lower-tier ABM-capable complement.

The beneficiaries of all these orders include:

Contracts and Key Events

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the THAAD system, and the US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL manages the contracts. Raytheon’s AN/TPY-2 radar system contracts are sometimes covered here, but these radars are also deployed without THAAD, so they’ve been given their own Spotlight article.

FY 2016

THAAD production delayed

July 14/16: The US and South Korean governments have agreed to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Seongju County in North Gyeongsang Province. A HAWK ground-to-air missile battery is already operated at the site and is likely to be moved to make way for the new system. Seongju was chosed as it is out of range of North Korea’s multiple rocket launchers deployed along its border with South Korea, and THAAD can protect key US facilities in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province and Daegu.

July 11/16: The US is to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea resulting in ire and protest from China. Deployment of the system, to counter the threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea, comes the same week as sanctions were finally placed on the hermit kingdom’s glorious leader Kim Jong Un for human rights abuses. Pyongyang has hit back calling the decision “an act of war” while China has lodged complaints with US and South Korean ambassadors.

July 5/16: The US Missile Defense Agency has awarded Alaska Aerospace Corp. an $80.4 million contract to construct a gravel road, a couple gravel pads, and a Life Support Area to support testing of the of two THAAD interceptors at Kodiak Island. Congressman Don Young praised the decision saying “As a long-time advocate who helped bring missile defense to Alaska, this contract award is good news for Kodiak and Alaska Aerospace and even better news for the continued security of our country.”

February 9/16: Following some initial reservations over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, South Korea is to begin talks with the US over installing the system. Fears held by some in Seoul that a THAAD system on the Korean peninsula would anger China seem to have been alleviated by Sunday’s rocket launch by North Korea. The rocket was apparently launched to send a satellite into orbit and follows last month’s nuclear test which has garnered condemnation from the international community. This combination of testing has increased fears of Pyongyang’s development of inter-continental ballistic missile technology. Any THAAD system would be paid for by the US, with one battery costing around $1.3 billion.

January 15/16: A proposal to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in South Korea is being reviewed by the government. A plan sent by the US forces based in the country is something Washington has wanted to do for some time as a wider ballistic missile defense plan for the region. Seoul has been reluctant to have it deployed as it may effect the often tentative relations with China, but recent nuclear tests by North Korea have put the idea back on the table.

December 30/15: Lockheed Martin has been given an additional order to provide an undisclosed number of production lots 7 and 8 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, one-shot weapons and related support services to the Missile Defense Agency. The $528.5 million contract modification sees an extra $144.6 million added to a pre-existing contract and will be completed by September 30 2019. The THAAD system protects the US and allied customers from short, medium and intermediate ballistic missile threats, and is operated and developed under the umbrella of the Missile Defense Agency.

December 1/15: South Korea may not need to install the THAAD missile defense just yet after the most recent failure of North Korea’s missile tests. It had been apparent that Pyongyang had been planning to test off the east coast of the peninsula after announcing a no-sail zone earlier this month. The failure will be a setback to North Korean plans to equip its submarines with below surface ballistic launching capabilities. Observers noted that the missile broke up underwater and failed to break the waters surface. Initial photographs of leader Kim Jong-un watching a successful test were quickly dismissed as state propaganda.

November 27/15: Japanese defence minister Gen Nakatani has raised the possibility of installing the THAAD missile defense system in the country. The system would be installed to protect against any threat that may come potentially from North Korea, who have raised the possibility of testing missiles. Pyongyang announced a no sail zone off the east coast of the peninsula earlier this month between November 11 and December 7. Nakatani’s comments come along with speculation that South Korea and the US have been discussing the installation of THAAD by Seoul during talks over deterrence methods to threats from the North. These rumors have been downplayed by both countries.

November 24/15: Task Force Talon, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Guam have completed their replacement of missiles. The exercise took place between September and November and involved a total replacement of its existing Interceptor stock to help maintain combat readiness. With a force of 200 soldiers, Task Force Talon is about a third of the size of the traditional air defense Patriot battalion. The exercise comes at a time of increased activity in the Pacific region and talks of installing further THAAD systems in South Korea which may be seen as a threat to an increasingly aggressive China.

November 3/15: A Standard Missile-3 Block IB (SM-3) interceptor failed to shoot down an extended medium-range ballistic missile (EMRBM) on Saturday following a malfunction, with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor system instead being used to take out the target. The SM-3 was used successfully earlier in October to shoot down a similar target off the north-west coast of Scotland, with this latest test part of a multiple-threat scenario test conducted in the western Pacific.

In addition to the interception of the EMRBM, an SM-2 Block IIIA was also used to simultaneously defend against a target drone aircraft, with the THAAD system also taking down a Short Range Air Launch Target (SRALT). The $230 million interception tests also involved the Aegis BMD system, including AN/SPY-1 radar system, as well as transportable AN/TPY-2 missile defense radars.

October 13/15: Lockheed Martin’s production of THAAD interceptors has been delayed owing to computer glitches. Only three out of 44 systems – destined for use by the Missile Defense Agency – have been delivered, with a revised delivery schedule now in place.

FY 2015

THAAD into South Korea?

March 19/15: Pentagon review. A major review has been launched by the Pentagon to assess the current state of play of missile defense systems, capabilities and programs, seeking to update a previous review from 2011. The Patriot is likely to come under scrutiny, as well as the THAAD system.

Feb 6/15: China allegedly warns South Korea on THAAD. For all of the questions that surfaced last May about whether South Korea would get THAAD (or wants it), or U.S. troops in R.O.K. would deploy one for themselves, or if South Korea’s on indigenous efforts would be up to snuff, the Chinese appear to be most worried about the U.S.’s system. Yonhap reports that Hong Lei, the Chinese foreign minister, warned South Korea a day after an exchange took place between the two countries’ defense ministers.

FY 2014

Purchases: USA, UAE; GAO and DOT&E report on THAAD performance and testing; THAAD and Air-Sea Battle; THAAD into South Korea? THAAD TFCC
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Sept 25/14: UAE. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Dallas, TX receives an $11.1 million firm-fixed-price modification to the UAE’s THAAD contract, covering delivery of single missile round transportation containers, peculiar support equipment, THAAD fire control and communication spares, and launcher spares. All funds are committed immediately, and the modification brings the contract’s total cumulative face value to $349.7 million.

Work will be performed at, Dallas, TX; Lufkin, TX; Ocala, FL; and Camden, AR, with an expected completion date of June 30/15. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL (HQ0147-12-G-9000, 0001, 0069).

Sept 24/14: Lockheed Martin in Sunnyvale, CA receives a $274.8 million ceiling modification to previously awarded sole-source, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract.

The announcement doesn’t say what for, but it’s THAAD’s contract, and just $2.7 million in FY 2014 USAF RDT&E budgets are committed immediately. The ordering period runs through January 2017. Work will be performed at Sunnyvale, CA and Huntsville, AL. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-12-D-0001).

Aug 7/14: USA. A $124.6 million sole-sourced fixed-price contract from the US government for THAAD ground components: launchers, launcher spares, fire control and communication spares, and support equipment. All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2014 MDA procurement budgets.

Work will be performed at Dallas, TX; Lufkin, TX; Huntsville, AL; Sunnyvale, CA; and Camden, AR, with an expected completion date of Aug 7/17 (HQ0147-14-C-0011). See also Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin Awarded $124.6 Million THAAD Contract”.

May 27/14: Korea. The US government is considering THAAD as an option to protect American forces in South Korea, and has conducted a site survey for possible South Korean locations. The issue is that the ROK is developing its own national KAMD missile defense system, and continues to reiterate that it won’t be part of a joint system with the USA and Japan. Which means that interoperability with systems like THAAD is a potential issue.

The Americans are thinking in geo-political terms, as a visible response to North Korea, and there’s also that standard underlying flavor of “of course they want to do it our way”:

“The U.S. could deploy its own Thaad system to South Korea temporarily, and then, in time, replace it with a [THAAD] system purchased by Seoul, a defense official said. Or it could allow South Korea to purchase its own, and jump ahead in the queue for the system, the official said.”

Very American. The thought that perhaps South Korea is happy with its Green Pine radars that sit in the TPY-2’s niche, frequently says that terminal defense is all it can use, and would rather deploy its own Cheolmae 4-H missile developed in conjunction with Russia, never enters the picture. On the other hand, the Americans might reply that their own forces would rather have THAAD’s protection, that more than 2 long-range radars might be a good idea against an enemy whose war plan includes in-depth terrorist attacks, and that a common equipment roster of PATRIOT PAC-3 and THAAD systems could create a basis for independent command and control systems that can still cooperate. Sources: Wall St. Journal, “Washington Considers Missile-Defense System in South Korea”.

April 11/14: GAO Report. The Pentagon has been reluctant to develop a life-cycle cost estimate for BMD in Europe, on the dubious grounds that it isn’t a separate program. that’s why GAO-14-314 concerns itself with EPAA’s costs and implementation issues. THAAD batteries are an important ancillary part of that defense, but their role isn’t clear yet. The 6 batteries have an estimated O&M cost of $6.5 billion over 20 years, but that $54.17 million per battery per year involves basing in the USA. Costs for basing in Europe are expected to be higher. How much higher? We don’t know, because the US MDA and US Army can’t agree on how to do the analysis. How confused are things?

“DOD officials stated that they are examining options for forward-stationing some THAAD batteries overseas. Doing so would likely increase operating and support costs due to higher operational tempo, contractors that are deployed with the system, additional needed security, life-support facilities such as barracks and a mess hall, and site preparation for the equipment. For example, MDA recently estimated that operating and support costs for one THAAD battery in Guam could be $11 million higher annually than if the battery was located in the continental United States. However, this estimate does not include costs for military personnel, fuel, site activation, transportation, or some contractor costs. Further, costs could be even higher if an element is located at an austere location due to additional costs for site preparation, security, transportation, and some contractor costs. This estimate also assumes continued contractor support… [but] DOD has not yet completed a business-case analysis as part of determining the long-term support strategy…. the THAAD business-case analysis remains incomplete as of December 2013, and there is no firm deadline to complete the analysis.”

Meanwhile, the TPY-2 radar deployments to Turkey (2011) and CENTCOM (2013), still can’t share information and work together, because that hasn’t been worked out. That will hurt all EPAA systems, but THAAD in particular would have benefited.

March 14/14: GAO report. The GAO releases GAO-14-248R, regarding the USA’s EPAA plans for defending Europe from ballistic missiles. THAAD is included in passing.

THAAD was scheduled to get upgrades by 2015 that would help it distinguish real warheads within debris fields. Part of that has been implemented, but the full version won’t be ready until 2017. A 2nd set of upgrades scheduled for 2018 would have improved interoperability with other missile defense systems, and allowed launches using the C2BMC system’s composite tracking from multiple sources. Those interoperability software upgrades will be late, leaving very little time to ensure that they work during Phase 3 testing for the European EPAA project. In addition, the C2BMC capability in question has been pushed off until 2020 “or later”.

Jan 28/14: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2013 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). THAAD is included, and the overall report is fairly positive.

The FTI-01 test saw THAAD hit 1 incoming missile, and go into the debris field of an intercepted target by design. DOT&E describes the test as “performance in a significantly different portion of the battlespace than previous missions with increased ground range, interceptor flight time, and closing velocity, as well as new target re-entry vehicle characteristics.”

On the flip side, THAAD experienced data latency with Aegis BMD messages when the primary network connection was unavailable, and there were track correlation concerns with the AN/TPY-2 (TM) radar. Mission software reporting was sometimes incorrect, and some critical faults during testing weren’t relayed through the system at all. Overall, the 39 equipment & organizational conditions around Conditional Materiel Release of the first 2 THAAD batteries in February 2012 are down to 31, with 4 closed in FY13 (verification of technical manuals, procedures for a post-launch launcher inspection, verifying capability against medium-range targets, and procedures and equipment to measure soil density for emplacement). In addition, the classified DOT&E February 2012 THAAD and AN/TPY-2 Radar Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report contained 7 more recommendations. Fixes and testing of remaining conditions are scheduled through 2017.

Oct 22/13: Air-Sea Battle. The US Army would rather not become irrelevant to the Pacific Pivot, and they have some useful ideas to that end. Military.com acquired a copy of a Sept 25/13 paper, called “The Army’s Role in Countering Anti-Access and Area Denial: Support to Air-Sea Battle.” The paper reportedly proposes a combination of advanced air defense and short-range strike missiles, as a potential response that’s less overtly aggressive than naval battlegroups and less expensive to maintain on station, but still raises the bar for any aggressor. If Navy or Air Force units have to escalate afterward, they’d do so with a defensive umbrella in place that helps cover their entry.

Systems targeted for this approach include THAAD, as well as the short-range PATRIOT and even land-based EPAA-type SM-3 missiles for air and missile defense. Striking power would come from MLRS or HIMARS units firing 300 km ATACMS missiles, and the paper also contemplates the development of additional land-based missiles. They would include anti-ship versions of ballistic missiles, and a 1,000 km class deep precision strike ballistic missile. If this looks like a deployable lite-brand mirror of A2/AD (Anti-Access/ Area Denial) strategies being pursued by China et. al., well, it sort of is. Sources: Defense Tech, “Army Pushes To Upgrade Missile Defense Systems || Additional background from: Breaking Defense, “Army Shows Cheek, Elbows Its Way Into AirSea Battle Hearing” (Maj. Gen. Gary Cheek, Army point for Air-Sea Battle) | Eaglespeak, “The Anti-Access/Area Denial U.S. Army and the Air/Sea Battle” | Midrats podcast, “Episode 195: The Pacific Pivot Ground Element”.

FY 2013

Purchases: US, UAE; Requests: Qatar, UAE; FTO-1. FTO-1 launch
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Sept 20/13: US/ UAE. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Sunnyvale, CA receives a $3.92 billion fixed-price-incentive-firm contract modification for THAAD interceptors from the USA and United Arab Emirates, and associated ground hardware for the UAE.

The UAE’s $2.706 billion order is a continuation of purchases (q.v. Dec 30/11, June 5/12) under the Sept 9/08 and Nov 5/12 Foreign Military Sales cases, which encompass 3+ Fire Units and up to 195 missiles. Under this order, they’ll receive 192 THAAD interceptor missiles, 16 Single missile round containers, and 16 Active leak sensor systems. Their total THAAD missile orders now stand at 288, and a priced option (Letter of Offer and Acceptance Amendment 01) could create additional orders. Production will run into Lot 6.

The US Army’s $862.4 million portion finalizes the production Lot 4 contract, and the order could rise to $1.215 billion and 110 interceptor missiles if next year’s $352.7 million FY 2014/ Lot 5 option is exercised by Dec 31/13. Current contracts involve 5 US Army THAAD batteries, with final Battery 3 & 4 deliveries expected by the end of the calendar year. These missiles are part of Battery 5.

Deliveries under these orders will take place from FY 2015 – FY 2019. Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with performance at Lockheed Martin’s Pike County facility in Troy, AL (missiles); Huntsville, AL (US MDA); and Camden, AR (launchers and control units). The Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL acts as the Army’s contracting agent, and performs the same role for the UAE (HQ0147-07-C-0196). See also Lockheed Martin, Sept 23/13 release.

US & UAE order

Sept 10/13: FTO-1 Test. A successful joint test of AEGIS BMD and land-based THAAD missiles from the Pacific Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site destroys 2 medium range target missiles.

The test involved full inter-operation. A land-based TPY-2 radar was positioned forward as the warning radar. It acquired the targets, and passed that onto the joint C2BMC (Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications) system. C2BMC cued DDG 74 USS Decatur, outfitted with AEGIS BMD 3.6.1 and the SM-3 Block IA missile. Decatur acquired the track, then launched its SM-3 and killed its target.

C2BMC also passed the track to a land-based THAAD battery’s own TPY-2 radar, which provided the intercept guidance for a successful pair of THAAD missile shots. The 2nd THAAD missile was actually aimed at the SM-3’s MRBM, in case it had failed to achieve intercept, but that turned out not to be necessary this time. Sources: US MDA, Sept 10/13 release | Lockheed Martin, Sept 11/13 release | Raytheon, Sept 10/13 release.

July 17/13: UAE. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Woburn, MA receives an $83.8 million sole-source, cost-plus-incentive-fee, and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They’ll provide software updates, contractor logistic support, radar repair and return, and technical services for the AN/TPY-2 radars in the UAE’s THAAD missile defense batteries.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA, White Sands Missile Range, NM, and the UAE through Sept 30/18. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL acts as the UAE’s FMS agent (HQ0147-12-C-0005).

June 18/13: UAE upgrade. Raytheon touts improvements to “a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) AN/TPY-2 radar”. So far, the only publicly-announced sale has been to the UAE, who will get a TPY-2 radar with 8 redesigned circuit card assemblies that improve the radar’s capabilities, while incorporating technologies and processes that weren’t available when Raytheon delivered the first AN/TPY-2 in 2004.

The new cards will be inserted into all new AN/TPY-2 radars Raytheon produces, but the USA is just about done with planned orders. The good news is, a swap-in upgrade shouldn’t be too expensive. Raytheon.

THAAD slips
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April 26/13: The GAO looks at the Missile Defense Agency’s full array of programs in report #GAO-13-342, “Missile Defense: Opportunity To Refocus On Strengthening Acquisition Management.” The good news is that the remainder of the missiles for the first 2 THAAD batteries have now been fixed and delivered. The bad news is that despite strong demand from theater commanders, the overall program has been reduced from a planned 9 batteries to 6, owing to budget constraints. In tandem, the planned number of AN/TPY-2 radars was cut from 18 to 11.

FY 2012 saw production resume with a July contract, but production is 4 months behind after faulty memory devices were found in some missile mission computers. To recover those delays, production will be ramped up from 3/month to 4/month – which is still well below the 6/month planned at this stage of the program. Missile batteries 3 & 4 will also incorporate a new “Thermally Initiated Venting System,” which keeps the missiles from launching or blowing up if overheated. It was redesigned in 2011, and is performing better, but the standards have never been applied to a missile this size. This part of the system may ultimately need a “best we can reasonably do” waiver before full acceptance of THAAD by the US Army in 2017. Another 320 interceptors will be produced from FY 2013 – 2017.

April 3/13: To Guam. The Pentagon announces that:

“The Department of Defense will deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to Guam in the coming weeks as a precautionary move to strengthen our regional defense posture against the North Korean regional ballistic missile threat.”

North Korean missiles may have a questionable ability to reach the USA, but Guam is another matter. It’s a US territory, so protecting its citizens matters as much as protecting its strategic harbor and airfield.

Nov 5/12: Qatar. The US DSCA announces [PDF] that Qatar wants to join its neighbor the UAE, and field 2 THAAD batteries of its own.

Their request is worth up to $6.5 billion, and includes up to 12 THAAD Launchers, 150 THAAD missiles, 2 THAAD Fire Control and Communications units, 2 AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars, and 1 Early Warning Radar (EWR). The USA would also sell them the required trucks, generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, fire unit test & maintenance equipment, system integration and checkout, repair and return, training, and other support.

The principal contractor is Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation in Sunnyvale, CaA, and the sub-contractor is Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA. Implementation of this proposed sale will require undetermined but periodic travel of up to 13 U.S. Government and contractor representatives for delivery, system checkout, and training.

Qatar request

Nov 5/12: UAE. The US DSCA announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates official request to expand its THAAD purchases. They’re interested in another 9 THAAD launchers and 48 missiles, plus the accompanying test components, repair and return, training, and support.

The estimated cost is up to $1.135 billion, and the principal contractors would be Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation in Sunnyvale, CA and Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA. Raytheon is an odd mention, since the DSCA request doesn’t include another AN/TPY-2 radar. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale, and implementation won’t require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the UAE. See Sept 9/08 for their previous request, which was only partially fulfilled in the Dec 30/11 contract.

UAE request

Oct 25/12: FIT-01. Pacific Chimera (aka. Flight Test Integrated-01) features a combination of land and sea missile defense systems, who go 4/5 against a combination of ballistic missile and cruise missile targets. The USA’s Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system acted as FIT-01’s command and control backbone.

The Medium Range Ballistic Missile E-LRALT (Extended Long Range Air Launch Target) was launched out of a C-17, tracked by a US Army AN/TPY-2 radar on Meck Island, and destroyed by its companion THAAD missile.

A pair of Short Range Ballistic Missile targets were launched from a platform in the ocean. One was destroyed by a US Army PATRIOT PAC-3 system, but the USS Fitzgerald’s [DDG 62] attempt to intercept the 2nd SRBM target with a long-range SM-3 Block 1A missile failed. The problem turned out to be a faulty IMU chip.

The USS Fitzgerald had better luck with an SM-2 missile against a low flying cruise missile target, and the Army’s PATRIOT PAC-3 battery racked up a cruise missile kill of its own. US MDA | Lockheed Martin | Raytheon.

FY 2012

UAE. State of tests. THAAD test launch
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July 17/12: A $150 million contract modification covers a combination of support equipment and additional launchers for Batteries 1 and 2; continuing production of missile Lots 3 & 4; and the manufacturing and delivery of Battery 5 launchers, THAAD fire control and communications.

It’s funded with FY 2010, 2011, and 2012 procurement dollars; and $10 million in FY 2010 funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. Deliveries will begin in FY 2014, and complete in FY 2016. This work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with performance in Huntsville, AL, and Camden, AR (HQ0147-07-C-0196).

June 5/12: US/UAE missiles. The US MDA awards Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. in Sunnyvale, CA an unfinalized, not-to-exceed $2.024 billion contract for a minimum of 138 THAAD interceptor missiles. The buy includes at least 42 American missiles under Lots 3 and 4, plus the United Arab Emirates’ unfinalized buy of 96 interceptors (HQ0147-12-G-9000, q.v. Dec 30/11 entry). It’s done as a joint purchase, in order to save money. Finalization of both contracts is expected by Nov 30/12.

Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed in Troy, AL. The performance period extends from June 4/12 through July 31/18. This action was synopsized as a sole-source requirement to LMSSC in FBO.gov, and 1 response was received. The US Missile Defense Agency’s THAAD Program Office at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-07-C-0196).

US/ UAE

April 20/12: The US GAO releases “Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency.” That bland-sounding title masks critical coverage of THAAD’s acquisition approach, which won’t be fielding operational missile batteries until July 2012:

“Production issues forced MDA to slow production of the THAAD interceptors… A flight test originally scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 was delayed until fiscal year 2012 due to the availability of air-launched targets and then subsequently was canceled altogether. This cancellation has delayed verification of THAAD’s capability against a medium-range target.

MDA awarded a contract to produce THAAD’s first two operational batteries in December 2006 before its design was stable… At that time, MDA’s first THAAD battery, consisting of 24 interceptors, 3 launchers, and other associated assets, was to be delivered to the Army as early as 2009. In response to pressure to accelerate fielding the capability, THAAD adopted a highly concurrent development, testing, and production effort that has increased program costs and delayed fielding of the first THAAD battery until early fiscal year 2012… During fiscal year 2011, after several production start-up issues, 11 of the expected 50 operational interceptors were delivered.[Footnote 18] Consequently, the first battery of 24 interceptors was not complete and available for fielding until the first quarter of fiscal year 2012 – more than 2 years later than originally planned. The same issues have delayed the second battery as well. Although the launchers and other components for the second battery were completed in 2010, the full 50 interceptors necessary for both batteries are not expected to be delivered until July 2012.”

March 27/12: Lockheed Martin announces a $66 million contract to continue THAAD development. Consultation with the firm reveals that this is part of the $515.4 million contract announced on Feb 3/12.

Feb 3/12: A maximum $515.4 million sole-source, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to Lockheed Martin Corp. in Sunnyvale, CA, for 5 years of THAAD upgrade development, integration, and testing. Examples of task orders include, but are not limited to, communications upgrades, obsolescence mitigation, flight and ground testing; and spiral development to further integrate THAAD in the broader Ballistic Missile Defense System architecture on land, sea and air.

Work will be performed in Sunnyvale, CA, and Huntsville, AL from Feb 1/12 through Jan 31/17. FY 2012 RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation) funds will be used to incrementally fund the initial orders (HQ0147-12-D-0001).

Jan 17/12: DOT&E. The Pentagon releases the FY2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). THAAD was included, and the results can be described as measured good news.

Test FTT-12 demonstrated THAAD’s ability to intercept 2 simultaneous short-range targets, while demonstrating the full battle sequences from planning to intercept, and collecting “technical data on intercepts far off the radar boresight and on performance against unique threat characteristics.” Reliability has improved from 2010, and THAAD also completed Phase 1 of its ground test program. There’s a bit more testing to go, but that was a necessary step toward an expected FY 2012 material readiness release, and transfer of the first 2 fire units from the US MDA to active service in the US Army.

The flip side is that THAAD’s lethality testing still has some gaps that need to be resolved, and some of that testing will have to take place after THAAD is released to the Army. Fortunately, the MDA targets program returned Coleman air-launched targets to flight in July 2011, removing a big barrier to testing. Target development and testing for the longer-range THAAD flight tests against medium-range missiles are set to start in FY 2012.

Dec 30/11: APY-2. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA receives a sole-source, maximum $363.9 million letter contract for 2 AN/TPY-2 radars. The contract will be finalized later. Work will be performed in Woburn, MA, and the period of performance is Dec 30/11 through March 30/15 (HQ0147-12-C-0006).

Raytheon’s release specifically identifies them as going “…to the U.S. Army as the radar component to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system”. Some TPY-2 radars have also been deployed independently.

Dec 30/11: UAE order. A series of contracts kick off the UAE’s THAAD deal (q.v. Sept 9/08 entry), which is estimated at $3.48 billion. It’s the 1st export sale for the THAAD system.

Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. in Sunnyvale, CA receives a sole-source letter contract at a total not-to-exceed price of $1.96 billion to supply the United Arab Emirates with 2 full THAAD Systems, and provide support services. Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed in Troy, AL. Performance extends from Dec 30/11 through June 30/16. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL manages the contract, on behalf of its FMS client.

Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA receives a sole-source letter contract, with a not-to-exceed value of $582.5 million, as an undefinitized contract action (UCA) to provide 2 AN/TPY-2 radars, spares, and training services to the United Arab Emirates. Work will be performed in Woburn, MA, and the period of performance is Dec 30/11 through Sept 30/18. This contract will be finalized in June 2012. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, AL manages the contract, on behalf of its FMS client (HQ0147-12-C-0005). See also Lockheed Martin | Raytheon | Bloomberg | AP | Reuters | Voice of America.TEXT

UAE order

Nov 1/11: The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awards Raytheon IDS of Woburn, MA a maximum $307.6 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Under this new contract, Raytheon will maintain software required to operate “the X-band family of radars,” and perform and Ballistic Missile Defense System test planning, execution and analysis. Discussions with Raytheon personnel confirmed that the funding applies to the XBR radar on the SBX naval platform, as well as their AN/TPY-2 radars (THAAD, European missile defense, deployed in Israel & Japan), and a “Ground Based Radar Prototype” that they’re working on as a technology demonstrator.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from Nov 1/11 through Oct 31/13, and the MDA’s FY 2012 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to fund initial orders. The MDA at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-12-D-0005).

FY 2011

NGAM Phase 1. TPY-2.

May 9/11: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. in Sunnyvale, CA receives a $60 million fixed-price-incentive, firm target contract modification to deliver 6 HEMMT transporters, 6 missile round pallets, and associated spares to support THAAD batteries 3 & 4. This order raises the total contract value to date to $1.64 billion.

Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed in Troy, AL; the performance period is extended from April 2011 to August 2013. $60 million in FY 2010 procurement funds will be used to fund this contract modification in its entirety (HQ0147-07-C-0196, #P00054).

April 7/11: TPY-2. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA receives a $14 million sole-source cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to maintain and improve the AN/TPY-2 radar’s software. Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from April 2011 through June 2011, and $4 million in FY 2011 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort.

This award beings total contract awards so far under (HQ0006-03-C-0047) to $1.936 billion.

April 7/11: NGAM Phase 1. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announces a trio of Phase 1 cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon to work on the Next Generation AEGIS Missile/ SM-3 Block IIB. The firms will perform concept definition and program planning for their offerings, and the competition will winnow down as the MDA picks which concept(s) to develop further.

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Bethesda, MD wins a $43.3 million contract, which could allow the firm to build on previous talk of expanding THAAD to the same 21″ diameter as SM-3 Block II missiles, in order to increase its speed and range.

March 24/11: The US GAO issues report #GAO-11-372: “Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability.” Key excerpts:

“However, the agency was unable to meet all of its goals for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, a system used to defend against targets in their last phases of flight… MDA finalized a new process in which detailed baselines were set for several missile defense systems… [but] GAO found its unit and life-cycle cost baselines had unexplained inconsistencies and documentation for six baselines had insufficient evidence to be a high-quality cost estimate… GAO makes 10 recommendations for MDA to strengthen its resource, schedule and test baselines, facilitate baseline reviews, and further improve transparency and accountability. GAO is also making a recommendation to improve MDA’s ability to carry out its test plan. In response, DOD fully concurred with 7 recommendations. It partially concurred with 3…”

March 18/11: US order. A $695 million fixed-price incentive and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for 48 interceptors, 6 launchers, 4 fire control units, and other ground equipment required to support THAAD batteries 3 & 4.

This finalizes the Sept 15/10 contract. $144.8 million in FY 2010 procurement funds are added to $119.2 million in FY 2010 funds used for the initial allocation (TL: $264 million), then another $430.9 million in FY 2011 funds brings us to the $695 million grand total. A $94.8 million option for additional launchers could bring the total to $789.8 million.

Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed in Troy, AL through December 2013 (HQ0147-07-C-0196). See also Lockheed Martin.

Feb 20/11: UAE. Reuters quotes Lockheed Martin VP of International Air & Missile Defence Strategic Initiatives Dennis Cavin, who says that “We are very close to finalising documentation necessary to have a successful [THAAD contract] for the UAE. This spring, the U.S. government will make an announcement…”

That announcement is expected to be a government-to-government deal worth up to $7 billion [vid. Sept 9/08 entry], making the UAE THAAD’s 1st export customer. The US government is expected to send a letter of agreement in the next few months, after which the UAE could start negotiations with contractors on production schedules, and support agreements with Lockheed and Raytheon.

Feb 18/11: A sole-source $8.9 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA. Raytheon will perform superdome obsolescence redesign, including system enhancements, technological improvements, and new products supporting “the X-band radars.”

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from February 2011 through June 2011, and $2.5 million in FY 2011 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort (HQ0006-03-C-0047, HQ0147).

Nov 10/10: TPY-2. A sole-source $25.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA, to refurbish AN/TPY-2 radar #4.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA through August 2011, funded by FY 2010 – 2011 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation funds (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Oct 4/10: An $18 million contract modification to Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. in Sunnyvale, CA, who will begin manufacturing 49 “redesigned mid-body heat shields for incorporation into THAAD interceptors” on mid-body substrate assemblies. Asked for details, a Lockheed Martin spokesperson said that this wasn’t an immediate concern, but:

“The redesign will eliminate microcracking which was identified during ground testing as a potential risk over a long period of time. This contract implements the heat shields on the 49 interceptors now in production. Lockheed Martin remains focused on ensuring THAAD is reliable, affordable and effective.”

Work will be managed by LMSSC in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed at Lockheed Martin’s Pike County Operations interceptor production facility in Troy, AL. Work is projected through February 2012 (HQ0147-07-C-0196).

FY 2010

7 TPY-2 radars delivered to date. Tests. Production delays. Test launch
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Sept 24/10: TPY-2. A sole-source fixed-price-incentive-fee modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA for AN/TPY-2 radar #8. The target price is $189.8 million. Work will take place from September 2010 through October 2012, and FY 2010 procurement funds will be used to fund it (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Raytheon’s release adds that the firm delivered the 7th radar earlier in 2010, on cost and ahead of schedule.

Sept 15/10: US order. A not to exceed $298 million contract modification to Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. (LMSSC) in Sunnyvale, CA to manufacture and deliver 26 THAAD interceptor missiles, representing the first lot buy of interceptors in support of the Battery 3 and 4 procurement (total of 48 missiles). the remainder of Battery 3 & 4’s missiles will be ordered in a future production lot.

Aviation Week confirms that Pentagon procurement chief Ashton Carter has approved THAAD production. The 48 missiles to equip Batteries 1 & 2 can now have optical block switches integrated, moving their delivery date from June 2010 to May 2012. A production interceptor will be flight tested with the optical block switch in spring 2011.

Work will be managed in Sunnyvale, CA, with final assembly performed at Lockheed Martin’s Pike County Operations in Troy, AL, and will continue through June 2013 (HQ0147-07-C-0196). Looks like the optical block switch problems are resolved.

Sept 1/10: TPY-2. A $22.6 million sole-source cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA will continue support services for the AN/TPY-2 radar’s flight and ground testing.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from September 2010 through June 2011. $1,443,793 in FY 2010 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Aug 24/10: TPY-2. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA received a sole-source contract modification for $43 million continue software maintenance in support of the AN/TYP-2 radar. The modification includes both fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee line items, and work will be performed in Woburn, MA. The performance period is through March 2011. FY 2010 & 2011 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used, and the US Missile Defense Agency manages the contract (HQ0006-03-C-0047). See also Raytheon release.

Aug 17/10: Frozen. Reuters reports that the problems with Moog’s optical block switch have frozen a pending $419 million production contract for 26 missiles. As the issue drags on, Lockheed Martin has offered to take financial responsibility for costs related to any further production delays. The firm reportedly has a solution that could get clearance in September, with interceptor missile deliveries beginning again by the end of 2010.

Army Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly adds that the Missile Defense Agency is eyeing potential competitive bids worth as much as $37 billion over the next 5 years, as it moves away from sole-source contracts. That could prove difficult when it comes to proprietary technologies like missiles, unless it’s a harbinger of more competition between missile types. With the advent of land-based SM-3s from Raytheon, that’s a very real possibility for THAAD. Reuters.

July 29/10: Delay. Bloomberg News reports that a combination of newly-added requirements and sub-contractor issue will delay delivery of the first 24 THAAD missiles by up to a year, and may delay the 2nd batch of 24 by 10 months or more. Lockheed Missiles and Fire Control was supposed to hand over the first THAAD missiles by Sept 30/10, but that is now expected to happen only by 2011. The next lot of 24 is due by June 2011, but may not arrive until April 2012.

The problem has several causes. In the middle of flight testing, the US Missile Defense Agency decided it wanted a safety switch to prevent accidental launches. Moog, Inc. in East Aurora, NY was the subcontractor, but its switches failed testing. The result is a set of missiles waiting for a final critical part that wasn’t in the initial specifications, a contractor who can’t finalize delivery, and an initial American THAAD battery at Fort Bliss, TX who is restricted to training.

Moog reportedly shut down its production line from March to May 2010 to fix the design, and delivered the first improved switch for testing in July 2010. Lockheed Martin also stepped in, assigning engineers to oversee all design and manufacturing process improvements at Moog.

July 29/10: Test. A THAAD system successfully intercepts its target during a low-endo-atmospheric MDA test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade of Fort Bliss, Texas, conducted launcher, fire control and radar operations, and were not informed of the exact launch time for the unitary missile target. The AN/TPY-2 radar, achieved all test objectives: acquiring the target, discriminating the lethal object, providing track and discrimination data to the fire control, and communicating with the in-flight THAAD interceptor. The fire control software, jointly developed by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, also performed successfully. This was the 7th successful intercept in 7 attempts for the operationally-configured THAAD system.

Several missile defense assets and emerging technologies observed the launch and gathered data for future analysis. Participants included the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system, and elements of the U.S. Army’s PATRIOT system which conducted engagement coordination with THAAD, and conducted upper tier debris mitigation exercises during the intercept engagement. US MDA: release | MDA photos and video | Raytheon.

June 30/10: R&D. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. in Sunnyvale, CA receives a $67 million “obsolescence mitigation” contract for THAAD system electronics. If a 6 year old computer is ancient, what kinds of performance and supplier issues would you expect for a program that began in the late 1990s? This sole-source, cost-plus-fixed-fee modification will cover obsolescence mitigation efforts for THAAD defense batteries 3 and 4, including completion of ongoing FY 2009 obsolescence efforts, and similar work required to support FY 2010 buys. Efforts will also include qualification of identified replacement components, required software updates to accommodate those new components, offering a test environment, and regression testing for the changes.

Work will be performed in Sunnyvale, CA from June 2010 through March 2011. FY 2010 procurement funds will be used to commit $27.8 million for this effort (HQ0147-07-C-0196).

June 29/10: Test. Endoatmospheric THAAD intercept test successful. A THAAD interceptor missile intercepts an incoming target missile at the lowest altitude to date, in a test off of Hawaii that was to simulate an endoatmospheric (inside the atmosphere), short range ballistic missile. This kind of scenario is more difficult than it appears; Lockheed Martin describes it as a “highly stressing angle,” due to the density and friction that a very high speed object encounters in the atmosphere.

Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade of Fort Bliss, Texas, conducted launcher, fire control and radar operations during this test, using tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the U.S. Army Air Defense School. Test personnel also used the Simulation-Over-Live Driver (SOLD) software system to inject multiple simulated threat scenarios into the THAAD radar, in order to simulate performance against a mass salvo. Other participants included the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system, and elements of the U.S. Army’s PATRIOT system. According to the US MDA, “Preliminary indications are that planned flight test objectives were achieved.” This makes the fully up to date, “operationally configured” THAAD system 7/7 in intercept tests so far (11 total tests so far since 2005). US MDA | Photos & Video | Lockheed Martin.

April 1/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Corporation of Sunnyvale, CA received a 5-year, sole-source, indefinite delivery/ indefinite quantity THAAD Field Support Contract, with a ceiling value of $434.7 million. Lockheed Martin will provide logistics, maintenance, software, training, and engineering services to fielded THAAD fire units through March 2015.

Work will be carried out in Sunnyvale, CA; Huntsville, AL; and Fort Bliss, TX. Fiscal year (FY) 2010 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be utilized for Task Orders issued in FY 2010 (HQ0147-10-D-0001). See also Lockheed Martin release.

March 30/10: GAO. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report. Its assessment of THAAD is mostly positive:

“The program’s critical technologies are mature and its design appears stable. However, it is still qualifying components and conducting flight tests, so additional design work may be necessary. Target issues continue to affect the program as it was unable to conduct two planned fiscal year 2009 flight tests or its first fiscal year 2010 flight test because of target issues. Although one successful intercept test during fiscal year 2009 could not demonstrate a major knowledge point because of target availability, as THAAD’s first developmental and operational test it demonstrated THAAD’s ability to launch two interceptors against a single target. The program is on schedule to deliver two THAAD batteries to the Army in 2010 and 2011.”

…[due to problems with the target missiles it intercepts] The program will not attempt a medium-range ballistic missile intercept until fiscal year 2011 – nearly 3 years later than planned. In its fiscal year 2010 budget, DOD requested procurement funding for THAAD for the first time. DOD requested $420 million in procurement funding to buy interceptors, launchers, and a fire control and communication system for a future THAAD battery, as well as to procure tooling and equipment to increase THAAD interceptor production capacity. Program officials told us that they plan to award a procurement contract for a future THAAD battery by the end of fiscal year 2010. These batteries will be fully funded using procurement funds [rather than] incrementally funded using research, development, test and evaluation funds as authorized by Congress.”

March 26/10: Walbridge in Detroit, MI won a $40.7 million firm-fixed-price contract to design & build 3 tactical equipment maintenance facilities (TEMFS) at 3 close but separate sites in Fort Bliss, TX. Supported projects will include a sustainment bridge, a Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) aerostat battery, and a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery.

Each TEMFS will provide a complex with repair and maintenance bays, equipment and parts storage, administrative offices, secure vaults, oil storage buildings, hazardous material storage, and other supporting facilities such as organizational storage buildings. Work is to be performed in Fort Bliss, TX, with an estimated completion date of Dec 30/11. Bids were solicited via World Wide Web, with 4 bids received.

March 16/10: TPY-2. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems of Woburn, MA receives a $17.4 million sole-source contract modification that includes both fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee line items. Under this contract modification, Raytheon will continue Phase II of concurrent test, training, and operations support unit integration for AN/TYP-2 X-Band radar.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA through November 2010. Fiscal year 2010 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used for this effort (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Oct 16/09: The U.S. Army activates its 2nd THAAD battery during a ceremony at Fort Bliss, TX. It’s the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command’s 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, A Battery of 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. US MDA [PDF].

FY 2009

Tests. SM-3.

Sept 17/09: SM-3s for Europe. The Obama administration announces revised plans for its European missile defense architecture. Instead of positioning Boeing’s GMD and Ground-Based Interceptors at silos in Poland and/or the Czech Republic, which could intercept even the longest-range ballistic missiles, they choose an architecture based around Raytheon’s SM-3, at sea and on land.

Gen. Cartwright does say that the US military will deploy a THAAD battery to Europe in 2009, as part of operational testing, and will continue to roll out the system as the Army’s wide-area air defense system. Its AN/TPY-2 radar is certainly secure, as it appears to be set as the land-based radar for SM-3s as well. Whether THAAD would remain secure in a significant budget crunch, or be “rationalized” away in favor of planned SM-3 deployments that offer much less mobility but much longer range, remains to be seen. Read “Land-Based SM-3s for Israel – and Others” for more.

Aug 17/09: THAAD II? Aviation Week reports that the USA is examining a number of possible changes to THAAD. The most significant change would add a 21″ booster and turn THAAD into a 2-stage weapon that could offer 3-4 times the existing system coverage (i.e. about 1.75 – 2 times existing range). That size would match the Navy’s planned SM-3 Block II missiles, and would force a redesign of the THAAD launcher to handle 5 of the new 21″ missiles instead of 8 of the current 14.5″ missiles.

The report quotes the US MDA’s THAAD project manager, U.S. Army Col. William Lamb, who says they are reviewing a concept from Lockheed Martin for possible inclusion in the Fiscal 2011 budget. Lockheed Martin Vice President Tom McGrath is quoted as saying that THAAD rocket motor manufacturer Aerojet conducted static-fire trials of a 21″ prototype and a second “kick stage” in 2006, as part of a privately funded R&D effort.

The news comes just before Raytheon announces their intent to develop a land-based variant of their naval SM-3 missile that will work with their AN/TPY-2 radar, and Boeing proposed a mobile version of their even longer-range GMD interceptors for use in Europe.

July 9/09: TPY-2. Raytheon announces successful integration and acceptance testing the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar’s Prime Power Unit (PPU), a trailer-mounted 1.3 megawatt Generator Set. Following this success at White Sands Missile Range, NM, the PPU will undergo extensive user evaluations as the next stage in its fielding process.

June 29/09: Test. The US Missile Defense Agency uses a routine flight test of the USA’s nuclear ICBM rockets to save money, by conducting some tests on the other end. After the Glory Trip 199 missile was launched from Vandenberg AFB, CA to ensure that all Minuteman elements continue to work properly, the MDA used it to test the AN/TPY-2 in Forward Base Mode, the Upgraded BMEWS Early Warning Radar at Beale AFB, CA, and items from its External Sensors Laboratory. Data collected during the exercise will be used to improve sensor capabilities and as risk reduction for future BMDS tests. MDA release [PDF]

Apr 13/09: Rollout. Lockheed Martin officially rolls out the first THAAD ground segment vehicles to come off the production line in Camden, AR. The THAAD Weapon System launcher and the Fire Control and Communications unit will be delivered to Soldiers at Fort Bliss, TX, which is expected to have a fully operational THAAD battery of equipment and personnel by the end of 2009.

April 6/09: THAAD comes out a winner in Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ proposed FY 2010 budget. While other missile defense programs are being cut, Gates proposes to spend $700 million to field naval SM-3 and land-based THAAD missiles. Presidential and Congressional approval are still required, before the final funding totals can become a reality.

March 18/09: Test. A THAAD missile completes a successful intercept of a ballistic missile target during a test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility off the Hawaiian island of Kauai. Soldiers of the US Army’s 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade conducted launcher, fire control and radar operations, using tactics, techniques and procedures developed by the U.S. Army Air Defense School. MDA release [PDF]

FY 2008

1st battery. UAE request. A THAAD Engagement
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Sept 17/08: Test cancelled. The US Missile Defense Agency has to cancel a THAAD test when the target missile malfunctions, leaving the THAAD system nothing to intercept within the Pacific Missile Range Facility’s designated “safe area” off of Kauai.

Interception outside of that safe area would certainly be possible, but might not be appreciated by any ship, aircraft, or other traffic that found itself under the falling debris. MDA release [PDF].

Sept 9/08: UAE request. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announces [PDF] the United Arab Emirates’ request for 3 Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) Fire Units with 147 THAAD anti-ballistic missiles, 4 THAAD Radar Sets (3 tactical and one maintenance float), 6 THAAD Fire and Control Communication stations, and 9 THAAD Launchers. This would represent the first foreign sale of the THAAD system.

The UAE is also requesting fire unit maintenance equipment, the heavy trucks that carry the THAAD components, generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost is $6.95 billion.

The principal contractor is Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation in Sunnyvale, CA (THAAD), and the sub-contractor is Raytheon Corporation in Andover, MA (radar).

The UAE will be requesting industrial offsets, which will be negotiated with these contractors. On the other hand, the UAE “does not desire a government support presence in its country on an extended basis.” A total of 66 contractor logistic support personnel could be stationed in United Arab Emirates for extended periods, and additional training and major defense equipment personnel may be in the United Arab Emirates for short periods of time, not to exceed 24 months.

UAE request

June 25/08: Test. A successful THAAD test involving a separating target (mock warhead separated from the booster rockets) inside the earth’s atmosphere. The target was launched from a U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft flying over the Pacific Ocean, and about 6 minutes later the interceptor missile was launched from a mobile THAAD launcher on the range facility. This was the 29th of 30 successful tests conducted since September 2005, of which 6 have been intercept tests.

The primary objective of this intercept test was to demonstrate target acquisition, tracking and aimpoint selection by the avionics software contained in the THAAD interceptor, and to intercept a separating target. Secondary objectives included observing launch effects on the THAAD vehicle, and verifying soldier performance in the system’s semiautomatic mode using current tactics, techniques and procedures developed by the US Army Air Defense School.

The U.S. Navy cruiser USS Lake Erie [CG-70] also received a tracking cue from THAAD, and used its SPY-1 radar to successfully track the target and conduct a simulated SM-3 missile launch to engage the target. MDA release [PDF] | Video [Windows Media].

June 13/08: Test. A non-firing test involves THAAD TPY-2 X-band radars in conjunction with the SPY-1 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system aboard the USS Lake Erie [CG 70], as 2 medium-range target missiles are launched near-simultaneously from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands, Hawaii. Lake Erie’s crew used their own radars, and also received data from 2 THAAD radars at PMRF via secure links. All equipment performed as designed, and the cruiser was able to get launch solutions on both targets. MDA release [PDF].

May 28/08: Battery 1. The U.S. Army activates Alpha Battery/4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 32nd Army Air & Missile Defense Command as the first THAAD battery, in a ceremony at Fort Bliss, TX.

The battery will receive 24 THAAD interceptors, 3 THAAD launchers, a THAAD Fire Control and a THAAD radar as part of the initial fielding. That will be backed by support from the Battery Support Center and Integrated Contractor Support System, as well as the necessary spares for a fielded unit. Unit training began in April 2008, in preparation for full-system fielding beginning in 2009.

Dec 17/07: Test. A THAAD test battery is a participant in the first shoot-down of a ballistic missile by a ship of the Japanese Navy, receiving data from the USS Lake Erie [CG 70] and participating in tracking. Read “Japanese Destroyer JS Kongo Intercepts Ballistic Missile” for full details.

Nov 15/07: Award. Lockheed announces that the THAAD program received Aviation Week’s 2007 Program Excellence Award for Research and Systems Design and Development. The program was praised for best practices including systems engineering, a process of “test as you fly, fly as you test”; and the application of pit-stop technology used in car racing to reduce maintenance, diagnostic, and repair times to seconds.

Oct 27/07: Test. At 3:15 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, a THAAD missile succeeded in the exo-atmospheric destruction of a non-separating target representing a SCUD-type ballistic missile, which was launched from a mobile platform positioned off Kauai in the Pacific Ocean. The interceptor was launched from the THAAD launch complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility. This was the 4th successful intercept for the current THAAD program over the last 4 tests, and the 3rd test of the THAAD system at Pacific Missile Range Facility.

The primary objective of this test was to demonstrate integrated operations of the system, including radar, launcher, fire control equipment and procedures, and the interceptor’s ability to detect, track and destroy the target missile using only the force of a direct collision. Other objectives included demonstrating performance of an interceptor that had been “hot conditioned,” or heated to a certain temperature before launching; and demonstrating the ability of the interceptor to perform correctly in the final seconds before target intercept. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas operated all THAAD equipment during all tests, conducting operations of the launcher, fire control and communications and radar. MDA release [PDF] | Lockheed Martin release | Raytheon release re: radar | BAE release re: IR tracking.

FY 2007

Tests. Orders begin.

Aug 22/07: Lockheed announces that it has selected its manufacturing facility in Camden, AR, to build the THAAD launcher and Fire Control and Communications (TFCC) unit. The Camden plant already produces MLRS/HIMARS 227mm battlefield artillery rockets, and the Patriot PAC-3 missile.

Initially, 35 new jobs will be created to support the program with production taking place in the 200,000 square-foot Launcher Integration Complex. Camden Operations currently has an employment population of 450. Employment at the facility could grow to more than 500 by 2010. Lockheed Martin release.

Aug 6/07: Israel. Jane’s Defence Weekly:

“Israel is leaning towards upgrading its own anti-ballistic missile Arrow Weapon System (AWS) rather than acquiring the US Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. While no formal decision has yet been taken, Jane’s has learned that officials from the Israel Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) have informed the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about potential complications with integrating THAAD into the country’s missile-defence alignment.”

Israel does end up opting for its Arrow-3 co-development with Boeing.

July 11/07: TPY-2. Raytheon announces a $304 million contract from the US Missile Defense Agency to develop advanced tracking and discrimination capabilities for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) forward based AN/TPY-2 radar. As noted above, the TPY-2 is also the THAAD system’s component radar.

Under the contract, Raytheon is responsible for the development and test of radar software, various engineering tasks, maintenance and support, infrastructure upgrades, and deployment mission planning. Work will be performed at the company’s Missile Defense Center in Woburn, MA and the Warfighter Protection Center in Huntsville, AL.

The first forward-based capability spiral was released on schedule in October 2006 and is operational. Raytheon IDS is developing the second forward-based capability spiral, with release planned in early 2008. As the prime contractor for this program, Raytheon IDS has delivered the first 2 of 5 planned AN/TPY-2 radars to the Missile Defense Agency. The first radar, delivered in November 2004, is currently deployed in Japan. The second AN/TPY-2 radar recently completed acceptance testing at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Raytheon is also responsible for whole-life engineering support for AN/TPY-2 radars under a contract awarded in June 2005. Raytheon release.

July 11/07: BAE Systems announces a $62.3 million contract from Lockheed Martin to begin production of the THAAD Interceptor’s infrared seeker. Assembly, integration, and testing of production equipment will take place at BAE Systems facilities in Nashua, NH; Lexington, MA; and Johnson City, NY.

BAE Systems began work on seekers for missile defense in the late 1970s and achieved the first hit-to-kill intercept of a ballistic missile target in 1984. The company started work on the THAAD seeker demonstration and validation contract in 1991 and achieved two hit-to-kill intercepts in 1999. The seeker development program was begun in 2000, and is scheduled to conclude in 2007.

June 26/07: Test. The US Missile Defense Agency announces a successful THAAD test flight entirely inside the low atmosphere, which features higher pressures and friction heating. This was the lowest altitude fly-out of a THAAD interceptor to date, and was strictly an aerodynamics & durability test. All test objectives were met, including interceptor launch, booster and kill vehicle separation, shroud separation in a low endo-flight environment, kill vehicle control, and evaluation of the heating effects on the interceptor mid-body.

When used in “low endo-atmospheric” mode like this, THAAD can serve as a 3rd layer between the mobile ground-based Patriot PAC-3 or MEADS system, and the longer range AEGIS BMD/Standard Missile-3 sea-based missile defense. This was the last planned missile test at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico; all future tests will take place at the Pacific Missile Range Facility near Kauai, Hawaii. MDA release [PDF format] | Lockheed release.

June 26/07: TPY-2. Raytheon announces completion of all factory acceptance testing on its 2nd THAAD radar, which was shipped ahead of schedule and under budget to the Missile Defense Agency at White Sands Missile Range, NM, for final testing and acceptance. Raytheon release.

June 22/07: Test. Missile defense Flight Test Maritime-12 took place, launching an SM-3 Block 1A missile from the destroyer USS Decatur [DDG 73]. The Spanish Navy’s Alvaro de Bazan Class AEGIS frigate Mendez Nunez [F-104] also participated in the test “as a training event to assess the future capabilities of the F-100 Class.” So, too, did the US Navy’s Ticonderoga Class AEGIS cruiser USS Port Royal [CG 73], which successfully used its SPY-1B radar augmented by a prototype AEGIS BMD Signal Processor (BSP) to detect and track the separating warhead in real time, and to tell the difference between the simulated warhead and the rest of the missile. The final variant of that processor is expected to be deployed in 2010.

USS Port Royal also exchanged tracking data with a ground-based Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system ashore, in order to verify compatibility. Video from the test | US MDA release [PDF] | Raytheon release | Boeing release | Lockheed Martin release.

April 5/07: Test. THAAD was successful in the second integrated flight test conducted by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. The test resulted in the successful intercept of a “mid-endoatmospheric” (inside Earth’s atmosphere) unitary (non-separating) target over the Pacific Ocean and demonstrated fully integrated radar, launcher, fire control, missile and engagement functions of the THAAD weapon system.

This was the first THAAD interceptor mission that was considered a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test, meaning that more than one element of the defensive system participated. Successful beyond-line-of-sight communications with a U.S. Navy AEGIS sensor, as well as communications links with the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system and the U.S. Air Force Space-Based Infrared Sensors (SBIRS) system, were both part of the test. In addition, soldiers of the U.S. Army’s 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade stationed at Fort Bliss, TX operated all THAAD equipment including the launcher, fire control, communications, and radar.

Other flight test objectives included demonstrating successful missile launch from the PMRF launch site; interceptor “kill vehicle” target identification, object discrimination and intercept; collection of data and hit assessment algorithms; and evaluation of the missile launching procedures and equipment. While post-test analysis will take place over several weeks, MDA reports that initial indications are that the test objectives were achieved. This was the 26th successful “hit to kill” intercept for elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System since 2001, and the 3rd successful THAAD intercept in the current program phase. MDA release [PDF format]. BAE release | Raytheon release.

March 5/07: Test. March 5/07: A THAAD radar test involves the launch of a short-range target missile from a C-17A aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, which deploys by parachute before its rocket motor ignites. The missile was launched at approximately 2:30 p.m. Hawaii Time (7:30 p.m. EST) approximately 400 miles west of the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii, and its flight was successfully tracked by the ground based X-band radar, now known as the AN/TPY-2 (Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance). Preliminary indications are that all radar data collection objectives were met.

The MDA release [PDF] says that “air-launched targets provide the capability to structure target missile trajectories during flight tests so that they are able to better replicate potential trajectories hostile ballistic missiles could use during an attack of our homeland, our deployed forces and our allies and friends.” A C-17 gives off a large radar profile, however, and at 400 miles it would have been well within the TPY-2’s surveillance range before the missile was dropped.

Feb 9/07: TPY-2. Raytheon Company in Woburn, MA received a $20 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification contract that could soar to $212.2 million to manufacture, deliver, and integrate the AN/TPY-2 radar component of the THAAD ABM system. Fiscal Year 2007 R&D funds worth $20 million will be used. Work will be performed at Woburn, MA and is expected to be complete by May 2010. The Missile Defense Agency in Washington, DC issued the contract (HQ0006-03-C-0047). See also Raytheon release.

Jan 26/07: Test. Test #15. An intercept test is successfully conducted at 7:20 p.m. Hawaii Time) at the Pacific Missile Range Facility off the island of Kauai in Hawaii, with the MDA and Lockheed Martin both claiming success. This test involved a single-warhead target representing a SCUD-type ballistic missile, traveling just inside earth’s atmosphere following launch from a mobile platform positioned off Kauai in the Pacific Ocean. Primary flight test objectives included demonstrating the integration of the radar, launcher, fire control and communications and interceptor operations; demonstrating radar and interceptor discrimination; and target acquisition and tracking by the interceptor’s seeker. See MDA release [PDF] | Raytheon release.

Jan 2/07: Israel. Israel to choose THAAD over Arrow? SpaceWar relays a report from the left-leaning Ha’aretz newspaper that Israel is considering halting the development of a new generation of its Boeing/IAI Arrow theater defense system due to the high costs involved, in favor of THAAD. Negotiations have reportedly been ongoing in recent months, and it is said that Israeli leaders will make a final decision on whether to phase out the Arrow some time in 2007.

While the USA has paid half of the Arrow system’s development costs since 1991 (and derived all technology access and lessons), it’s worth noting that THAAD could be paid for via 100% commitment of “soft” US aid budget dollars rather than requiring 50% hard currency outlays. On the other hand, the Arrow’s tests have been generally successful, and THAAD is not yet seen as reliable.

UPDATE: The Israeli Ministry of Defence has strongly denied these reports.

Dec 22/06: US order. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company of Sunnyvale, CA received a $619.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ cost-plus-award-fee contract for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire unit fielding, support equipment and initial spares. A January 3, 2007 Lockheed release adds that the contract is for the first 2 THAAD fire units, which includes 48 interceptors (missiles), 6 launchers, and 2 fire control and communications units. The system is scheduled for fielding in FY 2009.

Work will be performed at Sunnyvale, CA, though final assembly, integration and testing of production equipment will take place at Lockheed Martin’s award-winning manufacturing facilities in Troy, AL, and Camden, AR. The contract is expected to be completed in February 2011. This is a sole source contract award from the Missile Defense Agency, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Project Office in Huntsville, AL (HQ0147-07-C-0196).

“This is a major milestone for the THAAD program,” said Tom McGrath, Lockheed Martin vice president and THAAD program manager. Which it is, following a number of tests in which THAAD has performed reasonably well.

Orders begin

FY 2006 and Earlier

EMD. Manufacturing begins. Launcher on HEMTT truck
(click to view full)

July 12/06: Test. Successful test launch of a THAAD interceptor missile. The primary test objective was to demonstrate the interceptor seeker’s ability to accurately identify a ballistic missile target in the high-endoatmosphere, i.e. just inside the earth’s atmosphere. A non-separating Hera target missile was launched for the test, and (although it was not a primary objective) a successful THAAD intercept of the target occurred. See also Lockheed Martin MFC release.

May 11/06: Test. Successful launch was achieved of a THAAD interceptor missile. This was intended as a fully integrated flight test (not intercept test) of all THAAD components, including the mobile launcher, radar, fire control and communications element, and the interceptor missile.

A Raytheon release touts the performance of its THAAD Ground-Based Radar in the test. The THAAD radar, developed by Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), accomplished all test objectives, including communicating with the in-flight THAAD missile. Track and discrimination reports were successfully transmitted between the THAAD radar and fire control. Performance of the fire control software, jointly developed by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, was also successful. See also Lockheed Martin MFC release.

Nov 22/05: Test. New round of testing begins for THAAD with a non-intercept launch. All components work. See Lockheed Martin MFC release.

May 26/04: Lockheed Martin begins manufacturing the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile at its Pike County Operations facility in Troy, AL. One “pathfinder” missile and 16 developmental test missiles will be manufactured. See Lockheed Martin MFC release.

Manufacturing begins

May 29/02: Infrastructure. Lockheed Martin breaks ground in Troy, AL on a new production facility for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon System. The investment was reportedly about $13 million, and part of that will be used to optimize the THAAD facility for lean production and Six-Sigma programs. The Pike County site has won several independent awards for its quality and performance, and is considered a Lockheed Martin Center of Excellence for strike weapons. It already performs final assembly, test and storage of the Hellfire II and Longbow Hellfire anti-armor missiles; the Javelin man-portable anti-armor missile; the Israeli-designed AGM-142 ‘Popeye’ air-to-surface missile, and (in future) the JASSM air-surface missile. The plant currently employs about 230 employees, and will assemble and test the THAAD missile in a field-deployable canister. See Lockheed Martin MFC release.

Jan 24/01: Infrastructure. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control selects its production facility in Pike County (Troy), AL as the missile final assembly and test site for the THAAD weapon system. Work will happen in two phases, starting with the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase beginning in 2003, and the construction of a 39,000-square-foot, $8.6 million state-of-the-art facility dedicated to the THAAD program. Personnel staffing and training will ramp up at the Pike County facility beginning in calendar year 2004, with the first early development unit work beginning in 2004. An additional 15,500 square feet of administration and storage space will be added in 2004.

The second phase, Full Rate Production, will begin in 2007, with the construction of a 20,600-square-foot, $5 million addition to the Assembly and Test building, and 18,500 additional square feet for administration and storage. See Lockheed Martin MFC release.

June 28/2000: EMD contract. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Missiles & Space Operations in Sunnyvale, CA received a $77.5 million increment as part of a $3.97 billion (cumulative total includes options) cost-plus-award-fee contract for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) of the initial Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) tactical ballistic missile defense system. “During the EMD program, the system design will evolve to satisfy the Army’s key operational requirements while developing weapon system components that are not only effective but are affordable, ready for production, and available to the U.S. Army soldiers for a first unit equipped in FY 2007.”

Work will be performed in Sunnyvale, CA (68%); Huntsville, AL (30%), and Courtland, AL (2%), and is expected to be complete by May 3, 2008. This is a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 29, 1999 by the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command in Huntsville, AL (DASG60-00-C-0072).

EMD contract

Jan 30/98: Small business qualifier Tec-Masters Inc. in Huntsville, AL received a $2.2 million increment as part of a $27.8 million cost-plus-award-fee/ level-of-effort contract for Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Simulation and Hardware-in-the-Loop development. The estimated cumulative total value of this contract will be $43 million if all options are exercised. Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2002. This is a sole source contract initiated on Aug. 22, 1997 by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command in Huntsville, AL (DASG60-98-C-0044).

Nov 21/96: Silverton Construction in El Paso, TX received a $10.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for construction of 2 standard design tactical equipment shops, an organizational maintenance shop and direct support maintenance shop, a fuel dispensing facility, oil storage building, sentry station, pavement, site improvements, utilities, physical security, and information systems for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

Work will be performed at Fort Bliss, TX and is expected to be complete by Jan. 20, 1998. There were 31 bids solicited on Sep. 22, 1996, and 7 bids received by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Fort Worth, TX (DACA63-96-C-0004).

Sept 24/96: Small business qualifier Dynetics, Incorporated in Huntsville, AL received a $3.4 million increment as part of a $35 million cost-plus-award-fee/ level-of-effort contract for systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL and is expected to be complete by September 23, 2001. There were 39 bids solicited on March 29, 1996, and 3 bids were received by the U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command in Huntsville, AL (DASG60-96-C-0193).

Additional Readings & Sources Background: THAAD System

• US Missile Defense Agency – Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fact Sheet [PDF]

• Pentagon DefenseLINK, Missile Defense – Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System

• Army Technology – THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense Missile System, USA

• Designation Systems – Lockheed Martin THAAD

• GlobalSecurity.org – THAAD TMD

• Lockheed Martin – THAAD

• Gencorp’s Aerojet Rocketdyne – THAAD – 100% Mission Success

• DID Spotlight – AN/TPY-2: America’s Portable Missile Defense Radar

• Raytheon – Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Radar System

• Center for Defense Information, via WayBack – Missile Defense Tests: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Flight Test History. The left-wing CDI think-tank has a complete table of the first 12 tests to August 1999. See “Contracts and Key Events” section above for subsequent tests.

Official Reports

• US GAO (April 11/14, #GAO-14-314) Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities.

• US GAO (April 26/13, #GAO-13-432) – Missile Defense: Opportunity To Refocus On Strengthening Acquisition Management.

• US GAO (April 20/12, #GAO-12-486) – Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency.

• US GAO (March 24/11, #GAO-11-372) – Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability.

Background: Other National/ Regional Systems

• DID – SM-3 BMD, in from the Sea: EPAA & Aegis Ashore. The SM-3 has longer reach than THAAD, but its chosen deployment configuration in Europe isn’t mobile.

• DID – Gulf States Requesting ABM-Capable Systems. Covers a fuller panoply of BMD-related buys within that region.

• DID – Pining for Control: South Korea’s KAMD National Ballistic Missile Defense System. Which could complicate THAAD deployments there.

Competitive Technologies

• DID – Israel’s Arrow Theater Missile Defense. Coverage from 2000 – 2011. IAI and Boeing are currently working on the Arrow 3, which is competitive with THAAD.

• IMINT & Analysis – S-300P tag items. Articles give a very detailed overview of S-300/S-400 versions and deployment, backed by imagery intelligence of Russian sites. Also adds some S-500 related information. These Russian missiles also have BMD capabilities, but unlike THAAD, they’re also meant for long-range air defense within the atmosphere.

• DID FOCUS Article – Raytheon’s Standard Missile Naval Defense Family. Includes information and links related to the SM-3.

Testing, Testing…

• Designation Systems – Coleman Hera. Frequent target missile.

• DID (Dec 18/07) – US Missile Defense Shifting Toward More Realistic Testing?

HH-60G, Afghanistan
(click to view full)

In 2006 the US Air Force awarded Boeing a contract worth north of $10 billion for 141 HH-47 combat search-and-rescue helicopters, but by mid-2009 the CSAR-X program was cancelled during its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase by the Pentagon. At the time Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that this program had “a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution.”

That cancellation may have been warranted, but the underlying operational constraints are increasing as years go by, with a tentative replacement for aging helicopters that keeps slipping. In 2012, the Air Force got the green light to take another crack at it. The competition narrowed to a single bidder, and after wobbly budgetary announcements, the program was greenlighted. By the end of 2014 it was officially designated as HH-60W.

Aging HH-60G Pave Hawks

A solution to replace the USAF’s aging HH-60G Pave Hawk combat search and rescue helicopters becomes more pressing as SAR(Search And Rescue) and MEDEVAC(MEDical EVACuation) flight hours keep piling in. These helos are derived from early-model UH-60 Black Hawks, and were fielded starting in 1982 with an estimated operational life of 7,000 flight hours. Of the initial 112 airframes, the inventory was down to 99 as of late 2010. Only 93 of them were assessed as flyable as of March 2012, with signs of structural fatigue (i.e. cracks) on a majority of them. They are all expected to have reached the 7,000-hour milestone by 2019. In September 2011 two of them were already exceeding 10,000 flight hours.

HH-60G: Longest Sunset Ever

The shortfall in the fleet has been addressed with an Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program that funded 20 replacement H-60 family airframes over FY 2011-12. That’s just a short-term stopgap, as maintaining older helos becomes increasingly expensive and dangerous.

HH-60M and CRH budgets – Source: DoD Comptroller, Feb. 2012

Development funding for a new program was featured in the FY 2013 President Budget, but Congressional dithering took its toll. A couple of months into FY 2014, the Air Force sounded ready to both award the contract, and deprive it of any funding in its FY 2015 budget request. By March 2014, however, funds had been found.

Savvy observers will recall that years ago, CSAR-X Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was scheduled for 2012, at 10 operational aircraft. In order to defend its lead on this all-service mission, the USAF is putting an emphasis on affordability and fast production. Even so, it will be several more years before meaningful replacements begin to arrive in the field. IOC for the CRH-60M isn’t expected until 2020.

CRH: Contracts & Key Events FY 2015 – 2016

Official designation.

July 1/16: The first of 21 US Army UH-60L Black Hawks, converted and remissionized into HH-60G Pave Hawks, has been introduced as part of the service’s Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program. Works on the UH-60s is being carried out by Science and Engineering Services LLC which involves adding a comprehensive kit of modifications to the utility helicopter, along with additional equipment to convert it into a combat search and rescue HH-60G. The OLR program aims to replace aircraft lost in nearly 15 years of deployed combat operations since the commencement of the “War on Terror.”

May 24/16: Sikorsky’s HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopter is to move into the detailed design phase after successfully passing an air vehicle preliminary design review by the US government. The UH-60 Black Hawk variant will now enter a 75-month engineering and development phase which will see nine aircraft produced, including five “system demonstration test articles” to support operational testing. The design includes air force and mission-specific avionics, equipment and defensive countermeasures, plus a larger internal fuel capability and cabin area when compared to its UH-60 cousin and is unique enough to warrant its own development phase and even a separate assembly line.

Nov 29/14: Designation. The CRH is officially designated by the Air Force as HH-60W – or 60-Whiskey more informally – as the HH-60G’s successor. A name will be picked up later. The systems requirement review is scheduled later this fiscal year, with initial deliveries expected in FY19. For one this will depend on how the FY15 budget is actually wrapped up, as well as whether sequestration affects FY16 spending. The W in HH-60W could very well mean “wait”, as this project is clearly not among the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities.

FY 2014

Sikorsky wins, but will there be money? Fuel the Pave Hawks
(click to view full)

June 26/14: EMD Contract. As the sole offeror, Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $1.278 billion Engineering & Manufacutring Development contract that uses a combination of fixed-price-incentive/ firm at target price/ firm-fixed-price clauses to develop and produce up to 4 CRH-60M Pave Hawk Combat Rescue Helicopters, 7 training systems, and initial product support. The government’s Affordability Target Gate was around $2 billion, so the USAF is happy.

The same contract will be used to buy around 108 production helicopters, and if all options are exercised, the contract’s value could rise as high as $7.9 billion. It has been structured to handle quantity changes, so 112 CRH-60Ms (4 + 108) is the target, but it may not be the final tally. IOC is planned for 2020.

It’s also worth being careful around the math. One may be tempted to say that $7.9 billion – $1.28 billion EMD = $6.62 billion, which divides by 108 to get $61.3 million per helicopter during the production phase. That’s almost 3x the regular UH-60M rate, but it wrongly assumes that all of the options are just helicopters. Sikorsky has confirmed that the options also include things like training devices, spares packages, etc., and exact CRH-60M prices will be negotiated year to year as helicopters are bought.

$298.5 million is committed immediately, using FY 2013 and 2014 USAF R&D budgets. Work will be performed at Stratford, CT, and is expected to be complete by June 2029, if all options are exercised. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WISV’s Rotary Wing Branch of Special Operations Forces and Personnel Recovery Division/ISR Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH manages this contract (FA8629-14-C-2403). Sources: Pentagon | USAF, “AF Awards New Combat Rescue Helicopter Contract” | Sikorsky, “Sikorsky Awarded U.S. Air Force Contract to Develop New Combat Rescue Helicopter”.

CRH’s EMD & Production contract

March 4/14: Funds found. After initially saying during the FY15 budget rollout that CRH would be delayed by a year for lack of funding, the Air Force then scrambled to indicate otherwise, in these terms:

“Due to the criticality of this mission, the Air Force will realign about $430 million from other Air Force priorities beyond fiscal year 2014 through 2019 in order to award the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) contract to United Technologies’ Sikorsky…. The contract is expected to be signed not later than the end of June 2014. Before moving forward with the contract, the program must complete a Milestone B review including independent cost assessments. In order to enable this timeline, Sikorsky must also agree to extend its pricing through June.”

Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James refers to the contract as “a good competitive price” that “effectively uses the $334 million Congress appropriated for the program.” Plus a bit more. Congress has to approve this, though past indications suggest that this won’t be a problem. James does add that “if the FY16 DoD budget drops back to sequestration levels, this program, along with many others, will need to be reevaluated.”

USAF will go ahead

Dec 13/13: Politics. Secretary of Defense Hagel gets a letter from 74 of 528 Congressional representatives, who don’t want the USAF to leave new combat rescue helicopters out of USAF’s budget. They cite Gen. Moseley’s (correct) characterization of CSAR as a moral imperative for USAF pilots.

The USAF is cagey about committing to anything in response. It’s also worth asking, and answering: if a CRH-60M is really the only choice left, could the US military just choose to equip planned HH-60M buys with a fitting for an aerial refueling probe, then handle the job using a combination of Army (HH-60M) and USMC (MV-22) assets? By all accounts, this is a question being asked in the Pentagon. Using other services’ platforms could meet the moral imperative objection. If the answer is “no, that won’t do,” an effective case requires a precise explanation of why not. Sources: Defense News, “Congress to Hagel: Keep funding search-and-rescue helos.

Nov 22/13: The Air Force posts on its CRH solicitation page that:

“In response to the CRH solicitation, the USAF received one proposal. That offer, from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation has provided an acceptable technical solution and the USAF intends to award a contract based upon budget availability. The USAF is laying the groundwork to award the CRH contract in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014. The award is contingent on the outcome of the President’s budget review process where CRH would need to be funded across the future year’s defense program.”

Earlier in the week Defense News had reported that a CRH start was not funded in the FY 2015 – 2018 budget plans, which were put together by the Air Force under the assumption that sequestration will remain in place over the entire period. Acting Air Force Secretary Eric Fanning explained that new program starts were caught between a rock – the biggest priorities being F-35, KC-46 and the future strategic bomber – and a hard place called sequestration. Maybe this public messaging that the Air Force may have to curtail its combat search and rescue mission will succeed in what looks like a deliberate effort to shame Congress into disarming at least part of the sequester.

FY 2013

RFP, but pull-outs leave just 1 bidder; USAF says that’s OK, but they’re delaying the award. UKMCA/CHC S-92
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Aug 2/13: Delay. USAF spokesman Ed Gulick says that the CRH award will be delayed past Oct 1/13, instead of being awarded before Sept 30/13. The 1-year delay is attributed to “time required to complete an independent cost estimate and the impact of government furloughs.”

It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the USAF is either more focused on other spending priorities and likely to drop CRH in coming reviews, or taking the extra time in order to help ensure that the award will be as difficult as possible to challenge. With Sikorsky’s “CRH-60M” as the only contender, a challenge is likely anyway if the award goes through. Reuters.

Jan 4/13: Only 1. Reuters reports that the USAF wouldn’t confirm that it had received only 1 CRH bid, but USAF spokesman Ed Gulick said that they had “acquisition procedures in place to proceed with this important acquisition regardless of the number of bidders.”

That may not stop GAO protests, however, which doomed the USAF’s CSAR-X predecessor. Ominously, EADS North America Chief Executive Sean O’Keefe is quoted as saying that as written, CRH’s terms didn’t call for an evaluation of full life cycle costs. The Defense Department’s emphasis on affordability, and a new federal law which required such an evaluation, could be enough to sustain a protest.

Dec 12/12: Why 112? James Hasik wonders about the math behind 112 CRH helicopters. Why that number?

“I have watched at least two NATO air wars now in which the US Marine Corps seems to have had the hammer for CSAR. It’s important to note that the Marines don’t actually have specialized CSAR units or aircraft… What they do have is long-range rotorcraft and guys who train hard… In Bosnia in 1995, that was a CH-53 and some escorts from the Kearsarge, pulling out an USAF F-16 pilot. In Libya in 2011, it was an MV-22 from (coincidentally) the Kearsarge, pulling out an USAF F-15 crew.”

“…Without seeing the missions needs statement, it’s hard to know what led to the number 112, but the quantity is easy to criticize, and on the numbers… [set of assumptions made]… The point is that even under these unrealistically generous assumptions, the USAF would only want a fleet of 112 dedicated CSAR aircraft if it was figuring on losing lots of planes in a massive bloody war. The only plausible opponent that could give it that much trouble is China, and in that case, the H-60 hasn’t anywhere close to the range needed to recover the aircrews.”

He doesn’t think that math augurs well for budgetary survival.

Dec 11/12: Sikorsky alone. After studying the RFP’s structure and terms, most bidders decide that it’s impossible to win. Once minimum requirements are met, it’s a straight cost battle, with no credit for additional capacity or capabilities, and terms that will disqualify any bid over $6.84 billion. That’s a legitimate contracting approach, especially with the USAF’s top priorities leaving very little room for anything else. The KC-46A tankers are urgent, the F-35 program is set to spend huge amounts of money, and the vastness of the Pacific has made the next-generation bomber a priority. As contracting consultant Jim McAleese notes, everything else is going to be pushed to bare minimums to pay for them.

For CRH, this means that Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin are the lone team willing to bid. Their 2010 teaming agreement for the HH-60 Recap was issued long before the current RFP, and they won’t say which helicopter they’re bidding. All they could tell us is that: “Sikorsky intends to continue with its proposal to offer the Air Force a proven, affordable combat rescue helicopter system to perform the critical mission of saving warfighters’ lives.”

The HH-60M is certainly proven in this role, but the S-92 could also be touted as “proven” given its coast guard service, so the statement means nothing. As for the others:

• AgustaWestland and Northrop Grumman have decided not to bid the AW101/ “HH-71”.
  
• Boeing won’t bid the HH-47 that won the cancelled CSAR-X competition.
  
• Nor will the Boeing-Bell team bid the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor.
  
• Eurocopter has decided not to submit a bid, either, which presumably would have involved the special forces/ SAR variant of its EC725 Cougar, or a modified NH90 FAME with the MEDEVAC/SAR kit.

The question now is whether the USAF will simply barrel ahead with a late FY 2013 contract and say “these were our terms, whomever bids, bids” – or withdraw and revise the RFP. Reuters | Aviation Week | Defense News.

Oct 22/12: RFP. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition announces the posting of the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) RFP to the FBO.gov website, launching the acquisition program. All previous discussions are superseded by the RFP, and a contract isn’t expected until Q4 (summer) 2013.

The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract will develop the system and produce 8 helicopters. It will be a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) contract, with options for 16 more Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) helicopters. The FPIF contract includes a mandatory 11% profit margin at target cost, with another 1% possible if schedule performance meets the criteria. If costs go over that target cost, they’ll be shared 50/50 with the government, reducing contractor profit margins, until 120% (and just 1% profit) is reached. At that point, all further costs belong to the contractor.

Full Rate Production (FRP) options will be Firm Fixed-Price (FFP), and the USAF expects to buy around 85. A small portion of the contract will be a combination of FFP and Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) in order to cover “over and above” repairs and studies and analyses.

Known competitors to date include Sikorsky/ Lockheed Martin (HH-92? HH-60M?), and AgustaWestland/ Northrop Grumman (AW101/ HH-71). Both helicopter types already perform search and rescue roles. Boeing is believed to be examining a bid involving the V-22 tilt-rotor, similar to AFSOC’s existing CV-22s. FBO.gov | USAF | AIN Online | Rotorhub.

CRH RFP

FY 2011 – 2012

RFP drafts. From USAF Draft Statement of Work: Sept. 2012
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September 2012: Industry Day and 3rd draft. Details emerge as contractors seek clarification on terms and schedules. The “affordability gate” has been set at $6.848B, a number the Air Force does not seem keen to elaborate on. It is going to be a Best Value award with expected discussions past initial proposals, as the sums at stake lead the contracting officers to think an award without discussions would not be realistic. A 1% schedule incentive is built in, to be paid after (timely) delivery.

The draft Statement of Work shows how production of 112 helicopters is expected to be scheduled between EMD over FY 2013-16, followed by LRIP in FY 2017-18, and FRP in FY 2019-24. That would exactly replace the initial HH-60 fleet, but would be below the canceled 141 helicopter CSAR-X buy. CRH’s 2018 date for Initial Operational Capability would come 6 years later than CSAR-X had been aiming for.

One contractor made a salient comment that the Air Force just brushed aside in their answer by saying they won’t change their communications requirements:

“Spec requires basic comms capabilities — have quick SINCGARS, UHF-SATCOM, etc. However, HH-60G is acquiring new suite of multi-band radios that will also provide crypto modernization, full compliance with GATM (ED-23B) [DID: Global Air Traffic Management], and advanced waveforms such as SRW and MUOS. Won’t CRH be a step backwards from what will be fielded on HH-60G in FY14?

The government’s curt answer is disconcerting, given that CRH deliveries are expected several years after said HH-60G upgrades. GATM retrofits were also made on KC-135s an on C-5s among others, to meet new FAA standards and allow shared access within both civil and military airspace.

Finally, the USAF found that answers to an earlier round of classified questions were not mailed out back in July, leaving contractors hanging dry for the expected clarifications. This is to be corrected promptly.

The final RFP was originally scheduled earlier in 2012, and was postponed a couple of times. At the time of this writing its new release date is not known, though Wright-Patterson Public Affairs tells DID that it should be “very soon” as the 3rd draft should be the last iteration before a finalized RFP. As of July 2012, the date for the award was set to Q3 FY2013, but this now looks likely to slip by at least a quarter. Contractors will have 60 days to submit their proposals.

AW101/ CH-149
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Sept 18/12: AW101. Northrop Grumman and Finmeccanica’s AgustaWestland announce they will partner to bid on CRH, as well as the future presidential helicopter. They will offer the 3-engined, AW101-derived “HH-71” to compete for CRH.

Subsequent displays reveal a number of distinguishing features beyond the 3 engines, including a custom-designed medical suite, 7.62mm minigun turret mounted above the ramp, and rotor blades that push air away to reduce brownout during landings. Release | DoD Buzz.

March 21/12: Industry Day. interested contractors are briefed during an Industry Day whose information package is available on FBO (CCR validation required).

RDT&E budgeted as of PB 2013 – source: USAF
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Feb 2012: In the FY2013 President Budget, the USAF starts ramping up RDT&E funding for the CRH with 2 test airframes in FY13.

Jan/Feb 2012: After conducting an Acquisition Strategy Panel, the USAF Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition strategy in January. On February 10 the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) was received from OSD/AT&L.

This clears the way for an RFP with an approach centered on seeking and existing production helicopter with modifications that use existing mature technologies or subsystems requiring limited integration. In this case a Technology Development phase is not necessary and the acquisition process can proceed to the System Development phase.

MDD

Jan 30/12: HH-60Gs. Rotorhub reports that he HH-60G fleet carried out more than 9,700 sorties in 2010, recovering over 1,900 personnel, but falling to around 8,000 sorties in 2011. With respect to cracking and other issues, the past 6 years have seen 83 structural issues that required unscheduled depot maintenance. Col. Chad Franks, the commanding officer of the 347th Rescue Group adds some thoughts:

“What we have done over the last few years is we have put add-ons onto the [HH-60G] aircraft but it has not been integrated the way it should have been. So for us, getting that total integration of our mission systems and our rescue systems all in one package would be ideal… Given the aircraft we have lost over the last nine years, our first job is to get back to 112. We are doing that by buying UH-60Ms right off the line and outfitting them with our rescue equipment.”

August 2011: the Air Force issues a Sources Sought solicitation for a HH-60 Recap Program. This later morphed into the CRH, as per entries above.

May 26/11: Defense Tech reports on the HH-60 Recap program. Meanwhile:

“The service has initiated a band aid program to replace the 13 lost [HH-60] aircraft in the next couple of years with UH-60M airframes purchased from the Army. Still, this does little to address the fact that the vast majority of the CSAR fleet is aging and overused, with dozens of airframes developing stress cracks.”

April 27/11: AW101. AgustaWestland announces that they’ll offer the AW101-derived “HH-71” for the HH-60 RECAP program, and the AW139M for the USAF’s CVLSP utility helicopter competition. Vertical.

July 16/10: Boeing & EADS. Flight International reports that Boeing and EADS Eurocopter have each submitted data 2 alternatives for the HH-60 replacement program:

“Boeing has submitted data on the CH-47 and V-22 to the US Air Force as potential replacements for the HH-60G Pave Hawk fleet of combat search and rescue helicopters (CSAR), a spokesman says… the UH-60M [is] a helicopter less than half the size of the heavylift CH-47 and barely one-third the maximum takeoff weight of the V-22 tiltrotor.

The same variance in size, roughly put, also applies to the aircraft proposed by EADS, which are the NH-90 and EC-725 Super Cougar. EADS submitted data on both aircraft because they believe they “offer proven capabilities at best value and lowest cost to the taxpayer,” says EADS NA chief operating officer Dave Oliver.”

July 15/10: HH-60? Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin announce that they’ll compete together for the HH-60 Recap program, using a modified H-60M Black Hawk. The HH-60M is already in service as a US Army MEDEVAC platform. Sikorsky.

Additional Readings

• DID – CSAR-X: Canceled for Convenience. The CRH’s predecessor program would have bought HH-47 Chinooks.

• DII – Sikorsky’s $7.4-11.6B “Multi-Year VII” H-60 Helicopter Contract. Explains the UH-60M that sits at the contract’s center, though MYP-VII also buys HH-60M, MH-60S, and MH-60R helicopters.

• USAF – HH-60G Pave Hawk. The current CSAR helicopter.

Americas

• The first of 21 US Army UH-60L Black Hawks, converted and remissionized into HH-60G Pave Hawks, has been introduced as part of the service’s Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program. Works on the UH-60s is being carried out by Science and Engineering Services LLC which involves adding a comprehensive kit of modifications to the utility helicopter, along with additional equipment to convert it into a combat search and rescue HH-60G. The OLR program aims to replace aircraft lost in nearly 15 years of deployed combat operations since the commencement of the “War on Terror.”

Middle East North Africa

• MBDA Italia has secured a contract with Qatar to provide $1.1 billion worth of missiles for its new naval vessels. Missiles to be sold include the Aster 30 Block 1, VL MICA air defense missiles and Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles. The munitions deal follows shortly after Qatar agreed to the $5.1 billion purchase of seven naval vessels from Italy’s Fincantieri shipyard, which include four corvettes, one landing platform dock, and two offshore patrol vessels.

• Iraq has received the last of its ordered Mi-28 NE Night Hunter attack helicopters from Russia. The first of an estimated 15 Night Hunters was delivered in 2014 as part of a wider $4.2 billion defense package signed in 2012. According to Reuters, the deal marks the third biggest agreement for Russian arms sales since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

Europe

• The High Court in the UK has ruled in favor of a judicial review into British arms exports to Saudi Arabia. This unprecedented decision follows a challenge by the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills’ decision to continue issuing licenses worth $3.7 billion to the Saudi regime. CAAT’s campaign against British arms manufacturers has grown in recent years amid growing concerns over Saudi human rights abuses conducted with British made weapons and munitions in Yemen.

• Airbus is to conduct full contact flight trials of the automatic boom mode on its A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft by the end of 2016. While normally the task of a fully qualified boomer, the technology being trialed involves the use of real-time video and image processing to track a receiver aircraft’s exact position. The new concept involves the operator controlling the boom manually until it has been positioned within a required area, close to the receiver aircraft. At this point, its automatic mode would be engaged to complete the contact procedure. If successful, this method is believed to improve time, safety and operational aspects of air-to-air refueling.

• An agreement to create a joint Armenian-Russian air-defense system has been ratified by Armenia’s parliament. Initially signed by both nations last December, the new system will enable the inclusion of the Russian Air Force’s full range of capabilities, including multifunction fighter jets, into joint regional air defense. Opponents of the pact fear that too much control will now be extended to Moscow threatening Armenian sovereignty.

Asia Pacific

• Singapore is to announce its decision on which helicopter will replace its aging Super Puma fleet sooner rather than later. The $1 billion decision was put on ice following April’s crash of a civilian Airbus Super Puma in Norway which killed 13 people, whose military variant was a frontrunner in the competition. As a result, a decision in favor of Airbus would represent a strong vote of confidence in the helicopter after an 18 month evaluation process. Waiting in the wings, however, is Italian firm Leonardo Finmeccanica who is looking to steal the deal and get a foothold with one of South-East Asia’s biggest buyers.

• Japan is to launch a tender in mid-July for its $40 billion fighter acquisition program which has been dubbed the F-3 fighter jet program. Sources close to the program have revealed that US giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin have already been invited to take part in the project alongside local manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Adding to this, analysts say Japan’s preference for an aircraft that can operate closely with the US military, given close Washington-Tokyo ties, makes a non-US option a long-shot. Regardless, Saab AB and the Eurofighter consortium will none the less be looking for any opportunities to involve themselves in this mega bucks project.

Today’s Video

• The first F-35B Lightning II lands in UK for first time:

Pantsir-S1
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In October 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki signed a deal with Russia’s Rosoboronexport, variously estimated at $4.2 – $5.0 billion. The deal is characteristically murky, but it includes a combination of 43 Mi-35 (28) and Mi-28NE (15) attack helicopters, plus 42-50 mobile SA-22 Pantsir low-level air defense systems. Their combined cost is unlikely to approach $4 billion unless very extensive long-term support arrangements are included, but Iraq’s maintenance record suggests that this would be a very good idea. There has also been discussion in the press concerning MiG-29M2 fighters or armored vehicles as follow-on options, and the recent crisis in Iraq has led to a limited sale of refurbished SU-25 close air support aircraft.

The deals fill some important military and political holes for Iraq, and the full civil war in progress

Elements of the Deal Mi-28N
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It isn’t unusual for Middle Eastern countries to consciously split their weapon buys between different suppliers, in order to reduce dependence. Saudi Arabia does this very explicitly, and the same pattern can be found in Egypt and the UAE.

Air Defense: The SA-22 Pansyr/Pantsir is designed for mobile low-level air defense, combining twin 30mm guns with 12 57E6 radar-guided surface-to-air missiles that reach out to 12 km/ 10 miles, and up to 10,000m altitude. Sensors include targeting and tracking radars, with an electro-optical system for passive scanning. It’s more of a low-level air defense system than a remedy against enemies who can use precision bombing from altitude, but that would be quite enough to deal with any threats from Iran or Syria. Its weakness is its use of radio command guidance (RCG) from the launcher, which means that its attacks can be defeated with jamming, or by killing the launcher.

Iraq has barely progressed to airspace monitoring, and the Pantsir-S1s will be their first real air defense assets. Training will be required, in order to ensure that the new systems can work well with Iraq’s own emerging air force. Meanwhile, the system’s mobility allows it to be moved around for point defense as needs warrant. It’s also popular in the region. The UAE, Iran, and Syria all operate it, and Jordan has reportedly ordered some.

DJ Elliott of the Iraq Order of Battle believes the Pantsirs will serve in the same role as their Russian counterparts, acting as point defenses for more advanced air defense systems like the planned buys of American MIM-23 Hawk XXI batteries. Cruise missiles and anti-radar missiles generally don’t have jammers (though there is MALD-J…), so RCG remains effective. There are rumors that Iraq is negotiating for S-300 (SA-20) missiles; time will tell.

That went well…
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Helicopters: Confirmed rumors indicate that Iraq requested AH-64 Apaches, which they had seen up close in American hands, and which are also in use by neighbors like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, et. al. The USA reportedly offered Iraq AH-1Zs Viper attack helicopters instead, and eventually offered AH-64D/Es; by then, Iraq had already ordered Mi-28s and Mi-35s from Russia, and they eventually decided against ordering the American machines.

The Mi-28NE’s heavily-armored design is closer to the Apache than it is to the USMC’s new AH-1Zs, and the NE variant offers day/night capabilities. The Mi-35M is a more modern variant of the Mi-24s that Saddam’s air force flew, and it’s a much larger attack helicopter design, with internal space for 4-6 soldiers. That makes it an excellent choice for special forces. The Russian helicopters can’t use the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles that Iraq has been firing from AC-208 planes and IA-407 helicopters, but their 23/30mm cannons, rockets, guided missiles, and other weapon options make them a formidable force. The Mi-28’s future had been tentative until Russia finally stepped up with a 2006 order, and Iraq becomes an important early export customer.

There are other compensations for Iraq. One is political. Unlike the USA, Russia isn’t going to play politics with spares and support. If Iraq’s central government finds itself using these gunships in armed clashes with the Kurds, or other neighbors, Maliki knows that Russia won’t cut off Iraq’s access to parts, maintenance, or associated weapons. In exchange, Iraq has to accept a separate supply chain for Mi-28 and Mi-35 parts and weapons, coupled with Russia’s well-earned reputation for unresponsive support. They may have fewer attack helicopters in the air at any one time, but at least it won’t become zero.

Then What? T-90: next?
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There have been reports of other elements to the deal, with armored vehicles mentioned most often.

Armored Vehicles: Iraq’s purchases of BTR-4s and M113s, refurbishment of older BMP-1 and MTLB tracked vehicles, and rumored deal for more MTLBs, give them a full array of armored personnel carriers and infrantry fighting vehicles. What they’re really short on, is tanks. 140 M1A1-SA Abrams form the high end of their force, supplemented by some Soviet era T-72s and old T-54/55s. If their moves toward mechanized divisions is serious. Iraq Order of Battle publisher DJ Elliott sees tanks as the biggest gap. That makes rumors of an armored vehicle buy important.

There is a request outstanding for another 140 American M1s, but Iraq will need more than that to fill in its missing battalions, and some form of Russian or Ukrainian design seemed likely. DJ Elliott is wondering whether Iraq might begin buying tracked BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles for use as “light tanks,” at about at 35 per battalion, as an interim step. Their 100mm gun and missiles give them some ability to take on other tanks, their ability to work with infantry would give them broader counterinsurgency and security uses, and the UAE is already a regional customer. The other possibility would be a buy of main battle tanks. Older T-72s could be bought and upgraded at the new Czech-built facility in country. Or, Iraq could buy Russia’s T-90S model, in order to make up those numbers. So far, the Iraqi parliament seems unenthusiastic.

Artillery is another serious weakness in the current Iraqi army, and any deal for “heavy armored vehicles” could also be looking to shore up that weakness. Russia sells the 152mm MSTA-S tracked self-propelled howitzer, and the 2S31 Vena is a 120mm self-propelled mortar on a BMP-3 chassis. 9K57 Uragan (220mm) and 9K58 Smerch (300mm) rocket launcher systems mounted on armored heavy trucks offer longer-range artillery options, if Iraq is interested.

Su-25s unveiled

Fighters: Iraq is already training to fly 18 F-16IQ fighters, which are new aircraft roughly equivalent to Egypt’s new F-16C/Ds. They’ll need about 4 times that number in order to truly control their air space, and Russia really needs to sell MiG-29s. Modernized MiG-29M2s are fully multi-role aircraft, and buying them would remove Iraq’s single reliance of the USA for this critical asset. On the other hand, they come with a need for an entirely separate set of weapons, and have a questionable maintenance record in global service. France has a number of competitive options in this area, and this may be a harder deal for Russia to close. See “The New Iraqi Air Force: F-16IQ Block 52 Fighters” for in-depth coverage of Iraq’s options.

In 2014, however, the collapse of the Iraqi government’s authority in the north and west forced an emergency buy. A shipment of 5 used Russian Su-25 Frogfoot aircraft, along with Russian advisers, arrived in June 2014. Another 7 arrived from Iran, which began using them when Iraqi Su-25s fled to Iran during the Gulf Wars. The Su-25 was the Soviet counterpart to the A-10, a heavily armored close air support jet designed to loiter over the battlefield and accurately deliver ordnance at low speed. They were used in combat during Russia’s Afghan War, and despite their rugged construction, shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles did manage to take down some jets. It will be interesting to see how they fare in Iraq.

Contracts & Key Events Iraq
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July 1/16: Iraq has received the last of its ordered Mi-28 NE Night Hunter attack helicopters from Russia. The first of an estimated 15 Night Hunters was delivered in 2014 as part of a wider $4.2 billion defense package signed in 2012. According to Reuters, the deal marks the third biggest agreement for Russian arms sales since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

February 16/16: The delivery of 24 Pantsir-S1 air defense systems and missiles to Iraq from Russia has been completed. The systems were part of a wider defense package estimated to have been worth $4.2 billion with between 42-50 of the units on order. It remains unclear whether more will be delivered in future as part of the same or future deals, after Russian officials and businessmen met with top Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad to discuss oil, gas, and defense cooperation. The previous sale was met with some controversy as former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki almost cancelled the deal over allegations of corruption.

Oct 30/14: Mi-28s. Iraq has been receiving Mi-28NEs, but it takes time and preparation before new equipment can be used. The Mi-28s appear to be ready now, and:

“Defence Minister Dr Khalid al-Obeidi and senior ministry personnel observed a flypast of the helicopters over Baghdad ahead of their deployment to their operational bases. While their planned location has not been officially revealed, Taiji just north of Baghdad would be a likely option.”

The report arrives in the shadow of a recent announcement that Iraq’s Shi’ite army is preparing a significant offensive for Spring 2015. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iraq prepares to deploy Mi-28NE attack helos against the Islamic State” | NY Times, “Iraqis Prepare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help”.

Oct 8/14: Shot down. ISIS proves once again that that they’re well-armed and well-trained, shooting down an Iraqi Mi-35M attack helicopter and an IA-407 armed scout this week, and killing all personnel on board. The Iraqi Army aren’t the only combatants (q.v. Oct 1/14) with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles on hand.

Helicopters are inherently vulnerable to those kinds of measures. The Soviets discovered this in Afghanistan, losing earlier Mi-24 variants of the Mi-35M. As for the IA-407, the similar OH-58D was a key player during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the USA had quite a few of them shot out of the sky. Sources: Defense News, “IS downs another Iraqi helicopter”.

Oct 1/14: Pantsir-S1. The Iraqi government heralds the arrival of Pantsir-S1 systems, along with “Dzighit” twin-launchers for SA-16/-18 Igla missiles. The Russian arms contract reportedly includes 1,000 of the SA-18 Igla-S missiles. They won’t help at all against ISIS, but do allow dispersed low-level air control within territories controlled by the Shi’ite government. Russia Today adds that:

“Since November 2013, Russian military suppliers have delivered to Iraq 12 Mi-35M transport-assault helicopters (16 more to be delivered) and 3 Mi-28NA ‘Night Hunter’ gunships (12 to be supplied soon)…. The Iraqi army will soon start using Russia’s Solntsepek [TOS-1 heavy tracked vehicles that fire short range 220mm ‘Sun Scorch’ rockets carrying]… fuel-air explosive munitions… RIA Novosti reported, citing Almada Press news agency. The weapons have been delivered under the contract signed in July 2014.”

TOS-1 systems are normally part of chemical/ biological defense units in Russia, but one suspects that won’t be their role in Iraq. Sources: Russia Beyond the Headlines, “Russia supplies Iraq with Pantsir-S1, Dzhigit air defense systems” | Russia Today, “Iraq military gets advanced Russian air defense, flame weapons”.

July 6/14: Shot down? The Iranian government’s INRA media arm reports that Col. Shoja’at Alamdari Mourjani was reportedly killed over Samarra, north of Baghdad, last week. The Fars media arm showed pictures of the pilot’s funeral. The National Council of Resistance of Iran claims that 2 more Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members were also killed around Samarra: Kamal Shirkhani and Pakistani-born Javid Hossein.

The Shi’ite cleric and long-standing Iranian ally Muqtada al-Sadr has militia members deployed to protect Samarra’s golden-domed al-Askari mosque, alongside ground forces from the Iraqi government; Iran also has ground forces in theater. It’s possible that the Colonel was fighting on the ground as a Forward Air Controller. The other possibility is that The Islamic State’s Sunni guerrillas have shot down one of Iran’s Su-25s, which are acknowledged to have Iranian pilots (q.v. July 2/14). Iranian sources weren’t giving out those kinds of details, but you’d expect that the other side would be making more of any Su-25 kills. Sources: NCRI, “Third Iranian regime IRGC member killed in Iraq” | AFP via Saudi Arabia’s Arab News, “Iran pilot killed fighting in Iraq” | Voice of America, “Iranian Pilot Killed in Iraq Defending Shrine”.

July 2/14: Su-25s. The BBC reports that some of the Su-25s in Iraq are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Air Force – which is distinct from Iran’s regular air force. The BBC backs up their contention with cooperation from the IISS, which provides photos and serial numbers. The irony is, the jets were originally Iraq’s. During the 1991 war, 7 planes defected rather than face the allied armada. Now they’re back in Iraq, and the Aviationist says that “…(three Su-25UBKM and four Su-25KM jets) will be operated by four Iraqi pilots and 10 Iranian pilots.”

Actually, they may have been back before their official unveiling. On June 21/14, unidentified Iranian planes reportedly launched heavy airstrikes around Baiji, north of Baghdad. There are also rumors that this is a trade of sorts, wherein Iran gets ex-Indian Su-30Ks from Russia in exchange. Sources: BBC, “‘Iranian attack jets deployed’ to help Iraq fight Isis” | The Aviationist, “All Iranian Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes have just deployed to Iraq”.

July 1/14: Helicopter delivery. ITAR-TASS reports that An-124 ultra-heavy transport aircraft have delivered 4 Mi-35M and 3 Mi-28NE helicopters to Iraq. They’ve previously reported Iraq’s total at 43 helicopters, to be delivered by 2016: 24 Mi-35s and 19 Mi-28s. That differs from Rostvertol’s own financial reports, however (q.v. June 12/14), which list 28 Mi-35Ms and 15 Mi-28NEs, respectively. Source: ARMS-TASS.

July 1/14: Mi-28. Rostvertol celebrates its 75th anniversary, and the displays include Iraqi Mi-28NEs. Sources: LiveJournal bmpd, “Mi-28NE for Iraq” [in Russian, incl. photos] | Russian Helicopters, “Major Russian military helicopter producer celebrates 75th anniversary” (Rostvertol is a subsidiary).

Su-25 Arrival

June 26-30/14: SU-25s. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense confirms receipt of 5 Su-25 Frogfoot close-air support jets from Russia, and Iraqi Army Lieutenant General Anwar Hamad Amen Ahmed says that they will be thrown directly into the battle against the Sunni Caliphate in Iraq & Syria, but that takes more than fighters. It takes maintenance, which Iraqis are poor at. It takes jet pilots that have been trained to operate with ground forces, and Iraq doesn’t really have those. And it takes communications and specialized ground personnel so that support requests are answered in a timely way. Also not really present, though American special forces personnel have at least the training required. Gen. Ahmed says that:

“We have experienced pilots and other professionals. Our Russian friends have also sent their own experts to assist us in preparing the aircraft. All the logistics have been planned for as well.”

Sure. Of course, you can launch a “massive attack” by just sending the aircraft on free-ranging bombing missions, to areas where your own troops have fled. It helps if civilian casualties aren’t a concern.

A June 26th report by Russia’s Interfax had pegged the aircraft at ex-Indian “Su-30MKI”, which was obviously incorrect because India had only returned less-advanced used Su-30MKs from their initial stopgap order. A “source in the Russian aviation industry” added that delivery from storage warehouses of the Russian Defense Ministry could have allowed Su-27SKM fighters or Su-25 attack aircraft. Which seems to be what has happened. Sources: Interfax, “Russia might have supplied rebuilt Sukhoi aircraft to Iraq – source” | Russia Today, “Target ISIS: First batch of Russian fighter jets arrives in Iraq” | UK’s RUSI, “Desperate for Air Support, Maliki Turns to Russia”.

July 28/14: Shot down. The guerillas’ Al-Anbar News Twitter account publishes photos of a shot down Iraqi helicopter, reportedly an Mi-35, over Saklaviya northwest of Fallujah. There isn’t much left, so it’s hard to tell, but it had a large 5-bladed rotor. Twitter, Pic 1 and Pic 2.

June 20/14: Mi-24s. The Czech Republic’s Defense Minister Martin Stropnicky says that they are in talks to sell 7 of their 17 Russian-built Mi-24V attack helicopters to the Iraqi Defense Ministry.

The Iraqi government has lost Kirkuk to the Kurds, and lost most of the northern and eastern Sunni areas to hard-line Islamist forces that are backed (for now) by local Sunni tribes. At this point, Iraq needs any flying attack platform that can be delivered quickly, and they’re very similar to the Mi-35s that Russia recently delivered. Their weapon compatibility with Iraq’s existing armed Mi-17s would also be a plus.

The Czechs, keen to push an advantage, are also pushing Iraq to buy locally-designed L-159 light attack jets. Aero Vodochody had lost that contract to Korea’s KAI (q.v. Dec 12/13), but the FA-50s won’t even begin arriving until 2015 – 2016. The Czechs have about 8 jets in storage that they could deliver fairly quickly, and that may be enough for Iraq’s immediate needs. If Iraq wants more, restarting the L-159 production line won’t solve their problem in time. If the Czechs divert L-159 planes directly from their own air force, on the other hand, they could offer nearly-immediate deliveries as part of a helicopter/jet package deal. The Czechs would then be able to choose whether to refurbish the 8 stored L-159s for their own use, and/or backfill CzAF stocks with the new L-169 that’s in development. We’ll have to see what gets negotiated, if anything. Sources: Defense News, “Iraq Eyes Czech Mi 24 helos To Combat ISIL Militants”.

June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Iraq (foreign customer K-8) has apparently ordered 28 Mi-35M helicopters, and 15 Mi-28NEs. This differs from other reported figures, but DID will be using these numbers as the standard.

The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. Sources: Rostvertol PLC, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’, ZA2013 Year.

Mi-35 delivery

May 6/14: Delivery. The Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Konstantin Biryulin, offers some clarity in an interview with Interfax-AVN:

“Russia is successfully fulfilling the contract for supply of Mi-35 and Mi-28NE helicopters to Iraq. The Mi-35 batch has already been delivered [in December 2013] and the Iraqis are happy with them. As for Mi-28NE helicopters, the first batch of these will be delivered to Iraq before the end of this year,” said Biryulin, who leads the Russian delegation at the Sofex 2014 arms show in Jordan.

Sources: Voice of Russia, “Iraq to receive first batch of Russian Night Hunter helicopters before end of 2014”.

Feb 27/14: Some pictures and unofficial updates:

“Taken at Rostov on Don plant, the photographs show Baghdad’s new [Mi-28] attack choppers in the color scheme chosen by the Iraqi Air Force…. Akram Kharief, the editor of Secret Difa 3, a blog focusing on defense topics in the Maghreb region, we can show you the first images of the brand new Mi-28 Havoc helicopter on delivery to Iraq…. 23 Russian attack choppers have been delivered to the Iraqis, the first batch of 10, in September 2013 and the second of 13 examples, in January 2014.”

Sources: The Aviationist, “First images of the new Iraqi Mi-28 Night Hunter attack helicopters”.

Jan 4/14: Delivery. The Alsumaria television channel says that a 2nd shipment of 13 Russian Mi-28NEs have arrived in Iraq, for use in Iraq’s Sunni Anbar Province west of Baghdad. The 1st shipment reportedly involved 15 Mil helicopters, though it didn’t mention whether they were Mi-28s or Mi-35s. Subsequent reports cast doubt, and suggest that these may be Mi-35 helicopters, a modernized derivative of the Mi-24 made famous by Russia’s Afghan war.

The 1st group of Iraqi pilots and technicians reportedly finished their training in Fall 2013. Sources: The Voice of Russia, “13 Russian Mi-28NE helicopters arrive in Iraq”.

June 2013: Mi-28s. At the Paris air show, Rosoboronexport deputy head Alexander Mikheyev confirms to Russian media that the deal is still on, with the first deliveries scheduled for September 2013.

May 31/13: Deal begins. Rostech CEO Sergei Chemezov tells RIA Novosti that Iraq has begun payments, and production has started for the system in the October 2012 deal. RIA Novosti says the deal involves 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters, and 50 Pantsir S1 short-range air defense missile systems. RIA Novosti.

Deal in force

May 21/13: Investigation. The head of the Iraqi Parliament’s Integrity Committee, Bahaa al-Araji, says that Iraq’s Central Criminal Court has resumed an investigation into officials suspected of corruption related to the Russia deal. Overall verdict? “The deal remains in force, but is not being implemented yet…” RIA Novosti fills in some recent history:

“The Iraqi Parliament initiated an investigation into several officials…. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in March 2013 that Iraq and Russia had initialed a revised deal and deliveries under the contract would start by the summer. The corruption investigation was closed shortly after.”

Nov 9-12/12: Investigation. An Iraqi government spokesman announces that accusations of corruption had led Prime Minister Maliki to review the Russian arms deal.

Within a day or 2, however, Iraq’s acting Defense Minister Sadun Al-Dulaymi tells a press conference in Baghdad that “The deal is going ahead.” He says that the only issue involves a failure to submit some papers to the anti-corruption commission in time. BBC | Al-Jazeera | RIA Novosti.

Oct 18/12: American switch? Acting Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaimi tells Reuters that Iraq is talking with American officials about buying air defense systems and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. That’s an interesting comment, given the recent buys of Pantsir and Mi-28 counterparts from Russia, and the challenge of integrating the Pantsir S1s into American command systems if they want to create a unified air defense network. Reuters | Iran’s Press TV.

Oct 17/12: Testing. Russia’s RIA Novosti reports that Russia is going to test its Pansir-S1 systems against live cruise missiles for the first time, instead of target drones. Both tend to be missile-like bodies with jet engines, wings, and guidance systems. Still, some cruise missiles would offer lower radar profiles and evasive maneuvers that may not be programmed into a target drone. The question is how realistic the tests will actually be, given the natural desire to avoid hurting the SA-22’s export status.

Oct 15/12: DJ Elliott, who publishes the Iraq Order of Battle, offers his thoughts on Iraq’s recent buy:

“Iraq is reported to be buying additional long-range radars as part of the package and is rumored to be negotiating for SA20 [S300] SAMs. The 30 Mi-28s [1 Attack Sq-probably to be based at Taji] are reported to be $1 billion with the price for the Pantsir-S1s and additional air defense items is reported to be $2.3 billion according to Iraqi sources. There is also a surcharge for rapid delivery involved in those prices.

At first glance the Pantsir-S1 is a rip-off… However, it is still used for cruise-missile defense of SA20 sites because its communications/radars are compatible and cruise-missiles do not normally carry jammers… 42 Pantsir-S1s is 7 batteries of 6 firing units each in Russian structure indicating 7 initial planned Air Defense Battalions composed of 1 Battery of Pantsir-S1, 1 battery of SA20, and 1-2 batteries of anti-aircraft guns… Also, overlooked by most reporting but mentioned on Iraqi TV, the Czech deal includes establishing an Iraqi Armor rework/upgrade facility for T72 tanks. [At Taji?] This is more important than the aircraft deal and accounts for much of the price. An upgrade facility in Iraq for T72s means that the Iraqis are probably planning on buying large numbers of used T72s and [like the Russian Army] are going to use upgraded T72s as a large part of their tank force vice buying new T90s. The most likely sources for used T72s include the Ukraine and Poland – Russia is retaining its T72s and upgrading them thus is unlikely to have spares available to sell.”

Oct 9/12: The deal is “announced.” It’s clear that Iraq is buying 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters, and 42-50 Pantsir low-level air defense systems, but the numbers don’t quite add, and other elements of the deal are likely to emerge only with time.

The first challenge the deal must overcome is Parliamentary. Maliki can sign the deal, but Iraq’s legislature has to authorize the money for the purchases in its budgets. There has already been some pushback from that quarter, and time will tell how Maliki fares.

The next challenge will involve fielding, though this an easier hurdle. Iraq never really stopped operating Russian weapons, including tanks, artillery, helicopters, and guns. Some were scavenged and restored from the Saddam-era military. Others were provided by US allies. Still others, like Iraq’s Mi-17 helicopters, were bought using the USA itself as an intermediary. What’s different about these buys is that they involve a direct relationship with a new source for support, and also involve new roles within Iraq’s reconstituted military. Working our those kinks, and training to use their equipment’s full capabilities without endangering their own forces, is going to take work and time. Russia’s Pravda | RIA Novosti || Al Jazeera (incl. video) | BBC | Bloomberg | Kyiv Post | Lebanon’s Daily Star | Voice of America.

Russian deal

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Background: Weapons

Weapons are listed by designation, in alphabetical order.

• DID – AH-64E Apache Block III: The Once and Future Attack Helicopter.

• DID – Russia Improving its Mi-28 Attack Helicopter Fleet.

• Czech MoD – Mi-35 (Mi-24V) – Technical Specifications.

• Army Recognition – Pantsir-S1 / Pantsyr-S1 Air Defense missile – gun system / SA-22 Greyhound.

• GlobalSecurity – Su-25 FROGFOOT Grach (Rook) / Su-39 FROGFOOT.

• Military Today – TOS-1A Heavy flamethrower system.

Background: Other

• Wikipedia – List of Soviet aircraft losses in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Illuminating.

• DID (July 18/13) – Iraq: Weapons – and Challenges – In the Pipeline. SIGIR confirms reports that an AH-64 export case is pending, and it has now been formally announced – but no contract has been signed.

F-35A
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In December 2011, Japan picked Lockheed Martin’s new F-35A stealth fighter as its next fighter aircraft, to replace its aging F-4 “Kai” Phantom fleet. The F-35 was actually their 2nd choice.

Back in February 2006, Inside The Air Force (ITAF) reported that momentum was building within the USAF to sell the ultra-advanced F-22A Raptor abroad to trusted US allies, as a way of increasing numbers and production. Japan clearly wanted them, and the Raptor was a topic of diplomatic discussions in several venues, including a 2007 summit meeting. In the end, however, US politics denied export permission for downgraded export variants of the F-22, and its production line was terminated. That left Japan looking at other foreign “F-X” fighter options in the short term, while they considered a domestic stealth fighter design as their long-term project.

In the ensuing F-X competition, the F-35 Lightning II beat BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon, as well as an upgraded F/A-18E Super Hornet from Boeing. Now Lockheed Martin has to deliver, and so will its Japanese partners. Will the F-35A’s price and program delays create problems in Japan? This article looks at the JASDF’s current force, its future options, and ongoing F-X developments.

The JASDF: Structure & Choices F-4EJ “Kai(zen)”
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The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) currently has 3 fighter jet models in its fleet: F-15J/F-15DJ Eagles, its F-4EJ “Kai” and RF-4EJ reconnaissance Phantom IIs, and the Mitsubishi F-2 – a larger, longer-range variant on the F-16C. The Mitsubishi F-1 entered service in 1978 and is still listed on the JASDF web site, but it has now been replaced by F-2s [1]. Now, 42 F-35As will begin to replace the 80-plane F-4 fleet, but that won’t be the end for Japan.

The JASDF introduced the F-4EJ in 1973. It currently serves mostly in anti-shipping and other “permitted” strike roles, though it can also be used for air defense and policing. The RF-4EJ reconnaissance version will be replaced by F-15Js with special pods, and Japan has indicated that they will begin retiring the rest of the F-4 fleet early in the 2010s.

Japan has top-tier manufacturing experience, but they also had a qualitative and quantitative problem. Japanese firms have already produced F-15Js under license, and designed and produced the Mitsubishi F-2 in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The F-2 is larger than an F-16 and has more range, but its performance doesn’t compare to an F-15, and it costs nearly as much. The F-2s won’t be built in expected numbers, which means they cannot replace the F-4EJs and RF-4EJs.

J-20 Prototype
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The Japanese had important choices to make, and the 2010 tsunami sharpened that urgency by destroying 18 of Japan’s F-2 fighters. Then China pushed things to the next level, unveiling its J-20 twin-engine stealth fighter prototype.

The Phase 1 plan was for Japan to choose a future F-X fighter by the end of 2011, buy about 50, and begin receiving them in 2016. Meanwhile, Japanese industry is trying to figure out how to keep itself busy now that license production of F-15 components and F-2s is ending. The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies’ proposal involves producing F-X fighters and their F-XX follow-on buy until 2028, and having some of those 100-120 planes replace existing F-15Js as well. That would be followed by a Japanese fighter design, to begin development by 2017 based in part on lessons learned from their ongoing ATD-X stealth technology demonstrator. Japan hopes to fly ATD-X in 2014-2016, and the SJAC’s idea was that its successor could enter production around 2028, as the foreign-designed F-X fighter line closed down.

When choosing their initial F-X buy, the Japanese had several options.

The Winner: F-35 Lightning II F-35A test flight
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If stealth is desired, Lockheed Martin’s plane is considered a “second best” option to the F-22. While other contenders have sharply reduced their radar signature when compared to planes like the F-16, the F-35 is significantly ahead because it’s designed for stealth from the outset, including internal weapon bays. As China moved to introduce its own J-20 stealth fighter, that criterion seemed to eclipse all others in Japan’s thinking. “Joint Strike Fighters” also offer exceptional performance in the reconnaissance role, while its set partnership model smooths technology transfer issues. That transferred technology is very important to the Japanese, who are quietly working on stealth fighter concepts of their own. Finally, the F-35 will be widely used, offering commonality with key allies and ensuring a steady stream of upgrades without requiring steady Japanese investment.

On the negative side, the F-35’s single-engine design would be a concern during maritime combat air patrols, as it increases the odds of having an engine issue cause the complete loss of the fighter. Beyond that, the F-35’s industrial structure is largely set, its development delays could make on-time deliveries a problem, any early deliveries will cost well over $100 million per plane, and its declared status as a strike fighter clashes somewhat with Japan’s avowedly defensive posture.

Rising tensions in the area led Japan to conclude that it needed good ground-attack capabilities as an explicit requirement, and based on their mathematical analysis of submitted information, Japan concluded that the F-35A was more capable all around than other fighters with proven records. The choice was announced in December 2011, and agreement to buy up to 42 fighters was signed in June 2012.

Media reports aren’t completely precise, but they seem to suggest that Japanese F-35As could eventually fly with up to 40% Japanese manufactured content. Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on engines.

DDH-181 Hyuga & USN’s
LHD-2, post-tsunami
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The F-35B’s STOVL (Short Take Off, Vertical Landing) capabilities might make it an especially valuable future option, as a defensive aircraft that could operate from dispersed land locations, rather than bases that are easily targeted by enemy missiles.

It has a shorter range than other variants, but Japan is also fielding 18DDH Hyuga Class helicopter carriers for roles like disaster response, and will soon field larger 22DDH Izumo Class ships. They’re called “helicopter destroyers,” because Japan is currently prohibited from operating aircraft carriers, but it should be noted that other countries are planning to operate F-35Bs from comparably-sized ships. This very fact may inhibit Japan from ordering the F-35B, despite its potential usefulness as a land-based fighter.

Japan had other options, too. They included:

Boeing: The Traditional Supplier F-15Js
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Boeing and its predecessor firm McDonnell Douglas supplies the JASDF’s F-4s and F-15s. Their next-generation choices included:

Upgraded F-15s Japan could have chosen to go ahead and buy “kaizen” F-15Js at a comparable cost, possibly with the AESA APG-63v3 radar being fielded by Singapore. Additional capability boosts would come from attached pods like ReeceLight or SHARP for reconnaissance, or combination recon/targeting pods like LITENING or Lockheed’s Sniper ATP.

The concern in Japan is that this option could leave them without an air-to-air advantage against current PLAAF SU-30MKK aircraft, let alone potential future upgrades like the SU-35, or China’s J-20.

Boeing’s new F-15SE “Silent Eagle” appeared to be aimed directly at these concerns. It adds a number of important advances that will help it hold its own with currently-fielded fighters, and is optimized for the kinds of long-range, over-water combat patrols the JASDF requires. In full-stealth mode, its strike capability is sufficiently secondary that it need not raise alarm bells, but it’s still present.

While a combined F-15 Kai/ F-15SE buy appeared to be the easiest move, things did not work out that way. Boeing did not submit the F-15SE, and F-15 upgrades will have to be a separate, future issue for Japan. Instead, it submitted…

Super Hornet Int’l
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F/A-18Ei Super Hornet. The base for Boeing’s submission was the AN/APG-79 AESA radar equipped Block II model, and the F/A-18F model has already been sold to Australia. The “Super Hornet International Roadmap” is on the drawing board, adding improved radar signature, the ability to carry weapons in low-RCS underwing pods, better defensive systems, an advanced wide screen cockpit display, and more fuel capacity without increasing drag.

The other Super Hornet option for Japan would be even more exotic. Some of Australia’s Super Hornets are being fitted to receive electronic warfare equipment, which would allow conversion to EA-18G signals intercept and jamming fighters. That’s a unique capability, but Japan’s avowedly defensive posture makes it much less useful to them than it is to other countries.

Even with the EA-18G option, the Super Hornet was an odd bid choice. Beyond the electronic attack role, it’s less capable than the most current F-15 models, such as Singapore’s F-15SGs. Its main benefits relative to the F-35 and European options involved a low price in the $60 million range, the potential for significant license-production in Japan, and future commonality with Japan’s main defense partner, the US Navy.

Buy European Eurofighter: Rising sun?
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The Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale were seen as possibilities, and coupling them with the MBDA Meteor long-range air-air missile might have been very attractive, given Japan’s needs. Price is likely to be close to the F-35, and similar to the option of buying more F-15s.

Dassault Aviation declined to participate with its Rafale, and Saab’s single-engine JAS-39 Gripen NG wasn’t a contender, but Eurofighter campaigned hard. Their plane is a very capable twin-engine air superiority aircraft. Tranche 1 versions have very limited ground-attack capabilities that would satisfy “defensive-only” criteria, while the latest “Tranche 3” offers a good set of multi-role capabilities. The plane’s carriage of the long-range Meteor missile, and integrated IRST system that can find even stealth aircraft by their heat signatures, offer another pair of advantages over American contenders.

The Super Hornet raised questions of comparative capability relative to China’s new fighters, while industrial and technology sharing remain issues for the F-35, so the Eurofighter had a chance. Their platform did well, but Japan rated theoretical capability very highly, and their desk-bound mathematical analysis hurt Eurofighter. The Typhoon was seen as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that work, and picking it would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. That’s no small move, in a society that sets such store by deep industrial relationships.

What They Really Wanted: F-22s No climbing Mt. Fuji
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F-22J-EX. The F-22 was at the top of Japan’s wish list, due to its unmatched aerial performance, high level of stealth, and twin-engine design. In February 2006, a Lockheed Martin official confirmed that a proposal to sell Japan F-22s in some form of downgraded “international variant” was working its way through the Air Force with the support of the Japanese government. At the time, it was “at the three- or four-star level” and among civilian decision-makers. The request was pursued at the highest levels of government, but the USA killed the fighter by refusing to export it.

Japan’s combination of long sea zones and growing rivalry with China make a long-range, twin-engine, supercruising andunprecedented stealthy interceptor with reconnaissance capabilities a natural choice. Leveraging existing Japanese partnerships with Lockheed and Boeing made it nearly irresistible. With it, Japan would have had unquestioned air superiority over its territory for the foreseeable future.

There were clear American advantages to a sale. The USAF originally intended to buy 700-800 F-22 fighters, but that was cut to 442, then 381, and finally to just over 180. That left USAF planners concerned, even as foreign projects like Russia & India’s PAK-FA/SU-50, and China’s J-20, prepared to challenge US air superiority. If upgrades and proliferation led to confirmed fighter overmatch against US aircraft within the next decade, an active F-22 production line would have had considerable strategic and financial value.

On the negative side, the F-22’s extensive capabilities made many in the USA very nervous risking security breaches of its electronic architecture, stealth aspects, or next-generation data links. Licensed Japanese production, a standard requirement for other Japanese fighter deals, would be unlikely – or extremely limited if allowed. The aircraft’s $137-160 million base flyaway cost also gives pause, since a Japanese buy would require significant and expensive changes to the plane’s electronics. Some estimates placed the cost of an F-22J at around $250 million per plane.

Japan never had a chance to find out, as political moves within the USA blocked all F-22 Raptor exports. The USA was left to support its shrunken fleet all by itself, which includes financing a very expensive set of electronics upgrades over the next several years.

Japan’s F-X: Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2016

NG completes center fuselage Getting ready…
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July 1/16: Japan is to launch a tender in mid-July for its $40 billion fighter acquisition program which has been dubbed the F-3 fighter jet program. Sources close to the program have revealed that US giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin have already been invited to take part in the project alongside local manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Adding to this, analysts say Japan’s preference for an aircraft that can operate closely with the US military, given close Washington-Tokyo ties, makes a non-US option a long-shot. Regardless, Saab AB and the Eurofighter consortium will none the less be looking for any opportunities to involve themselves in this mega bucks project.

April 25/16: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $73.8 million contract for long lead materials, parts, components, and effort to maintain the planned production schedule for six low-rate initial production Lot 12 F-35A Lightning II aircraft as part of Japan’s procurement of the aircraft under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work is expected to be completed by December 2020. The first four of Japan’s planned 42 planes are in various stages of production at Lockheed Martin’s F-35 facility in Forth Worth, Texas while the remaining 38 Japanese aircraft will be assembled and delivered in Japan from Mitsubishi’s Nagoya factory.

February 18/16: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has started final assembly of their first domestically produced F-35A. Assembly has entered its final stages at the Komaki Minami plant, and it is expected they will have begun work on two of the fighters by the end of fiscal 2017. By 2020, this production will have increased to 16, and a total number to be manufactured in Japan is 38 out a fleet of 42. MHI will also be responsible for testing the jets stealth against radar. The experience gained by Mitsubishi in the development and manufacturing of the F-35 will help toward the development of Japan’s own next-generation stealth fighter, currently under development as part of the X-2 program.

December 11/15: Northrop Grumman has completed delivery of the center fuselage for Japan’s F-35 fighter, known as the AX-1. The center fuselage serves as the core structure for the 5th generation multi-role jet. Japan’s AX-1 is an F-35A jet which uses conventional take-off and landing. Japan has ordered 42 F-35s from Lockheed Martin. Three more center fuselages will be manufactured in the US, while the final 38 will be manufactured and assembled in Nagoya, Japan.

October 6/15: Northrop Grumman has completed the center fuselage for the Japanese Self Defense Forces’ first Joint Strike Fighter, forming the skeleton for the country’s first F-35A. The company manufactured the fuselage in California before shipping it to Japan for Final Check Out and Assembly. In total Japan has ordered 42 F-35As, with an initial order for six aircraft this year coming with a price tag of $827.4 million. The country selected the F-35 in December 2011, beating the Eurofighter Typhoon and an upgraded Super Hornet bid.

2013 – 2014

Expected costs keep rising; FACO agreement; MHI’s industrial deal goes sideways.

Aug 19/14: FY15. Japan’s Ministry of Defense intends to order 6 F-35As in FY 2015, and they’re asking for a YEN 124.9 billion ($1.21 billion) budget to do it.

Other major priority items include 3 long-range surveillance UAVs (YEN 54 billion) and new AEW planes (E-2D or E-737, YEN 58.8 billion). Sources: Reuters, “Japan looking to buy more stealth fighters in 2015: Nikkei”.

Aug 4/14: Industrial. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) was supposed to begin supplying F-35 rear fuselage sections for Japan and for other F-35 partners, but the government says that they’ll only subsidize Japanese production. Japan has already given MHI the YEN 63.9 billion yen ($623 million), as MHI is responsible for Japan’s Final Assembly and Check Out line (q.v. June 21/13), but the firm is worried that their lack of experience in competitive global aerospace markets will cause them to lose money on parts supplied for export. MHI wants another YEN 10 billion ($97.4 million) in subsidies, the government says “no,” and the parties remain deadlocked.

BAE was supposed to begin receiving MHI parts by 2015, but that isn’t going to happen. Japan’s F-35 deal may need to be amended, though one of Reuters’ unnamed sources say that “…if BAE can wait something could be worked out.” Meanwhile, IHI Corp. is building engine parts for Japanese F-35s and with Mitsubishi Electric Corp. is supplying electric components. Sources: Asahi Shimbun, “Mitsubishi Heavy Won’t Supply Parts for F-35 Fighter Project” | Reuters, “Mitsubishi Heavy’s F-35 Deal with BAE Caught In Japan Funding Spat – Sources.”

July 17/14: Weapons. In the wake of recent changes that allow Japan to export some defense items to certain customers, and engage in multinational collaborations with allied countries, Japan is becoming involved with MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile:

“Separately, the government also gave a green light to Japan’s joint research with Britain using Japanese seeker technology. It’s a simulation-based project linked to a Meteor missile development among European countries. Defense Ministry official Toru Hotchi said Japanese officials are hoping the research can lead to a technology that can be used for F-35 stealth fighter jets that Japan plans to purchase for its Air Self-Defense Forces.”

Meteor is about to enter service on the JAS-39C/D Gripen, with Eurofighter and Rafale qualification to follow by 2018. MBDA has previously stated that they plan to field a variant for internal carriage in the F-35, and have taken some design-related steps, but there’s no definite program or timeframe yet. Could interest be picking up? Sources: DID, “Meteor Missile Will Make Changes to Accommodate F-35” | (USA) ABC, “Japan Approves Joint Missile Study, Export to US” | NY Times 2014-04, “Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons”.

Feb 4/14: Bottakuri. Costs continue to rise for Japan, and F-35Js could end up costing YEN 300 billion each. Meanwhile, Japan’s new 5-year Mid-Term Defense Plan will buy just 28 F-35s by 2018, of a 42 plane order that would see 38 assembled in Japan under a final assembly and checkout deal. At that rate, they won’t make the target of completed deployment by 2021 without a high 2019 order surge. Meanwhile, prices have already climbed from the original YEN 9.6 – 9.9 billion agreement to YEN 14.95 billion each for 2 jets in FY 2013, and YEN 15.4 billion each for 4 more in FY 2014.

“Added to this are plant and tooling up costs of [YEN] 83 billion for 2013 and [YEN] 42.4 billion for 2014 as Japanese companies Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric and IHI establish assembly and production lines…. Sources here have privately begun to refer to the F-35 deal as a “bottakuri bar,” referring to establishments that lure customers… and force them to pay exorbitant bills through a range of excess charges for items not mentioned explicitly on the menu….. locally produced versions of US kit generally cost double their US prices…. Kiyotani said the F-35’s costs could climb to more than [YEN] 300 billion a fighter.”

Abe’s decision to print money at astronomical rates (q.v. Aug 22/13) is going to worsen this problem by dropping the exchange rate. The Yen has lost 28% of its value vs. the US dollar since June 29/12. Defense analyst Shinichi Kiyotani is quoted as saying that lack of specifics in Japan’s 10-year plan reflects uncertainty over the country’s ability to afford the F-35, and its 200 F-15Js and 90 or so F-2s will eventually need replacement. What to do? Sources: Defense News, “Future of F-35 Unclear as Costs Mount in Japan”.

Aug 22/13: Local non-discount. The Asahi Shimbun reports that Japan’s F-35As will be noticeably more expensive than their American counterparts, due to the cost of incorporating Japanese-made parts. They’re correct in general, but their figure is misleading.

The US government has reportedly authorized 24 engine and radar components to be produced in Japan, accounting for about 10% of the plane’s value, and that number is expected to grow with additional approvals. Overall, IHI Corp. will manufacture 17 engine fan and turbine parts, while Mitsubishi Electric Corp. will produce 7 radar system components that include signal receivers. Parts for the rear fuselage, wings, and undercarriage will come from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and other Japanese contractors. That will help Japan gain important experience for its own stealth fighters, and build on the composites manufacturing expertise gained in its F-16-derived F-2 program. The government has reportedly budgeted YEN 83 billion (about $844.1 million) in FY 2013 for F-35 related industrial infrastructure, including new facilities at an MHI factory in Aichi Prefecture.

The problem is that Japanese firms will be manufacturing only for JASDF F-35s, sharply raising per-part costs. The 2 aircraft ordered in 2013 will be the first with Japanese parts, and are now budgeted at YEN 15 billion (see also Sept 6/12, now about $153.5 million) each. Japanese sources cite it as a jump from YEN 10.2 billion (+47%), but sources when the contract was signed cited YEN 9.6 billion. Which makes the new figure seem like an even bigger jump of 56.3%. The real jump? Just 27%. On June 29/12, the equivalent dollar value for YEN 9.6 billion was $120.9 million per plane. A jump to $153.5 million is only 27% in real terms.

Abe may be more hawkish than his predecessor, but running the money printing presses full-bore will make it much more expensive for him to execute on those promises. Sources: Asahi Shimbun, “Japan-made parts to push up price of F-35 fighter jets for ASDF” | New Pacific Institute, “Japanese Companies to Manufacture 10 percent of each of Japan’s F-35As”.

Aug 13/13: 22DDH & F-35. A New Pacific Institute blog post looks at the new 22DDH/ Izumo Class “helicopter destroyer,” and its suitability for F-35s. The author doesn’t believe the ship is very suitable, as it would require expensive modifications that include a new landing surface, much greater munitions storage, greater aircraft fuel capacity, and possibly even new aircraft elevators. A ski jump isn’t 100% necessary, but would be important for good performance. Even after all of those expensive modifications, F-35 carrying and servicing capacity would be very limited, and the pilots would need expensive naval aviation training. It might be a good “lily pad” to extend air defense range in the southern sectors if Japan ever buys (very expensive) F-35Bs, but that’s about it.

Bottom line? The ship’s design makes it better suited to the helicopter and disaster operations it’s publicly touted for, and those needs alone are likely to keep the ship busy. NPI, “Does the Izumo Represent Japan Crossing the “Offensive” Rubicon?”

June 21/13: Industrial. Lockheed Martin has signed an agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. to begin work on a final assembly and check out (FACO) plant. Per Japan’s weapon export restrictions, it would only be used for Japanese orders, and Japan’s agreement will see the first 4 F-35As produced entirely at Lockheed Martin in the USA. Sources: Defense News, “Lockheed, Mitsubishi Sign F-35 FACO Deal”.

FACO

March 25/13: Long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $40.2 million fixed-price-incentive (firm-target), contract to provide long lead-time parts, materials and components required for the delivery of 4 Japanese F-35As, as part of Low Rate Initial Production Lot 8. See also June 29/12 entry.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in February 2014. All funds are committed immediately, and this contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD, who is acting as Japan’s agent through the FMS process (N00019-13-C-0014).

Feb 15/13: Industrial. Jane’s reports that Mitsubishi Electric Corporation is no longer banned from bidding on Japanese military contracts, now that they’ve finished paying the National Treasury back for previous overcharges in defense and space contracts. The ban could have affected MEC’s planned involvement in providing avionics and other products to Japan’s F-35A fighter program.

2012

F-35A DSCA request and contract; How the F-35A won; The future of stealth debated. White Paper
(click to read)

Nov 9/12: Industrial. Japan may begin receiving F-35As by 2016, but local industrial participation faces a number of barriers, due to Japan’s 1967 arms export guidelines. Media reports say that current plans to allow participation in the multinational project, under amended arms export guidelines, wouldn’t lead to deliveries of Japanese F-35A avionics, or of exportable parts for the main wings and tails, before FY 2017.

Media reports are vague, but seem to indicate that Japanese F-35As might eventually reach 40% domestically manufactured content. Japan Today | Yomiuri Shinbun.

Sept 6/12: Bottakuri. More cost hikes for Japan, as defense officials Defense Ministry officials cite “lower production efficiency” as the reason its next 2 F-35As will be YEN 15.4 billion (about $195 million) per plane and initial spares. The initial budget was YEN 13.775 billion per plane for the first 4, which works out to an 11.8% increase.

The ministry is trying to find the full YEN 30.8 billion for the FY 2013 budget request, in order to cover the 2 fighters in it. The Japan Times.

July 2012: Why the F-35 won. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012” White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won. All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of capability, industrial participation, cost, and support. It’s difficult to tell whether the F-35A’s subsequent cost jumps would have changed this evaluation, if they had been admitted at the time. Based on what the government says it knew…

The F-35A was deemed to have the highest capability. This may seem odd for a plane with no exercise experiences or operational history, but the rating was done as a mathematical analysis, not a flyoff. Within the inputs that Japan received and believed, the F-35A scored highest overall, with a good balance of high scores across air interdiction, weapons and targeting, electronic warfare capability, and stealth target detection capability.

Eurofighter won the industrial participation segment with the highest level of domestic participation, but had a harder time keeping its local manufacturing proposals within Japan’s prescribed cost bracket. The clear inference is that Japanese Eurofighters would have cost more than other customers have paid.

The F/A-18E+ Super Hornet International was best for purchase cost, while the Eurofighter Typhoon had the lowest expected fuel expenses. The F-35A eked out a “Gilligan win” here by placing 2nd in both sub-categories, and by avoiding the need for “renovation expenses.” Japanese KC-767s don’t mount pod and drogue refueling systems, which is what the Eurofighter and Super Hornet require. The Lightning II uses the same dorsal aerial refueling system as existing JASDF fighters, which avoids the need for KC-767 or C-130H refits.

In terms of support and maintenance costs, the F-35A was given the highest score, due to its in-depth, fleet-wide ALIS maintenance and diagnostic system. Having said that, all 3 contenders proposed performance-based logistics (PBL) based on delivered availability, so all 3 scored the same.

June 29/12: Buy 4, for more. Officials from Japan’s defense ministry say that they have agreed to terms for their first 4 F-35As, despite a 9.1% price increase. The price hike was caused by American cuts, which have shifted 179 aircraft out of the order book over the next 5 years. The planes will reportedly cost 9.6 billion yen (about $120 million) each over the entire buy, up from the original plan of $110 million. American officials said they could not offer the Japanese a lower price than other partnership nations. That makes the Japanese contract a good bellwether for the real base cost of an F-35A in the near future.

Fortunately for the Japanese, the overall contract remained at the expected YEN 60 billion (about $752.4 million). The cost of the 2 simulators and other equipment dropped to YEN 19.1 billion ($240.83 million) from the expected YEN 20.5 billion. Defense News | Fort Worth Star Telegram | Reuters.

42 F-35As

May 1/12: F-35A DSCA request. May 1/12: The US DSCA formally announces Japan’s official request for an initial set of 4 Lockheed Martin F-35As, with an option to buy another 38 and bring the deal to 42 aircraft. “The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-4 aircraft will be decommissioned as F-35’s [sic] are added to the inventory.”

The aircraft would come with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engines, and Japan would also want up to 5 spare engines. Other components of the deal would include Electronic Warfare Systems, Reprogramming Center support to keep those EW systems current, additional software development and integration, a fight trainer system for the F-35, other forms for personnel training & equipment, transport to Japan, ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) maintenance support systems, US government & contractor support that includes ALGS (Autonomic Logistics Global Support); and initial spare parts, technical data, tools & test equipment.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Japan involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, programs management, and training over a period of 15 years to conduct Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) and ALGS for after-aircraft delivery.

The estimated cost is $10 billion, which works out to $238.1 million per plane. Until a set of contracts are signed, it’s hard to split that accurately between purchase and support costs, and long support deals can add a lot to costs. Japan is also interested in considerably more local assembly than most of F-35 buyers, which is likely to add a number of unique costs of its own. Even so, the announcement has a ripple effect in Canada, where its huge cost per fighter draws a new round of questions about the plane. US DSCA [PDF] | Canada’s Postmedia.

F-35 request

April 2/12: Stealth’s future? A Japan Today article goes straight to the main military point at stake: the future effectiveness of stealth technologies:

“As more nations develop stealth fighters, then the use of radar as the main target acquisition device will be taken over by infrared, wake tracking, electro-optics, and radio/electronic chatter detection – thereby side-stepping radar stealth features – in short order.”

It’s a bit more complex than that, especially given the fact that stealth tends to be optimized for certain frequencies, so radars will still play a role. Still, the falling cost of high-bandwidth networking, and the need for a counter to stealth technologies, does suggest a range of countermeasures over the coming decades.

Feb 22/12: Negotiations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura conveys Japan’s determination to stick to agreed prices and supply schedules for Japan’s F-35s, after Japan’s Sankei newspaper cites unidentified US government officials as saying that Japan had threatened to cancel its orders if prices climbed.

“When we were selecting the fighter, we asked those making the proposals to strictly observe their proposed prices and supply schedules. Japan has conveyed this to the US from time to time…”

The question is whether this matters. Once a contract is signed, backing out becomes so difficult that for practical purposes, it’s impossible unless the price increases are wildly egregious. The time to back out is before any contract is signed. After that, the contract’s own structure and penalties must serve as a government’s insurance. Reuters UK.

2011

F-35A chosen as F-X; F-35 technical issues; China unveils J-20 stealth fighter prototype. F-35A: Winner.
(click to view full)

Dec 20/11: Winner! Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes. The initial contract will be for 4 F-35A jets in Japan Fiscal Year 2012, which begins April 1/12. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2016. Japan’s Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa reportedly said at a news conference that:

“…of the four parameters [performance, cost, industrial, and support], the most important was performance. When we think about our national security needs for our future fighters, we have to consider various security environments, and the movements and changes by various countries. In view of this we need to have a fighter that is capable of responding to these changing needs.”

The reported budget for Japan’s initial 4 planes is YEN 55.1 billion (about $706 million, or $176.5 million per plane and initial spares). Overall, the cost is expected to be YEN 9.9 billion (about $127 million) per plane, with spares. On the industrial side, a final assembly and checkout facility is expected in Japan, as well as work on components. Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on engines.

As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Japan Ministry of Defense [ in Japanese] | Lockheed Martin | Pentagon | AFA Magazine | BBC | Bloomberg | The Diplomat: interview, and Flashpoints blog | Defense News | Gannett’s Navy Times | Reuters | UK’s Telegraph | Wahington Post | Yahoo!

F-35A wins

Dec 13/11: F-35 problems. The Fort Worth Star-Telegram and POGO obtain an internal Pentagon “Quick Look Review” dated Nov. 29, which says the F-35 is headed for serious technical troubles. The overlap between testing and production has been a sore point for the US GAO in particular, as significant changes due to failures revealed in testing will require expensive retrofits of produced fighters, along with the extra costs of changing future production. Even as operational aircraft were being bought, from June 2010 – November 2011 there were 725 change requests for the fighter, of which 577 are still not yet available to implement.

Major issues issues raised included unexpectedly severe shaking (“buffet”) during high-speed maneuvers, problems with the helmet system’s night vision display, and frequent failures of an important electrical component that can knock out power and affect both oxygen and cockpit pressurization. The team also expressed concern at the slow progress in developing and testing the plane’s combat roles, including “certain classified issues” that especially affect air defense performance. Star-Telegram | POGO.org, incl. full Quick Look Review | Australia’s Herald Sun | The Hill.

Nov 4/11: Super Hornet International. Boeing continues to discuss Super Hornet International designs. Not much has changed beyond earlier releases that noted improved F414 EPE engines, a large touch-screen panel, warning systems with 360 degree spherical coverage, and conformal fuel tanks to extend range. They do mention that the dorsal conformal fuel tanks will have a similar center of gravity to the aircraft, and that up to 3 weapon pods would be able to carry 4 x AMRAAM/ 2 x 500 pound/ 1 x 2,000 pound bomb each, while keeping the plane’s radar signature low. That’s in line with earlier reports, which touted 2 x AMRAAMs and 2 x 500 pound JDAMs per pod, but the 2,000 pound JDAM is new. So, too, is confirmation that the new design would have additional radar shaping to lower its cross section further.

With the Super Hornet out of contention in India, Japan appears to be the main target, though the Super Hornet is also being marketed to Brazil, Greece, Denmark, Kuwait, and Qatar, among others. Aviation Week.

Sept 26/11: F-X RFP submission deadline. Boeing confirms that it’s offering the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet, which has also been exported to Australia. Boeing also makes the stealth-enhanced F-15SE design, but appears to have decided not to offer it.

Eurofighter GmbH submits the Eurofighter Typhoon, with BAE acting in a lead role. While the submission is described as “cost effective,” the firm is not explicit regarding the status of the submitted aircraft: new, or used.

Lockheed Martin is expected to submit the F-35A, but has made no announcement. Boeing | Eurofighter.

Mitsubishi F-2s
(click to view full)

April 13/11: RFP. Japan issues the Request for Proposal for its F-X fighter competition. Source.

F-X RFP

March 2/11: Eurofighter. During high level visits, British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge. BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.

Jan 18/11: China’s J-20. The Wall Street Journal reports that China’s unveiling of its J-20 stealth fighter has creates ripples in the region:

“Tom Burbage, general manager of the F-35 program for Lockheed Martin Corp., said Beijing’s progress in developing the J-20 has created a “stronger sense of urgency” throughout the Asian-Pacific region about air-force modernization. He said Japan, South Korea and Singapore are now engaged in bilateral discussions with U.S. government officials over the F-35… Mr. Burbage said the U.S. government has asked Lockheed to provide preliminary information on how it could build the Joint Strike Fighter with Japanese industrial input, building either major subcomponents or completing final assembly in Japan… on aircraft for its own military inventory.”

2008 – 2009

Efforts to buy the F-22 fail, Japan looks at other options. F/A-18F over CV-63
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Nov 23/09: F-35. In the wake of a FY 2010 American defense budget that ended F-22 production, while maintaining the ban on exporting the aircraft, Japan has been forced to look at other options. Kyodo news agency reports that Japan is considering buying 40 F-35s, and that the Japanese defense ministry is seeking fiscal allocation in the 2011 budget. According to media reports, the plane beat the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, F-15 Eagle variants, and EADS’ Eurofighter. The acquisition plan is likely to be incorporated in new defense policy guidelines and a medium-term defense plan to be adopted in December 2010.

The F-35s are estimated to cost YEN 9 billion (about $104 million) each; that’s a rather low figure, when compared to actual expenditures by the USA and Australia. If the reports are true, the critical question would become: what model of F-35? The F-35C’s longer range might suit Japan very well, while the F-35B’s ability to make use of highways and helicopter carriers would add a very interesting wrinkle indeed. Japan Today | Agence France Presse | domain-b | Times of India.

Oct 4-7/09: F-35. The Japan Times reports, and Jane’s confirms, that Japan is negotiating a requested payment of about YEN 1 billion (around $11 million), in order to receive “sensitive” information about the F-35’s capabilities. Japan wanted the F-22, and is reportedly still considering it; the government is also reportedly looking at the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault’s Rafale, Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE, and its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The Japan Times adds that:

“It is rare for a country to be charged such a large sum for information on potential imports of defense equipment. The U.S. also told Japan that Washington will not provide information on the F-35’s radar-evading capabilities until Tokyo makes a decision to purchase it, the sources said.”

One wonders about the wisdom of that sales approach, if true.

July 31/09: F-22. The US House passes “H.R. 3326: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010” by a 400-30 vote. The final version strips out F-22 funding. As House members prepare for negotiations with the Senate on a single, final bill to send to the President, the amendment vote, and subsequent passage of HR 3326, effectively marks the end of the F-22 program. F-22 production will continue through remaining funded orders, and cease in 2011.

Both the House and Senate versions of the 2010 defense authorization bill require a report to study the potential for F-22A exports. The House version listed only Japan, while the Senate bill did not restrict the countries involved. Development work would be required before production, however, which creates real problems. While it’s theoretically possible to bridge that time gap by resurrecting the American program in future defense bills, the aircraft’s supply chain will stop producing certain parts, and begin losing the people associated with them, long before the final delivery in 2011. That makes a production line restart in 2013 or beyond a very difficult and expensive proposition for potential export customers like Japan. See also: Aero News.

F-22 program ended

June 5/09: F-22. Reuters reports that US Senate Appropriations Committee chair Senator Daniel Inouye [D-HI], has sent sent letters on the F-22 issue to Japanese ambassador Ichiro Fujisaki, and to American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Inouye reportedly supports repeal of the 1998 “Obey Amendment” that bans F-22 exports, and the USAF is also said to have decided to support exports to select countries. Reuters adds that there is even growing Congressional support to repeal the Obey Amendment in the face of North Korea’s stepped-up belligerence, and the prospect of significant job losses if F-22 production is closed per Gates’ FY 2010 budget. The exact quote from one of their sources is “…decent support, but it’s not a slam-dunk.”

The senator confirmed sending the letter, but would not discuss its contents. Reuters claims that the letter conveyed some conclusions from a recent USAF study, which placed the estimated cost of developing an F-22 Export version at about $250 million per plane, assuming a production run of 40-60 planes. The USAF study also reportedly assumed that production of an F-22EX would begin in 4-5 years, with delivery beginning in 7-9 years following a re-start of the F-22 production line.

That price tag is about $80-100 million above the cost of a more-capable F-22A. It factors in average costs per plane for production line restart, and for substituting and integrating replacements for components that the USA still does not wish to export. The final cost per plane could certainly end up being higher, if the development and integration program runs over budget. It could also be lower, but only if the substitution program meets projections and one of 2 things happens: (1) The production line is not shut down, due to Congressional appropriations over the next 3 years; and/or (2) More F-22EXs are bought to spread out the F-22EX program’s development and restart costs, via additional Japanese buys or by adding other countries as F-22EX customers.

May 19/09: F-22. A Japan Times article looks at the barriers to F-22 fielding on the Japanese side of the equation, and concludes:

“In sum, Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would involve significantly increasing defense spending, rethinking the domestic production of weapons platforms and implementing a more robust legal and enforcement framework to protect classified information. Under current circumstances, these developments are not in the cards.”

Given that some of the F-22’s material/manufacturing methods are considered to be among its more sensitive technologies, domestic manufacturing in Japan is unlikely to be an option at all.

April 6/09: F-22. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announces his recommendation to terminate F-22 orders at the end of FY 2009, leaving the USA with a fleet of 187 aircraft.

F-15SE unveiled
(click to view full)

March 17/09: F-15SE. Boeing unveils the F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” which appears to be aimed directly at Japan. The aircraft has slightly canted vertical tails to improve aerodynamics and reduce weight, minimal additional radar shaping, the addition of coatings to improve radar signature further, and a pair of conformal fuel tanks with cut-in chambers for 2 air-to-air missiles each, or air-to-ground weapons like the 500 pound JDAM and 250 pound GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb. The tanks would be swappable for traditional conformal tanks if desired, and weapons could also be carried externally. BAE’s DEWS electronic self-protection system would be fitted, along with Raytheon’s AN/APG-63v3 radar that will equip all Singaporean F-15s and be retrofitted to the American fleet.

The intent appears to be to offer a “budget Raptor” in the $120 million range, with a basic radar signature that’s competitive with newer fighters like the similarly-priced Eurofighter Typhoon. Advantages would include better radar signature when internal carriage is used for long combat air patrols or limited precision strikes, a superior and proven AESA radar, longer range, and more total carriage capacity if necessary. On the flip side, it would not provide the same maneuverability options as canard equipped contenders like EADS’ Eurofighter or Dassault’s Rafale. The total package would come closer to parity with the SU-30MKI/M and subsequent versions of Sukhoi’s offerings, but may or may not measure up against longer-term opponents like Sukhoi’s PAK-FA or China’s J-XX. From Boeing’s release:

“Boeing has completed a conceptual prototype of the CFT internal-carriage concept, and plans to flight-test a prototype by the first quarter of 2010, including a live missile launch. The design, development, and test of this internal carriage system are available as a collaborative project with an international aerospace partner.”

That partner could also be Israel, which has now expressed interest in the F-15SE, and also made its own requests for F-22s.

Dec 28/08: F-22. Japan’s Daily Yomiuri newspaper reports that the country is likely to drop its attempts to buy F-22s, amid signs that U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s new administration may halt production of the aircraft.

Congress has yet to weigh in, however, and a consensus for continued production could easily change the odds for exports as well. Defense News report.

Oct 10/08: Eurofighter. Flight International’s “Eurofighter gets serious about Japan’s F-X contest” discusses political developments:

“If you had asked me a year ago, I would have said that the Typhoon did not have a chance due to the close US-Japan ties. I am no longer sure of that,” says a Tokyo-based industry source close to the Japanese defence ministry. “Washington’s continued refusal to release information on the [Lockheed Martin] F-22 has strained bilateral defence ties, and Japanese politicians and bureaucrats are eyeing the Typhoon as a viable alternative to the other American fighters that are on offer.”

Flight International’s sources indicate that Japan will make one more push in 2009, after the American elections. If that fails, it is likely to abandon efforts to secure the F-22, and move to buy other options.

July 16/08: Eurofighter. BAE executives interviewed at Farnborough discuss the Eurofighter’s opportunities with Japan if the USA refuses to sell that country F-22EX fighters. BAE says that is willing to share more of its technology with Japanese companies, establishing Japan as a so-called home market where it manufactures and sells products. Current BAE home markets include the U.K., the USA, Australia, South Africa, Sweden, Saudi Arabia.

The executive also mentions that BAE is looking hard at India and South Korea for future growth, adding that Defense spending in Korea will be greater than in the U.K. within 5 years. Bloomberg News.

2006 – 2007

Japan pushes for F-22, but is undermined by pro-China interests; USAF F-22As deploy to Kadena, Japan. F-22: Off to Kadena…
(click to view full)

Nov 15/07: F-22. The Lexington Institute’s quick brief “Asian Security: Japan Needs Better Tools To Do Its Part” weighs in, in favor of Japan’s case:

“The F-22 is the Air Force’s new top-of-the-line fighter, far superior to any other fighter in the world in its agility, survivability and versatility. It’s so capable that policymakers aren’t inclined to export it, even to trusted allies like Japan. But does that really make sense if Raptor is the plane best suited to protecting the Japanese home islands against cruise-missile attack or preempting a ballistic-missile launch by North Korea? It sounds like Washington is saying it wants Japan to play a bigger role in regional security, but with inferior weapons — or that the Japanese will have to depend forever on America to do the really tough missions… if we really want the Japanese to be partners in regional security, we should be willing to trust them with other top systems too — especially since they’re the one ally we have that isn’t inclined to export weapons.”

July 24/07: F-22. Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said he has recommended that the F-22 Raptor not be sold to Japan. His comments came during a briefing at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and concern a new U.S. “capabilities assessment group” of Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Office of the Secretary of Defense and industry officials who are reviewing Japan’s fighter requirement. Defense News.

June 28/07: CRS on F-22. The US Congressional Research Service issues its report re: selling F-22EX aircraft to Japan (last revised: July 2/07). The report itself is completely non-committal, as it sketches out the options. While the USAF and defense industry are solidly behind the idea as a way to keep the F-22 production line alive, there is some opposition in Congress. Key paragraph:

“The executive branch proposes and Congress reviews arms sales on a case-by-case basis. The sale of F-22s to Japan raises both broad questions about the security environment in East Asia and questions that are specific to domestic interests. Factors that argue for a transfer include potential benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of allied countries, and promoting U.S. interoperability with those countries. Factors that argue against a particular arms transfer include the likelihood of technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability.”

Increased Chinese capabilities and the need for a longer-range, twin-engine jet with the ability to take on modern SU-30 family jets is mentioned in the report body, but the military capability drivers are sidestepped and this is not highlighted as a key issue in favor. Japan’s policy of domestic production and license-building is mentioned in the document as a potential stumbling block, but it, too, is absent from the summary paragraph. CRS reports also tend not to present counter-arguments or responses to objections/contentions, as an attempt to remain “above” political debate. That tendency is also present here, and weakens the report as an analytical document. In a particularly interesting side note, however, the CRS report adds:

“A final industrial base issue pertains to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Although originally intended to be complementary aircraft, F-22 and JSF capabilities, development, and production have converged. Implicitly if not explicitly, these aircraft are competing for scarce procurement funds. Extension of F-22 production would likely bring these aircraft into even sharper competition.”

May 23/07: Given the Raptor’s top secret status, American trust in the purchasing country’s security levels and intentions is a significant part of any export decision. Israel’s past defense cooperation with China, for instance, which included sales like “Harpy” anti-radar drones without timely US notification, has created serious issues. It led to temporary suspension from Israel’s observer status in the F-35 program, and is also widely seen as a serious impediment to its current request for an export version of the F-22.

International espionage is a constant of international relations, and victimization is assessed differently; but sufficiently serious leaks can also have repercussions if they indicate a systemic problem, or happen at a high enough level.

Details are sparse, so it’s difficult to assess the true importance of recent developments in Japan. Reuters reports that classified data on the USA’s AEGIS naval radar/combat system, SM-3 missiles, and Link 16 tactical data net had been “leaked” in Japan. Local media said authorities believe that computer disks containing the classified data were illegally copied and circulated among dozens of students and instructors at a naval college in western Japan. The reports follow a police raid on Saturday of a naval college in western Japan over a “leak of data” in March 2007 when police found one of the disks at the home of a Japanese naval officer in Kanagawa during a separate investigation of his Chinese wife over her immigration status. AEGIS, SM-3 missiles, and Link 16 are all key nodes in Japan’s outer layer of its initial ABM defense system. Link from Taiwan’s China Post | Associated Press.

May 18/07: F-22. Bill Gertz, Washington Times: “Pro-China officials in the White House and Pentagon are quietly undermining Japan’s request to buy 50 advanced F-22 jet fighter-bombers, to avoid upsetting Beijing’s government, according to U.S. officials familiar with the dispute… Both the Air Force and the F-22 manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Corp., favor building an export version… The F-22 export is a major test of U.S. support for Japan and is being watched closely by Japanese government officials who are worried Washington will not back Tokyo and instead kow-tow to Beijing on the sale.”

April 30/07: F-22. Japan applies to buy fighter Australia rejects. The USA’s stated willingness to consider Japan’s F-22EX request re-ignites controversy in Australia, in the wake of the Australian government’s attempt to defuse the issue by maintaining that the USA will not sell the F-22 abroad.

April 27/07: F-22. Japan has yet to receive clearance for F-22EX fighters, but discussions are progressing. South Korea’s Yonhap news agency: “Seoul eyes advanced jets beyond F-15K” contends that the issue of F-22 exports to Japan will be under discussion during the imminent summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The decision will be watched closely by South Korea, which also wants 5th generation fighter jets for its 3rd phase F-X purchase. An excerpt:

“China is modernizing its air force at a rapid pace,” said Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council. “And so we are very positively disposed to talking to the Japanese about future-generation fighter aircraft.”

Japan has worked to improve its diplomatic and military relations with the USA, stressing its reliability as an ally and collaborating on sensitive technologies like missile defense. Hence the current situation, in which exports of the F-22 can be discussed with some odds of success. South Korea, which has made a very different set of choices, is unlikely to be received as positively.

April 20/07: F-22. Flight International reports that Israel has approached the USA about acquiring Lockheed Martin F-22s, as concern mounts about new threats to the IAF’s regional air superiority from proposed sales of advanced US weapons to the Gulf states, and Israeli assessments of a growing threat from Iran. Sources say that the issue was raised during a recent one-day trip by US defense secretary Robert Gates to Israel.

While unrelated to the Japanese request, and very uncertain for reasons of its own, the Israeli request raises both the pressure to create an F-22EX version, and the perceived market & benefits from doing so.

Feb 17-18/07: F-22. Kadena Air Force Base (AFB), Japan received 10 F-22A Raptors in the aircraft’s first overseas deployment. The F-22As are assigned to the 27th Fighter Squadron at Langley AFB, VA, and are under the command of Lt. Col. Wade Tolliver. The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system was discovered on February 11th, causing the aircraft to return to Hickam. The issue was corrected and the aircraft continued on to Kadena.

The 27th FS deployed more than 250 Airmen to Kadena for the 90-120 day deployment, which is part of a regularly-scheduled U.S. Pacific Command rotational assignment of aircraft to the Pacific. See USAF release.

Feb 11/07: F-22. The F-22A’s first foreign deployment, to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) in Japan, runs into a serious problem. The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system was discovered on February 11th, forcing the aircraft to return to Hickam without navigation or communications.

October 2006: wide spectrum of opinion in Australia (including the opposition Labor Party) is also pushing for an F-22EX request, based on arguments and strategic needs that are very similar to Japan’s. At the moment, however, the current Liberal Party government remains absolutely committed to the F-35A as its only future fighter force option.

September 2006: DID’s “Japan Looking to Expand Missile Defense & Military Spending” report looks at Japan’s current security situation, and political-economic shifts that may be very consequential for its defense market.

Feb 18/06: F-22. Inside Defense’s Air Force Plans to Sell F-22As to Allies offers a fuller discussion and analysis of Japan’s F-22 bid.

Footnotes

fn1. Reader Keith Jacobs informs DID that despite the JASDF listing of 7 F-1s in service, “The JASDF marked retirement of the F.1 with a six-aircraft flypast at Tsuiki Air Base (Kyushu) in 2006 (forgot actual date – but Feb or March if I remember correctly. They were aircraft of the 6th Hiko-tai (the final squadron unit). 6th Hiko-tai has now transitioned to F-2A and has its full complement of aircraft of the new fighter. JASDF also retired the last Fuji T-1B, assigned to the 5th Technical Training School and dispersed them to museums (as they did the T.3) from Komaki Air Base. “ The date of that retirement at Tsuiki was March 6/06.

Additional Readings Background: Japan’s Plans

• Japan Ministry of Defense – Defense of Japan. Annual white papers.

• Japan Ministry of Defense – Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications. 2007 snapshot.

Background: Fighters

• DID – Eurofighter’s Future: Tranche 3, and Beyond

• DID – The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy

• DID – Super Hornet Fighter Family MYP-III: 2010-2013 Contracts. Any Japanese purchase would fall under the US government’s multi-year purchase terms, and would effectively extend this production period.

• DID – Lockheed & Mitsubishi’s F-2 Fighter Partnership

News & Views

• New Pacific Institute, Japan Security Watch (Aug 13/13) – Does the Izumo Represent Japan Crossing the “Offensive” Rubicon? Conclusion: no.

• Aviation Week (Oct 22/12) – Japan Aims To Launch F-3 Development In 2016-17 [dead link]. See also News of Japan abridged version. Now known as “F-3” instead of “i3”, this would be a Japanese-designed stealth fighter as a follow-on to the F-35. Hence the importance of industrial offsets. If F-3 progresses slowly, opportunities open up for more F-35s.

• Bloomberg (Sept 2/11) – Lockheed Stealth Jet May Win Japan Deal. Speculative analysis. Suggests that stealth is a very important criterion for the Japanese.

• Aviation Week (June 11/09) – Boeing Studies Stealth Eagle Options [link now broken]. Interesting point made re: retrofits and stealth sales: “It’s not how low can you go, it’s how low are you allowed to go, and the U.S. government controls that,” says Brad Jones, Boeing program manager for F-15 future fighters. “We can get to different levels depending on the country.”

• Japan Times (May 16/09) – Hurdles to a Japanese F-22

• USA Today (July 12/07) – Japan may hold key to F-22’s future, thousands of jobs

• US Air Force Association Magazine (June 2006) – “Air Force Alliance” for the US and Japan. There have been major changes in the alliance over the last few years, as the level of cooperation between the 2 countries has grown by leaps and bounds.

Americas

• The MQ-8B deployed on board USS Coronado (LCS-4) is the first to be equipped with the new AN/ZPY-4(V)1 radar. Previously, the unmanned helicopter was fitted with the RDR-1700 maritime surveillance radar under an urgent requirement. Compared to the previous radar, the AN/ZPY-4(V)1 will increase the search area of the LCS, improving the ability to simultaneously track up to 150 targets and increase detection accuracies out to 70 nautical miles.

Africa

• Gabon is considering doubling the size of its transport fleet by revamping an early B model C-130. The 1976-built aircraft (TR-KKB) is currently at the Alverca facility of Portuguese maintenance and overhaul specialist OGMA, following its recovery from the African state after being grounded for eight years. OGMA has now sent a proposal to the government for upgrades which would see the installation of new avionics and a glass cockpit, as well as the replacement of several structural parts, including outer wing-caps and the 6m (19.7ft)-long sloping longerons at the rear of the aircraft.

Middle East North Africa

• After several months of frosty relations, Turkey and Russia have resumed bilateral ties including coordination on the fight against terrorism. Tensions between Ankara and Moscow have been high since the former’s shooting down of a Russian fighter accused of invading Turkish airspace last November. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan expressed regret for the incident on Wednesday and the Kremlin announced that Vladimir Putin said he would order the government to start talks with Turkey on resuming “mutually advantageous” trade relations and to drop restrictive measures on Russian tourists visiting Turkey.

Europe

• Germany’s Ministry of Defense has reached an agreement with Israel Air Industries (IAI) over the lease of five Heron TP unmanned aerial vehicles. The $666 million deal will see the drones become operational in 2018. A previous deal to lease drones to Germany was specifically intended for aerial intelligence-gathering missions; however, the Heron’s are capable of carrying payloads of up to one ton.

• An investigation by Norwegian authorities into an Airbus helicopter crash in April has found that the incident was probably the result of metal fatigue in the aircraft’s gearbox. All 13 people on board were killed when the Super Puma’s main rotor blades separated from the aircraft as it was ferrying passengers from a Norwegian offshore oil platform operated by Statoil. Previous Super Puma incidents linked to gearbox problems include a 2009 crash off Peterhead, Scotland, in which the rotor also flew off and 16 people died.

• BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, and the Defence Electronics and Components Agency (DECA) are to team up to bid for a significant long-term deal to become the avionics sustainment hub for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in Europe. The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed the involvement of BAE and Northrop Grumman, but declined to say anything about whether DECA, the British state-owned components repair operation, would have a role; however, due to US government insistence, some avionics repairs on the jet here are only undertaken by UK government employees.

Asia Pacific

• The US Army has awarded a number of contracts to companies for the Afghanistan Intelligence Services supporting US Forces in Afghanistan. BAE Systems and Six3 Intelligence Solutions were given $31 million and $28.6 million deals respectively with work to be carried out in Afghanistan, and will last until January 9, 2017.

• Four types of aircraft operated by the Indian Air Force are to receive the latest version of Rafael’s Litening targeting pod as part of a larger $500 million deal between India and Israel. The improved system has been equipped with upgraded infrared cameras and a charge-coupled device color camera to help identify targets on the ground, particularly in dense areas. Furthermore, the new pod doubles as a surveillance and reconnaissance system in addition to being a targeting pod.

Today’s Video

• VMA-211 is set to become the second operational F-35B squadron and the first unit to transition from the AV-8B Harrier on Jun. 30:

EQ-36 concept
(click to view full)

Firefinder radars track the path of incoming shells, rockets, mortars, etc., and calculate the point they were fired from. Raytheon’s TPQ-36 radar is specifically designed to counter medium range enemy weapon systems out to a range of 24 kilometers, while the TPQ-37 can locate longer-range systems, and even surface launched missiles, out to 50 kilometers. Michael Yon, embedded with 1-24 (“Deuce Four”) in Mosul, offered a first hand description of counter-battery radars’ effect on enemy tactics in 2005.

Better radar technologies offer a number of potential advantages for this role, including wider fields of view and less maintenance. Not to mention fewer disruptive, time-sucking false positives for deployed troops. In September 2006, Lockheed Martin began a contract to deliver their “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36” (EQ-36) radars. Despite the close official name and designation, this was a wholly new radar system, from a different company. Orders have begun to accumulate, along with deployments – and, finally, a less confusing designation change to AN/TPQ-53.

The TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar System TPQ-53 components
(click to view full)

The TPQ-53 includes a number of operational improvements, including 360 degree coverage capability instead of the TPQ-36’s current 90 degrees, and dramatic reductions in false alarm rates. A successful program would replace many of the TPQ-36 radars currently in service.

In 2002, the US Army began a research project called the Multi-Mission Radar Advance Technology Objective. The goal was similar to the US Marine Corps’ G/ATOR: a single mobile radar system able to perform Air Defense Surveillance, Air Defense Fire Control, Counter Target Acquisition (artillery tracing) and Air Traffic Service missions. Unlike the Marines, the Army didn’t proceed from there toward a full development project. Instead, they incorporated some of the technologies and learning from MMRATO into a competition that would begin by fielding radars to solve the CTA problem.

Both the truck-mounted AN/TPQ-53, and the smaller Humvee-mounted TPQ-50 LCMR (Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar) trace back to that effort, and the TPQ-53 also grew out of lessons learned from the previous generation TPQ-36/37 Firefinder radar series. The base radar technology is more advanced, and software and hardware were modernized. Mechanically, the radar got more robust gears, a rotating platform, an automated leveling system for faster and more reliable emplacement, and an improved air cooled system to improve reliability and keep costs down. The Army expects these changes to save millions of dollars over the radars’ lifetimes.

An AN/TPQ-53 radar system is actually made up of 2 vehicles. One FMTV truck is the Mission Essential Group, containing the radar antenna and the power generator. The second FMTV truck carries the Sustainment Group, with a climate controlled operations shelter and backup power generator.

The TPQ-53 is IFPC (Indirect Fire Protection Capability) compatible in countering rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks, and the Army is thinking of adding software upgrades to allow it to track larger targets, and perform air defense surveillance against UAVs, helicopters, and enemy aircraft.

The system’s operations center allows the radar to link back to Army command systems like AFATDS and FAADC2. Linkages to ground-based Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) command systems, which can also connect to fire control radars and defensive weapons like the Phalanx Centurion, provide a complete defensive solution for protected bases. If the radar’s functions expand to include broader air defense, those command system linkages will become even more important.

Automation and built-in test sensors means that only 4 soldiers can operate the system, with an emplacement time of 5 minutes and a displacement time of just 2 minutes. This compares to 3 HMMWVs and 6 people for the previous TPQ-36v8 system; or 2 FMTV trucks, 2 HMMWVs, and 13 people for the TPQ-37v8.

A built-in encrypted wireless radio can reach up to 1 km away, allowing operators to disperse and make themselves more difficult targets. Soldiers can use a pair of ruggedized Linux laptop computers to handle operations from anywhere in range, or work from the climate-controlled shelter vehicle.

EQ-36/ TPQ-53: Program and Industrial Team Old: TPQ-36 Firefinder
(click to view full)

The initial Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) contract for 5 radars was issued in January 2007. In spring 2007, the prototype completed successful counterfire target acquisition testing in both 90- and 360-degree modes at the U.S. Army’s Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, AZ. In summer 2007, the system completed successful air surveillance testing at White Sands Missile Range in White Sands, NM. A prototype was unveiled in October 2007, and the 1st system was delivered to the Army in summer 2009. By late 2010, the first EQ-36 systems were deployed in Iraq & Afghanistan.

An August 2011 option raised the EQ-36’s QRC order total to 36 systems (4 + 12 + 17 + 3), though some official documents place the number at 38. Another 65 AN/TPY-53 radars were ordered later, following the Milestone C update decision that launched low-rate initial production.

Over the longer term, the potential exists for $1.6+ billion in orders, covering all QRC units + 136 radars in the program of record. The Full Rate Production decision is scheduled for Q4 FY 2014.

Industrial team members for the EQ-36 program include Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2):

• Lockheed Martin MS2 in Syracuse, NY (Program lead, antenna array, digital module assemblies);
  
• Lockheed Martin MS2 in Moorestown, NJ, facility (transmit/receive modules);
  
• Lockheed Martin Simulation, Training and Support, in Orlando, FL (TPQ-53 training system and curriculum);
  
• Burtek, Inc. in Chesterfield, MI (operations shelter and stationary platform);
  
• Syracuse Research Corp. in Syracuse, NY (digital signal processor);
  
• Tobyhanna Army Depot in Tobyhanna, PA (maintenance support).

Contracts and Key Events

The radar is an American product, with the USA as its founding and largest customer. As such, timelines and divisions use American fiscal years, which end on September 30th.

FY 2014 – 2016

13 more for USA under MYP; Singapore’s export request. TPQ-53 system
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June 29/16: Lockheed Martin’s AN/TPQ-53 counter-battery radar has proven that it can be used to detect unmanned aerial vehicles alongside its usual task of detecting incoming artillery and rocket fire. The company announced the success following testing carried out by the US Army as part of its Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Conducted annually, the MFIX exercise brings together military, industry and academia to assess solutions to future warfighting needs in a live environment.

February 9/16: Testing of the Q-53 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System in June 2015 has shown the radar is having difficulty detecting volley-fired mortars. While the second initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) found the system effective against single-fired rockets, artillery, and mortar munitions, it was unable to handle the detection of more than one munition fired at the same time, according to Michael Gilmore’s annual Operational Test & Evaluation report. The radar also struggled to identify the difference between a mortar, a rocket, and artillery. The Army, however, has stated that the radars have been working well in operational environments, and plans are to increase performance in high clutter environments with development and integration of software upgrades in 2019, with more testing planned for 240 mm and 122 mm munitions not assessed in previous tests.

April 7/14: Support. Lockheed Martin in Liverpool, NY receives a $9.1 million contract modification for interim contractor ssupport of the AN/TPQ-53 radar fleet.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2012 Army budgets. Work will continue until Sept 30/14, and will be performed in Liverpool, NY. US Army Contracting Command in Aberdeen, MD manages the comntract (W15P7T-06-C-T004 P00092).

March 28/14: +14. Lockheed Martin in Liverpool, NY receives a $145.9 million contract modification for another 13 AN/TPQ-53 radar systems, along with 13 corresponding sets of on-board spares. This is the 4th installment under the March 13/12 multi-year contract, and brings orders to $751 million: 65 systems over 4 phases.

All funds are committed immediately, using FY14 US Army budgets. Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/16. US Army Contracting Command in Aberdeen, MD manages the contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015, PO 0022).

Oct 8/13: Singapore. The US DSCA announces Singapore’s export request for up to 6 AN/TPQ-53(V) Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar Systems (CTARS) with 120 degree sector scan capability, along with generators, power units, a simulator, a live fire exercise (!), tool and test equipment, spare and repair parts, repair & return services, software support, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, communication support equipment, personnel training, and other forms of US Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $179 million.

Singapore would be the radar’s 1st export customer. Their forces do deploy abroad, where CTARS capability will be very useful. At home, the city-state’s small size also makes them inherently vulnerable if problems in neighboring countries should allow local terrorists to acquire ballistic rockets.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin in Syracuse, NY. If a sale is negotiated, they’ll need Government and contractor representatives in Singapore for 6 weeks to support equipment deprocessing/fielding, systems checkout and new equipment training. Source: US DSCA, Oct 8/13.

DSCA: Singapore

FY 2012 – 2013

Multi-year contract; Milestone C approval; Initial fielding; Future competition? AUSA 2011
(click to view video)

June 27/13: +19. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY receives a $206.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to procure AN/TPQ-53 Radar Systems and corresponding spare parts, using a combination of FY 2012 and 2012 funds. Lockheed Martin sets the number at 19 radar systems, and this order brings the cumulative total face value of this contract is $605.1 million over the low-rate initial production contract, with 52 systems ordered over 3 phases.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY. US Army Contracting Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD manages this contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015, PO 0010). Sources: Pentagon, Lockheed Martin Aug 26/13 release.

March 12/13: Support. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY receives a $12 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification, to provide interim contractor support for the AN/TPQ-53 radar system.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY until the end of FY 2013 on Sept 30/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

Dec 19/12 – Jan 17/13: future competition for FRP? PM Radars issues a Sources Sought request to determine whether reintroducing competition for Full Rate Production (FRP) may be possible in FY 2014. In other words, this is not an RFP to displace incumbent Lockheed Martin just yet, but it’s the homework that might create the option to do so.

The Army anticipates an FRP contract in Q4 FY 2014, as a single award, firm fixed price (FFP) contract comprised of a base year, with multiple separately priced options and range quantities. Spares, new equipment training, and technical manuals will also be acquired on a FFP basis. This would lead to the acquisition of about 70 systems over 4 years. Key factors in the source selection process include a Live Ammunition System Demonstration (LASD) planned for the first half of FY 2014. Data witnessed by the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) will not be an adequate substitute to participating in the live demo.

The submission date for this information request, originally set to Jan 14, 2013, is later postponed to Feb. 12. The FRP RFP itself is planned for release in Q4 FY 2013, with an award in Q3 FY 2014. FBO: W15P7T-13-R-C113.

Jan 2013: DOTE report. In its FY2012 report, the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation notes reliability improvements, with less frequent system aborts than the 2011 system demonstration’s 1 per 30 hours. Some of these original issues were attributed to user documentation and training, which slated for further improvement.

Even so, the results show a fallback from vast improvements after initial configuration changes, to a final configuration figure of 1 abort every 75 hours during limited testing. Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is scheduled for fall 2013, and the radars will need a big jump to hit required reliability levels of 1 abort every 257 hours.

A Limited User Test (LUT) took place in the fall of 2012, but that’s in FY 2013, and so it isn’t covered in the 2012 annual report.

Oct 17/12: Add other functions? The US Army announces that it has begun fielding the AN/TPQ-53, and the Humvee-mounted AN/TPQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, to protect forward-deployed forces. They also discuss a number of the AN/TPQ-53 system’s features, and reveal that the Army is considering software upgrades that would add general air surveillance radar capabilities against helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Note that the radar’s antenna is heavily derived from the 2002 MMR ATO radar project, which already contemplated air volume search as a mission.

One indication that the Army is serious is that they’re moving the program from PEO IEWS Product Manager Radars, to PEO Missiles and Space. That will organize air defense radars under the same organizational umbrella as the counter-fire radars. US Army.

April 20/12: +21. Lockheed Martin issues a release citing $391 million in US Army contracts for 33 TPQ-53 systems.

Asked for clarification, the firm explains that the US Army has exercised its 2nd option under the contract since the March 13/12 announcement, adding another $225 million for another 21 systems (W15P7T-12-C-C015).

April 2/12: Lockheed Martin MS2 Radar Systems in Liverpool, NY receives a $23.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, for services “in support of the EQ-36 radar” through April 30/13.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY. The original bid was solicited through the Internet, with 3 bids received by U.S. Army Contracting Command in Fort Monmouth, NJ (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

March 13/12: Multi-year contract. Lockheed Martin Mission System and Sensors in Liverpool, NY receives a $166 million firm-fixed-price contract for 12 “enhanced AN/TPQ-36” (now called AN/TPQ-53) radar systems, including spares, testing, and training materials.

This means that Lockheed Martin will be the producer for the EQ-36 program of record, which could rise to 136 systems. It’s also the 1st installment of a larger $881 million contract, which could end up buying up to 51 low-rate production systems, plus Limited User Test (LUT) and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) services.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Feb 28/17. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with 1 bid received. The US Army Contracting Command at Fort Monmouth, NJ manages the contract (W15P7T-12-C-C015). See also US Army PEO IEW&S, Aug 15/11 entry | Lockheed Martin.

Multi-year contract

February 2012: Despite the issues noted in the DOT&E report, the TPQ-53 radar receives Milestone C clearance, allowing it to go ahead to Low-Rate Initial Production. Source.

Milestone C

Jan 17/12: Test reports. The Pentagon releases the FY 2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) Radar System” is included. The Army conducted 3 Live Ammunition System Demonstration (LASD) radar test events at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in October 2010, January 2011, and June 2011. Unfortunately, the DOT&E office reports that the systems had problems with reliability and accuracy:

“Based on radar testing at Yuma Proving Ground and Army reporting from theater to date, radar reliability remains poor and is well below system requirements… one system abort every 30 hours [instead of 1 per] 185 hours… provided accurate locations of most rocket, artillery, and mortars systems… [but] has difficulty detecting certain types of rockets and artillery rounds. Using updated software, the QRC AN/TPQ-53 radar demonstrated improvements in reducing the rate of misclassifying aircraft as threat projectiles in the 90-degree and 360-degree modes… June 2011 testing, the QRC AN/TPQ-53 radar decreased the rate of [false positives, but]… misclassifying and false location reporting rates remain below the Program of Record requirement of one false report in 12 hours.”

FY 2008 – 2011

1st delivery. New name. TPQ-53 on truck
(click to view full)

September 2011: TPQ-53. The EQ-36 gets a formal designation change, to the less-confusing QRC(Quick Reaction Capability) AN/TPQ-53. The Army will select the Program of Record EQ-36 radar contractor some time in FY 2012, to produce up to 136 systems. Source: 2011 DOT&E report.

Designation change

Aug 15/11: Army Contracting Command (ACC) APG-C4ISR, in Aberdeen, MD announces that it intends to buy more EQ-36 radar systems, to begin Program of Record purchases instead of the Quick Reaction Capability buys to date.

The solicitation for Full Rate Production (FRP) was first posted on Feb 16/11 at an estimated value of $940 million. The response date has been postponed by 30 days to Sept 14/11, under “Best Value” consideration and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) pricing. A June 30/11 revision addressed inconsistencies on desired quantities that had built up since the presolicitation. The planned production schedule for this 5-year contract is currently set to 12 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) units in FY 2013, 23 LRIP units in FY 2015, and 32 Full-Rate Production (FRP) units in FY 2016, for a total of 67 systems (W15P7T-11-R-T201). FBO.gov, ASFI.

Aug 15/11: +3. A $91.5 million firm-fixed-price cost-plus-fixed-fee award modifies Lockheed Martin’s April 14/10 contract, raising it to 20 EQ-36 systems: 4 EQ-36 radar systems with armored Sustained Operation Group (SOG) and Mission Essential Group (MEG) equipment, and 16 EQ-36 systems with standard SOG and MEGs.

Work will be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of July 30/12 (W15P7T-06-C-T004). By our records, this appears to raise the order total to 54 systems, though DOT&E figures place QRC buys at just 38 systems.

3 more systems

Oct 26/10: Deployment. Lockheed Martin announces that the U.S. Army has deployed the first AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) radars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Deployment

June 21/10: Sub-contractors. Donaldson Company announces that the EQ-36 will use its patented StrataTube filtration technology to air-cool its electronics, without introducing dust and other contaminants. Current schedules have the final units for that initial 17-system June 2007 contract delivered by fall 2010.

Donaldson StrataTubes use inertial force to spin dust and other contaminants out of the air stream, but have no moving parts to wear out or break, and are maintenance-free. Custom designed EQ-36 Strata panels are included in the radar’s antenna and pedestal systems, and it joins other StrataTube using military devices like the M1 Abrams tank and H-60 family of helicopters.

April 14/10: +17. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Syracuse, NY receives a sole-source $108.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for 17 enhanced AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) radar systems, plus associated sustained operational group and mission essential group (MEG) non-recurring engineering and MEG installation. Work is to be performed in Syracuse, NY, with an estimated completion date of Oct 8/10. The US CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ manages the contract (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

This award is made under an unfinalized contract, and commits 49% of the estimated final value. Lockheed Martin has confirmed to DID that this is a new radar order, which would make 34 radars ordered so far.

17 more Radars

July 2/09: 1st delivery. Lockheed Martin delivers the first EQ-36 Radar System to the U.S. Army on time, following successful live-fire performance testing against indirect fire from mortars, artillery and rockets this spring at the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. The effort also included engineering, contractor and government acceptance testing.

To accelerate the fielding of the EQ-36 radar, the U.S. Army in June 2008 exercised contract options with Lockheed Martin for 12 additional systems, which will include enhanced performance capabilities. With production for both orders now running in parallel, and the 12-radar order accelerated, all 17 of the EQ-36 systems are expected to be delivered by fall 2010. Lockheed Martin.

1st delivery

April 29/09: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Liverpool, NY receives a $20.7 million firm-fixed-price contract that buys spares for the 12 initial production Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Radar Systems.

Work is to be performed in Liverpool, NY, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/10. One sole source was bid solicited from the radar’s manufacturer and one bid was received by the CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ (W15P7T-06-C-T004).

FY 2006 – 2008

SDD; CDR. EQ-36 at Yuma
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July 29/08: +12. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Support in Syracuse, NY receives an $84.3 million firm-fixed-price contract to accelerate the production and delivery of the 12 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Initial Production Radar Systems (EQ-36), which were listed as options within the initial development contract. Those options were reportedly exercised in June 2008.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY, and is expected to be complete by Oct 25/10. There was one bid solicited on March 23/08, and 1 bid was received by the CECOM Acquisition Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ activity (W15-P7T-06-C-T004)

March 2008: EQ-36 program successfully completes its Critical Design Review. Source.

CDR

Nov-Dec 2007: Testing. A prototype EQ-36 radar built by industry partner SRC is tested against mortars and rockets at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. During the tests, the EQ-36 prototype successfully located the firing positions of both rocket and mortar launchers. Lockheed Martin says that live fire testing was conducted over a 7 day period without a single false alarm.

October 2007: EQ-36 program successfully completes its Preliminary Design Review. Lockheed Martin.

Oct 9/07: Lockheed Martin unveils an EQ-36 prototype.

Rollout & PDR

Sept 27/06: Development + 5. Lockheed Martin’s contract win of up to $120 million, issued by the Army’s Program Executive Officer-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors (PEO-IEW and S).

The original release says that the company is directed to provide the Army with 5 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 radars, within 36 months (W15P7T-06-C-T004). Subsequent conversations with Lockheed Martin reveal that this stage included just 4. The firm uses key technology from the MMR ATO program, especially the antenna/ emitter. Lockheed Martin release.

SDD

2002: MMR ATO. Contract to Syracuse Research Corp. (SRC) for a “Multi-Mission Radar, Advanced Technology Objective”. The radar is designed to perform C-RAM/ Firefinder, Air volume search, Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD), and Air Traffic Control functions.

For this demonstration project, Lockheed Martin is a sub-contractor. The radar turns out to be a TPQ-53 precursor. Later, the roles flip to make SRC a Lockheed sub-contractor, with responsibility for the radar’s core Digital Signal Processor.

Additional Readings

• Lockheed Martin – TPQ-53 Radar System. Formerly called the EQ-36, or Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar. Still referred to that way in some contracts.

Competitors and predecessors include…

• Raytheon – AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Weapon Locating System. See also ThalesRaytheon page.

• Global Security – AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Radar

• Raytheon – AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System. See also ThalesRaytheon pages for the TPQ-37.

• Global Security – AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Artillery Locating Radar

• DID – US Marines to Get G/ATOR AESA Ground Radars. G/ATOR’s scope matches MMRATO’s, but its evolution is a reverse image of the TPQ-53’s. It begins with air defense, and will add counterfire in Increment II. By Increment IV, it will have all of MMRATO’s envisioned capabilities, including Air Traffic Control.

• DoD Inspector General, via WayBack (Oct. 2001) – Firefinder audit report [PDF]. Older Firefinder radars were known as AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37 and AN/TPQ-47.r Artillery Locating Radar

• DID – US Marines to Get G/ATOR AESA Ground Radars. G/ATOR’s scope matches MMRATO’s, but its evolution is a reverse image of the TPQ-53’s. It begins with air defense, and will add counterfire in Increment II. By Increment IV, it will have all of MMRATO’s envisioned capabilities, including Air Traffic Control.

• DoD Inspector General, via WayBack (Oct. 2001) – Firefinder audit report [PDF]. Older Firefinder radars were known as AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37 and AN/TPQ-47.