The National Interest

In late September 2023, a Russian government document relating to its preparations for a very large civil defense exercise involving a nuclear war scenario was leaked to the Russian press. It reportedly described the planned October 3 Russian civil defense exercise indicating that, “Russia will stage its first nationwide nuclear attack exercise across 11 time zones in preparation for potential nuclear war.” The document reportedly stated, “In some constituent entities [regions] of the Russian Federation, as a result of emergencies or other types of physical impact, complete destruction of life support facilities and up to 70% of the housing stock is possible.” The reference to the destruction of “life support facilities” apparently means the loss of electricity, communications, water, and transportation.

The leak of such a document before the Russian Grom strategic nuclear exercise (which usually happens in late October but sometimes as late as December), is apparently unprecedented. The large Russian civil defense exercise is normally held every year in early October. It could be an unannounced part of the Grom strategic exercise. Grom usually involves simulated large scale strategic nuclear strikes and sometimes involves simulated non-strategic (tactical) nuclear strikes and strategic air and missile defense operations.

The content of the leaked document was not reported in the major Russian state media outlets that publish in English, which is also unusual considering its being leaked to the press. The inclusion of a damage estimate to Russia in the leaked document is also particularly unusual. The actual civil defense exercise itself was also not reported in Russia’s state media but was reported in the Russian press. “In some areas, schoolchildren were taught how to wear gas masks. In other areas officials were forced into bunkers. The exercise was based on the assumption of a giant nuclear attack from the West.”

The Russian press frequently gloats over the massive destruction its simulated Russian nuclear strikes inflicted in its Grom exercises as well as other Russian nuclear exercises. (In a 2010 Russian large nuclear exercise, a Russian press report proudly declared that, “…throughout the world, the mushroom clouds rose skyward.”) Russia’s pro-regime media treatment of a nuclear war usually ignores the consequences for Russia from retaliatory nuclear strikes.

The document reportedly stated that the Putin regime had “…taken a decision to develop measures aimed at increasing the readiness of civil defence forces and means to take measures to protect the population, material and cultural property on the territory of the Russian Federation, including general evacuation from danger zones.” Russian officials have bragged about its civil defense measures before, but a nationwide exercise just before Grom in the current political environment is ominous. Just before the exercise, Deputy Chairman of the Russian National Security Council Dmitri Medvedev said that the West was “actively pushing us to World War III.” The leaked document reportedly said that the nuclear scenario assumed that martial law had been declared in Russia and that there was a full military mobilization.

President Putin considerably increased Russian spending on civil defense in 2005. During this time period, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was the head of Russian civil defense. Russia has reportedly built some 5,000-7,000 bomb shelters in Moscow. A 2017 report of the Defense Intelligence Agency said Russia had 289,000 civil defense personnel, a large increase from the 20,000 in 1996 and 18,250 in 2008.

Since its initial attack on Ukraine in 2014, Russia has enhanced its nuclear capability and its civil defense efforts. In 2018, Rossia-24, Russian state television “…instructed viewers to stock up on food and water in case a war breaks out with the United States, playing on fears that a U.S.-led airstrike against Moscow’s ally Syria could lead to a military escalation.”

Threats of general nuclear war have been common from the Putin regime since its attack on Ukraine in February 2022. A couple of days after the civil defense exercise President Vladimir Putin declared Russian nuclear retaliation “…will be absolutely unacceptable for any potential aggressor, because seconds after we detect the launch of missiles, wherever they are coming from, from any point in the World Ocean or land, the counter strike in response will involve hundreds – hundreds of our missiles in the air, so that no enemy will have a chance to survive. And [we can respond] in several directions at once.” (This was in response to a question from Sergei Karaganov, a former Kremlin advisor who in 2023 advocated a nuclear attack against NATO, saying “…if we correctly build a strategy of intimidation and deterrence and even use of nuclear weapons, the risk of a ‘retaliatory’ nuclear or any other strike on our territory can be reduced to an absolute minimum.” If the initial attack did not get the desired result (NATO capitulation on Ukraine), he advocated hitting “… a bunch of targets in a number of countries in order to bring those who have lost their mind to reason.” Putin’s threat is included in paragraph 19 of his June 2023 nuclear doctrine and involves a nuclear attack on the West before Russia even knows that the attack against it is nuclear and with the attack involving as few as a single missile launch.

In the October 2022 Grom exercise, Russia’s Minister of Defense General of the Army Sergei Shoigu told President Putin that Russia’s nuclear exercise was “a training session” which involved “delivering a massive nuclear strike by strategic offensive forces….” Russian state television stated it was practice for an attack on the U.S. The 2019 version of the Grom exercise had the announced involvement of about half of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (about 250 missiles) which were reportedly launched. The distinguished Russian journalist Alexander Golts noted, “We’re talking about rehearsing ways to conduct all-out nuclear war. Such a war will start with the use of non-strategic forces (cruise missiles) and end with a mass nuclear strike, which will mean the death of everything living on Planet Earth,” and there was no room for “misinterpretation” about this. Hyperbole aside, Golts outlined the essence of Russian nuclear escalation strategy. He also pointed out another notable fact about Putin: “The world that Putin inhabits is far removed from reality.”

A common political objective of Russian nuclear exercises (and Russian nuclear threats) is to scare the West because of the belief among Russia’s leaders that Western fear of nuclear warfare can be exploited to allow Russia to win against Ukraine and then NATO. Russian nuclear strategy is similar to that of Sergei Karaganov but not quite as extreme.

The Australian Financial Review suggested that the purpose of the “evacuation drills” was to prepare for a “nuclear ultimatum,” quoting the editor of state-run RT to the effect that the “ultimatum” was imminent. If the Australian Financial Review is accurate in its assessment, the “ultimatum” would likely come after an expanded version of the Grom exercise. It is noteworthy that Russia began its attack on Ukraine after what amounted to an ultimatum against NATO aimed at reviving the Soviet Union.

The British Defense Ministry noted that the October 2023 Russian civil defense exercise involved a scenario of “…large-scale international armed conflict,” that civil defense in the Soviet Union and Russia goes back decades, and that it is “…unlikely that Russia had significantly changed its posture of national preparedness in recent months.” Certainly, there are reports of large scale Russian civil defense nuclear exercises in the recent past. For example, Russia’s Civil Defence Department Director Oleg Manuilov said that the 2016 exercise involved “…more than 40 million people, more than 200 thousand professionals (sic) rescue units and 50 thousand pieces of equipment.”

Reportedly, on civil defense day “…Russia traditionally hosts festive events: solemn commencement ceremonies for students of the Ministry of Emergencies of Russia, exhibitions of special fire and rescue equipment, relay races, etc.” This does not exactly seem to be a description of the October 2023 exercise which reportedly assumed an all-out nuclear war. This exercise comes after a report earlier this year in The Moscow Times that, “Bomb shelters across Russia are undergoing systematic inspections and repairs following a Kremlin order to upgrade the country’s crumbling Soviet-era infrastructure, according to current and former officials who spoke to The Moscow Times.”

What is most dangerous about Russian civil defense is that in the context of Putin’s world of political fantasy it is a potential crutch on which he might convince himself that he could fight and survive a nuclear war even if he was wrong about his belief that the West would not retaliate against his initial small nuclear strikes. It is important to remember that in 2015 the Russian military leadership was claiming that “Moscow’s layered air defense grants 99% effective defense against air attack…” due to the deployment of S-400 and SA-20 air defenses. The Putin regime has been making nuclear threats since 2007. However, the scope of Russian aggression supported by these nuclear threats vastly increased after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In 2016, the deputy head of Russian civil defense Andrei Mishchenko said, “The Moscow underground facilities will be able to protect 100% of the population of the city.” Although this is likely an exaggeration and certainly while civil defense can significantly reduce casualties, even the Russian civil defense leadership recognizes that most Russians don’t know where the shelters are located. However, they almost certainly tell Putin what he wants to hear, which is the military dominance of Russia’s armed forces.

There is nothing wrong with having strong civil defense capabilities but its implications in the light of Putin’s nuclear irresponsibility are quite ominous. The idea of nuclear war without Russian casualties due to active and passive defenses is just the sort of fantasy that the self-isolated President Putin might believe as he pursues his expansionist agenda. This is the man who believed that Russia would capture Kiev in two days. Indeed, in 2014, Putin stated, “If I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.” In 2014, he also said that “We’ll strangle all of them [NATO] ourselves!”

In Putin’s neofascist fantasy world, Russia’s scripted military exercises are reality and his nuclear threats will prevent any effective opposition. Hopefully, he has learned something from his failure in Ukraine, but it is dangerous to depend on this. He is pursuing victory in Ukraine on the basis of his willingness to accept great casualties. His self-isolation results in his constant reinforcement of failure.

In light of the current crisis, the United States should be maximizing its nuclear deterrent capability but it is not. For the first time in a major nuclear crisis situation, the Biden Administration has done nothing to enhance the U.S’ nuclear deterrence posture. Worse yet, in June 2023, the Biden Administration announced it would not numerically match Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. It said it was going to deter Russian nuclear escalation by space and cyber capabilities and by arms control. Concerning nuclear deterrence, the level of technical fantasy in the Biden White House rivals that in Putin’s Kremlin, almost in exactly the opposite direction.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: Free Wind 2014 / Shutterstock.com

Israel’s intention in ordering the evacuation of civilians from Gaza City is to create a free-fire zone where anyone who remains can be assumed to be a member of Hamas. The next phase of its coordinated air, ground and naval offensive in Gaza will be putting in ground troops to secure northern Gaza, which will allow specialist units to start searching and destroying the Hamas tunnel system.

This phase could be costly in terms of Israeli lives because Hamas fighters underground will have access to the surface to inflict casualties on Israeli troops—in much the same way as Islamic State fighters did in Mosul when they inflicted heavy casualties on advancing Iraqi soldiers.

Gaza tunnel entrances are hidden under houses, mosques and schools, while the territory’s narrow streets and alleyways are expected to be infested with booby traps and command-detonated improvised explosive devices. It will also be difficult and dangerous for the Israel Defense Forces to clear a path through collapsed buildings and areas blocked by rubble.

Use of tunnelling is not a new insurgent tactic. Australia had experience of it in South Vietnam where A Company, of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was ambushed from and uncovered the famous Cu Chi tunnel system. Insurgent forces that lack the capability to take on regular forces head to head can use tunnels to fight a survivable war of attrition that may eventually lead to war weariness and a negotiated settlement.

Once Israeli Special Forces get into the tunnel system, their aim will be to kill Hamas leaders, destroy Hamas fighters and weapons—particularly the rocket arsenal—and free any Israeli hostages held in the tunnels. However, it will be a costly process because Hamas is intimately familiar with the environment and has had time to booby-trap the tunnels and prepare defensive positions underground.

Indeed, Hamas has spent two decades building the labyrinth of deep, defensive tunnels to resist any ground assault by Israeli troops. It started building them in Gaza even before Israel withdrew its troops from Gaza in 2005. Hamas ramped up the construction after both Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on the area in 2007.

The extensive tunnel network is believed to be as much as 30 metres beneath the surface in some places and is an integral part of the Gaza defences Hamas has spent years preparing.

After the last flare-up of fighting between Israel and Hamas in 2021, the IDF claimed to have destroyed more than 60 miles of tunnels. Hamas responded, saying that only 5% was damaged and that its underground infrastructure comprised 300 miles of tunnelling.

Daphne Richemond-Barak at Reichman University in Israel, an expert on the tunnel system, said the tunnels beneath Gaza were deeper and more sophisticated than the cross-border tunnels used to access Israeli territory.

She noted: ‘The tunnels inside Gaza are different because Hamas is using them on a regular basis. They are probably more comfortable to be in for longer periods of time. They are definitely equipped for a longer, sustained presence. The leaders are hiding there, they have command-and-control centres, they use them for transport and lines of communication. They are equipped with electricity, lighting and rail tracks.’

Jonathan Conricus, an IDF spokesperson, said in a briefing last week: ‘Think of the Gaza Strip as one layer for civilians and then another layer for Hamas. We are trying to get to that second layer that Hamas has built. These aren’t bunkers for Gazan civilians. It’s only for Hamas and other terrorists so that they can continue to fire rockets at Israel, to plan operations, to launch terrorists into Israel.’

Even if the Israeli forces are able to destroy the tunnels and clear Hamas out of northern Gaza, they will then have to decide whether to occupy the territory—which could take large numbers of troops—or to withdraw.

Tom Beckett, executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the Middle East, said: ‘If the IDF attempts to mount a garrison large enough to control Gaza while continuing to protect the country from threats emanating from the West Bank, southern Lebanon and Syria, its capacity will soon be stretched thinly.’

Israel had clearly become complacent under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about its ability to contain the Hamas threat and control Israel’s Palestinian population. The latest round of violence shows once again that Israel will at some point have to engage in a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian leadership, whoever that may turn out to be.

Even if Israel decides to force more than a million Palestinian civilians out of northern Gaza on a permanent basis, it still has to contend with the more than three million disaffected Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem.

Clive Williams is a visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He was an infantry platoon commander in Vietnam in January 1966 when his platoon discovered a well-concealed entrance to what is now known as the Cu Chi tunnel complex. During that operation, several Australian soldiers were killed by Viet Cong operating from the extensive tunnel complex. They fired at the advancing diggers and were then able to reappear in ‘cleared areas’ from concealed tunnel entrances to cause more casualties.

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

In the wake of the shocking invasion of southern Israel by Hamas militants on Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to destroy Hamas.

“We are fighting a cruel enemy, worse than ISIS,” Netanyahu proclaimed four days after the invasion, comparing Hamas with the Islamic State group, which was largely defeated by U.S., Iraqi and Kurdish forces in 2017.

On that same day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant went further, stating, “We will wipe this thing called Hamas, ISIS-Gaza, off the face of the earth. It will cease to exist.” They were strong words, issued in the wake of the horrific terrorist attack that killed more than 1,300 Israelis and culminated in the kidnapping of more than 150 people, including several Americans.

And in a telling comparison, Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Gilad Erdan compared the attack with the toppling of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon in 2001, declaring, “This is Israel’s 9/11.”

As a scholar of military history, I believe the comparison is interesting and revealing. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaida on the United States, President George W. Bush made a similar expansive pledge, declaring, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

The U.S. response to 9/11 included the American invasion of Afghanistan in league with the Afghan United Front, the so-called Northern Alliance. The immediate goals were to force the Taliban from power and destroy al-Qaida. Very little thought or resources were put into what happened after those goals were attained. In his 2010 memoir, “Decision Points,” former President Bush recalled a meeting of the war cabinet in late September 2001, when he asked the assemblage, “‘So who’s going to run the country (Afghanistan)?’ There was silence.”

Wars that are based on revenge can be effective in punishing an enemy, but they can also create a power vacuum that sparks a long, deadly conflict that fails to deliver sustainable stability. That’s what happened in Afghanistan, and that is what could happen in Gaza.

A war of weak results

The U.S. invasion toppled the Taliban from power by the end of 2001, but the war did not end. An interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai took power as an Afghan council of leaders, called a loya jirga, fashioned a new constitution for the country.

Nongovernmental and international relief organizations began to deliver humanitarian aid and reconstruction support, but their efforts were uncoordinated. U.S. trainers began creating a new Afghan National Army, but lack of funding, insufficient volunteers and inadequate facilities hampered the effort.

The period between 2002 and 2006 was the best opportunity to create a resilient Afghan state with enough security forces to hold its own against a resurgent Taliban. Because of a lack of focus, inadequate resources and poor strategy, however, the United States and its allies squandered that opportunity.

As a result, the Taliban was able to reconstitute its forces and return to the fight. As the insurgency gained momentum, the United States and its NATO allies increased their troop levels, but they could not overcome the weakness of the Kabul government and the lack of adequate numbers of trained Afghan security forces.

Despite a surge of forces to Afghanistan during the first two years of the Obama administration and the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, the Taliban remained undefeated. As Western forces largely departed the country by the end of 2014, Afghan forces took the lead in security operations, but their numbers and competence proved insufficient to stem the Taliban tide.

Negotiations between the United States and the Taliban went nowhere, as Taliban leaders realized they could seize by force what they could not gain at the bargaining table. The Taliban entry into Kabul in August 2021 merely put an exclamation point on a campaign the United States had lost many years before.

A goal that’s hard to achieve

As Israel pursues its response to the Hamas attack, the Israeli government would be well advised to remember the past two decades of often indecisive warfare conducted by both the United States and Israel against insurgent and terrorist groups.

The invasion of Afghanistan ultimately failed because U.S. policymakers did not think through the end state of the campaign as they exacted revenge for the 9/11 attacks. An Israeli invasion of Gaza could well lead to an indecisive quagmire if the political goal is not considered ahead of time.

Israel has invaded Gaza twice, in 2009 and 2014, but quickly withdrew its ground forces once Israeli leaders calculated they had reestablished deterrence. This strategy – called by Israeli leaders “mowing the grass,” with periodic punitive strikes against Hamas – has proven to be a failure. The newly declared goal of destroying Hamas as a military force is far more difficult than that.

As four U.S. presidential administrations discovered in Afghanistan, creating stability in the aftermath of conflict is far more difficult than toppling a weak regime in the first place.

The only successful conflict against a terrorist group in the past two decades, against the Islamic State group between 2014 and 2017, ended with both Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq reduced to rubble and thousands of men, women and children consigned to detention camps.

Israel has the capacity to level Gaza and round up segments of the population, but that may not be wise. Doing so might serve the immediate impulse of exacting revenge on its enemies, but Israel would likely receive massive international condemnation from creating a desert in Gaza and calling it peace, and thus forgo the moral high ground it claims in the wake of the Hamas attacks.

Peter Mansoor is Professor of History, General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History, at The Ohio State University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image Credit: IDF/Creative Commons. 

After 56 years of occupation and a 16-year blockade, the Gaza Strip (Gaza) is now subjected to what Israel’s defence minister described as a “complete siege”. Water, food, energy and fuel supplies have been severed as further retaliation for Hamas’s attacks.

Gaza’s estimated 2.3 million citizens are used to struggle. And as a political ecologist researching food sovereignty in Gaza City and Khan Yunis, a city in southern Gaza, with local specialists, I’ve seen how the food system has already been stretched to breaking point.

Gaza’s single power station has now ceased to function, as the current dark night skies – save for explosions – bear witness. Without fuel or electricity, farmers will be unable to pump water to irrigate crops, or to process and safely store food.

Before the latest hostilities, 70% of Gaza’s households were already classified as “food insecure”, unable to afford their daily requirements. Two-thirds of people are refugees, reliant on UN aid. As a captive market, most of what is imported comes from Israel. Palestine is Israel’s third largest export market after the US and China.

Food and farming have long been complicated by repeated airstrikes, occupation and blockade. In good years, Gaza remains self-sufficient in fruit and vegetables, much produced intensively in polytunnels and greenhouses.

According to data I obtained from the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture, in 2021 Israeli exports to Gaza included seeds, over a million litres of pesticides and herbicides, and 4.5 million litres of fertiliser. Nitrates from fertiliser and treated wastewater applied to farmland that leach into groundwater are a major source of pollution, doing long-term damage to Gaza’s agroecosystems.

This dependency is compounded by a third of Gaza’s farmland being in no-go zones along the border, resulting in low cereal production and availability of animal protein. Most animal products came from (or through) Egypt, via the Rafah crossing, which has been a vital lifeline and was closed at the time of writing.

Small family farms and more intensive commercial farms still provide a source of livelihood for a significant proportion of Gaza’s population. Many home gardens, too, are used for food production, either for family consumption, sharing or bartering to ameliorate the stresses of blockade.

But as families now seek shelter from Israeli bombardment, the harvesting that takes place at this time of year will have come to a halt. Essential crops will spoil, and winter crops needing irrigation will perish.

Water

Israel controls all water resources across Palestine. Mekorot, Israel’s national water company, extracts water from the coastal aquifer that lies beneath bedrock along the coast of Gaza and Israel, to irrigate large-scale intensive Israeli agriculture. It then pipes and sells water into the Gaza Strip. This supply has now been cut off.

What is left comes from the aquifer, or groundwater polluted by untreated wastewater and nitrates. Over-exploitation of the aquifer, due to demands from Gaza’s population and Israel’s irrigation, has resulted in seawater intrusion and salinity levels so high that it is now considered unfit for human consumption.

Without fuel for pumps, no water extraction is possible. And the municipal desalination plant that supplied Gaza with 15% of its water has ceased to function.

Elsewhere, repairs of ageing and damaged infrastructure from previous bombardments have consistently been hampered by the blockade, affecting water pumping, desalination plants and sewage treatment.

In 2008, strikes on Gaza’s largest sewage treatment plant resulted in 100,000 cubic metres of sewage being released into homes and farmland. Further strikes in 2018 resulted in discharges of raw waste into the Mediterranean threatening the fish stocks Palestinians depend upon.

Just a few weeks ago, Gaza had eight wastewater pumping stations for sewage treatment, requiring 55,000 litres of fuel a month. An official I know at the mayor’s office tells me two of these were destroyed on the first day of Israel’s airstrikes. Without fuel to operate the ones that remain, a repeat of 2008 is already unfolding, with grave implications for ecosystem and human health.

Invasion

It is impossible to predict how disastrous a ground invasion would be. Over the past 15 years, damage to Gaza’s infrastructure is thought to amount to $5 billion (£4.1 billion) across four previous wars.

After the 22-day invasion from December 2008 to January 2009, the UN documented wide-scale damage to fields, vegetable crops, orchards, livestock, wells, hatcheries, beehives, greenhouses and irrigation systems. Over 35,750 cattle, sheep and goats and more than one million poultry were killed.

The UN mission stated that the destruction had degraded land, by “mechanical ripping and removal of trees, shrubs and crops”, and that the “passage of heavy tracked vehicles has compacted the soil”, hampering future cultivation.

With each war, Gaza’s dependence on Israeli imports of water, energy, fuel, food and agricultural inputs only increases. Meanwhile, Israel’s economy has become intricately bound to its illegal occupation of Palestine, to the tune of exports worth $4.16 billion in 2021, creating a perverse mutual dependence.

A complete siege on Gaza is arguably a contravention of international human rights law which states that Palestinians must be “supplied with the food, medicine and other basic needs to allow the population to live under adequate material conditions”.

The situation for Gazans is dire. Sheltering from military strikes, farmers unable to harvest or distribute food, added to blocks on water, food and energy, all in Gaza are acutely vulnerable to disease and malnutrition.

It is eight years since the UN predicted that Gaza would soon become “uninhabitable”. It said that years of blockade had “shattered” Gaza’s ability to provide for its people, “ravaged its already debilitated infrastructure” and “accelerated de-development”. A total siege will go a long way towards turning that prediction into a gruesome reality.

Georgina McAllister is Assistant Professor in Stabilisation Agriculture at the Centre for Agroecology, Water & Resilience, at Coventry University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Georgia’s government and citizens sought to join Western institutions. Accordingly, the government pursued aggressive anti-corruption policies to eliminate graft throughout the country.

Initially, the hard work paid off. Soon, Georgia discussed with organizations such as NATO how to join its ranks. This first occurred during the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. The organization welcomed Georgia’s membership aspirations. At the time, Georgia also ranked sixty-seventh out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. According to the organization, the index “measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given country.” Georgia’s strong ranking suggested that it had made significant progress in its reform efforts.

Fifteen years later, the Georgian government is a former version of itself. Over the past few years under Georgian Dream, the ruling political party in Georgia, the country has started to regress in its democratization efforts. The Georgian opposition and citizens are puzzled by the party’s decision. Georgian Dream has made very unpopular decisions, many of which have been criticized by the Georgian public.

For example, the ruling Georgian government attempted to introduce a bill that would force Georgian organizations to declare themselves as “foreign agent” if they received 20 percent or more of their funding from international donors. Critics argued that it would allow Georgian Dream to target opposition organizations, and after much political opposition, the bill was dropped. Meanwhile, Georgian Dream also introduced a bill allowing authorities to “increase the duration of covert surveillance.” President Salome Zourabichvili immediately spoke out against the proposal, stating that the legislation would “further restrict human rights.” Finally, Georgian Dream “unlawfully obtain[ing] and purposefully edit[ing] audio recordings from an opposition media newsroom.” These are just some examples of the questionable decisions Georgian Dream has pursued over the past two years. Their efforts are also not in line with the Georgian public.

For example, since its independence in 1991, Georgian citizens have supported integrating with the West. They have also pressured their government to become more democratic, and they want to enjoy the benefits of being part of Western institutions. This support increased following the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. According to a recent survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute, Georgian citizens overwhelmingly support potential integration with the European Union.

Despite this position, Georgian Dream continues to distance itself from Western institutions. Most precariously, the ruling Georgian party has opted to strengthen its relationship with Russia despite Russia having occupied parts of Georgia since 2008.

For example, following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, numerous countries around the world sent defense, humanitarian, medical, and financial aid to Ukraine to help it during its time of need. The international community also enforced stiff penalties on Russia to punish it for its behavior. But for whatever reason, Georgia is not one of the countries that has provided Ukraine during the war. In addition, Georgia has yet to implement sanctions on Russia for its war in Ukraine. 

To make matters worse, Georgia is pursuing policies to enhance its relationship with Russia. For example, a flight ban from Georgia to Russia was lifted earlier this year. Visa restrictions on Georgian nationals visiting Russia were also removed, making it easier for Georgian citizens to visit Russia. These developments suggest that Russia’s influence in Georgia is growing.

Meanwhile, as Georgian Dream strengthens its relationship with Russia, it is also currently distancing itself from its long-time ally Ukraine. It also damages the country’s relationship with the European Union and the United States. Last month, the ruling party falsely accused Ukraine of attempting a coup in Georgia. In the baseless accusation, Georgian Dream falsely stated that Georgian foreign legion groups in Ukraine would leave their defensive positions and they would return to Georgia to start an armed insurrection. The Ukrainian government swiftly denounced these claims, stating it does “not interfere and does not plan to interfere in the internal affairs of Georgia.”

Second, Georgian Dream attacked European officials. Earlier this year, the party withdrew its observer membership with the Party of European Socialists (PES), a progressive pan-European group. Georgian Dream alleged that PES failed to support its efforts and “failed to benefit Georgia on its path towards European integration.” PES immediately dismissed the claims.

Similarly, Georgian Dream has targeted pro-European politicians in Georgia. In a news series of baseless allegations, the party alleged that pro-European officials in Georgia were planning to “overthrow the [Georgian] state.” No evidence was provided to support these false claims. The Georgian State Security Service attempted to help Georgian Dream in these allegations, but the organization failed to provide information that supported these outlandish statements.

Finally, and most recently, Georgian Dream made baseless claims against the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It claimed that the American organization was working with the opposition movement in Georgia to start a revolution. Like its previous allegations, Georgian Dream failed to provide any evidence to support them.

Unfortunately, Georgian Dream is attempting to scare Georgian citizens into believing that Western organizations and officials are infiltrating Georgia. This fear-mongering, however, has attracted very little attention, and it has not fooled anyone. The allegations they have made are simply tactics to harass the Georgian opposition, and it is an attempt by Georgian Dream to remain in power. Despite these attempts, the Georgian opposition and everyday citizens have continued to fight back peacefully.

Now, time will tell how political matters develop in Georgia. Having gained no traction, Georgian Dream is concerned about its position in the upcoming 2024 parliamentary election. Seeing that the Georgian Dream has deviated from the people’s desire to strengthen relations with the West, it can be hypothesized that Georgian citizens will vote in favor of candidates who support anti-corruption reforms, democratization efforts, and transparency in Georgia. Voters will also support parliamentarians who want to strengthen Georgia’s relationship with the EU and other Western organizations.

Nothing is guaranteed in the 2024 parliamentarian elections, but Georgia’s democratic backsliding can certainly be altered. If Georgian citizens work hard with the Georgian opposition, and should pro-European politicians win their campaigns, then it is likely that Georgian Dream will no longer be the ruling party in the Georgian parliament. It will not be easy, and it will take a lot of hard work and effort, but the Georgian populace has the opportunity to change their country for the better. They must not squander this opportunity. Otherwise, should they fail to remove Georgian Dream’s majority, then the current democratic backsliding will continue. This will only strengthen Russia’s hand in the region.

Mark Temnycky is a freelance journalist covering Eurasian affairs and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He can be found on X @MTemnycky.

Image: Eval Miko / Shutterstock.

Few would dispute that Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega has imposed an authoritarian government on his country and that he is willing to use all resources available to retain power, come what may. This has been evident since at least 2008, when he rigged the mayoral election results in Managua to prevent his chief rival from challenging him. Since then, intimidation, legal manipulation, or outright fraud has been used to guarantee Ortega’s victories, not only in the presidential election of 2011 but also in the 2016 and 2021 votes.

Nicaragua’s internal opposition is essentially non-functional as Ortega’s Sandinistas have gained near-total control of the Congress and regional governorships. Opposition parties may be banned (just recently, YATAMA, a party representing the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic coast, has met this fate) or hindered by the Sandinista-controlled courts, allowing the government to pick who will run against it. And, of course, as a last resort, the ruling party effectively controls the ballot counting process.

Crossing the Line

But in recent years, Ortega (governing in tandem with his wife and Vice President Rosario Murillo) has moved decisively from the authoritarianism of merely controlling politics to what can only be considered as totalitarianism—extending control to nearly all of Nicaraguan public life. 

Nicaragua’s headlong rush in this direction has been highlighted by the recent seizure of its two most prestigious centers of higher learning, the Central American University and the Central American Institute of Business Administration (UCA and INCAE, respectively).

Political scientists have debated the exact meaning of totalitarianism since it was first used to describe Mussolini’s fascist conception of the state. A good recent characterization can be found in “Iron Curtain,” Anne Applebaum’s recounting of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe:

Strictly defined, a totalitarian regime is one that bans all institutions apart from those it has officially approved. A totalitarian regime thus has one political party, one educational system, one artistic creed, one centrally planned economy, one unified media and one moral code. In a totalitarian state there are no independent schools, no private businesses, no grassroots organizations, and no critical thought.

Attacks on Universities, Civil Society Organizations, and the Press

This most recent example of the totalitarian impulse, the suppression of UCA and INCAE, seems particularly egregious given that they were Nicaragua’s only centers of higher learning with significant international reputations. UCA was a Jesuit foundation with close ties to American counterparts such as Georgetown and Fordham Universities. INCAE, founded in the early 1960s in the spirit of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, aimed to provide students in the region with a U.S.-style MBA.

The seizure of UCA has its roots in the massive protests against the regime in 2018, shaking it to its foundations and galvanizing its push to acquire control of previously independent elements of society. As is typical in Latin America, the university was a hub of the protests and a place where participants sought refuge from repression.

For the regime, this was unforgivable. The university’s physical plant and bank accounts were seized and its Jesuit professors evicted from their homes on campus. UCA has been renamed Casimiro Sotelo State University after a former Sandinista student activist killed by former dictator Anastasio Somoza’s forces in 1967. However, it does not appear to function normally yet, leaving students to wonder if they will ever be able to finish their degrees.

The seizure of the INCAE business school seems more mysterious, as it did not host political dissent like UCA. However, its continued existence as an independent, professionally oriented entity with strong international links was a standing reproach to the ruling regime. However, it should be noted that its rector, Enrique Bolaños Abaunza, is the son of Ortega’s conservative predecessor as President of Nicaragua. And, of course, its handsome campus and considerable financial resources were doubtless tempting targets.

While Nicaragua’s other private universities are smaller and have had lower profiles than UCA and INCAE, twenty-seven have been closed or taken over by the state, for instance, Martin Luther King University, an institution associated with evangelical Christianity. While some still survive, their future is dim.

Ortega has taken an axe to Nicaraguan civil society—shutting down hundreds of non-governmental and private voluntary organizations under the pretext that they have not met paperwork requirements. Entities closed range from fairly obscure groups such as the Equestrian Federation of Nicaragua to prominent human rights and feminist advocacy groups. 

In some cases, the aim seems quite clear. For instance, the Nicaraguan Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUNIDES), a prestigious think tank and a key source of independent policy analysis that could challenge government claims, was closed in 2022 following a campaign of harassment of its board members. 

The apolitical Nicaraguan Red Cross has also been closed—in a country of pervasive poverty subject to recurring natural disasters. The safety net provided by the Nicaraguan state itself is gossamer-thin, but the fact that the Red Cross provided treatment to individuals injured in the 2018 protests was apparently unacceptable.

Nicaragua’s independent press has also been squeezed out of existence. The daily La Prensa and its owners, the Chamorro family, had a vital role first in the struggle against Somoza, then against Ortega and the Sandinistas after they took power by force in 1979. When it pushed back against Ortega following his return to power in 2007, it was initially tolerated, although subjected to harassment. However, in the post-2018 environment, its presence was no longer permitted. The newspaper was shut down in 2022, and its editor, Cristiana Chamorro, suffered eighteen months imprisonment before her release into exile.

La Prensa now exists only in internet form based outside of Nicaragua. The same is true of Confidencial, a newsletter published by Cristiana’s brother, the distinguished journalist Carlos Fernando Chamorro. They are thus available only to the relatively small number of Nicaraguans with consistent internet access. Certainly, Barricada, the Sandinista propaganda sheet, which consistently glorifies Ortega and Murillo, is no substitute.

In underdeveloped countries such as Nicaragua, radio is the principal means for the average citizen to hear the news—often barely rewritten from newspaper articles. The regime, however, destroyed the network of independent radio stations that existed in the capital, Managua, and elsewhere. Nicaraguans now live in an information desert.

The Suffocation of Religion and Business

Ortega has sought to prevent Roman Catholicism, the faith of the majority of Nicaraguans, from having any role in public life. This had been a consistent element of Sandinista rule during its first period in power, 1979–90. But when Ortega returned, he initially sought to co-opt the Church. 

He and his wife proclaimed themselves Catholics. They established a relationship with the aging Miguel Obando y Bravo, the former archbishop who had once been their fierce opponent. But the current hierarchy kept its distance, and as it raised its voice against increasing human rights violations, the government turned to confrontation.

Church-related entities, such as the Jesuit-affiliated UCA mentioned earlier, and Church-owned radio stations have been seized. Certain traditional religious festivals have been curtailed. The regime is averse to any large-scale activities in the streets which it does not control.

Priests have been arrested, including Rolando Alvarez, the Bishop of Matagalpa, who was given a twenty-six-year prison sentence for “treason,” a step reminiscent of those taken by governments in Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. Alvarez was offered release into exile but refused and remains imprisoned. 

The Vatican had generally sought to avoid direct confrontation in keeping with its historical preference for quiet diplomacy. Still, when Pope Francis felt compelled to make a sharply critical statement, the reaction was swift. The government expelled the papal nuncio, cutting off a direct conduit between the Nicaraguan Church and Rome.

Evangelical Christianity has faced a similar trajectory from co-optation to intimidation. Ortega initially made positive gestures, seeking allies among the many different denominations present in the country. This included restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, for which evangelicals felt a pronounced sympathy. However, their environment has become ever more complicated, and they, too, have gotten the message that the regime will not tolerate criticism. Evangelical groups who support the regime even receive some financial aid from the state.

The other main opponent the government has refused to tolerate is the organized business community. The pattern resembles relations with the Catholic Church: co-optation, then repression. The Higher Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) had been among the Sandinistas’ leading opponents during their post-revolutionary rule, and when Ortega returned to power in 2007, relations were initially tense.

However, particular business interests sought an easier relationship with the government. They promoted new leadership within COSEP, seeking an implicit deal with Ortega in which the private sector would be left alone in exchange for eschewing any broader political role. Indeed, it appeared that Ortega had abandoned Marxist policies of nationalization and state management of the economy that had characterized his first period in power.

Instead, what has taken place has been the slow absorption of many businesses by members of Ortega’s own family, often with opaque financial relationships with the Nicaraguan state, leading to a situation that more than anything resembles the pre-revolutionary Nicaragua of the Somoza era. 

As this went on, and as COSEP began once more to take a stricter line vis-a-vis the state, the regime considered any organized business community a potential threat. COSEP was shut down, as were various sectoral business chambers. Its head was imprisoned and then exiled.

“Totalitarianism-Lite”?

Nicaragua is losing its independent institutions: its private universities, its civil society organizations, its press, its business associations, and its religious establishments. That said, while one can fairly characterize Nicaragua as a totalitarian state, it is still somewhat short of the “ideal-type” totalitarianism exemplified by Maoist China or today’s North Korea. 

The Ortega government preserves the rhetoric and symbology of its initial Marxist era, together with its classic denunciations of U.S. “imperialism” and affection for Russia and China (from whom political, economic, and security support is welcomed). Revolutionary martyrs are honored. But beyond that, there is little serious ideological content to its governance.

Although the regime can muster large numbers of government employees and union members (the labor unions are Sandinista-controlled) for its rallies and to control the streets if needed, it does not seem interested and perhaps is incapable of permanently mobilizing and organizing the broad mass of the populace. It has demolished such independent organizations as existed before, but for the most part, it has not replaced them with government-controlled alternatives in the classic communist or fascist manner.

Instead, it seems content with an anomic society in which Nicaraguans are preoccupied with getting by under ever more difficult circumstances. The poor try to maintain eligibility for the minimal social benefits the state provides, and the small business and professional class keep their heads down to avoid trouble.

Ortega’s goal is to ensure that, beyond the long-neutered political opposition, no force can arise to challenge the regime’s monopoly on power, and no repetition of the 2018 protests can occur. At the same time, the role of the Ortega family in the economy continues to increase, and it appears that the long-term aim is a transition of power to the next generation. What we see in Nicaragua may be “totalitarianism-lite,” but it is still totalitarianism.

Richard M. Sanders is a Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. He is also a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua, 2007–10.

Image: Barna Tanko / Shutterstock. 

In recent times, the world has borne witness to heinous acts of violence and aggression committed by authoritarian regimes. The actions of Hamas in Israel, supported by Iran, and Russia’s activities in Ukraine serve as stark reminders that autocratic governments not only oppress their own citizens but also threaten global peace. In the face of such challenges, it is imperative that democracies across the world come together with resolute determination to safeguard freedom and promote peace.

One fundamental truth is that democracies do not typically wage war against their fellow democratic nations. In contrast, autocracies often engage in acts of aggression and expansionism, frequently supporting one another in pursuing their revisionist goals.

The alliance between Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a glaring example. Russia acquires military equipment from these autocratic states, while they, in turn, offer diplomatic support to Russia on international platforms like the United Nations. Additionally, these nations bolster Russia economically by purchasing its energy resources and supplying products essential to its military industry.

Hamas, a terrorist organization, receives financial support, military equipment, and training from Iran, making its attacks on Israel possible. These conflicts, like all wars, are devastating. What makes them particularly heinous is the deliberate and widespread targeting of innocent civilians, including children, and the appalling acts of violence against women.

Democracies must unite to defend against autocratic aggression and to preserve global freedom and peace. Unfortunately, the United Nations, while a vital forum for international diplomacy, often falls short of delivering effective responses. Authoritarian regimes often vote for their counterparts in the General Assembly and exploit the veto system to paralyze the workings of the Security Council. Therefore, democracies must supplement their UN efforts with partnerships between like-minded nations dedicated to upholding world freedom and peace.

Several democratic partnerships already exist and have proven valuable, warranting reinforcement. NATO, one of history’s most successful military alliances, remains relevant in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, there is an urgent need to address the issue of too many NATO members failing to meet the alliance’s 2 percent military spending requirement.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific. This coalition should expand its security cooperation and broaden its contributions to encompass shared research in cutting-edge technologies. It could evolve into a “pentagonal” by inviting South Korea, another regional democracy with substantial military capabilities, to join its ranks.

The G-7, which brings together the largest industrialized democracies and the European Union, plays a crucial role in coordinating responses to the increasingly dangerous actions of autocracies. In light of these challenges, the G-7 should evolve into a G-9 by including Australia and South Korea, both advanced economies and vibrant democracies.

In addition to strengthening existing partnerships, there is a pressing need to establish new ones. For example, an economic version of NATO’s Article V should be formed to counter economic coercion by autocracies. Such protocols would enable democracies to retaliate against aggressive, autocratic regimes and provide economic assistance to the affected democracies.

Another essential coalition, a Tech-12, would comprise the top techno-democracies, including the G-7 nations, Israel, South Korea, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and Finland. Rapid technological advances, particularly in fields like artificial intelligence (AI) and telecommunications, impact every aspect of our lives. Technology must be harnessed for good and not manipulated by autocracies to oppress their citizens or undermine democracies. A Tech-12 coalition can ensure that democracies, not dictatorships, establish global technology standards.

Lastly, these partnerships should adopt an inclusive approach, welcoming imperfect democracies and even non-democratic states willing to counter the malign actions of aggressive and revisionist autocracies. The goal is not to certify perfect democratic behavior but to create a united front against autocratic threats.

The recent barbaric attack supported by Iran and Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine stand as grave reminders that evil still exists in our world. Democracies must remain vigilant in defending global freedom and peace, and building partnerships is critically vital because unity amplifies strength.

Michael Fisch is the Founder and CEO of American Securities and a member of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council.

Dan Negrea is the Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center and served as an official in the State Department from 2018 to 2021.

Image: Andrea Izzoti / Shutterstock.

Vladimir Putin is expected to travel outside the borders of the former Soviet Union for the first time in 20 months to meet China’s Xi Jinping on October 17. The visit, if it happens, is likely to entrench a relationship in which Russia has become a useful tool in a broader Chinese strategy to consolidate its influence in Europe and the Americas.

The occasion of Putin’s likely trip to Beijing is the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious Chinese project to expand global trade routes with other nations and extend transport and infrastructure links.

To mark this event, China’s president, Xi Jinping, will host representatives from some 130 countries in Beijing on October 17 and 18.

Putin is likely to be the star guest. According to Russian sources in September, Putin accepted Xi’s invitation, although Beijing has refused to confirm this.

The two presidents would undoubtedly have lots to discuss. Since they announced their no-limits partnership in February 2022, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world has dramatically changed and keeps changing.

Instability has gripped the South Caucasus and the Middle East – both areas where Russia and China have interests at stake.

Yet their no-limits partnership has become a much more one-sided affair. Where Moscow and Beijing may once have coordinated their approaches, it is now likely that Russia aligns its policies to suit Chinese interests. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia and diminished its influence, at least for now, not only in the Middle East and the South Caucasus but also in central Asia. This has allowed China to become the dominant power there and cement its ties with the region.

Though now clearly a junior partner to Xi, Putin’s expected trip to Beijing still signals that Russia and China share a common agenda when it comes to ending a western-dominated international order and curtailing US and European influence in what both view as their zones of privileged interest across Eurasia.

Russia keeps emphasising alignment with China, not least because it has few other options except international pariah states such as North Korea and Iran.

Western sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s war against Ukraine have severely reduced trade along the New Eurasian Land Bridge (an overland rail link between China and Europe), once a major transport corridor for Chinese exports to European markets.

Instead, transport routes avoiding Russia have gained in importance, including the Middle Corridor linking China across central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus to the EU. This has also dented Russian hopes of closer integration between the BRI and Moscow’s post-Soviet economic integration initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

While the fact that Putin received an invitation from Xi to come to Beijing is important, it is also noteworthy that this is not a purely bilateral affair. In contrast to Xi’s visit to Moscow in March 2023, Putin’s trip will at best offer the Russian president an opportunity for talks with Xi in the margins of a summit designed to celebrate the BRI, a project closely associated with Xi personally.

Also, China has, and pursues, other options in its foreign relations. There is still a possibility of a meeting between US president Joe Biden and Xi at the Apec summit in San Francisco in November. And the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, visited China, possibly to prepare of an EU-China summit later this year.

What Xi wants to achieve

None of this implies that Xi is about to drop Putin as an ally. The key question is how Xi will balance his support for Putin with his need to stabilise relations with the US and prevent large-scale European “de-risking” – limiting technology exports to China, scrutinising investment from China, and decreasing dependency on China-only supply chains – that would further limit the access to EU markets for Chinese goods, services and capital.

Given the increasingly apparent conflict fatigue among Ukraine’s western partners and the likely benefits that Putin will reap from the current violent escalation in the Middle East, Xi is unlikely to disown Putin.

He may, however, see an opportunity to facilitate a settlement more on Russia’s terms than on Ukraine’s – a face-saving way out for Putin to claim victory that restores a modicum of stability across a region that remains crucial for the long-term success of the BRI and ultimately for China’s superpower aspirations.

If Xi were to pull this off, it would also cement China’s role in a future Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian security order.

While this would simultaneously turn Russia into a possible permanent second-order power in China’s shadow. It might also be Putin’s best hope of avoiding the humiliation of a never-ending war. That prospect, however, remains firmly on the cards, especially if China and the west maintain their current levels of support for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, which offers just enough for either side to avoid defeat.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Muhammad Aamir Sumsum / Shutterstock.com

Last weekend’s unprecedented events in Israel may constitute the largest-scale suicide terrorist attack in history. That’s why it will almost certainly lead to the death of Hamas, the organization that perpetrated it. 

Terrorist attacks are designed to project an image of strength and credibility, and Hamas’ attack certainly demonstrated some level of strength. It was a logistically and tactically complex operation, and the group clearly devoted significant resources to its planning and implementation. The as-of-yet unproven claim that Iran played a role in the attack only adds to the perception that Hamas is a formidable political power, a force to be reckoned with. 

But the reality is very different: Hamas is a declining organization that gambled everything on a single, audacious attack. The intention was to put to rest doubts about its legitimacy and ensure it maintains power in the Gaza Strip. The attack was not intended to topple the Israeli government or defeat the Israeli military. Even Hamas understands this is not possible. It was meant to strengthen support for an organization that has atrophied in many ways. 

And Hamas’ support will rise temporarily because it thrives on violence. The group replaced its competitor, Fatah, as the leading Palestinian political organization because its wave of violence against Israel appealed to Palestinians who believed Fatah had gone soft. Hamas’ abhorrent violence against noncombatants during the Second Intifada helped convince Israel to unilaterally relinquish control over the Gaza Strip in 2005. Then, in 2007, the organization waged a violent campaign against Palestinians to take complete control of Gaza. After more than fifteen years as the de facto government, Hamas is frequently viewed as corrupt and obtuse, much like the party it replaced. 

In fact, the only time Hamas sees a resurgence in popularity is when it clashes violently with Israel. In 2021, a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that Hamas’ declining popularity among Palestinians was reversed after it launched rocket attacks against Israel. This is a recurring pattern: in three major conflicts prior to 2021, fighting with Israel successfully resurrected its popularity. These waves of support always last a maximum of six months before Hamas’ ambitious promises ring hollow. 

The same is true of Hamas’ international reputation. Before the 2008 Gaza War, perceptions of Hamas had plummeted in Muslim countries around the world. Only one Muslim country surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project that year had a net favorable view of Hamas. But that changed when Israel invaded the Gaza Strip later that year. 

Violence created Hamas, and violence sustains it. That’s why the attack in Israel is a calculated gamble. A single, barbaric attack can dramatically reverse the fortunes of a declining organization. Facing a loss of legitimacy at home and abroad, Hamas planned an “all-eggs-in-one-basket” terrorist attack. Hamas’s leadership knew this decision could lead to their destruction, but they wagered it was also the last, best chance to solidify their power. 

That its leaders chose to accept such an insane level of risk tells us that the organization is weak. Weakness increases risky behavior as individuals and organizations desperately try to salvage their losses. Political scientists refer to this as “gambling for resurrection.” And let’s be honest: targeting women, children, and the elderly is a display of weakness, not strength. 

Hamas undoubtedly expended so many resources and personnel in the execution of this attack that they have little capacity to do much more. Their only hope is to spur Palestinians and others around the world into action. That’s the gamble. That’s the entire plan. So when we hear Hamas leaders like Ismail Haniyeh promising similar attacks, they are simply not credible. Al-Qaeda, after all, spent years promising attacks that would surpass 9/11, but in reality, it continued to coast on its reputation from that single attack. 

Hamas is now seeing the consequences of its risk-taking. Yes, there is already plenty of criticism of Israel, and that criticism will increase as Israel wages war in Gaza and perhaps elsewhere. Baiting Israel into committing heavy-handed acts of violence is part of Hamas’ strategy. 

But one of the few things holding Israel back from total war against Palestine in the past has been concerns about public perception. Namely, domestic and international backlash that could undermine such efforts. Israel no longer faces this constraint. Israel now has tremendous temporary support, and they know they only have a brief window to accomplish their goals. 

Israel will not be able to extinguish all the fires that have been lit. Palestinian dissent will not go away due to a single, or even a series of, military operations. In fact, it’s likely to be enflamed further. The members of Hamas that survive will channel their efforts into new terrorist organizations and political parties. But Hamas, as we know it today, will no longer exist. Hamas bet on violence to ensure its survival, but it has only hastened its destruction. 

Justin Conrad is the Gary K. Bertsch Director of the Center for International Trade and Security and Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. He is the author of Militant Competition (2021) and Gambling and War (2017). 

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock. 

In the days since the Oct. 7 surprise attack by Hamas, Israel has counted its dead and secured its borders. The country now faces a grim choice.

Will it continue trading air strikes and rocket fire with Hamas militants for a prolonged period? Or will it launch a ground invasion of Gaza that triggers more casualties among Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians while risking a two-front war?

The conflict so far already has been bloody. Israel reports 1,300 dead and 3,300 injured, with perhaps 150 more held hostage in Gaza. Israeli officials also say 1,500 Hamas militants who entered Israel have been killed.

Gaza similarly reports 6,600 injured and 1,500 dead, enough to overflow its morgues.

Israel has now secured its border against further Hamas attacks on land. But the rockets keep flying overhead.

Sustained rocketry

Israel has counted 6,000-plus incoming rockets so far. After the first day’s 2,500-rocket barrage, it’s now about 700 per day. Given their estimated stockpiles of between 14,000 and 30,000 rockets, Hamas militants could sustain such rates for many weeks.

The current rocket total has already surpassed the 4,380 reported during the Israel-Gaza conflict in 2021. Similarly, the current 700-rocket daily rate easily beats the 434 average of that 2021 conflict.

Israel’s Iron Dome rocket interceptor systems have consequently been busy. They might even have been overwhelmed on the first day.

The interceptor systems have clearly expended ample ammunition. I estimate they’ve launched roughly 2,300 interceptor missiles so far. Assuming costs of about US$100,000 dollars each, that’s US$230 million spent in six days.

The country’s interceptor stockpile is presumably running low. But Israel will likely receive more interceptor missiles via ammunition resupply flights from the United States that have already begun.

Despite most rockets reportedly being intercepted or landing in open fields, we know some did not. Based on past conflicts, I suspect at least 120 rockets have hit Israeli communities. That implies dozens of civilian deaths, as well as more injuries and much damage.

And each day the barrage continues, Israel suffers perhaps 10 more rocket hits and consumes another US$26 million of interceptors.

The rocketry hurts Israel’s economy too. Businesses lose productivity whenever employees must take shelter. And tourists won’t visit while rockets are falling near airports.

Meanwhile, Israeli warplanes have been pounding Gaza.

Airstrikes and mobilization

They’ve so far dropped 4,000 tonnes of explosives on Gaza.

But my research indicates that airstrikes didn’t slow the rocket fire during previous Gaza-Israel conflicts. Only ground assaults did that.

Warplanes also typically run out of worthwhile targets after about a week. And they’re more likely to kill hostages than to free them.

That’s partly why ceasefires took effect after eight days of fighting in 2012 and 10 days in 2021. And why Israel invaded Gaza on Day 8 of the conflict in 2009 and Day 11 in 2014.

(Oct. 14 will ominously mark Day 8 of this conflict. The clock is ticking.)

Meanwhile, Israel has mobilized 360,000 reservists, giving it half a million soldiers ready for action.

That’s expensive. The military must pay those extra people, while their normal civilian employers must go without them.

Altogether, the current fighting’s direct and indirect expenses could cost Israel at least $7 billion, or 1.5 per cent of its annual economic output. That’s assuming it doesn’t escalate.

A northern front

One place fighting could escalate is Israel’s northern border. In recent days, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic jihad militants in Lebanon and Syria have repeatedly fired at Israeli forces. Combatants on each side have been killed.

These attacks were small. But they force Israel to deploy some military units there instead of near Gaza. That includes at least one Iron Dome system.

The attacks also signal that Hezbollah could join the war if Israel invades Gaza. That group has far more soldiers than Hamas does. And its arsenal reportedly contains between 100,000 and 130,000 rockets, including some guided missiles.

So, what happens next?

Decision time

That largely depends on the Israeli government.

Its current situation is painful. The daily rocket salvos harm civilians in Israel, while the airstrikes hurt civilians in Gaza. And the Israeli economy bleeds cash every day the fighting continues.

Meanwhile, Israel’s air force has likely done all it can against Hamas. And the mobilized army is far too large for anything short of a Gaza invasion. The government surely feels pressured to “do something.”

An invasion seems imminent. Israel has told civilians in northern Gaza to flee somehow to the south as Israeli forces move in, presumably to give their soldiers clearer fields of fire.

We might still hope a ceasefire will somehow be brokered. But it appears Israel is about to launch a bloody ground campaign.

Michael J. Armstrong is an Associate Professor, Operations Research, at Brock University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Shutterstock.

The German arms industry has always been a fairly robust and advanced one. From Mauser to HK, it is often ahead of the game. This was very true during World War II when the Nazi forces made numerous advances in firearms and warfare including the first assault rifle and the first general-purpose machine gun. Along that route, we also got a firearm with a unique design and interesting legacy: the FG-42.

The FG-42 was developed as a result of the Battle of Crete. It doesn’t fall into a typical firearms category. It could be considered a battle rifle, but also an automatic rifle. It has a bullpupish design, it’s not necessarily a carbine, and it isn’t a machine gun, either. The FG-42 was a specific product made for a specific purpose that guided the design of this oddball weapon.

THE BATTLE OF CRETE LEADS TO FG-42’S DEVELOPMENT

Airborne infantry was first used during World War II. In Germany, the airborne infantry was part of the Luftwaffe. During jumps, the Nazi forces were only armed with pistols and hand grenades. Their rifles, submachine guns, crew-served machine guns, and anti-armor weapons were dropped separately from the aircraft.

A soldier armed with just a handgun isn’t capable of doing much fighting. The idea was that the airborne infantry could find their gear and get into the fight quickly.

But during the Battle of Crete, which was the first major-scale operation using airborne infantry, this idea proved to be disastrous.

The Commonwealth and Greek defenders were dug in and armed with rifles and machine guns. As the Germans scrambled to find their weapons, the defenders poured fire on them. This resulted in heavy casualties and almost allowed the defenders to win the battle.

This disastrous operation sidelined the paratroopers. Nazi high command was not interested in further deployment and considered shifting them to the regular infantry. However, this also forced the Luftwaffe to begin the development of the FG-42.

AN AIRBORNE-DRIVEN WEAPON

FG stands for Fallschirmjäger, which in German means parachute infantry and 42 commemorates the year the weapon was adopted. The rifle was to be a shoulder-fired automatic rifle that could replace bolt-action rifles, submachine guns, and light machine guns. Development was done entirely by the Luftwaffe because the German army had dismissed the entire idea as unrealistic.

The Luftwaffe developed the LC-6 specification to guide the development of the rifle, which stated that the rifle must be no longer than 39.4 inches and not much heavier than the Kar 98K rifle so paratroopers could jump with it. On top of that, the rifle must be capable of firing from the closed bolt in semi-auto but from the open bolt when toggled to full-automatic. The rifle needed to fire the 8mm Mauser round from a detachable magazine. Additionally, Luftwaffe still wanted the gun to use a bayonet and be capable of firing rifle grenades.

After several prototypes and variants, Luftwaffe got a rifle that met the requirements of the LC-6 specification and the FG-42 was born. The FG-42 used side-mounted magazines and had a number of extra features, including a folding set of bipods as well as the ability to accept optics. Germans fielded the gun with fixed four-power optics on occasion.

HOW DID THE WEAPON PERFORM?

The FG-42 gave the paratroops a unique rifle that they could jump with. Once on the ground, the weapon provided them with long-range, powerful capabilities. The weapons could be used as semi-auto rifles or in a squad support role to lay down automatic fire.

In action, the rifle featured a muzzle brake and a buffered stock which reduced recoil significantly. This made the gun easy to control when fired fully automatic at the enemy. Later models, known as Type G guns, featured a gas regulator which allowed for reliable feeding with a multitude of ammo types and qualities.

Although this was not a mass-produced weapon, paratroops deployed with it throughout the war, and was also used by the German troops that rescued Mussolini.

The rifle was used in Italy, France, Bosnia, and in defense of Berlin as the Nazi government was collapsing under Allied forces. The rifle seemingly performed well for its purpose. Admittedly several design changes were made to accommodate material shortages as they arose, but the rifle soldiered on until we kicked Hitler and the rest of his Nazi buddies in the ass.

LEGACY OF THE FG-42

The FG-42 saw no additional development after WWII as no one wanted to continue with such an odd rifle. However, some of the parts and pieces of the rifle went on to influence other guns. The U.S. used some of the weapon’s engineering in the M60 machine gun and Switzerland took some inspiration from the FG-42 to develop the Sturmgewehr 52 rifle. But the FG-42 remains somewhat lost to time.

Travis Pike is a former Marine Machine gunner who served with 2nd Bn 2nd Marines for 5 years. He deployed in 2009 to Afghanistan and again in 2011 with the 22nd MEU(SOC) during a record-setting 11 months at sea. He’s trained with the Romanian Army, the Spanish Marines, the Emirate Marines, and the Afghan National Army. He serves as an NRA certified pistol instructor and teaches concealed carry classes.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Shutterstock.

President John F. Kennedy famously quipped, “Too often we enjoy the comfort of opinion, without the discomfort of thought.” The same idea describes the current thinking about the end of Russia’s war in Ukraine. This is because the very question is premised on a comforting assumption that there will be an end to a long and costly war and that peace in Ukraine and Europe will naturally follow the war’s termination.  

This view reflects a narrow perspective on war as a time-bound, discrete event with a clear beginning and an end. Although highly popular, this perspective is both limited and misleading. 

Regardless of Ukraine’s ability to regain every inch of its territory, Russia may never surrender. Furthermore, Moscow is likely to retain the will and capacity to threaten Kyiv, not least because this war has been fueled by Russia’s imperial ideology that denies Ukraine its history, national identity, and statehood. Neither a negotiated cease-fire nor a peace deal will erase the carnage of indiscriminate aerial attacks and atrocities of the Russian army in the collective memory of the Ukrainian people. These traumatic experiences, in turn, will shape the perception of Russia as an eternal enemy of Kyiv.  

More importantly, wartime violence never ends with the cessation of wartime hostilities. The so-called “negative peace” that ends armed conflict rarely translates into the “positive peace” characterized by security for all people. Ukraine and the rest of the world will continue grappling with violence on multiple fronts. First, societal violence tends to increase after the end of a war when traumatized combatants return from the frontlines to their homes. Second, the deadly artifacts of war continue maiming and killing people (Ukraine today is the most heavily mined state of the world, with large swaths of its territory peppered with artillery shells and ammunition). Third, the concentration and free circulation of arms in war leads to the proliferation of weapons that often end up in the hands of violent non-state actors within and beyond the combatant nations. Fourth, the war has created more deadly weapons that will appear in future arms sales and violent conflict. 

While the view that wars don’t end but transform into other forms of violence is discomforting, it is more realistic. It points out the broader ramifications of wars and calibrates our expectations. Importantly, it prevents us from getting complacent that Kyiv’s decisive victory on the battlefield will remove all threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty, democracy, and independence.

Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva is a Professor of Strategy at the National War College, National Defense University.

Image: Oleksii Synelnykov / Shutterstock.
 

The killing of Israeli civilians by Hamas and retaliatory airstrikes on the densely populated Gaza Strip by Israel raises numerous issues under international law.

Indeed, President Joe Biden made express reference to the “laws of war” in comments he made at the White House on Oct. 10, 2023, noting that while democracies like the U.S. and Israel uphold such standards, “terrorists” such as Hamas “purposefully target civilians.” Speaking the same day, the European Union’s top diplomat Josep Borrell condemned Hamas’ attack but also suggested that Israel was not acting in accordance with international law by cutting water, electricity, and food to civilians in Gaza.

But international law and the very nature of the conflict itself – along with the status of the two sides involved – is a complex area. The Conversation turned to Robert Goldman, an expert on the laws of war at American University Washington College of Law, for guidance on some of the issues.

What are the ‘laws of war’?

The laws of war, also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), consist of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, their two Additional Protocols of 1977, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as certain weapons conventions.

Simply put, these instruments seek to spare civilians and others who are no longer active combatants from the effects of hostilities by placing restrictions and prohibitions on the conduct of warfare.

It is important to understand that modern IHL is not concerned with the reasons for, or the legality of, going to war. Rather, that is governed by the United Nations Charter and a member state’s own practice.

It is also important to note that violations of the laws of war are notoriously hard to prosecute and can be frustrated by lack of cooperation by the parties involved.

What is the nature of the conflict between Israel and Hamas?

The answer to this question is by no means clear.

Many humanitarian law experts would argue that Hamas and Israel are engaged in what is known as a “non-international armed conflict.” In other words, it would be classified the same way as a civil war that pits the armed forces of a state against an armed non-state actor, rather than an international conflict between two or more sovereign states.

If that were the case, the conflict would not be governed by the entirety of the laws of war, but instead by the more limited Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions along with numerous customary law rules, which derive from general practices accepted as law. Common Article 3, which applies to civilians and those no longer fighting, prohibits practices such as torture, summary execution and denial of a fair trial. But Prisoner of War status only applies to conflicts between states so would not apply.

But some international observers, including the United Nations, view Israel as, in effect, occupying Gaza – a view predicated on the fact that Israel controls Gaza’s borders and airspace and it supplies most of its electricity.

If that is the case, then the recent outbreak of hostilities between Hamas and Israel would trigger the entirety of laws of war.

That said, I do not believe that Israel is an occupying power in Gaza under a strict reading of the law. This is because Israel ceased governing and pulled its forces out of Gaza in 2005. Since 2007, Hamas, after expelling the Palestinian Authority, has in effect governed Gaza.

Is the bombing of Gaza illegal under international law?

Today the rules governing the conduct of hostilities in both international and non-international armed conflicts are essentially the same.

The foremost requirement in all conflicts is that combatants must always distinguish between civilians and combatants, and that attacks can only be directed at combatants and other military targets.

Protecting civilian populations caught in warfare essentially depends upon three factors:

1. Civilians must abstain from fighting;

2. The party in control of the civilian population must not place them at heightened risk of harm by using them as human shields; and

3. The attacking force must take precautions to avoid or minimize excessive civilian casualties when attacking lawful targets.

Not only are civilians in Gaza not lawful targets, they are also protected under IHL by the rule of proportionality. This rule prohibits an attack against a military target which foreseeably could cause civilian casualties that are excessive, or disproportionate in relation to the advantage anticipated from the target’s destruction.

In the case of Gaza, this rule requires that before launching an attack, the Israeli military analyze and determine the likely effect on civilians. If it appears that such an attack will cause disproportionate civilian casualties, then it must be suspended or canceled.

Given Gaza’s urban density, it will be extremely difficult for the Israelis to avoid substantial civilian casualties even when using precision weapons.

And this task will be nearly impossible if Hamas, as it has consistently done in the past, uses civilians and now hostages to shield military targets.

While Israel bears primary responsibility to avoid excessive civilian deaths in its bombardment of Gaza, Hamas’ ability to claim the bombardment constitutes a war crime would be weakened if it deliberately places its own people in harm’s way.

And while Israel is complying with its duty to give an advanced warning of an attack in north Gaza, the problem remains: Where do 1 million people go to seek safety when borders are closed and military targets are being hit throughout Gaza?

Is Israel’s siege of Gaza illegal?

Unlike in the past, total siege warfare now is unlawful regardless of whether the warring parties are involved in international or non-international hostilities.

Blocking the entry of all food, water, medicines and cutting off electricity – as appears to be happening in Gaza – will disproportionately affect civilians, foreseeably leading to their starvation. This is a banned method of warfare under customary and conventional IHL.

No matter how horrific the actions of Hamas, IHL does not permit an aggrieved party to respond in kind. Violation of the law by one party cannot, in principle, justify or sanction actions by the other that violate established prohibitions in international humanitarian law.

What are the status and obligations of Hamas under IHL?

IHL rules apply equally to all the warring parties irrespective of the nature of the conflict. This means that Israeli and Hamas combatants have the same rights and duties.

If, however, the conflict is non-international, then Hamas will be regarded as an armed non-state actor and its combatants ineligible for Prisoner of War status upon capture. Accordingly, Israel can try them for all their hostile acts whether or not Hamas complies with the laws of war.

But even if the conflict is an international one, then Hamas’s fighters would still be debarred from Prisoner of War status. They are not the armed forces of Palestine – which is recognized as a state by 138 nations and has the Palestine Authority as its government.

Rather, Hamas combatants are an irregular armed group. To be eligible for Prisoner of War status under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, members of an irregular armed group must adhere to very strict standards, both collectively and individually. These includes distinguishing themselves from civilians and complying with the laws of war. Manifestly Hamas has not and does not meet these standards. As such, Israel could lawfully deny them Prisoner of War status upon capture.

Israel, the U.S., and others label Hamas fighters as terrorists. Hamas’ recent acts – indiscriminately firing thousands of rockets into Israel, targeting, killing and taking civilians as hostages – are acts of terrorism in warfare and qualify as war crimes.

Robert Goldman is a Professor of Law at American University.

This article was first published by The Conversation.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

There is a great streak of ingenuity that runs through the American people. The phrase improvise, adapt, and overcome is intertwined into our military culture for a reason. Our troops are pros at improvisation and they improvise on a regular basis even when it comes to their weapons.

Weapon improvisation has a role in a number of circumstances. Sometimes the weapons issued by a military force are not the best option for the task at hand and other times, the best option might not be. This is where you improvise and have to make do with what you have, and if you do it right, you’ll always overcome the situation.  

Today we are going to look at five examples of how our fighting men improvised, adapted, and overcame when it came to their weaponry. 

THE MARINES’ STINGER 

The Pacific Campaign in WWII involved brutal jungle warfare. Jungle ambushes are tough to fight through as hidden attackers wait to fight to the death. The best way to defeat an ambush is with sudden, overwhelming firepower– for an infantryman, this means using a machine gun.

The machine gun of the era, the Browning M1911, specifically the M1919A6, was a passable weapon but it suffered from having an old and boxy design and the infantry variant weighed 35 pounds. A few enterprising Marines quickly discovered that the aircraft variant of the M1919, the .30 AN/M2, weighed 21 pounds, plus, its firing rate was a blistering 1,500 rounds per minute. So, they picked through aircraft graveyards and began building an infantry version of the .30 AN/M2. 

This improvisation led to the Stinger which featured a Garand stock, BAR sights, a redesigned solenoid trigger, and a bipod. These enterprising Marines made six of the guns and used them heavily in Iwo Jima. Marine Corporal Tony Stein earned the Medal of Honor wielding a Stinger in the initial assault on Iwo Jima where he demolished Japanese pill boxes and killed 20 Japanese soldiers. 

A RADICAL M1911 FOR PILOTS

Pilots in World War II were lucky if they were armed with an M1911 and a Savage-Stevens survival rifle, but that wasn’t a lot of firepower if they found themselves shot down in enemy territory.

Army Air Corps, and later Air Force officer and pilot, David Schilling, was known to be a tinkerer. While stationed in Europe and becoming a fighter Ace, he found time to enhance his service pistol. 

Schilling took a standard 45 ACP M1911 and began working on it. He extended the magazine to 20 rounds, added a forward grip to the gun, and converted it to full auto. His little micro-machine gun could cycle insanely fast and throw a ton of .45 ACP. This was surely enough to suppress a capture party long enough for the pilot to escape.

Although Schilling may not have explicitly enhanced his pistol for that purpose, since he was at heart a tinkerer, his design is fascinating.

A CHOPPED RPD TO FIGHT AGAINST VIETNAMESE AMBUSHES

During the Vietnam War, the elite MACVSOG were given a lot of leeway. They often fielded the best and most modern guns America had to offer, but those weren’t always the best for their unique job. For example, the era’s squad support weapon was the M60, which was somewhat large, heavy, and had massive recoil. The men of MACVSOG needed belt-fed firepower, but they needed something more compact than the M60. 

By hook or crook, MACVSOG acquired some of the enemy’s RPD light machine guns. These were 7.62x39mm, belt-fed, light machine guns. They were lighter and smaller than the M60, but still not small enough, so the MACVSOG men chopped their barrels off. Since these were not U.S. weapons, there wasn’t an issue with command getting mad.

These chopped RPDs were light and handy for jungle warfare but were no longer squad-support weapons for fire and movement. Instead, they had become better suited to counter ambushes. They became point-and-fire guns that allowed the troopers to send a wall of lead into a close ambush. These RPDs lacked sight, but likely produced a massive fireball when fired and sounded similar to North Vietnamese RPDs making it tough for the VC to pinpoint the location of the MACVSOG men.

THE M2 ‘SNIPER’ RIFLE

Carlos Hathcock is likely the most famous sniper to have ever lived. This Marine legend fought in Vietnam, where he became known as White Feather. He was a prolific sniper with an impressive kill count. Hathcock hunted down enemy high-value targets, often alone or occasionally with a spotter. From 1967 until 2002, he held the record for the longest-confirmed kill with his improvisation of a sniper rifle. 

Gunny Hathcock took an M2 machine gun – which fired the .50 BMG round – and mounted an 8X Unertl scope to it and used a tripod stabilized by sandbags. The M2 naturally fits a tripod forming a stable platform and the sandbags made it all the more stable. This crew-served setup also fired in semi-auto and threw a very potent and capable round. 

Hathcock used this gun to shoot an enemy traveling with weapons along a jungle road. The shot was fired from 2,500 yards away and still stands as the fifth farthest kill achieved by a sniper – and it wasn’t even done with a sniper rifle. 

THE MARINES’ MOLOTOV COCKTAIL 

When Operation Phantom Fury kicked off, the Marines were faced with the daunting task of clearing the entire city of Fallujah from enemy fighters. It was a tactical nightmare. Insurgents rooted themselves in the city and traded blow after blow with the Marines. When you’re attacking, you have to often face dug-in opponents, and in that case, many jihadists were willing to be martyrs. 

Marines quickly found out that the best way to flush a dug-in fighter out wasn’t with grenades or rifle fire but by fire. So they turned to an old weapon and began producing their own Molotov cocktails to clear dug-in opponents.

Marines listed their production methods in the After Action Report for the Battle of Fallujah. The best recipe is a mixture of two parts gasoline and one part liquid laundry detergent. This old-school weapon was powerful and capable as it always has been. 

Travis Pike is a former Marine Machine gunner who served with 2nd Bn 2nd Marines for 5 years. He deployed in 2009 to Afghanistan and again in 2011 with the 22nd MEU(SOC) during a record-setting 11 months at sea. He’s trained with the Romanian Army, the Spanish Marines, the Emirate Marines, and the Afghan National Army. He serves as an NRA certified pistol instructor and teaches concealed carry classes.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Creative Commons.

When the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, now British Petroleum, discovered Iranian oil in 1908, a century of petroleum energy primacy followed. The same is rapidly becoming true for minerals like lithium, copper, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements (critical minerals) necessary for technologies that produce, transmit, and store electricity. These elements can be found all over the world, but China controls nearly all critical mineral supply chains. Today, the United States needs critical mineral access more than it depends on foreign oil. The greatest opportunity remaining for U.S. critical mineral independence hinges on South American lithium.

Like internal combustion engines and oil, Electric Vehicle (EV) lithium-ion batteries are “driving demand for batteries and related critical minerals,” according to the International Energy Agency. The market cap for critical minerals grew from $160 billion in 2018 to $320 billion in 2022, primarily due to an increase in EV sales that rose from 2 million to over 10 million during the same period. Road transportation has long been the backbone of oil demand globally, and now, the same relationship is unfolding for critical minerals. And like oil shocks, even if felt by manufacturers before consumers, Americans will be more vulnerable to critical mineral price spikes as our vehicles and grids modernize.

The countries the United States needs to prioritize to head off exponentially growing lithium battery demand depend on the battery composition the United States ultimately bets on. Lithium leads the battery race because it is the metal with the greatest energy-to-weight ratio. Within these batteries, there is competition between Nickel-Manganese-Cobalt (NMC) and Lithium-Iron-Phosphate (LFP) cathodes. Both use lithium to store and release electricity. LFP just uses more common materials—and more lithium—to complete the circuit through your device. Moreover, NMC provides higher energy storage for the greater driving range in cars, but LFP is cheaper, safer, and quickly closing the energy storage gap with NMC.

While both NMC and LFP are commercially viable options, they are not equal in terms of U.S. national security. NMC batteries depend on China’s near-monopoly over Congolese cobalt and trade sway over Indonesian nickel, the two largest global reserves and productions of their respective minerals. And China has a history of using critical mineral exports as leverage. Because LFP batteries could sooner achieve independence from China, the United States understands their strategic value, hence the planned public-private installation of the first LFP cathode facility in the United States and a national goal to eliminate cobalt and nickel in batteries by 2030. Engineering toward LFP would still require the United States to invest in the lithium processing and battery manufacturing that China presently dominates, which can be addressed with enough time and investment through domestic and multilateral industrial policies—easier said than done. However, sourcing enough lithium to meet domestic demand calls for the tried-and-true bilateral approach.

Just as it was in the United States’ interest to secure a better relationship with Saudi Arabia in 1945 to ensure a constant flow of oil, it is now in the United States’ interest to establish the stable relationships necessary to underpin lithium imports upon which U.S. national and economic security rely. Securing the majority of domestic battery demand will require the United States to leverage the 54 percent percent of proven world reserves of lithium underneath the “lithium triangle” between Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia and the 24 percent of global reserves in Australia. Mexico is also weighing in by seeking a lithium association with Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—evoking comparisons to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In exchange, Latin America wants trade agreements and financing to industrialize and recover from a legacy of “foreign harassment,” as Bolivian President Luis Arce puts it.

Lithium discoveries in Maine in July and Nevada in September do not mean U.S. lithium independence anytime soon. Domestic oil was not enough to sate American demand during the twentieth century, and domestic lithium will not be enough for the short to medium term. Meeting projected U.S. demand for EVS will require 300 percent more lithium carbonate equivalent by 2050 than the entire world annually produces today—765,570 tons in 2022—compounded by global lithium trends that project roughly 3-4 million tons of demand by 2030, while only slated to produce 2.7 million tons the same year.

This is why securing a stable and sufficient lithium supply for Americans rests on the United States reconciling a legacy of resource exploitation and political intervention in Latin America; this history has colored lithium nationalization strategies in Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia, and Chinese contracts are taking advantage of lagging U.S. investment and public relations in the region. This year, China is helping Chile build a processing plant in exchange for discounted lithium and a $290 million lithium cathode factory. In July, China invested $620 million to create an electric vehicle plant in Brazil on a facility Ford recently abandoned. Since 2018, China has accounted for 88 percent of all money spent on lithium merger and acquisition deals over $100 million in Latin America. The United States must convince critical mineral nations in the region that history will not repeat itself by offering more favorable terms.

Striking competitive critical mineral partnerships will also take more than money, which is China’s main advantage. Thanks to a different suite of incentives controlled by an autocratic regime, the Chinese Communist Party is willing to invest for reasons other than profit and without concern for regulatory, environmental, or political risk. For the United States and its allies to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative, it will have to up the ante through technology sharing, resources to streamline and better standards for environmental licensing, and joint oversight to protect labor and transparency.

First, technology sharing helps critical mineral states enjoy the technology their labor makes possible. Second, well-equipped licensing bodies can both raise the bar for environmental stewardship and shorten the lengthy approval process of environmental regulations bottlenecking mineral supply. Third, joint oversight protects workers and gets ahead of informal economy bribes that steepen private investment costs. On the surface, transnational oversight may not appeal to some corrupt government officials in Latin America, except following the recent regional groundswell of discontent driven by corruption, flipping more than a couple of heads of state, a favorable domestic optic of transparency tied to billions in foreign investment can. The United States’ best chance for a competitive edge in the Latin American lithium trade, counterintuitively, is underwriting joint legal frameworks, given that technology partnerships, humane standards, and private investment all rely on the rule of law.

Future technology and decarbonization expect critical minerals to become the most demanded global commodity—after fossil fuels reach their tragic or managed conclusion. In the meantime, the geopolitics of resource security will continue to play out between incumbent petroleum on the one hand and rising critical minerals on the other. At least for batteries, it is in the United States’ self-interest to build a deeper, not necessarily broader, critical mineral coalition to support its economic and national security, like it once did with the Arab Gulf.

Alex Elnagdy is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Image: Shutterstock.

As any army officer will tell you, it’s very hard to achieve a destroy mission. Yet that is what, publicly at least, Israeli leaders have tasked the Israel Defense Forces to do. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to ‘crush and destroy Hamas’, adding that ‘every Hamas member is a dead man’; Defence Minister Yoav Gallant promised to ‘wipe [them] off the face of the earth’ and said that they would ‘cease to exist’.

The IDF has been slightly more circumspect, saying variously that its mission is to ‘degrade and destroy Hamas’s capability to attack Israel’ or to ‘dismantle Hamas and its military capability’ and that it is targeting Hamas’s operational and government capabilities, including the group’s leadership.

There’s obviously a political imperative that drives members of Netanyahu’s government to use the words they use, given that it is a government on whose watch 1,200 Israelis were killed in the attack launched from Gaza on 7 October. And the ground phase of the Israeli response will be significant and consequential—as one spokesperson said, this is war, not another military operation. The Israeli air campaign has already been going for days and the ground campaign is not far off. Gallant has said that it will take weeks or months to achieve the military aim to eliminate Hamas.

So, what will mission success look like for Israel? Hostage recovery is obviously an immediate priority, and there’s no doubt that Hamas will pay an enormous price for it reckless and bloodthirsty attack that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, mostly Israelis but also many foreign nationals whose governments also hold Hamas accountable for their deaths. Israel has already indicated that this won’t be another mow-the-grass-style operation where ground forces’ incursions into Gaza are limited in duration and scope since the punitive effect is considered to have been sufficient to re-establish the rules of the game.

But the attack from Gaza did away with any concept of conflict norms, and because of that the region is entering uncharted territory. The number of civilians killed in Gaza has likely matched those killed in Israel already, and those numbers will only rise despite Israel’s direction that residents evacuate to the south of Wadi Gaza. Israeli ground and air forces will exact a frightening toll on Hamas during the course of the operation, setting back its operational capability by years. There’s no doubt that Hamas will be degraded to a larger extent than it has ever been before. But it is unlikely to be destroyed.

The big question, though, is what happens after the Israeli ground forces have prosecuted all the targets, cleared all the ground they have been required to clear and are left in the semi-deserted wasteland that is Gaza. If they seek to destroy Hamas, including its ability to govern, who will administer Gaza? To withdraw precipitously will simply allow Hamas, or those with similar views, to re-establish themselves, while the idea that the Palestinian Authority would be willing (or capable) of governing Gaza after an absence of 20 years is similarly fraught. And the idea that Israel would seek to re-occupy Gaza is untenable politically on many levels.

It’s likely that the Israeli government has yet to decide what happens after the bloodletting has been exhausted. For now, it’s time for war.

But if there’s one lesson that should have been learned from the US experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; the Gulf states in Yemen; and Israel’s own two-decade-long occupation of south Lebanon, it’s that it is always easier to forcibly enter a country than it is to leave it. While the desire for revenge is the dominant driver of the Israeli government at the moment, its desire to destroy Hamas may not be practically achievable. More importantly though, Israel’s leaders needs to start turning their minds now to what happens after that desire for revenge has been sated.

Rodger Shanahan is a former Australian Army officer and Middle East analyst

This article was first published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock.com

Atlanta-based aviation firm Hermeus is actively developing a reusable hypersonic aircraft for both military and commercial applications, and this week it released a never-before-seen image of its technology demonstrator as it progresses toward ground testing in the months ahead.

Hermeus’ technology demonstrator, Quarterhorse, eventually aims to achieve speeds in excess of Mach 4 and potentially even higher thanks to the company’s unique propulsion system design. But before this high-speed platform can fly, it has to learn to walk… or more appropriately, taxi. And that’s precisely what the company’s recently unveiled Quarterhorse Mk 0 prototype aims to do.

Once complete, this non-flying aircraft will provide Hermeus with the opportunity to begin testing onboard systems like its remote flight controls, while production on the Quarterhorse Mk 1 – the company’s first flying prototype – is underway.

Quarterhorse measures about 40 feet in length and is powered by a turbine-based combined cycle (TBCC) engine of Hermeus’ own design dubbed Chimera. As its name reflects, this air-breathing jet engine could really be thought of as two engines in one: the first a turbojet and the second a ramjet. Turbojets are adept at powering aircraft from a complete stop and up to around Mach 3. Ramjets take over at high speeds; Chimera’s ramjet is designed to accelerate Quarterhorse past Mach 4 and potentially even beyond Mach 5 at altitudes as high as 95,000 feet.

Hermeus successfully demonstrated Chimera’s ability to transition from turbojet to ramjet power in a high-speed wind tunnel last November.

Achieving these speeds would make Hermeus’ Quarterhorse the fastest reusable jet of all time, eclipsing the legendary SR-71 Blackbird that has maintained the title for nearly 60 years, despite being retired for 24 of them. (There have been faster air-breathing jets like NASA’s scramjet-powered X-43 Waverider, but these platforms lacked the ability to land, and as such, were single-use.)

Hermeus doesn’t expect to steal the Blackbird’s title right away, however. Once ground testing is complete on Quarterhorse Mk 0, the next iteration – Mk 1 – will be tasked with taking flight to more thoroughly test its onboard avionics, flight controls, hydraulics, and other systems at likely subsonic speeds. Hermeus will then leverage lessons learned from the first two vehicles to begin construction on Quarterhorse Mk 2, which will stretch its afterburning legs beyond the sound barrier to begin a supersonic flight testing regime up to speeds below Mach 3.

Finally, with test data gathered from taxi, subsonic, and supersonic flight testing, construction will begin on the Quarterhorse Mk 3 – which Hermeus says will be able to fly faster than the SR-71, which had a publicly disclosed top speed of Mach 3.2. Hermeus isn’t aiming to just squeak by that record, however, and intends to push the Quarterhorse Mk 3 beyond Mach 4.

Using Hermeus’ Chimera TBCC propulsion system, it’s possible that Quarterhorse could eventually see speeds in excess of Mach 5 – which is commonly considered the hypersonic barrier. (Technically speaking, the hypersonic barrier is defined as the speed at which the chemical makeup of the air you fly through is affected by that interaction, but this tends to start happening at around Mach 5).

That would make this plucky start-up not only the owner of the world’s fastest reusable jet, but also Hermeus the world’s first company to field a reusable hypersonic aircraft.

With Quarterhorse under its belt, Hermeus then intends to move to its military-specific platform, Darkhorse, which will be powered by an even larger and more powerful TBCC engine using a Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan as its foundation. The F100, which powers high-performance fighters like the F-15 Eagle, will provide more than four times the thrust of Chimera’s current J85, allowing for much larger payloads and even greater speeds.

Sandboxx News had the opportunity to tour Hermeus’ Atlanta facility this past June while the Quarterhorse Mk 0 was already under construction and immediately after the company had taken delivery on its first F100 turbofan.

HYPERSONIC MISSILES VS. HYPERSONIC AIRCRAFT

In recent years, hypersonic missiles have garnered a great deal of attention thanks to their ability to flummox even the most advanced air defense systems through a combination of speed and maneuverability, but the incredible cost of these weapons has left many questioning whether they offer any real practical combat value. According to one recent Pentagon estimate, hypersonic missiles may cost as much as $106 million each, or about $27 million more than a brand-new F-35A.

America’s geopolitical opponents, Russia and China, both claim to have unpowered hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) in service, but their nuclear-capable deterrent role means neither country will need to demonstrate that these weapons work any time soon. (Russia’s Kinzhal, however, is nothing more than an air-launched ballistic missile that really puts the hype in hypersonic). The United States, on the other hand, has committed to fielding strictly conventionally armed (non-nuclear) hypersonic missiles with the goal of getting these weapons into the fight immediately upon entering service.

For a country like China, with its sights set on engaging America’s multi-billion-dollar supercarriers, a $100 million missile isn’t an unreasonable price point. But for the United States, which aims to use these weapons for conventional engagements the world over, there are very few targets that might warrant such a pricey munition.

Related: Hypersonic firm Hermeus proves their Mach 5+ jet engine works

A hypersonic platform like Hermeus’ Darkhorse, however, could defeat air defenses in the same way a hypersonic missile could. Modern air defense systems use advanced sensors to track and extrapolate a weapon’s trajectory, before launching an interceptor (another missile) at a point farther along that projected flight path – like a quarterback leading a wide receiver. By adjusting course even slightly, a hypersonic weapon or aircraft renders those calculations moot, forcing the system to start the process over again and potentially missing the opportunity to intercept at all.

But while the Pentagon assesses that its single-use hypersonic missiles in development may cost more than $100 million a piece, Hermeus projects that it can field its own reusable hypersonic aircraft for around that same price point. In other words, Hermeus could potentially take hypersonic flight out of the realm of high-dollar deterrent weapons with very few practical uses… and place it squarely in the realm of standard day-to-day operations.

Hermeus is not alone in this endeavor, however, with at least one other publicly disclosed program to field a hypersonic drone (of sorts) underway within the secretive confines of the Air Force Research Laboratory. The Air Force’s effort, currently known only as Mayhem, is aiming for higher speeds and will likely come with higher prices to match. Rather than combining a turbofan with a ramjet as Hermeus has, the Air Force intends to use a higher-speed scramjet instead.

From a practical standpoint, a combined cycle turbofan/ramjet and turbofan/scramjet work in very much the same way, but ramjets slow the inflowing air down to more manageable subsonic speeds before mixing it with fuel and igniting it for propulsion, whereas scramjet allows air to flow through them at supersonic speeds. As a result, ramjets likely can’t exceed Mach 6, whereas scramjets could potentially continue accelerating up to Mach 10 and even beyond.

However, all that added speed comes with a great deal of added complexity and cost. Scientists have likened ignition in the supersonic flow of a scramjet to trying to light a match in a hurricane. Despite a number of successful scramjet technology demonstrators over the years, no nation or company has so far managed to field a scramjet in an operational aircraft or weapon.

Ramjets, on the other hand, are based on older and more proven technology, and as a result, create fewer technical hurdles to overcome, which may just give Hermeus the leg-up it needs to be the first company to cruise past Mach 5, right into the record books, and all the way to the bank.

But before it can do any of that, Quarterhorse Mk 0 will need to prove it can manage the comparatively minor rigors of taxi tests right here on the ground.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image: Shutterstock.

Several months ago, I was introduced online to a former Russian diplomat with whom I was able to conduct a conversation on Zoom. Our topic was supposed to be Middle East politics, but not surprisingly, we went right to the war in Ukraine. I had been connected to the diplomat by a mutual acquaintance who holds liberal views on international affairs, and I expected the same from my new interlocutor. It did not take long for me to discover how those expectations were misplaced.

In order to start out non-aggressively, looking for common ground, I began by asking what he would think of an “Austrian solution,” hearkening back to the 1955 treaty which ended the post-World War II occupation of Austria, guaranteed its national independence, and established the principle of permanent neutrality. Wouldn’t that work for Ukraine?

His reply was unambiguous: absolutely not. The Russian goal, he insisted, was to conquer all of Ukraine and put Zelensky and his collaborators on trial.

There is a  lesson to draw from that encounter. While we in the West–in our think tanks, universities, and editorials–can be quite creative in designing compromises that would generously bargain away Ukraine’s territory, Russia–Ukraine’s adversary and ours–has shown no such inclination. We post-enlightenment liberals (one way or another) are inclined to look for exit strategies while the enemy plays to win.

This is the fundamental asymmetry of the moment. Unless the democracies overcome this aversion against the prospect of victory, the outcome will not be auspicious, and not only for Kyiv.

Not that long ago, one could envision a plausible end to the fighting in Ukraine with a return to the borders of February 24, 2022, a freezing of the conflict rather than a peace treaty, and continued ambiguity concerning Crimea. This would be far less than the legitimate goal of Ukraine to restore control over all its territory.

Still, there are limits to what Ukrainian forces can achieve without an acceleration of Western support. There has been too much foot-dragging in the delivery of weapons systems, especially in Washington and Berlin.

But that was then, and now, after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, geopolitics have shifted tectonically. Ukraine is no longer an isolated conflict. Ukraine and Israel alike face enemies sworn to their respective destruction, and both are supported by Iran. Both engage in systematic war crimes that are gruesomely identical. At stake ultimately is the collaboration of Russia and Iran, along with China and North Korea, to degrade American presence everywhere.

The U.S. is in a global conflict. Part of this conflict is the Ukraine War, which will only end when we finally decide to win it, which means recognizing the scope of the challenge, ramping up arms production, and committing to defeating–not appeasing–our enemies. 

Russell A. Berman, the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a co-chair of the Working Group on Islamism and the International Order. At Stanford, he is a member of both the Department of German Studies and the Department of Comparative Literature at Stanford, and he specializes on politics and culture in Europe as well as in the Middle East. He has served in numerous administrative positions at Stanford, including as chair of the Senate of the Academic Council.

A U.S.-China war is not inevitable, but it is increasingly likely.

While recent choices such as an overuse of sanctions, mutual economic decoupling, and political stunts like needless visits to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi or the cancellation of G20 attendance by Xi Jinping have raised tensions, the U.S. still has time and options to change its trajectory.

It can work to preserve economic coupling with China, maintain strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan, improve cybersecurity to stay technologically ahead, elevate regional cooperation to protect Taiwan and the South China Sea, and avoid costly foreign engagements to preserve national strength.

But these and any other measures are just short-term solutions that China can circumvent because, ultimately, the long-term answer to the China problem lies in resolving issues under the surface at home, not just in policy abroad.

The success of effective foreign policy and national defense - the kind that deters war and incentivizes peace with China in the long term while promoting a strong America -  is dependent on consistency, loyalty, responsibility, and transparency in execution. Yet, with endless investigations of corruption, foreign interference, compromised voting integrity, and moral destitution on all sides of the American political aisle, it is clear that many if not most in Washington lack these qualities. With leaders like this, China simply won’t be discouraged by American military actions alone.

American immunity to Chinese subversion like the fentanyl crisis and free-speech censorship or propaganda in universities and media is contingent on strong communities, families, and smart individuals of moral character. But as society becomes increasingly epicurean, distractions like culture wars, moral divisions, partisanship, and consumerism produce susceptible people who don’t possess the capacity to resist China’s pressures. With weaknesses like this, China won’t ever be convinced by American shows of strength overseas that it should do anything other than try harder to upset American power through other means.

Truly deterring China is not the unidimensional task many geopolitical pundits paint it to be of making the right military and economic threats in the right places at the right times. It doesn’t just require strength projection abroad with bases in the Philippines and more ships in the Taiwan Strait. It involves strength projection from home as well, in the form of strong communities and families that can resist all forms of Chinese pressures and produce competent, committed leaders capable of rebuffing Chinese advances and following through on good foreign policy. Otherwise, China will only ever see American strategic endeavors as temporary setbacks that can be overcome with the proper applications of force over the proper amount of time… and they’ll be right.

As such, strengthening the foundational moral fabric of American society is not only a foundational requirement for resisting Chinese subversion, but also necessary for truly realizing effective foreign policy. This truth is echoed unironically in a line from the ancient Confucian text, DaXue, which says “To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order; we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right.”

Any strategic prescriptions or genuinely good ideas enacted without addressing the underlying weaknesses in American society and government will just be like sending out ships full of holes; they will be well-intended actions that may be effective for a short time, but in the end only serve to mask the symptoms of our collision course with China until it's too late.

Garrett Ehinger is a China analyst who holds a bachelor’s in Biomedical Science with a minor in Mandarin Chinese from Brigham Young University in Idaho. He is currently a master’s student at the University of Utah studying public health. He has studied Chinese culture and language for over a decade.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Whether or not Iran played a direct role in planning and executing Hamas’ brutal assault on Israel doesn’t really matter. What does matter is Iran’s indispensable, long-term role in building Hamas’ capability to do what it did. In the near term, Israel will settle for nothing less than the physical elimination of Hamas as a military, administrative, financial, and organizational entity in Gaza. There can be no return to the status quo ante. But for any success in destroying Hamas’ capabilities to endure, the Iranian regime must also be eliminated.

The Iran Challenge 

The Islamic Republic is a vile regime that shares the annihilationist ideology of Hamas. It is detested by large numbers of Iranians. Their resentment periodically erupts into widespread opposition, which is brutally repressed by methods reminiscent of many other tyrannies. 

This cycle will probably repeat itself in the future. Still, another round of demonstrations by anti-theocrats wearing green shirts or by women discarding their hijabs is unlikely to produce a different outcome. Nor is economic strangulation on the horizon as long as Russia, China, others in the Global South, and even Western democracies worry first of all (understandably) about their own energy security and economic well-being and, therefore, fail even to enforce all the sanctions they have already endorsed. 

Nor is there much enthusiasm for the kind of military coercion that ultimately ended vile regimes in Afghanistan (temporarily) and Iraq.

How to Rid the World of the Islamic Republic 

So, if the ayatollahs in Iran won’t change their aspirations, what can force them to leave the stage?

There are not many options, but one possible vulnerability merits attention: Iran’s demographic makeup. Only about 50-60% of Iran’s population consists of Shi’ite Persians. Even in this, the most responsive audience to demagogic appeals to Iran’s historical greatness, there is widespread disaffection. 

This, after all, was the core that provided most of the country’s modernizing elites before the Islamic Revolution. But on the country’s periphery, there are large non-Persian and/or non-Shi’ite minorities – Azeris in the north toward the Caucasus, Kurds in the mid-west, Arabs at the head of the Gulf, Baluch in the east, and several others. Many of these are alienated from, if not actively hostile to, the regime, and most are accessible from other countries or the sea.

Foreign actors threatened by Iranian behavior can support demands by these populations, if not for secession or disintegration of the country (which might well encourage Persians to rally around the flag), then certainly for a government more tolerant and respectful of their cultural, linguistic and economic needs – that is, for something similar to the autonomous status of Kurdistan in Iraq. The potential here is illustrated by the outraged response to the murder of Mahsa Amini, which spread throughout the entire country but was most pronounced in her native Kurdistan. 

Therefore, foreign parties can begin to erode the foundations of the regime, at first with non-violent means -- in the form of funds, logistics and communications, information technology, and diplomatic endorsement. 

However, the regime would certainly respond (as it has done in the past) with a brutal crackdown, so foreign parties should not set out on this path unless they are committed in advance not to abandon those advocating the pluralization/decentralization/democratization of the country when the going gets tough or short-term interests change – as happened on more than one occasion to the Kurds in Iraq. This implies a willingness to escalate to military support and other active measures, at least in the form of instruction, individual and unit weaponry and operational intelligence, if not direct intervention. Failure to follow through on that would be worse, both politically and morally, than failure to assume the challenge in the first place.

A Broad Effort Needed 

Israel lacks the resources to take such a geostrategic gamble on its own. But there are many others who are also threatened by the Iranian regime’s aspirations and capabilities. These include the partners in the Abraham Accords, the putative partners in the tripartite accord promoted by the Biden Administration, and other informal allies in the region and elsewhere. Israel will find it difficult to convince the United States to take the indispensable lead in a campaign for regime change in Iran and to influence other key components to join in. Its chances would improve if it could persuade potential partners that it is also truly prepared, after Gaza, to act constructively on the Palestinian logjam. 

But for that to happen, Israel may well need to undergo its own regime change. In other words, when this stage of the confrontation is over, Israel will need to change its current government, change its government’s policies, and allow a true test of the argument made by critics of Israeli actions in Gaza that not all Palestinians are Hamas supporters or sympathizers.

Mark A. Heller is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. 

Sumit Ganguly is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington, and a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.