The National Interest

Navy Drone Ship Orca is a Mac Truck for Mine Warfare: The Navy’s new Orca undersea drone is the size of a Mac truck and could be a rapid capability for deterring China. 

The Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV,) fittingly known as Orca, is a fifty-one-foot autonomous submarine that can carry out clandestine missions like minelaying.  The first Orca began testing in 2023 and late last month, the second Orca hit the water for sea acceptance testing off the coast of Southern California.

Seen side by side, the first two Orcas radiate mystery and menace. The Navy is evaluating several unmanned underwater vehicles for various missions, including large vehicles such as the sleek Manta. 

But none match Orca for size and military capability. 

And just in time, as the Navy is rushing to be at high readiness by 2027 when China’s Xi Jinping has ordered his forces to be ready to attack Taiwan. 

The focus on 2027 has taken hold across the military budgets since it was first described as the Davidson window. “President Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese military leadership to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan,” CIA Director William Burns stated in 2023. 

“They are on a wartime footing,” Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti said of China during a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in September.  

If the CNO is serious about adding capability, Orca is an option. Accelerating the production of large ships is almost impossible in a tight timeframe. Only a few Navy programs can speed up to deliver in quantity by 2027. One of these is Orca. 

The program, which is the Navy’s largest unmanned vehicle, started as a joint emergent urgent need requested by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command for an underwater mine-laying vessel.  Boeing went on contract in 2019 and launched the first Orca prototype in 2023. Four more Orcas are under construction in Huntington Beach, California. The Orca hot production line would enable the Navy to add Orcas quickly before 2027. 

The diesel-powered Orca is almost the size of an eighteen-wheeler, with thirty-four feet of space dedicated to payload. Think of Orca as a giant, undersea truck with limitless missions and a reported range of 6500 nautical miles. It’s by far the biggest undersea drone ship in the U.S. Navy. Recent tests demonstrated forty-eight hours of autonomous operations covering over 120 nautical miles. 

Orca has numerous uses in deterring China. Each Orca will be equipped for clandestine placing of sea mines if a crisis escalates. Taiwan’s shallow waters and treacherous coastline are prime territory for mine warfare and, “a low-cost way to interfere with China’s military plans, increasing the risk of operational failure,” noted a trio of analysts.

Just as important, the U.S. Navy says Orca can perform complicated undersea mining operations that would otherwise be tasked to a manned submarine. Orca has a long-endurance capability, allowing it to operate autonomously for extended periods in challenging undersea environments.  Its cost is much less than a manned platform and the risk to sailors is lower. 

As CNO Franchetti said at CSIS, “We know we need to adopt robotic, cheaper autonomous technologies to help us complement and extend the reach and lethality of our manned fleet.”

Orca also has other potential uses, such as hunting Chinese submarines. The American strategy is counting on an undersea advantage to neutralize both Chinese conventional and nuclear submarine capabilities. China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines are a growing problem.  China deployed its new JL-3 (CH-SS-N-20) submarine-launched ballistic missile aboard the Type-094 submarines in 2022.

The extended range of that missile could allow Chinese submarines to lurk in forward locations and put targets in the continental United States within reach. An autonomous system like Orca lying in wait could make that much harder for China to accomplish. 

All these capabilities enable Orca to assist the submarine force, freeing up manned submarines for other tasks. Orcas could be in use from the High North of the Arctic to the South China Seas, in which case the U.S. Navy is going to need more than five or six of them. 

“China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force, a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces,” concluded Ron O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service.  The U.S. needs to prioritize its undersea advantage to nix Xi Jinping’s timeline.

For Franchetti, it’s personal.  “I’m going to be CNO in 2027,” Franchetti said. “So, I am compelled to do more, and do more faster,” she concluded. 

Adding more Orcas to the fleet would accomplish both tasks. “What we are doing now in support of unmanned vehicles is key to the future success of our great Navy,” Commander Timothy Rochholz, the commanding officer, of Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Flotilla Three at Naval Base Ventura County Port Hueneme, pointed out. “We must accomplish the mission our commanders ask of us, deliver Orca to the fleet, ready to fight, as soon as possible – that is our charge.”

Dr. Rebecca Grant is a national security analyst and vice president, of defense programs for the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization in Arlington, Virginia. She has held positions at the Pentagon, in the private sector and has led an aerospace and defense consultancy. Follow her on Twitter at @rebeccagrantdc.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Whom Shall I Vote For? That is the question American Arabs are asking and answering today.

No American candidate for the presidency should ever take the vote of any demographic group for granted, especially when the families and friends of that group overseas are under the threat of being killed by U.S.-supplied weapons. However, it’s not easy to determine who the majority of Arab Americans will support on November 5. 

The Republican nominee, former President Donald Trump (78), is rolling the dice in hopes of reclaiming the White House. On the Democratic side, Vice President Kamala Harris (60) is making her case that she can connect with the aspirations of most Americans, Arab Americans in particular. Both sides have a fight on their hands.

Trump’s recent rally in Michigan was an attempt to win over the majority of Arab American voters. Billboards lining Michigan highways and campaign visits highlight Trump’s promise to “stand for peace” in the Middle East while casting Harris as one-sided and unsympathetic to Arab American interests.

However, Trump has not publicly announced a strategy for ending the war through a ceasefire if elected. In fact, he reportedly told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “Do what you have to do,” signaling support for Israel’s military actions in Gaza and Lebanon. On the other hand, many Arab Americans are frustrated by what they see as insincerity from Vice President Kamala Harris on issues that matter to them.

A young Lebanese American voter from Tampa, Florida, Pierre Mokhtar, 26, shared his views on the election and who he’s voting for.

Mokhtar said, “The first time I ever voted was in 2016. I voted for Donald Trump. My intention is to vote for him again this time. He appeals to me the most, but I’m coming from a nuanced point of view. Many Arab Americans see Trump’s faults. One of them is his communication style.”

Mokhtar continued to explain his admiration for Trump: “He comes from outside the political class. There are pros and cons. The downside is that he doesn’t know how to work the political process properly. But the positive is he hasn’t been corrupted by the influence and time it takes to climb the political ladder.”

Many younger voters are pulling back from traditional politics and media, seeing them as relics that don’t serve their interests today. Trump’s recent appearance on “The Joe Rogan Experience” podcast earned him the host’s endorsement, resonating with some younger voters.

Data reveals that some of Trump’s highest approval ratings come from young men, who, in part, perceive him as stronger on protecting businesses and entrepreneurship. Mokhtar, from a family business background, touched on this issue: “As an Arab American, business appeals to most of us. Becoming a billionaire, regardless of where you started, is a significant accomplishment. No fool could do it. He’s clearly not a fool.”

Another Lebanese American, Robert Khoury, 52, shared his reasons for supporting Trump: “You have to vote for the lesser of two evils. I like Trump. He’s against wars. Yes, he says a lot of garbage, but at the end of the day, he means well. The man cares for everyone. The poor, the weak, and we want to avoid war. Watching his recent Michigan rally changed my mind about him. I wouldn’t vote for Harris for any reason. Michigan has the largest number of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Trump is counting on their votes to win the state.”

Khoury went on to criticize the Biden administration’s handling of the Gaza-Israel-Lebanon conflict: “The Biden administration is responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians—men, women, and children. And now, Lebanese. Why do they keep providing weapons to Israel?”

Many Arab Americans are eager to see a friend or ally in the White House who understands their aspirations, both economically and in foreign policy. Trump recently addressed a letter to the Lebanese American community, which said, “During my administration, we had peace in the Middle East, and we will have peace again very soon! I will fix the problems caused by Kamala Harris and Joe Biden and stop the suffering and destruction in Lebanon.”

Foreign policy is especially critical to Arab Americans in this violent time. Many have family members in Lebanon and Palestine who risk being killed every day. Yet, some Arab Americans who support Trump may want to pause and think twice.

Other Arab Americans support Vice President Kamala Harris. Mona Ali, a Miami resident, explained her endorsement: “I grew up in Dearborn, Michigan, and the values I was raised with have guided me to vote for Kamala Harris. I don’t believe that Donald Trump represents U.S. principles. As a woman, I’m concerned that women’s rights could be jeopardized if he is elected. If it starts with women’s health rights, where will it end?”

Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco Edward Gabriel (1997–2001) spoke highly of Harris and is rallying support for her. Gabriel shared his thoughts on the election and detailed his reasons for backing Harris: “As a retired U.S. Ambassador, I’ve spent decades helping Lebanese Americans prosper here and advocating for peace in Lebanon. I met Harris in Flint, Michigan, and she assured me she was working toward a diplomatic solution for Lebanon.”

Gabriel said Harris and he discussed the need for Lebanon to elect a respected president, strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, and work toward sustainable peace along Lebanon’s borders. He believes this understanding will help Harris win over Lebanese Americans.

When asked whether foreign policy or domestic issues drive Arab American voters, Gabriel commented: “It’s a combination of factors. Foreign policy is one, but Muslim and Arab Americans also believe Kamala will protect the rights of Muslims to practice their religion freely.”

During his first presidential run, Trump proposed a “Muslim ban” affecting several Muslim-majority countries, though it didn’t take effect. Nonetheless, he has promised to reinstate it and ban refugees from Gaza from entering the United States.

This election will be close. Arab American voters, like all Americans, are weighing their options carefully, caught between two candidates who each claim to champion their interests in different ways. As U.S. policies in the Middle East directly impact families and communities, they seek more than rhetoric; they demand genuine, consistent support for peace abroad and fair representation at home. This election is a pivotal moment for Arab Americans to assert their voices. With both parties courting their votes, neither should take this growing demographic for granted. Today, November 5, Arab Americans will make their voices heard, reminding candidates that their trust, like their vote, must be earned, not assumed.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Uncovered Hatches: In a construction mishap reminiscent of past U.S. incidents, the lead vessel of China’s new nuclear-powered attack submarine class reportedly sank while docked, echoing the 1969 sinking of the U.S. Navy’s USS Guitarro (SSN 665) in San Francisco Bay.

-The Guitarro’s mishap occurred as nuclear and non-nuclear work teams independently filled tanks for separate assignments without coordination, leading to uncontrolled flooding through uncovered hatches.

-After the Navy's investigation cited "culpable negligence" and inadequate communication, it took three days to refloat the submarine, delaying its commissioning by almost three years and costing $140 million in repairs.

In September, U.S. defense officials revealed that the lead ship of a new class of Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarines sunk while undergoing construction.  

The incident took place in the spring, and the Chinese government sought to hide the fact until a think tank analyst spotted the sunk sub at its pier.  

Although a hugely embarrassing incident for the ambitious Chinese military, it is not unheard of for submarines to sink while at port. Indeed, the U.S. Navy experienced a similar incident, but fifty-five years ago when shipbuilding technology wasn’t as developed as it is today.  

It’s 1969. The war in Vietnam is raging. The Navy has committed important resources to supporting the ground fighting in southeast Asia. But the number one threat remains the Soviet Union. The Navy continues to invest in and prepare capabilities that would help it defeat the Soviet Navy in the event of a conflict.  

Nuclear-powered submarines were all the rage. Using the immense energy of newly-tamed nuclear energy, subs powered by a nuclear reactor could operate for longer periods, sail faster, and were also harder to detect. Fast-attack submarines were particularly desired because of their ability to find and sink enemy warships and logistical vessels. To this day, a wolfpack of good fast-attack submarines properly led can wreak havoc on an adversary naval force.  

The USS Guitarro (SSN 665), a Sturgeon class nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine, is undergoing final touches before it gets commissioned and joins the operational fleet. Construction of the warship is taking place at the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard. Work on the sub is proceeding as scheduled. Indeed, has been under construction for four almost four years, and the plan is to commission it in eight months.  

Then, all of a sudden, at approximately 8:30 PM, the USS Guitarro starts sinking while still tied to the dock. Nuclear and non-nuclear construction groups had been working on the boat on two different assignments that required filling certain tanks on the boat to bring it closer to the surface. The two groups had not been coordinating despite working on assignments that influenced one another, and the water reached uncovered hatches. The submarine kept taking more and more water. Eventually, the submarine could take no more and sunk.  

The Navy conducted a thorough investigation following the incident to determine what caused one of its priced nuclear-powered attack submarines to sink while in port. The cause of the sinking was “uncontrolled flooding within the forward part of the ship.” The report concluded that the sinking was accidental. However, the immediate cause of the sinking was, “culpable negligence of certain shipyard employees.” Moreover, inadequate coordination contributed to the accident.  

It took Navy crews three days to refloat the sunk submarine. 

The whole incident caused a commissioning delay of almost three years and up to $140 million in repair costs.  

Building and maintaining a naval fleet is not an easy task. And enemy fire is not the only danger to the longevity of a fleet.  

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Key Points: Recent Russian tactical gains in southern Donetsk have added pressure on Ukrainian forces, with notable progress near Vuhledar and towns like Hirnyk and Kurakhivka, according to British Military Intelligence. This progress includes the capture of small towns over a 20 km front, bolstering Russia's ability to threaten Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian logistics hub.

-Despite suffering high casualties—over 1,000 per day on average—Russian forces sustain these advances with continuous recruitment, using attrition tactics that Kyiv resists to preserve its manpower.

-As the conflict drags on, Russia’s numerical advantage in troops remains a strategic hurdle for Ukraine.

The Russian forces have made significant tactical progress over the past few weeks. Although the Russian military hasn’t been able to achieve an operational breakthrough that would open the way to winning the war, the tactical successes are putting pressure on the Ukrainian forces.

In its latest assessment of the conflict, the British Military Intelligence estimated that “in southern Donetsk oblast, Russian forces have made advances in several areas along a 20km wide front.”

“Russian forces have seized control of several small towns and advanced up to 9km in some areas within the space of a week. These advances follow from Russia gaining control of Vuhledar at the beginning of October 2024,” the British Military Intelligence assessed.

Since September, the Russian forces have been making slow but gradual progress in certain parts of the contact line. The Donbas has been mostly where the Russian forces have been making gains, though the area around Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine is also an active one.

“Also in southern Donetsk oblast, Russian forces seized the town of Hirnyk and claim to have captured Kurakhivka. 15km southeast of Pokrvosk, Russia seized Selydove, which likely further sets conditions for Russia to threaten the logistics hub of Pokrovsk,” the British Military Intelligence added in its operational estimate.  

The Ukrainian military is fighting hard to maintain its control in Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub on that part of the battlefield that would be a significant blow if it were to fall to the Russian forces. For one thing, it would limit the Ukrainian military’s ability to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in the sector.

“Russia continues to prioritise the southern Donetsk frontlines maintaining favourable force ratios in this sector, which partly explains the increased pace of Russian advances,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

The big question is for how long the Russian military can sustain the rate of advance? Because it doesn’t come cheap. For over six months now, or 180 days, the Russian forces have been averaging more than 1,000 casualties each day. Sometimes, the average rises to even 1,300 casualties per day for a few weeks. And yet, despite the heavy losses, the Russian military continues to have enough men to sustain its World War One-tactics on the battlefield.

“Despite heavy personnel losses, Russia continues to recruit high numbers to sustain its operations in southern Ukraine,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

And the high rate of casualties is partly the reason behind the recent tactical success of the Russian forces on the ground. Simply put, Moscow can put more men on the meatgrinder, and it doesn’t care. Kyiv, conversely, has been very reluctant to commit all of its manpower to the conflict, arguing that there needs to be enough young men to power the economy after the war. Western military aid can help the Ukrainian military kill and wound more Russian forces, but troop numbers are also important. And in that regard, the Russian military has a clear advantage.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

 Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy extended the service life of three Ticonderoga-class cruisers—USS Gettysburg, USS Chosin, and USS Cape St. George—thanks to modernization upgrades and the successful implementation of the Transferrable Reload At-sea Mechanism (TRAM), allowing at-sea missile reloads.

-Initially slated for retirement by FY27, the cruisers will now remain active until the late 2020s, addressing the Navy's need for more operational warships. The modernization aligns with the Navy’s Warfighting Excellence initiative, ensuring these cruisers continue contributing to mission readiness.

-TRAM technology will also support future frigates, enhancing fleet flexibility and reducing dependency on port visits.

Days after the United States Navy announced that a dozen Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers would see their service lives extended, it was announced that three aging Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CG 47) will also continue to sail the world's oceans longer than expected.

On Monday, the Department of the Navy announced service life extensions for USS Gettysburg (CG-64), USS Chosin (CG-65), and USS Cape St. George (CG-71).

"This decision adds 10 years of cumulative ship service life from fiscal year 2026 to 2029," the U.S. Navy stated.

The three warships were chosen as all had "received extensive hull, mechanical and engineering, as well as combat system upgrades as part of an extended modernization program," with the work for CG-64 completed in fiscal year 2023 (FY23), while the modernization of CG-65 was finished in fiscal year 2024 (FY24), which ended on September 30. CG-72 is now on track to have the modernization completed in the current fiscal year (FY25).

"As a former cruiser Sailor, I know the incredible value these highly-capable warships bring to the Fleet and I am proud of their many decades of service," said Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro.

The Ticonderoga class modernization began in the 2010s, according to a report from USNI News. It was undertaken by the sea service to keep 11 of its 22 guided-missile cruisers in operation until the 2030s. As part of the effort, seven cruisers were taken out of active service, overhauled, and then returned to service as older vessels were subsequently retired.

FY24 saw four Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers decommissioned – including USS Vicksburg (CG-69) in June, and USS Cowpens (CG-63) in August. Both vessels had also undergone the modernization program. USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) and USS Antietam (CG-54) were decommissioned in September, at the end of FY24.

The U.S. Navy had sought to retire all of its cruisers from the Ticonderoga class by fiscal year 2027 (FY27) but was forced to reverse course.

"After learning hard lessons from the cruiser modernization program, we are only extending ships that have completed modernization and have the material readiness needed to continue advancing our Navy's mission," Del Toro added.

There is no denying that the U.S. Navy has too few warships, but a factor in the extension of the three cruisers was the successful test of the Transferrable Reload At-sea Mechanism (TRAM) on USS Chosin last month. It was employed "to load an empty missile canister into the ship's MK 41" VLS while the vessel was in the open ocean, the service previously announced.

Reloading the VLS isn't exactly high-tech, and instead employs a time-tested cable and pulley system, but the point remains that it allows sailors at sea to do what normally required a trip back to port. Moreover, it is a time-consuming process. TRAM – which will be used with the future Constellation-class frigates – will enable guided-missile cruisers and destroyers to reload the VLS at sea.

"This transformational logistics capability enables U.S. Navy ships to rearm without needing to pull into port," the Navy added. "The service life extensions align with Secretary Del Toro's priority of Warfighting Excellence and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti's Navigation Plan, which prioritizes putting more ready players on the field."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is sending North Korean combat troops to Russia to attack Ukrainian forces. This is an extremely risky action on his part, suggesting that he is desperate. While these troops have years of North Korean military training, they have no modern combat experience and are getting little preparation from the Russians. If they are committed to mass assaults on Ukraine’s front line, that could be disastrous for the troops and a problem for Kim.  

Kim likely understands some of the risks he is running. But prompt action by South Korea, Ukraine, and the United States could amplify those risks and discourage Kim from continuing his combat troop commitments. A failure to act could jeopardize the cohesion of the Ukrainian front lines and could even lead to a strategic breakthrough for the Russian forces which could become a disaster for Ukraine. 

If Kim perceives that his forces have succeeded, he may become emboldened to test his military forces against South Korea. 

North Korea has reportedly deployed 12,000 combat troops to assist Russia in expelling Ukrainian forces from Russian territory in the Kursk region. This Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory has been a serious embarrassment for Russian President Vladimir Putin. While Russian forces have slowly pushed Ukraine’s forces back, Putin likely hopes that the addition of the North Korean forces will defeat Ukraine's offensive and perhaps even lead to a breakthrough in Ukraine's defensive line.  

Interestingly, the Russians have dressed the North Korean forces in Russian uniforms and given them fake Russian identifications, suggesting that Putin wants it to appear that Russian forces, not North Korean forces, are solving this Ukrainian invasion problem. 

The fact that Ukraine was able to make a significant incursion into Russia with its much smaller military could eventually lead other nationalities to consider comparable actions against Russian aggression. Although Putin has sought to downplay the significance of Ukraine's offensive, it could over time raise questions in Russia about Putin's leadership performance. 

Meanwhile, Kim has benefited from Russian assistance. The North Korean economy is in terrible shape and the Kim regime is unable to independently meet the needs of the North Korean people. These inadequacies raise questions about the quality of Kim's leadership and the viability of the North Korean juche philosophy, which roughly translated means self-reliance. 

Fortunately for Kim, his father and grandfather spent decades building and stockpiling artillery and other munitions well beyond North Korea’s needs for potential conflict on the peninsula. Kim spotted Putin's need for artillery munitions and started selling his outdated, excess stocks to Russia in exchange for hard currency, food, and military technology. Kim has used the hard currency in part to improve the lives of at least some of his people, especially the elites, presumably reducing discontent with the regime. 

Kim has reportedly shipped millions of artillery shells, munitions , and weapons to Russia, enabling Russia to continue its advances against Ukrainian forces. 

Of course, many of North Korea’s artillery munitions produced in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s which had been largely stored underground are in questionable condition. At least some did not work, and some exploded when fired, causing Russian casualties. However, many did work, making Russia willing to pay for what North Korea shipped. 

The quantity of the munitions that Kim was prepared to send to Russia has likely been largely dissipated, which means Russian hard currency payments will soon be significantly reduced. This means that the improvement in the lives of some North Koreans could be ending, likely increasing instability above what it was before the Russian arms sales began. 

Kim therefore needed to find another way to acquire hard currency. So now he is selling North Korean combat personnel to Russia for something like $2,000 each per month, almost all of which the North Korean regime is likely keeping. The problem with this approach is that Kim is probably not sending personnel from unreliable families to Russia, fearing that they would defect. Kim likely felt he could afford to send soldiers from politically elite families. 

The North Korean combat forces have reportedly received relatively little training on Russian military operations. That suggests that Russia is planning to use many of them for mass assaults on Ukraine's frontline positions, where many Russian conscripts have died. Russia has reportedly been suffering 1,200 casualties per day, an extremely large number. 

If Russia employs these tactics with the North Korean forces, the lack of adequate North Korean medical services and supplies will exacerbate the situation. Casualties will undoubtedly anger some number of North Korean families that have been relatively supportive of the regime. Moreover, Russia is unlikely to pay for soldiers who are either dead or wounded, implying that Kim will need to send more troops over time to continue the flow of hard currency to his regime.  

Kim reportedly attempted to prevent the families of the dispatched soldiers from learning about their deployment to Russia, but this effort failed. So North Korea is seeking to isolate their families in the North to avoid any potential rebellion.  

It is reported that South Korea is already sending some information about the deployment into North Korea, which may be stoking opposition and instability. If this information campaign were expanded and augmented by U.S. efforts, many more North Korean families would be alerted to the selling of their sons to Russia. 

It is also reported that South Korea is contemplating sending some of its military personnel to Ukraine for observation and other non-combat purposes.  

Both South Korea and the United States should deploy experts in psychological operations to transmit messages to the North Korean troops to induce defections. Some North Korean defectors living in the South already are seeking to join such a deployment. Any new defectors would likely provide valuable insights into the situation in North Korea, something that Kim would hate: he does not want the outside to know how bad things are there. 

In addition, South Korean and U.S. personnel should be transmitting information about the wider world to the North Korean soldiers, anticipating that if they ever get back to the North they will pass on at least some of it to their families. This could include K-pop and other items of interest to the average young North Korean. 

Kim will hate this even more. He has called K-pop a vicious cancer that could cause his regime to collapse.  

At some point, the loss of control over the North’s information environment may even lead Kim to feel that it is too risky to send more combat forces to Russia. This would be a good outcome for South Korea, the United States, and especially Ukraine. 

But if North Korean forces help Russia achieve a breakthrough, that could be dire for Ukrainian forces. Such a situation could also strengthen the Kim regime at home and perhaps even convince Kim that he could successfully carry out limited attacks on South Korea, a truly unwanted outcome.  

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Program. 

 Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: A Royal Air Force (RAF) F-35B has successfully landed on the Japanese flattop JS Kaga for the first time, marking another step in enhancing interoperability among allied forces in the Indo-Pacific. This follows similar trials with the U.S. Navy’s F-35B on the Izumo-class vessel.

-The transformation of Japan’s JS Kaga and JS Izumo into F-35B-compatible carriers reflects Tokyo’s evolving defense capabilities amid regional tensions.

-While Japan avoids calling these ships “aircraft carriers” due to constitutional restrictions, their expanded air capabilities have drawn China’s attention, as the upgraded Izumo-class carriers could support air operations reaching targets within mainland China.

Just weeks after a United States Navy Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II conducted its first landing on the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) flattop JS Kaga (DDH-184), a Royal Air Force F-35B also landed on the multi-functional destroyer for the first time.

"Landmark landing! A F-35 pilot has landed on a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force platform for the first time. @RoyalNavy Lt Cmdr Baker - a test pilot on exchange with the Patuxent River Integrated Test Force - conducted the flight that aims to boost allies' integration," UK Defence Staff in US announced on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The vertical landing on November 2 occurred while the JMDSF warship was operating in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of San Diego.

"Pax ITF flight test members, U.S. Sailors and Marines, and the JS Kaga crew are executing developmental tests during these sea trials to gather the necessary compatibility data to certify F-35B Lightning II short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft operations," the F-35 Lightning II Pax River Integrated Test Force (PAX ITF) announced.

"Following analysis, the test team will make recommendations for future F-35B operational launch and recovery envelopes, further enhancing the Japanese navy's capabilities," PAX ITF added. "The results of the testing will contribute to improved interoperability between Japan and the United States, strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance and strengthening the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region."

JS Kaga is one of the JMSDF Izumo-class multi-functional destroyers being transformed to operate with the F-35B, the fifth-generation fighter's short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant. The ongoing tests follow similar ones carried out with JS Izumo in 2021, marking the first time a Japanese warship has operated with fixed-wing aircraft since the Second World War.

The JMSDF has operated the JS Izumo and JS Kaga since 2013 and 2015 respectively. Though the two warships may resemble modern aircraft carriers, were officially described by Tokyo as a "multi-purpose operation destroyer" due to their main purpose being to seek out and destroy enemy submarines in the self-defense of Japan with rotary aircraft.

In 2018, Tokyo approved a plan that would greatly enhance the capabilities of the warships – transforming them into de facto aircraft carriers. Each of the vessels has already begun a two-stage transformation that will allow them to operate fixed-wing aircraft – notably the F-35B Lightning II.

JS Izumo has undergone its initial modification stage, which included the application of heat-resistant paint to its flight deck, while JS Kaga has seen the aforementioned modification of its bow section – which has resulted in it earning comparisons to the U.S. Navy's Wasp-class and America-class amphibious assault ships.

Despite the modifications to its helicopter destroyers, Tokyo remains cautious in its exact terminology, refraining from explicitly labeling the modified Izumo-class vessels as aircraft carriers. That decision aligns with the nation's long-standing defensive security policies under the pacifist constitution, which was adopted after the Second World War. It did require some "reinterpretation" of the constitution's Article 9 – allowing Japan to exercise the right of "collective self-defense," and to engage in military action if one of its allies were to be attacked.

However, each of the converted warships could greatly enhance the JMSDF's ability to carry out air operations in the contested East China Sea – a move that has earned condemnation from Beijing. China may also note that Japan could be among the largest operators of the F-35 in Asia, and is currently on track to purchase at least 42 of the fifth-generation stealth fighters.

The carrier-based aircraft could be employed to strike positions within mainland China. According to a report from Interesting Engineering, researchers at the National Defence University's College of Joint Operations, operated by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) have conducted war game studies and warned that U.S.-made stealth aircraft – including the F-35 but also the F-22 Raptor – could hit already Shanghai with cruise missiles while operating from Japanese airspace.

Coupled with a carrier, the stealth F-35B could possibly strike targets even deeper within China. Whether that fact serves as a deterrent to Beijing, or only increases the saber-rattling has yet to be seen.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) recently conducted a joint "elephant walk" at Misawa Air Base, showcasing aircraft like the F-16 Fighting Falcon, JASDF F-35A, and P-8 Poseidon.

-This powerful display, involving a close taxi formation, serves as a show of readiness and deterrence against regional threats, namely China and North Korea.

-Elephant walks trace back to WWII, with the term coined due to aircraft’s nose-to-tail lineup resembling elephants.

-These exercises highlight unit strength and collaboration, and for Misawa, reinforced the U.S.-Japan defense commitment amid rising Indo-Pacific tensions.

On Friday, the United States Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) conducted a joint "elephant walk" at Misawa Air Base on Japan's home island of Honsh , the 35th Fighter Wing announced. It involved a variety of aircraft.

"Four U.S. #AirForce F-16 Fighting Falcons, four #Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, four JASDF F-2s, one JASDF E-2D Hawkeye, one U.S. #Navy C-12 Huron, and one U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon perform an Elephant Walk," the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) announced on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. Photos showed the aircraft lined up in a show of force.

It was just the most recent elephant walk – the term for taxiing a number of aircraft before takeoff – to include U.S. Air Force fighters and other aircraft.

In addition to the close formation on the ground, such demonstrations can involve a minimum interval takeoff as a show of power, and to serve as a deterrent to regional rivals – in this case, China and North Korea.

Two years ago, a formation of two dozen F-15C/D Eagle fighter jets assigned to the 44th and 67th Fighter Squadrons, a KC-135 Stratotanker assigned to the 909th Air Refueling Squadron, an E-3 Sentry assigned to the 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron, and an HH-60 Pavehawk assigned to the 33rd Rescue Squadron was seen lined up on the runway as a part of routine wing readiness exercise at Kadena Air Base, Japan.

Though the elephant walk at Misawa Air Base was on a smaller scale, it was notable for including U.S. and Japanese aircraft lined up together – highlighting the commitment of the U.S. Air Force to stand by its regional partners. In June 2020, the base also conducted an elephant walk formation composed of 31 aircraft, which was also meant to emphasize the efforts to enhance interoperability with the JASDF.

"This demonstration took the work of many agencies and individuals across the base, and the 35th Fighter Wing is grateful to our partners for showcasing the amazing, combat-ready force available to our Indo-Pacific leaders if called upon during a crisis," said Col. Kristopher Struve, who served as the 35th Fighter Wing commander at the time of the 2020 demonstration, the first bilateral and joint elephant walk at Misawa Air Base.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole.

Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation. It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. Image are of various elephant walks in history. 

What You Need to Know: Ukraine has adopted advanced protective measures for main battle tanks (MBTs) to counter drone threats on the frontlines, moving beyond makeshift solutions to purpose-built armor.

-Developed by Metinvest under Rinat Akhmetov's Steel Front initiative, these steel screens shield vulnerable areas like engines and ammo compartments from explosives dropped by drones.

-Unlike DIY options, these screens use high-grade steel for optimal strength without impairing tank maneuverability or visibility. While installation is complex, frontline reports indicate a 30-40% increase in vehicle survivability, allowing crews to survive attacks and evacuate safely. The protective screens may redefine MBT resilience in modern warfare.

Ukraine's Steel Front Takes Shape: The use of drones and other unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Ukraine has changed the role of the main battle tank (MBT) – where the powerful behemoths can be all too easily targeted, disabled, and even destroyed. Both Moscow and Kyiv have looked at ways to increase the survivability of their MBTs, and that has included ad hoc solutions that include netting, strapping wooden logs to the side, and notably welding "cope cages" over the turret and engine compartments.

However, those ad hoc solutions have given way to more carefully planned options, and Ukraine has been looking to utilize more carefully planned protection. This has included specially-designed protective screens – developed by Metinvest, and based on the framework of Rinat Akhmetov's Steel Front. The screens were meant to help counter drones and even explosive devices that are now being used on the frontlines.

"The primary objective of these screens is to save the lives of soldiers. Additionally, they protect the most vulnerable parts of the vehicles, such as the engine and ammunition, from attacks from above, as drones often drop explosive devices from this trajectory," explained Oleksandr Myronenko, chief operating officer of Metinvest Group.

He told The National Interest that the screens were designed to block or reduce the impact of explosives dropped by drones. Each screen can be installed directly on the vehicle and provide protection both in combat and while stationed in shelters. Sandbags or netting are also used only when storing vehicles in fixed positions.

"The screens are made from high-quality steel, which increases their resistance to explosions," said Myroneko. "Simple DIY methods, like homemade metal grids, cannot always achieve the same level of strength or consistent protection."

As the adversary's primary goal is to immobilize the vehicle first and then destroy it if possible, most of the drones and loitering munitions that the Kremlin's forces are employing have been tasked with rendering a tank immobile.

"Our screens function as nets that prevent drones from making contact with the vehicle’s body," added Myroneko. "This helps to protect both the vehicle and its crew."

The first cope cages appeared just months after Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Drones proved to be an unexpected game changer for Kyiv, and dozens or perhaps even hundreds of Russian tanks were subsequently targeted.

Russian troops took those ad hoc measures, but in some cases, it impacted the operations of the tank and even diminished some capabilities. The Steel Front screens developed by Metinvest were designed to provide added protection without compromising the vehicle's fighting abilities.

The only downside is that it can't be installed at the front. More than just a welder and a few tools are required. But the results can pay off quickly.

"Depending on the vehicle model – including the Abrams, Bradley, Leopard, etc. – installing a screen takes a team of 10–12 people approximately 12 hours on average," said Myroneko. "This includes securing the screens, testing compatibility, and conducting mobility and combat-readiness tests. This process is relatively quick, allowing vehicles to be prepared for battle in a short time."

In addition, the protective screens were designed so that they do not affect the mobility or combat capabilities of the vehicles.

"The focus was on maintaining the maneuverability of tanks and armored vehicles," Myroneko continued. "The average weight of a grid screen for a tank is about 430 kg, which is negligible given the overall weight of the tank."

He also explained that all of the components are made from steel, including the metal structures for the frame, metal grids, and sheet metal.

"However, these do not impair maneuverability, speed, or combat mission execution," Myroneko stressed. "The screen structures are positioned in a way that does not obstruct the driver’s view or block essential functions, such as movement, shooting, ventilation, or cooling systems."

According to Metinvest, soldiers on the frontlines have claimed the screens can increase a vehicle's survivability increase by 30-40%.

"We have documented real cases where vehicles were stopped on the battlefield, but thanks to our screen, the crew remained alive and unharmed," said Myroneko. "The soldiers were able to evacuate, and the vehicle was later retrieved for repair."

It isn't clear how many MBTs and other armored vehicles have been fitted with the screens but each one could be another game changer.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Main image is from Creative Commons. All others are from Metinvest Group.

What You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy’s next-generation SSN(X) nuclear attack submarine program aims to enhance undersea capabilities with greater speed, stealth, and payload capacity. However, budget constraints have delayed the start of SSN(X) construction until the 2040s, despite an initial timeline for 2031.

-With Virginia-class submarines in high demand and shipyards struggling to meet production goals, Congress hesitates on the SSN(X) due to its projected $6.2 billion per unit cost.

-As a more cost-effective option, experts suggest increasing investments in unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and modernizing shipyards to address immediate threats, rather than focusing solely on expensive, future-oriented systems.

The “X factor” has been longtime in military aviation nomenclature tradition, as in X-planes, such as the Bell X-1 that became the first aircraft to break the sound barrier, with the late great Chuck Yeager at the controls. 

Or the rocket-powered North American X-15, which, at Mach 6.7, is the fastest aircraft ever, yes, even faster than the air-breathing Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, which flew barely half that fast, at Mach 3.2, to the U.S. Navy’s (USN) upcoming F/A-XX fighter jet program.

But this time we’re talking about the “X factor” in a maritime context, such as warship’s nomenclature, more specifically an undersea warshp’s moniker. 

Say hello to the U.S. Navy’s (SSN(X)) program.

NOTE: “SSN” is the U.S. Navy hull classification symbol for nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarine, a designation used for interoperability throughout NATO under Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 1166.

The Navy first publicly identified the requirement for the SSN(X) program in 2014, and eight years later the USN brass submitted a budget request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 which included $98 million to continue research and development (R&D), including $29.8 million for general class development and $68.1 million for developing nuclear propulsion.

Along with the Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Virginia-class boats, the SSN(X) program is seen as a critical component of the USN's in maintaining American naval superiority in the coming decades, especially in the light of Communist China’s ever-expanding shipbuilding capabilities.

Given the experimental, hence the presence of that “X factor” in the first place, and hush-hush nature of the program, actual technical specifications and vital status for these prospective undersea boats are few and far better and speculative. 

In the general sense, the “X-boats” will provide greater speed, increased torpedo payload capacity, improved acoustic superiority and non-acoustic signatures, i.e. quieter, and higher operational capacity.

There is even a rumor that these subs will include biomimetic propulsion systems, which are engines that replicate the movement of undersea wildlife to make it harder for enemy submarines to track the SSN(X). 

Sounds all well and good in theory, right?

So, is there a potential holdup in practice, and if so, why? With so many up-and-coming military technologies (such as the USN’s DDG[X] next-generation destroyer program and aforementioned F/A-XX, along with the U.S. Air Force’s Next-Generation Air Dominance [NGAD] project) it all boils down to dollars and sense, as explained by my colleague Brandon J. Weichert explains in a October 27, 2024 article for The National Interest, “The U.S. Navy will push back construction of its next class of attack submarine, the SSN(X), until the early 2040s. Initially, the Navy had planned to begin building the SSN(X) in 2031. Then, the start date was pushed back to 2035. Now, because of budgetary constraints and the need to prioritize ongoing and near-term projects, the Navy has pushed the program back again.”

The most optimistic assessment of the prognosis for SSN(X) can be summed up as “Hurry up and wait.” The emphasis right now is on building up the Virginia-class fleet and given the suboptimal hand that America’s shipyards have been dealt, they’re struggling to produce even two of those boats per year, “[T]he older Los Angeles-class attack submarines continue being retired at alarmingly high rates…America’s Congressional Budget Office projected the costs of the SSN(X) to be around $6.2 billion per unit. That’s orders of magnitude higher than the $2.8 billion price tag of the Virginia-class submarines. Because of the high price of the SSN(X), Congress is understandably reticent to commit…The real focus for the Navy should not be purchasing another expensive weapons platform to fight tomorrow’s theoretical wars. Instead, the Navy must focus on reliably countering real threats today…The Navy should focus its efforts on rapidly expanding and modernizing America’s broken shipyards.”

As a far more cost-effective alternative to the SSN(X) money pit, Brandon suggests beefing up the USN’s  unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) drone program. Time will tell.

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).

 Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: China’s militarization of the South China Sea (SCS) has established a powerful anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network across the region, positioning it to delay or block U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency.

-Advanced surveillance, defensive, and offensive capabilities stationed on China’s manmade islands give Beijing a strategic edge in the opening stages of any conflict, potentially inflicting heavy losses on U.S. forces.

-This setup relies on achieving swift strategic dominance before U.S. responses can degrade its island defenses. Analysts agree the U.S. could eventually counter these islands but may face costly setbacks in early engagements, highlighting escalating risks in U.S.-China tensions.

America’s elite want you to think that they’ve got everything under control. In fact, they’ve lost control. The new reality is that the United States is a declining power in regions of the world that it once took for granted, notably in the region that the Pentagon now calls the “Indo-Pacific.”

According to former U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Studeman in a post on X, “China is working very hard at having superiorities [throughout the South China Sea] that nobody else can match.” Studeman continued his post by adding, “They’ve built an ability to project power with multiple types of capabilities—air, missile, militia, ships, submarines.”

In other words, Washington has sat idly by as its greatest geopolitical foe has marshaled its strength, enhanced its strategic position, and created capabilities that are tailored for stunting U.S. military power projection in regions that China claims as its own, such as the South China Sea (SCS) and the Taiwan Strait. China is also developing the means to potentially wrest control of the East China Sea and Yellow Sea from their other great regional foe, Japan. All this was unthinkable a decade ago.

Alas, China’s strength and position in the SCS are so great that short of total war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, there will be no rolling back of China’s presence in the SCS.

For instance, beginning in 2010, the Chinese military started a massive construction project throughout what international arbitration courts (and the United Nations) have already defined as international waters or maritime regions belonging to China’s neighbors in the SCS. These projects saw Chinese engineers build increasingly sophisticated and hardened military bases on manmade islands throughout the region.

China has placed complex surveillance stations on some of these manmade islands that monitor international shipping traffic through the crowded SCS and keep a close eye on the movements of foreign naval forces throughout the busy region. 

Beyond their surveillance capabilities, China’s manmade islands are now sporting new runways to host increasingly large military planes and China is deploying a robust—and lethal—anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network across the region. This A2/AD network is meant to prevent the U.S. Navy and its allies from projecting power through the SCS against Chinese forces (and allowing for Chinese forces to more easily project power in the area while behind the protective bubbles of those A2/AD networks).

In 2020, Gregory B. Poling of Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies argued in War on the Rocks that “without the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or some undiscovered (and unlikely) stand-in, U.S. forces would have little choice but to concede the waters and airspace of the South China Sea to China in the opening stages of a conflict.”

Poling’s excellent article further stated that, “The logistics and maintenance hurdles China would face during wartime would likely prevent the island bases from effectively operating over the long-term. But for several weeks at least—time that would be critical in a Taiwan contingency, for instance—they would pay huge dividends for Beijing.”

Responding to Poling’s 2020 essay, Olli Pekka Suorsa, a research fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, disputed Poling’s conclusions. In Suorsa’s summation, “U.S. tested conventionally armed intermediate range ballistic missile[s]” that were “once banned under the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty (INF)” are the surest way to end the purported threat that China’s manmade bases pose in a potential conflict with the United States.

Strangely, both analysts are in agreement on one aspect: in the long run, the United States would likely be able to knock those manmade bases out in a war—or at least degrade their threat considerably, using weapons like long-range ballistic missiles as well as whatever hypersonic missiles the Americans could deploy (although the United States lags far behind the Russians and Chinese in deployable and reliable hypersonic weapons). Yet, in the short run, the Americans are going to get rocked hard by Chinese forces stationed at those manmade islands.

What’s more, China’s military has built an impressive defensive array around Chinese islands in the SCS. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative first reported on Beijing’s defensive measures in 2016. According to its analysis, China has “built significant point-defense capabilities, in the form of large anti-aircraft guns and portable close-in weapons systems (CIWS).” In 2022, China proudly announced the success of its anti-ballistic missile system that it “billed as a bulwark against a hypothetical U.S. attack,” according to the Washington Examiner.

These systems can be deployed to degrade America’s long-range ballistic missile threat to those manmade islands.

And the fact that the anti-ship ballistic missile arsenals that undergird China’s A2/AD systems throughout the SCS will assuredly prevent the U.S. Navy from deploying its surface warship fleet—notably U.S. Navy aircraft carriers—against those fortified Chinese islands significantly reduces America’s threat to those islands. Then there are also the incredible developments that China has made in radar detection and even anti-hypersonic weapons technology—all of which will be deployed in defense of those manmade islands.

A final daunting issue for the Americans to overcome is the Chinese first-strike threat to the U.S. Air Force’s permanent forward bases in the Indo-Pacific, in places like Guam. China has already practiced hitting those areas as part of an opening bid to end America’s threat to its forces in the region. 

So, Poling’s take about those islands paying “huge dividends” to China in the opening phases of a war with the United States is apt. 

China’s entire plan relies upon achieving strategic surprise long enough to surround and possibly invade neighboring Taiwan. Once that occurs, and the Chinese have achieved escalation dominance over the Americans and their allies, Beijing believes it will be able to force a negotiated settlement with Washington. 

But even if China cannot do that, if the Americans decide to respond more forcefully, the costs to both sides will be far greater than what either government thinks.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

What You Need to Know: China’s aircraft carriers play a secondary role within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), supporting the nation’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy rather than serving as the fleet’s centerpiece.

-While the U.S. Navy relies heavily on carriers for global power projection, China’s defense centers on extensive A2/AD networks in the South China Sea, capable of keeping American forces at bay and deterring intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

-These A2/AD systems, featuring anti-ship ballistic and hypersonic missiles, create a protective bubble over Chinese forces, rendering China’s carriers a support asset, strategically positioned closer to home and more replaceable than their U.S. counterparts.

There continues to be a grave misconception about the importance of aircraft carriers in the overall force posture of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) surface warfare fleet. For American observers, the aircraft carrier is the penultimate naval power projection platform. 

Western think tank types cannot fathom a fleet, one that wants to be taken seriously at least, wherein the carrier is not the centerpiece of all activity. 

But that is precisely the case for China, a nation that very much wants to, and very well should, be taken seriously as a real challenger to the United States.

China currently has three aircraft carriers with a fourth on the way. The first carrier, the Liaoning, is quite unimpressive, even with all the modifications the advanced Chinese installed on the ship. 

It’s a hand-me-down from the old Soviet Union. 

Subsequent Chinese carriers, however, are indigenously built and they incorporate some of the most advanced systems imaginable. Indeed, China’s Shandong aircraft carrier has a new system installed that makes it nearly impossible for rival nations to track their massive carriers while at sea, or to use wake-homing torpedoes to attack the Shandong.

This is just one of many features the innovative Chinese military has gleaned from years of perfecting their tracking capabilities of large U.S. Navy warships, notably American carriers. Just last week the Chinese completed a massive wargame off the coast of the beleaguered democracy of Taiwan, which China covets.

In that wargame, for the first time, all of China’s operational carriers conducted joint operations. It was a signal to the Americans and the region that China was truly the most dominant regional actor. 

Of course, Japanese carriers remain technically more advanced than China’s, although that is set to change very soon.

More importantly, the Chinese defense industrial base, their mighty shipyards, are upstaging the Americans, once considered the “arsenal of democracy.” One Chinese admiral reportedly boasted to Western media that, unlike the American shipyards, there were “no bottlenecks” in the production line for China’s new and increasingly advanced carrier force. 

In other words, the fleet that the Americans have is static whereas China’s fleet is growing, and its industrial base is robust enough that it can far more easily replace any lost units or repair them at a greater rate than the Americans.

This is a decisive advantage, when one considers the high degree of probability that the United States and China will be in a shooting war likely over the fate of Taiwan soon. 

However, the primary role that carriers play in the overall strategic disposition of China’s navy is not the same as the role that America’s massive nuclear-powered carriers play in its expeditionary fleet. 

Instead, the Chinese carriers, while sophisticated, are merely support ships tailored to further China’s strategic goal of taking Taiwan. 

Interestingly, in this author’s assessment, the centerpiece of China’s maritime power is the advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that Beijing has spent the better part of a decade developing, and deploying, throughout the South China Sea (SCS) and along their coastline.

These A2/AD networks will be essential for China’s military in keeping the bulk of America’s military over the horizon in any war over Taiwan. The A2/AD threat includes massive numbers of long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, even hypersonic weapons that can track and destroy U.S. carriers, these are known as “Carrier Killers”. 

All these systems mean that the Pentagon will be hard-pressed to risk their massively expensive aircraft carriers, especially if the probability exists that those carriers will not even be within effective combat range of Chinese forces before they could be crippled or killed by China’s A2/AD systems.

China’s carriers are meant to operate within the protective bubbles that their A2/AD networks will create over whatever area of operation Beijing has assigned, again, likely Taiwan. What’s more, China’s carriers are far more replaceable than the American ones. 

While still technically superior to China’s, the American carriers will have to contend with far greater threats to its safe operation than will the Chinese carriers, which will be operating beneath the protective shield of those A2/AD networks and be operating much closer to their home territory than will the Americans. 

So, the next time you read a think tanker in Washington lambasting China’s carrier force when compared to that of America, remember that it is likely coming from a place of profound ignorance, and mirror-imaging, the bane of all analysts.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

What You Need to Know: The Lockheed-Martin F-22 Raptor, the U.S. Air Force’s premier stealth fighter, exceeds all near-peer airframes in capabilities like stealth, supercruise, and supermaneuverability. However, it was never adapted for carrier operations due to budget and technical constraints under the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) program.

-Although Congress had initially pushed for a carrier-compatible FB-22 bomber, the design’s limited combat radius, costly sweep-wing configuration, and limited internal bomb capacity prevented its development.

-Despite its costly upkeep and small fleet, the F-22 remains a significant deterrent against U.S. adversaries, but plans to retire older models face resistance.

Since its inception, the Lockheed-Martin F-22 “Raptor” has exceeded every near-peer airframe.

As the planet’s premier operational jet – combining stealth, supercruise, supermaneuverability, and sensor fusion in a single airframe – the Raptor remains one of the U.S. platforms that rival militaries fear the most.

However, there is one thing the world’s most capable air-superiority stealth fighter cannot do: fly from a carrier.

The single-seat, twin-engine tactical fighter jet entered service with the U.S. Air Force in 2005, following a lengthy and expensive production process. As the product of the U.S. Air Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter program, the Raptor was intended to outperform advanced Soviet fighters including the Sukhoi Su-27 and Mikoyan MiG-29. At this point of the Cold War, the Air Force determined that its current capabilities might be at a “mission deficiency” in the near future if a superior fighter was not in the works. 

Some of the Raptor’s cutting-edge capabilities include its smaller radar cross-section, which enables the airframe to fly undetected. In fact, the F-22’s cross section is about five to ten times less observable than the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Additionally, the fighter is equipped with twin thrust-vectoring F119 turbofan engines, which give its pilot unparalleled advantages in dog fights. The fighter’s larger frame also features three internal weapons bays. 

The Raptor’s formidable potential convinced Congress to pressure the U.S. Navy to consider adopting a sweep-wing version of the new jet under the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) program. As detailed by Sandboxx Media, “In return for the Navy considering the NATF as a potentially lower-cost alternative to developing their own replacement carrier-based fighter, the U.S. Air Force agreed to evaluate a modified version of the carrier-based stealth bomber being developed under the Navy’s Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program as a replacement for their own aging F-111.”

This collaborative approach would eventually beget joint combat aircraft programs across the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that would result in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

However, by 1991, the plan to incorporate a carrier-compatible FB-22 was dropped primarily for technical and budgetary reasons. Turning the Raptor into a bomber would significantly impact the airframe’s payload and range. Defense expert Sebastian Roblin explained in the past why the F-22’s limited combat radius would have been detrimental to bomber operations. The Raptor’s combat radius of 600 miles “is not nearly far enough for a deep penetrating bomber that cannot rely on tanker planes to tag along into hostile airspace.” 

Additionally, the Raptor can only carry four Small Diameter Bombs within its internal weapons bay. Any more munitions positioned on the wings of the airframe would diminish the Raptor’s stealth. Engineers also grappled with how to incorporate a sweep-wing design, similar to the F-14 Tomcat, into the FB-22. Sweep-wings are extremely expensive to maintain, and integrating this design into the airframe would compromise its stealth. 

While an FB-22 carrier-capable bomber would have been truly remarkable, it probably would not have altered the overall abilities of the U.S. military’s current carrier platforms. Plus, the Air Force had only purchased 187 F-22 airframes by 2009 – hundreds fewer than the original projection. America’s shift to the Global War on Terror, and the continuing development of cheaper, comparable platforms, kept the Raptors in short supply. Today, the Air Force is seeking to retire its fleet of older-model F-22 fighters, due to the platform’s expensive upkeep and diminishing value. Congress is working to stop the Air Force from taking such action. 

Despite the limited number of airframes available and working, the F-22 Raptor still deters U.S. adversaries. If the FB-22 was developed under the NAFT program, the bomber would probably be experiencing the same growing pains as its sister platform today. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Image Credit: FB-22 artist creation. 

Starfighter: Russia has announced ambitious plans to develop the MiG-41, a sixth-generation “starfighter” capable of extreme speed, EMP attacks, and laser weaponry.

-Intended to replace the MiG-31 Foxhound, the MiG-41 is designed to reach near-space altitudes and exceed Mach 4. However, while impressive on paper, these aspirations are widely seen as unrealistic given Russia’s current military priorities in Ukraine and technological limitations, particularly in directed-energy weapons.

-Some argue Russia should focus its resources on achievable projects like the Tupolev PAK DA stealth bomber, rather than the speculative MiG-41.

Russia wants the world to know that it is unaffected by the Western proxy war being waged between itself and the NATO alliance over control of Ukraine. Recently, Moscow let the world know that it was moving ahead with the construction of its long-range strategic stealth bomber, the Tupolev PAK DA. Russian forces already possess the world’s most advanced, working hypersonic weapons arsenals.

Now, Moscow has announced that it intends to move forward with the Mikoyan Design Bureau’s radical new sixth-generation warplane, the MiG-41.

But the descriptions of the MiG-41 do not sound like a new, more advanced warplane for the Russian arsenal. They look and read like a starfighter right out of Star Wars. 

Russia wants these planes to shoot down enemy missiles with lasers. 

Never mind that Russia does not have working directed-energy weapons. It’s what Moscow wants. What’s more, Russia wants the plane to deploy electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons against its enemies. 

Oh, and the bird will travel at speeds exceeding Mach four. 

The MiG-41 is meant to be a replacement for Russia’s MiG-31 “Foxhound.” Russian media sources reporting on the development of this theoretically extraordinary bird indicate that the plane will fly at altitudes that exceed anything that any other warplane can fly at. In other words, the Russians are sending this thing to the edges of space—hence, why I like to describe it as a “starfighter.” 

Russian tactical thinking has moved beyond simply building more kinetic warplanes. The theorized sixth-generation warplane, which is pure fantasy at this point, is meant to outfly its rivals. The weapons that are being developed for this experimental plane are non-kinetic. They’re meant to attack the sophisticated electronic operating systems of enemy warplanes. 

EMP weapons, lasers, and skimming low-Earth orbit are all the big dreams of the Mikoyan designers. It’s interesting. 

These schemes are also totally impractical. 

The Russians are in what Vladimir Putin has repeatedly described as an “existential” war with Ukraine. He’s likely right. That’s why all national resources have been directed into winning the war. 

And the Russians are winning, but the Russians are also still limited by the reality of their national position. 

In other words, the Russians need to focus on the practical and leave building the wünderwaffe to the Americans, who are proving with each decade since the end of the Cold War that such fantastical systems are rarely worth the money and time it took to build them. 

Where Russia is right to spend its limited resources is in developing the aforementioned Tupolev PAK DA long-range strategic stealth bomber. That system will prove decisive over time for Russia, especially if the Ukraine War continues unabated for the next several years. But the MiG-41 is as ridiculous as it sounds.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

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What You Need to Know: A recent CTC Sentinel report disclosed a near-miss missile incident involving the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea. A Houthi-launched missile reportedly came within 200 meters of the carrier, underscoring the growing risks posed by non-state actors.

-With an array of drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles, Houthi forces have increasingly targeted international vessels amid rising regional tensions.

-The incident underscores the challenges of protecting high-value assets like aircraft carriers against unconventional threats, with implications for U.S. naval readiness and strategy in more contested areas, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

The Houthi rebels nearly hit a US aircraft carrier with a missile, new report shows. The incident, which occurred earlier it the year, but was only just reported in the October issue of CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point’s monthly publication), suggests that the Houthi missile came within just 200 meters of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower.

“By some accounts, an ASBM [anti-ship ballistic missile] or other missile arrived at a very shallow trajectory, with minimal warning, without a chance for interception, and splashing down around 200 meters [656 feet]” from the Eisenhower. In other words: it was a close call.

The Houthis, whom Iran supports, have  been attacking international shipping lanes in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden ever since the war between Israel and Hamas began last October. The Eisenhower, along with other US and European vessels, were sent to the region to protect civilian ships traversing through the shipping lanes.

The Eisenhower, in particular, was quite busy during the deployment, expending “155 surface-to-air missiles, 135 land-attack cruise missiles, nearly 60 air-to-air missiles and 420 air-to-surface weapons during what is called a “historic” combat deployment,” Newsweek reported.

But the Eisenhower has been a target, as well. The Houthis, who have a diverse arsenal, including air, land, and sea drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, have been pushing back against the American presence in the region. The Eisenhower has relied upon its Carrier Strike Group, which includes a cruiser and destroyers, for protection. “The cruiser and destroyers, which were armed with missiles for air defense, formed a defensive layer to protect the aircraft carrier,” Newsweek reported. “Meanwhile, fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier, equipped with air-to-air missiles, can shoot down slow-flying drones and missiles.” Fortunately, the Eisenhower itself is equipped with self-defense weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles and gun systems for close-in threats.

Yet, the fact that low-tech drones and missiles, in the possession of a relatively rag-tag terrorist organization, can pose a legitimate threat to a multi-billion-dollar American supercarrier should be a point of concern – and speaks to the increased relevance of non-state actors in the post-Cold War global order. The aircraft carrier is a symbol for a nation’s prestige, military might, and technical prowess; that a rebel group armed with drones and missiles can threaten such a symbol perhaps transcends symbolism.

The supercarrier’s vulnerability to the Houthi rebels is also likely to exacerbate concerns over naval readiness for a confrontation with China. US strategy in the Indo-Pacific, where China has become increasingly assertive, depends upon successful aircraft carrier deterrence. Yet, to keep the carrier fleet safe from China’s (relative to the Houthi’s) sophisticated weaponry, America’s flagships may have a muted impact on any conflict.

But, frankly, the US public does not have, nor should have, the tolerance for the loss of a supercarrier. The human and fiscal toll implicit in the loss of just one supercarrier would be a shock to the conscious for a nation that has been able to engage in foreign conflict in a slow-burning, partially-committed sort of way for nearly two generations.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. The Main image is USS Ford undergoing U.S. Navy 'shock trials'. 

The era of unrestrained free trade is over, and it’s not coming back. It’s not what the modern, interconnected world demands. Instead, a new era of trade policy is needed—one designed to bring prosperity to working people, address inequality between and within countries, create high-quality jobs, and promote resilient and sustainable supply chains. The Biden-Harris administration has started to make this transition—and with important results to show for it. Donald Trump, on the other hand, offers a return to his failed trade policies, although this time with even more chaos and disruption.

The last several decades of deregulation, corporate tax cuts, and unfettered liberalized trade turned out to be like an addictive drug, with the highs of GDP gains and a growing stock market obscuring the slow but steady decline of middle- and working-class communities. The era may have benefited global companies and the wealthy, and it helped to lower extreme poverty in a handful of countries. But too often, this came at the expense of the environment and workers elsewhere, as the “race-to-the-bottom” approach that defined the era reduced wages and disincentivized companies from protecting the environment or decarbonizing their production.

Eventually, the damage proved too much to ignore. The so-called “China Shock” characterized by a range of predatory Chinese exports cost the United States over 1 million manufacturing jobs. Regions with high concentrations of industrial workers fared the worst. In these communities, poverty rates increased, fertility rates declined, and social and political norms were upended. While some may blame this on trade itself, it is important to remember that these impacts were not the result of the innate human desire to exchange goods and services but rather of poor trade policy. The policy was based on the flawed assumption that government intervention in the economy was inherently negative and that free trade was always preferable to the alternative.

It doesn’t need to be this way, but better trade outcomes require better policies. And Trump has proven that he is incapable of delivering this sort of change. Why? Because his view of trade policy is extractive in nature. His outlook is fundamentally about demonstrating power—seemingly, his own personal power. His obsession with tariffs is not about creating better outcomes for working people, the environment, or the climate. Instead, he appears to view tariffs as a way to compel others—adversaries and allies alike—to grovel before him, offering concessions in exchange for lifting tariffs.

That may sound fine to some, but this strong-man approach to trade ruins opportunities to collaborate with international partners to address century-defining challenges like climate change, inequality, migration, and others—all of which require global solutions. Trump’s presidency consistently demonstrated why this approach failed. When faced with his impulsive tariff threats, other countries simply made promises they had no intention of keeping, as China did in its “Phase One” trade deal with Trump. In fact, a recent Peterson Institute study found China didn’t buy any of the $200 billion of U.S. exports it had promised. World leaders learned quickly that Trump was governed by headline chasing, which meant they could give him the headline he wanted and win all the details. And in trade policy, details matter—a lot.

Despite his continued promises, his tariffs and corporate tax cuts didn’t reorient global supply chains. The total number of manufacturing jobs was lower when he left office than when he began his term. The trade deficit exploded, and industries like semiconductors continued to lose market share to China. Now, he seems to think that with bigger tariffs and even more corporate tax cuts, the result would somehow be different.

Americans know that trade policy isn’t about asserting dominance or extracting concessions. And it’s certainly not about the personal power of any one person. Rather, it should be about leveraging global commerce in a way that makes our world more sustainable, our environment cleaner, and our workers more prosperous.

Trade policy, including strategic tariffs, can be (and should be) a force that creates and sustains high-quality jobs. It should align closely with other government tools—including regulation and procurement, as well as research and development—to form a holistic strategy for expanding the middle class and strengthening workers and their communities. It has not always been this way, but it can be—and that’s why leadership matters. That’s why values matter.  

The Biden-Harris administration has demonstrated that with the right mix of values and pragmaticism, a trade policy that puts working people and the middle class at the center can deliver real results. The administration’s transformational investments in future-forward industries, its expansion of “Buy American” provisions, use of export controls and targeted tariffs, and its commitment to both invent and domestically produce the next great technologies of the future have resulted in nearly a trillion dollars of private sector investment into U.S. manufacturing, and the creation of roughly 800,000 new manufacturing jobs. It has also caused the trade deficit with China to reach its lowest level in years.

As a nation, we can build on these gains by modernizing U.S. trade policy based on three reinforcing principles. First, ambitious standards related to workers’ rights, climate action, and respect for the rule of law should be required to receive the United States’ best trade terms. Second, tariff rates should be increasingly based on firm-level decisions, allowing individual exporters to receive better rates based on how well they treat their workers, recognize the collective bargaining rights of their employees, protect the environment, and decarbonize their production. Third, trade policy should closely align with a national investment strategy, ideally coordinated with like-minded partners, to ensure domestic manufacturers—and their workers—remain at the forefront of the industries that will define our future. 

This sort of strategy requires thoughtful and knowledgeable leadership on trade issues. It also requires that trade policy not be used for personal gain but as a lever in the service of our values and in coordination with America’s partners and allies.

Ryan Mulholland is a senior fellow for International Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

What You Need to Know: With an impressive combat record of 104-0, the American-made F-15 Eagle is renowned for its speed, maneuverability, and lethal firepower. Originating from the Vietnam War era, the F-15 was developed to rival Soviet MiG fighters and has proven its superiority in air-to-air combat.

-The latest iteration, the F-15EX, further elevates its capabilities, carrying over 13.5 tons of weapons and launching up to 12 air-to-air missiles.

-Nicknamed the "bomb truck," the F-15EX combines the Eagle's legacy with advanced technologies, ensuring the platform remains a formidable asset for the U.S. Air Force in the years ahead.

Renowned for its 104-0 combat record without a loss, the American-made F-15 Eagle remains a fan favorite among aviation buffs and military experts alike. The fourth-generation platform may be technically lagging behind the newer F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets, but the Eagle still holds its own when it comes to speed and armament power.

In fact, the F-15 remains the fastest air superiority fighter within any American military service. The jet’s air superiority is achieved through a combination of unparalleled maneuverability, range, weapons, avionics, and acceleration. These top-tier capabilities certainly contribute to the platform’s stellar combat record.

The Eagle’s prowess and development can be traced back to the early days of the Vietnam War when the Navy and Air Force were sorting out details for a joint future tactical aircraft. At the time, then-Secretary of State Robert McNamara tasked both services to create a singular platform that could fulfill the missions of both. The Soviets were flying the MiG-23 and MiG-25, which were considered to be exceptional fighters. Big-name manufacturers like North American Rockwell, Fairchild Republic, McDonnell Douglas, and General Dynamics all submitted proposals. The Air Force ultimately selected McDonnell Douglas’s design plan and the F-15 was born.

When the Eagle prototype took the skies, it achieved many “firsts.” The platform was the first of its kind capable of attacking multiple enemy targets at the same time from distances of up to 100 miles thanks to its cutting-edge air-to-air radar-guided missiles and advanced radar system. Notably, the jet was also the first of its kind to be able to accelerate straight up towards the sky directly after take-off due to its incredible acceleration speed.

United States Air Force Lieutenant Cesar Rodriguez shot down more Soviet MiG jets than any other pilot ever since the Vietnam War.

The revered pilot achieved his first two kills during the first Gulf War against a MiG-23 and MiG-29 both flown by the Iraqi Air Force. His third kill occurred at the end of the decade in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The F-15’s stellar combat record has contributed to the platform’s continued service in the USAF. The F-15EX is the latest variant to be introduced, equipped with cutting-edge capabilities that surpass its preceding Eagle airframes. Experts refer to this new Eagle as a “bomb truck” since it can carry more than 13.5 tons of weapons. Earlier this year, it was reported that this platform was able to carry and launch up to one dozen air-to-air missiles. Breaking records in terms of quantity and tonnage of ordnance carried is what makes the Eagle II such a lethal variant.

While the F-15 may be an aging variant, the incorporation of next-generation technologies into the latest variant will help it to serve the needs of the Air Force for years to come.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

What You Need to Know: Russia's Su-57 stealth fighter is making its debut at China's Zhuhai Airshow to attract international buyers, but instead of admiration, the aircraft has faced ridicule on Chinese social media.

-Event attendees were able to inspect the fighter up close, exposing numerous visible screws and poor fuselage panel joints that detracted from the Su-57’s intended stealth image.

-Comparisons to China's own J-20 Mighty Dragon highlighted these perceived flaws. While the aircraft will likely attract attention when it flies at the airshow, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) now faces a PR challenge as photos and criticism of the Su-57 circulate online.

Russia continues to seek buyers for its Sukhoi Su-57 (NATO reporting name Felon) fifth-generation stealth fighter, and that explains why it sent a prototype to China, where it will be demonstrated at the 15th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, which will begin on November 12 outside the city of Zhuhai in the Guangdong province.

As previously reported, this is the first time that the Sukhoi Su-57 has been presented at the biennial airshow. The Kremlin likely expected that its highly-touted fifth-generation fighter would turn heads. It didn't count on Chinese social media, where the fighter was highly scrutinized and ridiculed.

"The oversight on the russian part was that they failed to organize a no-access zone for spectators, and the Chinese event visitors could freely come up unprecedentedly close to the Su-57 model demonstrated at the exhibition," Defense Express reported.

The aircraft was photographed in ways that Russia's adversaries might have once only dreamt of, and soon armchair pundits and aviation buffs weighed on every shortcoming they could spot.

"What especially catches the eye is the huge number of bolts holding together fuselage panels but this is no news, as previous models had the same look. A whole different matter is that the quality of joints fails to meet any reasonable expectations," the Daily Express added.

The result is that the aircraft didn't appear particularly stealthy on the ground, even as it was a prototype and not a serial production aircraft. Yet, commentators on TikTok were also quick to compare the Su-57 to China's domestically-built Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon.

"Lots of screws: Closer look at Russia's 5th generation Su-57 fighter jet at China's Zhuhai Airshow," wrote open source military news site Clash Report on X, sharing many of the same complaints as those on TikTok.

If the goal of sending the Su-57 was to raise awareness, get headline, and more importantly turn heads, then mission accomplished! The biennial airshow and aerospace trade expo doesn't kick off for a week and already the Su-57 is getting plenty of attention. While many of the attendees will still get to see the aircraft in flight – at least that's the current plan – and to see a static mock-up, which likely doesn't have the obviously apparent bolts and gaps, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) still has some bad PR to deal with in the meantime.

Master showman P.T. Barnum (and not Elizabeth Taylor as many believe) may have famously quipped "There's no such thing as bad publicity," but plenty of celebrities and politicians would argue to the contrary. As goes military hardware, the publicity that the Su-57 has so received could only get worse if the Felon literally crashed and burned!

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

North Korean Troops in Russia: Benefits, but also Risks for Moscow and Pyongyang - It has been widely reported that thousands of North Korean troops, the exact number is unclear, are in Russia and that some 8,000 are now in Kursk where the U.S. government expects them to soon join Russian troops in the combat effort to expel Ukrainian forces from the portion of that Russian province still under Ukrainian occupation. 

Moscow brought North Korean troops onto Russian territory and even sent them to the battlefield because Putin anticipated benefits from doing so. Although the North Korean deployment is tiny compared to the number of Russian troops on the front lines, their presence might relieve the need for Moscow to redeploy its troops from inside Ukraine to Kursk. In addition, while the Kremlin may worry about the sensitivity of the Russian public to Russian casualties, North Korean casualties are not something that ordinary Russians will worry about. 

Finally, bringing in North Korean troops in response to Ukraine’s surprise seizure of Russian territory in Kursk may be intended to dishearten Ukrainians, especially since this raises the possibility that even more troops from North Korea and perhaps elsewhere might join Russia in fighting against them. 

For Pyongyang, the benefits of sending North Korean troops to Russia might include, as Michelle Ye Hee Lee pointed out in the Washington Post, much-needed cash for North Korea’s heavily sanctioned economy, Russian technological assistance for North Korean military production, including its nuclear program, and increased world attention for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, which he reportedly craves. 

Some also fear that Kum Jong Un is sending his troops to Russia to gain battle experience which they might employ against South Korea. Perhaps he even sees sending North Korean troops to fight Russia’s enemies as obligating Moscow to send Russian troops to fight Pyongyang’s. 

This deployment, however, also involves potential costs for both Putin and Kim Jong Un. It may be that North Korean troops prove to be more trouble than they are worth if they do not fight effectively and coordination between them and Russian ones proves problematic, as some Russian troops have already acknowledged. It would also be embarrassing to both Moscow and Pyongyang if North Korean troops ended up defecting to Ukraine and then moving to South Korea. Seoul has already raised the prospect of responding to the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia by providing South Korean arms to Ukraine. 

Moscow and Pyongyang, though, are proceeding despite these risks, either because they do not see them as all that serious or because they believe the potential benefits outweigh the costs. 

Even if this calculation is accurate, other risks may be more difficult for Moscow or Pyongyang. While Putin has demonstrated that he is willing to accept high levels of Russian troop casualties, Kim Jong Un might balk at sending more North Korean troops if they end up being slaughtered in large numbers. Acquiring battlefield experience for possible use against South Korea, after all, is only useful if North Korean soldiers survive fighting against Ukraine. 

One risk that Putin runs is that inviting North Korean troops into Russia to fight against Ukraine opens the door to Kyiv inviting troops from other countries to Ukraine to fight against Russians. Even if most, or even all, NATO governments might not want to do this officially, “volunteers” from various NATO countries might arrive in increased numbers. 

Putin, though, may not worry about risk-averse NATO governments getting more involved in the Ukraine war. What should concern him, though, is what dependence on North Korean troops does to Russia’s image. Moscow’s dependence on Iran for armed drones and ballistic missiles as well as North Korea for artillery shells and now soldiers hardly enhances Russia’s image as a great power. 

As the war goes on, will Russia become even more dependent on others for arms and troops? What price will it have to pay for them? And what will happen if they cease to be forthcoming? 

The arrival of North Korean troops in Ukraine does not bode well either for Ukraine or for its Western backers. But it might not work out all that well for Russia or North Korea either. 

Mark N. Katz is a professor emeritus of government and politics at George Mason University, a global fellow at the Wilson Center, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

In the Middle East, putting out burning fires is a priority. Larger positive accomplishments are impossible as long as the bloodshed continues. However, avoiding the endless igniting and reigniting of more fires requires serious examination and recognition of the underlying combustible material, which is all too rare. It has long been observed and is still true that the regional policy of Israel—the country generating most of the flames—appears to be “all tactics and no strategy.” Something similar could be said about U.S. policy, notwithstanding the good intentions of its hitherto unsuccessful efforts to get a ceasefire.

The Middle East is a complicated place with many conflicts and rivalries, some of which intersect and overlap. The first thing to guard against in any discussion of underlying causes of the region’s instability is the all-too-common tendency to oversimplify and attribute all its troubles to a single cause.

But careful reflection about even just the current fires, let alone all the past ones, points to one factor that, more than any other, underlies the region’s violence and instability. That factor is the continued subjugation by Israel of Palestinians, the denial of national self-determination, and the occupation, blockades, and impairment of daily living that have gone with that denial.

The connection is most obvious regarding the horrors that have unfolded in the Gaza Strip during the past year, with suffering that includes tens of thousands of deaths. An earlier dismantling of some Israeli settlements left Israel in control of Gaza’s borders, airspace, and sea lanes, which it used to sustain a suffocating blockade that turned the Strip into the world’s largest open-air prison. A natural human imperative is to strike back at those responsible for imposing such conditions. Amid miserable circumstances, people feel they have little or nothing to lose by attempting to strike back.

The other fronts in what today has become multifront warfare in the Middle East stem from the oppression of the Palestinians. The Houthi regime in Yemen began its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea as a show of support for the beleaguered Palestinians of Gaza, leading the United States to intervene by bombing targets in Yemen. Without the dire situation in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis would have had no reason to attack Red Sea shipping, and they have made clear that their attacks will end when Israel’s carnage in Gaza ends.

The intense Israeli assault on Lebanon also grew directly out of the situation in the Gaza Strip and thus is another by-product of the subjugation of the Palestinians. Like the Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah started firing rounds into Israel out of solidarity with the Gazans. This was probably the least that Hezbollah’s leaders figured they could do lest they seem indifferent to the suffering of the Palestinians. Hezbollah, aware of the costs it incurred in the last previous full-scale war with Israel in 2006, did not want another war with Israel in 2024. Before Israel escalated this year to another major attack on Lebanon, Hezbollah, similarly to the Houthis, linked the cessation of firing along the Lebanon-Israel border to a needed ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

It is the political situation involving repression of the Palestinians that is the prime mover of the instability and violence—not the existence, nature, or objectives of any group or combination of groups that Israel considers its enemies. The groups in question have responded to the policies of Israel much more than to its mere existence. The origin, rapid growth, and popularity of Hezbollah in the early 1980s owed much to its role as the self-declared defender of Lebanese against an Israeli invasion of the country in 1982. 

That invasion, like the current one, also had a direct tie back to the subjugation of the Palestinians. The principal Israeli objective in 1982 was to deal a heavy blow to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which at the time was resident in Lebanon. If there were no occupation of Palestinian land in need of liberation, there would have been no role for a Palestine Liberation Organization.

Similarly, Hamas is not the prime mover of Palestinian violence against Israel, as demonstrated by the violent resistance conducted by an alphabet soup of Palestinian groups beginning in the late 1960s, long before Hamas was founded in 1987. Hamas owes much of its later growth and popularity to the widespread perception among Palestinians that the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority has been a feckless auxiliary to the Israel occupation rather than an effective opponent of it. 

Another way in which Hamas owed some of its strength to the Israeli policy of preventing Palestinian self-determination was through Qatari financial support that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu facilitated. For Netanyahu, propping up Hamas as a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority helped to keep Palestinian leadership divided and enabled Israeli leaders to keep asserting that they have “no partner” with whom to negotiate peace.

Then there is Iran, which is frequently and erroneously identified—by those promoting a monocausal explanation of the Middle East’s troubles—as the “real problem” in the region. Current tensions involving Tehran, in the wake of an Israeli aerial attack on Iran following Iranian retaliation for earlier Israeli attacks, again link back to the Palestinian problem. The most recent Iranian retaliation was for Israeli attacks that killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh while visiting Tehran and that killed Iran’s ally, Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah. The killing of Nasrallah was part of the current Israeli offensive in Lebanon, which, as noted above, grew out of the Israeli-inflicted carnage in the Gaza Strip, which in turn is an outgrowth of the occupation and Gaza’s status as an open-air prison.

Iran’s regional policies, and specifically its policies toward Israel, have been largely reactive. To the extent that Iranian antipathy toward Israel is based on more than a response to Israel’s attacks on Iranian interests—and the constant and intensely expressed Israeli animosity toward Iran—the Palestinian issue is again central. The Iranian regime speaks out on that issue partly out of genuine sympathy for the beleaguered Palestinians but mostly as a way of cultivating influence with Arab populations, among whom the Palestinian issue still has much resonance.

Although the Iranian regime has voiced some extreme rhetoric on the subject that appears to reject any two-state solution, it would have no reason to keep talking up the issue if a settlement were reached that gave Palestinians self-determination. It instead would have good reason to decide that whatever was good enough for the Palestinians was good enough for Tehran—especially given how the salience of the issue among most Arabs would quickly fade if the Palestinians finally got their own state.

If one takes away the Palestinian issue and takes away the Israeli attacks that compel an Iranian response, Iran has little reason to reject a stable relationship with Israel. There would still be obvious ideological differences, but since the first several years after the Iranian revolution, Tehran’s regional policies have been driven much more by pragmatic geopolitics than by ideology. Iran, like Israel and Turkey, is a non-Arab state operating in a predominantly Arab region. Geopolitical considerations have led Iran in the past to find some common cause with Israel not only when the shah was in power but also under the Islamic Republic when William Casey manipulated the hostage crisis to win the 1980 presidential election for Ronald Reagan. There was also the Iran-Contra affair, in which Israel played a significant part.

Consider an alternate history in which Palestinians did get their own state, either soon after the Jews in Palestine got theirs in 1948 or after a relinquishing of Palestinian territory that Israel conquered in the war that it initiated in 1967. There still would be many rivalries and other sources of instability in the Middle East that are not rooted in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. There still would have been, for example, sectarian and tribal fissures in Yemen that would attract intervention from the likes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There probably still would have been the reckless expansionism of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. There still would be rivalries involving the Muslim Brotherhood and authoritarian Arab regimes that have underlain political instability in Egypt and the Gulf. There also would be small extremist elements that would reject the existence of Israel, viewing it as a manifestation of Western colonialism.

Yet, in other respects, this alternate Middle East would be a much different and far less violent place than the actual Middle East of the past several decades. The violence that has been committed in pursuit of Palestinian self-determination would not occur if self-determination had already been achieved. The far greater Israeli violence in pursuit of keeping Palestinians subjugated would not occur if Israel were no longer subjugating the Palestinians.

The energies of Palestinian political elites would be focused on competing for power in their own state. Palestinians with real power would not be the object of disdain that the feckless Palestinian Authority has become, and there would not be the motivation to resort to violent alternatives to that fecklessness. 

Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, would not exist in the violent form we know today. Still, there would be a Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood that would compete for political power the way the branches of the Brotherhood in Tunisia and Jordan (and Egypt before Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup) compete for power in their countries. Even the Hamas we know has shown, when given a chance, its willingness and ability to compete successfully at the ballot box rather than with guns.

Palestinian leaders, whatever their ideological coloration, would have much to lose in this alternate Middle East universe if they were to turn toward violence against Israel, in stark contrast to the desperate, nothing-to-lose nature of much Palestinian existence today. U.S.-backed Israel still would be the most militarily powerful country in the region, capable of crushing any small Palestinian state that had gone rogue. The risk of losing their much-sought state would deter its citizens and leaders from any thought of going rogue.

Terrorism in this alternative Middle East would be significantly less than what the region has actually known, given how large a share of terrorism involving the Middle East has been driven by frustrated Palestinian nationalism. The situation in the alternate Middle East would be analogous to Irish nationalist terrorism after a peace agreement was reached in which the main nationalist movement Sinn Fein became part of a power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland and its militant wing, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, laid down its arms. Terrorism subsequently perpetrated by fringe extremist groups that rejected the peace agreement has been a small fraction of the violence that was occurring when the PIRA was still active.

In the alternate Middle East, the multiple wars in Gaza, including the devastating one that is ongoing, would not have been fought. Nor would the multiple wars involving Israel and Lebanon have occurred since each one derived from Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Differences between Israel and Lebanon would be limited to negotiable matters such as where to draw the boundary line in a Mediterranean gas field. 

As for what relations between Israel and other Arab states would be like in the alternative Middle East, one does not need to speculate. The Arab League peace initiative was adopted by all Arab states twenty-two years ago, has been repeatedly reaffirmed, and is still on the table. The initiative offers full normalization between the Arab world and Israel provided that Israel withdraws from the occupied territories—with the possibility of land swaps—provides for a “just settlement” of the Palestinian refugee problem and allows the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Arab neighbors are not out to destroy Israel. They are out to end the subjugation of their Palestinian brethren.

Of course, political leaders have to deal with reality, not with an imaginary alternative universe. Part of the current reality is a decades-long Israeli project of building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, which has made the establishment of a Palestinian state more difficult than it would have been earlier. Some observers believe that it already has made a two-state solution impossible and that the realization of human and political rights for Palestinians can now be achieved only within a single state shared with Jewish Israelis. A successful one-state solution would confer all or nearly all of the benefits of the alternate Middle East described above.

Whether a two-state solution is still possible and whether a one-state solution could be devised that would satisfy the national aspirations of both Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs is uncertain. However, those are questions that need to be actively and openly discussed, including by the U.S. government, with enough energy to drive toward the implementation of a solution. This means doing much more than ritually saying “two-state solution” as diplomatic boilerplate while doing nothing with U.S.-Israeli relations to bring any kind of solution closer to fruition.

What is most certain is that the Middle East will continue to be a violent place, with periodic paroxysms like it is undergoing now, as long as the subjugation of the Palestinians continues.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA, covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

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