Having just been awarded IOC, a look back at the QF-18’s first full flight:
QF-16s are former F-16 fighters that will be fitted with equipment for remote-controlled flight, and used as aerial targets and decoys for testing against air-air missiles, radars, surface-air missiles, etc. Could they be used for more than that?
The QF-16 is a follow-on to the QF-4 aerial target drone, which are converted by BAE Systems. The USAF is running out of F-4 family airframes to convert, and production is set to end in FY 2013. The QF-16s will be their replacements, but the conversion process must still be developed and tested. BAE Systems won’t be leading the QF-16 program, however; Boeing won that contract.
The initial contract involves 126 jets, but the overall program involves 210-220 QF-16 aircraft. Most will be taken from dry storage at the AMARG “boneyard,” at Davis Monthan AFB, AZ. Note that QF-16s aren’t fully autonomous, as they have pilots who sit on the ground and direct the planes via remote control. Tying the F-16’s systems into the new set of remote control systems was apparently quite an involved and challenging project.
FY 2012 – 2016
1st unmanned flight
click for video
September 29/16: Initial operational capability has been given by the USAF Air Combat Command for the QF-16 full-scale aerial target (FSAT). All 15 QF-16s located at the 82nd Aerial Target Squadron at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida have been approved for target operations. Due to replace the legacy QF-4 aerial target, the QF-16 will introduce fourth-generation fighter capabilities in the aerial target mission, maintaining all inherent capabilities of the baseline F-16 Fighting Falcon, including supersonic flight and 9 G maneuverability.
May 20/14: Lot 2. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $27.7 million contract modification for QF-16 Production Lot 2: 23 QF-16 conversions, with 4-year warranties for the onboard systems that turn them into remote control aircraft. This brings the contract’s total value so far to $158.7 million.
All funds are committed immediately, using FY 2013 procurement & 2014 R&D budgets. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and will be complete by May 20/16 as the warranties expire. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/EBYK (Aerial Targets) at Eglin AFB, FL manages the contract (FA8678-10-C-0100, PO 0058).
Lot 2
May 7/14: QF-16 UCAVs? With the USAF looking for just 210 QF-16s at most, and hundreds of F-16s in storage and headed for storage, Boeing is thinking bigger. Boeing’s QF-16 chief engineer Paul Cejas told IHS Jane’s that they’re thinking of using them as Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, for close-air support and deep strikes against the most dangerous targets.
Step 1 is giving the QF-16s control options that don’t require line of sight, which is currently the case at Tyndall AFB, FL and White Sands Missile Range, NM. Step 2 would involve thinking through mission performance very carefully. Contested airspace is the main reason to use a QF-16 over an MQ-9 Reaper, but UAV pilots have very limited fields of view. That’s a problem for contested strike missions, let alone aerial dogfights. Now add the inevitable delays of latency to magnify the problem, unless the QF-16s are given another level of autonomy for evasion and flight. Range will be limited without aerial refueling, though parallel R&D programs may be about to solve that issue.
On balance, this may be one of those ideas that needs to wait for another iteration or 2 of technology before it really makes sense. Sources: IHS Jane’s 360, “Boeing touts operational QF-16 UAV'”.
September 2013: 1st unmanned flight. The first unmanned F-16 flight takes place at Tyndall AFB, FL. The jet reaches Mach 1.47 and 40,000 feet, performing barrel rolls and other maneuvers before returning with a safe landing.
Boeing has modified 6 QF-16s so far, and this initial test plane had last flown 15 years ago. Conversions will continue, while the next step for converted planes is live fire testing at Holloman AFB, NM. Sources: Boeing feature, “On target: QF-16 flies with an empty cockpit”.
1st unmanned flight
Dec 11/12: More EMD. Boeing in St. Louis, MO receives a $17 million contract modification for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development Phase Option 1. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be complete by March 2014. The AFLCMC/EBYK at Eglin AFB, FL manages the contract (FA8678-10-C-0100, PO 0028).
Nov 19/12: Testing. The 1st QF-16 drone arrives for developmental testing at Tyndall AFB, FL. Boeing Global Services and Support will conduct testing on the QF-16, which will undergo approximately 6 months of testing to validate their capabilities and ensure compatibility with the Gulf Range Drone Control System. Next, the aircraft will deploy to Holloman AFB, NM, for 4 more months of integrated testing.
When all test milestones are complete, the aircraft will return permanently to the 53rd WEG, complete a transition period, and achieve initial operational capability at Tyndall AFB. The first production QF-16 is scheduled to be delivered in 2014. USAF | Boeing.
May 4/12: 1st flight. Boeing and the U.S. Air Force complete the 1st QF-16 Full Scale Aerial Target flight at Cecil Field in Jacksonville, FL. For safety reasons, initial flights take place with a pilot on board. Boeing.
1st flight
FY 2010 – 2011
1st “voluntold” F-16
(click to view full)
July 7/10: Sub-contractors. Herley Industries’ subsidiary Micro Systems, Inc. in Fort Walton Beach, FL announces a development and production contract from Boeing for a QF-16 command and control transponder and a ground systems module. This development contract has an initial award of $2.3 million, and a total potential value of $19 million.
April 22/10: F-16 arrives. The first retired F-16 Falcon arrives at Boeing’s Cecil Field facility near Jacksonville, FL to begin conversion into a QF-16 aerial drone. The team will receive 6 F-16s during the program’s development phase, which will be modified and serve as prototypes for engineering tests and evaluation prior to low-rate initial production. Boeing.
March 8/10: QF-16 EMD. Boeing in St. Louis, MO announces a $69.7 million contract to develop and provide QF-16 “optionally manned” full scale aerial targets. Phase I covers engineering, manufacturing and development. Under the terms of the remainder of the contract, expected to be awarded in coming years, up to 126 QF-16 drones will deliver beginning in 2014, and 2014 is also the expected year for full rate production. The USAF expects to buy 220 QF-16s over time.
QF-16 design and development will take place in St. Louis. MO. Ground and flight testing and production will be completed at the Boeing facility in Cecil Field, FL, near Jacksonville. The Boeing-led QF-16 team also includes BAE Systems in Johnson City, NY, who led the QF-4 program. For the Boeing QF-16 contract, $950,000 is committed at the outset by the 691st Armament Systems Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, FL (FA8678-10-C-0100). See also Boeing release.
Development contract
QF-4: fading awayOctober 2009: QF-4s. In a presentation to the NDIA, Deputy Director of the 691st Armament Systems Squadron Mike VandenBoom sketches out the remaining QF-4 program. As of October 2009, they had completed Lot 13 production and begun Lot 14 deliveries, with 256 QF-4s delivered to date. Production is now down to using RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft instead of F-4E fighters, which will provide another 3 years of full production capability until Lot 17, the final production lot.
QF-4 Lots 15-17 will comprise 36 aircraft, with deliveries lasting until July 2013, which is expected to provide enough inventory through FY 2015. Successor “QF-16” aircraft will need to pick up the job from there.
Additional ReadingsPakistan Air Force jets landing and taking off from highways near Lahore:
Israeli and Hellenic Air Force helicopters train in Greece:
Sweden’s Archer (6×6) Howitzer:
South Korea’s new AH-64Es:
Launch party of Klimov’s new TV7-117ST turboprop engine that will be the power plant for the Il-112V light tactical transport aircraft:
The good news? 2006 saw a convergence of opinion within the USAF that a new long-range strike platform was needed. This is understandable given the B-52H Stratofortress fleet’s age (40-50 years), the B-1B Lancer’s internal power and electronics issues, both of these platforms’ low survivability against advanced air defense systems, and the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber’s very small numbers (21, of which 7-12 are generally operational). The unmanned J-UCAS program, meanwhile was seen as having inadequate range and payload (Boeing X-45C: 1,400 mile radius with 8 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs). The USAF decided that J-UCAS wasn’t a solution and pulled out, stalling American UCAV development until the Navy chose to go ahead with the carrier-based N-UCAS.
The bad news? They seemed to have little idea of exactly what they wanted in their bomber. The FY 2010 budget killed those plans anyway, but in September 2010, pressure to field a new bomber began to rise again. By the time fiscal year 2015 budget planning was in motion, both DoD and the Air Force seemed committed to making the program one of the service’s top 3 priorities.
BAD NEWS: Officials disagreed on what kind of aircraft or missile should be designed to meet the requirement. A single plane? A missile? A family of aircraft? Manned or unmanned? A fighter-bomber like the FB-22/FB-23 idea to fill the FB-111’s vacant shoes, or a full-reach heavy bomber? A traditional land-based platform, or should it be carrier capable? Something comparable to the $2 billion B-2s to take on the toughest strike missions – or more of a utility aircraft like some of the “arsenal aircraft” proposals, aimed at replacing the B-52s with a platform based on a passenger jet or C-17 that would be more economical to fly and maintain? And where do proposals to simply re-engine the B-52 fleet fit in?
Until (unless) this was sorted out, R&D efforts could not succeed – and issues of future force structure remained open questions. An official Analysis of Alternatives was scheduled for Spring 2007, and the articles below chronicle developments in that process as it works its way forward. At this point, it appears certain that the new bomber will fly at subsonic speeds, and incorporate modern advances in stealth technology. Other elements are less clear.
THE GOOD NEWS? Key technologies, from stealth to control of unmanned combat aircraft, have taken many steps forward since this discussion began.
In September 2006, Inside Defense reported that the US Air Force was responding to ongoing Congressional pressure with a proposed $5 billion initial investment over the next few years. Their goal was to develop a next-generation long-range strike platform by 2018, with a fly-off before final platform selection.
All of this work was effectively brought to a halt when US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced his FY 2010 budget recommendations, and effectively suspended the competition. Research may continue in some related technologies under ‘black’ (non-public) budgets, but Sec 124 of the Senate’s S.1390 FY 2010 defense budget was clear:
“On May 7, 2009, President Barack Obama announced the termination of the next generation bomber aircraft program in the document of the Office of Management and Budget entitled ‘Terminations, Reductions, and Savings,’ stating that ‘there is no urgent need to begin an expensive development program for a new bomber’ and that ‘the future bomber fleet may not be affordable over the next six years’.”
By 2010, however, pressure began to rise again to field a new bomber. The breakthrough came, ironically, during a January 2011 speech about $150 billion in spending and program reductions:
“Finally, a major area of investment for the Air Force will be a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber. This aircraft – which will have the option of being piloted remotely – will be designed and developed using proven technologies, an approach that should make it possible to deliver this capability on schedule and in quantity. It is important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service. The follow on bomber represents a key component of a joint portfolio of conventional deep-strike capabilities – an area that should be a high priority for future defense investment given the anti-access challenges our military faces.”
Competing Teams Phantom Ray rolloutOn the contractor side, the program seemed to be shaping clearly, the picture has become muddy again.
On Jan 25/08, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced that they would be cooperating on a bid of their own. Their team will perform studies and system development efforts “in pursuit of the anticipated U.S. Air Force Next Generation Bomber program.” Their collaborative research and development efforts will include will include work in advanced sensors, future electronic warfare solutions, better networked awareness of the broader battlefield, command and control issues for stealth platforms, and virtual warfare simulation and experimentation.
By March 2010, however, the joint team members were each going their own way. Boeing’s X-45C Phantom Ray provides them with a very useful test platform that could become a base for a new unmanned bomber, and Lockheed Martin’s own work on “black program” UAVs gives them growing expertise as well. They eventually got back together in 2013, once requirements began to clarify.
Northrop Grumman is another obvious contender, as the designer and manufacturer of the B-2A Spirit Stealth bomber. The firm has moved away from designing full-scale manned military aircraft in recent years, but there are persistent rumors of black (secret) program contracts related to the design of a next-generation bomber, and NGC’s leadership has indicated that black programs are a growing strategic focus for the company. Taken in tandem, it seems likely that Northrop Grumman is already working on a next-generation stealth bomber design. CFO James Palmer admitted as much during a financial conference in November 2013.
UpdateSeptember 21/16: The USAF’s new long-range strike bomber has officially been named the B-21 Raider. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James made the announcement on Monday in what is a tribute to the legacy of WW2’s Doolittle Raiders rather than a reference to the Indiana Jones movie “Raiders of the Lost Ark.” The Doolittle Raiders are known for their surprise attack against Japan during on April 18, 1942, which forced the Japanese to recall combat forces for home defense, and boosted morale among Americans and US allies abroad.
September 4/15: Northrop Grumman and competitor coalition Lockheed Martin and Boeing submitted designs for the new long range bomber, with a decision expected in October. The first versions produced are expected to be manned craft, with unmanned craft coming a few years later. Designs are said to be more detailed at the stage than is typical.
Additional Readingstag: 2018bomber
In September 2011, Thales Raytheon Systems in Fullerton, CA received a $162.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for 56 Sentinel AN/MPQ-64A3 radars, along with associated spares and fielding support. Work will be performed in Fullerton, CA, and Forest, MS, with an estimated completion date of June 1/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (W31P4Q-11-C-0301).
Their Sentinel radar was to be an integral part of the SL-AMRAAM surface to air missile system, until the US Army decided to assume more battlefield risk and cancel it. Even so, the X-band Sentinel pulse-doppler 3D radars can detect a wide variety of aerial targets, and are being bought for forward area air defense units of the U.S. Army and USMC. Raytheon refers to this buy as Improved Sentinel radars (MPQ-64F1), and conversations with Raytheon personnel confirm that the Pentagon’s “MPQ-64-A3” is the same radar. They also confirm its ability to pinpoint the origin of mortar and artillery fire, and note that its effective range has tripled over the original Sentinel, to 120 km/ 75 miles. Cargo HMMWVs are used as the companion/ towing vehicle, and are equipped with the requisite generator to provide power for the radar.
UpdatesSeptember 21/16: Egypt is to receive eight Sentinel AN/MPQ-64F1 radars following the foreign military sale approval by the US State Department. The package, including training and other associative equipment, is estimated to cost $70 million. Once delivered, the Sentinels will work toward improving existing Egyptian air-defense capabilities following a series of aviation disasters over the last year.
North Korea’s latest ballistic missile launch:
Launch of Israel’s Ofek-11 reconnaissance satellite:
Boeing’s T-X offering Part II:
Boeing’s T-X offering:
Back in July 2005 it was apparent India’s sanctions against Denel and possible disqualification from a $2 billion artillery contract could have a major effect on the South African defense firm as a whole. In August 2005, those sanctions came to pass, barring Denel from a contract it was likely to win and accelerating efforts already underway to radically restructure the firm.
CEO Shaun Liebenberg launched that shift in late 2005 with some frank discussion of the global defense market, and the position of small-medium players like Denel in it. At DSEI 2005 in London, UK, the outline of this new strategy was already apparent. Many of the products Denel is known for will no longer define the firm. But could it find a way to stanch the bleeding and survive in a globalized market?
And how has it done since?
Denel’s Position
Mokopa Laser ATGMThe new CEO was frank about Denel not being viable under the current model. According to Liebenberg, global prime contractors succeed due to privileged relationships with their domestic customer who largely fund and promotes the development of new system platforms.
“Changes in the defence industry have forced consolidation and the forming of alliances worldwide… Although Denel has an enviable range of products, we no longer have a captive domestic market or the scale to succeed as an independent systems integrator and exporter of such a broad range of products…”
“Our analysis of the international defence environment shows much of global defence spend is not directly accessible to independent contractors like Denel,” Liebenberg explained. “The US Department of Defense in recent years has awarded contracts almost exclusively to US and NATO companies. These companies supply most other markets, too. Developing nations like India, Brazil and Israel have strong domestic industries to serve their own customer, whilst giving intense competition to other independents.”
Rooivalk and GripenDenel’s product range drives the full scope of its ambitions home. If anything, it’s surprising that the reckoning hasn’t come sooner.
Indigenous efforts in the missile field alone include the A-Darter (intended as a Sidewinder 9X/ ASRAAM/ AA-11 Archer contemporary), Ingwe and Mokopa anti-armor missiles (think TOW2 and Hellfire/Brimstone competitors), and Umkhonto-IR ship based anti-air missile. The firm also has a full line of optronics; 3 UAV projects (including a reconnaissance UAV, a high speed stealth UAV, and a target drone); a full-fledged new-generation attack helicopter project in the Rooivalk (Eurocopter Tiger/ AH-1Z/ Mi-28 contemporary); the Umbani bomb kit (a kit that converts ordinary bombs to something approaching a JSOW); world-class artillery systems in the G5, G6, and accompanying base bleed ammunition; vehicle turrets, a full line of military small arms; plus C4ISR products, licensed production of other helicopters, aircraft maintenance, and more.
Some products, like its artillery, are genuine world-beaters coping with a shrinking market for their specific product range. On the other hand, many of these expensive development projects were substitutable at home, and non-viable abroad from the get-go. Little wonder the new CEO has concluded that local defense spending clearly won’t suffice, even with some 45% of Denel’s business still deriving from the domestic market.
Worse, much of South Africa’s recent domestic spend has taken place in areas falling outside Denel’s product range, like fighter jets and naval systems. Denel’s involvement was limited to sub-contracts on the SA Navy’s corvette weapons suite, some workshare on the Gripen, Hawk and Agusta helicopter programs, and the hope of additional workshare as part of the Airbus A400M military transport. Liebenberg clearly understood, and stated, that some non-viable businesses would have to be made viable or exited entirely.
Denel’s New Strategy
Liebenberg believed that his company’s capabilities are attractive to global prime contractors for partnering. Liebenberg said Denel meets the pre-requisites to act as a specialised contractor that could slot into the value chain of the global players, because it has a technology edge or low cost production capabilities in several niche areas, plus good systems integration experience.
As such, he intends to pursue a strategy that focuses Denel business on being a domestic prime contractor, whilst becoming a specialized contractor or sub-supplier to other international defense contractors.
In keeping with Denel’s new strategic direction, formally announced by CEO Shaun Liebenberg in August 2005, the Group is showcasing some of its niche defence and aerospace systems at DSEI 2005 this week in London, UK.
Denel’s advanced LCT-30 combat turret will be part of the South African Army’s new generation infantry combat vehicle. Denel also hopes to interest more customers in its sophisticated sub-systems, like its ‘Eagle Eye’ target location binocular, Denel’s NATO certified LH-40C eyesafe laser rangefinder already in use with some European armies, the ‘Kenis’ infrared thermal imaging camera, and the Goshawk electro-optic stabilized airborne observation system. Denel is also supporting Zeiss Optronik of Germany with periscope equipment for a number of foreign navies.
Umkhonto-IR conceptYet Denel hasn’t given up on all of its bigger projects. Its Umkhonto IR surface-to-air missile, selected by the South African and the Finnish navies, remains on offer now that performance testing and live firings have concluded successfully [DID: Sweden would eventually buy them too, as a partial offset for the SAAF’s new Gripen fighters]. In the artillery department, its ‘Arachnida’ electronic targeting and combat management is already in service on the UK’s light artillery guns and was exported in quantity to a Middle East customer, and Denel’s world-class artillery ammunition is currently being evaluated in the NATO environment as well as in the United States. In 2007, Denel announced a strategic alliance with Germany’s Nitrochemie to develop a new generation of modular propellant charges for 105mm and 155mm artillery, and 2008 saw Germany’s Rheinmetall take a majority stake in Denel Munitions.
It’s going to be a long road ahead for Denel, as it always is in major corporate restructurings. Jack Welch, widely considered to be the gold standard of modern-day CEOs, offered his take on the restructuring/ crisis process in a Wall St. Journal article that covered the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The circumstances are different, but the process is universally applicable.
In a way, however, the scale of the problem is blessing to Denel. The very overreach that has landed the firm in such trouble has also made it sufficiently important to South Africa’s defense infrastructure that allowing the firm to fail will be seen as a last resort option. Given the roster of projects it has successfully brought to fruition, it’s also clear that Denel has some very talented engineers and personnel on hand.
Strong government support, a solid share of South Africa’s production allocation for the A400M global project, and success in its alliance efforts could yet steer the South African firm back to health. Yet the international defense market is becoming a difficult place for small-mid size firms without an in-demand flagship product. Unlike Apollo 11, failure is an option.
Updates and Key Events Hoefyster/ Badger –September 15/16: South Africa’s Defense Minister announced plans to update the country’s indigenous Rooivalk attack helicopter. Speaking at this year’s African Aerospace & Defence Show, Nosiviwe Masipa-Nqakula said the helicopter has “blooded” itself having carried out a series of successful operations as part of the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Manufacturer Denel is also working on marketing the helicopter to other African governments who are fighting insurgencies, namely Nigeria and Egypt, and further afield governments like India and Brazil.
November 10/15: South African firm Denel Vehicle Systems has also bagged a $63 million contract to develop and produce N35 mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles with UAE firm NIMR, with this contract reportedly covering the development of both 4×4 and 6×6 variants over the next two years. An initial batch of South African-produced vehicles will be followed by a transition in production to the UAE, including transfer of the production line’s supply chain and technical expertise.
July 22/09: A Denel release suggests renewed efforts to step up exports – even as it makes the importance of the Hoefyster IFV project, and the continued primacy of South African defense spending, clear:
“In 2005 Denel Land Systems was a company “in anticipation.” Inheriting an overdraft of R400m and a loss of R180m year-on-year, DLS was insolvent for all intensive purposes. Despite this however, the strategic and technical value of the company remained evident… Having technical expertise and an artillery capability among the best in the world does not automatically equate to sustainability however… All product lines manufactured by DLS were reviewed as a result, with non-core products such as hunting rifles immediately being exited. We simultaneously applied for recapitalisation funding, which was used to repay an overdraft and give DLS a “clean start”
Despite this however, DLS needed a catalyst for growth and sustainability. With over 70% of its business coming from the local market and notably from the SANDF, it was critical that DLS secured a sizable defence contract… we were conscious of the business and strategic value this type of contract would enable… The Hoefyster project has provided just the required impetus. With a total contract value of R8.3bn and the demand phase in activation already worth R1bn, the contract’s full effects are not confined to DLS, but also being felt by 60 local contractors – a glimpse of the scale of impact the company can have on the local economy.
While Hoefyster proved a critical element in ensuring DLS broke even during the financial year 2008/09… we have started visiting previously interested international parties and looking for new ones in the Middle East, Far East, South America and Africa. To step into these international markets however, strategic partners will be critical in ensuring access. As such, our focus has seen us already engage with a number of key players so as to establish supplier contract relationships.”
July 16/09: Denel Group CEO Talib Sadik discusses the organisation’s revised growth strategy in a corporate release, and offers an update on turnaround progress made to date. Since the turnaround began in 2006, Denel has inked strategic equity partnerships with Carl Zeiss, Rheinmetall Defence and Saab:
“While acknowledging the Group still faced challenges, most notably the continued posting of losses by Denel Saab Aerostructures and securing further recapitalisation, Sadik maintained it was important to acknowledge the milestones that had already been achieved. These included the improved relationship with the South African Department of Defence, enhanced risk management and programme execution, and the significant performance of and turnaround seen in some of Denel’s fully-owned (100% shareholding) businesses… Turbomeca Africa has continued to grow its profits year-on-year. We have also seen Carl Zeiss Optronics’ sales per person has increased from R0.8 million to R1.6 million since its restructuring, and are expecting Rheinmetall Denel Munitions to post its first profits in the new financial year,” explained Sadik. He added that Carl Zeiss Optronics has shown a 100% increase in revenue over a two year period, while Rheinmetall Denel Munitions’ order cover is in the region of 70%.”
Overall, losses are continuing at a declining rate, from R 1.56 billion in the 2004/05 financial year to R 347 million in 2008 (q.v. Sept 9/08 entry). Despite the net loss, Denel Group’s gross profit has grown from -6% in 2006/07 to 16% in 2008/09, while revenue per employee across the Group has more than doubled from R 353,242 in 2006 to R 745,460 in 2009. R&D has grown to R 1.12 billion in 2009 driven largely by development of the A-Darter 5th generation air-to-air missile, the Badger/Hoefyster 8×8 IFV, and subcontracting work on the A400M military cargo aircraft.
Denel’s order book has seen the most growth, from R 3.75 billion in 2006 R 16.05 billion (including confirmed contracts) at the end of 2009. The May 2007 IFV win played a large role in that increase, by adding R 8.3 billion to the order book.
Jan 19/09: In its analysis of the South African defense industry, analyst firm Forecast International sees Denel’s efforts paying off. In accordance with mandates attached to government recapitalization efforts valued at $455 million, Denel has proceeded with restructuring. Forecast International believes that amid rising uncertainty around the domestic defense market, the sector’s decision to discard self-sufficiency in favor of an industry structure optimized to increase access to the global defense market appears is looking like a good strategy. It adds:
“Since the South African Ministry of Public Enterprise opted to divest from unprofitable domestic defense enterprises and relax regulations on foreign investment in the defense sector in late 2005/early 2006, 10 major acquisitions involving foreign defense enterprises targeting South African enterprises have occurred… Since early 2006, Denel has sold 20 percent of it aerostructures division at a price of ZAR66 million to Saab to form the Denel Saab Aerostructures joint venture; 70 percent of its optronics division was acquired by Carl Zeiss Optronics in exchange for phased investment in Denel’s European logistics network; and Rheinmetall AG acquired a 51 percent stake in Denel Munitions in return for the provision of financing and advising on the business unit’s restructuring.”
While Denel has yet to operate at a profit, operating losses declined nearly 37% between 2007 and 2008, and decreased at a compound annual rate of 74% since restructuring efforts were initiated in early 2006.
Talib SadikSept 25/08: State-owned Denel (Pty) Ltd’s Chairman of the Board Dr Sibusiso Sibisi announces Talib Sadik’s appointment as Group CEO for a period of three years. Mr Sadik was appointed as Group Financial Officer of Denel in 2006, and has been an executive member of the Board of Directors since that date.
Sept 9/08: Denel’s Acting Group CEO Talib Sadik, announces that for the fiscal year that ended on March 31/08, the Denel Group increased gross revenue to R 3,894 million (2007: R 3,310 million) and posted a net loss of R 347 million (2007: R 549 million). Of the total turnover 56.8% was from domestic sales (2007: 47.5%) and 43.2% from export sales (2007: 52.5%). Sadik:
“We managed to improve the loss for the past year through focusing on core businesses, phasing out of legacy contracts, savings in operating costs and profits on the sale of non-core assets… Better contract negotiations including higher advance payment receipts towards the year-end and improvements in our debt collection process helped us to achieve the healthy cash situation.”
See full Denel release | Engineering News.
Sept 1/08: The finalized deal involving Rheinmetall and Denel Munitions comes into effect. Denel release [PDF].
June 1/08: Denel Group’s CFO Mr Talib Sadik becomes interim CEO of Denel.
Feb 8/08: Germany’s Rheinmetall Group signs an agreement with Denel (Pty) Ltd, indicating its intention to take a majority equity stake in Denel Munitions. The deal is finalized on Sept 1/08. Read “Rheinmetall Buying Majority Stake in Denel Munitions” for more.
A-DarterJuly 25/07: Denel’s Group CEO Mr Shaun Liebenberg, announces a net loss of R 549.1 million for the past year ended March 31/07 (2006: R 1,363.4 million) on turnover of R 3,268.1 million (2006: R 2,773.2 million). Gross profit rose to R 754.0 million (2006: loss of R131.1 million). His statement adds:
“Incremental sales by Denel Land Systems and Denel Munitions to clients in South America, Europe and the Middle East added to the increased turnover… At year-end Denel received a number of large contracts, notably the R8.3 billion ‘Hoefyster’ – the biggest in Denel’s 15-year existence, and the A-Darter air-to-air missile contract worth approximately R1 billion… BAE Systems awarded Munitions a contract worth R300 million over three years to supply brass cups, which are used in the manufacture of small calibre ammunition. Denel Optronics, in which German firm Carl Zeiss Optronics has acquired a majority holding, received a BAE Systems contract worth R200 million to produce 450 units of its unique pilot helmet tracker system for use in the Eurofighter-Typhoon jet.
…The agreement signed with Saab in Sweden in June 2006 regarding the establishment of a new aerostructures company, led to Saab AB (publ) taking an initial minority equity stake and operational management control, with Denel retaining an 80% holding… At the close of the financial year Denel and German company Carl Zeiss Optronics GmbH agreed on an equity partnership for Denel Optronics. Denel was to retain a minority share with Carl Zeiss Optronics taking a majority holding of 70%. The effective transaction date was after year-end, with final share transfer on 20 July 2007. The company now trades as Carl Zeiss Optronics (Pty) Limited.”
May 17/07: Denel wins the $1.2 billion, 264-vehicle contract for the South African Army’s new generation “Hoefyster” infantry combat vehicle program. The goal is to produce an 8×8 wheeled APC in the 25 ton class, designed as a family of vehicles that can be equipped with various turret and on-board options. It is described as the biggest single contract in firm history. The vehicle will not be Denel’s, however, but Patria Oyj of Finland’s popular AMV.
April 2007: Denel’s missile/UAV subsidiary Denel Dynamics announces a joint development agreement with Brazil’s Ministry of Defence and Forca Aerea Brasileira for the A-Darter short range air-air missile (SRAAM), signed as a government to government agreement via South Africa’s Armscor. The original contract was apparently signed in July-August 2006, but the formal cooperation launch was announced at the 2007 Latin American Aerospace and Defence exhibition in Brazil.
Additional ReadingsPrecision artillery fire offers an alternative to air support. It has a shorter reach, but very considerable throw-weight and repeatable fire, plus 100% persistence and availability in any weather. GMLRS is a highly accurate GPS-guided rocket that can be fired by ground forces 35 miles away and arrive on target, in under a minute, under any conditions, with a 200 pound unitary warhead that will take out a fortified house. That’s very useful. When integrated into a battlefield surveillance/strike setup like Task Force ODIN, their effectiveness is kicked up several more notches. Rocket pods can be carried on M142 HIMARS truck-mounted systems (1 pod, 6 rockets), or tracked M270 MLRS launchers (2 pods, 12 rockets).
In July 2011, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Dallas, TX received a $438.2 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for Full Rate Production Lot VI. It includes:
They’ll go to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, as well as GMLRS pods for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers Japan, Jordan, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike last year, neither the Pentagon nor Lockheed Martin will discuss specific numbers of rocket pods per customer.
Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, TX; Camden, AZ; Orlando, FL; and Lufkin, TX, with an estimated completion date of April 30/14. One bid was solicited with one bid received by US AMCOM Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-11-C-0166). See also Lockheed Martin release.
UpdatesSeptember 15/16: The first units of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead rocket has rolled off Lockheed Martin’s production line. A company statement said the warhead was designed to engage the same target set and achieve the same area-effects requirement as the old MLRS submunition warhead, but without the lingering danger of unexploded ordnance. Lockheed received a US Army initial production contract for the warheads in June 2015.
May 24/16: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $331.7 million foreign military sales contract by the US Army. The sale will see the company provide the defense departments of Israel, Singapore, Finland and Jordan with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) which includes 290 alternative warhead rocket pods, 34 unitary rocket pods and 529 reduced range practice rocket pods. Work and delivery of the system is expected to be completed by March 31, 2018.
UkrOboronProm’s Mi-24PU1 attack helicopter. :
Raytheon’s Center Display unit:
Russia wants a “5th generation” fighter that keeps it competitive with American offerings, and builds on previous aerial and industrial success. India wants to maintain technical superiority over its rivals, and grow its aerospace industry’s capabilities. They hope to work together, and succeed. Will they? And what does “success” mean, exactly?
So far, preliminary cooperation agreements have been signed between Sukhoi/United Aircraft Corporation, for a platform based on Sukhoi’s T50/PAK-FA design. This DID FOCUS article consolidates specific releases and coverage to date, and adds analysis of the program’s current state and future hurdles.
The plane behind the project has taken on several names. The T50 may eventually become the SU-50, but for now it’s referred to as PAK-FA. The aircraft project is also known as FGFA (India: Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft), and PMF (Russia: Prospective Multirole Fighter). Key characteristics include:
Shaping: Some observers have tried to characterize the T50 as a copy. That’s a mistake. The PAK-FA’s first flight revealed a distinctively Russian stealth-driven configuration, which borrows from previous Sukhoi designs and priorities. The prototype has some clear stealth-limiting features, from fit quality, to features like Sukhoi’s standard spherical InfraRed Scan & Track (IRST) system mounted near the cockpit. Those may change in the production aircraft; meanwhile, a smaller tail, clear stealth shaping, and internal weapons carriage all indicate a strong push toward a stealthier plane.
The PAK-FA’s air intakes are set back from the leading edge root extensions (LERX), and one interesting wrinkle involves movable LERX shapes that come forward from the wings to join the aircraft body. This “PChN/ Movable LEX” feature apparently allows some of the maneuverability bonuses normally associated with canards on planes like the SU-30SM, SU-34, etc., but in a much lower profile design.
RT featureEngines: Reports concerning the fighter’s initial engines vary. Some sources contend that the engines used in its test flight are 5th generation engines, but most of them report that it is borrowing from the SU-35 program for now, until more advanced engines designed specifically for the plane can be fielded. Both descriptions could be correct. The SU-35S reportedly uses a heavily-upgraded and more reliable version of NPO Saturn’s AL-31F, named the Saturn 117S. It is said to offer over 30,000 pounds of thrust, with full 360 degree thrust vectoring, and is believed to equip initial PAK-FA fighters. The longer-term question is whether incremental 117S upgrades will let the aircraft reach its required “5th generation” performance levels, or whether the AL-41F project, which aims to use a new and improved engine core, will be able to replace the 117S in future.
Weapons: Russian reports cite carriage of 8 missile suspension points inside the fuselage, to match the F-22. While the Raptor has 2 body bays (with space-saving AVEL launchers) and 2 smaller side bays, the Russian plane is big enough to have 4 body bays and 2 side bays. Air-to-air weapons will certainly include the improved AA-11 (RVV-MD SRAAM) and AA-12 (RVV-SD MRAAM), but RIA Novosti adds that it has the ability to carry 2 ultra long range AAMs, presumably the 200-400 km Novator K-100-1. These “AWACS killers” are also intended for use on the SU-35, and their size may force the PAK-FA to carry them externally.
To date, the T50’s ground-attack weapon capabilities remain something of a mystery.
PAK-FA prototypeSensors: The PAK-FA’s advanced Tikhomirov AESA radar is still undergoing testing on other platforms, and its readiness could be important to the project. As is true of all 4+ generation Russian designs, the radar will be supplemented by an IRST that looks for the heat produced by engines and air friction. This allows long-range, no warning missile attacks, and offsets enemy advantages from radar stealth.
Another approach to offset enemy radar stealth involves L-band radars in the wing’s leading edges, to help the plane find other X-band optimized stealth fighters. The plane’s SH121 radar complex will reportedly add another 3 small X-band AESA radars around the front and sides of the aircraft, in order to provide full radar coverage. Harmonizing these features with stealth, and ensuring that they don’t become a maintenance nightmare, will be another important technical challenge for the new fighter.
The fighter’s biggest technical challenge will involve harmonizing all of these sensors into a single view for the pilot. Russia and India aren’t short on programming talent, but pilot ergonomics has been a long-standing weakness in Russian fighters, as western pilots found when they began flying East German MiG-29s. Good sensor fusion is a technically challenging task, especially if the goal is a system that can accommodate upgrades without ruinous expense. The talent is there, but both Russia and India have mixed histories trying to manage those kinds of military efforts.
Other Electronics: Sukhoi’s releases emphasize an advanced datalink that allows PAK-FA aircraft to share situational awareness, much like NATO’s “Link 16” standard. As the USAF has discovered, however, having other platforms share information with stealth aircraft, while retaining “low probability of intercept” to avoid giving the stealth aircraft’s positions away, is difficult. Russia and India will need to resolve that issue, or accept the operational limitations of a unique but incompatible datalink.
Test flightAll of these characteristics show a convergence of Russian design with leading-edge technologies. Russian 4+ generation fighter designs have always placed a premium on super-maneuverability, and so does the T50. Russian AESA radars are becoming service-ready, and the T50 looks set to be a key platform for their use. Engine improvements may even allow Mach 1+ supercruise if the T50’s weight can be kept down, and if Saturn can deliver on promised operational performance – but both of those “ifs” remain to be proven.
Once it becomes operational, this plane is expected to get the designation SU-50. The big question right now is how close it is to reaching that goal.
Development Timelines, Risks, & Differences of Opinion Defined Design? A Disagreement From YF-22 to F-22As of February 2014, 5 PAK-FA prototypes are flying, and 2 more are in ground test roles, which is short of the 8 that were expected to be available by the end of 2013. The “T3” prototype was the first to have the full avionics and radar suite, including the AESA radar. The plane is reportedly preparing for full operational trials in 2015, and VVS fielding in 2016-2017, but the history of stealth fighters justifies some caution about those dates.
In 2009, former Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. chairman Ashok Baweja took that caution several steps further, saying that that the current PAK-FA prototype and tests were only “proof of concept” level work. The Russians had already approved the design in 2008, so they clearly didn;t see things that way, but America’s F-22 program history made Baweja’s thesis plausible. The YF-22 prototype made quite a few modifications en route to its F-22A designation, over a period lasting several years. The Russian design has changed since 2009, including visible reinforcements to indicate a need for redesign in the wings and other areas. On the other hand, external design changes haven’t been much in evidence, and they continue to move forward with more advanced tests.
India’s low level of expertise designing advanced fighters, and the advanced nature of Russia’s project before India joined, both point toward a final FGFA design that’s much closer to the planes Russia is already flying.
Russian & Indian Timelines PAK-FA Mach flowDifferences of opinion re: the fighters’ readiness also express themselves in each side’s proposed timelines. Russia is focused on 2015-2016 production and 2017-2018 fielding, though senior officials acknowledge that full serial production won’t begin until 2020 – 2024.
Indian officials have pushed a timeline that’s up to 4-5 years longer, in order to develop many of the FGFA’s systems and make a long list of changes. As the cumulative cost and risk of their chosen course become apparent, however, they’re reducing their demands. A 2012 interview with Air Chief Marshal Browne suggests that India’s FGFAs will hew much more closely to Russia’s design, beginning with the current single-seat configuration instead of a new 2-seat layout. About 100 HAL engineers are already working on the project from a facility in Bangalore, and another contingent has moved to Russia to work in the Sukhoi design bureau.
That’s all well and good, but it’s 2014, and the joint R&D contract between Russian and India remains unsigned. Plenty of time remains for meddling, as India was expecting to receive prototypes in 2015, 2017, and 2018. India would still have to fund their own national program of FGFA (SU-50KI?) customization for the Indian air force by a joint team of Russian and Indian engineers. The difference is described as “mission hardware and software,” though it would be surprising if Indian bureaucrats’ fetish for “indigenization” was forced to stop there. Each prototype will be slightly different, creating an incentive for the military and political figures to press for additional changes and alternations.
If India’s FGFA R&D program can get underway in 2014, and if it progresses without major delays, a 2018 prototype would finalize the base configuration, and Indian development could end in 2019. Whereupon series manufacturing would begin at HAL in 2022.
Note the number of “ifs” required to meet even that target. Which will also have to contend with HAL’s known high-tech production industrial issues (vid. LCA Tejas & M-MRCA programs). They’ll need to be solved by the time FGFA production begins, because its manufacturing techniques are likely to be a step beyond anything HAL has attempted to date.
So much for the original plan of IAF service by 2017. If current dates hold true, India wouldn’t see operational serving FGFA fighters until 2025 at the earliest. At the same time, India’s planned FGFA buy is shrinking, from over 200 to around 144.
In a project of this nature, it’s par for the course for Russia and India to both end up being too optimistic in their initial schedules. There’s still more than enough room for that dynamic to happen within the revised schedules, as the project works through configuration, testing, and production issues. The history of modern fighters suggests that software could prove to be particularly troublesome.
Contracts & Key Events 2015 – 2016Sukhoi insists it will meet new 2016 production deadlines. Airshow demo
September 9/16: Russia’s Deputy Minister for Defense Yuri Borisov has said that the Sukhoi PAK-FA is ready for mass production with Moscow planning to acquire a squadron of aircraft in 2017. Equipped with advanced avionics and all-digital flight systems, the PAK-FA is set to become the first operational stealth aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces. An export version is expected to be available by 2025.
June 21/16: United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has announced that its Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA is now ready for mass production. According to Russian newspaper Izvestia, the fifth generation fighter almost fully meets the requirements of the military’s combat capabilities. UAC is also currently preparing a proposal to be submitted to the Russian Ministry of Defense on starting serial production.
December 11/15: The Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Boisov has said that testing of the PAK FA is nearly complete. The 5th generation fighter is intended to replace the Mig-29 and Su-27 currently currently in service. The fighter is part of a development partnership between Russian manufacturer Sukhoi and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The Indian Air Force may purchase 154 of the aircraft once they come into service in 2016. The PAK FA is set to rival the US made F-35 fighter, but holds a major export advantage in that it is much more cost effective.
August 27/15: Russia’s “fifth generation” Sukhoi PAK FA stealth fighter is to get the X-58USHK missile, which will reportedly reach mach 3.5. But the critical advantage the new combo would bring was expressed in the a Tass sub-headline: “The missile will be placed inside the fighter’s fuselage.” Thus the PAK FA – also called the T-50 – will remain stealthy, where the F-35’s weapons bay has grown even smaller on the new variants and most weapons will have to be mounted externally.
Feb 2/15: Agreement on production split. The Hindu reports that the main sticking point (who produces what) is settled between the Russians and the Indians. Up to now, the Indians were producing only 13 percent of the fighter, and none of the interesting technology bits. The agreed-upon split hasn’t been made public.
Feb 2/15: On (new) schedule. Originally slated for 2015 production, the PAK-FA, now being called the T-50 in press materials, is to be produced in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in 2016, according to company officials. There is no mention of an export market. India had already cut its order from 200 fighters to 144, but bureaucrats have also pushed back certification to 2019, after which production could be authorized. Complaints by the Indian Air Force in early 2014 may indicate some buyer’s remorse.
2014Negotiations with India turn tense, remain in limbo as Russia moves ahead; Better stealth than the F-22?
Oct 21/14: Sub-contractors. Russia’s Radio Electronic Technologies concern has provided the 1st batch of Himalayas internal electronic warfare systems for the new jet.
The Himalayas EW system was developed by RET’s Kaluga Scientific Research and Radio Technology Institute, and is manufactured at its Signal Radioplant in Stavropol. Sources: Defense World, “Russian T-50 Aircraft Gets Himalayas EW System”.
Sept 15/14: Negotiation. The Russians and Indians are saying different things to Defense News. “A “Russian diplomat in India” tells them they they “have finally sorted out all sticky issues that have been holding back an agreement,” adding that India’s workshare was eventually expected to increase from 13-18% to 40%. India’s MoD refused to confirm this, “especially those [issues] related to workshare between the two countries”.
We’ve seen enough programs involving India to be skeptics, even when Indian officials will confirm such stories. The magazine’s sources say that India and Russia will sign a final agreement on the program the end of 2014. Take that as the metric, and believe it when you see it. Sources: Defense News, “Indo-Russian Jet Program Finally Moves Forward”.
Aug 30/14: Tension. India isn’t pleased with the lack of response to its questions concerning the recent PAK-FA engine fire (q.v. June 10/14), NPO Saturn AL-41FI jet engine performance, Byelka AESA radar performance, the lack of permission for its pilots to fly the jet in Russia, and HAL’s low workshare. India’s lack of a firm development agreement is the 1-sentence argument for much of this situation, except for the engine fire question and HAL’s workshare.
HAL’s workshare has reportedly dropped from 25% to just 13%: tires, the VOR-DME basic navigation avionics, coolant for the radar, a laser designation pod and the head-up display. This list appears to justify analysis that HAL simply doesn’t yet have the capability to be a full partner in such a sophisticated aircraft, and may also be a function iof Indian dithering as Russia simply goes ahead and makes final decisions about the PAK-FA’s development..
Within HAL’s workshare, the Laser Designation pod itself is unlikely to come from India, but may be produced under license. Israel’s RAFAEL LITENING pods equip many Indian aircraft, including the SU-30MKI, but Eastern European and American pressure on Israel makes SU-50 integration tough to contemplate. Thales’ Damocles pod, which already equips Malaysia’s Su-30MKMs and would equip Indian Rafales, would be a more logical choice.
The real challenge here is twofold. One is the M-MRCA program, whose $10 billion cost growth really shrinks the overall room for PGF funding within India’s budgets. The related challenge is time, and “IAF sources told IHS Jane’s that this deadline [to begin Indian production in 2020 – 2021] would be missed by several years.” Sources: Daily Mail India, “India-Russia jet deal hits turbulence over ‘technical worries’ ” | IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Indian Air Force unhappy at progress of PAK-FA fifth-gen fighter”.
Aug 4/14: Negotiations. Still no firm production agreement re: the PAK-FA/ FGFA/ PMF, following the end of the initial engineering development contract in 2013. Russian sources continue to make hopeful noises, but at this point, it means very little until there’s a firm contract in place. Sources: Itar-Tass, “Sukhoi to sign another contract with India on FGFA”.
June 10/14: Fire. A commission will be investigating:
“Today after the regular test flight of the T-50 aircraft at the airfield of the M.M.Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky near Moscow, while the plane was landing, a smoke above the right air intake was observed, then a local fire broke out. The fire was quickly extinguished. The plane is to be repaired…. This incident will not affect the timing of the T-50 test program.”
The Moscow Times suggested that the damage might leave the plane out of action for a little while, as people reportedly: “…saw smoke and flame billow out of the front of the engine and [it] caused visible damage to the exterior of the aircraft.” Sounds like an engine issue. Maybe one day, we’ll know. Sources: Sukhoi, “Sukhoi’s message over the incident with the T-50 aircraft” | Moscow Times, “Russian Advanced Prototype Fighter Jet Erupts into Flames on Landing”.
Fire
Feb 21/14: Production version. Sukhoi announces that their production version will not be waiting until 2016, while the current set of 4 flying and 2 ground prototypes continue their work at Zhukovsky. In fact:
“Today the flight model of the prospective 5th — generation fighter aircraft (PAK-FA, T-50) arrived to the 929th Chkalov State Flight Test Centre’s airfield in Akhtubinsk for State Joint Tests…. The PAK FA tests program included aero-dynamic features evaluation, tests of stability and controllability and of dynamic strength, function check of on-board equipment and aircraft systems. Optical locator system as well as active electronically scanned array radar was tested on the aircraft with positive results obtained. Air refueling mode was tested. Supermaneuverability tests of the aircraft are under way. Aircraft systems are being tested on the test stands, ground experimental works continue.”
It’s still possible for hardware or software problems to make the delivery of 60 combat-capable aircraft an impossible goal by 2020, and Russian reports aren’t going to involve public accountability or discussion of test results. Even so, the Akhtubinsk arrival is embarrassing timing for War Is Boring’s same-day report. Sources: Sukhoi, “T-50-2 fighter aircraft made the flight to Akhtubinsk” | Russia & India Report, “Russian Air Force receives first FGFA T-50 fighter for tests”.
Feb 21/14: No mystery. “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery” wonders why Russia is buying SU-30MK2s, SU-30SMs and SU-35s, in addition to the future PAK-FA. It turns out that the answer is extremely simple: industrial priorities that bought up aircraft the Chinese stopped buying, took advantage of successful advanced SU-30MKx export developments, and aim to provide the SU-35 with a home country order base for potential exports. That sort of thing happens all the time, everywhere. The article ends up stinging itself with this quote re: the PAK-FA:
“The T-50’s schedule has stretched farther and farther to the right. Originally planned for handover to the air force’s Akhtubinsk flight test center for evaluation in 2014, recent announcements suggest this might now slip until the second half of 2016. This would derail plans to declare initial operational capability, and the start of full-scale production, at the end of 2016.
The best-case scenario would have seen 60 production T-50s delivered between 2016 and 2020, but this now seems a distant hope. As a result, the air force is badly in need of supplementary equipment.”
The 1st PAK-FA arrives in Akhtubinsk for testing that same day. Sources: War Is Boring, “Russia’s New Air Force Is a Mystery”.
Feb 7/14: Timelines. Russia and India are still negotiating the FGFA R&D contract, but India’s Chief of the Air Staff and Air Chief Marshal Norman Anil Kumar (A K) Browne tells the Press Trust of India that the 1st FGFA prototype will arrive in India this year, for testing at Ojhar AB, located NE of Mumbai. One imagines that he’s speaking on the basis of a draft R&D contract that would have Indian scientists and test pilots in Russia until the R&D phase is scheduled to end in 2019.
2022 is now given as the planned in-service date, as India slip farther and farther from the original plan of having these planes in service by 2017. That 2017 date was always a pipe dream, and even present dates depend on very large financial decisions being made very soon by an unpopular government, or by its electoral successor. It’s more realistic to assume that the draft R&D agreement won’t actually become a signed contract and disbursed funds until 2015 or later, with attendant effects on India’s schedule.
Meanwhile, Russia continues to develop the plane,m but even they are several years from serious fielding. Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) First Deputy Director Alexander Fomin is quoted as saying that testing and manufacturing ramp-ups will require: “At least… [6-10 years] before we build a sample of the fifth generation fighter plane and being its serial production.” Sources: Itar-Tass, “Russia fulfils FGFA obligations with India – Alexander Kadakin”.
Jan 21/14: India. India’s Air Force is directly criticizing the stealth fighter program, according to the minutes of a Dec 24/13 meeting chaired by secretary of defence production Gokul Chandra Pati:
“Business Standard has reviewed the minutes of that meeting. The IAF’s three top objections to the FGFA were: (a) The Russians are reluctant to share critical design information with India; (b) The fighter’s current AL-41F1 engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of the Sukhoi-30MKI’s AL-31 engines; and (c) It is too expensive. With India paying $6 billion to co-develop the FGFA, “a large percentage of IAF’s capital budget will be locked up.”
On January 15, the IAF renewed the attack in New Delhi, at a MoD meeting to review progress on the FGFA. The IAF’s deputy chief of air staff (DCAS), its top procurement official, declared the FGFA’s engine was unreliable, its radar inadequate, its stealth features badly engineered, India’s work share too low, and that the fighter’s price would be exorbitant by the time it enters service.
Top MoD sources suspect the IAF is undermining the FGFA to free up finances for buying 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for an estimated $18 billion, an acquisition that has run into financial headwinds because of budgetary constraints….”
Perhaps if India hadn’t structured its MMRCA competition to completely ignore the costs of the competing aircraft, this wouldn’t be happening. But they did, and it is. Sources: India’s Business Standard, “Russia can’t deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF”.
Jan 16/14: T-50 trolling. Rosoboronexport’s parent firm Rostec decides to troll the aviation world, with claims that the PAK-FA will have better stealth than the American F-22 Raptor:
“The average [radar cross section value] for the T-50 fighter is between 0.1 and 1 square meter…. the T-50 is now ahead of not only all other fighters of the Russian Army, but also foreign models. For example, the visibility of the American fifth-generation F-22 fighter is 0.3-0.4 square meters, according to PAK FA chief designer Alexander Davidenko.”
This means almost nothing. First, the Russian PAK-FA range includes values that are a closer match for the Eurofighter than the F-22. Second, Davidenko couldn’t know the F-22’s real production values without access to American flight test data, and there are rumors that it’s smaller than 0.3 m2. The third issue is production. Davidenko’s claims for the PAK-FA back existing assessments that it’s a legitimate stealth aircraft design, but production work affects final values for any plane. If it’s shoddy and alignment is poor, for instance, a design with RCS of 0.1 m2 could easily hit 1.0 m2 in reality. Russia is known for many things, including excellent and robust fighter designs, but precision work? Not so much. A real comparison would require test data from production aircraft (q.v. Nov 12/12 caveats), including different values from various angles, and their different success levels against different radar bands. That isn’t on offer for either plane.
Other points in the release are more informative, if true. Rostec says that composite materials are just 25% of the fighter’s weight, but cover 70% of its surface. A new power system design from Rostec’s Aviation Equipment provides double the amount of electrical power offered by previous Russian systems. We hope they have better luck than Boeing has, but that power will be needed by Radioelectronic Technologies’ new avionics and related systems. With respect to the plane’s biggest current deficit, UEC has an initial-model of the next-generation AL-41F1 thrust-vectoring engines installed in a prototype now, and Rostec is feeding general expectations that the AL-41 will give the new fighter supercruise capability. Sources: Rostec, “The T-50 Fighter will feature even greater stealth capabilities” | Air & Cosmos, “Le T-50 russe serait plus furtif que le F-22”.
2013Test flights, incl. the new 5th prototype; Negotiations and tensions with India.
T50, incoming
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Oct 28/13: #5. Sukhoi flies the 5th T50 prototype at its Y.A.Gagarin KnAAZ aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Once it finishes local flight tests, the aircraft will join the program flight tests at Zhukovsky, near Moscow.
Sukhoi pegs the number of flights to date at “more than 450”, with another 2 planes are involved in ground tests as a complex ground stand and static testing platform, respectively. Sources: Sukhoi release, Oct 28/13.
Oct 21/13: Indian complaints. Aviation Week reports that India is dissatisfied with their development workshare, in a project they came op late and close to lockdown on their partner’s side, and for which they have only recently managed to produce anything resembling their specifications (q.v. April 10/13):
“We have a major opportunity in the FGFA program,” Indian air force (IAF) Deputy Chief Air Marshal S. Sukumar says. However, “at the moment [the 15% development share] is not very much in favor of Indian development. We are flagging it through the government. It should be much more focused towards indigenous development capability.”
The problem is that 4 Russian T50 prototypes have performed about 450 test flights since January 2010, and the VVS plans to begin inducting the fighter in 2015-2016. Even if they’re a year late, it doesn’t leave much room for development. That would have required fast decisions to begin the contract early, when the design was still in need of refinement.
India’s desires and its modus operandi are in conflict once again, and the question is whether the dichotomy will become a stumbling block in negotiations for the final $11 billion system development contract. At this point, the only way to square that circle would be to increase the number of differences between the Russian and Indian fighters, or to involve India in developing the “Block 10” next iteration of a fighter whose core technologies are already a big stretch for Indian firms. Either approach would drive up overall costs for the contract under negotiation (q.v. July 15/13), and add substantial risk to India’s plans to begin manufacturing at HAL in 2022 – itself a problematic proposition, given HAL’s record. Sources: Aviation Week, “India Concerned About Fifth-Gen Fighter Work Share With Russia”.
Oct 18/13: Aircraft issues. An article in The Aviationist looks at issues with the PAK-FA, which don’t get the same exposure as western projects with their public oversight. Piotr Butowski of the Polish Magazyn Lotnictwo notes that:
“…the plane still suffers from the strict g-limits…. The plane underwent a modernization in the Sukhoi facility on the Polikarpov Street in Moscow Dec. 2012 and May 2013. The airframe was reinforced according to the flight tests and static tests that were already carried out; many new [metal strip] overlays can be seen on the airplane’s surface.”
Problems and modifications aren’t abnormal. The 1st PAK-FA prototype has structural cracks in 2011, and the 2nd had an engine flameout cancel its public MAKES 2011 air show performance. Sources: The Aviationist, “Russia’s most advanced fighter jet’s troublesome childhood”.
July 15/13: India Delays. The FGFA project’s parameters may be set (q.v. April 10/13), but there’s a problem with the R&D deal, which was pegged at $11 billion equivalent. The Times of India:
“Defence ministry sources said the inking of the final design and R&D contract for the stealth fighter has been hit by a huge delay, with Russia also jacking up costs for the futuristic project. “It’s very unlikely the FGFA final design contract will be concluded in the 2013-2014 fiscal,” said a source. “The timeframes will now have to be revised. MoD has established a committee of specialists and finance officials to verify the rise in costs. An internal contract negotiation committee is also in progress…”
Russia isn’t going to wait, and will continue development of their version while they wait for India’s signature. Operational testing is slated to begin in 2014. If FGFA negotiations stretch into 2015, the net effect will be to severely delay India’s variant, even as the base Russian design becomes more and more firmly set.
April 25/13: VVS flight. The Russian air force’s (VVS) Chkalov Flight Test Center begins flying the PAK-FA prototypes, with a 2-hour flight from the M.M. Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovsky (Moscow region).
At present, Sukhoi has 4 flying test planes, which are mostly flown by company test pilots, and 2 ground test planes. Sukhoi.
April 10/13: India. Sukhoi announces that the parameters for their joint FGFA project with India are set:
“The contract to develop a sketch and technical project of the Russian-Indian perspective multi-functional 5th-generation fighter (PMI/FGFA) was completed. The fighter design was fully developed. The both parties have agreed upon on the amount and division of work during the research and development (R&D) stage. A contract for the R&D is being prepared. It is to be signed this year.”
March 1/13: Plans & Schedule. High-level Russian and Indian sources offer a bit more clarity concerning dates, but they seem to be at odds regarding electronics.
Russian VVS commander Gen. Victor Bondarev expects weapons release trials to begin in 2013, as the number of aircraft rises from 4 – 8. If tests go well, the fighter could enter series production in late 2015 or early 2016. Based on past fighter programs, that may be a bit optimistic.
Meanwhile, IAF chief of staff Air Marshall N.A.K. Browne is expecting to sign the big design & development contract for the FGFA in 2013. They’ll receive 3 developmental prototypes in India in 2015, 2017 and then 2018, rather than the wider 2014-2019 window reported earlier. That SDD version would apparently be fully common between Russia and India, making Pogosyan (vid. Feb 7/13) correct to that point. India would then fund, as a separate project, FGFA (SU-50KI?) customization for the Indian air force by a joint team of Russian and Indian engineers. The difference is described as “mission hardware and software,” though it would be surprising if Indian bureaucrats’ fetish for “indigenization” was forced to stop there. Series manufacturing would begin at HAL in 2022.
If true, it means that India wouldn’t see operational serving FGFA fighters until 2025 at the earliest, and that’s only if HAL’s known industrial issues with high-tech production are fully solved by 2022. AIN.
Feb 7/13: Avionics. At Aero India 2013, Obedinnoe Avaitstroitel’noi Corporatsii (United Aircraft Corp.) President Mikhail Pogosyan says that the new fighter will “have a single set of on-board equipment [cockpit avionics],” as a requirement of the Indian Air Force. He adds that India’s fighters will also share the Russian single-seat configuration.
Both of those statements would represent major changes from India. India’s initial plans involved a 2-seat variant that would follow the example of programs like the SU-30MKI, and create a unique cockpit avionics set that used equipment from Indian companies and foreign vendors. If Pogosyan is correct, India has backtracked toward a standard type configuration, and joint funding of upgrades. UPI.
2012India’s timeline keeps falling back, as it cuts plans to 144 jets; No SU-50 for ROKAF; Prototype #4 flies; AESA radar testing begins.
#T2 lands
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Dec 12/12: #4 flies. The 4th prototype takes flight at the snowy Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association (KnAAPO). UAC.
Nov 12/12: RCS guess. Airpower Australia uses public-domain photos coupled with the Physical Optics (PO) method for predicting the Radar Cross Section of complex targets on Russia’s T50, using VisCam View software to produce a PolyChromatic Spherical Representation (PCSR). Without flight test data, it’s still a guess, but it’s a kind of guess that Moore’s Law has made available outside of large intelligence agencies.
Their guess? It won’t match the F-22, or even China’s J-20, but if they introduce a rectangular faceted design to the engine nozzles and add radar absorbent coatings, they might beat the F-35. Sources: Airpower Australia, “A Preliminary Assessment of Specular Radar Cross Section Performance in the Sukhoi T-50 Prototype” | WIRED Danger Room, “Russia’s Stealth Fighter Could Match U.S. Jets, Analyst Says”.
Oct 9/12: During an interview with India Strategic, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne confirms that HAL has committed $6 billion to joint development. Plans have changed, and India’s 144 planned FGFAs will all be single seaters, now, hewing much more closely to the Russian baseline. In the same vein as India’s SU-30 MKIs, however, they’ll have some avionics and integration differences. According to the ACM Browne:
“… the first prototype is likely to be delivered to India in 2014 followed by two more in 2017 and 2019. The series production then “will only be ordered based on the final configuration and performance of the third prototype.”
See: India Strategic | IANS.
Aug 19/12: Even later to India. Reports now indicate that the 1st FGFA prototype flight tests should start in India in 2014, with deliveries to the Indian Air Force by 2022, a full ten years from now. This would be the start of a $30+ billion, 250 plane program over the next decade, at roughly $100 million each.
Closer to the present, Russia and India are reportedly finalizing the research and development phase at $11+ billion, split evenly between the two parties. Business Standard | AviationWeek.
Aug 8/12: Radar. Sukhoi announces that they’ve begun flight tests of the PAK-FA’s Tikhomirov “active phased array radar system” in both air-to-air and air-to-surface test modes. Initial trials toward flight refueling also take place this month. Sukhoi | The DEW Line | RIA Novosti.
May 14/12: Late to India. India is already backtracking on service dates for its FGFA variant of Sukhoi’s T50, bringing them closer to predictions made by outside observers years ago. M M Pallam Raju has moved the plane’s certification and production start date from 2017 back to 2019. Close examination shows that 2020 or beyond is more likely.
India’s Business Standard also highlights a number of areas that aren’t settled, where ongoing specifications changes and/or technical problems may end up delaying the fighter and send India’s costs skyrocketing. India reportedly wants 40-45 design changes to the current PAK-FA, including its own avionics and a “360 degrees” AESA radar. That last requirement is likely to involve AESA “cheek fairings” that need to maintain aircraft stealth levels, a tailcone radar, and the internal computing and software required to fuse all of those radars into a single picture. They also want at least 2,000 hours of certification flying, and possible configuration changes in light of tests. India now expects their fighters to prepare for service no earlier than 2019, and if the IAF fields a 2-seat version, it’s likely to take even longer. All of India’s changes add 3 types of risk.
One is technical risk. India’s history is littered with overly ambitious projects that India’s Ministry of Defense and associated state-run agencies approved, but could not execute. The cutting-edge nature of the FGFA project magnifies those risks, even with Sukhoi’s assistance.
The 2nd risk is cost risk. Sukhoi’s help, and the associated design, production, and testing of new FGFA equipment, won’t come for free. The more changes India makes, the more the project will cost them. Russia isn’t going to pick up the tab for changes to a design their air force has already approved, and even the “Tactical Technical Agreement” that specified Indian changes isn’t going to mean much if costs become a problem. Russia has forcibly renegotiated critical defense contracts with India several times, and won’t hesitate to do so again.
The 3rd risk is schedule risk. Since Russia is focused on fielding the current single-seat configuration in its current form, while India is focused on major configuration changes and is still debating a 2-seat variant, both of those timelines could turn out to be true. Russia could wind up fielding SU-50 squadrons several years before India even finishes development. India’s Business Standard.
Jan 29/12: Korea: No PAK-FA. The Korea Times quotes a DAPA spokesman, who confirms the potential F-X-III competitors:
“No Russian firm submitted an application to attend the program’s explanatory session, which was a prerequisite to participate, by the Friday registration deadline,” a spokesman of DAPA said. He noted that a representative from Swedish company Saab, which has been searching for additional export orders for its Gripen multirole fighters, successfully filed an application for the mandatory session along with Boeing, Lockheed Martine [sic] and EADS.”
This means that the Indo-Russian PAK-FA will not be part of the $7+ billion competition, despite reports (vid. July 20/11) that it was intending to participate, just as Russian disinterest kept the SU-35 out of F-X-2.
2011Prototypes #2 & 3 fly; Testing flameout; South Korean opportunity?
PAK-FA: takeoff!
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Dec 22/11: #3 flies. First flight of the 3rd PAK-FA prototype from Sukhoi’s KNAAPO aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Sukhoi.
Sept 6/11: Exports? Russia & India Report highlights an analysis by Russia’s unofficial Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT), which takes a look at potential buyers of the PAK-FA’s export version. They see a potential for 274-388 export units beyond India or states that spun out of the Soviet Union, like Kazakhstan et. al. Their projections for possible buyers, and their projected purchasing periods, include:
Aug 24/11: Flameout. Flight International conveys NPO Saturn general director Ilya Federo’s explanation of the MAKS 2011 failure:
“The motor did not fail – in fact, it was put by erroneous control input into a wrong mode that caused the surge. This is not an engine failure, but the wrong data input caused by a malfunctioning sensor feeding data to the flight control system. After what had happened the motor was checked [and] the malfunctioning sensor was replaced by a good one. Today, there is no issue with this engine.”
Aug 22/11: Flameout. After performing a basic fly-over with the PAK FA, Sukhoi intended to close Russia’s MAKS 2011 air show with a bang – and did, sort of. The pilot of its second prototype PAK-FA/T50-2 was forced to abort his take-off run, and the planned flying routine, after 2 bursts of flame erupted from the right engine.
The show’s organizers compounded the embarrassment by promising that the 1st prototype would fly instead – but it was not on site, and is believed to be in maintenance following its Aug 17/11 demonstration. Flameout: Flight International (incl. flame burst picture) | India’s Open magazine | China’s Xinhua || Appearance: Moscow Times | Pravda | RIA Novosti | Voice of Russia | Reuters | UPI | WSJ Emerging Europe blog | op-ed – Right-wing Heritage Foundation, USA.
July 20/11: PAK-FA for South Korea? As South Korea’s DAPA eases the criteria to try and foster more competition, DAPA’s Col. Wi Jong-seong says that “Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi expressed its intent to compete in the fighter jet procurement project early this year.” The report quotes him as saying that Sukhoi’s T50 PAK-FA will be up against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, and EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon. Assuming we don’t have an F-X-2 repeat, where all competitors but one drop out.
At this point, FX-III is being touted as a 60 jet buy of high-end fighters, with a budget of 8.29 trillion won ($7.86 billion). Eurofighter reportedly offered a better deal than the F-15K in F-X-2, but lost. The firm recently proposed to phase in Korean assembly for Phase III, with the 1st 10 made in Europe, the next 24 using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea. Korea Times.
March 3/11: #2 flies. Russia’s 2nd PAK-FA fighter prototype successfully completes its 1st test flight in Russia’s Far East region of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Note that China’s Xinhua cites local reports dated Feb 23/11, but Sukhoi’s release pegs the date at March 3/11.
UAC’s Mikhail Pogosyan adds that they expect to have a fleet of 3 test aircraft by year end, and says the existing jets have now made 40 flights since last January to test the model’s aero-dynamic characteristics and electronics. Beyond that, Pogosyan tells Russian media that the Indian Air Force will “acquire 50 single-seater fighters of the Russian version” before their 2-seat FGFA is developed. If true, it would go a long way toward ensuring that India meets its 2017 induction target. On the Russian end, plans are to purchase the first batch with existing engines, buying the first 10 aircraft after 2012 and then 60 after 2016. Russia’s Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies director Ruslan Pukhov predicts that Vietnam will be the 2nd export customer for the fighter. Sukhoi | Russia’s Pravda | China’s Xinhua.
Feb 9/11: With Aero India 2011 underway, Sukhoi offers some additional details regarding the December 2010 agreement with India:
“This is the first of a series of documents governing the obligations of the parties at different stages of the program. The PMF project includes the design and development of a next-generation fighter, which will have such advanced features as stealth, supersonic cruise speed, high maneuverability, highly integrated set of avionics, an advanced warning system about the situation, the internal deployment of weapons and the possibility of a centralized reporting and electronic warfare system. The fighter is being developed on the basis of the Russian perspective aviation complex (PAK FA) according to stringent technical requirements of the Indian side. The further development of the program envisages design and development of a two-place version of the aircraft and integration of an advanced engine with increased thrust. The two sides are supposed to cooperate in joint marketing of the complex in other countries.”
Feb 9/11: India. Indian defence minister AK Antony reiterates their target of a 2017 induction for the FGFA. India’s defense procurement history suggests that they’re unlikely to make it. Time will tell. Sukhoi.
20101st flight; Russian air force plans; Contract with India.
Sukhoi PAK-FA: 1st flight
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Dec 20/10: Contract. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reportedly signs a set of defense and nuclear agreements in India, including the FGFA development contract. Details remain sketchy. Bloomberg | BBC.
Dec 16/10: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Chairman Ashok Nayak tells Russia’s RIA Novosti that Russia and India have agreed on key features of the design contract for their joint fifth-generation fighter project. The cost of preliminary design is estimated at $295 million, with work expected to be complete within 18 months. The partnership will develop both a single-seat and a twin-seat version of the aircraft by 2016, focusing on the single-seat version in the initial stages of development.
Nayak said the contract could be signed by the representatives of India’s HAL and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) during a visit by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to India on December 20-22. RIA Novosti.
Development contract
Nov 30/10: The right-wing American Heritage Foundation think tank releases an analysis of the Russia program and its implications: “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America“.
July 23/10: Testing. Sukhoi’s KnAAPO issues a release saying that:
“Sukhoi Company has completed the preliminary on-land and in-flight activities which involved all 3 engineering prototypes of the Frontline Aviation Advanced Airborne Complex (PAK FA)… These prototypes were used for testbed strength tests, on-land optimization of fuel systems and other work towards flight trials. The flying prototype has made 16 flights… enables execution of a complete program of flight trials… Vladimir Popovkin, the Russian Defense Minister First Deputy, in his interview to the Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper estimated the Russian Air Force’s demand for the 5th-generation fighters at 50 to 100 units. It is planned to complete all tests of the PAK FA airframe in 2011-2012, and to sign a contract in 2013 for a pilot lot of ten aircraft for testing the model’s entire weapons suite.”
July 13/10: Russia. RIA Novosti quotes senior Russian figures. Russian Air Force chief Col. Gen. Alexander Zelin confirms the expected delivery dates of over 60 planes, which they hope to begin in 2015-16, but equipped with older, “non-fifth” generation engines from existing SU-30 family planes.
“Deputy Defense Minister for Arms Procurement Vladimir Popovkin said the Defense Ministry would purchase the first 6 to 10 aircraft after 2012, based on the outcome of initial tests… The prime minister said 30 billion rubles (around $1 billion) had already been spent on the project and another 30 billion would be required to complete it, after which the engine, weaponry and other components would be upgraded.”
April 2010: Testing. The 1st flying prototype of the fighter, and the avionics testbed used for systems optimization before flight trials, are delivered to the flying test center of the OKB Sukhoi Experimental Design Bureau in Zhukovsky, near Moscow. On April 29/10, the flying prototype begins preliminary tests. Source.
March 29/10: Welcome to the new world of intelligence, where a pair of YouTube videos appear to provide insights into PAK-FA technologies. Veteran aviation journalist Bill Sweetman reports that:
“…the video highlights a new honeycomb core material designed for high temperatures. It also states that the T-50 will have no fewer than five radar arrays: the 1500-module forward active electronically scanned array (AESA), two side-facing X-band sub-arrays and two “decimetric” (L-band) arrays in the leading-edge root extensions. It also states that the goal is to fight the F-22 by closing within visual range. Another new video shows a novel inlet radar blocker… It uses flexible vanes with a rotating ring at the rear end: in the “stealth regime” it provides extensive blockage, but it clears the airflow when it doesn’t matter or you need full speed or power.”
Late March 2010: Testing. Acceptance trials of the flying prototype are fully completed. Source.
March 16/10: Russia. In “The future of the Russian Air Force: 10 years on“, RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik discusses planned buys and pending recapitalization of the Russian Air Force over the next decade:
“According to various media reports, the Ministry wants to buy at least 1,500 aircraft, including 350 new warplanes, by 2020. The fleet would include 70% new equipment at that point, said Air Force Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Alexander Zelin… The Defense Ministry has now signed contracts for the purchase of 32 Su-34 Fullback advanced fighter-bombers to be delivered by 2013, 48 Su-35 Flanker-E fighters by 2015, 12 Su-27SM Flanker-B Mod. 1 fighters by 2011, 4 Su-30M2 Flanker-C planes by 2011 and 12 Su-25UBM Frogfoot combat trainers. This year, the Defense Ministry intends to sign a contract for the delivery of 26 MiG-29K Fulcrum-D fighters by 2015. Additional contracts for the delivery of at least 80 Su-34s and 24-48 Su-35s are expected to be signed. In all, the Russian Air Force is to receive 240-260 new aircraft of these types. It is hard to say much about the specifications of another 100-110 aircraft, due to be manufactured primarily after 2015. They will probably include 25-30 MiG-35 fighters, another 12-16 Su-30 combat trainers for Su-35 squadrons and 40-60 Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Advanced Frontline Aviation Aircraft System) fifth-generation fighters…”
Feb 12/10: Testing. The PAK-FA prototype reportedly makes its 2nd flight at Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Times Now | RT .
Feb 6/10: Some aviation watchers ask “How long has the PAK-FA or T50 been flying?” They believe that the first prototype may have flown before January 2010, and that there may be more than 1 prototype, based on differences in available photos.
Jan 29/10: Fly! The first prototype PAK-FA fighter lifts off from KNAAPO’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur facility for a 47 minute flight, piloted by Sukhoi test-pilot Sergey Bogdan. Sukhoi says that the plane met all expectations. Sukhoi JSC release | NPO Saturn release [in Russian] | Russia 1 TV video | Pravda | RIA Novosti | Times of India | Aviation Week | Defense News | Agence France Presse | BBC | Canadian Press | Washington Post | China’s Xinhua | Aviaiton Week’s Bill Sweetman: Preliminary Analysis.
1st PAK-FA flight
Jan 6/10: India’s Business Standard covers the workshare and capability issues that have must be addressed before production contracts and arrangements can be finalized. The project is currently expected to have development costs of $8-10 billion, and Russia and Sukhoi have already made substantial investments.
The crux of the negotiations revolves around HAL’s designated development workshare, and the areas it will be applied to. On the other side of the table, the Russian United Aircraft Corporation is wary of India’s lack of design credentials, coupled with the cutting-edge nature of this project. HAL is intent on a 25% share, to include the mission computer and critical software (building on Indian SU-30MKI work), navigation systems, cockpit displays, counter-measures dispensing (CMD) systems, composites expertise and production to complement Russia’s titanium expertise, and modifying Sukhoi’s single-seat design into a twin-seat fighter for the IAF. HAL’s Chairman Ashok Baweja seems to have a different view of the fighter’s design state, referring to existing prototypes as “proof of concept” items rather than nearly final designs.
Once the 2 sides come to a firm agreement on issues of design and funding, UAC and HAL will sign a General Contract, and set up a joint venture to design and build the aircraft. That has not happened yet, while Sukhoi has continued to push forward with general design, and has produced a prototype aircraft. Business Standard describes India’s workshare as “almost finalised,” but as we’ve seen with other Indian procurements, that doesn’t necessarily mean anything.
Jan 3/10: Rollout. Reports surface that the first prototype of Russia’s PAK-FA aircraft has rolled out on the runway at KNAAPO’s plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, but did not fly. The test pilot reportedly switched on the engines and made 2 runs on the airstrip, while testing the brakes.
Russia’s vice premier Sergei Ivanov had promised that tests would commence in December 2009-January 2010, and the Russian Air Force reportedly plans to induct the fighter beginning from 2015. DNA India.
2008 – 2009Russia – India MoU signed; Russia approves their version’s design; Exports could be a challenge.
PAK-FA: early concept
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Oct 9/09: India. The Indian Ministry of Defence issues a release regarding the 9th meeting of the Russia-India Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation on Oct 14-15/09:
“Among the major new projects which will be high in priorities of the Indian agenda for bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries, will be projects for joint design and development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and of the Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA). The co-development and co-production of the FGFA with Sukhoi Design Bureau Russia has been progressing, with several rounds of discussion already completed to finalize the technical requirements. During discussions in the meeting of the Commission, Shri Antony would highlight New Delhi’s interest in ensuring that the development phase of the FGFA is completed by 2016, as originally anticipated and that induction of the aircraft into the IAF can start by 2017.”
See also: Times of India.
Aug 28/09: Radar. Tikhomirov’s NIIP reportedly exhibits models of the PAK-FA’s active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Tikhomirov reportedly says the AESA antenna entered bench testing in November 2008, and was mated with the radar’s other blocks for an initial integration test “this summer,” with a 2nd radar produced by mid-2010 for integration with the operational prototype aircraft.
The Milaz report adds that Sukhoi will complete 5 prototypes for initial testing, including 2 to be dedicated for ground test activities. Initial trials are scheduled for completion in 2011-12, with the company expecting to produce an initial batch of aircraft for operational trials by 2015.
April 16/09: Exports? Forecast International offers a cautionary market assessment of the FGFA:
“…with the PAKFA program under increasing tension and the West’s major aerospace firms seeking to shore up additional orders for soon to be closed fourth-generation aircraft production lines, Russia faces the prospect of declining presence in the world’s most high sought after arms markets… Faced with the considerable research & development costs associated with developing a new, advanced fighter platform, Russia is seeking to both distribute costs and ensure that a viable export market will exist… Sukhoi, is reported to have already invested as much as $115 million in company capital…
Several factors are working against the Rosoboronexport’s attempts replicate the international cost/production-sharing development model implemented for the F-35, which is expected to become the dominant fighter in the fifth-generation market… the unproven status of the PAKFA… its timeline for delivery its far behind its western competitors. Deliveries of the PAKFA are not anticipated to begin until 2017. Finally, as production of the Eurofighter Typhoon and Lockheed Martin F-35 ramp up, the western aerospace firms currently producing advanced variants of fourth-generation aircraft are likely to push hard to gain additional order to extend production lines.”
Aug 8/09: RIA Novosti quotes the chief of the Russian Air Force, Alexander Zelin, from the MAKS-2009 arms show. Zelin says there are problems with the PAK-FA’s proposed new engines, and:
“For the time being the aircraft will use Saturn engines. There are problems, I admit, but research is continuing.”
Dec 29/08: MoU. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) sign the deal to jointly develop and produce a 5th generation fighter aircraft. HAL Chairman Ashok K Baweja:
“We (HAL and UAC) are moving forward as per schedule. We (have) just done the general contract yesterday. I went to Delhi and signed the general contract.”
According to reports, Russia and India will simultaneously develop 2 versions of the aircraft: a 2-seat version for India, and a single seat version for the Russian Air Force. India Defence.
India – Russia MoU
Sept 29/08: India Today magazine reports that the Russian and Indian designs for the FGFA project will differ somewhat, while efforts continue to define India’s participation in a project that has reportedly already had its design frozen by Sukhoi. HAL Chairman Ashok Baweja is quoted as saying that the Indian aircraft will be a 2-seat aircraft, which changes some aspects of design and has an especial impact on stealth unless carefully managed. Bajewa added that both stealth and supercruise capabilities were expected for the aircraft, adding that both sides were closer to a real agreement defining India’s participation, almost a year after the original cooperation memo was signed. India’s capabilities in composite materials manufacturing was mentioned as a possible basis for industrial participation.
Meanwhile, Russia’s the United Aircraft Corporation President Alexey Fedorov says that the single-seat T50 is set to fly in Russia in 2009 as planned; Bajewa adds that it will be powered by an ALF-31 FP engine.
The most interesting quote was Indian Air Vice Marshal Kak’s, who noted that the opportunity to gain from being part of the design process was gone, and added that “…if we have missed out on the design phase, we have to analyse the cost-benefits of acquiring only super cruise and stealth technology for $10 billion.”
A fair question. One likely to be asked in the political realm as well, when the time comes to finalize the agreement. Which leads to the corollary questions: How important each aspect is to the IAF? And where, if anywhere, might enough of these performance benefits be acquired at less cost?
Summer 2008: Design approval. The fighter’s initial design is approved in Russia, and the prototype blueprints are delivered to the KNAAPO aircraft building company based in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Source.
Russia approves design
April 3/08: RIA Novosti reports that Russia plans to begin flight tests of a new fifth-generation fighter based on Sukhoi’s PAK FA project in 2009.
Feb 28/08: HAL explains some of the timelines facing the FGFA program. HAL Chairman Ashok Baweja explains the process, which is also the set of implicit points of failure where the project can become stalled or canceled:
“We have only signed an Inter-governmental Agreement which agrees to cooperate in developing the FGFA. Now from that will flow the project report, general contract, the structure of the company that will be set up, and where the funding will come from. An aircraft design, development, certification, the complete entity with its power plant, systems, weapons, trials, is a process which takes 15 years to be completed.”
2004 – 2007India signs key agreement, but it isn’t finalized.
India’s SU-30 MKIs
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Nov 6/07: India. Issues and rifts may be developing between India and Russia over the FGFA contract, which still lacks key signatories. Defense News reports that key difference include the design’s level of finalization (India wants more input and hasn’t finalized requirements, Russia says the design is final), India’s monetary share (HAL says $2 billion, agreement suggests $5-6 billion), and other issues. The Defense News report does claim that Sukhoi’s secret PAK-FA/ I-21/ T50 design has been selected as the foundation.
The first prototype of the aircraft is reportedly projected to be test-flown by 2015, but the number of aircraft to be built remains among the unsettled issues, and the 2 state-owned firms (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. & Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau) have not signed any agreements yet.
All of these things are solvable by negotiations, of course, but that means the partnership is still effectively in negotiations, rather than a final deal.
Oct 18/07: India and Russia sign an Intergovernmental Agreement for joint development and joint production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). The agreement was signed in Moscow, Russia at the conclusion of the 7th Meeting of the India- Russia Intergovernmental Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation.
India’s Defence Minister Mr. AK Antony and his Russian counterpart Mr. Anatoly Serdyukov also signed a Protocol which envisages a ‘new strategic relationship’ based on greater interaction at various operational levels. The two countries have agreed to strengthen and expand relations in all areas, especially in the areas of more frequent joint exercises and greater R&D cooperation. Talks with Russia to extend the 2000 Military Cooperation Agreement beyond 2010 have now begun, and Antony also expressed hope that the two countries would soon sign an Intergovernmental Agreement on co-development and co-production of Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MRTA). The India MoD release adds:
“The Defence Minister described the Agreement on FGFA as a ‘major landmark’ and said that the Indo-Russian relationship is on a trajectory to reach new heights. He Mr. Antony expressed satisfaction at the outcome of discussions on other important projects e.g., supply and licensed production of T-90 tanks, SU-30 MKI aircraft and other strategic issues. He admitted that there has been a delay in the delivery of the repaired and refurbished aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov along with supply of deck-based fighter aircraft MiG-29K and said it was decided that some more studies by technical groups would be done to go through the details. He appreciated the efforts made by the Russian side to resolve issues relating to life cycle support of equipment of Russian origin.”
Inter-Governmental Agreement
Aug 29/07: India. India’s MoD issues a familiar release, in response to renewed questions:
“Co-development of a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft has been identified as an important area of cooperation between the Indian and Russian Government. Technical discussions to work out the details are in progress. Efforts are on for finalizing the draft Inter Governmental Agreement in this regard. This information was given by the Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh in a written reply to Shri Gurudas Dasgupta and Shri CK Chandrappan in Lok Sabha today.”
March 1/07: India. “Advanced Combat Aircraft” release from India’s Minister of State for Defence Production Shri Rao Inderjit Singh:
“The co-development of a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft has been identified as an important area of cooperation between the Indian and Russian governments. Technical discussions to work out the details are in progress. Efforts are on for negotiations and finalization of the draft Inter-Governmental Agreement in this regard.”
Dec 10/04: The new fighter’s exterior design is approved. Source.
Russia’s SU-27/30 Flanker family fighters were invented in the 1980s and 1990s, and attempted to incorporate the lessons from America’s 4th generation “teen series” fighters (F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18) into their designs. They were successful, and India’s Air Force may now be flying the world’s second best air superiority fighter in the SU-30MKI. The MKI, and European designs like the Eurofighter, Rafale, and JAS-39 Gripen, are typically referred to as “4+ generation” aircraft.
The term “fifth generation” fighter is part marketing hype, and partly based in reality. There are no objective criteria for this designation, and very few examples, which means it’s mostly applied based on when the development of a front-line, advanced fighter begins. There are a few general constants on the American side: some level of stealth, and internal weapon carriage to maintain it; arrays of embedded sensors within the airframe’s structure, rather than as bolt-ons; and sensor fusion into single displays. On the other hand, level of application varies for each category, and key capabilities like super-maneuverability and supercruise (Mach 1+ without using fuel-guzzling afterburners) have not been constants.
F-22, bays openThe USA’s “5th generation” F-22A Raptor offers full stealth, supermaneuverability, an advanced AESA radar, huge computing power that creates a single “sensor fusion” picture from the plane’s array of embedded sensors and datalinks, and the ability to “supercruise” above Mach 1 instead of just making short supersonic dashes. It is operated by the USAF, and just over 190 aircraft will constitute America’s entire fleet. America has refused to export it, despite interest from very close allies.
To a lesser extent, there’s also the cheaper F-35 Lightning II, with some stealth, a smaller AESA radar, sensor fusion, and even more computing power and sensors embedded around the aircraft. It lacks supercruise or super-maneuverability, and will be produced for domestic use and export in Air Force, Marines/STOVL, and Navy variants.
Russia’s MiG 1.44 (if indeed it was a real project?) and/or “I-21” type aircraft were early attempts to keep up with the Americans, but lack of funds suspended both efforts.
The obvious solution was a foreign partner, but Europe had limited funds, and had invested in its own 4+ generation projects: Dassault’s Rafale, EADS’ Eurofighter, and Sweden’s Gripen. India, on the other hand, has a long-standing defense relationship with Russia, and the funds to pursue advanced projects. From their point of view, a joint development agreement is one way to restrict Russian cooperation with China along similar lines. See Vijiander K Thakur’s “Understanding IAF interest in the MiG fifth generation fighter” for more background.
Until similar aspects of the Russian design became clear, however, it was impossible to know exactly what Russia and India meant by “5th generation.” Some of those ambiguities were resolved when Russia unveiled its T50 demonstrators.
Appendix B: DID Analysis – Under Pressure (2008) The competition?If there’s one watchword to use for this deal, it’s “pressure.” Russia has been putting pressure on India lately to remain a customer, by giving China export rights to jet engines that will power Pakistan’s new fighters, and by working to evict India from its base in Tajikistan. Verbiage concerning deepened strategic cooperation needs to be seen in this light.
The second kind of pressure at work here is the fiscal variety. With the Navy also demanding funds for new ships, submarines and aircraft as India’s geostrategy shifts toward securing the Indian Ocean sea lanes, any additional fighters will face an extremely tight fiscal environment over the next decade and more.
India already faces cost pressures given limited defense budget and pressing need to refurbish its existing fleet, modernize its fighters via the MRCA competition, and bring the Tejas LCA on line to replace its MiG-21s. Not to mention adding new platforms to patrol India’s vital sea lanes, fulfill naval fighter needs, upgrade its transport aircraft fleet, and extend the IAF’s reach. Meanwhile, India’s SU-30MKIs remain one of the best 4th generation aircraft in the world, with a comfortable edge over regional rivals, good growth prospects, and superiority over most current and planned US aircraft as well.
SU-30MK2s, ChinaThen there’s pressure in future, as the strategic agreement lays the foundations for something of a dilemma down the road. There are no real guarantees when dealing with Russia, only its interests of the moment and the logic of cash. Any fighter whose R&D is partly underwritten by India can easily be sold to China later on if relations turn sour, or if India does not buy enough aircraft to make exclusivity worthwhile from Russia’s point of view. One might think that this would be counterbalanced somewhat by Russian wariness about giving a potential rival its best technology, but past experience shows that even this will be for sale. China’s real military budget is about 4-5 times India’s according to most credible estimates, and is likely to remain so.
Given the amount of Russian equipment in India’s military, and the limitations of defense budgets in a democracy that prevent a massive “throw-out and re-equip” exercise, India’s options for retaliation would be very limited.
India faces high hurdles to retaining future exclusivity – and is handing a potent lever to Russia for future “negotiations” involving Russian armaments.
Additional Readings Background: PAK-FAThe development of Saab’s fighter-bomber:
Iran’s S-300 spotted at the Fordow nuclear facility: