The National Interest

Recently, Japan unveiled new export control measures for chipmaking equipment, encompassing twenty-three items across six categories, including lithography, etching, cleaning, deposition, and masking. While the specific targets of these measures were not explicitly mentioned, it is evident that China, being the largest importer of chipmaking equipment since 2020 and accounting for close to 40 percent of Japanese chipmaking equipment exports in 2021, is likely one of the intended targets.

The actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as a strategic alignment with the U.S.-led “Chip-4 Alliance,” aiming to curb China’s semiconductor industry. An important question emerges: Will these measures effectively contain China, enabling the U.S.-led chip alliances to maintain their strategic advantages, or will they trigger a new crisis for the chip industry by inadvertently providing China with an opportunity to accelerate its collective efforts toward achieving chip self-sufficiency?

Chips are pivotal to a nation’s economic growth, societal advancement, and national security, acting as the “brains” or controlling units of modern society. They are especially critical for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data analytics, which are key determinants of a country’s future technological competitiveness. Moreover, chips embody military-civil fusion technologies that can be employed in the development of advanced weaponry. Consequently, mastery over chipmaking supply chains has emerged as a central point of contention in the intense competition between the United States and China, two global powerhouses in a race for technological supremacy. 

The U.S.-led restrictions on China have prompted a shift in priorities within the semiconductor industry. National security is now taking precedence over economic efficiency, which was based on the global production network in chipmaking. These restrictions, which began under the Trump administration and have been reinforced by the Biden administration, include technological sanctions and export controls that prevent Chinese tech firms from acquiring advanced chips and restrict China’s access to key technologies and personnel in chipmaking. Amid escalating economic nationalism and in response to the 2021 supply chain disruptions in the automotive industry, the U.S.-led semiconductor alliances have enacted industrial policies to ensure the security of their chip supply chains. Such steps underscore the escalating concerns not just about safeguarding but fortifying national security as nations aim to preserve their sovereignty in an uncertain global landscape where trust and compliance with a rules-based order are on the decline. The fundamental premise here is that advanced technologies and equipment in chipmaking should not be supplied to countries that could potentially employ them to challenge the democratic world.

How Far Is China from Self-Sufficiency?

Following these restrictions, China is grappling with significant “chokepoints” that are stymieing its advancement in the semiconductor industry. As a relative latecomer to the field, China is at risk of falling further behind, particularly in next-generation technologies, if these chokepoints stay in place. This “chokepoint strategy”—akin to a kung fu master quickly executing a single sword move to sever their adversary’s throat—can readily be employed in warfare or geopolitical disputes. Here, a country or organization can identify and exploit vital points or bottlenecks—like a critical resource, transport route, or technology—in the competitor’s value chain. This metaphor vividly illustrates the risk of China being stifled or strangled, thereby hindering its ability to effectively compete and keep pace with the industry leaders in semiconductors.

The crux of the chokepoint strategy is that the party employing this strategy—in the case of semiconductors the United States and its allies—has monopolistic control over these chokepoints. By exercising this control, the United States and its allies can potentially disrupt the progress of China in chipmaking.

China has recognized the threat of chokepoints in its industrial capabilities. In 2018, the nation identified thirty-five technologies/products that could be subject to chokepoints. Advanced chipmaking tools and materials were included on this list. Fast forward five years, and with the United States and its allies having tightened their control over the chokepoints in China’s chipmaking, how prepared is China for self-sufficiency?

A simple response is “not much,” despite China having made certain strides in the domestic supply chain. Chinese start-ups span nearly all subsectors, from design software and databases to manufacturing equipment and semiconductor materials. However, regarding domestic substitution, the readiness is below 5 percent in most areas so far.

To upgrade its capacity for mature processing mode chipmaking, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) has invested in four additional foundries in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen since 2021. Although SMIC asserts that it can theoretically produce advanced 14nm chips using its existing DUV lithography systems, it is a considerable distance from reaching mass production. In the capital- and technology-intensive chipmaking industry, achieving mass production at a high yield rate is critical, as it can effectively lower the cost per chip. Transitioning to mass production and reaching a high yield rate requires significant time, manpower, and capital investment, provided the necessary equipment and tools are accessible.

The advanced lithography machine is a significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking capability. In this area, domestic substitution is currently less than 1 percent. ASML, based in the Netherlands, remains the sole supplier of EUV lithography machines, which are vital for advanced chipmaking. Immersion DUV lithography machines, produced by both ASML and Nikon from Japan, are likely to be added to the export restriction list, which could trigger a significant upheaval in China’s chipmaking capability. Shanghai Microelectronics, a domestic competitor, can currently manufacture lithography machines that only support mass production of chips using a 90nm or larger processing mode.

China has made notable progress in the field of etching machines, achieving about 10 percent domestic substitution. China’s Advanced Micro Fabrication Equipment Company is the first in the country to produce etching machines for advanced chipmaking. With the use of domestically produced lithography and etching machines, and through multiple exposures, it is feasible for China to manufacture chips with a 65nm processing mode or smaller at a large scale with high yield rates. These domestically produced machines can meet the production needs of most chips used in military applications, power management, LCDs, Wi-Fi, automobiles, and a wide array of consumer electronic systems.

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools represent another significant chokepoint in China’s chipmaking endeavors. Under the influence of U.S. sanctions, Huawei has found itself unable to update its EDA software, despite holding permanent EDA licenses. There have been reports of Huawei developing its own EDA tool, yet its efficacy and market acceptance remain uncertain.

Semiconductor materials could potentially become chokepoints if Japan implements export control measures. Out of the nineteen core semiconductor materials, Japanese companies command a market share of over 50 percent in fourteen. For instance, Japanese companies dominate the worldwide supply of photoresist used in lithography, holding over 85 percent of the market share. Amid the Japan-Korea trade dispute in 2019, Japan, by restricting the export of three types of materials to South Korea, instigated a disruption throughout the entire semiconductor value chain. China has progressed in low-end photoresist production, but still heavily depends on Japanese imports for almost all high-end photoresists. Due to these reasons, Japan’s export control measures are interpreted as targeting China in a more systemic and precise fashion than the U.S.-imposed sanctions.

A Chaotic Future?

While these restrictions may hinder China’s progress in chipmaking, their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. Chips are highly complex products that require deep technical expertise in both hardware and software, and they rely on a tightly woven global production network.

The sophistication of chipmaking is evident in the significant investment in research and development. In 2021 alone, the industry invested a total of $71 billion in research and development (R&D), which overshadowed the total investment by China’s “Big Fund” of $51 billion since 2014. The R&D investment has been fuelled by the global innovation ecosystem, where customer demand for high-performance chips has been a driving force behind advancements in chip design and manufacturing. Nvidia, as an example, initially focused on providing GPUs (graphics processing units) for the gaming industry but has expanded its applications to other areas. Its growth has been propelled by increasing user demand in graphics-intensive gaming, bitcoin mining data analytics, and AI training and inference tasks. The CEO of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, has expressed concerns that being unable to access the Chinese market would significantly limit their opportunities for growth as China remains its largest market in gaming and data centers.

The global production network in chipmaking is constantly evolving, with companies striving to enhance their positions by acquiring new capabilities and engaging in higher value-added activities. Throughout history, there have been three major shifts in the chipmaking industry, each involving the relocation of lower value-added segments of the value chain to emerging economies or regions. In the first shift, chip manufacturing was transferred from the United States to Japan, while the United States maintained its dominance in chip design and intellectual property. The second shift witnessed Japan retaining higher value-added segments in materials and equipment, while manufacturing and packaging were transferred to South Korea and Taiwan. In the third shift, South Korea solidified its position in memory and display semiconductors, Taiwan specialized in foundries, and China took on the lower value-added packaging and manufacturing of chips of mature process mode. Each of these shifts not only led to industry restructuring but also redefined the structure of the value chain, creating opportunities for latecomers to bridge the gap. However, it should be noted that each of these shifts was generously supported by their respective governments in terms of policy and capital.

China frequently comes under criticism for its use of industrial policy and subsidies to support its domestic technology sector. However, despite these measures, China has been unsuccessful in significantly enhancing its semiconductor sector using its industrial policy.

Reflecting on the situation, several factors have hindered China’s progress in chipmaking. Apart from a deficiency in capital and talent within the industry, the largest barrier to China’s advancement is the absence of effective synergy among its upstream and downstream players in the value chain. Chips function as intermediate goods in the production of electronic and electric devices, a sector where China has a significant global presence. To maintain their competitiveness, Chinese downstream manufacturers have favored imported chips, which are cheaper, more powerful, and more energy-efficient than their domestically produced counterparts. Similarly, design tools struggle to secure orders from local chip designers; and domestic design software and IP, equipment, and materials face obstacles in being adopted by local foundries, as they often prefer superior imported alternatives. This lack of industry-level coordination stunts technological progress and results in disjointed industrial development.

The current structure of the semiconductor value chain is highly interdependent, though value distribution is uneven. The United States holds the largest market share (47 percent), primarily in chip design and core IP. It’s followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China (as of 2021). Specialized equipment manufacturers, who operate within a niche but highly protected market, can only survive within this global network. For instance, ASML has investments from several downstream companies within the network. Despite its monopoly, ASML only garnered about 6.5 billion euros in 2022, making up less than 2 percent of the total semiconductor industry revenue. This structure of the value chain presents formidable barriers to latecomers, such as China, who are seeking to gain a foothold in the market.

Now, technology sanctions and export controls have inadvertently opened a window of opportunity for Chinese firms to catch up. In response to the chokepoint strategy, the Chinese semiconductor industry is forced to strive for self-sufficiency by fostering interdependent relationships within the ecosystem. The timing also works in favor of Chinese enterprises. Had the sanctions been imposed a decade ago, Chinese companies would have had limited technological accumulation to enable catching up. Over the past ten years, however, China’s investments in nearly every subsector of chipmaking have witnessed rapid generational upgrades within closed feedback loops, bolstered by collective investment from a wide array of players such as the government, tech companies, digital platforms, and downstream manufacturers. Thus, China is poised to stimulate a catch-up in chipmaking.

Reflections

Predicting a specific timeframe for China’s catch-up in semiconductors is challenging. However, a complete stifling of progress is unlikely. Geopolitical disruptions, coupled with technological upheavals, have led to reduced stability and predictability. Indeed, the “chokepoint strategy” carries its own set of challenges and risks. It may inhibit global cooperation and innovation and stall the overall growth of the semiconductor industry, potentially affecting Western participants. Moreover, it could provoke retaliatory actions from targeted adversaries, further destabilizing global supply chains, and potentially leading to escalating conflicts or even warfare.

For China, maintaining an open mindset in chipmaking is vital. The sector stands to benefit from the diverse inputs of all stakeholders. Furthermore, China needs to strike a delicate balance between competition and cooperation with its foreign competitors whenever possible. Regrettably, self-sufficiency often runs the risk of leading to self-isolation.

For Japan, the export control measures could potentially impact bilateral relations and may escalate trade tensions, especially considering the historical conflicts between Japan and China. Japan is a significant trading partner for China, and the Chinese market remains vital for Japanese manufacturers in semiconductors. In retaliation to Japan’s alignment with the United States in curbing China’s chipmaking, Beijing could consider restricting the export of critical minerals to Japan and Chinese consumers could potentially organize boycotts of Japanese products, as they have during previous bilateral conflicts.

Worst of all, an intensification of the chip wars could potentially lead to a complete decoupling in technology. Such technological decoupling entails not just the separation of supply chains, but also the establishment of different technological standards, innovation ecosystems, and markets by the disconnected parties. This could bear significant economic and social repercussions.

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney. Marina’s research interests cover China’s innovation policy and practice, emerging technologies, and network effects in digital transformation. She is the author of three books, including Demystifying China’s Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Image: Shutterstock.

For a moment, it seemed as though the Russian government would fall. On June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the thuggish leader of Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary outfit, raged against the Russian military and threatened retaliation after it allegedly bombed a Wagner training camp. The Kremlin denied the incident—and opened a criminal case against Prigozhin for attempting to incite an armed rebellion. In response, Prigozhin launched an open war against Russia’s military leaders, seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don and vowing to march on Moscow to remove them from power.

Chaos ensued. Wagner advanced. Vladimir Putin’s plane departed from Moscow; the Kremlin’s press service insisted that the president remained behind. The roads to the capital were blocked. The Russian internet was censored. Russian military units between Prigozhin and Moscow offered little resistance, and rumors of defections flew. The vast majority of soldiers remained stationed along the battle lines in Ukraine, even as the rogue mercenary group drove by behind them. Chechen fighters loyal to pro-Putin strongman Ramzan Kadyrov appeared ready to enter the fight from the south.

Then Prigozhin blinked. He issued a statement backpedaling—declaring that he had not sought to overthrow Putin, only to “march for justice,” and claiming that he would not attack Moscow to avoid spilling Russian blood. (By this point, more than a dozen Russian soldiers had been killed during the push north, though it is clear that the offensive could have been far more violent.) Through the mediation of Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko, a deal was reached whereby Prigozhin would leave the country and enter exile in Belarus. Wagner units would return to their posts in occupied Ukraine. The crisis was defused. Putin survived. The “end of history” was once again averted.

The eleventh-hour deal came as a surprise to many Western observers, who noted that the Kremlin’s early statements seemed to reject the possibility of a compromise. Putin, who had a decades-long relationship with Prigozhin and had supported him throughout the war, could have extended an olive branch. Instead, he gave a televised address condemning Prigozhin and his followers as traitors—seemingly giving the Wagner leader no choice but to seize Moscow and overthrow the government. The agreement gives both sides an alternative.

Prigozhin’s terse statement—released on his Telegram channel—has been his explanation for why he chose to accept Lukashenko’s proposal. The reasons it lays out are entirely selfless: Prigozhin, a patriot, wished to avoid the needless loss of Russian life. It is far more likely, though, that his acceptance of the terms—even with his army on Moscow’s doorstep—was in recognition of the futility of the mission he had taken upon himself to carry out. A report from The Telegraph hinted at other motivations, including threats made against Prigozhin’s family.

In a narrow sense, Prigozhin might have succeeded in his objectives. He ended his offensive within Moscow Oblast, less than 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the capital. Russian troops remained garrisoned within the city, but their defenses would have been gravely inadequate against Wagner’s hardened and well-equipped veterans. Absent outside interference, Prigozhin could have captured Moscow in short order.

But then what? The rogue warlord’s next move would not have been at all clear. Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Army Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, and any other Russian leaders of importance would have fled the city before Prigozhin could capture them. The Russian state has famously abandoned Moscow before; the city’s fall would not cause the collapse of the government. Even if he had wanted to extend his northern march to St. Petersburg, Prigozhin would not have had the strength. While he nominally had a total of 25,000 troops at his disposal, the convoy traveling north only contained around 5,000—hardly enough to hold Moscow, a city of 13 million, even if the population had been totally compliant. If Russian troops had arrived in greater numbers from the front lines in Ukraine, Prigozhin could not possibly have held the city, even with additional Wagner reinforcements.

More importantly, by shooting his way into the Russian capital—and then fighting to defend it against the military—Prigozhin could have caused thousands of deaths, both among the soldiers on both sides and the civilians caught in the crossfire. In doing so, he would have abandoned any pretense of acting on behalf of the Russian people, or of having the country’s best interests in mind. One of the reasons that Wagner troops were able to travel north so quickly was the lack of opposition from the Russian military or police units between them and Moscow. The military’s inaction bodes poorly for Putin, but it also gave both sides a critical opening to defuse the crisis before it escalated further. If Prigozhin had fought an open battle in Moscow—or even a battle with Kadyrov’s troops near Rostov-on-Don—a deal between the two sides would have been much more difficult to reach.

In no conceivable universe would the crisis have ended with the installation of “President Prigozhin” in the Kremlin. Putin would never have voluntarily surrendered power, and if a civil war had erupted, one side would have had two million troops of various stripes and the other would have had 25,000. It is unclear how exactly this would have proceeded, but sooner or later, it would have inevitably ended in Prigozhin’s death. Even now, as Putin reasserts his grip on the country, the Wagner leader’s ultimate fate is unclear. In the past, Putin has said that he could never forgive betrayal—a term he applied to Prigozhin’s actions on the 24th. Even in his relative safety in Belarus, Prigozhin may wish to avoid open windows for the foreseeable future.

While the Kremlin has remained tight-lipped on the Prigozhin incident, the Lukashenko deal was clearly in Putin’s interests as well. Prigozhin would not have succeeded in toppling the Russian strongman in the short run, but he has already done incalculable damage to his position. By accepting the deal, Putin has cut his losses, gained an opportunity to reassert his authority within Russia, headed off prospective challenges to his leadership, and ultimately avoided a far greater tragedy.

The most enduring consequence of Prigozhin’s actions will likely be the shattering of Putin’s carefully cultivated image of invulnerability. Russia’s state-controlled TV channels cut off coverage of the attack immediately after it began, and pro-Wagner websites were swiftly censored, but the people of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh—two major cities with more than one million inhabitants each—watched with their own eyes as Prigozhin’s troops seized control of city military installations. Worryingly, the two cities’ inhabitants welcomed the attackers, giving them food and water and cheering for them as they passed through. As Prigozhin left Rostov-on-Don for exile in Belarus on the night of June 24, he was thronged by civilian supporters, and Russian police re-entering the city after the mercenaries’ departure were blocked by an angry crowd chanting pro-Wagner slogans. If Putin’s position remains that the Wagnerites committed an act of treason, a number of Russians appear to be comfortable with treason.

Perhaps more ominously still, Russian civilians’ sympathies for Prigozhin and the Wagner Group appeared to be shared by some Russian military units during their drive north. Elements of “Storm-Z,” a second Russian mercenary company formed by Putin allies to rival Prigozhin, spoke in support of his campaign against the “rats in the rear.” Rumors that various Russian units had joined with the Wagner Group appear to be false, but these units did nothing to stop the mercenaries’ advance, either. Ordinary Russian conscripts seem unwilling to die for Putin—a development with uncomfortable parallels in Russia’s past.

Total fealty to the ruler has long been a feature of Russian military history. The Tsar’s army experienced mutinies and desertions during the First World War, but it never attempted to overthrow him. Joseph Stalin executed dozens of high-ranking officers during his purges, and for decades afterward, the Soviet military remained totally subservient to the Communist Party; one of the reasons for the failure of the 1991 coup attempt was its leaders’ reluctance to escalate the situation after Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin simply refused to meet their demands. Putin has sought to maintain this principle. Whatever their performance issues, Gerasimov and Shoigu have been unquestionably, unflinchingly loyal, even as their troops have not.

Ironically, the prioritization of loyalty over competence in the Russian military helps to explain Russia’s disappointing performance against Ukraine—a performance that necessitated the involvement of the Wagner Group in the first place. Given a freer hand and greater resources, Wagner quickly overshadowed the Russian military in effectiveness, forcing Ukraine out of Bakhmut after a months-long battle. Perhaps it is this gap in competency, coupled with frustration at how the Army is doing things, that drove Prigozhin to rebel.

But an effective mercenary is a double-edged sword. “The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not,” Niccolo Machiavelli wrote in The Prince, advising his sovereign against their employment: “if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness.” Putin would have been wise to listen.

Trevor Filseth is a former foreign affairs writer for The National Interest.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Beijing this month for meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese leaders mostly met the low expectations for the event. Blinken’s journey helps to rejuvenate high-level Sino-U.S. dialogue at a time when the bilateral relationship is at a nadir and might even be drifting toward war in either the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. The meeting seemingly offers hope for recovery and stabilization of relations. U.S. president Joe Biden said Blinken “did a hell of a job” in Beijing and that “We’re on the right trail here.” Of his meeting with Blinken, Xi said “This is very good.”

Alas, there is abundant reason to be skeptical.

The modest breakthrough has landed the relationship in front of a much bigger and thicker wall. Top-level communication is necessary but not yet sufficient for repairing a damaged relationship. The damage stems primarily from policies by each country that the other loathes. The problem is that neither country may be willing and able to change these policies that antagonize the other.

China’s List of Grievances

Prior to meeting with Xi, Blinken spoke with the PRC’s highest-ranking foreign affairs official, former Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Wang provided an efficient list of China’s top grievances with the United States. As paraphrased by the PRC media, “Wang asked the US to stop hyping the `China threat’ narrative, lift illegal unilateral sanctions on China, stop pressuring China’s technology and development and stop willfully interfering in China's internal affairs.”

“Hyping the China threat” refers to the U.S. concern that China aspires to displace America as the most strategically influential country in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing contends that the United States erroneously assumes China will naturally seek regional hegemony due to its newly-acquired relative economic and military strength. China, however, is an exceptional great power that will “never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence,” according to the CCP government.

The second major Chinese grievance is the United States making it harder for China to acquire key leading-edge technologies, alluded to in the reference to Washington suppressing China’s “technology and development.” Chinese officials and government-approved commentators have for years accused the United States of trying to “contain” China, and recently Xi himself has openly accused Washington of “comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” For Beijing, tech bans have become one of two spearpoints of containment. Already working to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, the Biden administration is also considering a ban on U.S. companies from investing in certain technology sectors in China. From Beijing’s standpoint, this is “politicizing and weaponizing economic, trade and technological issues under the guise of national security” when “the real purpose of the US is to deprive China of its right to development.”

The third PRC grievance, “interfering in China’s internal affairs,” includes U.S. criticism of the mass incarceration of Uighurs in Xinjiang province and the dismantling of civil liberties in Hong Kong. It also includes what Beijing sees as the most pressing dispute in Sino-U.S. relations and the other spearpoint of containment: Washington’s support for the government of Taiwan. The new PRC foreign minister, Qin Gang, said in March that Taiwan is “the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Wang Yi reportedly told Blinken, “On the Taiwan question, China has no room for compromise or concession.”

The United States is unlikely to address these PRC grievances to anywhere near Beijing’s satisfaction.

The View from Washington

China has amply proved itself an increasingly formidable potential U.S. adversary. It is undergoing a huge military modernization and expansion. It leverages its vast economic power to undermine U.S. global influence. It aspires to world leadership in emerging technologies. And it opposes important aspects of the U.S.-sponsored international order.

The Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes the PRC as “coercive and increasingly aggressive,” seeking to “refashion” the world to “suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” to the detriment of U.S. interests. Obviously, Washington does not accept Beijing’s Chinese exceptionalism or its “will never seek hegemony” rhetoric. Rather, Washington sees the United States and China as competitors for regional and global leadership. The diplomatic aspect of this competition requires America to continue calling out aggressive and expansionist PRC behavior before the international audience, just as Beijing asserts its own counternarrative. Nor is it reasonable to expect the United States to reverse its restrictions on helping its chief potential adversary achieve global technological—and consequent military—superiority.

For Washington to stop “interfering in China’s internal affairs” in the sense of not criticizing China is an impossible ask. Shaming illiberal states for infringing on civil liberties is now a part of America’s political culture, and the CCP leadership has infamously thin skin. Bashing China is now a bipartisan sport in U.S. domestic politics, with the politicians of both major parties scrambling to appear hawkish.

Only a day after the Blinken-Xi meeting, Biden seemingly unintentionally offended Beijing by casually referring to Xi as a “dictator” who was surprised and embarrassed by the spy balloon incident. A PRC government spokesperson immediately responded that Biden’s remark was “extremely absurd and irresponsible. . . . seriously infringing on China’s political dignity, which is an open political provocation.” The White House, in turn, indicated it will not retract the statement.

Beijing demands the United States must stop selling armaments to Taiwan and cease all contact between U.S. and Taiwan government officials. The U.S. position, however, is that arms sales are justified by Beijing’s permanent threat to use force against Taiwan. A U.S. law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires Washington to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Neither the PRC threat nor the U.S. law are going away anytime soon. Washington also maintains that the “one China policy” is satisfied by the lack of formal U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and does not preclude all contact between U.S. and Taiwan officials. In any case, members of Congress have repeatedly demonstrated that they will honor Taiwan leaders even against opposition from the U.S. executive branch.

American Frustrations

The U.S. side is similarly unlikely to get what it wants.

The most urgent American concern in the bilateral relationship is the need for crisis management. This appeared to be at the top of Blinken’s Beijing agenda.

Related U.S. concerns are perceived aggressive PRC activity toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea, which from the U.S. point of view increase the possibility of an accidental or unintended war.

Beijing could demonstrate goodwill to Washington by ceasing the hostile military signaling toward Taiwan and by quietly accepting the U.S. Navy’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea instead of threatening collisions with U.S. ships and aircraft. This, however, is almost unimaginable.

The Chinese government has framed both Taiwan and the South China Sea as do-or-die issues: the CCP either proves its legitimacy to rule China by establishing control over “Chinese” territory coveted by foreigners or fails on both accounts. Regime legitimacy, and thus security, is on the line. So is national security, as Taiwan outside of PRC control anchors the string of islands that form choke points between China’s east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Only by owning the South China Sea can Beijing keep unwanted foreign warships and warplanes away from China’s east coast. There are economic incentives as well: the South China Sea contains fish and hydrocarbons, and if captured, Taiwan would be the PRC’s richest and best-educated province.

Most importantly, the PRC seems to know no alternative way to attempt to de-escalate tensions with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea other than demonstrations of military bravado.

There is no hint of Chinese willingness to accommodate the U.S. desire for crisis management. China suspended contact between the two countries’ militaries after U.S. congresswoman Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022. In May, PRC defense minister Li Shangfu refused to meet with U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin on the sidelines of a conference in Singapore. Repeating a phrase PRC officials often use when discussing foreign relations, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained that the United States “must correct its mistaken actions” for military dialogue to resume.

This position resurfaced during the Biden visit to Beijing, during which China did not agree to the U.S. proposal to restart bilateral military engagement. PRC officials and commentators have elaborated that, in their view, the Americans want China to agree to allow the USA to challenge Chinese “core interests” with impunity. The PRC position is that if the USA wants to avoid crises, it should stop arming Taiwan and cease operating military units in Chinese-claimed waters and airspace.

Qin Gang said in March that the U.S. government’s “so-called `establishing guardrails’ for China-US relations and ‘not seeking conflict’ actually means that China should not respond in words or action when slandered or attacked. That is just impossible!”

Furthermore, Beijing likely sees the U.S. desire for crisis management as merely additional leverage for seeking concessions from Washington in bilateral disputes—an approach similar to Beijing canceling cooperation on climate change to express anger over particular unrelated U.S. policies.

Beijing has been emphasizing that Washington must keep the commitments Biden made during his talks in 2022 with Xi in Bali, the first face-to-face meeting between the two men since Biden’s election as president. Immediately before his meeting with Blinken, Xi said: “the two sides have agreed to follow through the common understandings President Biden and I had reached in Bali.” Qin Gang and Wang Yi also mentioned the Bali commitments.

What does Beijing think Biden promised in Bali? A PRC media report offers a summary: “The US does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ does not support ‘two Chinas’ or `one China, one Taiwan,’ and has no intention to have a conflict with China, . . . the US side has no intention to seek "decoupling" from China, to halt China's economic development, or to contain China.”

Signposts of Failure

This is a signpost of impending failure. Each of these points suggests misunderstanding on Beijing’s part, to be followed by disappointment. From a U.S. perspective, Biden has kept his word. But as the Chinese should well know by now, Washington’s interpretation of what is allowable under a “one China policy” is far looser than Beijing’s. The U.S. government is clearly and openly committed to strengthening alliances to counter possible PRC military moves and is implementing an industrial policy to reduce vulnerability to China (as China is also doing in reverse). Americans would argue these are prudent defensive actions, not proof of “seeking a New Cold War.” And American officials say they are “de-risking” rather than “de-coupling,” even if the PRC insists on calling it containment.

The momentum gained through the Blinken visit to China will soon stall because the policies that drive the downturn in U.S.-China relations are likely to stay the same. Both sides think these policies are necessary to uphold fundamental national interests. The domestic politics in both countries support these policies. And unfortunately, these policies reflect a new era of great-power rivalry within the same region in which the adversarial aspects of bilateral relations are ascendant.

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Image: Shutterstock.

With Russia’s waning momentum and influence in the wake of a slew of setbacks in the Ukraine war, concerns over an imminent Chinese attack on Taiwan have somewhat subsided. However, China’s recent charm offensives indicate its strategic calculations for an attrition war with Taiwan. To win such a war, China recognizes the necessity to accumulate as many bargaining chips as possible before entering into negotiations. One crucial aspect of this process is the restoration of its significantly damaged global reputation.

China has sought to claim the mantle of peacemaker since its reversal of the Zero Covid policy. Externally, it has actively presented itself as an unbiased alternative to the United States. After brokering an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China ventured into the highly sensitive Israel-Palestine conflict. Additionally, its unexpected vote in favor of a UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by the endorsement of French president Emmanuel Macron, highlights China’s potential mediating role in resolving the Ukraine conflict.

Internally, China is undergoing a diplomatic system overhaul. The removal of outspoken “Wolf Warrior” spokesman Zhao Lijian was followed by a carefully orchestrated visit to China by former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Furthermore, Beijing’s propaganda efforts are toning down the domestic fervor surrounding the idea of forcibly taking Taiwan. Despite its routine boilerplates against perceived “Western smear campaigns,” China appears to be adopting a more restrained and moderate diplomatic approach, aiming to convince the world that it still prioritizes peaceful means over force in its approach towards Taiwan.

However, China’s recent diplomatic shift belies its strategic adjustment towards the self-governing island. The lessons learned from the Ukraine war have led Xi Jinping to realize that if a military juggernaut like Russia can fail to annex Ukraine, the challenge of seizing a better-defended Taiwan would be even greater for China. This is especially true considering the island’s vital geopolitical and economic significance to the United States and the Western world. Consequently, China has recognized that a swift Blitzkrieg, as Russia had envisioned for Ukraine, is less feasible in the case of Taiwan. Instead, an attrition war, whose effect was validated during the Sino-Japanese War, would be a more practical strategy for China’s current status as an economic giant. Additionally, through salami tactics, China could chip away Taiwan’s outlying islands bit by bit.

An important giveaway of China’s plan for an attrition war with Taiwan can be gleaned from its recent contact with Ukraine. Following a long-awaited phone call between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, China dispatched a special envoy with a peace plan—built on its highly controversial twelve-point peaceful proposal on Ukraine—to the battle-scarred country. However, the mediation ended up with a public rejection from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba that Ukraine would not surrender territory to Russia in exchange for ending the war. While the specific details of the meeting were not disclosed, Kuleba’s remarks suggest that China’s proposal may have involved territorial concessions by Ukraine. If the land-for-peace approach proves successful in the Ukraine conflict, it is highly likely that China would employ a similar strategy in future negotiations during an attrition war with Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the assumption of China’s ability to outlast Taiwan and its Western allies in an attrition war hinges on its integration into the global economy and a robust self-sufficiency system.

China learned a crucial lesson from the Ukraine war: in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the best way to minimize or avoid economic sanctions from Western countries would not be through decoupling, but rather by further binding itself to the global value chains. Germany’s opposition to banning imports of Russian gas and oil, due to its high dependence on Moscow’s energy supplies, is a prime example. The European Union also demonstrated caution when imposing sanctions on Russia in order to minimize repercussions for EU citizens and businesses. To defend itself from potential surgical sanctions that may be imposed by Western countries, China is willingly accepting economic olive branches extended by EU powers such as France and Germany.

However, China’s endeavor to leverage its gargantuan economy does not make it bulletproof to Western sanctions. To counter China’s economic coercion, the U.S.-led Western bloc unveiled its “de-risking” strategy as a precautionary response during the G7 summit, aimed at minimizing the potential costs of a sudden escalation over Taiwan. This undoubtedly intensified China’s self-sufficiency movement, prompting it to expand its envisioned sanctions-proofing system to include its neighbors.

Exemplified by its Xi’an summit with Central Asian leaders, Beijing is accelerating the formation of a G7-like alliance. This alliance aims to strengthen economic ties as well as foster a collective security consensus. In response to G7’s planned diversification of supply chains to reduce their reliance on China, the country is also diversifying sources of its self-sufficiency system as it realizes it would largely be on its own if no preparation is made to sustain its potential war economy. Central Asian nations, seeking a reliable security partner in the absence of Russia, could play a practical role in aiding China, particularly given their limited relations with Taiwan. Assurances from Central Asian leaders that they would not interfere in China’s approach to the island have solidified the scaffolding of the regional-scale self-sufficiency system that China is establishing.

Speculations about the quick decline of U.S. combat power during a confrontation with China may bolster the latter’s confidence in taking Taiwan through an attrition war. Nonetheless, the resistance from Taiwan and the backlash from Western countries cannot be underestimated. Understanding these challenges, China is bound to unite all available forces and exploit any cleavage between the United States and its allies. One particularly workable and valuable target is certain EU countries that are actively seeking economic development through cooperation with China. Macron’s advocate for “strategic autonomy” to ensure the EU has more options beyond simply aligning with the United States on issues like Taiwan is one significant achievement that China has snatched.

As China is shifting towards an attrition war strategy, it is imperative for the U.S.-led Western bloc to adapt accordingly. The “de-risking” tactic cannot fundamentally resolve the underlying reliance on China within global supply chains. Instead, the United States should rev up the development of Taiwan’s self-sufficiency system. Rather than focusing solely on marginal improvements in the already tight economic ties between Taiwan and other democracies, the U.S.-led Western bloc ought to provide Taiwan with a stronger diplomatic endorsement to spur more “swing countries” in Asia, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, to participate in the island’s self-sufficiency system.

It is anticipated that China’s economic coercion would continue to be effective in the event of a war with Taiwan. When that day comes, the reluctance of major EU powers like France and Germany to provide sufficient assistance during the early stages of the Ukraine war is likely to re-emerge. The only feasible way that Taiwan could outlast China in an attrition war relies on its endurance until a turning point where its counter-offensive achieves success is reached. But before that, it must establish a self-sufficiency system that is at least on par with, if not stronger than, that of China.

Jiachen Shi is a Ph.D. student in political science at Tulane University. He received his M.A. in international relations from the University of Liverpool. His articles have been featured in The Diplomat.

Image: Courtesy of the Office of the President of Kazakhstan.

On Friday evening Moscow time, the Kremlin—and the world—was stunned to witness what seemed like the beginnings of a coup against the government of President Vladimir Putin. The man leading the charge, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has a long history with the Kremlin. A former restauranteur, Prigozhin eventually, with the help of government contracts, built himself into an oligarch. But what he is most known for today is having founded the private military corporation Wagner Group. Since its inception in the early 2010s, it has seen action around the world, most notably in Africa and in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where it has played a large role in patching holes in sometimes weak Russian lines.

For the past few months, tensions between Prigozhin and the Kremlin—though Prigozhin has until recently been careful to critique the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, and not Putin himself—have risen, with Prigozhin claiming that Shoigu was purposefully denying Wagner ammunition. On Friday, those tensions reached a boiling point as Prigozhin posted a video that he claimed showed the aftermath of a Russian missile attack on a Wagner camp (though analysts have found that, based on videos of the same camp from one day before, nothing had changed).

Within twenty-four hours, Prigozhin and his forces proceeded to leave Ukraine and reached within 200 kilometers of Moscow. As of the time of writing on Saturday evening, according to news reports and Prigozhin’s own Telegram messages Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko has apparently negotiated a ceasefire and potential resolution. Prigozhin claimed that his forces will return to Ukraine—though what Putin has promised in return is unclear.

What really caused Prigozhin to begin his self-proclaimed “March of Justice” is likewise unclear. While he originally claimed to be only hunting Shoigu and spoke repeatedly about not being against Putin, his drive toward the Kremlin seemed to belay that possibility. After all, any attempt to kill, usurp, or otherwise remove Putin’s minister of defense by force would clearly be seen as an attack on Putin himself.

Speculations that this was all some grand, 4D-chess-style play by Putin himself to eliminate Shoigu can be dismissed. Prigozhin’s spear penetrated deep into Russia, humiliating the Russian armed forces which were either unable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to fire on his troops (with the exception of a few pilots). If Putin wished to eliminate Shoigu, firing him would have been far less of a hassle.

But where do things go from here, how does this latest incident affect both Russia’s and the West’s future? While nearly anything can happen, there are only four potential scenarios.

The Likeiest Scenarios

The first scenario can be called “the Truce Holds.” Here, Prigozhin returns to the front, possibly keeping some troops in Rostov, and resumes fighting. What happens to him in the medium and long term, however, is open to some speculation, pending further details. Likewise, the nature of the agreement between Putin and Prigozhin and what it entails has yet to be seen. Perhaps Putin agrees to fire Shoigu (which would be something of a political earthquake, as Shoigu is the only person to have served in the top levels of the Russian Federation’s government since its founding). Whatever the ultimate outcome, however, Prigozhin is unlikely to remain in Russia. He has at this point eliminated multiple Russian Air Force targets—possibly killing the pilots—and humiliated Putin’s government on the world stage. Exile of a sort seems like the likely outcome.

The second scenario, “Mop Up,” sees the truce break. Prigozhin either immediately or in the near future rebels yet again. This time, however, he is captured or killed. The Russian government then proceeds to mop up the rest of Wagner as a semi-independent force. Putin’s credibility would still take a hit—after all, a private military company he allowed to come into existence would have driven over 200 km into his own country in a coup attempt, pulled back, and attacked a second time—but he would remain in power, for now. Russia’s war in Ukraine would be hampered, however, as Wagner’s forces made up a not insignificant amount of troops there. Depending on the nature and scale of the mop-up, Russia would be forced into either a temporary or even permanent defensive posture for the remainder of the conflict. Moreover, even if Prigozhin was killed, Putin would likely not last much longer in office—having created the conditions for repeated potential coup attempts by private military forces is too great a stain on his record. He’d be quietly pushed to retire before the next presidential election.

The third and unlikeliest scenario, “President Prigozhin,” sees the truce break—but here, the Russian armed forces melt like butter as Wagner resumes its advance and storms the Kremlin. It is not an impossibility; on the open highway from Rostov to Voronezh, Prigozhin faced effectively no resistance. He also, on his now-paused march, seemingly altered his goals (or at least publicly moved closer to his private ones): in response to an address by Putin demanding that he stand down, Prigozhin said that those against Wagner “today are those who gathered around scumbags.” As it is unlikely that Prigozhin drove to Moscow for a stern talk and a handshake, in this scenario he takes the Kremlin and installs himself or a politically presentable chosen ally as the new president of Russia.

If he manages to do this smoothly—without serious opposition from the armed forces or the intelligence services, which is unlikely—it would be fairly bad for Ukraine. Prigozhin has critiqued the Ministry of Defense for a while now on their running of the war—from the refusal to transition to a war economy to a, in Prigozhin’s view, reluctance to truly fight aggressively. The Wagneritr is also significantly more ideological than Putin; whereas Putin mostly gave meandering addresses about how sinister the West is, Prigozhin would likely put in place a “positive” vision for Russia. A Prigozhin in charge, either directly or indirectly, would likely immediately put the country onto a serious war footing instead of adopting Putin’s strategy of keeping the war as far away from the population as possible.

The Worst Case Scenario

Yet what if Prigozhin makes it to Moscow but fails to secure power? Perhaps Putin escapes to St. Petersburg and vows to fight on, or perhaps the Wagnerites and the Russian armed forces begin to fight in earnest on the outskirts of the city? This development, the fourth scenario, could only be described as the “Second Russian Civil War.” It is likely that, similar to the first Russian Civil War, the combatants would not remain limited to a  two-sided conflict of government against rebels. Ramsam Kadyrov, the leader of Russian Chechnya who has until now been loyal to Putin, may sense an opportunity to truly make a kingdom for himself. Certain elements in Tartarstan or elsewhere, which have itched for their own ethnically-based states, may work for independence. China, which has had an eye on Siberian water for years, may—in the name of securing their border—move to take control of some strategic parts of Siberia.

The West, for its part, would need to consider how to proceed. A breakup of Russia into civil war would be disastrous, which is why realist thinkers like Henry Kissinger have urged the West to avoid such. A fracturing of Russia’s eleven time zones would open up a new chess board on the budding Cold War between the United States and China, exacerbating tensions and, ultimately, likely sucking Washington into conflicts there.

The United States would also likely have to reel in NATO and European allies. Questions that Washington has never had to confront will need to be answered. In the event of a Russian civil war, Ukraine would likely recapture all its territory. But what if it wants to go further: should Washington stop an angry Ukraine from performing its own “special military operation” in a shattered Russia’s frontiers? What happens if Poland, seeing Russian authority collapse, begins looking hungrily at the territories east of the Curzon line, which it lost under Josef Stalin?

Plus, there is the question of Russia’s nuclear stockpile. Russia, after all, possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country: what happens if they fall into the hands of any of the Tartar nationalists, Wagnerites, Islamic extremists, or other warlords who could emerge from the conflict?

Caution is Warranted

As of the time of writing, events appear to be defaulting toward the first scenario and least destabilizing scenario. Yet the situation on the ground is fluid—Prigozhin’s currently-declared exile to Belarus, among whatever other concessions have been promised, depends heavily on Putin keeping his word. Whether that is enough for Prigozhin is yet to be determined.

Ultimately, when coups get underway, the fog of war intensifies, making it difficult to see what will happen. In the event of “Mop Up,” the scenario otherwise most favorable for Putin, his authority may still be so weakened that someone else tries another coup in the months to come. “President Prigozhin” could see Prigozhin briefly control Russia, only to be challenged by yet someone else. And a full-scale “Second Russian Civil War” produces questions which been asked only in the nightmares of Western strategic planners. The last Russian Civil War produced the Soviet Union, after all. There is no reason to believe that this one would produce anything better.

Anthony J. Constantini is writing his Ph.D. on populism and early American democracy at the University of Vienna in Austria. Previously he received an M.A. in International Relations from St. Petersburg State University. In 2016 he was the War Room Director for the NRSC.

Image: Shutterstock.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes his state visit to the United States, and after the historic conclave of the national security advisors of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines in Manila, the United States continues to develop its latticework (to use the turn of phrase adopted by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan) of “flexible partnerships, institutions, alliances and groups of countries” across the world to balance China. The challenge now facing the U.S. policy establishment, however, is how to prevent these partnerships from being derailed.

Twenty years ago, in these pages, David M. Lampton bemoaned an American tendency to conduct bilateral relations with other states on the basis of the “Christmas tree” approach: “hanging all sorts of conditions (oftentimes very minor or petty issues) as a price for other states to pay for the continuation of normal, bilateral relations.” To combine the two metaphors, a latticework approach cannot hold up if too many weights are placed on it.

The fact that a coalition of states might find extremely close alignment on a particular issue (or set of issues) and seek ways to facilitate common action does not, therefore, mean that there is complete harmony of interests or agreement on all questions. Yet over the last several decades, the United States has often operated from the premise that Washington can present partners with a laundry list of disparate preferences and demand compliance. Even two decades ago, it was clear that “a country may earnestly desire to be a partner of the United States, but this in no way means that it ceases to pursue its own national interests.” Today, when the rise of China and greater coordination among the states of the Global South offers greater hedging opportunities, other countries have options while the United States has diminished leverage.

A “latticework” approach to international affairs means that the mix of obligations and commitments to other partners will differ on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the Japan-Republic of the Philippines-United States security consultation, which Josh Rogin argues might herald the emergence of a JAROPUS coalition, is grounded firmly in the assessment of a shared threat arising out of China’s efforts to extend its maritime sphere of influence. It does not automatically follow that JAROPUS will move in lockstep with the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, even though AUKUS also exists to respond to China’s improved maritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific basin. AUKUS implies a level of defense technological-industrial integration, for instance, that is not a step the JA or ROP parts of the JAROPUS triad are prepared to take. Nor do these two coalitions (JAROPUS and AUKUS) assume the emergence of a common security alliance with India (via the QUAD (Japan, Australia, India, U.S.) format.

It can seem very tempting to take all these developments and conclude that the end result is the creation of an all-encompassing alliance, akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, a few years ago, my students at the Naval War College developed a timetable for the creation of an Indo-Pacific Area Treaty Organization, or IPATO. But even NATO is based on a series of limits: geographically confined to the North Atlantic area, and among states that share a vast, intertwined network of economic interests and general agreement on questions of values and governance. Yet NATO allies have often been very resistant to expanding their commitments to assisting the United States in other areas of the world.

The U.S.-India relationship shows the challenges of navigating a “latticework” relationship. When it comes to the rise of China as a regional and global challenger, the United States and India share common strategic assessments and concerns. For an America that seeks to reroute critical supply chains around a Chinese competitor, India is part and parcel of any robust Asian supply chain that bypasses China. Yet India’s strategic interests diverge from those of Washington when it comes to Russia and Iran. And on a whole host of issues related to understandings of human rights and what constitutes democratic governance, India is prepared to push back against U.S. efforts to argue that American (or Western) standards form the universal yardstick by which all others are measured. The challenge for the Biden administration, in the run-up to the Modi visit, has been whether it is possible to ringfence U.S.-India collaboration in the first two areas from the criticisms, particularly from members of Congress, about India’s divergence from U.S. preferences in the latter areas.

The “minilateralist” approach that Jada Fraser and others have discussed argues in favor of creating focused coalitions that are defined by a small set of issues. It also means that the United States has to become more comfortable with multitiered arrangements, where, beyond a small core group of allies (such as the UK, Germany, or Japan) that share an overlapping shared vision across an entire spectrum of security, political, and economic issues, the United States recognizes a larger group of associates who commit to some but not all of the obligations. For instance, Ash Jain and Matthew Kroening lay out a strategy for economic statecraft for a new democratic community of nations that brings together both a core group of U.S. allies but envisions a broader set of associated powers who partner with the U.S. on selected sets of issues. But a multilateralist, tiered level-of-association approach shifts the basis of engagement away from the broad parameters of alliance towards negotiating focused and specific agreements with other countries—laying out not only specific duties but also the benefits both parties expect to receive—and with the understanding that other issues not covered in those agreements will not alter the bargain.

Congress, in particular, never likes minilateralist, association approaches—members are loath to give up the power to insist on compliance with every possible demand or request. The Biden administration resisted those tendencies with the Modi visit, because of the strategic importance of India to the U.S. strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” basin. But in the context of the strategic competition with China, a black-or-white approach to partners can backfire, especially when Beijing is willing to deal in shades of gray.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College and director of the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Image Courtesy of the White House/Twitter.

Though the weather in the District of Columbia presented a gloomy and unusually chilly June day, the welcome for Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s state visit was anything but. Though small groups of Sikh separatist activists and human rights protesters did appear near the White House, they were drowned out by the sizable and enthusiastic welcoming crowd of Indian-Americans assembled on the South Lawn.

The Biden administration hoped this week’s ceremonies would provide a stately capstone to over a decade of ever-closer strategic partnership between the United States and India. The hard work of cultivating New Delhi as an economic and security bulwark against China has paid off with a plethora of new joint initiatives. For Modi’s part, he successfully communicated India’s growing national and economic confidence and brushed off concerns about “democratic backsliding” by declaring that there is “no space for discrimination” in India.

The remarks from both Joe Biden and Narendra Modi following the prime minister’s welcome stressed shared, universal values, including democracy and pluralism. Ironically, the DC and New Delhi commentariat spent the last week debating the balance of hard interests that drive the “strategic partnership,” and wondering if “values” play any role at all.

Following a one-on-one conversation, Biden and Modi unveiled a number of advances in the U.S.-India strategic partnership across the board, from space exploration to semiconductors to supply chains to military cooperation. U.S. Navy vessels can obtain repairs in Chennai, Mumbai, and Goa. Both militaries will invite liaisons from each other officer corps—an outcome unthinkable during the distrust of the Cold War. Most importantly, India now has access to the coveted F414 jet engine through a coproduction agreement. Moreover, the leaders announced a $3 billion purchase of thirty MQ-9B Sea Guardian predator drones. Both deals will enhance Indian air strength and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities vis-à-vis China in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

Yet, developments in defense cooperation, while significant, must be seen as incremental improvements. Not only do they build on the achievements of the Trump and Obama administrations, but the fact will remain that India still relies on Russia for between 60 to 85 percent of its military equipment. While this critical dependence is lessening, it will not disappear for some time, and the rate of its diminishment depends on the United States offering cheaper defense weapons systems and India’s sustained investment in the modernization of its own armed forces.

As others have noted, Modi positioned India as a tribune for and bridge to the “Global South.” Biden seeks to take advantage of this by supporting India’s UN Security Council membership proposal and African Union representation at the G20. Realizing the noticeable lack of cooperation from developing countries on the administration’s Ukraine policy, the White House is eager to offer greater stakes in preserving the U.S.-led international order.

Modi’s address to a joint session of Congress attempted to soften his image with progressives and tout domestic achievements to Indian voters back home. Contrary to the media portrayal of the prime minister as a right-wing populist and analogue to Donald Trump, Modi waxed on the themes of diversity, dignity, and democracy while emphasizing his efforts to expand access to healthcare, protect the environment, and accelerate “women-led development.” Topped off with a thick layer of avuncular geniality, sprinkled with folksy Hindi witticisms, and encouraged by an enthusiastic visitor gallery, Modi’s address made a resoundingly charming impression on the assembled senators and members of Congress. That is apart from a group of hard-Left representatives that boycotted the speech.

Among the good feelings on either side and Modi’s talk of a “New Dawn,” those unfamiliar with the history of Indian grand strategy might be forgiven for thinking Washington and New Delhi will eventually agree to a treaty alliance akin to Australia or Japan. Nevertheless, India is certain to continue its hallowed policy of strategic autonomy and carve out a place for itself as one pole in a multipolar order. This carving, however, will no doubt rely on American military cooperation and economic investment, just as India’s non-alignment during the Cold War did not prohibit significant Soviet arms purchases.

Envisioning the future relationship will require a willingness to overlook or manage differences without losing sight of shared interests. India obviously cannot be classed among the United States’ traditional treaty allies. Yet it does not make sense that it be counted among more authoritarian partners with fewer shared values, like Saudi Arabia or Egypt. The fact that the United States and India at least conceive of themselves as quintessential democracies is significant, even if they disagree over the meaning as such.

James Himberger is the Associate Editor of The National Interest. He can be followed at @Beaconsfieldist on Twitter.

Image: Shutterstock.

In a joint press conference with President Joe Biden on June 22, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked that “even the sky is not the limit” for U.S.-India cooperation. India’s state visit is nothing short of historical, considering the widespread craze for Modi’s charisma as well as the number of agreements signed across various sectors like defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare, and more. Out of all of those, the proposal to jointly produce the GE F-414 jet engines stands out. This is because only four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and France—can make jet engines. Manufacturing behemoth China is yet to crack it. The jet engine technology is so precious that the United States has been careful to share it even with its allies. This, however, is about to change.

General Electric has signed a memorandum of understanding with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to co-produce the GE F-414 engine for the Indian Air Force. While GE is pursuing necessary export authorizations with the U.S. government, the agreement is set to usher in a new phase of defense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi.

In the last six months, both countries have been working through the initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) to set channels for strong private sector cooperation in technologies of strategic consequences. When Secretary of Defense Austin visited New Delhi, India and the United States also agreed on a Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap. The jet engine deal marks the beginning of a promising collaboration on defense innovation and technology cooperation. It is also a significant step towards settling the two fundamental differences in an otherwise thriving defense relationship. First, the United States wants to increase military sales to India, while the latter presses on technology transfers for indigenization. Second, India’s role as a maritime power has been central to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific, while India has prioritized the land border with China. The GE jet engine deal shows how both countries can balance these mutual concerns.

From Buyer-Seller Relationship to Co-Production

Defense cooperation between the United States and India has grown exponentially in recent years. India’s elevation as a Major Defense Partner status (in 2016) and Strategic Trade Authorization I (in 2018) strengthened the foundation of the defense partnership. However, impediments such as different national bureaucratic structures, acquisition models, and budget processes held both countries back.

Until the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative could figure out the institutional nitty-gritty as a “silent enabler,” the United States supplied arms to India via Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sale mechanisms. However, a buyer-seller relationship was not feasible for India in the long term—though cutting-edge, American weaponry is costlier than French and Russian counterparts. It was a major reason India could not make big-ticket purchases from the United States and instead chose France (for the Rafale jet over F-16s, for example) and Russia (for the S-400 missile system over PATRIOT PAC-3). On the contrary, India sought technology transfers to develop its defense-industrial base. For the United States, it was difficult to divulge sensitive technologies without adequate trust in the Indian defense ecosystem.

The jet engine deal shows a modus operandi to realize the true potential of the strategic partnership. The jointly-produced GE F414 will fit into India’s advanced light combat aircraft (HAL Tejas Mk-2) and the first batch of prospective fifth-generation stealth fighters (HAL AMCA). As Indian Air Forces aim to maintain forty-two squadrons (around 756 fighter aircraft) by 2035, thousands of jet engines will enter the production line over the next decade. Through this deal, the United States has made a long-term investment in the Indian defense market.

The jet engine deal, in addition to the General Atomics UAV deal, will also advance India’s goal for military modernization. From assembling components to performing maintenance operations, Indian companies will gradually learn the know-how of jet engines. Technology transfers have a long gestation period before the receiver can independently develop some part of the system. In the next few years, India’s defense industry will absorb immense skill to build the capacity to produce high-tech systems.

If the United States and India begin more joint production projects of such scale, their military industries will be engaged for decades. The United States wants a share of India’s defense market, while India needs access to advanced military technology.

Addressing India’s Conundrum: Land or Maritime?

America’s interest lies in seeing India as the central maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. In contrast, India’s present primary concern is the volatile Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. Though India has a development-centric approach to the Indian Ocean, a hot border has constrained New Delhi from committing desired military resources in the maritime domain. Time and again, U.S. policymakers acknowledged India’s border challenges but lacked a sustainable strategy to facilitate India’s proactive posture in the Indian Ocean.

The jet engine deal has also opened a pathway for India to mitigate the Himalayan threat while promoting its maritime assertiveness. Most fighter jets using the GE-F414 engine will be deployed at India’s land borders. Procuring MQ-9B SeaGuardians UAVs will also ramp up its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. The development comes after Washington leased two Predator drones in 2020 for surveillance after the Ladakh standoff with China.

Future areas of defense-industrial cooperation include aerial combat, land mobility systems, ISR, and munitions. Considering the regional threat environment, India will primarily use these technologies in the Himalayan theater. But this is not all. The official iCET handout refers to an “initial focus” on these seemingly land-oriented technologies, after which both would identify their operational use cases in maritime security. Furthermore, deployed U.S. ships will now be able to access Indian shipyards for service and repair. Such access to the American fleet on Indian naval facilities is unprecedented.

The United States is farsighted in realizing that New Delhi will go maritime only when the 2,167-mile Sino-Indian land border is taken care of. India’s inroads in the Indian Ocean will also directly result from its economic rise and territorial security. A strong India on the land can also commit more to external balancing in the maritime domain, which supplements America’s wider Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Setting Future Goal Posts

Though the GE jet engine deal is a significant milestone, the United States and India can do much more to enrich the partnership. Some of the future goals posts for both countries can include the following.

First, the United States should strive to become the largest arms provider to India. Russia’s ability to act as a reliable arms supplier for India has diminished due to the prolonged war in Ukraine, a bottled-up economy, and subservience to China. America can fill the vacuum created by a weak Russia. At the same time, New Delhi can cultivate the Department of Defense and the military-industrial lobbies to maintain a level-headed realist India policy in the corridors of Washington.

Second, the United States and India should build on the outcomes of the visit to negotiate a Security of Supply Arrangement and Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The former will allow India to request prior delivery of orders with U.S. firms while the latter will promote synergy in research, development, and interoperability between the two countries. These agreements will facilitate working together during unanticipated disruptions and possibly open channels for wartime cooperation.

Amidst all the Modi-mania and euphoria regarding India, the United States policymakers must apply sober thinking. The United States is accustomed to leading its allies and having partners who toe the line on almost all issues. India, however, does not like to be led by superpowers; it instead strongly pursues issue-based alignments. Yet though their strategic worldview differs, the U.S.-India bonhomie cannot be more natural in today’s strategic environment and, one daresay, shared democratic values. Washington and New Delhi must be persistent because relationships of such importance are seldom a sprint but a marathon.

Ambuj Sahu is a doctoral scholar in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington. He was previously trained as an electrical engineer at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi. He tweets at @DarthThunderous.

Image: Image courtesy of GE.

In Lebanon, political paralysis and the inability to uphold basic tenants of democracy have become features of the country’s system. Last week’s twelfth parliamentary attempt to choose a new president was defeated in another spectacular fashion. The powerful Shia Hezbollah and some of its allies exited the chamber, breaking the necessary quorum to keep the vote going. This made the speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, close the session due to an insufficient number of members being present. This has led some of Lebanon’s political parties to argue for a new model of governance, specifically one that makes Lebanon adopt neutrality vis-à-vis all wars. Is such an idea viable?

In an interview with former minister Melhem Riachi, who is also an MP representing the Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), he shared his belief that such a proposal is not a theoretical discussion or intellectual exercise. Rather, it is a necessity to rescue Lebanon from its self-inflicted wounds. We discussed why it has been difficult thus far to elect a president and break the now eight-month deadlock.

“It is normal, very normal. Because this is not a cause, it is the effect of many causes. Especially because Lebanon is facing many problems between its communities and how people see politics. It is also under the influence of regional and international developments.”

Lebanon has always felt the burdens or potentially the rewards of regional and global decisionmaking. As the regional tensions calm down following Syria and the Arab League’s rapprochement and Iran and Saudi Arabia’s resumption of diplomatic ties, it is natural for people to ask whether these developments will have a positive impact on Lebanon’s affairs at home. One example remains the presidency. Riachi acknowledged that although the question of who will make it to Baabda (the presidential home) is not solely up to the Lebanese, this should not stop the democratic process.

“We cannot elect a new president in a purely Lebanese way. We tried hard to make it so but it was impossible. Unfortunately, this is caused by an equilibrium of power. Our camp and theirs are equal in Parliament. That is why no one can elect a president alone.” When asked if the solution will come from outside or direct negotiations between both camps, Riachi said, “The real solution must be to go and vote, and vote and vote, again.”

Riachi talked about how the source of Lebanon’s problems lies in its roots, meaning the manner in which politics has been practiced and the country’s foundations have laid the groundwork for its current failure.

“I think it’s better we find a solution in the roots. Because the problem is in the regime, the way of our democracy; it is our constitution, we need to shake it all and rebuild it again all together with the principle of subsidiarity.”

He went on to say that Lebanon must now more than ever declare its neutrality to the world and request all foreign intervention to be stopped. “We need neutrality, we need to declare it, and get everybody away from Lebanon. When I say everybody, I mean everybody.” When asked to specify, Riachi replied, “The Iranians, the Saudis, the Americans, the French, everybody who tried to influence us. Everybody must go out. Our allies, and their allies.” Unfortunately, such a proposition is not so simple to implement.

Hezbollah has long received support from Iran and its allies, which is largely responsible for making it a regional player. For decades, the Saudis have backed Lebanese Forces and other opposition parties as a counterweight to Hezbollah and Iran’s regional influence that it designated as a threat. This was always a dilemma for Lebanon. How can sovereignty be respected when internal players from all sides are recipients of foreign support that bypasses the state? It can’t. Riachi accepts this as a historical reality and recognizes the need for change.

“Everybody must be out. This is a real neutrality to keep its people here. We have a huge wave of immigration, especially from the Christian community. This is dangerous, and it is more dangerous for the Muslims. Because the Muslims cannot live here without the Christians and vice versa.”

Lebanon has faced an increase in emigration since the economic crisis began in 2019. According to a study conducted by the Lebanese American University, emigration has pushed out the middle class which was largely comprised of the Christian community. Lebanon’s system is built on the concept of confessional consensus.

As jobs became scarce and salaries fell, most Lebanese have worried about their financial security. As the crisis exacerbated, so did dependency on international aid. Remittances from Lebanese living abroad have grown annually. World Bank data shows a 27 percent increase since the fall of Lebanon’s pound (lira).

Nevertheless, there still must be a final decision taken from the Lebanese leadership on foreign policy. For too long, Lebanon has been like a gray piece on the Middle East geostrategic chess board. It belongs to no one, but everyone can use it. Changing this reality must be on top of the priorities for Lebanon’s future president and government. The question is simple: what should define Lebanon’s foreign policy in the Middle East?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

A long and detailed Washington Post article about the work of the Department of Justice and FBI in investigating the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and related efforts to overturn the result of the 2020 presidential election shows officials being highly reluctant to include in any investigation the actions of Donald Trump, despite his key role in the events in question. An aversion to taking any action that could possibly be portrayed as having a political motivation left a major line of inquiry unexplored for about a year until the facts of the case left no choice but to perform what now constitutes the January 6 portion of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation.

This picture is, of course, the opposite of what Trump’s defenders continue to assert is a political bias in the department that has made investigators and prosecutors eager to go after Trump and to single him out for disparate treatment. That assertion is being heard again this week on Capitol Hill, with Republicans inviting testimony from John Durham, who was given the job during Trump’s administration of trying to find a “political witch hunt” behind an earlier FBI investigation involving Trump’s relations with Russia and who failed to find any, being reduced to making criticisms about analytical rigor and the like. That failure was hardly surprising, given that the Department of Justice inspector general had already determined that the opening of the FBI’s investigation into the matter was justified, given what is in the public record about Trump’s relationship with the Russians along with important and still unanswered questions about that relationship.

The Post’s reporters evidently had well-placed sources inside the department. Their account is so detailed that the story tells itself in a way that would make it difficult to impart a spin to the narrative, even though it would be safe to assume that at least some of the sources were happy to have this reportage become public because it refutes the false accusations of investigations being politically biased.

Viewed from another angle, however, the account does not put the Department of Justice in an especially favorable light. Officials were so scared of being subjected to political criticism from pro-Trump elements that they dragged their feet in pursuing lines of inquiry that they probably should have pursued with alacrity. They viewed the politically safest way of investigating January 6 to be a “bottom-up” approach that gave priority to prosecuting individual rioters who attacked the Capitol. It was a small-fish approach that intentionally shoved aside any attention to big fish, notwithstanding evidence they already had of a more organized seditious conspiracy. It was not until Smith assumed his present duties that the scope and speed of the investigation reached levels that it would have reached months earlier were it not for the trepidation about a political backlash.

The principal consequence has been a delay in having open questions resolved and justice served. Whatever problems may arise from prosecutions bumping up against the 2024 political calendar are due less to any intentional bumping—by either pro-Trump or anti-Trump elements—than to timidity-based slowness within the department.

The pusillanimity in investigating Trump has given rise to a double standard of sorts in matters involving political candidates—but again, in a direction opposite from what Trump’s supporters allege. The Post article mentions an episode from the past that evidently weighed heavily on the minds of prosecutors and investigators: the announcement by then-director of the FBI James Comey, just eleven days before 2016 presidential election, that the bureau was re-opening an investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of an email server—only to determine later that there still were insufficient grounds for bringing any criminal case. Critics charged, with good reason, that this election eve announcement probably contributed to Clinton’s defeat. Officials in the FBI and Department of Justice, faced with considering Trump’s role in events of 2020 and 2021, did not want to do anything that might have similar political repercussions, or might be perceived as having them. They overcompensated not only in avoiding any politically ill-timed announcements about investigations but in failing for months to investigate certain important matters at all.

In shying away from timely and vigorous investigation of anything involving Trump, the timorous officials not only delayed serving justice but did not avoid political brickbats from Trump’s supporters anyway. Trump’s party had been pushing hard the theme of a supposedly politicized law enforcement bureaucracy even before its more recent hostile reactions to the indictment of Trump regarding the Mar-a-Lago documents. It is difficult to imagine that the themes and reactions would have sounded any different if the officials in the department had conducted investigations with the speed and intensity they deserved. And even a carefully researched article in the Washington Post is unlikely to change the minds of ordinary supporters of Trump who have internalized those themes.

False claims about political bias affecting the work of law enforcement and security bureaucracies undoubtedly are partly just partisan rhetoric. But there probably is a genuine difficulty in understanding the mindset and professional ethic of the public servants who work in those bureaucracies. The people making the claims are political animals; those against whom they are making accusations are not. The latter self-selected into work in which apolitical performance of duties is part of the organization’s code of conduct. Refraining from partisan bias is part of their professional raison d’être.

Of course, people working in bureaucracies have personal political views, which they express in the privacy of the voting booth and possibly openly after they retire. But the resistance to letting any such views contaminate their performance of duty as long as they wear a badge in an organization such as the Department of Justice is strong and reflexive. I have seen the strength of that resistance first-hand in the intelligence community, where part of the organizational code of conduct is neutrality with respect not only to parties and candidates but also to policies. It is thus not surprising that many professionals within the department would strive to the point of excess to avoid doing anything that could possibly be construed as departing from neutrality.

The false accusations about bias have multiple costs. They are, in the first instance, slurs against honest people doing their jobs with dedication. They impede the full and proper functioning of something like a law enforcement agency in the current matters involving Trump. They create a constituency for possible moves that really would weaponize law enforcement and make the Department of Justice a political servant of whoever happens to occupy the White House.

Even if those advocating such destructive moves do not get the opportunity to make them, the false accusations encourage over the long term more of the sort of mission-impairing hesitancy that the Post article describes. The damaging falsehoods centered on Trump will lead investigators and prosecutors in the future—faced with cases involving other politicians well after Trump has left the scene—to be afraid to pursue a case vigorously to wherever the facts may lead.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.

Last November, the research nonprofit OpenAI unleashed ChatGPT, its artificial intelligence (AI) powered chatbot, on the world. Mere months before, conversations about AI were relegated to academic conferences and science fiction conventions. But, as ChatGPT exploded to become the fastest-growing consumer application in history, AI rapidly became a kitchen table issue. Now, policymakers are shining a spotlight on the industry and asking the question: how much regulation is necessary to mitigate potential risks without stifling innovation?     

From government reports to briefings and hearings to legislation, AI is the topic du jour on Capitol Hill as lawmakers attempt to answer this question. While legislative proposals regarding AI vary widely, the ethos behind such proposals can generally be grouped into two categories. The first consists of proposals aimed primarily at mitigating potential risks of AI, which typically take a more heavy-handed approach to regulation in the name of consumer protection. The second takes a broader view of the AI ecosystem, attempting to foster innovation and global competitiveness with a more light-touch regulatory regime.

While both approaches are well-intentioned, the latter focusing on innovation and competitiveness holds greater promise. After all, the United States is not the only country developing AI systems, and amidst the Great Tech Rivalry it is essential that we remain globally competitive in cutting-edge technologies. If Washington is too heavy-handed in regulating AI, it risks becoming an innovation desert, like Europe.

The Heavy Hand…

The heavy-handed approach is typified by Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA). As one of the very few members of Congress holding degrees in computer science, Rep. Lieu has been one of the most vocal lawmakers on the question of AI regulation. Just before introducing the first federal piece of legislation itself largely written by an AI, Rep. Lieu opined in the New York Times:

The rapid advancements in AI technology have made it clear that the time to act is now to ensure that AI is used in ways that are safe, ethical and beneficial for society. Failure to do so could lead to a future where the risks of A.I. far outweigh its benefits…. What we need is a dedicated agency to regulate A.I.

Though Rep. Lieu admits that his proposal has little chance of actually passing through Congress this session—and concedes that the first step toward an AI regulator is a “study and report” approach—Lieu and many of his colleagues are hyperfocused on heading off consumer harm that largely remains theoretical. Such an approach seeks to create a regulatory regime based on what these technologies “could” or “might” do in the future.

This prospective framework is antithetical to rapid innovation. For evidence, we need only look to Europe.

Brussels has a long tradition of onerously regulating technologies in the name of mitigating risks to consumers. Take for instance the European Union’s comprehensive data privacy framework, the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR has three primary objectives: protecting consumers with regard to the processing of personal data, protecting the right to the protection of personal data, and ensuring the free movement of personal data within the Union. To differing degrees, the GDPR arguably succeeded at the first two of these goals; the legislation created strong consumer protections around the collection and processing of personal data.

However, the GDPR has mostly failed to achieve the goal of ensuring the free movement of data. This is primarily because data, which flows seamlessly across physical borders, cannot be impeded nearly as easily. Tech platforms and applications have had a difficult time complying with the GDPR, which in turn has restricted the voluntary, free flow of personal information rather than ensured it.

According to one study that examined over 4 million software applications, the implementation of the GDPR “induced the exit of about a third of available apps.” Perhaps even worse, the GDPR has led to a dearth of technological innovation throughout Europe. That same study found that the market entry of new applications halved following the implementation of GDPR.

The European Parliament is now developing legislation that it intended to be “the world’s first comprehensive AI law.” While this proposed EU AI Act is not a one-size-fits-all policy akin to the GDPR and other European tech regulations, it will create strict rules for any system utilizing AI technology. Such strict rules around new applications for AI systems, imposed regardless of concrete, provable harms, are likely to strangle the little commercial innovation around AI that remains in Europe.

…versus the Light Touch

The United States cannot afford to follow in Europe’s footsteps and implement heavy-handed regulations that might hamper innovation for the sake of mitigating unproven harms. With China leading the way in both AI innovation and regulation, we must be considerate in our own approach to both. AI systems certainly present novel and unique risks in practically every aspect of human life. But these new technologies also present novel and unique opportunities that should not be handicapped by a heavy-handed approach driven by moral panic.

As two of my colleagues recently wrote in American Affairs, getting AI regulation right “requires a commonsense approach that can account for both the mind-bending dynamics of cutting edge AI systems, while also right-sizing the risks of AI regulations and AI gone wrong.” While Rep. Ted Lieu and his colleagues in the “sky is falling” camp go too far in the direction of onerous European-like tech regulation, there is another camp that recognizes the importance of a light-touch approach to supporting domestic innovation and global competitiveness.

A prime example of this is the recently introduced legislation from Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Mark Warner (D-VA), and Todd Young (R-IN). Based on the American Technology Leadership Act from the last Congress, this revised proposal would establish a new Office of Global Competition Analysis. The purpose of this new office would be to assess America’s global competitiveness in strategic technologies and provide policy recommendations on ways to protect and improve competitiveness. As Sen. Bennet stated, the goal of the legislation is to “lose our competitive edge in strategic technologies like semiconductors, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence to competitors like China.”

This second camp, as typified by Sen. Bennet and his colleagues, is less reactive, more constructive, considers the importance of global competition, and recognizes that caution is necessary to avoid imposing heavy-handed regulations that hinder innovation and hamper a nation’s ability to keep pace with AI advancements. To be clear, these lawmakers are not ignoring the real risks presented by AI systems. Rather, they are putting such risks into a global perspective and making a more well-informed calculus about the proper level of regulation.

Maintaining American Innovation

By fostering an environment that encourages both domestic and global competition around AI technologies, and by providing a regulatory framework that promotes responsible AI use, the United States can maintain its global leadership in this crucial field. By embracing light regulation focused on global competitiveness, policymakers can encourage investment, attract top AI talent, and foster an environment that enables American companies to lead in AI development. By allowing room for experimentation and adaptability, the United States can remain at the forefront of AI innovation, providing economic and societal benefits while maintaining a competitive edge on the global stage.

Luke Hogg is the director of outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation where his work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and public policy. He is also an innovation fellow at Young Voices. You can follow him on Twitter at @LEHogg.

Image: Unsplash.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing from June 18–19 in an attempt to dial down tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and rekindle high-level communication channels to steady their wobbling bilateral relationship. Blinken’s trip marks the first for a U.S. secretary of state to travel to China since 2018, and he is also the highest-ranking American official to visit since the inauguration of President Joe Biden in January 2021.

In the context of worsening U.S.-PRC relations, Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali last November and agreed to tackle their disagreements responsibly. Blinken originally planned to visit Beijing in February this year. But he scuttled the trip soon after the United States detected and shot down a high-altitude balloon that U.S. intelligence says was used for espionage over North America.

In the intervening months after downing the PRC’s spy balloon, U.S.-China relations declined precipitously. Military-to-military contacts between Washington and Beijing have stalled. Yet, dangerously close encounters between the two militaries by air and sea have not ceased, as shown by the recent near collisions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its support for Taiwan while charging Beijing for considering to give lethal support to Russia for Putin’s aggressions on Ukraine and strengthening the Chinese espionage base in Cuba to intercept and eavesdrop on signals and communication messages crucial to U.S. national security.

Recognizing the dangers accompanying a lack of dialogue, the Biden administration has sought a “thaw” in relations with Beijing. Beijing, however, has countered, accusing Washington of promoting a duplicitous two-pronged approach—seeking dialogue to set up “guardrails” with China on the one hand and forcibly containing China’s legitimate strategic and economic interests on the other. Congress enacting restrictions on the semiconductor trade and mobilizing allies across Europe and Indo-Pacific against the PRC are notable examples.

Thus, when Blinken arrived in Beijing, it’s no wonder his hosts were eager to put the onus of redressing U.S.-China relations on Washington. PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang claimed “that the China-U.S. relationship is at the lowest point” since 1979. Wang Yi, the top foreign affairs official of the Chinese Communist Party, attributed the “root cause” of deterioration to Washington’s “misperceptions toward China.” He demanded that the United States “reflect upon itself” and stop inflating the "China threat.” President Xi posited that the international community expects Washington and Beijing to “coexist in peace and have friendly and cooperative relations.” The Chinese leader asked Blinken to “make more positive contributions to stabilizing China-U.S. relations.”

Blinken’s Three Objectives and Outcomes

Secretary Blinken communicated that the Biden administration values a responsible relationship between Washington and Beijing. He set out three objectives for this trip, all predicated upon an overarching principle: “intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict.”

First, it is necessary to reopen lines of communication so both powers can responsibly manage their relationship and avoid misunderstandings. Second, Blinken asserted the significance of advancing the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, including “speaking directly and candidly” about these concerns with Beijing. Thirdly, he believes the two nations can jointly “explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges.”

How many of these objectives did Blinken achieve in his two-day whirlwind visit to Beijing? According to the secretary’s press conference after his meeting with Xi Jinping and the State Department readout concluding the visit, there were no breakthroughs. This outcome was expected, but there are optimistic signs that communication is back on track, and both nations recognize the urgency to halt a downward spiral in relations. The State Department described the meetings as “candid, substantive, and constructive.” China’s Foreign Ministry reported “candid, in-depth and constructive talks at length on the overall bilateral ties and important issues.” Beijing also voiced the need to build “a stable, predictable and constructive relationship with the U.S.”

On areas of possible cooperation, the United States and China promised to reinforce “people-to-people” exchanges between students, scholars, and businesses, as well as increase direct flights between the two countries. Transnational issues like climate change, North Korea’s nuclear program, global economic stability, food security, international health, and the fentanyl crisis were also identified as areas for future discussion and collaboration.

Yet, for areas of contentions, deep fissures remain. Though Beijing has reassured the secretary that “it is not and will not provide lethal assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine,” and Blinken confirmed there is no evidence contradicting that, he still raised concerns that Chinese companies “may be providing technology” for Moscow to bolster their military capacity. Indeed, in China, the ubiquitous influence of the CCP makes it challenging to distinguish between transactions made by state-owned businesses from those of private enterprises.

As the United States and its allies stepped up efforts to ban China from access to advanced and sensitive technologies crucial to military and economic dominance, Beijing has as well taken punitive actions on American and foreign businesses operating domestically. Blinken sought to “disabuse” the Chinese view that the United States was aiming at “economically containing” or “decoupling” from China. He explained that the United States is merely “de-risking,” or “investing in our own capacities and in secure, resilient supply chains; pushing for level playing fields for our workers and our companies; defending against harmful trade practice; and protecting our critical technologies so that they aren’t used against us.” This is in line with the notion of “small yard and high fence” coined by Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, referring to “implementing carefully tailored restrictions on the most advanced semiconductor technology exports to China, premised on straightforward national security concerns.” The PRC wasn’t persuaded, as Wang asked the Blinken to “lift illegal unilateral sanctions against China, stop suppressing China's scientific and technological advances.” Xi told Blinken “neither side should try to shape the other side by its own will, still less deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development."

Differences over Taiwan

The Taiwan Strait remains the most rancorous sticking point for the United States and China. Beijing asserted that Taiwan is the “core of China’s core interests,” which “has no room for compromise or concession.” Blinken, nonetheless, reiterated the one-China policy mantra derived from the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. He reminded Beijing of “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” The United States “does not support Taiwan independence” and is “opposed to any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.” Washington insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences and meeting its responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act, including ensuring that the island democracy can defend itself from invasion.

Regarding crisis management, the Xi government has rebuffed Blinken’s persistent requests to restart the military-to-military engagement put on hold since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit last year. The confrontational incidents between their respective fighter jets in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have made restoring these connections highly relevant. Still, Beijing may continue to act recklessly and brazenly in these scenarios to deter U.S. military movements.

Biden’s Optimism and Reality Check

It is unclear whether high-level diplomacy can meaningfully change the trajectory of U.S.-Chinese relations, which is still veering toward greater antagonism. But at the very least, resuming talks and contacts will allow each side to convey their intentions more clearly. Blinken’s visit will likely pave the way for more high-level official meetings between Washington and Beijing, including potential visits from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, and Climate Envoy John Kerry in the coming months. Beijing is particularly interested in meeting with American officials in charge of economic policy given China’s economic slowdown and their anxiousness over Washington’s bans on foreign investment and export of high-technologies to China. Xi is reportedly looking forward to his first visit to the United States since 2017 to attend the APEC meeting in San Francisco, where he is expected to meet with Biden.

Domestic politics, however, are at play. The Biden administration has already received mounting criticisms from congressional Republicans for slow-walking the delivery of weapons to Taiwan and the investigations into the February spy balloon incident and the origins of COVID-19. While calling Xi a “dictator” kept in the dark about the spy balloon incursion, Biden argued that the incident was more “embarrassing than intentional” for Beijing. The president plans to meet with his Chinese counterpart again to talk about their “legitimate differences” and areas where they can get along.

The president’s optimism aside, it remains an objective fact that U.S.-PRC relations are so brittle and their mutual trust level so low that any new conflicts can plunge their fragile détente into another disequilibrium. The PRC’s growing power and ambitions cannot but lead to heightened anxieties and vigilant responses from Washington. The January and November 2024 Presidential Elections in Taiwan and the United States, respectively, will introduce new uncertainties. Beijing’s belligerent reactions toward Pelosi’s Taiwan trip last August and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s transits to America this April illustrated how the island’s upcoming political transition—assuming another more nationalist candidate is elected—may further sharpen Xi’s conviction that the situation requires further escalation or even invasion. Come November 2024, Biden’s intense competition with the PRC may not be sufficient to satisfy the burgeoning domestic and bipartisan anti-China sentiments and ensure his reelection. A more hawkish White House will derail the modus vivendi that Blinken has worked so assiduously to reconstruct.

The Biden administration needs to be more clear-eyed about the extent and practicality of stabilizing relations with the PRC after years of adversarial postures from both sides. Whether the American public is willing to accept the president’s approach and whether Beijing is genuinely willing to reciprocate Washington’s overtures is not at all assured.

Dean P. Chen, Ph.D., is an associate professor of Political Science at Ramapo College of New Jersey.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Pacific Islands are strategically important to U.S. ambitions to balance China. Although President Biden’s decision to cancel his trip to Papua New Guinea was unfortunate, the State Department managed to ink two important agreements elsewhere in the region.

On May 22 and 23, State announced the signing of Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreements with the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia. The pacts will govern U.S. relations with both countries for twenty years. Ambassador Joseph Yun, the lead U.S. negotiator, hopes to finalize negotiations with the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands were vital elements in the U.S. strategy to defeat Imperial Japan during World War II. Collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS), they remain critical to U.S. defense today. While the COFAs establish uniquely close relations between the parties in several respects, the key provisions are the exclusive military rights granted in return for economic assistance.

The COFAs grant Washington “full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to” the FAS. The exclusive right to operate armed forces and bases throughout the FAS gives the United States an irreplaceable “strategic denial” right, granting it the ability to prevent foreign militaries from entering the FAS zone or using it as a base of operations.

These denial rights have grown in importance due to China’s military buildup and expanding footprint in the Western Pacific. Micronesia, the subregion that includes the FAS and Guam, is included in the Second Island Chain, making it critical for stationing U.S. military assets for any military contingency in the Indo-Pacific.

The Biden administration has proposed funding the COFAs at $7.1 billion for the next twenty years—approximately $300 million annually for all three countries. Thus, for less than one-tenth of the current assistance to Ukraine, the United States can ensure it maintains exclusive military access to these critical Pacific islands for at least two more decades.

Once negotiations with the Marshalls conclude, it will be up to Congress to amend all three COFAs and appropriate the funding. This can be done most expeditiously by following the Joint Resolution model, which Congress used last time it renewed the COFAs.

The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2003 passed as a Joint Resolution, authorizing and appropriating $3.5 billion for Micronesia and the Marshalls in one legislative vehicle. Given the strategic imperative and broad consensus among conservatives and liberals in support of the COFAs, a similar Joint Resolution-based approach would offer the best chance at renewing the COFAs before they expire this September.

Another option is for a stand-alone bill, or bills, to pass through regular order in the House and Senate. Congressional leadership could task its respective chambers to fast-track these bills, although there is no guarantee they will complete this process before the current COFAs expire.

A third option for renewal would be to insert implementing text into a larger vehicle, such as the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) or appropriations legislation. It has become the norm for these “must-pass” vehicles to incorporate other important priorities that don’t pass through regular order due to congressional dysfunction. Depending on the legislative vehicle, the policy provisions could pass without any funding attached, requiring separate appropriations and complicating the process.

Should the process drag out beyond the September 30 deadline, some COFAs will require interim funding. When assistance funding expired in 2009, the United States and Palau reached a bilateral agreement setting new levels of assistance. True to form, Congress failed to authorize and fund the deal until 2018. In the interim, the legislature provided partial funding in successive appropriations bills. Stopgap measures such as these undermine U.S. credibility in the eyes of potential regional partners.

For decades, U.S. foreign policy has largely neglected the Pacific Islands. Today, the stakes are much higher. Former Micronesian President David Panuelo recently warned about China’s increased “gray zone” and political warfare tactics to coerce his country into accepting Chinese bribes and aligning more closely with Beijing. Last year, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, its first in the region, which allows for deploying Chinese military personnel on the islands in case of civil unrest.

The United States is a Pacific nation with vital interests and key allies across the region. Defending them requires America to be present across the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean. Congress has a once-every-two-decades opportunity to secure privileged access to three Pacific Island nations at a reasonable price tag, reaffirming America’s commitment to the region while denying China opportunities to expand its reach into the FAS.

Congress must not let the opportunity to re-balance the Pacific regional order slip away.

Andrew J. Harding, co-editor of “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China,” is a researcher at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.

Image: Shutterstock.

Speaker Kevin McCarthy and President Joe Biden should be congratulated for getting Congress to pass the debt limit deal in a timely manner with large majorities in both houses of Congress. Given the fact that we have a divided government, it is not surprising that some members of both parties, like the Republican’s Freedom Caucus and the Democrat’s Progressive Caucus are unhappy with some parts of the bill.

Among the most vociferous critics, of what they believe is a fatal flaw in the deal, have been Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and five of his Senate Republican colleagues. These six senators contend that the adoption of President Biden’s proposed defense budget of $886 billion for FY2024 will undermine our security. According to Graham and his colleagues, the Biden defense budget for FY2024 of $866 billion is at least $40 billion short of what the Pentagon needs to keep pace with the Chinese military buildup because, when one factors in inflation for the FY2024 budget, it actually represents a real decline from the FY2023 budget of $841 billion. Senator Graham actually called the Biden defense budget a joke and said if Republicans adopt it, they will be doing a disservice to the party of Ronald Reagan.

But close examination reveals that, for at least five reasons, this argument is without merit.

First, the five-year plan for defense spending that Biden proposed in early 2021 projected that he would be spending $775 billion in FY2024 for defense. The amount approved in the budget deal is over $100 billion or 14 percent more than that projection and more than enough to keep pace with inflation. Moreover, in real terms, it is more than we spent at the height of the Reagan buildup and $146 billion, or 20 percent, above former President Donald Trump's last budget of $740 billion in FY2021.

Second, many of those supporters of spending more on defense argue that, because of the mandatory spending caps imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011, often referred to as sequestration, our military capabilities actually declined over the past decade. But this argument is also without merit. The Pentagon got around sequestration by using the warfighting budget, which was supposed to fund only our military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore was not subject to sequestration, as a slush fund. For example, the Pentagon used funds from the warfighting budget to fund programs like the European Defense Initiative—which had nothing to do with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but did improve our contributions to NATO, thus helping us deal with Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. In fact, the Budget Control Act did not undermine our military capabilities. For example, in 2016, six years after the enactment of the Act, General David Petraeus, who commanded our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and also ran the CIA, argued in a 2016 article that the state of our military was “awesome.”  And in his four years in office, former President Trump actually increased defense spending by over $100 billion.

Third, Senator Graham and many of his supporters argue that the Pentagon can and should get more money because the Department of Defense’s share of the gross national product is at historic lows. This argument is also without merit. Neither defense nor any other federal program is entitled to a fixed share of the GDP. For example, what would happen if the threat increased, and the economy declined? Should defense spending be reduced? Moreover, at its current level, the Pentagon spends more than the next ten countries in the world combined, including three times more than China and ten times more than Russia.

Fourth, keeping the FY2024 defense budget level will prevent us from spending the appropriate amount on military equipment to help Ukraine fight its war with Russia and to deter China from invading Taiwan. But this argument ignores the fact that the $48.9 billion in military aid that has already been authorized for Ukraine is funded separately from the proposed $886 billion budget and Taiwan is actually paying for the vast majority of the equipment that we are and will be sending to them.

Fifth, the argument that the Pentagon needs more funds to protect our security ignores the fact that much of the money that the Pentagon receives is wasted. According to a recent 60 Minutes interview with Shay Assad—the former senior contract and awards negotiator for the Pentagon under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump—military contractors routinely overcharge the Department of Defense for what it buys each year because there is not much competition for defense contracts. According to Assad, the average profitability for defense items rose in the Cold War from 12 to 15 percent to about 40 percent today. This position is shared by Speaker McCarthy and Dick Durbin (D-IL), the Senate’s number two Democrat. Durbin argues that one of the reasons that Pentagon spending keeps increasing is because of price gouging from defense contractors. McCarthy points out that the $866 billion agreed in the budget deal is the most we have ever spent on defense and that since the Pentagon has failed its last five audits, he knows that there are many efficiencies to be found.

If the Appropriations Committees keep these points in mind, they should not feel it is necessary to add funds to the FY2024 defense budget which is already at historic highs. In fact, the party of Ronald Reagan needs to realize that, in real terms, this budget is almost $200 billion above the peak of Reagan’s defense budget build-up.

By supporting the bipartisan deal, including the defense portion, the party of Ronald Reagan will not only provide the Pentagon with what it needs to protect our security, but also help the country deal with the immense budget deficits that will undermine our security if allowed to continue.

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Army.

The Saudi regime has long been correctly criticized—including during the recent LIV golf saga—for its abysmal human rights record, including the suppression of dissent at home and the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. And under Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS’s) leadership, Saudi foreign policy was initially fairly aggressive—for example, its regional rivalry with Iran, sanctions against Qatar for being too friendly to Iran, and the aggressive prosecution of a regional war in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that has killed way too many civilians. Yet as MBS’ leadership has matured, so has Saudi foreign policy into a more pragmatic and neutral stance, resulting in greater effectiveness.

The prince has seen three American presidents who want to cut back on American engagement in the Middle East, he feels that Saudi Arabia must do more for itself and its own security. For example, MBS refused to follow the United States and the West into imposing sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine; instead, the kingdom increased its imports of Russian petroleum products. In addition, Riyadh has diversified its foreign relations in general and especially with China, the largest buyer of Saudi oil and its greatest trading partner. The fruits of better relations with China have been realized with successful Chinese mediation between Iran and the kingdom, restoring diplomatic relations. This rapprochement may also help quell or solve other conflicts between the two countries in the Middle East, especially the brutal Saudi bog in Yemen.

However, Saudis are clearly trying to broaden their foreign policy, in part, to get the United States to pay more attention to the oil-soaked kingdom. The kingdom’s officials haven’t been subtle about this blackmail, claiming they preferred the United States to be their principal ally but needed to broaden their diplomatic horizons, given the lack of U.S. commitment. They have noted that former President Donald Trump did nothing in 2019 when drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities—allegedly masterminded by their then-arch foe Iran—temporarily stifled roughly half of the nation’s oil output. The Biden administration hasn’t been spared either. MBS is quite conscious of how, during the 2020 election, then-candidate Joe Biden promised to make the Saudi prince a “pariah” over the killing of Khashoggi. Two years later, the Biden administration was angered when MBS allowed the OPEC+ oil cartel to cut production, raising short-term oil prices before the U.S. midterm elections.

No one can begrudge the Saudis for diversifying their diplomatic relations, prioritizing their own national interests, and realizing that they need to do more to safeguard their own security. The region-wide benefits of easing relations with Iran in the Middle East through Chinese mediation have enhanced Saudi Arabian security and should have facilitated the much-needed reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific. In fact, over time, the Saudis had become too dependent on the arrangement reached during World War II between then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and then-King Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud for the United States to defend Saudi oil fields in exchange for access to the oil.

If Saudi Arabia can be more pragmatic about its foreign policy, the United States can and should be more pragmatic about the Roosevelt-Saud arrangement, which was never an ideal arrangement in the first place—the overestimation by World War II and post-war U.S. presidents and policymakers of the importance of Saudi Arabia in the world oil markets have demonstrated as much. A more pragmatic U.S. policy needs to debunk such long-held myths about that market.

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a major oil producer and exporter, and is also an influential member of the OPEC+ cartel. But it alone cannot control the long-term price of crude oil. It may have an influence on the short- and medium-term price of oil, but cheating has always plagued natural resource cartels. Many producers have an interest in saying they will abide by their official production quotas but can make more money if they secretly export above the quota. Of course, in the long run, this severely impedes the ability of any cartel to keep the price of a commodity above the natural market price.

One added reason that the United States can be more pragmatic about cozying up to Saudi Arabia—which the Biden administration, despite its initial hostile rhetoric, has been doing again—is that it is likely to be cheaper to just buy oil at the going world market price rather than to spend U.S. taxpayer dollars to try and defend something that really doesn’t need defending. Saudi Arabia, Iran, or any other producer doesn’t even need to directly sell oil to the United States; putting oil on the market from anywhere reduces the world price.

Finally, the oil market is ever-changing, and the heavy U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area is less needed now than ever before (and even that was a collective illusion in American policymakers’ minds). The fracking revolution in the United States has again made the United States the world’s largest oil producer, greatly enhancing U.S. “energy security.”

Congratulations to the Saudis for pragmatically diversifying their foreign policy. But Washington should not succumb to MBS’s attempt to play off improved relations with other powers—for example, China and Russia—to get an increased U.S. security commitment. The United States fell for that trick during the Cold War, when non-strategic developing countries flirted with the Soviet Union to get more out of Washington. Similarly, in the current Saudi case, the United States is spending vast amounts of money defending oil that is being exported mainly to China. America can no longer afford to be everywhere in the world. It ought to emulate Saudi pragmatism, which in the present moment means transferring attention and military resources from the Middle East to the more strategically significant Indo-Pacific region.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow with the Independent Institute and author of several books, including, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.

China’s increased military capabilities in recent years, coupled with frequent military exercises near Taiwan, raise concern about a military invasion. Once rare acts, provocative actions such as China’s entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone now occur frequently, in part to coerce Taiwanese officials towards policies more in their favor. War may still be unlikely, with less than a quarter of international relations experts polled earlier this year expecting war across the Taiwan Strait this year. That the United States remains a key defensive partner for Taiwan likely depresses Chinese confidence in such an invasion, with Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu stating war with America would be an “unbearable disaster” for the world.

However, does the Taiwanese public believe the United States is committed to Taiwan’s defense? At one extreme, an overly confident public may balk at increased defense spending or military reforms in the belief that these shortcomings will be covered by Washington. Meanwhile, a public with no confidence may feel its options are limited to increase defense spending, in which it cannot expect to match that of China or find a means to placate it.

Several factors presumably lead to a confident Taiwanese public. After all, the United States has a long history of aiding Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, even after the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, as the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has provided the framework for continued arms sales and military training. Taiwan also remains strategically important as a barrier to Chinese naval expansion into critical sea lanes, and defending Taiwan serves as a deterrence against further Chinese aggression elsewhere. Moreover, not only has every president pledged support for Taiwan since the enactment of the TRA, but also a broad bipartisan consensus exists alongside an  American public that appears increasingly sympathetic to efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

However, there are many reasons for the Taiwanese to be less optimistic. The United States maintains a deliberate policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its commitments to Taiwan in part to deter actions from either side of the strait that would alter the status quo. Despite beliefs that President Joe Biden may have been signaling a shift in policy with a firmer commitment to Taiwan’s defense, White House officials clarified no intention of such. Nor have criticisms of strategic ambiguity, including suggestions that the policy has “run its course” and fails to restrain China, led to its revision.

Likewise, even if the Biden administration and members of Congress were sincere in their statements about defending Taiwan, the potential costs of a military conflict with China would be significant, especially after decades of Beijing investing in military modernization, making any intervention on behalf of Taiwan beyond arms sales much more difficult. Simulations also suggest the difficulty that the United States could defend Taiwan. Simulations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found the United States able to defend Taiwan, but with tens of thousands of U.S. casualties and associated equipment losses, opening questions as to whether Washington and the broader American public are ready for such a commitment. Related, while the United States repeatedly references commitments to Taiwan, where this falls within the broader priorities of U.S. foreign policy is less clear.

To identify Taiwanese public concerns, I surveyed 1,105 Taiwanese via a web survey (implemented by Macromill Embrain) from May 25 to June 5, using quota sampling for age, gender, and region. I asked respondents: “How confident are you that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China were to start a war against Taiwan?”

Overall, only 35.47 percent of respondents stated they were fairly or very confident in U.S. defensive commitments. However, confidence largely divides on partisan lines, with 73.65 percent of supporters for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) fairly or very confident, compared to only 15 percent and 18.98 percent of supporters of the two main opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) respectively. Additional analyses found that, despite assumptions to the contrary, concern about a potential Chinese invasion did not correspond with levels of confidence, while the partisan divisions remain statistically significant after controlling for age, gender, income, education, and general views of both the United States and China. The results suggest that, despite strengthening informal relations, including “the most comprehensive trade agreement” since 1979, and reiteration by the Biden administration of commitments, the Taiwanese public remains skeptical of this commitment.

One interpretation of the partisan divergence would suggest that the DPP base, in part responding to elite cues from party officials, has engaged in wishful thinking, overconfident about the depth of American defensive commitments and the appeal to protect democracies in light of recent efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. Another interpretation would suggest that KMT and TPP supporters are more likely to view American commitments as cheap talk, however well-intentioned, in the absence of incurred political and economic costs to defend Taiwan and that the United States, acting in its own national interests and constrained by a loss-sensitive public, would fail to meet expectations. Unfortunately, my survey did not unpack confidence further in terms of specific actions (e.g., providing additional arms, and coordination of air and naval forces), but the results may suggest how strategic ambiguity contributes to divergent perceptions in Taiwan.

While the United States remains Taiwan’s strongest security partner and the only one to provide arms sales, ultimately Taiwan’s defense requires both external assistance as well as broad investment in domestic production and reforms in training and personnel. Last year, efforts to address the former were clear as Taiwan increased its defense budget by 13.9 percent for 2023. However, my survey found a divided public on this increase as well, with 44.62 percent believing it was about the right amount, 35.48 percent too much, and 19.91 percent too little. Again, views diverged sharply on party lines, with a majority of DPP supporters (59.14 percent) thinking the current about was about right, compared to 59.38 percent of KMT supporters and 43.07 percent of TPP supporters stating it was too much, likely in part a function of lower expectations of conflict or that such spending may exacerbate miscalculations on China’s part. Regarding training and personnel, the expansion of military conscription currently maintains broad public approval. However, its effects may be limited without a shift in training towards increasingly technology-dependent specialized knowledge.

Timothy S. Rich is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Public Opinion Lab at Western Kentucky University. His research focuses on public opinion and electoral politics, with an emphasis on Taiwan and South Korea.

Image: Shutterstock.

Western sanctions have isolated Russia from its usual Western trading partners, necessitating its move into new markets. This primarily includes countries and regions where governments have not participated in the sanctions against Russia. Amidst this endeavor to diversify its economic relations, Moscow has demonstrated a keen interest in Africa, where it increasingly seeks to involve itself in a number of industries.

For Western policymakers and observers, the dynamics of Moscow’s engagement with Africa is notable; partially for geopolitical concerns, partially for economic competition considerations, and partially because they help highlight what many in the West believe is a policy failure: the inability to inflict more severe economic damage on Russia is in part driven by the fact that the rest of the world was not willing to follow the West’s lead.

How and What Does Russia Invest in Africa?

In an interview late last year, Russian academic Natalia Piskunova indicated that Russia’s policymaking process regarding African investment is divided into two levels: what the Russian state does and what private Russian businesses do.

According to Piskunova, in the years before 2010, when Moscow started showing more open interest in Africa, Russian companies with interests in the African market such as Rusal, Rosneft, and Lukoil unsuccessfully lobbied for government support for their operations on the continent. It was only after the Russian government gradually began showing interest after 2010 that the state and companies began cooperating more.

Russian companies, regardless of whether they are private, state-owned, or have a level of state participation, receive assistance from the Kremlin in the form of subsidies and tax-free agreements. Aside from making up for lost time, this support enables Russian business interests to better establish themselves and expand operations. This is worth noting, as Moscow is particularly interested in some specific key fields and industries.

Logistics, Finance, and Sanctions Evasion

Many African ports are essential in terms of international trade logistics, including those in North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria), East Africa (Kenya), and Southern Africa (South Africa). Likewise, African airports, particularly regional airline hubs such as Cairo, are also helpful for Moscow, as Russian businesses and tourists make use of flights to Africa. One example is Ethiopian Airlines, which renewed its flights to Russia in August 2022. This access is important for Russia because the EU has closed its airspace to Russian-owned and-registered planes.

On a more cynical level, Africa’s trade infrastructure also serves an avenue for evading sanctions. These countries do not support Western sanctions and, unlike the European Union, have not prohibited Russian ships from using their ports. Russian ships can thus undergo repairs in these ports if necessary and pay for such services. As China and India account for 40 percent of Russia’s oil exports and the Red Sea is a significant transit route for oil tankers, port access in the Red Sea’s littoral countries—Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti—is also crucial. In addition, the Port of Cape Town in South Africa is useful for Russian oligarchs—they avoid having their luxury yachts seized by docking them in countries that have not joined the sanctions.

On the financial side, the largely state-dominated banking sector on the continent can help Russia conduct international banking and financial transactions in the face of sanctions elsewhere. African finance uses China’s UnionPay payments system, which is essential for Russia given that Visa and Mastercard have left the Russian market.

Russia’s political and military backing of various regimes on the continent also grants it an additional financial boon: access to gold from Sudan and diamonds from the Central African Republic. These resources are essential for the Russian budget, making the country’s economy more resilient to foreign sanctions, especially since gold and diamonds are not as easily frozen and seized as other financial assets.

Extractive Industries: Mining, Agriculture, Oil & Gas

For the Kremlin, African gold and diamonds are not just financial assets. Russia’s mining industry, which has considerable expertise, has found considerable success in the continent and plays a major role in Moscow’s policymaking.

In Angola, the Russian company Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond miner, is one of the owners of Catoca, the world’s fourth-largest diamond mine. The country is important to Moscow because of its copper reserves, which are crucial in producing machinery and high technology, especially considering the fact that Russian copper ore is hard to extract. There are concerns that the sanctions against Russia and Alrosa may disrupt mining operations through a lack of spare parts and machinery. Meanwhile, in Guinea, Rusal, one of the world’s largest aluminum companies and owned by sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, owns Dian, the world’s largest bauxite deposit. About half of Rusal’s aluminum ore bauxite production comes from its mining operations in Guinea.

Africa is also rich in “rare earth” minerals, which are essential in the production of hi-tech devices (such as smartphones and monitors), energy conversion systems (wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, and electrical machinery), and military equipment (lasers and radar). While the West, particularly the United States, has been wary of exploiting these elements owing to environmental considerations, the Russians and the Chinese have made inroads in Africa to secure these vital resources. As a result, Russia has leverage with the West, as the technology needed for transitioning to a green economy relies on these minerals. Even Russia’s Wagner Group, a private military outfit with Kremlin ties, frequently provides security to African governments in exchange for access to natural resources. It will most likely be compensated for its collaboration with the military junta in Mali, for example, through access to uranium, diamond, and gold mines.

Russia’s agriculture and fertilizer industry also enjoys success in Africa, granting it much policymaking heft in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Agriculture views African nations as worthy agricultural partners. Its importance is reflected in its leadership: the ministry itself is headed by Dmitry Patrushev, the son of Nikolai Patrushev, who is the secretary of the Russian Security Council.

Relatedly, Russia is a major partner of the continent in terms of food and fertilizer exports. Food accounts for 40 percent of the consumer basket in Africa, which is directly impacted by the war in Ukraine, as Russia and Ukraine account for nearly 30 percent of global wheat exports. More than 50 percent of wheat imports in Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Sudan, and Somalia come from Russia and Ukraine. In addition, in 2021 Russia, was the leading exporter of nitrogen fertilizers, the most used fertilizer on the continent, and the second-biggest exporter of potassic and phosphorous fertilizers, accounting for 14 percent of global exports.

Somewhat unexpectedly, Russia’s oil and gas industries are not as successful in Africa as elsewhere owing to political security considerations. This is because oil and gas operation processes—extraction, refining, transportation, etc.—require specialized facilities, which themselves require significant capital and time to develop. For example, Russian energy giants such as Gazprom and Rosneft returned to Libya after leaving the country owing to NATO’s 2011 intervention there. Yet while countries such as Libya appeal to Russia as an investment destination, Moscow also views security and political stability as preconditions for the influx of capital, thus putting certain limits in place.

Nuclear Energy

In contrast to the oil and gas industries, Russia’s nuclear industry has recorded successes in Africa. Rosatom, a state-owned nuclear energy company, is active in constructing nuclear power plants and helping African nations address their energy supply needs. In both economic and political terms, nuclear power plant projects are suitable investments for Moscow, as they create a dependency on its nuclear expertise and materials.

After a delay of several years, in July 2022 the concrete was poured for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, which Rosatom will build in the town of El-Dabaa. The project was agreed to in 2017 by Russian president Vladimir Putin and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, and is “the largest Russian-Egyptian cooperation project” since the 1950s. Although South Korea has introduced sanctions against Russia because of the Ukraine invasion, a state-owned Korean company, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, will provide turbine-related equipment and construction services at the El-Dabaa plant.

Other countries are also potential partners for the Russian nuclear energy industry and Rosatom going forward, as the continent’s growing population forces it to address the issue of energy supply, with potential clients including South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, and Rwanda. It is worth mentioning that South Africa planned to build more nuclear plants, with Russia’s Rosatom as one of the bidders. One project was announced by former South African president Jacob Zuma, only to be canceled by his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, in 2018 for being too expensive. In 2017, the South African High Court declared the contract between South Africa and Rosatom on increasing nuclear capabilities at South Africa’s only nuclear power station, Koeberg, to be unlawful.

Defence Industry

Speaking of creating dependencies, Russia’s defense industry plays a prominent role in Moscow’s economic collaboration with Africa. Between 2015 and 2019 the Russian government signed nineteen agreements related to military cooperation with African governments, focusing on weapon sales. Russia’s presence in the African arms market is expedited by the fact that many national army arsenals come from the Soviet Union when Moscow was a major weapon supplier to the continent. In addition, Russia does not place conditionalities on arms transactions framed around human rights and governance standards. From 2017 to 2021, Moscow provided almost half of Africa’s imported military equipment (44 percent), followed by the United States (17 percent), China (10 percent), and France (6.1 percent). Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Uganda are among the largest buyers of Russian weaponry.

It remains unclear how much the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and disruptions in global supply chains in recent years have and will further impact Russian arms exports to the continent, in terms of both delivering new equipment and providing maintenance for old equipment. Russia does appear willing to fight for its markets, however. In August 2022, it held its “Army 2022” military exhibition with visitors from seventy-two countries, during which Putin said it was ready to share its weapons with its allies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Other Interests: Tourism and Pharmaceuticals

A number of other industries factor into Russia’s relationship with African countries, though with mixed results.

Tourism is one of the winners. Consider, for example, Russian tourism in Egypt. Before the Ukraine war, tourists from Russia and Ukraine made up around 40 percent of beach holidaymakers in Egypt. However, at the start of the war, hotel occupancy rates in Egypt’s Red Sea resorts dropped by 35 to 40 percent. That fall is now being reversed: in August 2022 Egypt was the second most popular destination for Russian tourists, after Turkey and ahead of the United Arab Emirates. In terms of wealthier Russian tourists, from the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 to December 2022, premium travel from Russia to Egypt went up by 181 percent. This suggests that Egyptian tourism has profited from the war in Ukraine, to the extent that Egypt is considering introducing the Russian payment system Mir in Red Sea resorts.

Russia’s pharmaceutical industry has seen less success. A good example of this is Moscow’s attempts to promote its Sputnik V vaccine against COVID-19 on the African continent through so-called “vaccine diplomacy,” which largely failed. This was owing to issues with vaccine efficiency, high prices, and delayed deliveries—as well as the fact that the World Health Organization has not approved it.

The Consequences of War

Given that African nations are still developing and that Russia’s primary economic goal in the short and medium term is withstanding the impact of Western sanctions, there is a limit to Moscow’s economic engagement with the continent. However, Russia and African nations will use any opportunity to boost economic ties.

Overall, Russia’s turn towards the Global South, including and especially Africa, may turn out to be one of the most defining legacies of the Ukraine war. The Global South countries may not wield the financial heft of the Western economies, but their landmass, population, and resources make them important partners for non-Western powers like Russia and China. This is something that Western policymakers ought to keep in mind.

Dr. Vuk Vuksanovic is a Senior Researcher at Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate at LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank within the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Follow him on Twitter at @v_vuksanovic.

This article is based on a report he authored for the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

Image: Shutterstock.

One of the United States’ most pressing interests in the Middle East is maritime security, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz, in which oil tankers move approximately 17 million barrels of oil daily. To protect this vital interest, America has consistently maintained thousands of U.S. troops and military installations in the Persian Gulf. But an increasing Chinese naval presence in the Gulf has some in Washington speculating that Gulf states are shifting away from the U.S. sphere of influence and towards Beijing’s. According to this argument, China will attempt to assert its newfound dominance in the Gulf—similar to its attempts in the South China Sea—and threaten U.S. maritime energy access in the region, causing enormous damage to the U.S. economy.

Yet rather than viewing it as a threat, Washington should recognize there are benefits to Chinese involvement in the Middle East. These include regional stability, as already evidenced by China’s facilitating recognition agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Middle East also has the potential to become a financial and military liability for Beijing, which could give the United States a leg up in its current Sino-American rivalry.

For one, if China were to become entangled in Middle Eastern conflicts, this would drain resources and reduce its ability to challenge American power on other fronts. For instance, China has invested close to $200 billion in Latin America, which extends its ability to influence regional politics. It has been pressuring South American nations—Argentina in particular—to permit the construction of military bases. But if China were to become preoccupied with problems in the Middle East, it may force them to deprioritize these other projects. 

Beijing is already moving in this direction. For example, China’s domestic persecution of Muslims has spawned dozens of militant Chinese Muslim groups in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There have been bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan targeting Chinese nationals, and ISIS is putting China in its crosshairs. Moreover, China has also built a naval base in Djibouti—with other potential base sites in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—and deployed thousands of special forces in Syria. For extremist groups like ISIS, these are rich potential targets.

Simultaneously, concerns about China wielding its newfound regional influence to harm American economic interests—especially when it comes to energy affairs—don’t carry much weight. Because of the United States’ firm integration into world trade, any harm to American regional maritime or energy security would damage other international actors that China is trying to strengthen relations with. Directly threatening America in this way is thus antithetical to China’s own goals. Barring the collateral damage, such moves would also invite retaliation. The United States has considerable influence over the South China Sea, its regional states, and other areas vital to Chinese influence and trade. If Beijing were to exercise its influence in the Middle East in such a way that directly harmed U.S. economic interests, Washington could easily counter back.

There are some proactive measures the United States can take if it wishes to maximize costly risks to China. To start, Washington could reduce the common interests between China and the region’s inhabitants while still leaving plenty of room for Chinese overreach. For example, acknowledging China’s peacekeeping efforts in a positive light would remove mutual animosity towards the United States as a shared interest. With America no longer decrying Chinese peacekeeping efforts, fewer actors will see cooperating with China as a way of “defying” America. The United States should also focus on scaling down its extensive military presence in the Middle East, leaving gaps that Beijing may try to fill. This way, Chinese interests and forces end up becoming salient targets for militant jihadists in the face of an increasingly distant America. 

The United States should reconsider its current attitudes toward China’s expansion in the Middle East and take it for what it is: a chance to let China make costly mistakes. Washington needs to acknowledge that not everything China intends to do in the region will threaten U.S. interests. Not only that, but some of China’s initiatives may bring about stability in places that America has historically failed to stabilize. All the while, this approach can give Washington a leg up over its rival by keeping Beijing’s hands full. Only in well-defined instances where U.S. interests are directly threatened should Washington act decisively. Otherwise, all the United States needs to do is cautiously observe events unfold and avoid premature intervention.

Simeone Miller is a Middle East security analyst and a current graduate student in the Social Sciences and Globalization MA program at California State University, San Bernardino. He has previously worked as a researcher at the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism and a Marcellus Policy Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society.

Garrett Ehinger is a China analyst who holds a bachelor’s in Biomedical Science with a minor in Mandarin Chinese from Brigham Young University in Idaho. He is currently a master’s student at the University of Utah studying public health. He has studied Chinese culture and language for over a decade.

Image: Shutterstock.

Unless its wildfires cause the skies in New York City to turn the color of a sci-fi dystopia, Americans tend not to think much about Canada. But you know who has not forgotten about our neighbor to the north? China’s ruler, Xi Jinping.

As part of China’s unfriendly competition with the West, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman appears to have overseen a far-reaching and complicated effort to advance Beijing’s interests through direct interference in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Those elections were conducted amidst a hostage crisis. In 2018, China kidnapped two Canadian nationals in response to Ottawa’s decision to detain the chief financial officer of Huawei at the Trump administration’s request. Public reporting suggests the People’s Republic of China’s covert operations were aimed at defeating anti-Chinese candidates for office, “grooming” future political stars in the Vancouver municipal elections, and securing a government led by Justin Trudeau—but a weakened one, reliant on minor parties for confidence and supply (as it happened, the actual result).

The rest of the world only knows about these distressing allegations due to an anonymous source in the Canadian intelligence services, whose identity and true motivations remain unknown. But if these allegations are even remotely true, it would do more than merely rock the Trudeau government; it would be yet another data point that China is embarking on a full-spectrum drive against the democratic West, including by targeting Western publics. To put it mildly, more than Canadian interests are at stake in getting to answers.

At first, it seemed as if we all might soon get clarity. The prime minister ordered two closed-door probes into Chinese chicanery, and then appointed an independent special rapporteur to conduct his own review and make a determination on whether to hold a public inquiry. This is a robust process where a commission is imbued with authoritative power (including subpoena authority and the ability to call witnesses) to pursue a mission of public enlightenment on a thorny and vital issue. Given that the most troubling allegations of Chinese interference seemed to hew in the direction of benefitting Trudeau’s Liberals, such an approach seemed amply warranted and was generally expected.

Despite not having a parliamentary system, we Americans know the value of such independent commissions. After the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, President George W. Bush and Congress agreed to empanel a bipartisan commission to ferret out answers as to how such a horror could have happened. A body so composed and with such a writ, backed by the ability to take testimony and issue subpoenas, was the right call. The 9/11 Commission proceeded to ultimately put together both the definitive history of the attacks and a series of substantive recommendations for precluding future mass casualty terror in America. More than Americans benefited from this process—the entire civilized world was better informed about the Al Qaeda threat as a result.

Bush could have taken a different path—indeed, the president was initially resistant to an independent review. The White House could have insisted on an executive branch investigation instead, perhaps headed by a luminary and family friend such as James A. Baker III. The administration could have assured Congress that Baker would issue regular public reports and hold public hearings, notwithstanding his lack of power to issue compulsory process or to compel testimony.

This hypothetical Baker review could have been couched as being necessary to preserve executive privilege and to avoid the unnecessary difficulty of discussing classified information in a public forum. Such a review would have undoubtedly come under intense criticism, and even if it had reached the same conclusions as the 9/11 Commission, likely would never have achieved purchase as an authoritative account.

Such a “family friend review” is precisely the approach that the Canadian government initially took—with possibly even worse results than might have met a hypothetical “Baker inquiry.” Trudeau appointed David Johnston as special rapporteur. Johnston is a former governor-general, ski-trip companion and friend of Trudeau’s father, and recent associate of the Pierre Trudeau Foundation, an entity which—astoundingly—has just been embroiled in a CCP-backed donation scandal. Nor did Johnston take steps to improve this appearance of bias. Instead, he employed as his right hand a lawyer with a donation history to the Liberal Party, secured crisis management services from the same company assisting former Liberal minister of parliament Han Dong (who was named in one of the more salacious allegations of this l’affaire Cathay), and appears to have failed to interview former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole until after he had already principally drafted his initial report on the crisis.

That report, issued at the end of May, more or less dismissed the public allegations, exonerated the Trudeau government of direct knowledge or wrongdoing, and concluded, despite conceding that Chinese interference existed, that the government should not open a public inquiry into China’s attack on Canada. (Johnston cited the difficulty of discussing classified information in such an inquiry.) By declining to ask for a public inquiry, Johnston ensured that he would remain in control of the government’s public-facing review of China’s election interference. Unsurprisingly, Johnston’s report was quite expectedly received as if the rapporteur was merely providing top cover for the government.

The opposition parties in Parliament—including the left-wing New Democracy Party that holds the balance of power—reacted fast and furious. Johnston was hauled into Commons for a three-hour grilling—which suggested a potentially serious gap between the facts about Chinese targeting of the Tories in 2021 and the content of his report. The Commons also passed a non-binding motion that he be replaced and a public inquiry be opened. Polling found that nearly 60 percent of Canadians disagreed with Johnston on the question—the public demanded a public inquiry.

Johnston and Trudeau initially resisted the backlash, but ultimately, the special rapporteur resigned on Friday. The next day, the government signaled that it was now open to a public inquiry. Chinese political espionage against Canada may yet get the public airing and exacting review that it deserves. And the American people will also benefit from such a course.

Perhaps Xi views Canada as a proving ground for tactics that might be wielded in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, or as a soft underbelly into Five Eyes, or simply as a democratic roadblock to his dream of creating a “Community of Common Destiny for All-Mankind.” The United States needs to know—preferably without relying on decontextualized leaks from our intelligence partner spilling over onto the pages of the Globe and Mail and filtering down into the American media ecosystem.

The scale, scope, and intentions of the Chinese government’s covert electoral operations against our ally’s political system matter, both in terms of truly understanding Beijing’s ambitions and figuring out how to re-establish deterrence against such operations there, here, and throughout the Western democracies. A public inquiry—a “9/11 Commission” for Canada—will have the salutary side effect of helping the American people know what they are up against as they politically organize and associate with one another throughout civil society.

Because we can be sure of one thing: what happens to Ottawa will not stay in Ottawa.

Zac Morgan is an attorney specializing in First Amendment and campaign finance law. He previously worked for the Institute for Free Speech, and currently serves as counsel to Commissioner Allen Dickerson of the Federal Election Commission.

The views expressed in this article are his own and do not express an official view of the U.S. government.

The U.S. Marine Corp’s Force Design 2030 (FD2030), the service branch’s restructuring plan to prepare for a future conflict with near-peer adversaries, includes Littoral Regiments. These could possibly pose a threat to any aggressor’s actions in limited areas of the Western Pacific. They theoretically extend American striking power into areas where our enemies hope to dominate and use as access points into open ocean areas critical to America and its allies.

A legitimate threat is something our enemies will not ignore in a conflict. They will target and strike Littoral Regiments deployed on the small islands that threaten the enemy’s access to the region. Once the regiments’ equipment is destroyed, the enemy can cut off and bypass the island, leaving the Marines to “die on the vine” like Japan’s powerful base at Rabaul in World War II. Therein lies the undiscussed challenge facing Force Design 2030 and the Littoral Regiment concept: how to survive and sustain the regiments against a well-armed, air and missile-equipped enemy.

In today’s world, a threat can be found and struck rapidly from afar. So the regiments must either enjoy significant integrated air and missile defense support or adopt a maritime equivalent to artillery’s “shoot and scoot” tactics. That is, insert quickly, target and shoot and then deploy rapidly to another location. Otherwise, the regiments will suffer the same fate as America’s Wake Island defenders and Japan’s Rabaul and many of its island garrisons in World War II.

A recent exercise at Twentynine Palms, California, reportedly has shown the regiments have a reasonable capability to withstand a combined arms assault. However, has anyone simulated the most likely enemy response to a Littoral Regiment attack, a retaliatory air and missile strike? What air and missile defenses will the regiments enjoy? If China is the enemy, expect those attacks to involve precision strikes U.S. forces have not experienced in years, if not ever. What tools does the regiment or Joint Task Force Commander have to address that problem? Hardening against attacks from above takes time and expense, neither of which exists in abundance once the conflict starts. Dispersal and constant shifting of positions around the island seem wiser, particularly if the regiment adroitly executes camouflage and deception.

Many of the Marines will survive those strikes, but the same cannot be said for the equipment. Without missiles, radars, and other combat systems, the regiment becomes an impotent maritime force that must be reinforced, reconstituted, and logistically supported. Near-peer state opponents have the technology to isolate and re-strike the regiments as required to conduct that state’s operational and strategic objectives. An isolated garrison that can neither strike nor impede enemy operations will be bypassed, monitored and occasionally struck again for training if not operational purposes. That is the fate of unsupported Littoral Regiments that stay in place.

This is not to say such regiments may have no impact or purpose. Their deployment during a crisis could strengthen the deterrence of any U.S. and allied actions. It could also complicate the aggressor’s operations and plans. Suddenly, its access outward may be constrained and the regiments’ presence at or near maritime chokepoints enhances the U.S. and allied ability to enter areas the aggressor hopes to restrict to its own use. However, combatant and Marine commanders need to consider the likely enemy actions against those regiments if the aggressor chooses to launch a war. Island garrisons are only as valuable as their ability to impede enemy operations and that necessitates supporting them against enemy action.

So far, the Navy has not properly supported the Marines Force Design 2030. Proposing a fourteen-knot modified merchant ship does not an amphibious maneuver force make. Instead, naval planners should be working with the Marines to address the regiments’ mission challenges and requirements. The concept is potentially attractive if it addresses all the operational requirements needed for success. Rapid movement and re-deployment will be essential. The Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) largely are an open-ocean warfare disaster waiting to happen, but they should be considered for the rapid transport mission the Marines need. In World War II, the U.S. Navy modified obsolete destroyers to serve as high-speed amphibious transports. The forty-five-knot Independence-class LCSs can transport the Marines and helo-transportable equipment to and from deployment sites. The heavier equipment will require a platform with greater lift, either an air cushion vehicle the LCS can transport or a seaplane. The Navy-Marine team should examine both if their leaders are serious about the Littoral Regiment concept.

Seaplanes may offer a better solution. They are faster and offer more flexible deployment options. Unfortunately, none with appropriate capabilities are in service now but the Special Operations Community is examining the development of kits to make some C-130 aircraft into ad hoc seaplanes. What will work for special operations forces will work for the Marines. The Littoral Regiments’ radars and other equipment can be transported in C-130s. If shoot and scoot are what one needs, seaplanes are a better option than any ship.

Force Design 2030 has sacrificed the Marine Corps’ overall broad mission capabilities, promising to transform the Marine Corps into an innovative and relevant twenty-first-century warfare force. Making that promise reality will require a great deal more study and thought that has appeared so far in public discourse. The enemy gets a vote in war and so far the FD2030 concept and debate have ignored that potential vote. Neither the Marine Corps nor this nation can afford that oversight to continue.

Looking beyond its combat concept, America also cannot afford FD2030’s impact on the Marine Corps’s broad overall combat capabilities. History has not been kind to single-mission forces and the narrowing of Marine Corps mission focus and capabilities comes at the expense of the missions at which it excels, rapidly responding to the needs of Americans in danger or populations hit by natural or manmade calamities. The Navy-Marine Corps team owes the American people a better plan than that presented in FD2030.

Captain (USN) Carl O. Schuster is a career naval officer who served on a variety of U.S. and allied warships before transferring to intelligence at mid-career. He has extensive experience as a planner at the amphibious group to the theater command level and finished his career as the director of operations at the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps.