The National Interest

The U.S. Navy performed without parallel in World War II, and more than met the challenges of the first Cold War. But both conflicts are firmly in the past. Today, we now face a formidable maritime and industrial power rival in China. The technological and geopolitical challenges we now face demand that the United States act much more urgently and faster. Nowhere is this more clear than in our Navy.

America desperately needs more ships, but maintenance delays result in, as one retired admiral put it, “the equivalent of losing half an aircraft carrier and three submarines each year.”

The USS Connecticut, a premier submarine, commissioned for service in 1998, struck an underwater mountain in the South China Sea in 2021. It won’t be back in service until 2026, according to the Navy. This is about three times as long as the sixteen months it took to build the Pentagon, the physical building, in the first place. By coincidence, the estimated cost of repair for the USS Connecticut is $80 million—equal to the cost of building the Pentagon ($1.1 billion in today’s dollars).

The Pentagon is a big place. Room for 25,000 workers. Parking spots for 9,700.

Defense officials and experts at the Hay Seward Initiative consider the US submarine force a crucial advantage over a numerically larger Chinese navy. But the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a 2022 summary concerning U.S. capabilities against China that the Navy lost 10,363 operational days from 2008 through 2018—the equivalent of more than twenty-eight years—“as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards.”

Currently, an alarming eighteen of the Navy’s forty-nine fast-attack subs are out of service, awaiting repair and servicing. Fast-attack subs fire torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are essential to winning a potential fight against China over Taiwan or South China Sea lanes.

Maurer of the GAO explains that the Navy may be giving top priority “for scarce shipyard space” to aircraft carriers and ballistic-missile submarines, “which means attack subs are more likely to rack up idle time waiting to get into an available dry dock.”

This is totally unacceptable. The Connecticut is one of the United States’ three nuclear-powered Seawolf-class vessels, the service’s largest attack subs. The Navy describes the class as “exceptionally quiet, fast, well-armed, and equipped with advanced sensors.” It has eight torpedo tubes and can hold as many as fifty weapons in its torpedo room.

Ronald O’Rourke, a naval analyst with the Congressional Research Service, indicated that the delay is “a product of the complexity of modern warships – and thus the complexity of the work needed to repair damage to them.”

As I highlighted in Power Rivals: America and China’s Superpower Struggle, both the Navy and Congress need to address this issue without delay. The Pentagon, likewise, needs to be much more agile and nimble. Speed, flexibility, and time are just as important as the number of ships and subs. Advanced technology and complexity are great, but not if it leads to key assets sitting in dry dock.

Calls for bureaucratic reform are not new, and experts have long warned of the dangers of a culture that cripples organizations, as officials check boxes rather than get results.

The time for renewal, reform, and rebuilding is past due. It is high time to push for change in a bureaucratic Washington that is too much talk and little action.

Luckily, Washington has allies in South Korea and Japan that are building some of the highest quality and affordable naval assets in the world.

Buying ships from these countries, or building U.S.-designed vessels in their shipyards, perhaps including the Philippines in the mix as well, could be a cost-effective way of catching up with China.

All three countries have mutual defense treaties with the United States. So why doesn’t Washington team up with them to outbuild China?

The problem is largely political; U.S. law currently prevents the Navy from buying foreign-built ships, even from allies, or from building its own ships in foreign countries due to both security issues and to protect America’s shipbuilding industry.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon estimates China’s navy to have around 340 warships, while the United States has fewer than 300. It likewise estimates the Chinese fleet will grow to 400 in the next two years, while the U.S. fleet will take until 2045 to hit 350.

Voters should have a clear message for Washington: if more money is going to be spent on defense, then make sure it is being spent effectively.

Carl Timothy Delfeld is the co-founder of the Independent Republican and Hay Seward Initiative, managing director of Blackthread LLC, a former U.S. Treasury advisor, former U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank, and author of Power Rivals: America and China’s Superpower Struggle.

Image: U.S. Navy/Flickr.

Over the last few weeks, Washington has been abuzz with everything India. On June 22, President Joe Biden, cabinet secretaries, and the U.S. Congress gave a rousing reception to the visiting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. For his part, the prime minister cheered Republican and Democratic congressmen with his quip that he could “help them reach bipartisan consensus,” referring to the across-the-aisle support India enjoys in Washington.

It was certainly an apt decision to honor the Indian leader, given that the U.S.-India partnership has significantly expanded under President Biden. Both the White House and several members of the Biden administration, from the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to the Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, have characterized it as the “most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.”

However, over the last few months, some of the Biden administration’s regional policies in the Indo-Pacific have done more harm to its partners, particularly India and its geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Biden administration’s foreign policy cut a significant departure from its predecessors until last month, returning to Washington’s old ways: myopic democratic interventions, benevolent outreach to adversarial nations, and partisan bickering. Over the last few weeks, Washington’s primary Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, have borne the brunt of these missteps.

President Biden, in a last-minute change of plans, canceled his scheduled trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia to address the debt-ceiling crisis in Washington, with Republicans stalling the Democrats from raising the debt ceiling levels. While Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went ahead with his trip to Papua New Guinea and signed a crucial defense agreement with the Pacific Island nation, Biden canceling that leg of the tour was not the best messaging to a region increasingly falling under China’s orbit.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi went ahead with his travel itinerary as scheduled and turned it into an opportunity to showcase India’s position on the global stage. New Guinea’s president hailed Modi as the leader of the Global South. Taking an implicit jab at the United States and China, the island-nation leader said, “we are victims of global powerplay, and you [Modi] are the leader of Global South. We will rally behind your leadership at global forums.” Prior to Biden’s cancellation, the Indian government had decided to accommodate his visit and cut short their visits as a courtesy to the incoming American presidential delegation.

While this was a minor setback for a coordinated approach toward Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean challenge is a more geopolitically complex Gordian knot.

In mid-May, Blinken threatened Bangladesh with sanctions if the Indian Ocean state did not host free and fair elections in the 2024 poll. Suppose the United States were to follow through with its threat. In that case, India and Japan will be in a quandary as they have consistently positioned Bangladesh as a gateway connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia for supply chain and infrastructure connectivity initiatives. Geographically, Bangladesh is nestled between India’s state of Bengal to the west and India’s northeastern provinces to the east, bordering a thin strip of land the connects the rest of India to the northeast (also known as the “chicken’s neck”). Thus the densely populated country’s interaction with the rest of the world is directed through India or the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo have invested in infrastructure in the region and have long-term plans to invest in Dhaka’s growth. Recently, Japan and India agreed to jointly develop the Matabari deep-sea port in Bangladesh to serve as a “strategic anchor” in the Indian Ocean. Though often underreported, Japanese investment plays a vital role in South Asian development. It is also undeniably India's Northeast region's major infrastructure and development partner. Through the Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain, the Japanese government envisions increased connectivity between India’s landlocked northeast and Southeast Asia, creating a single economic zone and an alternative trade connectivity project to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida articulating his government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in New Delhi in early March this year, called for increased integration of India’s Northeast with Bangladesh to transform the region into a single economic zone.

Moreover, Japan is attempting to capture the businesses moving out of the pricier markets of Southeast Asia, using the Bay of Bengal region. Japan’s regional strategy has neatly complemented the Modi government’s policies. Modi transformed the older “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy of increasing strategic and economic engagement with Southeast Asia as a countervailing force to China’s involvement in the region.

Tokyo has slowly and steadily supported this transformation. A case in point is Tokyo and New Delhi hosting the India-Japan Act East forum to discuss cooperation on a range of projects that will increase connectivity in India's Northeast to Southeast Asia.

India’s Northeast has a history of civil unrest and strife, making it a challenging region for development. Furthermore, its landlocked topography and poor infrastructure limited its connectivity to both its neighboring countries and the rest of India. Only parties interested in the long game or have a vision for the region could invest in that part of the world, and in this case, it is Japan.

Interestingly, as an extension, both Japan and India are engaging the immediate eastern neighbor to Bangladesh and India, Myanmar. Sanctioned by the United States, Myanmar has limited partners on the world stage. Nonetheless, Japan and India have continued engagement with the military junta to prevent the nation from falling entirely under China’s influence.

However, once again, Indo-Japanese interests are affected by America’s sanctions

Earlier in May, India-Myanmar inaugurated the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. India supported this port to enhance sea lane connectivity between India’s eastern states and Myanmar. However, since the sanctions, Indian companies have either had to depart Myanmar altogether or face global scrutiny for working with the military junta-led government.

As satellite images released earlier this year indicated, increased activity on the Great Coco Islands of Myanmar had the markings of Chinese military involvement. Situated less than thirty miles north of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, any potential militarization of the Coco Islands by the Chinese could pose a significant threat to India’s security in the Indian Ocean. In this geopolitical equation, India cannot afford to disengage from Myanmar. And yet, America’s economic statecraft is undercutting India’s vital regional partnerships.

Henry Kissinger, who celebrated 100 years last May, summed up this dynamic well, "it may be dangerous to be America's enemy, but to be America's friend is fatal.” It is undoubtedly proving so for Japan and India, but more so for New Delhi in the Indian Ocean.

Against the backdrop of these measures comes the Biden administration’s attempts at thawing relations with China. While Biden departs from his predecessors as the only recent president to not ask for Kissinger’s advice, he is beginning to walk in the footsteps of a grand strategist by making attempts to mend ties with China.

From the dialogue in Vienna to Blinken rescheduling his trip to Beijing for last month to the official abandonment of economic “decoupling” for the less confrontational “de-risking,” Washington’s approach to China shows signs of softening. While members of IPEF agreed on moving ahead with a supply chain agreement in Detroit, in the same week, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with her Chinese counterpart to discuss trade and economic ties. Washington's blow-hot and blow-cold approach does not assure allies and partners of the consistency of its priorities and policies, particularly partners that it courts for strategic competition with China.

Furthermore, Washington’s skewed sanction policies toward democratic backsliding in a few states while calling for engagement with authoritarian China raise questions about the motives of such policies. While the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it continues to do massive business with Beijing. This selective condemnation only further isolates partners and strengthens Chinese engagement with the sanctioned nations.   

Director for Regional Affairs at the Pacific Forum, Rob York, called this misbegotten strategy “a holdover from America's unipolar moment that we [America] need to outgrow. America's moral authority, and the benefits of aligning with Washington, are no longer assumed but must be competed for, and sanctions must be employed far more judiciously than they have been.”

This type of awakening to multipolar realities of the world order should inform Washington of the pitfalls and shortsightedness of its foreign policies. America’s sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft should not be used for democratic interventions but to deter its enemies. If not, the United States will have few allies in its strategic competition with China.

Akhil Ramesh is a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum.

Image: Shutterstock.

Africa is littered with the economic debris of predatory trade practices like dumping. Amid the growing debate about the exclusion of South Africa from the African Growth and Opportunities Act, another trade twist arrives. South Africa’s minister for Trade, Industry & Competition, Ebrahim Patel, will soon decide whether or not to reimpose suspended antidumping duties on chicken from Brazil and various European countries after opting out a year ago. At stake is the future of the South African poultry industry and that of an increasingly unstable country. When chicken, the primary source of meat for South Africans becomes unaffordable, state fragility looms.

Alarmingly, the most industrialized country in Africa is sliding in political stability rankings: the “rainbow nation” boasts shaky infrastructure, widespread institutional corruption, and a staggering official unemployment rate of more than 32 percent. In addition to regular power outages, called “loadshedding,” the country labors under soaring input costs and monthly poultry imports from countries such as the United States, Brazil, and Argentina have more than doubled since October 2022. As a result, the South African poultry sector is under the whip.

If anyone needs hard proof of the crisis, look no further than Astral Foods, one of the country’s largest poultry producers, listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The company recently announced an 88 percent decline in operating profit, having incurred costs of $38.5 million due to blackouts. It had processed about 17 percent fewer broilers, resulting in a drop in production of about 1.1 million broilers a week. Soaring input costs mean domestic producers are subsidizing the price of chicken by about 8 cents per pound.

Since the South Africa trade minister postponed the imposition of antidumping duties in August last year for twelve months, the country’s economic crisis has deepened, smashing business confidence and jobs. Opening the door to dumping, as Patel did last year in the hope of containing food inflation, now becomes a question about how soon South Africa wants to be classified as fragile.

The country is already sitting in the “Elevated Warning” category of the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Ondex (FSI), along with fellow travelers such as Sri Lanka, Colombia, Senega, and Kyrgyzstan. On almost every key metric South Africa’s global risk ranking has degraded significantly over the past ten years. Even the ruling ANC party secretary-general Fikile Mbalula has conceded that South Africa is at risk of becoming a failed state.

Nigeria, another African giant, which for years has been crippled by similar challenges, now sits in the alarming “Alert” category of the FSI. Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer, but its power sector is a mess, with frequent blackouts affecting businesses and households.

The effect on Nigeria's poultry industry has been devastating. Compounded by the same pressures South Africa’s industry is experiencing, farms are closing and scarce jobs are being shed, according to the Poultry Association of Nigeria. One study suggests that about 25 million people in Nigeria, which has a population of 95 million, are supported down the poultry industry’s value chain, making its decline a contributor to that country's slide towards fragility.

Haiti, one of the poster children of failed states, can testify to the effect of dumping. Their local rice production collapsed in the face of cheap U.S. imports—dubbed “Miami rice”— in the 1990s. Haiti, already struggling with weak institutions and rampant corruption, sank further into fragility. Today it stands at the 11th worst spot on the FSI.

Imports of poultry from Brazil to South Africa rose from $114.3 million in 2020 to $171.5 million last year, according to Trade Data Monitor, its import market share soaring from 44 percent to nearly 73 percent. If the import tariff suspension is not ended in August there will simply be a continued decline in domestic production that threatens long-term domestic food security.

The South African government has a role to play in curbing this slide towards fragility, by urgently tackling the endemic power, corruption, and other systemic issues. These admittedly are hard problems to solve. An easier one is ensuring a fair and just trade regime that does not sell precious jobs down the river. While ensuring affordable chicken for the SA population is vital, so is safeguarding the local poultry industry and the jobs it provides

South Africa’s poultry crisis is not only a threat but a wake-up call. North America, Europe, and the UK have a stake in the outcome, beyond the chicken trade. Ghanaian president, John Mahama told the United Nations in 2016 that poultry imports were responsible for massive job losses and increasing migration.

Trading partners from Brazil, the UK, the EU, and the United States should not play chicken with South African state fragility.

Francois Baird is the founder of the FairPlay Movement against predatory trade.

Image: Shutterstock.

In Star Wars, the spacecraft of the galaxy far, far away are propelled through space by massive engines glowing bright blue. Current spacecraft may pale in comparison, but the technology that powers these ships is becoming a reality. 

Other countries like China have devoted significant resources toward developing space capabilities. That’s why ensuring that the United States is leading in rocket technology is important to allow U.S. spacecraft to respond quickly to changes in low-Earth orbit and deeper in space. Developing different rocket technologies and fuel variety can equip the United States with a plethora of options for maintaining low-orbit spacecraft, traveling to Mars, and harvesting resources from space for transportation back to Earth in an economical time frame.

Innovations in rocket propulsion using several different types of designs can allow future spacecraft to reverse course, turn around, change directions mid-flight, and reach their destinations in a matter of months. Plasma rocket technology will be the key building block for long-distance space travel. The federal government should continue to champion this technology’s development for further utilization of space resources and defense applications. 

Plasma-based systems work by heating ions of fuel to create plasma and then directing that plasma using magnetic fields to be dispensed in a particular direction. This creates thrust to propel a craft forward, but plasma-based engines can vary plasma output and direction, creating much more potential for navigating the vacuum of space. 

Ad Astra’s Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR), for example, can vary thrust power and can take either hydrogen, helium, or deuterium as fuel. This variety of fuel types would allow for extreme flexibility in space, as electrolysis would split water into usable oxygen and hydrogen for human consumption and fuel for the plasma rockets. As hydrogen is also one of the best shields against harmful radiation, its use as fuel for plasma rockets would reduce the likelihood of astronauts or sensitive machinery being damaged by space radiation and any potential radiation given off by the engines themselves. 

Plasma-based rockets have the potential to radically decrease travel times in outer space and in low-Earth orbit. Most rockets today are designed around chemical use, which caps their exhaust velocity around 5,000 meters per second. While that may seem fast, this causes multi-ton rockets to carry thousands of gallons of fuel to deliver a small payload to a distant planet. Capping exit velocity also leads to journeys that would take months, even years, to complete one-way. 

Using plasma-based rocket technology, like the Pulsed Plasma Rocket (PPR) developed by NASA and Hbar Technologies, has the potential to cut humans’ travel time to Mars down to only two months. Current investigations into PPR technology have shown that this type of engine may be capable of generating 20,000 pounds of force (lbsf). This force generation runs against the need for constant electron bombardment within the engine to produce plasma, meaning a consistent source of electricity is needed. 

While some fuels may fill niches during a space flight in order to preserve fuel consumption or reduce a spacecraft’s weight, ion and nuclear fission rocket technologies all are viable substitutes for plasma-based rockets. Today, ion thrusters are used to adjust satellites’ position in Earth’s orbit and are the main fuel source for probes on multi-year journeys into the solar system. Ion fuel systems have been recorded as having up to 90 percent fuel efficiency and can travel massive distances on a relatively small amount of fuel. 

Case in point, NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster has been operated for over 43,000 hours on 770 kilograms of xenon propellant as fuel. The drawback for fuel efficiency is that spacecraft using ion thrusters require a large amount of time to reach full acceleration. Small probes and satellites powered by ion thrusters can reach speeds of up to 200,000 mph but require multiple months to reach top speeds. 

Ion thrusters have the potential to power smaller spacecraft or act as a backup power source but have yet to be utilized for larger spacecraft. Fission reactors have the opposite problem: Their ability to produce a large amount of energy and rapidly accelerate a spacecraft runs up against the challenge of miniaturizing a fission reactor to be able to fit into a spacecraft. Fission engines combined with an electrical power source would ensure that thrust could be generated at all times, or at a moment’s notice, to change a craft’s direction. Both ion thrusters and nuclear fission may be combined with a rotating detonation rocket engine to generate enough initial energy to break through Earth’s gravitational pull to place spacecraft into orbit above Earth before beginning a journey to Mars.

Other nations like China have poured millions of state dollars into developing space resources, AI, robotics, and quantum computing for their satellites. By developing the technology to push our spacecraft further faster, the United States’ space capabilities will leave China in low-Earth orbit while the United States leads the way in traveling to Mars and advancing deeper into the solar system.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and former Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, The National Interest, and the Boston Herald.

Image: Shutterstock.

Over the past three decades, the world has undergone profound transformations. Political and economic restructuring has led to the erosion of the prevailing Western hegemony. However, it is incorrect to claim that the West is being replaced by a non-Western hegemonic force. Instead, what we observe is a leveling off in the ongoing competition between the West and the East.

Hungary and the other Central European states are growing increasingly concerned about Europe’s diminishing capacity to engage in this competition. There is a growing perception that excessive energy is being directed towards ideological disputes, which in turn diverts attention away from crucial areas of collaboration that could further enhance Europe’s strength.

A strong and dependable Europe, serving as an influential ally, is of paramount strategic interest to the United States. The Western alliance, compared to a strong engine with two parts, has driven progress over the past century. It is crucial to ensure that both parts have sufficient power to keep the momentum going. Considering this, Central Europe, located at the center of the continent and serving as its economic powerhouse, plays a significant role, making it a natural and indispensable partner for the United States.

The Era of Western Hegemony Is Coming to an End

The West’s dominance over international relations, resting upon three key pillars, is visibly diminishing.

The first pillar was the West’s longstanding dominant position as the global economic powerhouse for two centuries. The second pillar involved the establishment of institutional bodies in international relations and trade by the West, granting them the ability to shape the rules of globalization. The third pillar relied on the idea that the United States, as the hegemonic superpower after the collapse of the USSR, would collaborate with Europe to promote the neoliberal political and economic model, aiming for a more peaceful world. As the prevailing belief of that era declared, we had reached “the end of history.” However, all three pillars are now displaying signs of declining influence.

The premises of the third pillar in particular have failed remarkably. The imposition of the neoliberal political and economic model not only resulted in alienation from the rest of the world but, paradoxically, brought together its adversaries in increasingly closer cooperation. The events of the past year have undeniably demonstrated this, leading even some of the most avid proponents of “the end of history” to abandon their belief in it.

It is intriguing to note the similar narrative adopted by America, portraying the war in Ukraine as a conflict between democracies and autocracies—an ironic stance when considering the United States’ role in supplying arms to 57 percent of the world’s authoritarian regimes in 2022.

In this context, even the second pillar finds itself on shaky ground. The challengers to the existing order are actively constructing alternative systems for agreements, forming alliances, and establishing platforms to address conflicts. It seems inevitable that a tipping point will arise, where they will effectively bypass the institutional framework established during the past few decades of globalization and thrive within parallel systems.

A closer examination of the first pillar reveals equally worrisome prospects. In an extraordinary turn of events, the economic rivalry between the Western and non-Western worlds is approaching a state of equilibrium after two centuries, signifying a momentous shift in civilizations. The unfolding of these transformations can be observed through at least five significant areas: economic power, access to vital resources such as raw materials and energy, demographic trends, technological advancements, and military capabilities.

The East has witnessed a remarkable surge in its share of global economic output, at the expense of the West. Back in 1990, the Western world’s dominance over the world’s economic output was exceeding the 50 percent mark. Fast forward to today, and that figure has drastically decreased to a mere 30 percent. These trends will continue as the center of economic gravity continues to shift further toward the East.

The geographical reality that most of the world’s raw materials and energy resources are located outside the West has further exacerbated our competitiveness. Although the United States enjoys a slight advantage in this regard, largely due to its vast shale oil and gas reserves, the West has been unable to fully compensate for this disadvantage. Notably, certain European governments, spearheaded by Germany, swiftly embarked on a green transition to meet Europe’s energy demands. However, the rapid policy changes outpaced technological advancements, resulting in green energy remaining considerably more expensive compared to other sources, thereby hindering our economic competitiveness.

Demographic trends also work against the West. Regardless of the metric used, the world’s population surpasses the 8 billion mark, with a staggering 7 billion individuals living in non-Western countries. Despite the efforts of Hungary and a handful of like-minded governments to implement family policies aimed at increasing fertility rates, the trends still indicate a deep demographic crisis in the West, particularly in Europe.

The realm of technology is also fiercely contested. Emerging players invest heavily in research and development, almost matching the expenditure of established giants. This head-to-head race involves various nations, with notable progress seen in Eastern electric cars and battery technologies—areas of significant importance for Central Europe.

Lastly, in terms of military power, the West undeniably maintains a substantial edge over the East. While this may initially seem advantageous, the prevailing consensus underscores the futility of exploiting this advantage, as doing so would entail dire global consequences—a tragic outcome not worthy of pursuing.

Preserving Europe’s Success Requires Overcoming Unnecessary Ideological Quarrels

Central Europe is now confronted with a profoundly transformed geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. The future unfolds as a multipolar world, with the West being just one of several power centers. Despite this, Central Europeans are eager to see the West effectively compete with the non-Western world. Our aspiration is for a prosperous Europe, where we play a significant role in its achievements.

To navigate through this new reality, it is crucial to understand how Europe has succeeded in the past during major global changes. We must examine the approaches used to unite diverse European nations with varying values, identities, and interests in successful cooperation. In this regard, we can look at the thinking of the founding fathers of the European Union.

One such figure, Konrad Adenauer, was aptly called the “strategist of humility” by Henry Kissinger. Adenauer, a Christian-democratic statesman, skillfully combined humility with strength, insight, and strategic thinking. His famous quote, “we all live under the same sky, but not all of us have the same horizon,” captures the essence of his profound understanding of humility.

Adenauer recognized that the success of Europe does not require absolute agreement on every aspect of life. European integration is not an end in itself but a means to an end. He emphasized the importance of focusing on shared interests rather than fixating on differences. Failure to adopt this approach risks losing the opportunity for cooperation.

In an era where mutual understanding is crucial to navigating through challenging times, Europe finds itself entangled in divisive issues. One such concern revolves around identity and values. Western European nations and their Central European counterparts often differ in their approaches to immigration, the family unit, national roles, the essence of liberal democracy, and the protection of children. These topics often become intertwined, leading to a conflation of issues and a disregard for the diversity envisioned by Adenauer.

Another significant challenge arises in the realm of geopolitics. Some advocate for Europe to align exclusively with a great power, effectively decoupling from the rest of the world. However, we firmly believe that such an approach is fundamentally flawed. What we need instead is to focus on connectivity, actively avoiding peripheralization and fostering connections with a broad range of countries and market players. Throughout history, Europe has thrived by being open, acting as a mediator between the East and West, promoting peace, and engaging in fair trade. By re-embracing these principles, Europe can overcome the challenges it faces and build a prosperous future.

Five Points for a Successful Europe

When confronted with these contentious issues, we are faced with three fundamental choices. We can choose to settle the dispute once and for all by declaring one side the victor and the other the vanquished. Alternatively, we can find ourselves engaged in an enduring ideological war of attrition. However, there exists a third avenue worth exploring: removing these contentious matters from the agenda altogether and focusing on areas where genuine cooperation is possible.

Within the European Union, economic strength stands as the most significant political capital. Central European states, constituting 8 percent of the EU’s GDP, have emerged as the bloc's fifth-largest economic powerhouse. Notably, this economic ascent has been accompanied by an extraordinary growth rate outpacing that of Western Europe over the past twelve to thirteen years. Considering these factors, a Central European perspective not only deserves attention but also careful consideration from our Western partners.

Firstly, we propose to maintain the original idea that a successful European Union relies on the cooperation of independent and sovereign Member States. Preserving our national sovereignty, which Central European people have fought for over centuries, as well as the distinct political and cultural identities of European countries, is crucial. Europe, embracing the motto "united in diversity," recognizes the strength that comes from its diverse perspectives and viewpoints. This variety of voices strengthens the continent, making it more resilient and competitive, and importantly, allows Member States to accurately represent the views of their people.

Secondly, Europe should pursue EU expansion. The conflict in Ukraine has starkly highlighted the EU’s limited control over its immediate neighborhood, and enlargement could offer a partial solution. However, this can only succeed if we reduce the overcentralized bureaucratic power in Brussels. For instance, decisions on foreign policy still require unanimity, but Brussels aims to move towards qualified majority voting with the support of some larger Member States. Foreign policy is an essential aspect of sovereignty, and smaller states in our region are particularly keen on preserving it. Therefore, an integration where larger member states can effectively impose their will on smaller member states is far from desirable for those aspiring to join.

Thirdly, it is important for Europe to establish its own standing army as a means to defend itself, thereby reducing its dependence on the United States. By developing its own military capabilities, Europe can assume greater responsibility for its defense and share the burden with the United States. This would foster a more balanced partnership between Europe and the United States, making Europe stronger and more self-reliant while simultaneously promoting a more equal distribution of security responsibilities within the transatlantic alliance.

Fourthly, it is imperative to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, and a critical factor in attaining this objective lies in securing affordable energy access. Without affordable energy, the decline of European industry and the precarious situation faced by the struggling European middle class would become inevitable. The green transition should be pursued gradually, avoiding outright bans on specific energy sources and suppliers.

Lastly, Europe must preserve its Christian values within its political framework. Central Europeans emphasize this not as a fashionable conversion program but because they believe that Christian values and teachings can be translated into political and economic principles that contribute to building a better, fairer, and safer Europe. These values establish a shared cultural foundation upon which European states can collaborate.

Central European states are not miracle workers, and expectations of miracles are unwarranted. However, by implementing these suggestions, Europe can preserve its competitive position in the changing global landscape, ultimately contributing to the strengthening of the West.

Balázs Orbán is a member of the Hungarian parliament and political director for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to whom he is unrelated.

Image: Shutterstock.

In Star Wars, the spacecraft of the galaxy far, far away are propelled through space by massive engines glowing bright blue. Current spacecraft may pale in comparison, but the technology that powers these ships is becoming a reality. 

Other countries like China have devoted significant resources toward developing space capabilities. That’s why ensuring that the United States is leading in rocket technology is important to allow U.S. spacecraft to respond quickly to changes in low-Earth orbit and deeper in space. Developing different rocket technologies and fuel variety can equip the United States with a plethora of options for maintaining low-orbit spacecraft, traveling to Mars, and harvesting resources from space for transportation back to Earth in an economical time frame.

Innovations in rocket propulsion using several different types of designs can allow future spacecraft to reverse course, turn around, change directions mid-flight, and reach their destinations in a matter of months. Plasma rocket technology will be the key building block for long-distance space travel. The federal government should continue to champion this technology’s development for further utilization of space resources and defense applications. 

Plasma-based systems work by heating ions of fuel to create plasma and then directing that plasma using magnetic fields to be dispensed in a particular direction. This creates thrust to propel a craft forward, but plasma-based engines can vary plasma output and direction, creating much more potential for navigating the vacuum of space. 

Ad Astra’s Variable Specific Impulse Magnetoplasma Rocket (VASIMR), for example, can vary thrust power and can take either hydrogen, helium, or deuterium as fuel. This variety of fuel types would allow for extreme flexibility in space, as electrolysis would split water into usable oxygen and hydrogen for human consumption and fuel for the plasma rockets. As hydrogen is also one of the best shields against harmful radiation, its use as fuel for plasma rockets would reduce the likelihood of astronauts or sensitive machinery being damaged by space radiation and any potential radiation given off by the engines themselves. 

Plasma-based rockets have the potential to radically decrease travel times in outer space and in low-Earth orbit. Most rockets today are designed around chemical use, which caps their exhaust velocity around 5,000 meters per second. While that may seem fast, this causes multi-ton rockets to carry thousands of gallons of fuel to deliver a small payload to a distant planet. Capping exit velocity also leads to journeys that would take months, even years, to complete one-way. 

Using plasma-based rocket technology, like the Pulsed Plasma Rocket (PPR) developed by NASA and Hbar Technologies, has the potential to cut humans’ travel time to Mars down to only two months. Current investigations into PPR technology have shown that this type of engine may be capable of generating 20,000 pounds of force (lbsf). This force generation runs against the need for constant electron bombardment within the engine to produce plasma, meaning a consistent source of electricity is needed. 

While some fuels may fill niches during a space flight in order to preserve fuel consumption or reduce a spacecraft’s weight, ion and nuclear fission rocket technologies all are viable substitutes for plasma-based rockets. Today, ion thrusters are used to adjust satellites’ position in Earth’s orbit and are the main fuel source for probes on multi-year journeys into the solar system. Ion fuel systems have been recorded as having up to 90 percent fuel efficiency and can travel massive distances on a relatively small amount of fuel. 

Case in point, NASA’s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster has been operated for over 43,000 hours on 770 kilograms of xenon propellant as fuel. The drawback for fuel efficiency is that spacecraft using ion thrusters require a large amount of time to reach full acceleration. Small probes and satellites powered by ion thrusters can reach speeds of up to 200,000 mph but require multiple months to reach top speeds. 

Ion thrusters have the potential to power smaller spacecraft or act as a backup power source but have yet to be utilized for larger spacecraft. Fission reactors have the opposite problem: Their ability to produce a large amount of energy and rapidly accelerate a spacecraft runs up against the challenge of miniaturizing a fission reactor to be able to fit into a spacecraft. Fission engines combined with an electrical power source would ensure that thrust could be generated at all times, or at a moment’s notice, to change a craft’s direction. Both ion thrusters and nuclear fission may be combined with a rotating detonation rocket engine to generate enough initial energy to break through Earth’s gravitational pull to place spacecraft into orbit above Earth before beginning a journey to Mars.

Other nations like China have poured millions of state dollars into developing space resources, AI, robotics, and quantum computing for their satellites. By developing the technology to push our spacecraft further faster, the United States’ space capabilities will leave China in low-Earth orbit while the United States leads the way in traveling to Mars and advancing deeper into the solar system.

Roy Mathews is an Innovation Fellow at Young Voices. He is a graduate of Bates College and former Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, The National Interest, and the Boston Herald.

Image: Shutterstock.

In June 2023, India announced its decision to reopen the application process for businesses interested in constructing new semiconductor fabrication plants (commonly called fabs). The process will be undertaken by a new government agency, the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM), within the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY). The ISM is designated to implement a “long-term strategy” for developing semiconductors and display manufacturing “ecosystem.”

This “modified” government-approved $10 billion incentive program that aims to support (up to 50 percent) project costs will increase India’s attractiveness as a globally competitive partner. India is not yet comparable to major global semiconductor producers (and consumers) with deeper pockets (e.g., the United States, whose CHIPS Act provides $52 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing). India’s wooing of the semiconductor industry notwithstanding, this is the second round: the government approved its first incentive policy in December 2021, and the application process closed in early 2022. Only a handful of companies applied, and little progress has yet occurred.

Things were looking up when the Indian conglomerate Vedanta signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Taiwanese technology giant (also a key Apple supplier) Foxconn for a $19.5 billion fab investment in Gujarat. But reportedly, the government will deny the project funding for not fulfilling its requirements.

In the wake of the new reapplication announcement, the speculation about funding rejection seems increasingly likely, and the joint venture might reapply. In addition, the chipmaking plans of the ISMC consortium, including Israel’s Tower, are similarly stuck owing to Tower’s delayed merger with Intel. The third applicant, a Singapore-based consortium led by IGSS Ventures, has also decided to resubmit its case.

Despite initial setbacks in the semiconductor manufacturing race, India expects to collaborate with major global partners, particularly Taiwan and the island’s high-tech companies known as the “national jewels.” Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent state visit to the United States, which enhanced defense and technology cooperation in a big way, should also act as a catalyst. Reportedly, ahead of the trip, the Indian approved the U.S. chipmaker Micron’s plan to invest $2.7 billion in a semiconductor testing and packaging unit in Gujarat. But will top Taiwanese players like the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—the largest and most sophisticated chip manufacturer—and United Microelectronics Corporation also enter the fray?

In the post-COVID pandemic era, when supply chain disruptions continually challenge global trade, diversification is vital for both Taiwan—the world’s leading player in the global electronics industry — and India—the world’s fifth-largest economy with a young workforce and a top tech talent market. Unfortunately, India’s shaky infrastructure will obstruct development, particularly for an industry dependent on reliable, high-volume water supplies. On the plus side, both parties intend to redouble efforts to minimize such difficulties.

Modi envisions India as a globally competitive hub of Electronics System Design and Manufacturing (ESDM) under his “Make in India” and “Digital India” initiatives. Establishing the semiconductor wafer fabrication facilities will strengthen manufacturing and innovation and help establish a dependable value chain. According to some estimates, India’s semiconductor market will expand by about $85 billion and generate employment for 600,000 people by 2030, highlighting the industry’s vital role in global value chains.

For India, owning stakes in the high-technology ecosystem is crucial for not just removing supply chain obstacles for its rapidly expanding domestic consumption but also for strengthening its exports. Naturally, Taiwan features prominently in this vision. On the other hand, Taiwan’s dominance in the semiconductor industry—accounting for about 60 percent of the total global foundry market with the largest number of new fabs—has put a spotlight on Taiwan’s post-pandemic difficulties. Specifically, these problems include the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, the looming threat of Chinese invasion, and persistent water problems amid increased global demand.

In this context, Taiwan could effectively utilize India’s growing global profile, especially during and after its twin presidencies of the G20 and Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO); its high-tech and security-oriented relationship with the United States; and its current vision of capitalizing on the country’s scale and magnitude of opportunities. Moreover, as manufacturing companies start “de-risking,” Southeast Asia and India gradually become ideal alternative destinations. Partnering with India will undoubtedly ease the ramifications of localized chipmaking, which is on trend globally and has compounded the talent or skill shortage concerns.

Fortunately, their growing bonhomie reflects a new direction in ties. In 2018, Taiwan and India signed two bilateral agreements that covered both direct and indirect “third-location” investments, ensuring protection in line with international standards and a dedicated desk (called Taiwan Plus) to address Taiwanese investors' concerns and facilitate their operations in India. Since then, the bilateral trade has maintained a steady upward trajectory (about $8.45 billion in 2022, an increase of 9.8 percent from 2021).

In 2022, the director-general of the India-Taipei Association—India’s de-facto embassy in Taiwan—highlighted the Indian government’s plans to invest about $30 billion in building its own semiconductor supply chain to curtail India’s overdependence on imported chips. For now, India is not concerned about advanced chipmaking. Still, it seeks to produce “mature chips” used in everyday applications, such as electric vehicles, home appliances, and medical devices, that will likely face maximum pressure in the coming years. At the same time, India is looking to boost self-reliance in display manufacturing for home-grown production of household electronics, smartphones, and automobiles—the domestic consumption of display components will reach more than $10 billion by 2025.

In this context, India hosted a delegation of semiconductor manufacturers, including Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC), the world’s sixth-largest contract chipmaker and the third-biggest in Taiwan, in August 2022. Months later, the visit of the Taiwanese business delegation led by Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Chern-Chyi Chen in late 2022 has given new momentum to the strategic cooperation, including the potential for a free trade agreement (FTA). Additionally, the inauguration of the Taiwan-India CEO roundtable and the signing of three MoUs, including one between Taiwanese memory chipmaker Adata Technology and the Electronic Industries Association of India (ELCINA), are noteworthy milestones in bilateral economic cooperation.

Furthermore, India’s “Act East” policy and Taiwan’s “New Southbound” policy will enable resource and talent sharing in these times of great shortage, especially in the resource-intensive semiconductor industry. India’s steady growth in clean energy and the government’s efforts to harness hydroelectric capacity should allay some concerns about energy shortages. Moreover, the turn toward sustainability—a much-needed semiconductor manufacturing component—will work in India’s favor.

Currently, over 100 Taiwanese companies have invested in India. Semiconductor collaboration could boost this figure higher. Taiwan has the expertise and experience to aid India in setting up its domestic manufacturing capabilities. First, Taiwanese companies could help train and upskill Indian talent. Second, India’s new extended reapplication window decision should encourage companies like PSMC to enter into joint production arrangements in India. Third, Taiwanese companies can also be useful for India in gradually establishing its own tech ecosystem: connecting with local fabless chip design houses; building assembly, testing, marking, and packaging (ATMP; referring to outsourced semiconductor assembly and test) plants; and then finally setting up the fabs.

Partnerships with giants like the PSMC, which has experience setting up plants in China, and the TSMC, which is currently spending $40 billion to build two fabs in Arizona, would drive higher growth for India and India-Taiwan strategic ties. Modi’s U.S. visit has invigorated India’s semiconductor plans and may attract Taiwanese contractors to invest in India, especially after top American firms enter the race. In March this year, India and the United States signed an MoU to create resilient, innovative semiconductor supply chains to boost India’s aspirations.

Notably, China-related geopolitical concerns figure in the semiconductor collaboration. India’s adversarial relationship with China is getting more fragile amid the tilt towards the US; China is watchful of India’s economic-technological cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” affected by the China-U.S. hegemonic battle, has found safer pastures away from China. However, the weakening of China’s dependence on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry has raised security fears for the island.

Against such a scenario, Taiwan’s diversification plans would look to gain at least limited political support from India. Even if India is unlikely to forsake the “One China” policy, New Delhi has an increasingly favorable disposition toward Taiwan and has even expressed concerns about the militarization of the Taiwan Strait.

The event of a Taiwan invasion would have devastating effects on India’s economy and regional security. So New Delhi continues to walk a tightrope between China and Taiwan. Yet, today, the promise of new technologies pushes India toward Taipei. Whether shared democratic values and economic-technological convergence will develop greater strategic bonhomie is, however, an open question.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is a Contributing Editor for The National Interest. He is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden, and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, The Netherlands.

Image: Shutterstock. 

In a scientific first, researchers from Caltech beamed power generated in outer space back to Earth. The Space Solar Power Demonstrator proves the scientific basis for a new, long-hoped for energy source: space-based solar power (SBSP). By capturing solar energy in outer space, without the many factors that make terrestrial solar intermittent, SBSP can unlock a whole new class of baseload energy technologies to provide clean energy and reduce carbon emissions. The rapid reduction in launch costs enabled by the growing commercial space sector means that it could be economic within the next couple of decades. Among other entities, the European Space Agency, China, Japan, and the U.S. Department of Defense are all actively pursuing research and development in this area. However, Caltech’s achievement is overshadowed by an uncomfortable fact: despite being the world’s leader in space activities, the United States is in danger of falling behind on SBSP and may lose this emerging sector to geopolitical competitors. In short, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to develop and commercialize space-based solar power by combining the public and private sectors to solve complex engineering, economic, and regulatory challenges.

After a relatively stable decade in energy markets, major global changes are underscoring the dependence of modern economies on energy services. Pandemic-driven disruptions in energy markets, including an accelerated oil boom and bust, undermined near-term investment in energy supply. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further exacerbated energy price volatility, raising the prospect of Europe losing its larger supplier of energy and the world losing its second-largest oil supplier. More broadly, the reemergence of global geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China, is leading to escalating competition over strategic industries, including energy and space. Finally, all of this is occurring against the backdrop of ever-worsening climate change and the ever-pressing need to reduce carbon emissions as much as possible as fast as possible. Even with the growth of wind and solar, and the emergence of other advanced energy technologies, the world needs all of the clean energy it can get. Further, as legacy thermal powerplants are retired at an increasing rate, the need for dispatchable and baseload power systems is becoming ever more acute.

Space-based solar power speaks to all of these needs in one package: it can be dispatched quickly to support system ramping, it can provide baseload power at very high capacity factors, it produces zero direct emissions, it is resilient, and it can achieve all of this simultaneously. The scientific first principles are simple. Solar power in space is about eight times more powerful than on the Earth’s surface because it does not need to go through the atmosphere, it is not blocked by clouds, and does not experience nighttime. If this solar power could be collected and beamed back to Earth, namely with long wavelength microwaves, terrestrial markets could gain access to a 24/7 clean energy source. Of course, the complexity of such an undertaking is not trivial. SBSP was first popularized by astrophysicist Gerard O’Neill in the 1970s, but progress has only occurred in fits and starts, in large part because costs remained prohibitive.

With the rise of commercial space innovators like SpaceX, the economic equation for SBSP is starting to flip. Reusable rocketry, off-the-shelf satellite equipment, and economies of scale are driving down the costs of space access. Additional innovations like commercial space stations and in-space assembling and manufacturing can support the construction of large, complex satellite installations. The potential for space mined resources from the Moon and asteroids can further reduce material costs. 

Many regions, especially those facing desperate energy situations, are starting to notice. The European Space Agency (ESA) is embarking on the ambitious Cassiopeia program to develop SBSP. Underlying this program are two studies by ESA finding that the first utility-scale demonstration project could cost less than $20 billion. While costly, such a price tag is on par with many first-of-a-kind energy megaprojects, such as the construction of two new nuclear reactors in Georgia. China sees SBSP as a way to become an energy and space superpower. It has plans for a low Earth orbit test in 2028 and a geosynchronous orbit test in 2030.

In the next several decades, the world could effectively build hundreds of gigawatts of baseload, utility-scale power plants, anywhere in the world. Certain configurations could enable SBSP stations to switch between power markets, enhancing system reliability and flexibly complementing variable renewable energy sources. Countries that have not been blessed with the economic advantages of energy resources could not only produce their own domestic energy securely, they could develop export markets by sending excess space power production to world markets. Beyond grid-scale power, SBSP can support many types of advanced energy activities, from remote defense operations to orbital satellites, to bases on the surface of the Moon or Mars. And all of this with limited carbon emissions—although space stations require rocket launches, the lifecycle emissions are likely to be comparable to other clean energy sources.

However, the United States is not currently on track to join in this energy abundance. Only a handful of American entities are working on SBSP, namely the Department of Defense and Caltech. NASA is funding several projects focused on power beaming, but only for space applications. No R&D nor commercialization roadmap exists for U.S. agencies and the private sector. Without broader coordination and a demand driver, there will simply be insufficient investment to support the development of utility-scale SBSP.

A broader American innovation ecosystem has yet to develop. Notably absent from these developments are some of the most important entities for developing commercialized energy technologies: the Department of Energy, national laboratories, and power sector customers. Space industry efforts alone cannot unlock this technology. Further, important policy and regulatory venues for such space energy systems, like the State Department, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and Federal Communications Commission, have yet to establish a sufficient legal foundation.

What would a comprehensive strategy look like? Early this year, we published an article in the journal Space Policy arguing that a technology development program can form the keystone of such a strategy. We proposed the use of a public-private partnership to progressively de-risk the technology while lowering prices. Starting from small-scale activities, an aggressive but feasible program could reach utility-scale, cost-competitive systems by the 2040s. The Department of Energy’s new Office of Clean Energy Demonstration, created in the recent infrastructure bill, would be a perfect host for such a program.

Beyond technology demonstration and cost reduction, such a program would also enable sustained policy development to establish a long-term regulatory framework. Regulatory challenges include the use of radio spectrum currently used by other satellites and terrestrial users, addressing concerns about the security and safety of microwave beaming, and the integration of SBSP into highly regulated energy markets.

The most important starting step is for the Biden administration and Congress to declare the development of space-based solar power a national priority to fight climate change, enhance energy security, and secure global competitiveness in two strategic sectors. Interagency coordination across NASA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy can direct government investment to enabling technologies in the laboratory. Private-sector-led innovation, working closely with academia, can take these innovations into actual deployment, reducing costs through staged deployment.

Ultimately, SBSP could become one of the defining energy sources of the twenty-first century. By complementing other clean energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power, it can secure global mid-century decarbonization while ensuring the United States and its allies protect their energy security. And even if long-shot carbon-free technologies like nuclear fusion were to become commercially viable, SBSP’s unique characteristics would still justify the investment into it. As fantastical as it sounds, solar power beamed from space is exactly the kind of leadership-defining, world-changing bets that the United States should be making this century.

Alex Gilbert is a Fellow and Ph.D. student at the Colorado School of Mines, and Director of Space and Planetary Regulation at Zeno Power.

Leet W. Wood currently works in energy policy and regulation at a DC not-for-profit. He received his doctorate from George Mason University in 2019.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Western hemisphere is home to some of the world’s largest economies—the United States, Canada, Brazil, Mexico—and boasts countries with long-standing democratic traditions. Yet a lack of U.S. leadership and vision has left the hemisphere vulnerable to authoritarian encroachment, weak economies, and populations at risk. A new regional economic security framework is badly needed.

America’s backyard, instead of being filled with democratic friends and booming economies, is home to Russian bombers and mercenaries, twenty-nine Chinese-owned ports and port projects, a widespread Iran and Russia-fueled anti-U.S. propaganda machinery, Chinese-enabled fentanyl and money-laundering operations, wobbling and fallen democracies, and widespread economic and political instability. Soon, it may also be home to yet another Chinese surveillance outpost.

Over the last two decades, Latin America has seen wild swings from left-wing populists to right-wing populists and back, all of which have enabled corruption, disappointed their populations, and left the United States without stable partnerships across the region. In response, Washington has settled into a hands-off approach to the region—allowing Venezuela and Nicaragua to slide into dictatorships and largely ignoring chaos in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and El Salvador.

In addition to rising internal hardline forces within Latin America, external autocratic forces are imposing their will upon the region with little in the form of a coordinated American response. Russia and Iran are also increasingly active throughout the Americas, providing military assistance to Venezuela, evading sanctions in Cuba, or pushing misinformation and destabilizing democracy. The rising influence of authoritarianism throughout Latin America is pushing the region away from the stable and interdependent democracies that would benefit both local citizens and the hemisphere at large.

The true autocratic behemoth in the region, however, is China, which has ramped up its economic investment throughout the region, driving deep debt dependency while pushing an anti-democratic vision of surveillance states and crumbling, corruption-driven infrastructure. Ecuador has already discovered thousands of cracks in its brand new $3 billion Chinese-built and Chinese-financed hydroelectric dam.

With tacit state support, Chinese organized crime is infiltrating Central American drug trafficking and money laundering operations—supercharging both. China has become deeply interwoven in Latin America’s energy grids, ports, and other critical infrastructure, putting essential services and global commerce routes at risk to the whims of Beijing. And China is increasing its military engagement throughout the hemisphere, from booming weapons sales and anti-riot police gear to joint exercises and training.

The United States needs a concrete strategy to address Chinese encroachment throughout the region, whether through its illegal overfishing off of South America’s Pacific coast or its growing fentanyl operations throughout Latin America.

America’s cool relations with Central and South America have, meanwhile, failed to capitalize on the tremendous promise of the region and its critical role in American economic and national security. A prosperous Latin America lowers the pressure on immigration to the United States, offers critical supply chain advantages, and is rich with resources and human talent that should catalyze twenty-first-century technologies. Mexico has frequently benefitted from U.S. efforts to locate supply chains closer to home, but so much more could be done. A purposeful shift of critical supply chains of U.S. manufacturing from Asia to Latin America could promote regional prosperity, lower costs for American businesses, and reduce pressures contributing to political instability and mass migration.

A U.S.-led and unified Western hemisphere has the potential to control the future of energy and become a free and open answer to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) over the next century. The Americas possess some of the largest deposits of lithium and other critical minerals and the technological expertise to lead the world’s green future. Unfortunately, we are currently ceding much of the control of those resources and refining to China, which produces most of the world’s solar panels and electric vehicle batteries—often at factories utilizing forced labor. The United States cannot stand by passively as our energy security is threatened by reliance on a new generation of autocrats.

Washington must bring powerful answers to pressing issues in the region: populism, political unrest, and disinformation; water and food insecurity; extreme weather; mass migration; the evolving drug trade; money laundering and corruption; and weakened democratic institutions. These elements are interconnected, as violence in Guatemala and weak institutions in Nicaragua lead directly to immigration at the U.S. southern border. Political upheaval in Peru and Bolivia provides openings to Chinese state-sanctioned incursions.

For a rising Americas to succeed, there needs to be a focus on developing hemisphere-wide stability and keeping our physical, digital, and trade borders both secure and efficient. Reinforcing respect for democratic norms and increasing U.S.-led capital investment would help counter cheap Chinese cash and the petty dictators that thrive on corruption and misinformation.

The United States can take steps now to improve economic security and resilience throughout the Americas:

To begin with, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation and U.S. Export-Import Bank can help lead the way in Latin America, attracting more Western capital to the hemisphere, de-risking markets, increasing regional foreign direct investment, supporting manufacturing partnerships, and helping stabilize the tenuous economic conditions that fuel emigration and the drug trade.

U.S. law enforcement should coordinate with trusted allies throughout the hemisphere to develop a regional network of champions and tools to battle violence, corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, and drug trafficking.

Properly trained and resourced election monitors should ensure fair elections throughout the region, while non-partisan watchdogs should be empowered to monitor and act against misinformation from both foreign authoritarian regimes and domestic provocateurs.

Finally, unified and consistent policies throughout the Western Hemisphere on beneficial ownership registries, foreign agents, corporate taxation, and human rights protections should form the backbone of a more transparent framework for doing business.

China is already active throughout Latin America, destabilizing the region and putting our adversaries in our backyard. We don’t share a physical border with China, Russia, or Iran, but their trade, economic, and political influence throughout the Americas suggests the “border” isn’t so far away. It is time for Washington to reclaim leadership throughout the hemisphere. Offering improved economic security for countries and citizens is a critical first step.

Elaine Dezenski is Senior Director and Head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Image: Shutterstock.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private military company, the Wagner Group, is a dead man walking. A thoroughly unsavory character, Prigozhin has reinvented himself several times since his nine-year stint in prison for fraud and robbery while in his twenties, at one point becoming the caterer to the entire Russian Army and the Kremlin. But a man like Prigozhin would never be satisfied in the food service business.

Prigozhin used his vast wealth garnered in food service and gambling to create two ventures close to the Russian state: a troll farm called the Internet Research Agency, which the U.S. Department of Justice indicted for interference with the 2016 U.S. election, and the Wagner Group, a PMC (private military company). The Wagner Group coalesced under Prigozhin in 2014 to provide plausible deniability to Russian president Vladimir Putin for paramilitary operations, first in Crimea, then in Syria and Africa, and now in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.  The Wagner Group operated, in effect, as Putin’s private army.

Not only did this enrich Prigozhin further—a raid of the group’s headquarters in St. Petersburg in the last several days netted 4 billion rubles (about $48 million) in cold hard cash—it also gave him a small but combat-experienced army.  Money and men-in-arms equal a measure of real political power, even in autocratic Russia.

But given that Russia is autocratic, such power could not be allowed to persist so close to home. There were signs that the Putin regime would pin the blame for war crimes committed in Ukraine on Prigozhin (crimes the Wagner Group no doubt did commit, but so did official Russian forces), killing two birds with one stone. More proximately, the Putin regime made sure to deploy the Wagner Group troops on the very frontlines, with a high attrition rate, gradually weakening the group as a serious fighting force. At the same time, Wagner’s combat-experienced veterans fought the Ukrainians more effectively than the official Russian conscript army.

Prigozhin understood what was happening. A few months ago, the once highly secretive commander began to post public videos in which he used, shall we say, colorful epithets to lambast the regime.  He did not attack Putin himself, but rather Putin’s inner circle, most notably Chief of the General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov and Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu. He accused them of pocketing money meant for ammunition purchases and deceiving Putin about the real status of the Russian position in Ukraine. In essence, Prigozhin accused Gerasimov and Shoigu of treason during a time of war, styling himself as a true, straight-talking patriot.

Prigozhin’s new high-level profile among the Russian public was a very canny ploy to make it harder for Putin to destroy the Wagner Group and assassinate Prigozhin himself.  Assassination was, without a doubt, a genuine concern for Prigozhin, given how many oligarchs and bureaucrats in Russia have recently met their demise under suspicious circumstances.

Most commentators in the know feel the tipping point for Prigozhin to go on the offensive over the last few days, taking over Rostov-on-Don and marching within 200 kilometers from Moscow, was, in fact, an attempt by the Putin regime to strike at the Wagner Group’s leadership, dressed up to look like a tragic case of friendly fire.  NBC News reported on 23 June that:

In the audio messages on Telegram, Prigozhin accused Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu of ordering a rocket strike on Wagner’s field camps in Ukraine, where its soldiers are fighting on behalf of Russia against Ukrainian forces. The claims have not been verified. An unverified video posted on the ‘Razgruzka Wagner’ (Wagner’s Combat Vest) Telegram channel showed a scene in a forest where small fires were burning and trees appeared to have been broken by force. It carried the caption: ‘A missile attack was launched on the camps of PMC Wagner. Many victims. According to eyewitnesses, the strike was delivered from the rear, that is, it was delivered by the military of the Russian Ministry of Defense.’

Prigozhin then accused Shoigu of killing at least thirty of his men in that rocket strike.  Given how much disinformation surrounds all events concerning Russia, it’s unclear what actually happened. What is clear is that Prigozhin must have decided that forces within the Russian regime were conspiring to assassinate him and his leadership team.

What does one do when the Russian government wants you dead, and the West won’t grant you asylum due to war crimes allegations?

Prigozhin is no fool; he’s one of the cagiest characters around. He apparently decided the only play left for him was to up the ante for Putin personally. It would be impossible, of course, for an army of at most 25,000 to take Moscow. But Prigozhin could start the “march for justice,” portraying himself as a true Russian patriot amid a den of thieving bureaucrats and politicians. Even if he didn’t get far, Prigozhin would reveal to the world how much of a paper tiger Vladimir Putin really is, emboldening others within Russia’s circle of power. Best case scenario: Putin would negotiate with him to avoid a bloody fight in the very heart of Russia.

Prigozhin got his best-case scenario. Putin roped in Belarussian autocrat Aleksandr Lukashenko to negotiate a deal whereby Prigozhin would reportedly go into exile in Belarus.  The future of the Wagner Group is unclear: African autocrats have reportedly been reassured their Wagner Group units will remain to shore up their fragile regimes. Group members in Ukraine will face integration within the official Defense Ministry command umbrella. Overall, the Wagner has been seriously weakened, despite Prigozhin’s hope to command the group from exile.

Prigozhin himself will live for another day, and he has grievously wounded Putin’s carefully cultivated reputation for strength not only on the world stage but also in Russia itself, where weakness brings out the wolves in force. It was a masterstroke by a player holding a very weak hand.

Because of this, Prigozhin is a dead man walking. There’s likely a doorknob with Novichok on it in his future, to be sure. What’s more interesting to consider is whether, by his bold choice, Prigozhin has, in effect, given Putin the same fate. Only time will tell.

Valerie M. Hudson is a University Distinguished Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where she holds the George H.W. Bush Chair.  Her views are her own.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the twenty-first century, Chinese foreign policy is widely reflected in developing global partnerships and expanding interests with other countries as geopolitical instruments for power and influence. China has resorted to building a global network of strategic partnerships (flexible political cooperation based on informal political bonds) instead of broad formal alliances (which often target external enemies based on defense treaties). While traditional alliances can potentially expose Chinese diplomacy to high risk, partnerships are perceived as more flexible and interest-driven. Such partnerships denote a shared commitment to managing unavoidable conflicts so that the two countries can continue working together on vital areas of common interest. 

Building strategic partnerships worldwide is one of the most important dimensions and instruments of Chinese diplomacy to achieve geopolitical goals. In the competitive Middle East dominated by Washington, Beijing has had to build a regional presence that does not alienate the United States or any Middle East states while pursuing its geopolitical interests, even as the U.S. security umbrella offers a low-cost entry into the region. China’s partnerships with the Middle East states broadly tend to correspond to the three major categories of partnerships: comprehensive strategic partnerships (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates), strategic partnerships (Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, and Kuwait), and innovative comprehensive partnership (Israel). Through strategic partnerships usually founded on economic interests, China has pursued its Middle Eastern geopolitical interests bilaterally without adopting region-wide or multilateral goals. It can say that Beijing's circle of friends in the Middle East is getting broader and more diverse (See Table 1).

China was among the first countries to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the State of Palestine as a sovereign state in 1988 and has since provided diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians. China has also been a vocal supporter of the Palestinians in international forums and has called for a just and lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the two-state solution. The strategic partnership agreement signed by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Chinese president Xi Jinping in June 2023 shows China's commitment to supporting the Palestinian people and the close relationship between the two countries (marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of establishing formal relations). It also signifies China's willingness to be more active in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Xi called the strategic partnership an “important milestone in the history of bilateral relations.”

The China-Palestinian Authority (PA) strategic partnership is significant for both countries. For China, it is an opportunity to deepen its engagement in the Middle East and to gain a foothold in a region that is increasingly important to its economic and strategic interests. For the PA, the agreement is a sign of China's growing support for the Palestinian cause and a potential source of much-needed economic and political support. The strategic partnership includes an economic and technological cooperation pact, a deal on mutual visa exemption for diplomatic passports, and a friendship between the Chinese city of Wuhan and Ramallah. Overall, China-Palestine relations have maintained a positive growth momentum in recent years. The two sides launched the first round of negotiations on a free trade zone and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Belt and Road Initiative cooperation. The trade between the two countries in recent years has grown steadily and, in 2022, reached $158 million, reflecting a 23.2 percent increase compared to the previous year (see Figure 1). The China-Palestine strategic partnership is a significant development that has the potential to benefit both countries. However, it is important to note that the partnership is still in its early stages, and it remains to be seen how it will be implemented and its long-term impact.

The Prospects and Obstacles

China's establishment of a strategic partnership with the PA is another sign of its growing interest in the Middle East and its desire to increase its regional influence. China has been steadily increasing its economic and political engagement in the Middle East in recent years, and this partnership is another step in that direction. The strategic partnership with Palestine is the twelfth partnership China established in the Middle East (see Table 1). This shows that China is increasingly interested in the region and is looking to expand its influence there. Nevertheless, China's influence in the Middle East is still relatively limited. The United States is still the most powerful great power in the region, and it will need to do more to build its influence if it wants to become a significant player in the Middle East. Therefore, the importance of the strategic partnership between China and Palestine is mainly in the economic and bilateral spheres. The two countries have already signed several economic cooperation agreements, and the strategic partnership will likely lead to even more cooperation in the future. China is also expected to provide Palestine with financial and technical assistance, which will help to boost the Palestinian economy.

China has been a long-time supporter of Palestine and has provided economic and humanitarian assistance to the PA. China's aid has been essential in recent years as the PA has struggled to meet its financial obligations. China aided Palestine in the construction of more than forty projects, including schools and roads, the Palestinian Foreign Ministry building; sent expert teams, medical supplies, and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic; and recently pledged a further $1 million donation to the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Upgrading China-Palestine relations to a strategic partnership will provide a framework for increased cooperation on various issues, benefiting both countries. It has the potential to help Palestine's economic development and humanitarian situation.

China relies on strategic partnerships to bolster its diplomatic posture in the Middle East and give large Chinese companies a leg up when negotiating infrastructure and digital deals with the local governments. China has historically shown sympathy toward the Palestinians in public. Still, it has focused more on its relations with Israel (a close ally of the United States) in practice due to technology and commercial interests, and the two sides established an innovative comprehensive partnership. China-Palestine trade is small two-way trade that only totaled $158 million in 2022, compared with $17.62 billion with Israel. China has become Israel’s third-largest trading partner. Still, it remained far behind the EU ($49.19 billion) and the United States ($22.04 billion), even though Israel trades with China more than any other European country. 

Overall, the China-Israel relationship is complex and has challenges and opportunities. China is looking to Israel for technology and commercial opportunities, while Israel is looking to China for investment and support. The increased tensions between the United States and China, however, could affect the China-Israel relationship. Therefore, Israel is forced to conduct its trade relations with China out of economic and commercial interests while considering U.S. demands and taking advantage of opportunities.

Moreover, China supported the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict to enhance its worldwide image and bolster its great power status. Over the years, China has promoted several multipoint peace plans to facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process on multiple occasions, but with little success. However, China's recent success in brokering a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia could give it renewed hope of playing a more active role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

The China-Palestine strategic partnership comes when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at a standstill. The renewed hostilities, Palestinian internal divisions, increased Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, and a far-right government in Israel have all dampened sentiment toward negotiations in the near term. These longstanding obstacles in the Palestinian-Israel relationship led China to mainly be limited its diplomacy to construction, manufacturing, and other economic projects in the region. Only time will tell how the China-PA strategic partnership will ultimately impact the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

China's growing presence, through strategic partnerships, in the Middle East poses significant challenges to the United States' wide range of vital geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic interests. The United States, however, still has several advantages, a long history of engagement in the region, strong ties with many Middle Eastern countries, and a strong military presence. Washington cannot afford to take China's growing presence in the Middle East for granted. It needs to continue to engage with the region, strengthen its ties and alliances with Middle Eastern countries, and be prepared to compete with China's strategic partnerships for regional influence.

Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ukraine’s dogged resistance to Russian aggression surprised many experts who anticipated a rapid Russian victory. It also elevated the importance of understanding a nation’s resolve to resist aggression as a critical determinant of war outcomes. Ukraine’s example naturally raises questions about Taiwan, which faces a similar potential threat of aggression from a powerful neighbor.

Taiwan’s capacity to resist invasion is an issue of top importance to the United States. Any U.S. military intervention in a China-Taiwan clash carries a high risk of escalation to a major war. Washington and the U.S. public might opt against intervention if Taiwan’s military rapidly collapsed or if the conflict appeared to be a lost cause. Conversely, a resolute and dogged Taiwanese defense could garner international sympathy and increase the likelihood of U.S. government and public support for intervention. Taiwan’s resolve also plays a critical role in enabling even the possibility of a U.S. intervention. Because the Pacific Ocean is so vast, it could require considerable time—potentially several months—for the United States to mobilize sufficient U.S.-based combat power to augment forward-deployed military forces and fight a major contingency in East Asia.

In a recently released report, RAND researchers evaluated Taiwan’s capacity to resist high-end attacks. We considered four factors: political leadership and society, military effectiveness, durability (ability to withstand punishment), and allied military intervention. We concluded that political leadership and society was the most important factor by far. Strong political leadership (in the form of respected national leaders capable of commanding and enforcing the public’s loyalty), a largely unified and cohesive public, and strong public support for a compelling national cause or ideology offer the most durable foundation for a resolute defense.

A prepared and capable military can bolster the effects of political leadership by denying the adversary an easy conquest. By staving off imminent defeat, Taiwan’s military could prolong the conflict and allow time for foreign intervention to arrive and for international sympathy to strengthen. Severe disruption to the economy and infrastructure of the island—along with mounting civilian and military casualties—may bolster public resolve in the initial phases of the conflict, but over the longer term, those disruptions are likely to erode public support for the war.

The promise of U.S. intervention offers an additional important resource for infusing determination and resolve, but the effects of a promised intervention will depend both on the state of the island’s political leadership and military capabilities and on the nature and scope of promised U.S. aid. In general, the weaker Taiwan’s political leadership and its military are, the earlier and more robust the U.S. intervention must be to maximize the prospect that Taiwan will avoid defeat.

Our study raises several implications for U.S. planners and policymakers. First, analysts should pay particularly close attention to the quality and strength of the island’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion in the lead-up to a crisis and conflict for insight into the island’s ability to withstand a large-scale Chinese attack. All other variables, including the state of its military and the island’s enduring vulnerabilities, should be regarded as of secondary importance.

Paradoxically, an evaluation of the island’s political leadership in peacetime sheds little insight into how it will perform at war, a point underscored by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s leadership, which appeared unremarkable in peace but bold and inspiring in war. This is because the circumstances of how and why a conflict begins can significantly impact a leader’s resolve and the population’s cohesiveness. Since we cannot predict what the circumstances will be, it is thus extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate how Taiwan’s leadership may perform in war.

Second, Taiwan’s disadvantage in the quantity of armaments and troops does not necessarily doom it to defeat. Taiwan can take important steps to improve the effectiveness of its military. However, even if Taiwan’s military dramatically improved its combat effectiveness, China’s military advantage will likely continue to grow owing to the enormous resource imbalance. Given these trends, Taiwan’s ability to withstand a major Chinese attack will increasingly hinge on the strength of its political leadership and social cohesion above all other factors.

Third, the impact of severe casualties and economic loss likely would cut two ways in a major war. Initially, Taiwan’s public likely would rally around the national leadership in favor of resistance to an aggressive China. However, over the long term, heavy costs of conflict likely would erode public support for continuing the war. Public backing for a war to defend against a Chinese attack could fade after an initial surge of support. How public support changes over time could vary depending on the strength of the island’s political leadership and degree of social cohesion, however.

Finally, U.S. military intervention will continue to remain important for Taiwan’s ability to withstand a large-scale Chinese attack, owing to the island’s vulnerability and military disadvantages. A well-led and socially cohesive Taiwan might be able to mount a determined resistance for perhaps many months, but over time the island’s vulnerability and the military’s inferiority would likely take a severe toll. Absent a robust U.S. military intervention, Taiwan’s government would be severely challenged to withstand a determined all-out Chinese attack indefinitely.

Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the nonpartisan, nonprofit RAND Corporation.

Image: Shutterstock.

In their much-talked-about Harper’s magazine essay, “Why Are We in Ukraine,” Benjamin Schwartz and Christopher Layne provide a coherent and convincing case against U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine. They argue that U.S. foreign interventions and geopolitical meddling in pursuit of global hegemony and dominance that went well beyond NATO expansion were responsible in part for Russian president Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Schwartz and Layne suggest that Washington is fighting a proxy war, and a “decidedly hot” war—as opposed to a cold one—in Ukraine. They refer to the U.S. involvement there as the “most intense and sustained military entanglement in the near-eighty-year history in the competition between the United States and Russia,” with weapons provided by Washington inflicting casualties on Russians “directly or indirectly,” and with America “edging close to direct conflict” with Moscow.

Yet notwithstanding all the many ways in which the two depict and criticize U.S. policy in Ukraine, the historical analogy they seem to employ by implication—that of Vietnam, given that the title of their essay recalls a 1968 speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson entitled, “Why are we in Vietnam?”—is misplaced for a very simple reason: unlike that war in Southeast Asia, where close to 60,000 American service members had lost their lives fighting, there are no American troops engaged in combat in Ukraine. Nor are Americans fighting in Ukraine in the same way that they did in Iraq or in Afghanistan over the past twenty years. They aren’t fighting there at all.

A case can certainly be made—in the same way that U.S. post-Cold War, anti-Russia policies, in particular, the expansion of NATO and the support for Ukraine led eventually to the current war there—that American policies of providing diplomatic, military, and economic aid to Kiev could, at some point in the future, create the conditions for direct U.S. military intervention, and perhaps even to direct nuclear conflict with Russia.

Certainly, if and when Ukraine is invited to join NATO—a big and conditional “if”—the United States would then be committed to sending troops to help protect that country from outside aggression. This is in line with how we will soon be committed to defending Finland or, for that matter, other sovereign states like Montenegro. Some Anti-interventionists criticize those commitments, but these enjoy bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and don’t face any major public opposition.

Moreover, a case can be made that America’s support for Ukraine, even if it doesn’t join NATO, could be extended and yet not draw the United States into a military conflict.

In a way, the opponents of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy recall the leading members of the foreign policy establishment who in 1948 opposed then-President Harry Truman’s decision to recognize the new state of Israel. They argued that American support for the Jewish state could prove to be costly for Washington in the long run.

They lost that debate then. But in retrospect, they were right that the long-term support for Israel would prove to be costly for the United States. Yet at no point in the seventy-five years of close cooperation between Washington and Israel has America been drawn into a direct military intervention in the wars between the Israelis and the Arabs—or with Soviet Russia, the former patron of Egypt. The sole exception that has proven this rule is the brief nuclear close call during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

If anything, despite the high costs of the relationship, U.S. public and congressional support for Israel has remained solid all those years, even at the height of the oil embargo that the Arab energy-producing states imposed on the United States to punish it for supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

The point is not that Schwartz and Layne are wrong in their criticism of U.S. policies towards Russia and Ukraine. Rather, it is that, unlike the long-term response to U.S. interventions in Vietnam or Iraq, the American public—and by extension, Congress—is apparently willing to sustain U.S. entanglements abroad as long as American boys and girls are not fighting there and their costs don’t involve many American casualties.

Indeed, studies conducted about public attitudes toward U.S. military interventions abroad have confirmed what is probably common sense: that there has been a direct correlation between the rise in the number of American casualties in those wars and public support for U.S. involvement in them. If anything, with the end of the draft and the rise of a volunteer American military fighting American wars, and with more soldiers surviving battlefield injuries, the public seems to be more tolerant of costly American military interventions, even in the face of American casualties.

Otherwise, how can one otherwise explain what amounted to American public apathy as U.S. direct military intervention in Afghanistan lasted for two decades, with close to 2,000 American servicemen killed and more than 20,000 injured? And when was the last time that Congress debated the presence of close to 30,000 American service members in the Korean Peninsula seventy years after the war there had ended?

Moreover, notwithstanding the rising “inwardist” public attitudes in response to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, these conflicts haven’t dulled support for military involvement, at least according to a recent survey from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The surveyors found that, instead of seeing a public that is shrinking back from getting involved in the world, “especially when there’s an ally involved, we’ve actually seen somewhat of an increase in support for using the military.”

Some public opinion analysts have, in general, suggested that the public has supported the Biden administration’s policies in Ukraine, including the economic sanctions imposed on Russia and the aid provided to Ukraine, but remain opposed to sending U.S. troops to fight in that country—something which President Joe Biden has insisted will not happen during his presidency.

From that perspective, it’s doubtful that by recounting the history of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy—which antagonized the Russians and has been central to Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine—the arguments made by Schwartz, Layne, and others are going to have any impact on the public or congressional attitudes.

Instead, opponents of these policies need to explain why they oppose backing U.S. NATO allies against a potential Russian threat and providing support to a friendly sovereign nation invaded by a foreign aggressor.

One should not really expect mounting public and congressional opposition to American assistance to Ukraine, a relatively democratic nation with people who “look like us,” when Washington has been providing a corrupt Middle East regime, Egypt, with over $50 billion in military aid and $30 billion in economic assistance since 1978.

A Ukraine that continues to be seen by America as a nation fighting for its survival against a U.S. adversary is more likely than not to continue to benefit from U.S. assistance—not unlike Israel, which, with $236 billion in military and economic aid, has become the largest recipient of American assistance.

Critics of the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, therefore, face a major challenge in trying to change public and congressional attitudes as long as the United States itself is not drawn directly into the fighting there.

It would probably make more sense for these critics to focus on how to reorient American policy towards Russia and create a new balance of power in Europe when the war ends, thereby ensuring that the conflict doesn’t remain frozen like in the Korean Peninsula. If that were to happen, then people seventy years from now might be forced to explain why the United States remains in Ukraine.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: Shutterstock.

An uncomfortable but profound question is being asked around Washington DC these days: has American capitalism failed, and if so, can it be rescued? This inquiry is central to a debate playing out in the heart of the U.S. political establishment as policymakers, experts, and others grapple with the geostrategic challenges of our time.

At the heart of this discussion is a small but increasingly influential center-right think tank, American Compass, and its founder, Oren Cass. A leading conservative domestic-policy wonk and former policy director for (now Senator) Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign, Cass started American Compass to “restore an economic consensus that emphasizes the importance of family, community, and industry to the nation’s liberty and prosperity.” Better yet, as described by the Washington Post when the think tank was first launched, Cass and his followers are mounting:

…a frontal assault on the most hallowed principle of modern conservative economic policy — that market transactions should be given preeminent weight when setting public policy. [...] Cass and his allies, however, stand for the opposite idea: only democratic politics permits the collective judgment of the people to be heard, distilled and implemented. That judgment has a healthy respect for markets and economic freedom, but it has the wisdom to know when liberty becomes license and when the freedom of some is injurious to the health of society. In those cases, Cass and American Compass hold, it is not only proper for society to intervene in the market but also necessary for it to do so.

In the three years since its founding, American Compass has come far. Just one week ago, the organization held a fully-attended forum within the Russell Senate Office building that saw the participation of four Republican senators (Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio, J.D. Vance, and Todd Young), packs of congressional staffers, numerous influential commentators, policy wonks, and more. It is worth emphasizing how significant this is: in U.S. politics, proximity to political power is de facto power in and of itself. That a small think tank can host such an event within the literal halls of power is no small feat.

At this event, Cass and his team gave out multiple copies of their recently completed and appropriately named handbook, Rebuilding American Capitalism: A Handbook for Conservative Policymakers. This 104-page tome, loaded with analyses and policy proposals covering a broad number of issues—globalization, industry, finance, family, education, labor—is both a political platform and a definitive answer to the question raised at the outset: yes, American capitalism has failed, and yes, it can be rescued.

All this is timely and of particular concern to foreign policy practitioners and American strategists, especially given the return of great power competition and the coming multipolar geopolitical environment.

Great Power Competition Requires Great Industrial Capacity

The cold reality is that strategic competition between great powers in the modern era requires not only ample resources—a large, healthy, and growing population; a strong agricultural base; access to key mineral resources—but also sufficient financial and industrial capabilities.

As history has advanced, great power competition has increasingly required greater technical expertise. Technological advancement means new innovations, devices, and weapons, which must be designed, built, maintained, and upgraded. Moreover, the production of all these requires a sufficiently large industrial base that must be supported, conserved, and prioritized. Ensuring a steady supply of technical experts and financing is thus also essential—and increasingly so—to great powers.

The totality of this dynamic was made most clear in the European World Wars of the twentieth century. Warfare relied not just on millions of armed and trained men, as has long been the historical norm, but also on a wide variety of vehicles, machines, and gadgets. All of these devices—themselves products of an inherently scarce supply of experts—in turn, relied upon vast manufacturing and logical systems of production: industrial-scale farming, mining, refining, fabrication, shipping, and so on, all of which had to be supported by a strong financial sector and credit-worthy government. This dynamic was just as clear throughout the Cold War: the United States’ primary advantage throughout the conflict, and the reason for much of its current global primacy, is because it led the world in technological development throughout the twentieth century, which itself was largely derived from its mammoth post-World War II industrial capacity and economic model.

This longstanding historical norm—the struggle over resources, productive capacity, and technical know-how—was broken with what may now be called the post-Cold War Interregnum. The United States, left as the world’s hegemon after the fall of the Soviet Union, chose to embark on a mission to promote and support an integrated globalized economy. The result, it was declared, would nominally be mutually beneficial to all participants, with economic liberalization giving way to political liberalization, the advance of democratic progress, human rights, and economic prosperity for all.

The Free Market Nightmare…

This dream failed to materialize. In the Foreword of Rebuilding American Capitalism, Cass bluntly describes what the neoliberal, overly pro-free market economic policy of the post-Cold War era has produced in practice:

Comparative advantage is supposed to allow a developed economy like America’s to focus on the most advanced technologies, but the U.S. trade balance in advanced technology products has swung from a $60 billion surplus in 1992 to a $190 billion deficit in 2020. Innovation is supposed to drive productivity but, in the manufacturing sector, productivity growth has turned negative, with factories producing less per worker in the early 2020s than the early 2010s.

The economic system’s malfunction has dire human consequences. Whereas 40 weeks of the typical male worker’s income in 1985 could provide the middle-class essentials for a family of four, by 2022 he needed 62 weeks of income—a problem, there being only 52 weeks in a year. Nearly half of Americans report having fewer children than they want and, outside the most highly educated and compensated households, affordability is the most frequently cited obstacle. The average American can no longer expect to earn more than his father did at the same age. Poorer regions can no longer expect to catch up with wealthier ones. The bottom 50% of households had less wealth in 2019 than in 1989, though the top 10% added $29 trillion. Life expectancy is falling.

The fundamental issue at hand is not capitalism itself. As Cass notes, “the first 200 years of American history, as a backwater colonial republic grew into a continent-spanning industrial colossus and home of the world’s middle class,” demonstrates that the economic model can function quite well. The problem, rather, in Cass’ words, is an ideological belief that took hold which posited that economic activity should occur with zero government involvement, based on the grounds of maximizing individual autonomy: “...free individuals exercising free choice in the market, each presumably able to optimize his own life. The failure of families to form reflected merely a preference for other pastimes.” People, in other words, vote with their wallets. The result, which has amounted to companies opting to off-short and out-source industry in the pursuit of greater efficiency and higher profits, justified by delivering lower costs to consumers, has been:

 …a disaster for the nation. Globalization crushed domestic industry and employment, leaving collapsed communities in its wake. Financialization shifted the economy’s center of gravity from Main Street to Wall Street, fueling an explosion in corporate profits alongside stagnating wages and declining investment. The decline of unions cost workers power in the market, voice in the workplace, and access to a vital source of communal support. These trends [...] contributed to rising inequality, slowing innovation, narrowing of opportunity, and loss of middle-class security.

Aside from devastating damage to Americans’ economic livelihoods and futures, the United States has also de facto surrendered away its industrial-technological capacity, and with it, the country’s ability to self-renew its competitive advantage. Off-shoring manufacturing has not only resulted in the loss of millions of jobs and falling productivity growth but also a decline in our ability to produce new technologies. To quote Sridhar Kota and Tom Mahoney, “once manufacturing departs from a country’s shores, engineering and production know-how leave as well, and then innovation ultimately follows.” Studies have shown this to be true, with spending on research and development moving abroad to be closer to production and engineering. With the departure of that industrial capacity goes not only America’s ability to produce needed armaments on a war footing but also its ability to innovate and its technological-military advantage.

The Department of Defense has likewise sounded the alarm on these developments. In their FY20 Industrial Capabilities Report, which transcribes the department’s “priority industrial base risks and vulnerabilities,” the Pentagon provides a stark warning:

Together, a U.S. business climate that has favored short-term shareholder earnings (versus longterm capital investment), deindustrialization, and an abstract, radical vision of “free trade,” without fair trade enforcement, have severely damaged America’s ability to arm itself today and in the future. Our national responses – off-shoring and out-sourcing – have been inadequate and ultimately self-defeating, especially with respect to the defense industrial base.

This off-shoring/out-sourcing trend, when combined with environmental concerns, is limited not just to production but also to basic resource acquisition. Consider that U.S. leaders have neglected to maintain the country’s access to the critical minerals and materials necessary not only for retaining our military advantage but also for high-tech manufacturing and renewable energy technologies. Without these resources, twenty-first-century industrial leadership and real economic progress itself become impossible. America closed down its own primary rare earth minerals mine in Mountain View, California in the 1990s. Since then, China has come to account for 90 percent of global rare earth production, establishing its dominance in both mining and refining and leaving America to depend on a strategic competitor for 80 percent of its critical mineral imports. Once again, the Department of Defense has sounded the alarm on this matter, also noting in its 2020 Industrial Capabilities Report that:

[Emerging] technologies pose new problems for defense contractors and for the Pentagon in securing a trusted supply chain for critical items such as processed rare earth elements and microelectronics, where gaps and unanticipated interruptions can be triggered by the loss of a sole supplier for purely economic reasons, or by an embargo or military action by an adversary. Events of either type can jeopardize a sustainable industrial base.

The United States—having shorn its industrial-technological capacity and forfeited control over key resources and supply chains—is thus ill-prepared for an era of great power strategic competition. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War—arguably a de facto proxy war between the West and Russia over Ukraine’s agricultural bounty, energy and mineral resources, industrial base, and ability to project power over certain geographical regions—illustrates current circumstances. Whether it be in ammunition, shipbuilding, or weaponry, it is now reasonable to worry that the United States does not have the material capacity to fight a large-scale industrial war.

…and the Danger to American Democracy

But perhaps most damning of all—even more than wrecking the industrial basis necessary for the United States to remain a pre-eminent geostrategic and economic actor in international affairs—is what the failure of the neoliberal agenda has meant for the U.S. political system itself.

When first established in the United States, corporations were oriented toward encouraging national development and pursuing economic achievements that no individual or family firm could do alone. Consider, for example, that Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. treasury secretary and the father of U.S. finance and industry, helped co-found the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures in 1791. This early corporation aimed to promote industrial development along the Passaic River in New Jersey, resulting in regional industrialization for over 150 years.

However, this model ran into problems from the 1880s through the 1930s. Corporations, simply put, were spectacularly successful—too successful, even. Such was their financial and industrial power—and their consequent political power—that they began to supersede or even capture the power of the state. The resulting situation, with a handful of individuals wielding disproportionate influence over the levers of government and public policy, was antithetical to republican governance.

Elected politicians of the time period were keenly aware of this in their efforts to restrain corporate power. Senator John Sherman, the statesman behind the eponymous 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, declared, “if we would not submit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat of trade.” Senator Joseph O’Mahoney stated in 1934 that “many of the modern corporations engaged in interstate commerce are greater and more powerful than most of our sovereign states.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attorney general, Francis Biddle, declared in 1944 that “When the industrial life of a country passes into the hands of a few individuals, their power over the direction of public affairs exceeds the power confided by the people to their elected representatives in the government itself.”

It is with great trepidation then that we hear contemporary elected officials talk about multinational corporations in the current political environment. Senator John Kennedy in 2019 declared that Google and Facebook “aren’t just companies. They’re countries.” Large commodity traders can determine the fate of entire nations through their control of energy and food. A number of banks and financial institutions are so powerful that they are, as the term goes, “too big to fail.”

It is through this lens, then, that the ongoing political debate of U.S. economic policy and the mission of American Compass, Oren Cass, and his various allies and followers must be understood: at stake is not only the future of U.S. geoeconomic (and thus, geopolitical) power, the livelihood of its citizens, and the fate of the current international order, but also, implicitly, the fate of the United States as a sovereign republic.

Can America Save Itself?

The challenge that Oren Cass and his colleagues have undertaken is thus great but not insurmountable. If anything, several recent political trends are in their favor.

Abroad, the war in Ukraine put the reality of America’s poor military-industrial situation in stark relief, triggering something of a political awakening. Leading Washington think tanks, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies to the Center for New American Security, have published reports and studies of varying quality proclaiming the newfound need for industrial policy. Elbridge Colby—a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (and is widely considered to be a future secretary of defense)—has been warning that a war with China could be lost if the U.S. industrial base isn’t up to par. For a high-level official (who notably was also special assistant to the president for the defense industrial base in 2017–2018) to issue such warnings is quite telling, especially given consistent signs that he’s correct. Overall, Washington officialdom—and consequentially, policymakers—have suddenly discovered that the industrial base really matters.

Domestically, political progressives focused on economic policy are also beating the same drum as Cass and his followers. This neo-Brandeis movement, focused on reviving 1930s-style antitrust enforcement, has gradually gained power and scored victories. It is telling, as leading antitrust policy wonk Matthew Stoller notes, that the Wall Street Journal editorial page has written 64 attacks on Federal Trade Commission chair Lina Khan in less than two years. Stoller’s own organization, the American Economic Liberties Project, something of a left-wing counterpart to Cass’ American Compass, has also been making great strides in influencing Congress, the Biden administration, and Washington officialdom and policy thinkers more broadly. For once, reforming America’s economic model appears to be a genuine bipartisan cause.

Time will tell how Cass, American Compass, and its ideological allies fare in the coming years. The success of last Wednesday’s forum paints a rosy picture. There remains, however, a few major concerns with Cass’ agenda that this humble observer cannot shake off: a broader reform of American capitalism and its current economic incentive structure will mean addressing thorny political issues.

Consider some practical national security concerns in the world of technology. Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Apple may be hulking giants with more power than some countries, which needs to be restrained. But it is precisely their size and scale that allows them to render services—such as cybersecurity for the ordinary user/consumer—that otherwise wouldn’t be possible. Would a thousand small companies, rather than a handful of large ones, be able to mount a comparable cybersecurity defense effort against foreign adversaries? Would Americans’ personal data really be safer if it were shared with smaller companies, as some argue, if foreign actors could acquire those smaller companies? It is doubtful. Like telecom companies, Big Tech firms may be natural monopolies, requiring political compromise and extremely detailed regulation.

Likewise, consider what the re-orientation of economic incentives in the U.S. economy might look like in practice. The push for globalization and the off-shoring of American industry and jobs, for instance, was driven by the argument that everyone would benefit from lower costs. Yes, jobs are lost, but consumer ultimately benefits from cheap food, consumer goods, cheap labor, and so on. Cass and cohort would propound, correctly, that this trade was certainly not worth it if it came at the cost of American livelihoods and the country’s industrial base (with its strategic value)—to say nothing of American democracy itself.

That is certainly true, but consider what reversing some of this would look like in practice. Suppose, for example, that fair trade laws were to be reintroduced, as Mattew Stoller argues. This would certainly go a long way in checking the power of large retailers and “empowering Main Street over Wall Street,” as it were. But it would also mean an increase in prices for the ordinary consumer, who might very well revolt at the ballot box.

This, perhaps, is the real question that American Compass, and Americans more broadly, must wrestle with: are U.S. voters ready and willing to accept that a higher cost of living and some economic pain in the short and medium term, if not longer, is the literal price for the preservation of U.S. democracy?

It is hard to say now, for this thesis has yet to be tested. Pessimists would contend, not unfairly, that the prospect is dubious. But given Americans’ historical tendency toward grit, endurance, and hope for a better tomorrow, the answer may yet surprise us all.

Carlos Roa is the Executive Editor of The National Interest.

Image: American Compass/Twitter.

The conflict between Iran and Israel has substantially intensified over recent years, with its scope broadening daily. Israel’s worries about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, regional influence, and military advancements have positioned it as a key player in responding to these perceived threats. As such, with the aim of strengthening deterrence against Iran, Jerusalem has designed a strategy of death by a thousand cuts, which includes intensifying covert operations against Iranian interests.

Unlike its previous strategy, which focused on sabotaging Tehran’s nuclear program and assassinating its nuclear scientists, Israel now appears to have extended its web to target other scientists and officers in charge of missile and drone programs, as well as members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force. Additionally, Jerusalem is utilizing its diplomatic capacities to further operationalize this strategy of “death by a thousand cuts” by expanding its relations with Iran’s neighboring states—especially those that do not have good relations with Iran. Strengthening relations with Azerbaijan and the Kurdistan Region, normalizing relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and reopening its embassy in Turkmenistan are among its actions in this regard. 

Given all this, what has Iran done? It seems that Iran’s response to Israel’s actions can be evaluated in the framework of two short-term and long-term approaches. Tehran’s short-term approach to Jerusalem’s actions has mainly included a case-by-case response, including targeting positions and assets related to Israel in the sea or a third country. In this regard, drone attacks on Israeli ships in the Persian Gulf and missile attacks on the Mossad headquarters in Erbil have been carried out. In addition, Iran’s long-term policy toward Israel has always been based on creating a defensive front in the Eastern Mediterranean. By propping up Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement alongside Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran has endeavored to turn Lebanon and the Gaza Strip into defense embankments against Israel. 

How Iran’s West Bank Strategy Came to Be

The term “Arming the West Bank” was raised for the first time in the middle of the 2014 Gaza War. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that he considered the only way to rescue Palestine was by “arming the West Bank like Gaza.”

A month after the end of the conflict, the notion was raised again in Khamenei’s meeting with Ramadan Abdullah, the former secretary-general of the Islamic Jihad Movement. In this meeting, Khamenei stressed the need for “serious planning to join the West Bank in confronting Israel” with the aim of increasing Israel’s security concerns.

These statements were welcomed by Palestinian militant groups. Among others, Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative in Tehran, considered this approach to be a serious and important option for resistance groups in Palestine—if supported by Iran, they could change the balance of power in what Palestinians see as the occupied territories.

In Iran’s view, this approach stands out because of how vulnerable Israel is to it. Not only is the West Bank relatively close to Israel’s three key cities and military-economic centers—Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa—but also the presence of Jewish settlers and more than two million Palestinians provides a rich environment for Iran to open a new front. Unlike Iran’s other deterrence measures, arming the West Bank would inflict more deadly blows on Israel by reducing the geographical distance as much as possible. The approach could paralyze Israel’s security system and blockade Israel within its own borders by expanding the geography of the conflict.

How Would the Strategy Be Implemented?

Iran has plenty of options on the table to pursue this approach: it can transfer small arms and light weapons through non-state allied intermediaries, provide training to facilitate the production of light weapons inside the West Bank itself, finance the purchasing of weapons from arms dealers, and more.

Tehran, however, faces a few obstacles in attempting to pursue this strategy. The borders of the West Bank, for one, are strongly patrolled by Israel and Jordan, impeding any easy arms shipments. Similarly, the Palestinian National Authority will not look kindly upon the arming of its domestic political rivals and the potential diplomatic damage that this could result in.

On the other hand, Iran was seriously involved in Syria and Iraq and had focused on defeating Saudi Arabia in regional conflicts. Despite these obstacles, some reports show that at the same time, Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Quds Force, in contact with the commanders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, emphasized the arming of the West Bank as Iran’s priority in the occupied territories. Also, while many experts were talking about the impossibility of this strategy due to many hurdles, former Iranian diplomat Hussein Sheikh al-Islam rejected this issue and said: “We know how to deliver weapons to the West Bank. We have already delivered weapons to other fronts.”

As some news sources, quoting Israeli security officials, have revealed, Lebanese Hezbollah, the main non-state ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has transferred light weapons to the West Bank. In addition, the smuggling of arms through dealers or other people to the West Bank has grown significantly in recent years. The latest example in this regard was the arrest of Imad al-Adwan, a Jordanian lawmaker, by Israeli police on charges of trying to smuggle weapons to the West Bank.

The idea of negotiating with Israel has faded among the Palestinians for various reasons (such as the continuation of settlements, the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by Donald Trump, and the inauguration of the most right-wing government in Israel). In return, they have turned to individual armed struggle, which has gained unprecedented popularity among the young generation of Palestine, especially after the intensification of arms smuggling to the West Bank.

The emergence of new armed groups in the West Bank, such as the Jenin Brigade, the Balata Brigade, and, most notoriously, the Lions’ Den, shows a change in approach in this region. In the past two years, the beginning of a new round of conflicts in Nablus, Jenin, and Sheikh Jarrah and numerous attacks against checkpoints, soldiers, and Israeli settlements have led some analysts to consider the continuation of this situation as the beginning of the Third Intifada. Iran openly supported the actions of armed groups in the West Bank. Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, praised the Palestinian youth of the West Bank and said: “Before the West Bank was armed, few actions were taken against Israel in this area, but today, in some days, more than 30 operations are conducted.” Ramzan Sharif, the spokesman of the IRGC, also announced that these groups are fully supported by Iran.

From a macro perspective, it seems that Iran is pursuing two strategic objectives via its policy of arming the West Bank: the unity of Palestinian groups in confronting Israel and the addition of a new front in the battle with Israel. The importance of unity among the Palestinian groups lies in the fact that after the end of the Second Intifada, the West Bank was out of the conflict with Israel, and the armed groups were active only in the Gaza Strip. In the current situation, the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip can lead to the formation of a joint command structure in order to coordinate information and operations between Palestinian groups under the supervision of Iran and Hezbollah. This happened for the first time in the war of 2021, known as Saif al-Quds. 

Also, the gradual expansion of West Bank arming will increase Iran’s capabilities in any possible action against Israel. Especially if the pursuit of this policy is accompanied by the transfer of more advanced weapons such as rockets, mortars, and short-range missiles. In this case, Israel can be attacked from at least three fronts: southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. As it stands, it seems that the third decade of the twenty-first century in the Middle East should be called the era of intensification of the Cold War between Tehran and Jerusalem and the confrontation between the two strategies: Arming the West Bank and death by a thousand cuts. Especially after the normalization of Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and speculation about the continuation of de-escalation with Arab neighbors, Iran’s capacity to focus on confronting Israel will increase.

Dr. Amir Hossein Vazirian holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran, Iran. His research interests are primarily focused on Iran’s foreign and security policy and Middle East Studies.

Image: Shutterstock.

For more than a year now, the question of whether Taiwan is next if Russia is allowed to take over Ukraine has been repeatedly asked. Some have argued that defeating Russia may save Taiwan, while others have urged against equating the actions taken by Vladimir Putin with the possible ones that Xi Jinping may take.

The conversation is worth having. There are merits to the assertion that in responding to the invasion of Ukraine, the West can demonstrate that it is a cohesive and effective force. Likewise, there are also merits to the claim that the strategic significance of Ukraine and Taiwan—as well as the threats posed by China and Russia—are intrinsically different.

Yet there is another discussion that is equally, if not more, important. It centers around the question: would the West respond with equal determination if China invades Taiwan? Today, alarmingly, it seems unlikely.

On April 26, China’s Xi Jinping and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy held their first war phone call, leading to much speculation regarding China’s role as a potential global peacemaker. Such speculation, understandably so, worried and frustrated many in the United States. These ill feelings originate not solely from the fact that China would likely prioritize Russian interests, but also because if China, the United States’ biggest economic and political competitor, were to become the peacemaker of the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II then what would that mean for the state of global affairs and the position held by the United States?

What appears evident is that the illustrated harms faced by China due to Ukraine’s propped-up military resilience exist mostly in the imagination of American think tankers and politicians. Realizing this does not require getting inside the heads of Chinese officials. The strength of the Sino-European relationship is illuminating enough.

Consider that while in the United States we talk about China and Russia as simultaneous threats, in France, Emmanuel Macron comes back from his Beijing visit saying that the European Union will not become a U.S. “vassal,” claiming that the union must resist involvement in U.S.-China disputes over Taiwan. German companies, despite Washington’s attempts to isolate Beijing, continue to venture into China out of economic necessity. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU wants to “de-risk” but not “de-couple” from Beijing—particularly given a 98 percent dependency on China for rare earth minerals. Other examples abound.

On the other hand, among Republican senators, for instance, the “China is Watching” claim has been perpetually shrieked. Yet not even the most vocal China hawks have made a significant push to have European statesmen or, at the very least, Ukraine, publicly state that China should be watching closely or that China-led peace deals should be treated as ridiculous. In refusing to amount such opposition, the same individuals that argue that China and Russia are parts of the same threat are exhibiting either incompetence or dishonesty. If China and Russia are indeed two sides of the same coin, as they suggest, then why is it that Americans are alone in treating them as such?

In light of these concerns, on March 2, I asked Irish ambassador Geraldine Byrne Nason, Italian ambassador Mariangela Zappia, and the Danish ambassador Christina Markus Lassen two simple questions: is China our biggest threat in the long-term, and is Taiwan an independent country?

The Irish ambassador responded by saying that “we have to be careful with pushing Russia and China into a corner,” completely inverting the logic used by those concerned with Chinese expansion in the United States, as she implied that cooperation with China is worth pursuing. The real threats, Nason claimed, are “the climate crisis and the nuclear threat.”

Similarly, both the Italian and the Danish ambassadors refused to make statements about whether Taiwan is an independent country, with the Italian ambassador claiming that “cooperation with China is benefitting all of us” and that “China is a rival in values” that follows a “predatory approach to governance.”

If the direct responses from three ambassadors and other comments by EU leaders (Macron, von der Leyen, etc.) are anything to go by, then in the eyes of a good number of European leaders, China is far from perfect but the most prescient threat they face is Russian. Intelligently, unlike Washington, they have been able to prioritize their resources and efforts in accordance with their needs. As such, Europe finds itself in what is really a favorable position: Europeans can rely on American assistance vis-à-vis Russia, but ensure that when it comes to playing in a different arena—primarily the Indo-Pacific—they can sit down and observe.

Meanwhile, when the same logic is used in the United States by those who argue that we must not push Russia toward China and that we must prioritize deterring America’s—not Europe’s—main threat, our partners from across the Atlantic are quick to display their indignation.

Aside from Russia, the status quo leaves the United States in the worst position. Despite our consistent and generational support to Europe, the idea of them sacrificing close to as much as what we have sacrificed for them seems implausible.

If countries were people, this would be labeled a toxic relationship. But countries are not people, they are countries. When cleansed from rhetoric, the reality is that the Europeans are not our friends, they are our allies—in specific scenarios under specific circumstances.

If the United States wants to deter China, we need our European partners to express with the same confidence seen regarding Ukraine that China cannot be a peacemaker, and that Chinese expansion poses a threat to them and their partners.

Some may be quick to suggest that in 2020, China became the EU’s main trading partner, meaning that they would never take a stronger position. Still, the reality is that in 2021, according to the EU itself, the United States is just 1.5 percent away from China in terms of trading goods, and militarily, they have grown accustomed to our support.

So, yes, we can push, just like China does.

At the minimum, individual European leaders should reciprocate what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said four months ago when he said that “China doesn't have much credibility because they have not been able to condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine.” Additionally, Washington must pressure Europeans into exhibiting their opposition to Chinese expansion as a precondition for increased, or even continued, support. It is that simple.

If Europe cannot do this, if they continue to be characterized by softness toward China, then they are taking America’s defense of their sovereignty for granted. It is essential then to delineate our priorities—weakening China matters more to us than weakening Russia—and openly emphasize that a refusal to oppose Chinese expansionary efforts is disloyalty toward us. Given the nature of reciprocity, this is not too harsh; it is reasonable.

If pursued effectively, this framework could lead to the United States spending and focusing less on Ukraine, or European countries taking stronger positions regarding China. Both options are better than the status quo.

To prevent future conflict, the West must constrain the Chinese Communist Party’s expansionary efforts. To do this, we do not just need Europe, but we also need them more than they need us in Ukraine. They know this, and we should make them act like it.

Like China, it is time that we place conditions and set standards when cooperating. We must let Europe know that it is a two-way street— if we stand with them, they must demonstrate that they will stand with us.

Juan P. Villasmil “J.P. Ballard” is a commentator and analyst who often writes about American culture, foreign policy, and political philosophy. He has been featured in The American Spectator, The National Interest, The Wall Street Journal, International Policy Digest, Fox News, Telemundo, MSNBC, and others.

Image: Shutterstock.

Lebanon’s political problems and solutions have a strong tendency of repeating. This reality has become increasingly apparent in the ongoing failure to elect a new president—an arena where the international community is once again making some significant moves to effectively save the country. Indeed, as Beirut continues to bicker over candidates and other long-running feuds, the country’s political elites likely expect and hope to rely on their international backers to resolve strictly Lebanese problems. While undesirable, international action likely constitutes the only path toward a new government in Lebanon today given current political obstacles.

Recent French efforts are at the forefront of international action in Lebanon today. French president Emmanual Macron recently dispatched his new envoy for Lebanon—former Foreign and Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian—to meet with Lebanese elites and encourage constructive dialogue on the presidential file. Le Drian is a major political actor in France, carrying substantial international influence and skill, which reflects Paris’s seriousness in resolving Beirut’s gridlock. The envoy described his trip to Lebanon as “a consultative mission ... to ensure the country moves on from the political impasse.”

Yet interestingly, Le Drian expressed that he would not push for any candidate in his visit—including a third-party option that could lead to consensus between Lebanon’s major political blocs. This comes as a surprise given Paris has privately supported Hezbollah-backed Suleiman Frangieh for months following its public-facing support for reformist elements in recent years. Whether Le Drian’s comments reflect another shift in France’s position remains to be seen, although Frangieh’s viability is certainly questionable at best following former finance minister and senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official Jihad Azour’s strong showing in the last presidential vote on June 14.

Le Drian took this message to each of the major Lebanese political actors, meeting with the leaders of each of the leading political parties and independent reformist camp, Maronite patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rahi, Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Najib Mikati. He also met with General Joseph Aoun—the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and a rumored presidential favorite amongst many stakeholders working on the Lebanon file.

Some of Lebanon’s political elites have made clear that international pressure is unnecessary. Samir Geagea, head of the conservative Lebanese Forces (LF) party, did not mince words following his meeting with Le Drian: “The solution doesn't need French, American or Iranian intervention … What is needed is a sovereign domestic decision.” Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) head Gebran Bassil expressed similar sentiments in his meeting with Le Drian as well. Both are major Christian parties in Lebanon that are usually opposed to each other, until recently.

The French push follows a meeting on June 16 between Macron and Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) in Paris. The two leaders reportedly discussed Lebanon’s woes at length, calling for progress on the presidential file. Just days later, rumors of a potential conference in Riyadh in August or September began to appear in Lebanese media. Qatar and Egypt are supposedly playing a role in setting up what is being described as a “new Doha”—referencing the 2008 Doha Agreement that ended an eighteen-month political crisis that erupted into violence.

Thus, as Lebanese political elites and international actors claim to support a Lebanon-led initiative, global and regional powers are pulling strings in the background. While MbS has openly called Lebanon’s presidential issues an “internal affair” and has gradually backed Riyadh out of the Mediterranean country’s affairs, the crown prince has a vested interest in resolving disputes to avoid the political violence that evolved in 2008. Indeed, a Saudi-led (or supported) initiative to resolve Lebanon’s political dispute makes sense alongside the kingdom’s turn toward pragmatism and diplomacy in support of its Vision 2030 economic development agenda. 

The other major stakeholders likely understand this as well—including Iran. The question at play ultimately becomes one of getting Lebanon’s elites in the same room to make the necessary political deals that only international guarantees can backstop. Recent diplomatic exchanges across the region reflect a concerted effort to achieve this outcome—not limited to the Saudi foreign minister’s visit to Tehran and the Iranian foreign minister’s current Gulf trip.

Whether or not the Iran-Saudi deal helps facilitate such a meeting remains to be seen, although the warming of ties between the regional rivals certainly suggests the deal can be a net positive on any political efforts to subsequently lower the temperature in Lebanon. Indeed, while some have argued that Riyadh chose to cede Lebanon to Iran and Hezbollah in its re-normalization with Tehran, this is hardly a foregone conclusion. Rather, those with a stake in Lebanon likely prefer—at a minimum—a status quo arrangement that leads to some reforms without destabilizing the country further. This is particularly true of West Asia’s regional powers given no one side can sustain a full takeover of the country with their proxy of choice—including Iran and Hezbollah given the former’s economic woes.

Thus, all eyes should be on France’s current diplomatic push in relation to a regional effort to institute cross-party dialogue between the major Lebanese political actors. This probably will not result in a Frangieh or Azour presidency, particularly given both candidates appear to be positioned for the sake of such a dialogue on a consensus candidate at this stage. If this is truly the case, Aoun could become the next president of Lebanon, barring some procedural and constitutional hurdles, and understanding varying international support for his candidacy. Expect dealmaking on other issues as well—namely that of the prime minister’s office and central bank governor position that will open in July following Riad Salameh’s end-of-term.

Such a process highlights the repetitive nature of Lebanese politics—one that has continuously failed to address systemic shortcomings that regularly reproduce the same problems. International stakeholders would be wise to use any opportunity for dialogue to address the root causes of the issues at play. Unfortunately, the cyclical nature of the situation at hand will likely prevail, applying bandages to wounds that require much more attention and care.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Shutterstock.

Dangerous illusions buy China time and cover for the execution of President Xi Jinping’s multi-faceted plan for global domination. China has already made such progress; the China threat is now so great that the Free World cannot afford dalliance, wishful thinking, or repose. U.S. efforts to keep communication channels with Chinese leaders open make sense, but optimism regarding the fruits of engagement and diplomacy with China is not warranted.

China’s expansionist drive and bullying of neighbors; subjection of Hong Kong and Tibet and scheme for overtaking Taiwan; extreme human rights violations and techno-totalitarian control; relentless espionage and interference campaigns in democracies; collusion with Russia, Iran and bad actors across the globe; tremendous influence and anti-American positions in international forums; massive military build-up and preparation for war; and recent aggressive moves against U.S. planes and ships in the South China Sea, simply must give U.S. policymakers and negotiators pause.

Rather than hold on to fading hope that engagement and diplomacy will appreciably soften China’s stance, the United States must rise to the current challenge. Only by facing the hard truths about Chinese revisionism can America form principled and wise China policy.

Before believing that China, unlike Russia, is amenable to reasonable relations with democratic states, consider the China-Russia relationship. At their February 2022 meeting in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced an “unlimited partnership,” which they said was aimed at countering U.S. influence. As he departed their March 2023 summit in Moscow, Xi told Putin, “Right now there are changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for one hundred years.” Echoing that note, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said any Ukraine peace talks should discuss “the principles on which the new world order will be based.”

Such statements sent a chill down many a foreign policy analyst’s spine because a new world order, or even a major war, no longer seems entirely out of the realm of possibility. This juncture calls for a conscious rejection of complacency.

Shortly after the Moscow summit, which expanded China and Russia’s economic and strategic ties, Chinese defense minister General Li Shangfu announced that China and Russia would increase military and military-technical cooperation and arms trade. Although China doesn’t overtly supply Russia weaponry for use in Ukraine, China provides dual-use rifles, body armor, drones, and financial support for Russia’s ferocious assault. Trade between China and Russia rose to $190 billion last year, and China’s imports of Russian energy have increased to $88 billion since February 2022. The only “peace” China wants in Ukraine will advantage Russia and increase Chinese influence over Europe.

The Pentagon has warned that Russia and China are producing space weapons to attack U.S. satellites and to evade U.S. missile defense systems and that Russia is providing highly enriched uranium for China’s nuclear program. China’s space, cyber, and bio-weapons capabilities, dramatic nuclear weapons ramp-up, and intercontinental and submarine ballistic missile production paint an alarming picture. Alerts by Microsoft confirmed by U.S. officials that a Chinese-sponsored hacking group targeted critical infrastructure in the United States, including Navy telecommunications systems in Guam that are key to Pacific defense, highlight China’s likely instigation of cyber war as part of a move on Taiwan.

Optimism in certain circles that China can become a responsible member of the international community if only the West keeps pursuing economic and diplomatic compromise is refuted by China’s cultural genocide of the Uyghur minority, violations of treaties and international norms, and close strategic and military ties with North Korea, a fanatical totalitarian state that relies on severe, omnipresent repression and nuclear proliferation and brinkmanship.

When weighing China’s real intentions, consider China, Russia, and Iran’s anti-Western front. The three countries capitalize on instances of American retreat, back each other in the UN, and engage in the subversion of democracies. They benefit from expansive trade, weapons, technology transfers, joint military exercises, and mutual sanctions breaches. They recently participated in their third trilateral military drill in the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea.

There is no mistaking China’s dramatically enhanced position in the Middle East. Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has announced that Iran’s “comprehensive strategic accord” with China is in effect. China provides technology for the repression of Iranian protestors and civilian life in general. Another dismal indicator of freedom’s trajectory came when Xi Jinping and Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman met in December and agreed on major energy, defense, infrastructure, and technology deals. Especially bad for human rights, Saudi-led Arab League states agreed to a statement endorsing China’s “efforts” and “position” in Hong Kong and “rejecting Taiwan’s independence in all its forms.” Subsequently, China managed to negotiate a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

For China, these developments constitute steps forward in replacing the U.S.-oriented world order. China’s trade with the Middle East now exceeds that of the United States.

China’s tremendous success in making Western countries dependent on Chinese goods and supply chains and its principal commercial agreements and loans on every continent have greatly augmented China’s power. Moreover, China has benefited from decades of aggressive espionage, influence campaigns, and intellectual property theft, especially in the United States. In addition to corporate and political infiltration, China altered American universities via Confucius Institutes, sinology programs, and joint scientific research, which served China’s ideological and military-strategic priorities. So too, in Europe, as China made significant infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications investments, it worked hard to steer media narratives and capture European academic, business, and policy elites.

In South America, China, Russia, and Iran have significantly increased their presence and leverage and support of oppressive anti-American dictatorships. Venezuela even hosted Russian war games, which included China, Iran, Cuba, and others, in 2022. China is establishing airports, seaports, space facilities, and Confucius Institutes in the region. Honduras’s decision to drop diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of China and Brazil’s enthusiasm for deepening ties with China are sobering reminders of China’s sway.

China has spent about $1 trillion on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Despite setbacks, the BRI has advanced China’s imperialistic drive, leading not only to new security agreements and docks for China’s navy but also to the insidious expansion of Chinese information and surveillance technology. Among the deals that actuate Xi’s claim that “the East is rising and the West is declining” is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, with which China is carving a path to the Indian Ocean, Cambodia’s Ream military base, which is becoming a base for Chinese operations, and China’s massive Pinglu Canal project, with which China seeks closer connectivity with Southeast Asia.

All of the above facilitates the worldwide reach of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united front system and propaganda, including its quest for technological supremacy and control of the world’s data, rare earth minerals, and energy assets.

In international organizations, China energetically pursues predominance. From corrupting the UN, the WHO, and the World Bank, to realigning the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, to attempting to turn BRICS into an anti-U.S. coalition, China never lets up. Although the United States and ASEAN are enduring partners, it is notable that ASEAN’s Secretary General recently completed a four-day “working visit” to China, meeting many high-level officials, including China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi. When China hosted a summit with Central Asian countries this May, seeking to broaden China’s role in the region’s economies and security, Chinese diplomats derided President Joe Biden’s efforts to smooth relations and the G7’s supposed “bloc confrontation.”

Xi’s redefinition of the world order goes hand in hand with his redefinition of words; he insists China will free the world from U.S. “unilateralism” and lead the progress of “equity” and “justice.” But the mendacity of this rhetoric is revealed by China’s severe human rights violations against Uyghurs and Tibetans and the persecution of Christians, Falun Gong adherents, dissidents, and democracy advocates. U.S. leaders should stress to non-aligned countries the dire implications for their citizens if they align with the CCP. The “National Security Law” stamping out freedom in Hong Kong is the real face of the globalization of the Chinese Communist Party.

Having focused more on mutually profitable economic interaction than on the meteoric rise of China’s hard and soft power, democracies face a China formidable and emboldened enough to parade its ambitions. China is on a trajectory to surpass the United States in military might; U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “the military balance is becoming unfavorable to the United States and our allies.” In addition to a spy balloon traversing America, brazen provocations and island-building in the South China Sea, territorial encroachments on neighbors, and major military air and sea exercises “encircling Taiwan,” China now issues explicit threats. Xi says China is preparing for war. Foreign Minister Qin Lang warns there will be “conflicts and confrontation” unless the United States stops “containment.”

The Biden administration’s recent engagement efforts and search for “guardrails” in the U.S.-China relationship—which include emphasizing economic relations while downplaying defense and human rights concerns, requests (often rebuffed) for high-level meetings, and pledges to “de-risk” rather than “de-couple”—have too many costs relative to hypothetical benefits. A June 14 letter from House Foreign Affairs chair Michael McCaul (R-TX) to Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted reports that the administration had “held back human rights related sanctions, export controls, and other sensitive actions to try to limit damage to the U.S.-China relationship.” Moreover, the letter complained that the State Department “refuses to provide answers on these issues to Congress as Secretary Blinken prepares to depart for a trip to China.” For his part, after raising concerns about China’s “provocative actions” in the Taiwan Strait, Blinken walked back, offering: “We do not support Taiwan independence.”

Recalling the futility of threatening Russia with major consequences “if” it “invaded” Ukraine, the United States and its allies should prioritize military spending and outline potential sanctions for egregious aggression. They should do all possible to preempt war while at the same time demonstrating a willingness to fight for Taiwan if necessary. A Chinese conquest of Taiwan would put the Indo-Pacific region into vulnerable disarray. The world would see that the Free World cannot prevent China from forcing its will on the Taiwanese people and ending their vibrant democracy.

It should be impossible to downplay China’s drive for global dominance by now. It would be unwise not to craft alliances and deterrence proportionate to China’s military buildup and expansionism. It would be unprincipled not to speak out against and penalize China’s terrible repression and backing of brutal dictatorships. It is both necessary and proper to reduce dependency on Chinese supply chains and sever academic and technological relationships that advance China’s weapons and surveillance systems.

In a world saturated with Chinese and Russian propaganda, America should renovate Voice of America-type programs for the digital age. The United States should step up its game in regional and international trade, organizations, and relationships in a world redefined by China's economic and geopolitical influence. America should project a generous, reliable, compelling presence in the world.

The scale and reach of the China threat are breathtaking and game-changing. Complacency, wishful thinking, and procrastination in dealing with it are luxuries the United States and its allies cannot afford.

Anne R. Pierce is an author of books and articles on American presidents, American foreign policy, and American society. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is an appointed member of Princeton University’s James Madison Society, and was a Political Science Series Editor for Transaction Publishers. Follow her @AnneRPierce.

Image: Shutterstock.

Iranian-made Shahed drones have caused mass destruction in Ukraine. With their Volkswagen-style engines, they can fly undetected for about 120 kilometers and deliver an explosive power of 40 kilograms. The components to make this drone? A mere estimated $20,000. Yet to shoot them down, Ukrainians are using American-made NASAM missiles that cost about… $400,000 per drone taken down. One can hardly blame the Ukrainians for resorting to using 1960s German Gepard anti-aircraft guns instead.

The lessons of the awful Ukraine war so far are many and varied. But something that has struck most observers is that while the Russians have been outmaneuvered, they have been holding their own against modern Western military equipment by using old tanks and artillery. In particular, American gear, while technologically advanced, is either not always the best choice on the battlefield, prohibitively expensive, or both.

A number of examples ought to be considered.

Which is the “Best” Tank?

The news that Germany and the United States agreed to supply Ukraine with Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks created quite a stir. Both tanks, which are superior to their Russian counterparts, are similar in size and firepower. The American Abrams in particular is known to be battle-proven and virtually indestructible.

Yet there are a few issues with the Abrams tank. For one, an Abrams weighs up to seven tons more than the Leopard, which could easily get stuck in Ukraine’s muddy fields or bring down some of its light bridges. Another issue is that the latest version of the Abrams is optimized to run on jet fuel, which is understandably hard to replenish on the battlefield. Even more problematic, however, is that on-field repairs aren’t always possible for an Abrams. In fact, some logistical considerations make the prospect seem like a living hell. For example, a frontline battalion cannot fix an Abrams with broken optics. Replacing these requires pulling out entire subsystems and shipping them to a depot—potentially hundreds of miles away—while also ordering replacement subsystems. Finally, there is the cost dimension: producing an Abrams can top $10 million per unit, while the latest Leopard 2 costs around $6 million.

All things considered, the German Leopard 2 is a better choice in Ukraine over the American M1 Abrams. In fact, because of existing availability, the Leopard 2s have entered service, mainly via Poland and Canada, months ahead of the Abrams.

Airpower Isn’t Cheap

The United States, along with other NATO members, was initially reluctant to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter planes; Washington took the view that doing so could escalate the conflict. The F-16 is, after all, a battle-proven jet with fifth-generation stealth technology. It is more than a match for any Russian fighter jet and can carry a vast array of air-to-ground missiles and loitering munitions.

However, the Swedish government has offered Ukraine its Saab JAS 39 Gripen plane. The Gripen (Griffin in English) is a fourth-generation fighter jet that can land on small runways and highways, and has highly effective sensors and electronic jamming equipment. While not battle-proven like the F-16, the Gripen has consistently scored highly in air-to-air war games. The result has been something of a lobbying battle over which jet to procure.

Yet despite Kyiv’s open preference for F-16s, a number of Ukranian pilots concede —in private—skepticism of whether such is the best choice.

Consider the costs. According to industry group Aviatia, the Gripen cost $7,800 per hour to fly, while the F-16 cost $12,000 per hour. Gripen maintenance is also much cheaper: while SAAB (which makes the Gripen) and Lockheed Martin (which produces F-16s) do not advertise the yearly maintenance cost of their fighter jets, practically all commentators agree the F-16 is more expensive. Executiveflyers.com estimates that an F-16’s maintenance comes at about $10 million per year. Yes, the Gripen is more expensive to produce than the F-16, as it sells for $17 million more per plane, but this is due to the existing scale: the F-16 has been produced and exported since the mid-1970s.

There is also a sizeable gap in terms of training. Swedish pilots and maintenance recruits are trained for twelve months to operate the Gripen. The F-16, by comparison, takes at least thirty-six months.

Finally, there are on-the-ground conditions to consider. As noted recently in The Economist:

Soviet runways were built like floor tiling: panels of concrete blocks with sealant in between. That allows them to withstand the expansion and contraction from extreme heat and cold. It also means that moss, stones and other debris accumulates in between. The Gripen, with smaller air intakes that sit higher up on the fuselage, would cope with this far better than the F-16 [...] Ukraine could resurface some airfields, but that would only invite Russian missiles. And while the F-16 can land on roads in a pinch, its lighter undercarriage is not as well suited to the stresses of short runway…

Don’t be surprised if Ukraine provisionally decides to buy Gripens as well as F-16s.

Yet regardless of which plane is chosen, the war in Ukraine has provided another valuable lesson. Air superiority, so valuable in all twentieth-century wars right up to Desert Storm, may no longer be achieved by manned aircraft alone. Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles make the airspace dangerous. Both Ukraine and Russia have hundreds of S-300 missile batteries. Ukraine has also recently obtained the Patriot battery system. All these systems are battle-tested and very effective against manned aircraft.

As a consequence, the combat duties of fighter aircraft have transformed; jets are now primarily used as short-flight, air-to-ground missile launchers. Dogfights are extremely rare. Downed aircraft by friendly fire is not uncommon—Ukrainians have taken to crudely inpainting the underside of their fighters with the national colors of blue and yellow.

The alternative to manned aircraft is the use of drones. The Ukrainians have been ingeniously making thousands of inexpensive “suicide” drones. Comprised of cheap electronic parts, some made with 3D printers, they only have to last long enough to deliver their deadly cargo. American-made aircraft, including drones, now face additional competition that often delivers far more bang for the buck.

Do You Want to Ride into Combat in a Deathtrap?

Delivering combat infantry to and from the battlefield is a challenge in and of itself, and often requires a specialized vehicle. In Ukraine, there is the choice between the Australian Bushmaster—a smelly, powerful, loud, and heavily armored fighting vehicle—and the American Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle, which is of similar size, and power.

The major difference is that whereas the Bushmaster will stay and fight with infantry, the Stryker will deliver and leave. This is just as well, given that the Stryker is lightly armored and vulnerable to any gun more powerful than a machine gun. It has been described as “a deathtrap.” When used by U.S. forces, it usually enters battle alongside the powerful and well-protected Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a tank in all but name. That may not be an option in Ukraine. The Stryker also suffers from a variety of technical issues, as recounted in Responsible Statecraft: “the armor shielding it was fitted with proved largely ineffective and weighty, mud spattered from its rubber wheels into the engine during deployments caused innumerable maintenance problems, computer command displays inside the vehicle didn’t always work, soldiers in battle gear were being killed in rollover incidents because their seatbelts didn’t fit and (crucially), the bottom or the vehicle was thinly armored.” On top of all this, the Stryker is notoriously difficult and expensive to maintain.

The Bushmaster, in contrast, can sustain itself in the field for three days, has withstood Russian attacks, and costs $1.57 million per unit compared to the Stryker’s $4.9 million per unit. For a cash-strapped, war-time government like Ukraine that requires both effectiveness and low costs, it isn’t hard to see which vehicle is preferable.

Bang for Your Buck

It is worth repeating that all the systems mentioned above are not like-for-like, and offer different capabilities depending on the terrain and fighting conditions. Similarly, all the listed (estimated) unit prices do not take into account bulk-buying discounts (but also, crucially, the often costs of ongoing maintenance). It is also worth recognizing that American equipment often—but not always—utilizes super technology, and the price tag may reflect the expense that went into research and development.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict delivers a clear warning to U.S. arms suppliers of the need to rationalize and simplify production and maintenance costs, along with system complexity. And this is without factoring in concerns that some arms suppliers are engaging in price gouging.

Ultimately, though a particular platform may be “the best,” that does not mean much if a particular platform isn’t sustainably usable on the battlefield, either because of its complexity, its costs, or because of the particular environment in which it has been deployed. Foreign, non-Western buyers may not—and often do not—have Western budgets, and will be looking for simpler and less expensive, yet as-effective, options. Policymakers in Washington—many of which come from electoral districts that play host to arms suppliers and employ constituents—ought to take note of this.

Patrick Drennan is a journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.

Image: U.S. Army Flickr.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have been two of the quickest countries in the Middle East to take full advantage of the new multipolar world in which they have found themselves. Both nations have been able to successfully exploit all sides of conflicts to pursue their own interests. Riyadh in particular has forcefully and blatantly used its new and more powerful standing in the changing geopolitical environment to press its demands on superpowers with crude disregard for a quickly vanishing global hegemonic pecking order. In one of the most recent examples of this, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly threatened “major economic consequences for Washington” if it retaliated against Riyadh’s oil cuts. Similarly, Abu Dhabi has felt emboldened enough to withdraw from a U.S.-led maritime coalition based in Bahrain due to frustration at the United States for not doing enough to deter Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

In stark contrast to the aggressive posturing by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Cairo sits idly by, fumbling its way through this new reality. This difficulty is for a variety of reasons; the most prominent of which is its rapidly sinking economy. This situation, however, affords the United States a unique opportunity to assist Egypt in improving the distressed state of its people, thereby regaining much of the goodwill Washington has lost over the past few years.

Back and Forth

One of the earliest signs of Egypt’s struggle to adapt to the changing geopolitical environment came when it was revealed that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi ordered up to 40,000 rockets to be covertly shipped to Russia. This leaked intelligence was rejected shortly thereafter by Egypt. Later, it was reported that, instead, the sale of this artillery ammunition to the United States for transfer to Ukraine was approved. But although Egypt came out strongly against the veracity of the report regarding this supposed transfer of weapons to Russia, pundits and experts in Moscow and elsewhere seemed to believe that this transfer of weapons had been a real possibility. The lack of commitment and wavering to such a sale, even before the leaks were revealed, was manifested through the canceled “Bridge of Friendship” joint naval exercise between the nations scheduled for July 2022.

This behavior differs greatly from the UAE’s, whose president Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia’s largest and most important business/economic summit. Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to MBZ, described the latter’s attendance as a “positive calculated risk” within the UAE’s policy of de-escalation and dialogue. Similarly, Russian interior minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev—a top Russian official who is sanctioned by the West—visited Riyadh and held meetings with his counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud. While diplomatic engagement on the one hand and selling weaponry on the other are not in the same class, the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s cavalier attitude and ruthlessness in pursuing their own interests above all else, while giving themselves enough wiggle room and flexibility to not marry themselves to one side over the other, is evident.

Egypt, on the other hand, seems hesitant and indecisive about its own self-interest, alternating between marrying and divorcing one side over another ad infinitum. Consider that the cancelation of military exercises with Russia comes in conjunction with a strengthening of Egypt’s maritime partnership with the United States, as the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command transferred three patrol craft to the Egyptian Navy on March 21 during a ceremony in Alexandria. Yet this is also taking place while Egypt plans to drop the U.S. dollar in favor of local currencies in bilateral trade with India, China, and Russia, and amid reports that Cairo has formally applied to join BRICS.

All these dealings and heavy-footed maneuvering must be understood within the context of Egypt’s faltering economy. It was reported in late May that, due to a shortage of foreign hard currency, Egypt’s state grains buyer has deferred opening letters of credit to pay for its wheat purchases. Not much later on June 6, details emerged that Egypt has been struggling to raise cash for foreign debt repayments after it quadrupled its external borrowing over the past eight years. These repayments, which Egypt owes to the International Monetary Fund and foreign bondholders—mostly in the Gulf—amount to about $4.5 billion; more than half the annual revenue that comes in from the Suez Canal. On June 13 it came to light that Egypt is allocating $4.14 billion for its food subsidy program, which has been facing serious struggles since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since the start of the war, Egypt’s currency has depreciated by nearly half, and foreign investors have pulled more than $20 billion out of the country.

In short, whereas its Gulf neighbors can act with fluidity between great superpower rivals without fear of serious reprisal, Egypt is forced to go all in and move with less flexibility because of its dire economic straits. Cairo’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy allows for a middle road to be taken, but that can only work if the government is flexible enough to not fully commit one side over the other. A lumbering and heavy-footed state being pulled down by its economic troubles lacks such maneuverability.

Washington to the Rescue?

Up until this point, the United States has sought to pressure Egypt to act in certain ways by withholding military aid to Cairo. This policy would be effective if America were still the hegemon of a unipolar world. But in today’s multipolar world, aid can come from elsewhere, like China, with much greater ease. Multipolarity lends itself more to the carrot than the stick.

Cairo’s current troubles, however, present an opening. Sisi is already attempting to hold talks with whatever remains of his political opposition—a sign that he realizes the difficult position his country is in. Washington should take this opportunity to offer Sisi economic aid for improving the state of the Egyptian people, rather than simply threatening to withhold military aid. By helping Cairo get Egypt’s economy back on track, the United States can leverage the current moment to its advantage, rather than eventually seeing Egypt do as the Gulf states are doing, to Washington’s ultimate disadvantage.

U.S. policymakers ought to therefore consider doing so. A generous economic relief package specifically earmarked for the Egyptian people, rather than the military, along with a well-run PR campaign would not only be a major diplomatic win but would also help ensure that Cairo continues to seek assistance from the United States. Multipolarity may open up other options for countries, but it does not preclude remaining with a prior benefactor.

Sam Fouad is a Middle East analyst, editor, and a PhD candidate at The Catholic University of America. He has previously worked in communications, on political campaigns, and in a Senator’s office. His work has appeared in Responsible Statecraft, Newsweek, The New Arab, Inkstick Media, The Atlantic Council, The Globe Post, and Al Jazeera Arabic, among others. Sam holds a bachelor’s degree from Boston University and a master’s degree in international relations from UMass Boston.