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Due to the intense religious persecution that they face, increasingly minorities are forced to flee the Muslim world.

As time progresses, the Islamic world is becoming more and more homogenous. Fewer and fewer non-Muslims who have lived amongst Muslims since antiquity are choosing to remain in their ancestral homeland. The trend began with the establishment of the State of Israel. After Israel became a country, around one million Jews were compelled to leave the Arab world. Following the Iranian Revolution, many Persian Jews followed in their footsteps. Now, numerous non-Muslim minority groups including Christians, Hindus, Mandeans, and Bahais among others are following in the footsteps of the Mizrahi Jews. The question remains, why?

In Bangladesh, both Christians and Hindus are systematically persecuted. Not too long ago, there was a report that 8 Christian women were assaulted and beaten after a militant group attacked their home. Furthermore, sources within Bangladesh claim that a Hindu temple was vandalized and the Hindu gods were desecrated recently. In another instance, it was reported that a Hindu girl was raped and the girl’s father’s life was threatened. When the mother went to report the incident to the police, she was sexually assaulted, stripped naked and threatened into dropping the case. And according to the World Hindu Struggle Committee, a minority was recently beaten up for refusing to participate in a political rally and the Awami League has proven themselves hostile towards Hindus who seek to run for political office. Given this situation, the World Hindu Struggle Committee claims that an increasing number of Christians and Hindus are fleeing Bangladesh, moving either to India or the Western countries.

For members of the Bahai faith in Yemen, the situation is quite dire. According to the US State Department, the Houthis in Yemen have been persecuting members of the Bahai faith. Amnesty International reported that a member of the Bahai faith was given the death sentence at the beginning of this year for allegedly communicating with Israel. They claimed that six other Bahais were also detained merely for practicing their faith. According to social media reports, there are still Bahais in Houthi prisons merely for being Bahais and no other reason.

Due to experiencing such persecution in Yemen, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, most members of the Bahai faith today live in India, Kenya and the US. Even though the Bahai faith was founded in Iran, the Bahai faith’s international headquarters is located in the State of Israel, as the Iranians destroyed many of the historic Bahai shrines within the country in a manner that is reminiscent of the destruction of the Buddhist statues by the Taliban in Afghanistan. To this day, Bahais are not recognized as a legitimate faith in Iran and are denied the right to study in university, to work and to enjoy any semblance of basic human rights.

The Bahais are not the only faith persecuted by the Iranian regime. The Mandeans, just like the Bahai, are denied the status of a protected faith in Iran. According to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mandeans are systematically murdered and raped within the country due to the fact that the Iranian government considers them to be infidels. They claim that the Iranian courts have ruled that raping Mandean women and girls is part of their purification process and therefore, violators receive impunity. Furthermore, the report claimed that Mandeans are also not allowed to touch food in the markets due to the belief that they are unclean. Due to experiencing such persecution, many Mandeans have immigrated to Canada, the US, Australia and the European Union. In fact, Mandeans were among the group of Iranian political refugees that Trump denied entry into the US.

Given such persecution, minority Hindus, Christians, Bahais, Mandeans and members of numerous other minority faiths originating in the Muslim world have found that if they want the freedom to continue practicing their faith and to live dignified lives, they have no other choice but to leave their ancestral homelands and to immigrate to democratic countries. For this reason, it is of pivotal importance that the Trump administration admits not only Christians but all other religious minorities from the Islamic world into the United States because these religious groups have no other way of surviving and thriving as a people since the radical Islamists have deprived them of any other opportunity to live a good and free life in their native lands.

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FILE PHOTO – A group of disputed islands, Uotsuri island (top), Minamikojima (bottom) and Kitakojima, known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China is seen in the East China Sea, in this photo taken by Kyodo September 2012. Mandatory credit. REUTERS/Kyodo/File Photo 

Beijing’s expanding military presence in the South China Sea (SCS) continues to attract the world’s attention. Tensions over the ownership of islands and the legitimacy for building artificial ones escalate, with some outsiders also joining the battlefield, including the U.S. and Japan. However, the dispute over SCS pales in comparison to the crises that happened in the East China Sea (ECS) around a decade ago, when a hot war between China and Japan seemed imminent. Today, the tension on the ECS has cooled down, but the dispute remains unsolved.

History of the Dispute on the ECS

The center of the dispute is the contested ownership of a group of islands – called Senkaku by the Japanese, Diaoyu Dao by the Chinese, and Diaoyutai by the Taiwanese (SDD) – extending to the water surrounding the islands, because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gives countries the right to claim Exclusive Economic Zone 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline.

The dispute occurred after the Second World War.  Under unconditional surrender, Japan needed to return all occupied territories taken from other countries. However, the Japanese government contended that it did not take SDD from the Chinese since it is unmanned. On the Chinese side, both Beijing (People’s Republic of China) and Taipei (Republic of China) claim that SDD should be returned to China after Japan was defeated. Both governments regard themselves as the legitimate government of China, although Beijing is internationally recognized.

The peak of the dispute was reached around a decade ago and started with a purposed breakthrough. In 2008, both China and Japan signed an agreement on joint development of the ECS’s natural resources. However, the cooperation ended following critiques of the Chinese government for betraying national sovereignty.[i] The atmosphere over the ECS then became increasingly dangerous. The first crisis occurred in September 2010 when Japanese coast guards detained the crew of a Chinese fishing boat near SDD.[ii] Beijing fiercely protested this action and arrested four Japanese in Hebei Province, accusing them of trespassing in a military installation.  In late September, though Japan released all detained Chinese prisoners, neither side became softer on the dispute. The crisis reached a second peak in 2012 when the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, decided to nationalize SDD from the private owner. Beijing and Taipei protested fiercely against the proposal.  In July, Japan recalled its ambassador in China.  On August 15, the victory over Japan day, people from mainland China, Hongkong, and Macao boarded a Hongkong boat to land SDD and were detained by the Japanese coasts guard. 2 days later, Japan deported those who boarded SDD.  Following these events, both China and Japan (with the U.S.) launched military exercises on the ECS, further worsening the situation.[iii]

Since then, the tensions over the ECS have gradually cooled down but some conflicts continue to occur. In 2013, Beijing declared the East China Sea (ADIZ) where all planes need to report to the Chinese authority, overlapping with the ADIZ claimed by Japan. In mid-2014, a Japan Self-Defense Force surveillance plane entered the overlapped ADIZ and Chinese fighter jets intercepted it. While military conflicts have virtually disappeared, some other small friction remains. For example, in this March, Chinese Foreign Ministry complained about some controversial clauses regarding SDD in a proposed Japanese history textbook.

Incentives Behind Assertiveness

A common reason for all involving governments to be assertive to varying degrees is the rise of nationalism. For example, in China, the Communist Party shifted its focus from the communist ideology to the economy and nationalism after crashing demonstrating students in 1989. The government launched the Patriotic Education Campaign, which aims at raising public awareness of “the century of humiliation” when China was bullied and invaded by foreign countries. The primary target is Japan, which invaded China in 1931 and occupied a huge portion of the nation until 1945. As expected, the campaign greatly raised anti-Japanese sentiment in China. For instance, in 2005, Japan’s petition for a permanent membership in United Nations Security Council joined with the controversial clauses in history textbooks triggered protests across China. Also, from 2008 -2012, anti-Japanese demonstrations spread throughout the country.

In Japan, public attitudes toward the disputes with China are mixed, but nationalism is more active with government backs those movements. Defeated in WW2, many Japanese views the punishment on Japan as “victor’s justice” and the current Abe administration is trying to make Japan a normal country again. (Under the Peace Constitution, Japan now can only engage in defensive wars.) The most controversial events are the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers. The Yasukuni Shrine became a disputed place since it enshrines some war criminals during WW2 who were accused and executed by the international court. Every time when Japanese politicians visit the shrine, Beijing and Seoul protest intensively. Japanese nationalists view critiques made by the Chinese and Koreans as insults to their national heroes, so they also protest against the Chinese and Koreans.

For Taiwan, the nationalist movement does exist but seems to be less active than in the other two countries. Taiwan, officially called The Republic of China, also claimed SDD and its surrounding waters. However, the government and people are less interested in such dispute as Taiwan has enjoyed a good relationship with Japan since WW2. Although Japan colonized Taiwan for more than half a decade and its brutal colonial rule still has some negative effects, many people prefer to the colonial period as they hate Kuomintang’s autocracy more. Additionally, both Japan and Taiwan were supported by the U.S. to counter the expansion of Communism. Still, nationalist movements have gained certain support from the government and the public. For example, in September 2012, Taiwan deployed 8 Coastal Guard ships near SDD, which were later dispelled by the Japanese.[iv]

The Road to Cooling Down

In August 2012, President of ROC, Ma Ying-jeou announced the East China Sea Peace Initiative, calling for a peace settlement of the ECS dispute and more cooperation. Beijing has not responded to this initiative so far. However, Japan eagerly responded to it and signed an agreement with Taipei about fishing in the ECS in 2013.

Also, the overheating of nationalism triggered deep concerns by Beijing. Although Beijing uses nationalism as a pillar of its legitimacy, it fears to be criticized as not nationalistic enough. During the crises in 2010 and 2012, protests across China were accompanied by numerous reports of riots, including attacks on Japanese companies, factories, Japanese brand cars, and their owners. Such violence challenged the government as it faced the dilemma of whether or not to support these so-called “patriotic” troublemakers. The government chose to crack down them because it not only wanted to continue the negotiation with Japan but also to try to protect its international image and keep foreigners and their investments in China.

Another essential factor that contributed to peace would be the limitation of natural resources under the ECS. In the very beginning of the dispute, Japan claimed that China (both mainland and Taiwan) raised the dispute over SDD only after the discovery of natural gas and some other resources under it. However, it turned out that the gas field is not so promising. For Beijing, the quantity of gas reserves there is not that big, only about 24 billion cubic meters. (Annual consumption of natural gas in China is around 200 billion cubic meters.) Japan also does not count on the gas field under the ECS. In addition to the concern over limited reserve volumes, the far distance between the field and Japan’s mainland made the cost to transport gas incredibly high.

Security is another concern for all three participants, as all parties prefer stability in the region. Japan, since WWII, has been the de facto controller of SDD, which is under the coverage of the U.S-Japan defense treaty. (Although the U.S. claims that it does not support any particular country over the dispute, it will protect every territory under Japan’s administration (including SDD).)[vi] If China attacks SDD, the U.S. will need to defend Japan and a new World War may become reality. Besides, the ECS dispute is only one of several flashpoints: the others include the Taiwan Strait, North Korea, and the South China Sea. All three issues involve China and the U.S. and are related to each other. The escalation of any tensions regarding these issues may trigger chain effects, bringing East Asia and even the world into dangers.

To maintain the stability in East Asia, disputing countries use diplomacy to ease the tensions. One remarkable achievement is the resuming of High-level Consultations on Maritime Affairs between China and Japan in September 2014. (The latest one was hosted this April.) Although they did not solve the territorial dispute, the two sides decided to cooperate on other issues such as fighting against smuggling, human trafficking, piracy, and protecting the environment.

The Way Out

So far, the tension of the ECS has cooled down. Also, cooperation and negotiations continue to make progress. However, the cooperation is mostly bilateral: either between Taipei and Tokyo or Beijing and Tokyo. Besides, another event like detaining Chinese citizens by Japanese authorities near SDD may again obstruct the cooperation on the ECS and even escalate to a diplomatic or even military crisis. Thus, all sides should try to have a trilateral conference at least about some innocuous topics and establish a well-functioning communication mechanism to prevent the escalation of any potential crisis. In addition, all parties, especially China and Japan, should closely monitor the nationalistic movement, which will definitely hinder future cooperation. The international community should also help to maintain the current status quo and do not stir troubles in the region. A stable East Asia would be the basis for solving the dispute on SDD in the future.

[i] Mark J. Valencia, The East China Sea Disputes: History, Status, and Ways Forward, Asian Perspective 38(2014), pp.191

[ii] Valencia, pp.194

[iii] Valencia, pp.195

[iv] Dennis V. Hickey, Taiwan and the Rising Tensions in the East China Sea, Asian Survey, Vol.54, Number 3, pp.504

[v] Paul O’ Shea, How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute, Asian Survey, Vol.55, Number 3, pp.555-556

[vi] Sheila A. Smith, Japan and the East China Sea Dispute, pp.4

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Egyptian Jewish activist Levana Zamir believes that Trump’s next move will be to set up an international fund to compensate both Jewish and Arab refugees from the 1948 Israeli War of Independence.

In recent days, US President Donald Trump has taken a number of steps in favor of the State of Israel. Firstly, he relocated the US Embassy to Jerusalem. Afterwards, he cut off funding to UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority without exempting US aid to Palestinian hospitals. And in recent days, Abu Mazen announced that the deal of the century includes the Palestinians being offered a confederation with Jordan, an idea that was rejected by the Hashemite Monarchy and which Abu Mazen was also not too enthusiastic about. Now, the US Department of Education on Civil Rights will be investigating how anti-Israel groups have promoted anti-Semitism at Rutgers University. After taking all of these pro-Israel steps, one must ponder, what unconventional step will Trump take next on the Israeli-Palestinian front?

Between 1948 and the 1960’s, approximately one million Jews were either compelled to flee the Muslim world or suffered from a wave of anti-Semitic violence that prompted them to leave their homes in the Muslim world. Some Jews in countries like Iraq and Egypt were outright expelled. Others in places like Morocco were not expelled but nevertheless suffered intense anti-Semitism that made it impossible to continue living there. As Moroccan Jewish activist Dina Levin explained, “The Jews had no protection. Arabs used to throw stones at us but if Jews did the same in return, they would be imprisoned. The Arabs did not give us a good life. In Morocco, there was a verdict that Jews could not walk with shoes outside of the ghetto. It existed for 400 years.” Furthermore, after the State of Israel was established, what was a horrific situation became even worse. There were a series of pogroms and outright massacres against Jews across the Arab world. In places like Iraq, many Jewish women were raped during these pogroms.

Given that there were two groups of refugees from 1948 and not one, Egyptian Jewish activist Levana Zamir is advocating that Trump’s next move should be to set up a special fund in order to help Jewish refugees from Arab countries and also the descendants of Palestinian refugees to receive financial compensation. According to her, supporting such a compensation fund goes hand and hand with cutting off funding to UNRWA: “They hope in the UNRWA schools that they will have the right of return ASAP and it is only temporary for them. UNRWA is helping them to continue as refugees instead of doing what we did, to leave the camps, to study and to work. Most of the UNRWA money goes to munitions and other things.”

“We began with this more than a year ago by speaking to MK Anat Berko,” Zamir noted. “She was the first to hear from us to stop UNRWA for we have the same rights as them. We asked her to speak out for an international compensation for us and the Palestinian refugees instead of having the world support UNRWA. She asked the Israeli Minister of Agriculture about our compensation. He told her that I am sending a letter to Bibi to talk to him about it. Now, Bibi declared we are going to ask UNRWA to stop all of their budgets for all Palestinian refugees. We are doing things but slowly. The next step will be an international fund that will give money to both groups of refugees. It won’t go to the PA but straight to them, the people.”

Both Zamir and Levin are strong supporters of Trump’s efforts to establish peace, believing that it is the only way forward due to the realism it espouses. According to Levin, “We cannot be in a situation where there is no one to turn to. If not, the situation is wild. The problem is that they were raised with hatred and it is hard to make peace. The children who grow up on hate cannot love us. You cannot be sure about them. That is the danger. But we must try.” Yet Zamir indicated that even though it is hard, Trump’s deal is the only game in town and therefore everyone must invest all of their efforts in it: “We cannot go back to Egypt. Even as tourists, they do not give everyone visas. We for sure cannot go to Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria, etc. It was a disaster for the Jews from the Arab states. We got nowhere else to go.”

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What are the origins of the armed conflict that has been raging in eastern Ukraine since 2014? Which role did Russia play in the emergence and escalation of the originally unarmed confrontation, in the Donets Basin (Donbas), after the victory of the Euromaidan revolution? When, how and to what degree exactly did Moscow get involved? Which relative weight did local sources of the conflict compared to the impact of foreign factors, i.e. the Kremlin’s covert actions in Ukraine? These and similar questions are not only academic topics hotly debated in Ukraine and the West. The way one answers them has also far-reaching implications for Western thinking, policies and diplomacy with regard to Russia and Ukraine today and tomorrow. Since 2014, an array of new evidence and research has emerged that helps clarifying the picture.

New Evidence about the Pre-History of the War in the Donets Basin

For instance, in late 2016, Russia-watchers were intrigued by a leak of emails sent and received by the office of Vladislav Surkov, an official adviser to President Putin, responsible for Russia’s policies towards Ukraine and the Moscow’s satellite states in northern Georgia. The Surkov Leaks then renewed the discussion of Moscow’s involvement in the pseudo-civil war and emergence of “people’s republics” in eastern Ukraine. These leaks confirmed once more that the armed conflict in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas is, to large extent, a Kremlin project. It is merely one part of Moscow’s broader policy of undermining the Ukrainian state after the victory of the Euromaidan revolution in February 2014.

Yet, while the Surkov Leaks provided important additional documentation, they do not alter, in principle, our understanding of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. They confirm with novel details and support with empirical proof earlier mainstream interpretations of the nature of the armed conflict in the Donbas as a covert Russian invasion of Ukraine. Two months before their release, another leak had, however, provided evidence that questioned earlier interpretations of the genesis of the tensions in eastern and southern Ukraine. They deal with the prehistory of the events that eventually led to the start of the still ongoing low-intensity war in the Donets Basin, in April 2014.

In August 2016, Ukraine’s General Procurator published a video tape containing illustrated and annotated audio recordings of a number of conversations between Sergey Glazyev, one of Vladimir Putin’s official Advisers within the Administration of the President of Russia, and several pro-Kremlin activists located or living in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. These dialogs were recorded in late February – early March 2014. They vividly illustrate Moscow’s covert support for anti-governmental protests in Ukrainian Russophone regions following the victory of the Revolution of Dignity on 21 February 2014. The tapes reveal the involvement either of the Russian state itself, or of, at least, a significant fraction with the Kremlin, in the initiation, coordination and financing of separatist meetings, demonstrations, pickets and similar actions on Crimea as well as in various regional capitals in Ukraine’s eastern and southern parts immediately after the victory Revolution of Dignity.

Putin’s advisor Glazyev, for instance, on 1 March 2014 informs his interlocutor Anatoliy Petrovich in the south-east Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia: “I have an order to raise everybody, to raise the people. People should gather on the square [of Zaporizhzhia] and demand to turn to Russia for help against the Banderites [derived from the name of Stepan Bandera – a war-time Ukrainian ultra-nationalist who fought against, among others, Soviet power and was killed by a KGB agent at Munich in 1959]. Specially trained people should throw out the Banderites from the regional council’s building. Then they should arrange a meeting of the regional council, create a regional executive committee, give it executive power and subordinate the police to this new executive. I have direct orders from the leadership [of Russia] – to raise the people in Ukraine wherever we can. That means we have to bring people to the streets, as we did in Kharkiv. According to this example! And as soon as possible! Because, you see, President [Putin] has already signed a [presidential] decree. The operation has already began, there is information that the troops are already moving out. What are they waiting for? We can not do all this with [military] force. We use force only to support the people – nothing more! But if there are no people, what support can there be?”

While the tapes became a big issue in Ukrainian media and caused an angry reaction in Moscow, they have so far been largely ignored by Western newspapers and think-tanks. Mostly, they were – if at all – mentioned only en passant in reports about Ukraine of that time, by European and American journalists and researchers. Their Russian contents were, to be sure, quickly translated into English and annotated with supplementary information by the Ukrainian analytical website UA Position. Yet, only few observers – for instance, Halya Coynash of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, or Brian Whitmore, then at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and today at CEPA – made, in August 2016, these tapes special topics of their analyses of the Kremlin’s start of its hybrid and proxy war against Ukraine. Yale historian Timothy D. Snyder and Virginia Tech geographer Gerard Toal have since mentioned the Glazyev Tapes in their recent seminal monographs on the confrontation between Russia, Ukraine and the West.

The Significance of the Tapes for the Interpretation of the Conflict

The low attention to the Glazyev Tapes, in the international analysts’ community, may have been partly due to the fact that the Ukrainian General Procuracy office has still not published the raw recordings out of which the annotated public tapes were composed. Some may suspect that the published records were tampered with, or/and that they do not reveal the full story of the events they are supposed to illustrate. It is, however, unlikely that these recordings are fakes or doctored. The published conversations are interactive and made by interlocutors whose voices can be easily ascribed to persons, on the basis of their audible statements recorded in video material published elsewhere. The Kremlin would have probably published proof for any manipulations, had they taken place. Nor has there been any other public questioning of the genuineness of these audio documents.

The continuing international inattention for the Glazyev Tapes was and is surprising. If they are indeed authentic, the Glazyev Tapes should modify our understanding of the origins, dynamics and nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The most important aspect of the Glazyev Tapes is arguably not their contents. What is remarkable about these conversations is the time of their recording in late February – early March 2014, i.e. several weeks before the post-Euromaidan civil conflict in eastern and southern Ukraine turned into a pseudo-civil war in the Donbas.

Until the publication of the Glazyev Tapes, the prevalent interpretation of the roots of the Russian-Ukrainian War was that Moscow intervened – with, first, largely paramilitary and, later, increasingly regular military forces – into an escalating confrontation between pro-Kyiv and pro-Moscow Ukrainian citizens of the Donets Basin. To be sure, few serious observers ever doubted the Kremlin’s crucial role in turning these initially unarmed – though often already violent – confrontations on the streets of the east and south Ukrainian cities into a putatively civil war by late spring 2014. Yet, there was and is still a debate among Ukrainian and foreign observers of these events about the character of the pro-Moscow protest actions that had preceded, and supposedly led to, the escalation of armed violence.

Even many “russocentric” interpreters of the confrontation in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas conceded that the cultural-regional differences between Ukraine’s russophone east and south, on the one side, and ukrainophone west and bilingual center were the predominant cause of the tensions in such Russian-speaking cities as Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk or Odesa, after the Euromaidan. The post-revolutionary anti-Kyiv grass-roots activities of many Russian-speakers in Ukraine – such was the story – led to their confrontation with the new pro-Western and nationally oriented leadership that came to power as a result of the Revolution of Dignity. The local tensions, so it seemed, led to a conflict in the Donbas that the Kremlin eventually felt – depending on the interpreter’s preferences – obliged, forced or convenient enough to intervene in.

To be sure, the evidence contained in the Glazyev Tapes does not nullify the factor of Ukrainian inter-regional strains (not a particularly unique characteristic of Ukraine, in any way) in the emergence of the Donbas conflict. In fact, the conversations published do not concern the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but other regions in russophone Eastern and Southern Ukraine. One can only infer from these recordings that similar Russian mingling was happening in the Donbas too, and that the now documented early-on involvement of the Kremlin in certain locations is merely the tip of a far larger iceberg.

The Glazyev Tapes could, in fact, be seen as strengthening the argument about the relevance of regional differences within russophone Ukraine – an old theme in post-Soviet sub-national studies. They indicate that Moscow was engaged in a broader attempt to destabilize the largely Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, but was only able to instigate a pseudo-civil war in the Donets Basin. Russia’s informal influence was, however, not strong enough to do so in other eastern and southern regions in which Glazyev with his local partners, as the tapes illustrate, actively supported secessionist tendencies. The leak could be thus read as evidence for earlier interpretations emphasizing the crucial role of specifically regional factors in Ukraine’s break-up.

Yet, the time of the recording and documented depth of Glazyev’s involvement in these Ukrainian events also support a different narrative. They imply that Russia was by no means merely an additional third actor or late intervening factor when the protests turned massively violent and led to the first armed skirmishes, in April 2014. Rather, the Glazyev Tapes indicate that Moscow had been already entangled in the still largely unarmed protests across eastern and southern Ukraine immediately following the victory of the Euromaidan, in late February and early March 2014 (if not before). The recordings suggest that the Kremlin had been behind, at least, some separatist activities several weeks before the actual war started. Yet, Moscow’s clandestine pre-war activities remained remarkably unsuccessful in mainland Ukraine, in late February and early March 2014. Surprisingly, the distinctly weak Ukrainian state – just shaken by a full-scale revolution – was still strong enough to resist Russia’s clandestine non-military assault on its sovereignty and integrity, at that point. The only partial exclusion, in late February 2014, was of course Crimea where – as we already know – Russian special forces without insignia had played, however, a crucial role in starting the secession process.

The genealogy of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict appears, after the publication of the Glazyev Tapes, somewhat different than before. It looks now as if Moscow or, at least, a part of the Russian leadership was, in late February 2014, starting a comprehensive attempt to annex not only Crimea, but also large chunks of mainland southern and eastern Ukraine, i.e. to create a Novorossiia (New Russia). Yet, in order to do so, pro-Russian local activists had first to produce some legal or/and political pretext for an official Russian military intervention. An employment of Russian troops abroad had just been made (domestically) legal by a special Federation Council resolution adopted on 1 March 2014 granting the President of Russia the right “to use Russian military forces in Ukraine to improve public and political situation in that country” (– a right revoked in June 2014). Yet, for the Russian public and international audiences, it still needed a weighty justification for such plain expansionism coming from inside Ukraine. To this purpose, an – at least seemingly – official document or particularly grave political event would first have to appear in the respective Ukrainian region up for invasion, and to provide some basic fodder for the Kremlin propaganda machine. Such an initial move in this or that Ukrainian region could have then been spun by Russian media as providing sufficient legitimacy for preparing and conducting an armed “humanitarian” intervention by Moscow on Ukrainian territory – and to finally annex the occupied areas either formally or informally.

This scenario materialized more or less on Crimea. Glazyev’s conversations with the Russian imperialist politician Konstantin Zatulin and Crimean pro-Russian separatist Sergey Aksyonov, on the tapes, illustrates some of the particulars. Yet, even in Simferopol, the crucial session of the Autonomous Republic’s parliament that initiated Crimea’s secession had to be assembled and made to vote with the help of Moscow’s paramilitary forces, as one of their members, notorious Igor Girkin (“Strelkov”), detailed in a later interview. Something similar – as the Glazyev Tapes indicate – was also tried or, at least, intended in Kharkiv, Odesa and other cities. Yet, the hoped-for Ukrainian calls for Russian help did not come about as planned, during the first few weeks after the Euromaidan. The following “civil war” that only began more than a month later in the Donets Basin was seemingly merely Moscow’s Plan B. It may have been an altogether improvised scenario that spontaneously grew out of the initially unarmed, yet abortive subversion of the Ukrainian state by Russia-directed activists, in late February and early March 2014. More revelations and research will be necessary to fully verify, further specify and properly document this course of events.

Still, the Glazyev Tapes now provide first direct evidence for what earlier empirical research – by, among others, Nikolay Mitrokhin, Viacheslav Likhachev and Anton Shekhovtsov who focused on the Russian far right’s role in the Donbas – had already indicated. At least one important circle within the Kremlin was already actively fanning the East Ukrainian social conflict several weeks before it was replaced by a covert Russian paramilitary invasion. Whereas Mitrokhin, Likhachev and Shekhovtsov emphasized the ultra-nationalist ideological motivations of the Russian or Russia-supported activists in Eastern Ukraine, the Glazyev Tapes illustrate the financial remuneration that the Kremlin or a faction within it provided to the pro-Moscow “anti-fascists.”

How the Tapes Help Clarifying Two Paradoxes of the Donbas Conflict

To be sure, one could have suspected something like this already before the Glazyev Tapes were published. There had been two obvious contradictions in the “ukrainocentric” narrative of the origins of the conflict in the Donbass: First, comparative regional studies have emphasized some peculiarly “uncivil” traits of society in the Ukrainian Donbas. Ukraine’s easternmost population has been characterized as relatively more pro-Soviet and patriarchal than people in many other Ukrainian regions. After Ukraine’s assumption of independence in 1991, the Donbas’s crucial social, political and economic structures were, moreover, largely captured by the semi-criminal Donetsk clan and its political wing, the Party of Regions. Against this background, it was, in spring 2014, remarkable how well and sudden the most Soviet-nostalgic sections of the Donbas’s society managed to seemingly self-organize a large anti-governmental protest without much (official) help from the dominant regional Donetsk clan. Even before the Glazyev Tapes appeared, this story – implicit in the civil war narrative of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – looked, at least, incomplete.

Second, while the pre-conflict Ukrainian Donbas was characterized by certain cultural pathologies, it still had a functioning and structured socio-political life. Like any other modern populated region in the world, the Donets Basin had, before Russia’s covert intervention, a multitude of established and interlinked political, industrial, educational, cultural and other institutions with formal heads, informal leaders and regional celebrities known to all or large parts of the Basin’s citizenry. Yet, when the Donbas “uprising” started in spring 2014, not a single widely known local dignitary seems to have visibly taken part in it – not to mention, led it. Although the Donbas had – like any other society – regionally prominent politicians, journalists, doctors, entrepreneurs, writers etc., apparently none or very few of the Luhansk and Donetsk notabilities chose to become, if not a leader, then at least an open participant of the 2014 so-called “Russian Spring.”

The only prominent Ukrainian politician ever officially involved with the putative insurrection in the Donets Basin was Oleg Tsaryov, a notorious member of Ukraine’s pre-Euromaidan parliament (who had, during the uprising of winter 2013-2014, tried to deport approximately three dozen foreigners, including myself, from Ukraine). Tsaryov became for a while the speaker of the joint and by now defunct Novorossia joint parliament of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. However, Tsaryov is not from the Donbas, but from the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk oblast – perhaps, the country’s most staunchly pro-Ukrainian russophone region. Instead, the leaders of the Donbas putative uprising and so-called “People’s Republics” were either Russian citizens, like the prolific ultra-nationalists Igor Girkin or Aleksandr Borodai, or hitherto un- or little known representatives of the Donbass – some of them, like the first Donetsk “People’s Governor” Pavel Gubarev, also Russian ultra-nationalists. (Gubarev had been a member of Russian National Unity, a Russian neo-Nazi organization that uses the swastika as a symbol and was involved in the “Russian Spring” in the Donbas.)

The Glazyev Tapes contribute to explaining the reasons for these two contradictions, i.e. the low social capital and civic under-organization of the rebellious region, and the absence of the Donbas’s regional notability in the leadership of the uprising. The allegedly popular insurrection in eastern and southern Ukraine was from its beginning in late February 2014 an undertaking meticulously guided and heavily supported from Moscow. The Russian Spring in the Donbas did thus not need an active local civil society. As political leadership and resources were provided by Moscow, an involvement of regional dignitaries was not necessary for the rebellion to happen.

Implications of the Glazyev Tapes for the Minsk Agreements

This interpretation should not only modify public narratives of the “Ukraine Crisis,” but also have repercussions for the Western approach to the Minsk Agreements. In particular, the West should re-consider its insistence on Ukraine’s soon fulfillment of the political parts of the Minsk Agreements. Not only is it obvious that Ukraine was forced to accept enormous political concessions to Moscow against the immediate background of extremely bloody Russian military offensives, shortly before or during the negotiations of the various Minsk Agreements in September 2014 (Ilovaisk) and February 2015 (Debaltseve).

The Glazyev Tapes also illustrate that the social rationale for far-reaching new political rules in the Donbas envisaged in the Minsk Agreements – a considerable reduction of Ukraine’s sovereignty, in the currently occupied territories – is slim. A popular Western interpretation of the concessions to the separatists in these Agreements had been that the mere fact of an, at least, initially grass-roots insurgency in the Donbas should be somehow reflected in its future status. Yet, the Glazyev Tapes illustrated, in 2016, that the entire East Ukrainian uprising had from its start not been as popular a phenomenon as it had earlier seemed. If one acknowledges the Russian involvement in, and imperial rather than local dimension of, the seeming insurgency, then the apparent compromise in the Minsk Agreements assumes a different notion.

The Minsk compromise appears now not any longer as a result of Ukrainian and Western consideration of certain peculiarities of the Donets Basin. Rather, a future special status of the currently occupied territories looks, after publication of the Glazyev Tapes, as a strange reward for the partial successes that Russia had in fueling otherwise weak separatist tendencies in eastern Ukraine following the victory of the Euromaidan. Ukraine has been undergoing a general decentralization drive since 2014 – a development unrelated to the Minsk process and a direct result of the victory of the Revolution of Dignity.  A special status for the currently occupied territories, as foreseen in the Minsk Agreements, is thus redundant.

All regions of Ukraine are currently or will soon be acquiring new rights, additional responsibilities and greater autonomy. If the now Moscow-controlled territories return under Kyiv’s control, they would sooner or later also benefit from general Ukrainian decentralization. It is less the Donbas’s specific regional interests than the partial successes of Russia’s secret subversion efforts that has found their way into the texts of the three deals between the Ukrainian government and the separatist pseudo-republics in Minsk. The West should treat the questions of whether, when and how Kyiv needs to implement the respective domestic political articles of the Minsk Agreements accordingly.

[Earlier versions of the article were published by Open Democracy, Geopolitika.lt and the ECFR.]

The post The Glazyev Tapes, Origins of the Donbas Conflict, and Minsk Agreements appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

When President Donald Trump announced on 8th May that the United States would not be a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran deal, anymore, it was easily predictable that new tensions between Tehran and Washington will emerge soon. It didn’t take long for the European Union to voice its regret over President Trump’s decision and say in an unequivocal manner that Trump’s unilateralism won’t mark the premature death of the Iran deal, signed and sealed only three years ago.

Britain, France and Germany issued a statement in which they reiterated their continued commitment to the JCPOA as long as Iran abides by its nuclear commitments. They said Europe will honor the terms of the Iran deal and encourages trade and business with Iran. It was then when the advent of a gap in the US-EU relations was noticeable.

In phone conversations with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the leaders of the three countries gave assurances that Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal would not be translated into the demise of the agreement, signed in July 2015.

However, it isn’t difficult to conclude that the fulfillment of one of President Trump’s main campaign promises is a lethal blow to the foundation of a deal, which according to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, was so meticulously negotiated that there were lengthy discussions and debates between the interlocutors over each of its words. The document runs to 109 pages, including five annexes and is an intricate and detailed roadmap for collaboration between Iran, the United States, the European Union, China and Russia and finally the United Nations Security Council on the prospects of Iran’s nuclear program. The Iran nuclear deal is endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, specifying the restrictions Iran voluntarily imposes on its nuclear program in return for the removal of all nuclear-related sanctions it was subjected to by the six countries involved in the negotiations and the Security Council itself.

The departure of one of the main signatories of the agreement, followed by the enforcement of new sanctions against Iran, however, means a lot of things, including disappointment for those who believed Barack Obama’s commitment to diplomacy and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s overpowering of hardliners at home, translated into the signing of the nuclear deal, were the first steps in a long walk to a lasting Iran-US reconciliation which even Donald Trump couldn’t thwart.

Even if the European countries, China, Russia and the traditional clients of Iran’s oil in Asia such as India, Japan and South Korea continue doing business with Iran under the shadow of harrowing US sanctions and even if the nuclear deal is salvaged through day and night efforts and diplomacy by the remaining parties, it’s undeniable that the psychological effect of the new sanctions imposed 6th August cannot and will not be alleviated and the international community’s relations with Iran will always be marred with fear of US penalties over business with a country which the Trump administration is apparently fully committed to bring to its knees. Unless anything changes in the White House or unless Iran is back to talks with the United States, Iranians shouldn’t wait for any good news as their country becomes a pariah state shunned by partners and rivals and isolated on the international scene.

For a number of reasons, Trump’s decision in pulling out from the nuclear deal with Iran and imposing new sanctions will lead to serious complexities in the future of Iran-US relations and make any rapprochement and reconciliation implausible or hard to achieve. Iran has said no to new negotiations with the United States even as its economy is collapsing with the first bites of the sanctions.

The demands put forward to Iran by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as the US government’s preconditions for the improvement of relations with Iran, sound impossible to be granted by the standards of the Iranian government. The granting of these requests mean forgoing the quintessential and prototypical footing of the 1979 revolution: exporting the revolution. Maybe, situation in the future will be such that Iran forgets about its ideological ambition of exporting its revolution in the Middle East and to its neighbors, but for the moment, Trump’s antagonistic attitude hasn’t convinced the authorities in Tehran to come back to the negotiation table and it goes without saying that the geopolitical dynamics of the Iranian society are fundamentally different from North Korea, so it’s not possible to expect Iran to give in to pressure easily even when it’s conspicuously suffering.

The new round of US sanctions which target the Iranian people and statesmen alike will be complemented by additional measures shortly when the second phase of sanctions will be triggered on November 5. The first round of sanctions renders three major contracts between Iran and aircraft manufacturers Airbus, Boeing and ATR for the delivery of 230 commercial airplanes to Iran null and void and even cancels deals for $852 million worth of pistachio export and $424 million in carpets export.

Even if the sanctions imposed by President Trump, who warned the world countries boldly to stop doing business with Iran or they will have their US trade ties compromised, aren’t examples of human rights violation – they directly affect the livelihoods of millions of Iranians, including patients in need of imported medicine, they have a clear message. Forty years after the Iranian revolution and the cutting off of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States, the two countries aren’t on a promising path to rapprochement and reconciliation and continue making the proponents of diplomacy and peace even more disappointed, rendering the mending of their flawed relations more difficult for the future Iranian and American governments.

The post Trump Sanctions: The Latest Disappointment for the Advocates of Iran-US Reconciliation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

[Translated from Ukrainian, by VoxUkraine.]

The Kremlin media’s well-known narrative of a supposedly almost unanimous support among Crimea’s population as well as of the allegedly profound historical justification for the annexation has many supporters not only in Russia, but also among numerous Western politicians, journalists, experts, and diplomats. Often, these commentators consider themselves – in distinction to “idealistic” defenders of international law – as geopolitical “realists,” or even – in contrast to their overly emotional colleagues – as more “balanced” observers. To yet greater extent, this problem is relevant for the discourse of the various German and other so-called Russland- or Putinversteher (Russia/Putin-understanders), meaning those publicists interested in Eastern Europe who consider themselves as exceptionally empathetic interpreters of the Russian “soul.” Based on their ostensible deep knowledge of Russia’s nature, past and destiny, the Russland-/Putinversteher typically expose considerable understanding and voice elaborate justifications for the Kremlin’s current foreign policies (Heinemann-Grüder 2015).

In many cases, the various apologetic narratives of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea ignore, however, the fact that the Russian propagandistic preparation, secret service operation and military intervention that led to Crimea’s transition had started already in late February 2014, if not earlier (Головченко & Дорошко 2016; Центр глобалистики «Стратегия XXI» 2016; Дорошко 2018). Not only many Russian, but also certain Western narrators of Moscow’s takeover of the Ukrainian peninsula flippantly or purposefully omit or downplay the fact that Crimea’s actual occupation by Russian troops had occurred already several days before the alleged “declaration of independence” by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereafter: ARC) and city of Sevastopol on March 11, 2014, and the Kremlin’s official inclusion of these territories into the Russian Federation on March 18, 2014.

Yet, Russia’s military takeover of the Ukrainian Black Sea region prior to the various pseudo-legal acts on Crimea in early spring 2014 is an – if not the most – important facet of this rapid change of borders. The switch of real political control over the peninsula from Kyiv to Moscow had already been accomplished within the three weeks before the completion of the official process of Crimea’s official secession and formal incorporation into the Russian Federation. The entire transition processes had become possible only after a distinctly sudden and initially hidden, yet resolute seizure of the peninsula by Russian regular troops, irregular forces and local proxy groups, at the end of February and in early March 2014 (Березовець 2015).

Not only Moscow’s unapologetic military occupation of the peninsula, but also the following official course of Crimea’s separation from Ukraine and annexation to Russia grossly violated a number of fundamental international legal norms as well as certain provisions of the Constitutions of Ukraine, Crimea and even the Russian Federation itself. These facts are already well established and relatively thoroughly covered in the relevant Western and Ukrainian scholarly legal literature (e.g.: Allison 2014; Heintze 2014; Luchterhandt 2014a, 2014b; Marxsen 2014, 2015; Peters 2014; Behlert 2015; Bílková 2015; Grant 2015; Singer 2015; Nikouei & Zamani 2016; Zadorozhnii 2016; Czapliński et al. 2017). What has been lesser discussed so far are various political circumstances of the so-called “referendum” organized by the Kremlin on March 16, 2014 that also cast considerable doubt on the claim – still surprisingly popular among many Western politicians, journalists and diplomats – that the vast majority of the Crimean population had been craving for “reunification” with the Russian Federation, as well as on the assertion that there were supposedly weighty historical reasons for Moscow’s land-grab.

The ambiguous results of the “referendum”

Oddly, one of the most critical early assessments illustrating the doubtfulness of the “referendum’s” officially announced results was made by three representatives of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (hereinafter Human Rights Council), one of Vladimir Putin’s official consultative bodies (Бобров 2014).[1] A member of this authoritative Russian institution had made a private visit to Crimea in mid-April 2014. Based on his observations and conversations during this informal trip, as well as on other reports, three members of the Human Rights Council published an unofficial report on the Human Rights Council’s website (Бобров 2014).

In this statement, the three reputed activists claimed that, according to the estimates of “practically all interviewed experts and residents,” the percentage of Crimeans who took part in the “referendum” in the ARC was not 83.1%, as reported by the Crimean authorities that had fallen under Kremlin control, but rather somewhere between 30% to 50%. In the estimation of the three Russian human rights defenders, the annexation was supported not by 96.77 % of the alleged participants of the “referendum,” as reported by the Moscow-directed Crimean authorities, but by only by 50% to 60% of the Republic’s voters (Бобров 2014; Peters 2014).

The latter figure roughly corresponds to the average results of various surveys on the accession of Crimea to Russia held on the peninsula prior to the annexation.[2] The critical assessment of the alleged results of the voting held on Crimea on March 16, 2014, by three members of the Russian Human Rights Council, is supported by a brief statistical analysis, by Aleksandr Kireev, of the dynamics of the officially reported turnout for the pseudo-referendum (Киреев 2014). The suspicious attendance data presented by Kireev suggests a likely large-scale falsification of voting results. The conclusions of the informal report submitted by the Russian human rights defenders go in the same direction as an even lower estimate of Crimean voter turnout, by the Mejlis (council) of the Crimean Tatars, the executive organ of the peninsula’s indigenous population’s representative body.[3]

Based on these estimates, it would appear that only less than a third of Crimea’s population may have actually casted its votes for acceding to Russia. This would seem to be the case even if one factored in a probably higher turnout and stronger support for the annexation, in the city of Sevastopol, the base of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. The likely overall and rather low approximate percentage of Crimean votes cast for the annexation is not sufficient to even partially justify such a significant change of borders in post-Cold War Europe. Moreover, the report by the Russian Human Rights Council quoted political experts in Crimea who reported to them that “residents of Crimea voted rather for terminating, as they put it, ‘the terrible corruption and the use of force by the thieves from Donetsk’ [installed in republican offices, by Yanukovych’s administration in 2010-2013 – A.U.] than in favour of accession to Russia” (Бобров 2014).[4]

Why polls carried out later cannot legitimize the “referendum”

According to the last relevant pre-annexation poll in mid-February 2014, i.e. a few days prior to the start of Crimea’s occupation by Russian soldiers without insignia, 41% of the respondents in the ARC, i.e. excluding the city of Sevastopol, supported then the merger of Russia and Ukraine into one state – such was the question posed by the Ukrainian sociological service (KIIS 2014). This result roughly matches the average results of earlier polls concerning a possible accession of the peninsula to Russia (Podolian 2015). In stark contrast to numerous pre-annexation polls, various opinion surveys conducted after the seizure of the Black Sea peninsula by Russia, seem to be demonstrating nothing less than doubling of popular support for Crimea’s inclusion into Russia. Ever since the annexation in March 2014, among Crimean residents, the share of those supporting the peninsula’s incorporation into the Russian Federation has been usually higher or even considerably higher than 80%.[5] For the following reasons, the seemingly unambiguous results obtained after the annexation operation are, however, of only limited significance to an interpretation of the events that took place on Crimea, in early 2014 (Sasse 2017).

First, the results of recent polls should be – at least, partially – considered in light of the extremely aggressive anti-Ukrainian defamation campaign conducted by pro-Kremlin TV and radio channels as well as Russian newspapers – the only mass media sources available to Crimeans since March 2014 (Fedor 2015). Second, some interpretations of more recent polls, according to which the vast majority of respondents on Crimea support the annexation, do not take sufficiently into account a tendency among voters to opt for following earlier paths of development once they have been freely or forcibly chosen, and to support the respectively current status quo. Decisions expressed in popular polls are affected not only by voters’ ideological preferences, but also by other factors such as social conformism, psychological inertia, collective pressure, and strategic calculation.

Weighty choices are often made, to one or another degree, path-dependently. They – consciously nor not – consider the possible severity, inconveniences and risks of changing a previously embarked upon political direction. Polls – especially, on such fundamental issues as statehood, borders and security – thus reflect not only the narrowly defined political positions of respondents. They also express many voters’ inclination to try maintaining the present state of affairs and their desire to preserve public concord. An example for the effects of this psychological mechanism was the referendum on Scotland’s independence, also conducted in the year 2014. In this – in distinction to the Crimean pseudo-referendum – fully legal, properly prepared and universally accepted plebiscite, eventually 55.3% of a population, of which about 84% consider themselves Scots and where separatist tendencies have always been strong, voted against independence of their region from the United Kingdom.

Interestingly, prior to 2014, voters’ general preference for maintaining an acceptable status quo had starkly “pro-Ukrainian” consequences on Crimea. Despite unquestionably strong pro-Moscow sentiments among many ethnically Russian Crimeans already prior to the Kremlin’s propagandistic preparation of the annexation, there had been a relatively high level of political stability on the peninsula, over the previous 20 years (Sasse 2014). This was a result of, among others, the mentioned partial dependency of human beings’ preference for continuing the previously chosen path and for supporting any current order, as long as it does not contradict the fundamental interests of the people in question.

At least, that seems to be the implication of a series of in-depth interviews conducted by British political scientist Eleanor Knott (2018), within her field research on Crimea, several months before the start of the Euromaidan. Knott’s investigation revealed that Crimeans with strongly and otherwise unanimously pro-Moscow views, when being asked “either/or” questions about where Crimea should belong, replied surprisingly conformist and non-separatist. In these interviews, taken on Crimea in 2012-2013, even radically pro-Russian respondents opted to preserve the peninsula as a part of Ukraine and did not demand its annexation to the Russian Federation (Knott 2018). This, at first glance, unexpected preference among pro-Moscow Crimeans was, probably, no indicator of substantive sympathy for the Ukrainian state. Instead, it reflected these ethnic Russians’ desire to preserve stability, predictability and peace in their home region.

Thirdly, some observers, who refer to sociological research conducted on Crimea after the annexation, underestimate or even entirely ignore the real or perceived risks that potentially pro-Ukrainian or simply non-pro-Moscow respondents run and are afraid to run when answering questions about their desired status for Crimea. Oppositional Crimeans on the occupied peninsula need to have, since March 2014, considerable courage and resoluteness to express their views openly. They will have to be ready to do so in spite of – rightly or wrongly – anticipating possible persecution against themselves and their close ones (family, friends, colleagues) as a result of voicing their doubts about the annexation in front of strangers, i.e. the more or less anonymous interviewers from (supposedly) sociological services. Political positions that may be dangerous to articulate today on Crimea include doubts about the legitimacy or/and legality of the Russian annexation, regrets about the political detachment of the peninsula from Ukraine, or an approval of a return of the peninsula under Kyiv’s control. Given the new political and legal situation in this Black Sea region, since the start of its occupation in late February 2014, pronouncing such sentiments or even expressing mere sympathy for Ukraine can lead to all kinds of problems.

After being annexed by Moscow, the Black Sea peninsula has become one of the European regions with the highest levels of limitations of basic political and civil rights (UNHCR 2017). Since 2014, disapproval of the so-called “reunification” of Crimea with Russia has become increasingly stigmatized by pro-Kremlin media and the externally installed new authorities on Crimea. In a – probably, often anticipated – worst-case scenario, expression of such a position can have serious consequences for respondents if, for instance, the survey is wiretapped or simply staged by Russia’s special services – dangers that many citizens of Crimea are, probably, well aware of.

Since 2014, the notoriously rigid so-called “anti-extremist” and “anti-separatist” Russian laws are being applied on Crimea, in order to suppress political opposition. Moscow and its local representatives continually persecute dissent on the peninsula. This is especially the case with regard to pro-Ukrainian members of the Crimean Tatar minority. Sometimes, it concerns simply sympathizers of Ukrainian symbols and culture (Halbach 2015; KHPG 2016-2018).[6] For these and similar reasons, the consequences of political criticism of the annexation, remorse about the separation from Ukraine, or a recognition of Crimea as belonging to the Ukrainian state, remain unpredictable for respondents to sociological polls.

To be sure, the situation on Crimea today is very different from that in the Soviet bloc, before the mid-1980s. Under totalitarianism, countless official polls and votes had been seemingly indicating ridiculously high public support for the communist leaders and regimes until shortly before they were toppled in popular uprisings. Fear of unpredictable future repercussions of expressing political dissent is, presumably, today much lower on Crimea than during Soviet times. Yet, such dreads probably do exist among many pro-Ukrainian-minded, Moscow-critical or simply neutral Crimeans these days. Hence, it seems likely that some or even many of them either refuse to participate or do neither fully nor honestly express their opinions in polls about the status of the peninsula.

One should thus be cautious about post-annexation research results on political attitudes of Crimeans. This scepticism even applies to those surveys conducted by well-known Western opinion polling institutions working on the peninsula, since 2014. In conclusion, post-annexation survey data have only limited value for assessing the real popular support for Russia’s seizure of Crimea, before Moscow began its systematic preparation and swift implementation in early 2014.

The curious course of the “referendum”

Looking back at the events of spring 2014, there are other reasons questioning the pseudo-referendum’s result and cautioning against a lenient attitude towards official Russian interpretations of Crimea’s annexation. The “referendum’s” preparation, procedure, media coverage, and ballot were so manifestly biased that this poll can serve as a textbooks example for manipulation of voting. The date of the “referendum” was changed twice in a short period of time. The residents of Crimea had neither the time nor the opportunity to discuss openly, freely and critically the alternatives they would have to choose from during the approaching popular vote on March 16, 2014 (Podolian 2015).

Before the referendum, the OSCE, therefore, publicly refused to send observers to the “referendum” and stated: “International experiences […] showed that processes aiming at modifying constitutional set ups and discussions on regional autonomy were complex and time consuming, sometimes stretching over months or even years […]. Political and legal adjustments in that regard had to be consulted in an inclusive and structured dialogue on national, regional and local level.”[7]

These conditions were not met. Thus, not only the OSCE, but all other competent international governmental and non-governmental electoral monitoring organizations refused to send their representatives. Instead, the Kremlin invited several dozen representatives of foreign radical and, in most cases, marginal political groups. These guests were later presented to Russian TV viewers as “international observers” that approved of the legitimacy and orderliness of the “referendum” (Shekhovtsov 2014, 2015; Coynash 2016).

That was in spite of the visually documented fact that the vote happened under conditions of tangible psychological pressure caused by demonstrative presence of Russian soldiers without insignia – the notorious “little green men” or, in Kremlin parlance, “polite people” – as well as of armed pro-Moscow irregulars from various Crimean and Russian paramilitary groups. It was also strange that among the alternatives offered in the “referendum” there was no option to vote for a simple preservation of the existing status quo, that is of the then valid Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted in 1998 (Giles 2014). Instead, Crimean voters had two options, each offering to change the legal status of Crimea – either annexation of the peninsula to the Russian Federation, or a return to some older constitution of the ARC from 1992. Both of these ballot options, moreover, were phrased ambivalently – and arguably, to some degree, absurd.

“Russia,” the All-Russian Empire and the Russian Federation

The first option in the pseudo-referendum promised Crimeans a “reunification of Crimea with Russia” (vossoedinenie Kryma s Rossiei). However, as anybody with elementary knowledge of East European history and geography would know, Crimea had never been part of a “Russia” separate from much of the dry territory of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state to which the peninsula has belonged since 1991. Most of modern continental Ukraine was, just like Crimea, a part of, first, the Tsarist Empire, and, later, the Soviet Union. Those two states were, apparently, meant by the word “Russia” in the 2014 “referendum.”

The Kremlin was here playing with terminology in that it purposefully abused the multiple connotations of the word “Russia.” The term “Russia” can denote, depending on the context, the Tsarist Empire, the (politically irrelevant) Russian Republic within the USSR, the Soviet Union as a whole, or the post-Soviet Russian Federation. Despite the primitiveness of this and other similar verbal games in relation to Ukraine (“fascism,” “putsch,” “separatists,” “civil war,” etc.), such manifest manipulations of the meanings of key terms continue to affect many Western observers.

Crimea belonged from 1783 to 1917 to the All-Russian Empire, but this former “Russia” does obviously not correspond to the modern Russian nation state (Furman 2011). Much of the dry territory of modern Ukraine, and not just Crimea, once belonged to both, the Tsarist and Soviet states – as did the territory of almost the entire modern Russian Federation. Both post-Soviet republics, the Russian Federation and independent Ukraine, are thus successor states to the “Russia” with which Crimea was promised “reunification” in the pseudo-referendum of 2014.

In the West, many still do not seem to fully understand that the Crimean peninsula was never part of a mythical Russian nation state existing separately from most of today’s mainland Ukraine. The only land-based connection between Crimea and the territory of – what is today considered – “Russia,” in imperial and Soviet times, were the southeastern dry lands of today Ukraine. This was also the area of the Tsarist Empire via which Catherine the Great took control over Crimea, in the late 18th century, deploying, moreover, many Ukrainian-speaking soldiers in this operation. The larger part of left-bank Ukraine, i.e. its mainland eastern and southern parts, as well as right-bank Kyiv had belonged to the Tsarist Empire already before Catherine’s capture of Crimea. The larger part of right-bank Ukraine, i.e. today mainland central, southwestern and western Ukraine, was attached to the Tsarist Empire within a few years after Crimea’s annexation, between 1783 and 1795, as a result of the so-called second and third partitions of Poland, as well as after a victorious war against the Ottoman Empire.

For these and other reasons, Crimea could not have been detached from the Russian Federation that had only emerged in 1991. Accordingly, it could not be “reunited” with it in 2014. In 1991, Ukraine in its entirety, including the Black Sea peninsula belonging geologically and historically to it, departed from “Russia,” i.e. the Soviet empire. An even partial acknowledgement of Moscow’s historical justification of the 2014 annexation amounts to a recognition of Russian imperial irredentism as an ordering principal for the post-Soviet world. This, in turn, would entail an acceptance of Russian claims to many more lands outside the current Federation. Some of these territories had become parts of the Tsarist Empire, at about the same time as, earlier than, or even much earlier than, Crimea.

It is true that ethnic Ukrainians never dominated Crimea’s population – neither after the accession of the peninsula to the Tsarist Empire in 1783, nor after its inclusion into the Soviet Union in 1922, or after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Yet, by the end of the 19th century, the ethnic group still constituting the relative majority of residents of the peninsula were the indigenous Crimean Tatars, most of whom are today strongly pro-Ukrainian. Only later, during the 20th century, ethnic Russians became, first, the relative and, later, the absolute majority within Crimea’s population. This was a result of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes’ brutal demographic engineering of the peninsula, i.e. the purposeful settling of Eastern Slavs on Crimea, as well as the systematic eviction, deportation, suppression and, partly, annihilation of the Crimean Tatars as well as other non-Slavic ethnic minorities of the peninsula.

Contrary to widespread public perception in Russia and the West, today’s predominantly “Russian” demography of Crimea is thus a fairly young historic phenomenon. Moreover, it is, to considerable degree, the result of Moscow’s mass violence against Crimean Tatars as well as other non-Russians on Crimea. The historical connection of Crimea to the post-Soviet Russian Federation – and not to today Ukraine, favoured by most Crimean Tatars – is fragile for other reasons too.

Under Tsarism, Crimea belonged to the All-Russian Empire’s Tauric Gouvernement (Tavriya) from 1802 to 1917. This large administrative district encompassed not only the Black Sea peninsula, but also a significant part of southeastern mainland Ukraine, connected to Crimea through the Isthmus of Perekop. The dry part of the Tavriya province was demographically larger than Crimea, and its population consisted predominantly of Ukrainians or “Small Russians,” in Tsarist imperial terminology (Головченко & Дорошко 2016, 75). According to the population census of 1897, the entire Tauric Gouvernement, i.e. Crimea and the mainland part to the north of the peninsula, had approx. 1.4 million residents. Of them, about 0.4 million were Russophones, and about 0.6 million were Ukrainian-speakers.[8] Of the then circa 0.55 million inhabitants of the Tauric Gouvernement’s peninsula, 35.5% were Crimean Tatars, 33.1% were ethnic Russians, and 11.8% were ethnic Ukrainians.[9] Thus, the Tsarist-Tauric period of the Crimean past, that lasted for over 100 years, establishes an administrative-historical connection of the peninsula with the territory of present-day continental Ukraine as well as with the pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars rather than with the modern Russian Federation or nation.[10]

Crimea’s past as a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in 1921-1954 is often referred to by Russian supporters and Western apologists of the annexation. Yet, not only should this period be contrasted to the following longer period of Crimea’s belonging to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) in 1954-1991. Neither the RSFSR, although it had briefly existed already before the foundation of the USSR in 1922, nor the UkrSSR, although it was – unlike the RSFSR – an official member of the UN since 1945, were recognized independent states.

Moreover, the by far largest and most violent as well as murderous change of population on the peninsula falls into the RSFSR period of Crimean history. In 1944, Stalin ordered a brutal mass deportation of Crimean Tatars as well as several other minorities from the peninsula to Central Asia (Crimea’s relatively significant German minority had been deported by force, already in 1941). As a result of this purposeful ethnic cleansing, a significant part of the native population of Crimea perished, and, only then, the ethnic Russians became an absolute majority on the peninsula.

Having once been the predominant ethnic group on the peninsula, the Crimean Tatars today comprise, according to different statistics, about 10-12 % of Crimea’s population. Their geopolitical preferences have been principally shaped by their ruthless repression by Moscow since 1783, Stalin’s mass deportation of 1944 as well as their later return to the peninsula and reintegration into their homeland, i.e. into the late UkrSSR and post-Soviet Ukraine. Crimean Tatars’ views on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are also heavily informed by the cult of Stalin in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (Magocsi 2014; Беліцер 2016; Hottop-Riecke 2016). These and similar historical experiences of Crimean Tatars and their organizations explain their staunch support for the sovereignty and integrity of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, and their predominant consent to a return of Crimea to Ukraine (and much weaker demand for an independent Crimea). The pro-Ukrainian position of the Crimean Tatars and history of their deportation came briefly to the attention of a wider European public through the victory, for Ukraine, of the Crimean Tatar singer Jamala, with her song “1944,” in the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest (Wilson 2017, 15).

Developments during Crimea’s Soviet period can thus hardly be used as historical arguments in favour of the 2014 Russian annexation. They have limited relevance for current affairs, since they refer to episodes within the history of a highly centralized former empire. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state where the inclusion of Crimea into the RSFSR in 1922, and the economically motivated transfer of the peninsula from the RSFSR to the UkrSSR in 1954 had largely administrative purposes and only little political meaning (Jilge 2015).

Moreover, there were several cases of territorial transfers, within the USSR, that put under question the logic of the annexation’s apologists’ reference to the 1954 shift.  For instance, during a change of administrative boundaries inside the young USSR in 1925, the UkrSSR had lost, to the benefit of the RSFSR and Belarusian SSR, territories larger than the territory of Crimea it gained in 1954 (Головченко & Дорошко 2016, 91). Nevertheless, until 2014, no representative of the Ukrainian political elite had put forward any official territorial claims to neighbouring countries based on these facts or with reference to the numerous pre-revolutionary maps where the territory of “Ukraine” exceeds – partly, by far – the territory of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. Such historical narratives, megalomaniac views, and irredentist plans remained the prerogative of extreme and marginal political movements in Ukraine, as in most countries, before the Russian aggression. Only after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, mainstream public Ukrainian rhetoric concerning, for example, Russia’s southern Kuban region has, in response to the sudden claims by the Kremlin, become more provocative.

The post-Soviet leadership of Russia, despite many political disputes concerning the peninsula and especially Sevastopol, had never officially questioned Crimea’s inclusion into post-Soviet Ukraine, until 2014. Notwithstanding numerous unofficial political announcements by Russian politicians and some revanchist declarations of the Russian parliament after 1991, post-Soviet Russia formally and repeatedly affirmed the peninsula’s belonging to the Ukrainian state in several treaties and agreements (Kuzio 2007). The two legally most important documents, in which Moscow has recognized Crimea as part of Ukraine, are the tripartite 1991 Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian Belavezha Accords on the dissolution of the USSR, and the bilateral 2003 Russian-Ukrainian Border Treaty. Both agreements were ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments in accordance with due procedure and signed by the respective Presidents of Russia and Ukraine. An official press release from the Russian Presidential Administration on Putin’s signing of the law on the ratification of the border agreement between Russia and Ukraine in 2004 says: “The administrative border existing between the RSFSR and the UkrSSR at the moment of the collapse of the USSR was taken as the basis [of the treaty], in accordance with the [border’s] determination in the relevant state legal acts.”[11]

The unclear alternative to annexation in the “referendum”

The second option in the pseudo-referendum of March 16, 2014 offered Crimeans a return to the ARC’s constitution of 1992. Yet, its wording was even more confusing than that of the first option and its promise of a “reunification” of the peninsula with “Russia.” The paradox of the second question of the “referendum” was that, during the year 1992, two relatively different versions of the ARC’s Constitution had been adopted by the Republic’s Supreme Council.[12] Deliberately or not, it was left unclear, in the 2014 “referendum,” which of these two alternative republican basic laws the question actually referred to. The voters were simply asked: “Are you for the restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and for the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?”

It remained uncertain to the public, media and voters, however, exactly what constitutional text of 1992 the ballot’s second question had in mind. Was the “referendum’s” question offering a return to the more “confederative” version of the Crimean Constitution of ​​May 1992, or a re-introduction of the somewhat later, yet significantly changed and more “federative” version of the Constitution adopted in September 1992? The paradox was that both 1992 versions of the Constitution had established Crimea as a “part of Ukraine,” as formulated in the “referendum.” In the May 1992 version of the Constitution, Article 9 stated that Crimea “is included in the state Ukraine” (vkhodit v gosudarstvo Ukraina).[13] In the significantly modified September 1992 version of the Constitution, this assertion was additionally supported in Article 1, by the phrase that Crimea lies “within Ukraine” (v sostave Ukrainy).[14] Although both 1992 versions of the Constitution thus saw Crimea as belonging to Ukraine, these two texts departed in many other ways from each other, and defined the status as well as institutions of Crimea differently.

Had the majority of Crimeans opted for this second choice during the “referendum,” the newly created satellite government in Simferopol could apparently have chosen from the two different versions of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, at its own will. The Moscow stooges in, and not the population of, Crimea could have decided which text of the Crimean Constitution would have been adopted. There is a suspicion that the “referendum’s” strangely ambivalent second question was deliberately put in vague terms instead of offering the, for these types of referenda, usual option of a simple preservation of the status quo (Giles 2014). Perhaps, this, at its core, incomprehensible alternative to supporting a plain annexation was designed to increase the likelihood of choosing the first, much clearer option – full inclusion into the Russian Federation. In March 2014, the alternative put before Crimea’s residents was not so much a choice between Russia and Ukraine than one between a clear and blurry future.

The historical facts and political information listed in this article are neither unusual, nor secret or new.[15] They and some similarly revealing aspects of the noteworthy events of February-March 2014 are common places in today Ukraine. They are well-known to regional experts at Western universities and think-tanks, as well as to Eastern Europe specialists in European governments, political and civil organizations.

Nevertheless, many Western observers who do not hesitate to voice publicly comments on the past, annexation and future of Crimea do not seem to know or, worse, are choosing to ignore some or even most of the mentioned facts. Instead, many of them, at least, partially follow the Kremlin’s apologetic narrative for the annexation: A, perhaps, somewhat bent referendum ultimately led to a change of borders which (allegedly) was overwhelmingly demanded by Crimeans, and which corrected some (mythical) historical injustice.

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Footnotes

A different version of this article was initially written for German readers and published in the open political science journal Sirius: Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen. It was then translated, edited and modified by VoxUkraine, in Ukrainian, Russian, and English.

[1] For a list of some of the earliest relevant comments by critical Western experts on the pseudo-referendum, see: Podolian 2015, 122-128.

[2] An incomplete review of some relevant surveys can be found, in English, here, and, in Russian, here: Илларионов 2018.

[3] A short summary may be found here in English.

[4] See also: Wilson 2017.

[5] Some relevant quotes, sources and other information on this issue may be found here.

[6] «Скоро начнут сажать за мысли об Украине» – из крымских сетей // Крым.Реалии, 5.5.2018.

[7] OSCE Chair says Crimean referendum in its current form is illegal and calls for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue // ОSCE, 11.3.2014.

[8] Первая всеобщая перепись населения Российской Империи 1897 г. Распределение населения по родному языку, губерниям и областям // Демоскоп Weekly

[9] Some relevant data and sources may be found here.

[10] “Ukrainian historians [furthermore] point to a long history of earlier engagement [before 1783], with local Ukrainian Cossacks having a more intimate interaction with the peninsula than the northerly Muscovite state.” Wilson 2017, 4-5, with reference to: Смолій 2015. See also: Громенко 2016.

[11] President Vladimir Putin signed a law ratifying the Treaty between Russia and Ukraine on the Russian-Ukrainian State Border // President of Russia, 23.4.2004.

[12] For some more elaboration, see: Умланд 2016.

[13] Constitution of the Republic of Crimea // Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 6.05.1992.

[14] Law of the Republic of Crimea “On Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea” // Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 25.9.1992.

[15] For more information in English, see: Transitions Online 2015.

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The post Whom Does Crimea Belong to? Russia’s Annexation of the Ukrainian Peninsula and the Question of Historical Justice appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Starting this week we will be running a foreign affairs weekly quiz each Monday!

Here is the first one! Enjoy!

The post New Foreign Affairs Weekly Quizzes appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the mid-1960s, during the height of the American auto industry’s success in Detroit and surrounding border states, the US and Canada developed the Auto Pact. The Auto Pact brought Canada into the thriving industrial base in the northern region of the United States and over the years integrated Canadian and American auto production under the labels of the major US auto manufacturers. They developed what was called the Just In Time (JIT) system, where parts produced in Canada or the United States would cross the border to complete the production of a vehicle at a different plant nearby, but over the international boundary. While the immediate border region of Ontario still has much of its production and employment rooted in the manufacturing and auto industry, many of their American counterparts have disappeared, left for more tax friendly states in the US South or left the United States altogether. The traditional relationship did not degrade from lack of will, American and Canadian auto sector workers often shared connected Unions in addition to working for the same company, but with a sharp decline in production in Detroit and northern US states, American workers lost entire communities, and their cousins in Canada lost much of their stable employment as well.

With the Auto Pact being the basis of Free Trade between the two countries, in the late 80s the precursor to NAFTA, the Canada United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) was signed in 1988. This bilateral agreement sought to expand the auto industry’s relationship between the two countries and add additional sectors to the growing free trade basket. NAFTA was signed in 1994 with the addition of Mexico to the mix. Recently, NAFTA negotiators came to an agreement between the US and Mexico. Canada and the United States are currently discussing issues privately, with elections in both countries determining strategy over good neighbourly common sense.

The Canadian position seems to be one that follows a strategy of including social development goals in their new trade agreements. While The Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) included many common social goals, a similar approach in China and India was seen as inappropriate, likely due to a long history of cultural interference during the colonial era by Western powers. A similar strategy with the United States fell on deaf ears. With the recent election of the US President challenging many of the same issues brought up by the Canadians in their negotiations, it would be inappropriate to change American society via trade negotiations so soon after the electorate recently made their decisions on how they wished to develop their own communities, done by vote.

Much of the support gained by the President came from former workers and passive Union support in the border states with Canada. With the post-NAFTA economy routing jobs out of the entire region, support from disaffected former Union workers gave a massive boost to the campaign of President Trump. While there is still substantial employment in the auto sector in Ontario, Canada, the Just In Time system of the past has been substantially degraded, and the logistical reality of having auto plants in Southern Ontario is challenging jobs daily in the region. With the core of Canada-US trade starting from the Auto Pact, to CUSFTA to NAFTA being autos, and the economic reality in states like Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, it would be short term pain, albeit a lot of pain, for long term gain if trade relations soured between Canada and the US. Auto tariffs would make it more economical for US companies as well as foreign manufacturers in Canada to relocate to the United States. With the recent decline in corporate tax rates for companies operating in the US along with the low but now matched Canadian rate, free(albeit heavily taxpayer funded) healthcare and newly proposed Canadian carbon and energy consumption taxes now put Canada at an economic disadvantage.

Mexico was able to cope and negotiate with the current US policy of raking in US companies back home by proposing to lower corporate tax on companies operating in the border states to a small amount, as well as ensure a higher minimum wage for employees working in the auto sector in Mexico. With so much venom coming from the US on Mexican trade and other issues, the US and Mexico were able to ink a deal that even soothed a hardened President. Canadian leaders who are now in the drivers seat but seek a vehicle for election strategy should be weary of campaigning against perceived political rivals across the border. Alienating the American electorate and giving extra incentives to workers, unions and an Administration that wants you to challenge them will simply hurt Canadians, and while it might return the current government to their jobs in Ottawa, it will rapidly have an effect on an already debt burdened and mismanaged Canadian economy.

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The political transformation in the Horn of Africa is arguably the most counterintuitive development in the 21st century so far. Ethiopia has steered away from implosion and, for the first time in its history, appointed an Oromo Prime Minister with an Islamic name and heritage, ending the 20-year-long conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nonetheless, Abiy Ahmed, the charismatic new Prime Minster from the intelligence sector, is yet to find a firm footing and harmony within the deeply rooted and ethnically-dominated domestic political apparatus. The sporadic ethnic-targeting violence raging in the Oromo and the oil-rich Somali region is an ominous preview.

This enormous strategic achievement and the peace and economic development potential that it inspires cannot be underestimated. Neither can the value of the psychological and emotional liberation resulting from the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement that reconnected families and old friends. Having said this, from the strategic or policy perspective, it is too naïve not to question the real impetus driving this, the subsequent dramatic changes and the possible implications for each country and the region.

So far, all we have got is a bellyful of sound-bites seasoned with euphoric cheers. There has been little clarification as to the actual context; who and what is the driving force, and why with such unprecedented haste? If one must drive on the fast-lane, it is critical to keep hands on the wheel and eyes on the road.

Naturally, in politics there is no such thing as random acts of transformation; especially between two sworn enemies and most certainly in geopolitics. The strategic rivalries between the United States of America and China on the one hand and Saudi/United Arab Emirates and Turkey/Qatar on the other hand have been raising tensions if not fuelling various conflicts.

So prudence dictates that a leap of faith under these circumstances might not be the best option.

Tripartite Grand Strategy

The US is being squeezed out of Djibouti by its geopolitical rival China and the Trump administration is yet to unveil a coherent policy towards the Horn. Meanwhile, China is building its first overseas base to project its ever-growing military power. China is already well established on a trade and development front across Africa. The infrastructure and political support system for its new Silk Road are already established or in progress.  Despite owning nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries, the Chinese expansion in the region, and indeed Africa, is giving the US what I would call a strategic vertigo.

AFRICOM still remains the floating State Department in charge of guarding US interests in the region with the same old guards – Ethiopia handling the political bidding and Erik Prince (Blackwater) and companies via the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) DP World handling all matters intended to evade scrutiny and accountability. This may offer some perspective as to how a tiny Gulf nation became the key element through which the geopolitical landscape of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa is redesigned.

Despite the successful international business narrative it projects, clouds of suspicion still hover over dubious multifaceted maritime enterprise. The significant ‘intelligence and security risks’ associated with the company and its Erik Prince and private military partners was one of the main reasons why in 2006 the US congress rejected a DP World deal to manage six US ports, its support of neoconservative heavyweights and Vice President Dick Cheney notwithstanding.

In addition to the $700 billion trade between Europe and Asia that passes each year through Bab al-Mandab, the European Union is determined to constrict the out of Africa migration trend by promoting and investing in what it calls regional integration to improve trade, security and good governance. Ethiopia is to be the anchoring state and IGAD is to remain the institutional shepherd with international backing. The Horn model could then be extended to the entire continent. There is only one little caveat: no Turkey, no Qatar, and certainly, no China.

Ever since the eruption of the Gulf Cooperation Council feud that led to a Qatar blockade more than a year ago, neither politics nor security has been the same in the Horn of Africa. This is especially the case in Somalia, where the competing geopolitical interests of the UAE and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Qatar and Turkey on the other intersect. Though there are other zero-sum competitions at play in Somalia, none have brought in more cash for the disjointed politics locally known as siyaasadda kala fur-furka than the Gulf monarchs.

General Anwar Eshki is the Chairman of the Middle East Center for Strategic and Legal Studies and a close advisor to Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. He is the architect of the Saudi strategic duplicity that led to the bloody Yemen war, the normalisation of its relationship with Israel despite the systematic genocide of Palestinians, and the policy to facilitate Ethiopia’s annexation of Somalia.

In a speech he delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, the General recently argued, “Unifying the Horn of Africa under the leadership of Ethiopia” and connecting the Horn to the Arab peninsula by Al-Nour Bridge “connecting the al-Nour town of Djibouti and al-Nour town of Yemen.” The General made it clear to his audience that he spoke English but was advised, contrary to his preference, to deliver his speech in Arabic and to read it to his audience. Was the general reading the first draft of Saudi Arabia’s strategic policy toward the region or flashing reassurances to other partners?

Transformation Made Easy

When, in mid-June Shaikh Mohammed Bin Zayed visited Ethiopia, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development deposited $3.7 billion in the National Bank of Ethiopia– an amount equal to Turkey’s investment in Ethiopia. The day after, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister flew into Mogadishu. In a matter of about three hours, and without leaving the airport compound, the PM signed an agreement with the Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo securing Ethiopia and her behind the scene client a historic consignment- four of Somalia’s most strategic Red Sea and Indian Ocean ports. And where cash is the king, it was not too difficult for the UAE to acquire a number of ports in Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan.

In the following month, the new Prime Minister visited Asmara to meet with President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. On that very same day, the two sworn enemies signed a peace agreement that immediately restored diplomatic relations, and promised the imminent resumption of flight services and the use of Eritrea’s port facilities for Ethiopia.

Within weeks, the Somali President lands in Asmara to meet with President Isaias and restore diplomatic relations with Eritrea. All of a sudden, ‘Africa’s North Korea’ became the hottest destination. The rest of the IGAD member states are in line to pay their homage, despite the fact that Eritrea is officially under sanctions. Interestingly, in what seemed haphazard and an orchestrated political cover for Ethiopia—the country that spearheaded the sanctions on Eritrea with tons of disinformation—President Farmajo called upon the UN Security Council to lift the sanctions. This not only “deeply shocked” Djibouti, it also triggered a domestic backlash against a president with slipping popularity and a government considered a political apparatus to advance various international projects.

Is De-Turkification of Somalia Possible?

Ever since the Arab Spring, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have aggressively pursued a strategic objective aimed to stifle any and all Muslim Brotherhood influence due to the latter’s social and political capital on the streets that emanate from grassroots social services. Gulf monarchs consider that group and Turkey’s political ascendancy and influence on the Islamic and Middle Eastern affairs as the most serious threat to their life-long rule.

So as soon as Turkey launched a massive humanitarian and development campaign in 2011 and began to form a strategic partnership with Somalia, the UAE came on the scene for what many consider an effort to torpedo Turkey’s newly-found stature in Somalia. The UAE established the second largest embassy after Turkey in Mogadishu. It opened the Sheikh Zayed Hospital to compete with the Erdogan Hospital. By the time Turkey started to provide scholarships to train military officials, the UAE was already bankrolling various mercenary groups engaged in various clandestine operations, and trained a controversial Somali military contingent which it recently disbanded and left the weapons cache looted.

Turkey, while in alliance with Qatar, is on an entirely different scale. In a controversial campaign to settle a domestic political matter, Turkey exploited its close relationship with the Somali government to eradicate any and all institutions and individuals affiliated with the Gulen movement. Despite this, Turkey still embodies the gold standard of bi-lateral nation-building and development. With its tangible achievements and non-interference policy on Somalia’s domestic politics, the Turkish model has exposed the international aid system as corrupt and politically toxic. Though initially Qatar had a controversial start that mimicked the UAE’s, it finally settled to emulate the Turkish model and fund building roads and other essential infrastructures.

Trust but Verify

Despite all these changes, Ethiopia still has “too many conflicting interests that may compromise vital US interests” in favour of China, with which Ethiopia is economically intertwined. Could Abiy Ahmed be the person to bypass China and Turkey, which also have billions of dollars invested in Ethiopia? Any indication that he is there to ‘undo what is working for what could work’ might turn the old establishment against him and set a domino effect of regression in the region. If that is not enough to cause concern, Somalia, Djibouti and to a certain degree Eritrea each has its conflict of interest.

To level the playing field and guard against parasitical geopolitics, Somalia should demand the total withdrawal of the Ethiopian and Kenyan troops that are part of AMISOM as well as those who are illegally based in various regions in the Somali territory. And that UNSOM, the camouflaged guardian of Soma Oil and Gas interests, to close shop.

Eritrea for its part should demand an alternative to IGAD – a freshly-negotiated regional institution that grants an equal voice to each member and headquartered outside Ethiopia.

The Horn of Africa is an emerging market with great economic potential. But to turn that potential into economic success and sustainable stability, the region’s political, business, intellectual and social leadership’s aspirations must be in harmony: no foreign power or coalition of interests could secure that.

Therefore, the people of the Horn should not remain hostage to their historical enmities or to the myopic visions and corrupt ambitions of their political leaders. It is time to think big, but not recklessly. Each country must first address its domestic challenges and reconcile with itself.

Each country must come into the so-called regional integration deal sovereign and sober.

• LSE Centre for Africa

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Palestinian youths look at a building and mosque that were damaged by an Israeli air strike in Gaza City. Israel’s military said it had launched air strikes targeting Hamas in the Gaza Strip on July 14 as rockets and mortars were lobbed into southern Israel from the blockaded Palestinian enclave. / AFP PHOTO / MAHMUD HAMS

In recent days, various Israeli media outlets have reported that a long-term truce between Israel and Hamas is imminent. According to a foreign source, such a truce was discussed between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US National Security Advisor John Bolton. The question remains, what incidents have prompted the negotiation of this truce, what obstacles remain in the way, and what are the pros and cons of such a truce?

Recent months have witnessed intense violence between Israel and Palestinian terror groups in Gaza that included weekly riots, attacks on Israeli soldiers and attempts to infiltrate Israel. Incendiary kites launched from the coastal strip have set hundreds of fires in southern Israel, burning over 7,000 acres of land. Since the March of Return began, more than 610 rockets and mortar shells had been fired at Israel by August 9. During the same period of time, around 170 Palestinians have been killed and 18,000 Palestinians wounded.

According to Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid, “The Israeli side has a huge interest for a long term truce because that will give Israel more of an opportunity to focus on the northern border with Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.” Dr. Reuven Ehrlich, the head of the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, believes the truce will be based on the understandings that were reached following Operation Protective Edge: “This is the basis of everything. I think that first of all, all of the sides concerned must agree on a cease-fire. It seems like all of the relevant sides will agree on something minimalistic.”

Some Israelis support such a cease-fire. Former Israel Consul General Yitzchak Ben Gad declared: “I believe Hamas will not change its ideology. They do not believe Israel has a right to exist. Therefore, there is no chance for peace because people do not change their radical ideology overnight. The only way forward is to achieve a cease-fire, which is quiet for a while, one year, two years, whatever.”

However, not everyone in Israel is happy with the idea of Israel negotiating a truce with Hamas. As Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi notes, experience has shown that an arrangement with a terror organization that does not attempt to reach stability or security over the long-term “only prepares the terrorists for another round of terror for the residents of Israel.”

Prominent Middle East scholar Dr. Mordechai Kedar added: “In my view, any agreement without returning the Israeli dead soldiers and the citizens that are in Gaza is a major failure of the Israeli negotiator. Secondly, I would like to know what will happen if and when Israel finds a new tunnel dug into Israel. Is Israel allowed to blow it up within this agreement or not? In another related question, if Israel finds out one day that Hamas has built a factory to produce missiles which can precisely hit all of the cities from Metula to Eilat, does Israel have permission to get rid of this factory or not? This is very important point because if Israel does not close this issue now, it might be a problem in the future.”

Kedar and Safadi are not the only ones opposed to this cease-fire. According to Eid, “It looks like one of the biggest obstacles to such a truce between Hamas and Israel is the PA. The PA in their recent central committee announced that any truce has to be made by the PLO, which is considered as the only representative of the Palestinian people. It looks like Abbas right now is very upset with the Egyptian government. How can the Egyptian government coordinate such a truce between Hamas and Israel by excluding the PLO, the PA and Abbas? It is not going to be easy, for Abbas also announced that if the truce takes place between Hamas and Israel, he will cut any support or funding for the Gazan strip. That would be hell for the Gazan people.”

While it remains to be seen whether Israel and Hamas in Gaza will successfully negotiate a long-term cease-fire and whether the parties to the conflict remain committed to it, one thing is certain: Civilians on both sides will continue to suffer so long as quiet and tranquility are not restored both to the Gaza Strip and the communities of southern Israel.

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Photo Credit: links.org.au

Since spring 2014, Ukraine suffers from a full-scale war in the Donets Basin (Donbas). For the solution of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, Western and Ukrainian political analysts, opinion- and policy-makers, civic activists as well as diplomats need to jointly implement an agenda of re-imagination, prioritization, pacification and re-integration. The Donbas conflict should be understood anew, approached differently, engaged with directly, and solved sustainably. It should start with clearer communication of the stakes of the Ukraine Crisis for the EU. Resulting tighter economic and individual sanctions should be accompanied with positive offers to a post-imperial Russia. For a transition period, the Donbas should be put under the control of an international administration and UN peacekeeping forces. Finally, Ukraine and the West need to find a way to secure sufficient central control over a reintegrated Donbas while formally implementing the Minsk Agreements’ political parts.

Phase One: Re-Imagination  

A communication campaign should address a widespread misperception that today’s Donbas confrontation is comparable to older territorial disputes in such “failed states” as Georgia, Azerbaijan or Moldova. The ongoing war’s repercussions beyond Eastern Ukraine demand public clarification. The Donbas war needs to become perceived as a hot conflict putting under question Europe’s security system as long as one of the largest European states remains on the brink of collapse.

The prime reasons for this risk are neither the current domestic political tensions nor grave economic difficulties of Ukraine. During the break-up of the USSR in 1989-1991, “Ukraine without Kuchma” protests of 2000-2001, Orange Revolution in 2004, or Euromaidan uprising in 2013-2014, Ukraine was shattered by tremendous upheavals. Yet, none of these conflicts seriously endangered the Ukrainian republic’s integrity. Ukraine’s economic situation throughout the 1990s or during the Great Recession of 2008-2010 was as difficult as – or more so than – today. Yet, neither of these two deep economic Ukrainian dives threatened European security.

While being laudable by itself, the West’s large-scale financial help and developmental support for Ukraine is sometimes misconceived as a (if not the) major instrument to solve the Ukraine Crisis. Yet, even graver earlier political and economic domestic dislocations in Ukraine’s recent past did not threaten the stability of its state. Western help for Ukraine should continue but not any longer be misunderstood as a substitute for actually solving the Donbas conflict.

Moscow’s shrewd combination of crude military and seditious non-military methods (“hybrid war”) is meant to subvert Ukraine as a socio-political community. The Kremlin’s premier instrument for achieving this aim is to keep the Donbas as an open bleeding wound that will eventually cause Ukraine’s state to implode. A seemingly domestic Ukrainian collapse can then be used by the Kremlin to demonstrate to Russia’s population the impotence of European integration and foolishness of post-Soviet democratization.

While this is a rational strategy in terms of short-term Russian regime stability, it is hazardous enterprise. Western public opinion shapers need to communicate better why and how Ukraine’s possible future collapse entails transnational risks. For instance, possible millions of Ukrainian refugees would be flowing into the EU. In a worst-case scenario, a malfunctioning of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhia, less than 300 miles away from the current war zone, would have repercussions worse than those of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. A public narrative emphasizing European states’ national interest in Ukrainian stability needs to replace currently widespread externalization of the Donbas war as a sad, but far away conflict with few direct implications for the EU.

Phase Two: Prioritization

A novel understanding of the all-European relevance of the Donbas war should lead the EU to put its solution higher on its foreign policy agenda, and closer in the immediate future. The current sanctions regime is not trivial, yet malapportioned. According to research results of Moscow’s Skolkovo School of Management, EU sanctions “are capable of jeopardizing Russia’s production of gas and, particularly, oil in the future.” The underlying assumption of Brussels’s approach is that strategic patriotism guides Moscow’s decision making. The West hopes that future income losses for the Russian state will lead the Kremlin to modify already today its policies towards Ukraine. Yet, the logic of Moscow’s approach to secure domestic regime stability may be different. A soon collapse of the Ukrainian state resulting from successful hybrid war – above all, in the Donbas – can be sufficient to compensate for negative political repercussions of declining future energy exports.

In other words, the West needs to more explicitly address the figurative race between domestic effects on Russia of, on the one side, Western sanctions, and, on the other side, Ukrainian destruction. If Ukraine’s negative example demonstrates in time to Russia’s population that democratization leads to suffering and chaos, the Putin System can absorb a later decline of Russian living standards that results from the EU’s current sanctions. While a poorer future Russian state may be bad, it may still be seen as better than a democratizing Russia that risks ending up in a Ukraine-like collapse. Putin’s regime will, according to this supposition, prevail in spite of notable future EU sanctions effects.

In order to counter-act this scenario, the West should develop a tougher combination of carrots and sticks. First, sanctions need to be modified so as to generate earlier effects. Among others, Russian access to Western financial markets should be further reduced, and the building of the Nord Stream II pipeline be frozen. Second, the Putin system’s integrity should be shattered via additional measures against government officials and so-called “oligarchs.” The freedom the regime’s major stake-holders (as well as their immediate family members) should be further restricted to generate more intra-systemic dissatisfaction.

Third, a forward-looking vision for improved post-conflict Russian-Western relations should be communicated throughout Russia. Western positive offers to a future less aggressive Moscow could include joint energy projects or a free-trade zone between the Eurasian and European unions. Western awards to Russia for even more comprehensive solutions to all disputed territorial conflicts from Transnistria over Crimea to South Ossetia could include an Association Agreement (including a DCFTA) with the EU, visa-free regime with the Schengen Zone, and Membership Action Plan with NATO. Think-tanks and NGOs should communicate such ideas within the Western public. After they become widely known, national governments and international organizations (EU, NATO) could be encouraged, by interested parliamentarians, intellectuals et al., to voice such proposals for a hypothetical Euro-Atlantic integration of Russia in meetings with Russian governmental and non-governmental actors. The offers should be made officially, explicitly and repeatedly to feed societal pressure for a change in Russia’s foreign political course.

Phase Three: Pacification

Once Moscow takes a more compromising position, practical solution of the Donbas conflict can start. Western experts, diplomats and politicians should thus explore the future financing, mandate and shape of an international peacebuilding operation across the entire Eastern Donbas. A temporary third-party intervention would provide a transitional stage between Moscow’s current crypto-occupation and the seized territories’ subsequent return under Kyiv control. A UN mission with up to 30,000 peacekeepers, as the core element of such an operation, could serve the Kremlin as a face-saving mechanism. Moscow would, in the UNSC, have to be approve employment of a multinational force in the Donets Basin, and could present this to the Russian public as Putin’s peace initiative.

In combination with OSCE observer and EU civil missions as well as in cooperation with the Ukrainian state, the UN troop’s primary task would be to provide for demilitarization, disarmament, demining, re-reset of local self-governance, media freedom, return of IDPs, creation of a new police force, observance of civil and political rights, as well as preparation of local elections. Armed UN detachments would have to come from non-NATO and non-CSTO countries to preempt accusations of instrumentalization. Andrej Novak (2014), Oleksiy Melnyk with Andreas Umland (2016), the International Crisis Group, Richard Gowan and Andrey Kortunov (2017), or, more recently, Alexander Vershbow, Vitalii Kulyk with Maria Kucherenko and Liana Fix with Dominik Jankowski (2018) have, among others, discussed various additional challenges of such a scheme. International developmental organizations (World Bank, UNDP, EBRD, USAID, GIZ, DFID, SIDA etc.) should become active in the occupied territories as soon as an improved security situation permits.

Phase Four: Reintegration

The principal issue for the restoration of the currently occupied territories as parts of the Ukrainian state, after transitional international administration, are the political provisions of the Minsk Agreements.

They include demands for a constitutional reform, a special “law on interim local self-government,” the creation of “people’s police units” as well as other prescriptions intended by the Kremlin to infringe upon Ukraine’s political sovereignty. In February 2015, the signed text of the so-called Minsk II Agreement had been largely pre-formulated by the Kremlin. Nevertheless, most of Moscow’s formulations were accepted by Ukraine, Germany and France under the impression of a Russia-led and victim rich military offensive by the separatists conducted concurrently with the Minsk negotiations.

Ukraine’s major stakeholders (MPs, parties, opinion-leaders etc.) reject today the 2015 agreements’ political parts. Western and Ukrainian politicians, diplomats and experts thus need to discuss, already today, a future way out of this deadlock. A possible trick to do so would be a joint Ukrainian-Western re-interpretation of the Minsk Agreements’ emphasis on exceptional standing of the Donbas. A new reading of the Minsk II’s call for a “special status” of the Donbas could mean future stronger rather than weaker control over the currently occupied territories, by Kyiv.

To be sure, the Kremlin’s goal, with Minsk II, was to increase the Donbas’s official independence, and Russia’s unofficial influence there. Yet, Ukrainian and Western diplomats could agree upon turning this purpose of the Agreement text on its head while still formally fulfilling its prescriptions. A future Ukrainian law on the Donbas could indeed proclaim a “special status” for the currently occupied territories. Yet it could, for instance, increase the power of the Luhansk and Donetsk prefects. The new political offices are envisaged by the constitutional reform in connection with Ukraine’s ongoing decentralization which, in turn, is explicitly mentioned in the Minsk Agreements. While these prefects had been originally designed to fulfill supervisory functions in a decentralized Ukraine, their prerogatives could, for the Donbas, be extended to that of temporary presidential governors within the framework of a regional interim regime. The National Guard – not mentioned at all in the Minsk Agreements – could, in a future Donbas law, be granted additional rights and obligations on the currently occupied territories. Similar further provisions could be included in a future Donbas law in order to make a constitutional reform acceptable or even desirable to the Verkhovna Rada.

Concluding Remark

This four-stage plan will hardly be to the liking of the Kremlin. If implemented consistently, it could still force Moscow to go along with it. Tightening Western sanctions will eventually lead Putin’s entourage to assent to an international administration of the Donbas, as the least embarrassing way out. Once UN troops have arrived, Kyiv could start gradually implementing a reintegration plan that does not violate the Minsk Agreements’ text, yet still re-establishes proper Ukrainian control over the Donets Basin. Only this end result will constitute a sustainable solution to the conflict.

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On the global scale of human suffering, Yemen outweighs all other countries. In its fourth year, the Yemen war – fueled by regional and other hegemonic powers – is nowhere near its end. Neither the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which has been accused of war crimes, nor the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, accused of recruiting child soldiers, are close to winning this conflict.

Yemen is a humanitarian catastrophe in progress. And on the political front, the way things are evolving, the Somali model might be a fait accompli. It is hard to imagine a different fate for Yemen than that of Somalia – numerous balkanized political entities cursed with perpetual distrust and hostility.

Two-Sides of the Same

As someone whose ancestral background is deeply rooted in both Somalia and Yemen and with a keen interest in post-colonial political evolution in both societies, I can attest to the profound cultural similarities between these two countries and their peoples.

Both countries have never been left on their own in modern history. Both societies are dominated by a primitive tribal system that preserves history through oral traditions that commonly cling on to toxic narratives against other tribes. Both tend to zealously defend tribal honor or vanity even if that means sacrificing their countries’ interests. Both have religious extremist groups. Both are considered rich in natural resources though they remain two of the poorest nations in the world. In both countries, a culture of corruption is as rampant as their addiction to khat (qat), a plant with amphetamine-like stimulant potency. And the rule of law is by and large superseded by the tribal or clan social and political orders.

Furthermore, both are located in coveted strategic geographical areas. Both have separatist or secessionist movements whose claim to self-determination is based on the artificial demarcations of the British colonial power. Both nations have foreign elements that are hell-bent on advancing their own exclusive interests. And foreign interests in both countries are so camouflaged with domestic political affairs that it is almost impossible to identify which is which.

Despite these daunting similarities, I believe transformation is still possible, though it will require herculean sacrifices.

Geopolitics Rules

Geopolitical conflicts have certain distinctive characters that set them apart from conventional ones. Actors who are set to reap the strategic benefits are seldom visible in the fields. Covert actions frame or shape the overt ones. And those who ultimately show up as most equipped firefighters or the most enthusiastic life-savers are often the real arsonists.

These arsonists, who are routinely armored by credulous or greedy local citizens, are on a mission to establish favorable realities on the ground. They re-engineer the neighborhood and create an environment conducive to perpetual (but manageable) insecurity that makes the local populations in desperate dependency.

Criteria for Junglification

The Saudi-led coalition has taken a page out of the playbook used in the catastrophically failed Iraq war. The strategy was simple: invade under the altruistic pretext of coming to save Yemen. Inflict awe-striking destruction. Destroy historical sites, records, and rituals that could reinvigorate collective memory and collective identity – a sense of nationhood.

Pick a side on a sectarian divide knowing full well that in tribal societies there is nothing wholly monolithic. Support various zero-sum tactics in the hope that they will play right into the Saudi hegemonic interest in the region. Don’t worry about an exit strategy. Count on installed puppets and count on the support of the exploitable sectarian masses and their raging appetite for ethnic-cleansing.

Battle of Hodeidah

The battle to control Hodeidah is still underway, and the longer this continues, the worse the humanitarian crisis will get. After Houthis refused to adhere to the demands to disarm and hand over the Hodeidah port and evacuate the city, the Saudi-led coalition forces have launched a ferocious invasion that shook the foundation on the Houthi control of strategic geographical areas in Yemen.

Soon after, an Emirati navy vessel was destroyed, and missiles were fired at Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh for the first time. This forced a swift change in rhetoric and preconditions and lent the U.N. proposal a fresh appeal for both sides. 

The Hodeidah battle is broadly considered as the most significant since the fall of Sana in September 2014. For the Houthis, it is a “do or die” struggle. Though the coalition claims that the Houthis receive their weapons through Hodeidah, it has been the most important port where 70 percent of Yemen’s food and other essential supplies come through.

If this battle drags on for long, it will exacerbate an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Likely Outcomes

At the deadly poker table, many continue to make their emotionless moves. There are those who are interested in sectarian supremacy, those interested in regional hegemony, those interested in lucrative mercenary projects, those interested in proxy political legitimacy, and those with the grand strategy to secure geopolitical dominance.

The likely outcome for Yemen is the Somali model – tribal fiefdoms exposed for perpetual exploitation. On July 17, a two-day pow-wow ended in Brussels. The so-called Somalia Partnership Forum brought together six Somali presidents to discuss the affairs of their single nation through a third party or representatives of 58 nations that are all presumably willing to pour more money into Somalia project than they are willing to fight poverty and homelessness in their respective countries.

So, is there an alternative?

The only means to change this imminent trajectory is to accomplish what Somalia has been stuttering and stumbling with – and at times faking it – for decades: a genuine reconciliation followed by a rigorous campaign to sacrifice claims of exclusive tribal rights for inclusive equal rights for all Yemeni citizens. This requires empowering the educated younger generation who by and large transcend the self-destructive clannish worldview of the traditionalist elders.

• first appeared on The Globe Post

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Animated image of the future Tempest fighter plane.

The United Kingdom recently announced that they were working on producing their own stealth fighter project. Named the Tempest, it would become the front line of the Royal Air Force and would commit billions into the UK’s aviation industry. While the F-35 project had multiple innovational links to the British Aerospace industry and would have produced a fair number of skilled jobs in the UK itself, the international fighter project for the F-35 may be on shaky ground. Competition that would remove signatory nations from the F-35 project would make the fighter more expensive to produce, despite there being production and employment guarantees for most contributory members to the project. While the Tempest was announced to be flying with the RAF by 2035, it still might be the case that F-35 “NATO” fighter will still become part of the British air arm alongside the Tempest.

The initial vision of the F-35 was seen as a stealth support and strike aircraft that would do the heavy lifting and be able to evade enemy radar and anti-air systems. It was envisioned that the more expensive and elite F-22 fighters would enter enemy airspace in order to destroy their air defenses and the F-35s would come in as a second strike support aircraft to eliminate further threats. Older 4th generation fighters would then follow through with prolonged strikes once the air defenses are non-operational. The Tempest may serve alongside the F-35s as the F-22s would if the UK keeps its links to the F-35 program, but the relationship and whether or not the UK will stay with the F-35s remains to be seen. Some countries like Canada who may exit the F-35 program have chosen to purchase 1990s era F-18A and F-18B types from Australia. Committing to old aircraft, especially those that a country already possesses and needs to be replaced can be dangerous to the aircrew. With material fatigue as well as no effective protection against modern anti-air system, committing to older types sends the message that there will be a lack of participation in future NATO missions, difficult at a time when spending on NATO commitments are due to rise in the next few years. The Tempest does the opposite, showing a commitment to lead missions that require increased radar protection in order to complete its missions.

New 6th generation fighters have one main goal in mind, and that is to defeat ever developing radar and missile systems that are likely to produce hard to defeat defense shields in the future. Modern systems like the S-400 and ever developing BUK-M3 will be widely distributed to any country that wishes to purchase them over the next few years. With more advanced systems already in production in Russia and China, it will be interesting to see how a fighter design set to make its expensive debut in 2035 stands up to modern missile systems by then. With Anti-air systems now being able to target missiles themselves, targeting a larger plane or drones may not be a definitive challenge by 2035, or even by 2020. Whether it be F-35s, Tempests or more F-22s, the focus on pilot safely and security should be paramount in the minds of policy makers and those choosing to place their pilots in active danger zones.

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After the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a geopolitical gray zone emerged between Western organizations on the one side, and the Russia-dominated space on the other. This model was always fragile, did not help to solve the Transnistria problem in eastern Moldova or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in south-western Azerbaijan, and was shaken by the Russian-Georgian war of 2008. It finally broke down with Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Against the background of these shocks, a partial solution to the security challenges of the current gray zone for all of the countries of Eastern Europe — whether in- or outside NATO and the EU — could be to revive the old concept of the Intermarium (land between seas). By cooperating and allying with each other, the states between the Baltic and Black Seas could bolster their security and in particular improve the balance of power against Russia, without immediate further Eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU.

Why would that be necessary? NATO’s 2008 Bucharest declaration promised Ukraine and Georgia a future inclusion into the Alliance, yet did not provide them with a Membership Action Plan. In 2013 and 2014, the European Union signed a “new generation” of especially comprehensive association agreements with Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, yet without an accession perspective attached. The European Union’s Eastern Partnership — established with six post-Soviet East European and South Caucasian states in 2009 — touches a wide array of political, economic, and cultural themes, yet fails to provide military security. Only Azerbaijan, among the Eastern Partnership countries, partly resolved its security issue by concluding a separate mutual aid treaty with Turkey in 2010, obtaining the promise of military help from a NATO member and relatively powerful country.

Remaining outside comprehensive military-help schemes, it is no wonder that Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (as well as Azerbaijan before it had concluded its treaty with Turkey) became partially failed states that do not fully control their territories. Russia and its allies took advantage of the lacking international embeddedness of these four countries. Moscow supports separatism directly in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the Donets Basin (and indirectly, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh). Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula was simply annexed to the Russian Federation in March 2014.

Neither the EU nor NATO will any time soon be able to fill the conspicuous security vacuum they have left with their hesitant and inconsistent enlargement policies in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Both organization have, in the past, amply demonstrated their inadequacy as strategically thinking and geopolitically resolute actors. Against this background, an increasing amount of post-Soviet politicians, diplomats, and intellectuals are starting to discuss alternative options to at least partially increase their countries’ security. The most prominent among these concepts is the Intermarium.

The Historical Roots of a Union of the Lands Between the Seas

The idea of an association or coalition that would encompass the lands of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, from Baltic to the Yugoslav nations, appeared first in the 19th century. Such an alliance would have been directed against the threats of Tsarist Russia in the east, as well as of, initially, Prussia and, later, the German Reich in the west. After World War I, the idea gained momentum in Poland, which strived to survive and strengthen itself within the ongoing European turmoil. Its first inter-war leader Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) re-introduced the 19th-century concept of a Slavic union called Międzymorze (Land between the Seas). The term became subsequently known under its Latinized form “Intermarium,” and referred to some sort of alliance of the Central-East and South-East European states located between the Baltic, Black, Adriatic, and/or Aegean seas.

Initially, Piłsudski sought to achieve such an East European union or even federation that would have included Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. The 1920 Warsaw Treaty, a military-economic coalition with the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic, could have become a first step toward such a coalition. Yet, the alliance did not prevent Ukraine’s and Belarus’s capture by the victorious Bolsheviks during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. It became clear that those East European lands which had fallen under control of the Soviet Union, founded in 1922, were no longer available for an Intermarium. Subsequently, Piłsudski sought to forge a confederation between about a dozen European states, including the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and Greece, that would have strengthened its members against both Soviet and German threats. However, the broad geographical scale of this project and differences in the interests of the possible member states prevented its realization, and thus could not prevent the Nazi-Soviet assault of September 1939.

In and after the World War II, Eastern and Central Europe suffered the very fate that Piłsudski’s Intermarium had been supposed to prevent. The small nations between the great powers became mere objects of contemporary European history. The years under fascist, Soviet, pro-Soviet, or other communist rule (as in Yugoslavia) added shared experiences to the lands of the Intermarium that had been already before tied to each other by various historic, linguistic, religious, and personal links. Now, some or all of these countries also experienced a short occupation by the Third Reich and its allies, and long-lasting Moscow-backed and/or Soviet-like governments, economic collectivization, totalitarian rule, international isolation, political indoctrination, etc.

Yet another common experience for the countries of East-Central Europe in the 20th century was Western discriminatory discourse on them, which “sliced” the history of these nations away from Europe’s past and memory, an imagination of the European continent sharply criticized by, among others, Norman Davies and Tony Judt.[1] In this discourse, what was thought of as “real” Europe was its western or, at most, central part. For many Westerners, the nations controlled by the (pro-)Soviet regimes seemed to be too foreign and strange to be considered properly Western. This view remained prevalent throughout the 1990s, and, to some degree, even after most formerly communist states had become full members of NATO and the EU.

The Intermarium’s Relevance Today

The creation of a full-scale Central and Eastern European union or federation, as once envisaged by Piłsudski, is not any longer feasible or necessary today. That is because the majority of countries in this region have either already acceded to the EU, are expecting to do so soon, or have concluded far-reaching association agreements that will gradually make them parts of the Union’s economic and legal sphere. The Intermarium’s nations are thereby already closely connected and integrating with each other.

This is also why some initiatives within the EU — like the Visegrad group, Three Seas Initiative, and Via Carpatia transport corridor — are so far of only marginal relevance to Eastern Europe’s security. To be sure, these initiatives have also political dimensions and thus remind of the inter-war Intermarium idea. Yet they are mere additions to the regular integration process within the EU and its Eastern Partnership. They thus lack larger geopolitical clout and remain essentially intra-Union lobbying projects. The Adriatic Charter association, created by the United States, Albania, Croatia, and Republic of Macedonia in 2003, and joined by Montenegro as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2008, is a step towards solving the security dilemma in Europe’s post-Cold War south-east. Yet there is no such project for the “grey zone” states between the EU and Russia, which today are in a somewhat similar situation to interwar East-Central Europe.

In fact, immediately after the break-up of the Soviet bloc and Union, the Intermarium briefly reappeared in its original form in Poland, under the label “NATO-bis” which would have been a separate security organization of Europe’s post-communist countries. That project was driven by fears of Russian neo-imperialism, similar to those of Piłsudski 70 years before. The idea of such a regional security coalition was also championed by non-Polish political leaders in East-Central Europe ranging from Algirdas Brazauskas (1932-2010) in Lithuania to Zianon Pazniak (b. 1944) in Belarus, as well as regional political experts. Yet, most of the states of the presumed pos-Cold War Intermarium alliance soon received membership invitations from the EU and NATO. As a result, for Eastern Europe’s new EU and NATO candidate and later member states, the added value of creating a new regional security organization declined rapidly.

Still, in view of continuing threats and risks in Eastern Europe, the Intermarium concept has, since 1991, constantly remained in the air throughout the region. It has also become a vehicle for promoting the interests of Eastern EU members within the union. The term has thus experienced a double revival, as both an enhanced regional cooperation project and as a transregional security concept. When the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party won the 2015 elections, it announced a more active stance by Warsaw in Central-East European political affairs in both of these regards. Initially, PiS wanted not only closer cooperation within the Visegrad Group members, but also stronger attention toward Ukraine as well as the other Eastern Partnership countries.

Poland’s new focus on the V4, Intermarium, and, briefly, Ukraine had, however, an ambivalent intention. It went along with the new PiS government’s increasing criticism toward Germany and France, who, in the eyes of the Polish conservative party’s speakers, are allegedly using the EU to exploit weaker states and further the liberal anti-traditionalist agenda of their mainstream parties. Manipulating anti-Russian and anti-German sentiments among PiS supporters, the new Polish president Andzej Duda (b. 1972) has re-utilized the concept of Intermarium as an East European cooperation scheme not only directed against Russia, but also presenting it as an alternative to the dominant Western countries within the EU. Somewhat similar motives may have been behind the activities of the new Croatian president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic (b. 1968), to intensify regional political, economic, and security cooperation of the EU member states between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas.

In contrast, for Ukrainians, the idea of Intermarium is primarily related to their national security concerns, as Ukraine struggles to survive in its ongoing hybrid war with Russia. In Kyiv, the Intermarium is seen as complementary, rather than antagonistic, to other integration schemes. Kyiv already has — within the logic of an Intermarium — developed special ties with other Central-East European states, albeit in the loose forms of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (known under its acronym GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) and the Community of Democratic Choice. Later on, Ukraine started certain military cooperation with Lithuania and Poland, and established a common military brigade with them. Lithuania and Poland have for many years been those countries that Ukrainians, according to polls, favor strongly. These and similar developments are an expression of the sense of common interests, perceptions, threats, and, partially, even identity among Moscow’s former colonies in East-Central Europe. Yet, none of the Intermarium-related projects have yet led to the creation of potent security alliance in Eastern Europe.

Worse, the Intermarium as a security concept is becoming increasingly corrupted by narrow interests of Warsaw’s new traditionalistic leadership. What Poland seemingly today wants is to create an alternative center of influence inside the EU to improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis Western states. Suspiciousness toward Germany’s ardent Europeanism, desire to regain some of their sovereignty and to protect “traditional values” are now leading to a counter-reaction by Central-East European nations. This has manifested itself in strong opposition against the EU’s refugee distribution quotas by the governments of the V4 countries and Slovenia. (In Kyiv, there has emerged an even more radically anti-Western interpretation of the Intermarium idea by a minor far right party National Corps that has recently grown out of the notorious Azov Regiment, a volunteer National Guard unit, founded in 2014 by a small group of Ukrainian racist ultra-nationalists.)

Yet another cooperation reminiscent of the Intermarium, the already mentioned Three Seas (Adriatic — Baltic — Black Sea) or Trimarium Initiative (TSI), has infrastructure development as its main focal point. It fosters energy cooperation to reduce East-Central Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. While not being a member of the TSI, non-EU countries such as Ukraine may, in the future, benefit from these plans too. US President Trump attended a TSI summit in July 2017.

So far, however, none of the various above projects revives the original Intermarium’s intentions to join forces of smaller Central-East European nations against a geopolitically and militarily more powerful enemy. Today, an Intermarium could stretch from Narva in the north to Batumi in the south. Significant parts of the populations and the majority of foreign affairs experts of the countries between the Baltic and Black seas view Putin’s Russia as their biggest threat. Inside NATO, the political mainstreams of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania regard Russia as a major security problem. The same can be said of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova outside NATO. These states could thus form the core of an East-Central European and South Caucasian defense coalition. Further European countries within, or close to, the “land between the seas” — from the Scandinavian to the Western Balkan nations — might be willing to support, join, or associate themselves with such an alliance.

With regard to its legal set-up, the mentioned 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan could function as a model treaty for a security arrangement between certain eastern NATO states on the one side, and some post-Soviet non-NATO countries on the other. As in Article 2 of the ratified Turkish-Azeri alliance, the exact modus of action, in case of an aggression, could be left open to each treaty party. The pact could simply state an obligation that, if confronted with an attack, the parties would “mutually assist each other”, while the exact contents of the support would be agreed upon once a military infringement has happened. It should thus not conflict with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but would still constitute a warning to the Kremlin that new Russian military adventures will be costlier than Moscow’s low-risk interventions in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. While such a coalition of non-nuclear-weapons states cannot be a comprehensive solution to the post-Soviet security dilemma, it would constitute an enormous improvement for Zwischeneuropa (in-between-Europe).

However, paralleling the course of events after 1918 in East-Central Europe, since 1991 the Intermarium idea so far remains within the realm of speculation. The resulting non-inclusion of the gray zone countries continues to leave the perceived costs of further Russian aggression in the region low. Even after 2014, coalition-building in Eastern Europe has not gotten off the ground. The three associated Eastern Partnership countries now receive more political, economic, and also military support from NATO and the EU. Yet, they are still left on their own, by the West and their Central-East European neighbors, in their military confrontations with the Kremlin. The obvious lesson from both the inter-war and early post-Soviet periods is that this is not a sustainable state of affairs for the international relations of Eastern Europe.

Risks and Gains of an Intermarium Today

Our first publication of this assessment in 2017[2] triggered a swift response from MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Poland’s first Minister for European Integration.[3] He acknowledged that regional strategic cooperation is beneficial for all parties involved and for Europe as a whole – but he rejected the idea of a military alliance. Saryusz-Wolski argued that such an alliance would provoke Russia to test the Intermarium’s seriousness. If no “serious action” from members of both the Intermarium and NATO to a Russian challenged followed, the new alliance would be exposed “as a paper tiger.” Conversely, if the Intermarium’s NATO members were to engage actively in confronting Russia, this could undermine the protection provided by the Washington Treaty’s Article 5. Saryusz-Wolski concludes that a “military Intermarium” would erode “the deterrent effect of the [Atlantic] alliance.”

It is true that Russia likes to test reactions of its foes, as, for example, Moscow’s testing of Ukraine’s defenses in Mar’inka in summer 2015 showed. Yet, while Russia wants to portray itself as an unpredictable power capable of an all-out attack, in reality it has preferred hybrid methods and avoided open military confrontation. Even in the turmoil of early 2014, Russia used “little green men” without insignia to occupy Crimea – a scenario also considered by Estonia, but not tried by Moscow.

Russia still does not admit its military presence in Donbas and continues to claim that its soldiers spotted there are mere “volunteers.” The Kremlin behaves in this way as the West would likely view an open military attack as a “red line” making “business as usual” with Russia impossible. Against this background, the primary goal of an Intermarium would be, for the member countries, to deal jointly with hybrid threats. The limited nature of such threats would make it for NATO’s hypothetical Intermarium member states relatively easy to respond. Such engagement is unlikely to mean participation in a conventional war, and a subsequent erosion of the deterrent effect of NATO. In any way, a loosely formulated alliance treaty can leave it up to each party to decide which exact means – military or non-military – it chooses for fulfilling its alignment obligations. The formulation “military Intermarium” is Saryusz-Wolski’s, and not ours.

Saryusz-Wolski also claims that EU member states skeptical of the Eastern Neighborhood Policy will deny “association or membership benefits to Eastern European states, citing their Intermarium membership as sufficient enough.” We cannot follow such the reasoning behind such a speculation. Saryusz-Wolski’s estimates that “however suboptimal the current situation may be, it is still preferable to the institutionalization of parallel security structures.” He advises using “economic means to achieve the political goal of peace and stability.” Such conclusions let us suspect that he does not see or does not want to fully acknowledge the direct security challenges that will remain for the “gray zone” states in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus, as well as the indirect risks for their Western neighbors who made it into NATO and the EU.

Kostiantyn Fedorenko is a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and frequent commentator on current Ukrainian affairs for various European media outlets.

Dr. Andreas Umland is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, and editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press at Stuttgart and distributed by Columbia University Press at New York.

NOTES

[1] E.g.: Tony Judt. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. Penguin Books, 2006.

[2] Kostiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland, “How to Solve Ukraine’s Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe,” War on the Rocks, August 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/.

[3] Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, “In Between Security Arrangements: The Trojan Horse of Military Intermarium,” War on the Rocks, October 13, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/in-between-security-arrangements-the-trojan-horse-of-military-intermarium/.

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The Trump team has been pushing false rhetoric regarding immigrants since the moment Trump announced his candidacy in 2015. Starting with his infamous “they’re rapists” comment at his candidacy announcement speech to his call for a “complete and total shutdown of all Muslims entering the United States,” Trump has made it abundantly clear that one of the core parts of his platform was going to be cracking down on illegal and legal immigration.

The latter issue he went after with the “travel” ban. The original ban most notably prohibited people from Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia from entering the United States for 90 days while also placing new restrictions on the US’s ability to accept refugees. The ban’s stated purpose and title was “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” The lunacy of the Supreme Court decision to uphold a watered down version of the ban a year later (ignoring the ridiculous conflict of interest in the case as Neil Gorsuch, who voted for Trump, was appointed by the petitioner himself) and the flawed logic of the original ban is clear. Two studies done by the CATO Institute serve as great evidence to this end. First, they found that the vetting process of citizens from the Middle East trying to travel to the United States was already incredible thorough and “robust” including thorough background checks, several rounds of interviews, and fingerprinting. Second, they reported that “Foreigners from [the] seven nations [in the original ban] have killed zero Americans in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and the end of 2015.” In fact, between 1975-2015, terrorists originating from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon have accounted for far more deaths than any other country in the world. Terrorists from the fifth country on the list, Kuwait, have only accounted for six deaths in the time frame while the top four are all in the triple digits and above. None of those countries were on any iteration of Trump’s travel bans. Trump’s cries for national security fall well short.

As far as the Supreme Court goes, it’s more than obvious that the intention behind the travel ban was maligned. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor writes in Trump v Hawaii, “Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus … The majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.” Trump did exactly what he told the voters he would do: he stopped Muslims from entering the United States to the best of his abilities, through a thinly veiled attempt to cry national security.

Not only does the ban fail to actually protect the United States against potential terrorists, the ban actually has harmful, negative impacts. Specifically, it exacerbates the problem of radicalization, arms extremist groups with unlimited recruitment publicity, and jeopardizes our relationship with critical foreign governments. The same CATO report that explored the US’s “robust” vetting processes cited a Department of Homeland Security draft intelligence assessment which found that “most foreign-born, US-based violent extremists likely radicalized several years after their entry into the United States.” Critically, Trump’s ban makes the problem much worse. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, former senior director for counterterrorism and deputy legal adviser at the National Security Council Joshua A. Geltzer, and former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matthew G. Olsen published an article for CNN explaining their scathing opposition to the ban in which they write: “The ban is so obviously, palpably, indeed explicitly anti-Muslim in nature that it has — understandably — offended Muslim-American communities around the world, including in the United States. Yet those are precisely the communities that can prove critical for identifying and responding to individuals becoming radicalized by groups like ISIS and al Qaeda.” Furthermore, Clapper et co explain that “effective counterterrorism relies heavily on robust intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign governments.” Restricting a country’s citizens from entering the United States is a “surefire way to offend that country’s government and impede intelligence-sharing, rather than enhancing the flow of information about terrorist threats as effective counterterrorism requires.” In fact, after Chad was included in an iteration of the travel ban, they pulled their troops out of Niger where they had been aiding in a counterterrorism fight against Boko Haram. Despite their removal from Trump’s next ban, “there’s been no indication of when, if ever, Chad’s troops will return to Niger. It’s usually not easy to soothe an offended partner.”

Conclusively, Trump’s travel ban does nothing to improve national security, while subjecting “countless families and individuals … pain and suffering” and arming extremists groups with recruitment materials. Nevermind the justification is essentially to punish citizens of foreign countries because the government believes a few individuals from their country pose a threat to national security. Trump’s Muslim ban is incredibly dangerous and blatantly unconstitutional.

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Members of the Me Too Movement who protest against harassment and sexual abuse are not “weak” and are not “looking for attention” but rather are heroines speaking out for justice.    

American actress Lindsey Lohan recently came under fire after she proclaimed that women who speak up about sexual harassment “look weak” and that some women go to the police “for the attention.”  Although she later on apologized for her remarks, it is still a major blow for all women worldwide to have a woman of her status come out and make such remarks.   The lack of compassion she demonstrated in her remarks highlight that she has lived a privileged life and is out of touch with many women across the world, who have fallen victim to harassment and sexual abuse in the hands of men and yet can only dream of having the privilege of reporting them to the police, who will then proceed to have an impartial investigation.

Take the story of Iranian journalist Neda Amin, who is living as a political refugee in Israel.  Twice, she was raped by the Iranian regime due to her activities against the ruling Islamist government.  According to her, she did not even have the privilege of reporting the rapes to the police for the Iranian regime was on the side of the rapists.  If she had proceeded to report the rapes, she could have found herself criminally prosecuted. In 2014, Iran hanged Reyhaneh Jabbari, a victim of an attempted rape who fought back against her rapist and killed him.   The Iranian regime accused her of committing an unwarranted murder.   According to NCRI Women’s Committee, when 41 women and girls were gang raped recently in Iranshahr in Balochistan Province by the Basij militia, it was the whistleblower and a Baloch man who staged a sit-in protesting against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that were prosecuted.   The gang rapists got off without punishment.

Iran is far from the only regime where the government is not on the side of the victims.  According to the UN, Syrian government forces and militias have raped and sexually abused women and girls in order to punish opposition communities in 20 governmental and intelligence branches, Reuters reported.  Of course, with Assad almost completely winning the Syrian Civil War, the victims of Assad are unlike to obtain justice in Syria.  Although a UN report recommended that Syria be tried for these grave war crimes at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, to date, this has not happened.  Syria is not a signatory of the Rome Statute and thus Assad can only be brought to The Hague if the UN Security Council mandates it.  Since Assad is allied with both China and Russia, this is unlikely to happen.  As a result, some victims of Assad’s regime are seeking justice in German courts but without the support of The Hague, comprehensive justice for the victims is unlikely.   Assad has literally gotten away with perhaps the worst democide of the 21st century so far.

Not having the freedom to publicly speak out against such sexual violence and to obtain justice for such horrific crimes can emotionally kill a woman or girl.  According to Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, a Christian woman in Bangladesh who was the victim of sexual harassment recently committed suicide.  Basu claimed that a mob had entered into her home, demanding money.  According to the report, when the woman refused to give them the money, they tortured her and forced her to pose for a nude video.  They told her that they would give her three days to give them the money or else they would post the video online on social media.   Due to the despair that this incident caused her and the fact that she could not expect justice if she proceeded to prosecute the sexual harassers with the police, Basu stated that she committed suicide, emphasizing that this Christian woman was merely one of many such victims in Bangladesh.

Basu blames the ruling government in Bangladesh for such incidents, accusing them of systematic human rights violations against their own people: “They sell arms to the Rohingya rebels, steal votes, engage in bank robbery, coal theft, gold theft, diamond theft, wage a shameful attack on ordinary peaceful students and engage in rampant corruption across the country.  In addition, they rape minorities, gang rape minorities, force a father, son and uncle to gang rape a mother and daughter, torture, take possession of Hindu crematoriums, evict Hindus from their homes, rape female students while taking a video of it, give sponsorship to terror groups like ISIS, harass ordinary people and for such things, ordinary people cannot escape.”

Compared to female victims who live in countries like Iran, Syria and Bangladesh, every American female should consider herself privileged.   However, even in Western countries like the US and Israel, a woman who is a victim of harassment and sexual violence still is in a disadvantaged position.  I know this from personal experience.  When I was 7 years old, I was raped by my brother’s best friend, which robbed me of anything resembling a normal childhood.  When I finally grew up enough to report the rape to the police, the rapist managed to get off with community service and a fine payable to the US government.  I never saw any of the money.  If it was physical damage caused by a traffic accident, I would have received financial compensation but not for the emotional scars of getting raped at age 7.   What was their justification?  He was a minor when he committed the crime, as if it mattered to me as the victim what age the rapist was.   I was no exception.   According to a 2014 Psychology Today report, there is only a 16% chance that a rapist will ever spend a day in jail in America.

Of course, Israel is no better than the US.   In the 1990’s, 7 teenage boys gang raped a 14-year-old girl on Kibbutz Shomrat in Israel.   To make matters worse, instead of supporting the victim, the kibbutz did everything they could in order to cover up the rape.  According to an academic article that was published in the International Journal of Conflict and Violence, the Kibbutz media at the time blamed the victim for the incident instead of the rapist.  Furthermore, she was completely ostracized by her community for harming the name of the kibbutz.  Even worse, the legal system did not support her as the victim in the way that they should have.  The submission of the indictment was delayed by a number of years due to the mental health condition of the victim.   Originally, the 7 boys were acquitted in the District Court but the Israeli Supreme Court intervened in the case and sentenced them to two to three years in prison.  That’s it.  Two to three years for completely destroying the life of the victim.  To date, the victim is not able to function.  She never managed to get her life back together but the perpetrators only got two to three years behind bars.

Although these incidents happened many years ago, I fear that not much has changed since then.  As a Middle East based journalist, I routinely have been harassed online for over a year now.   Although the harassment is not sexual in nature, the manner in which people here in Israel try to shut me up whenever I wish to speak out about it is sort of similar to how the Kibbutz tried to shut up the poor 14-year-old gang rape victim on Kibbutz Shomrat, whom Israeli society attempted to silence since her story destroyed the visionary dream of the Kibbutz movement.  I am told to suffer silently and to give into the dictates of my male harasser and his friends merely due to his prominent position in society.  My life story during this past year apparently destroys the halo effect around this prominent individual.  Therefore, too many people are trying to silence me as the victim.   And this is precisely why the world needs a Me Too Movement in order to empower female victims to stand up for themselves and to demand justice now.  It is not easy for a victim to make such demands.  Any victim of sexual abuse or harassment will tell you that going public is one of the most difficult things to do in a society that always blames the victim.  Therefore, any woman who goes public exposing such abuse is a heroine, not someone who is weak or a drama queen.

In fact, standing up for justice for victims of harassment and sexual abuse is an important virtue.  As American poet Suzy Kassem proclaimed, “Stand up to hypocrisy. If you don’t, the hypocrites will teach. Stand up to ignorance, because if you don’t, the ignorant will run free to spread ignorance like a disease. Stand up for truth. If you don’t, then there is no truth to your existence. If you don’t stand up for all that is right, then understand that you are part of the reason why there is so much wrong in the world.”For this reason, American actress Lindsey Lohan personally insulted countless women across the world with her statement.

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According to research conducted by the Center for Near East Policy Research, Palestinian youngsters currently attending Hamas summer camps are learning methods of attacking and killing Jews. This is a blatant violation of children’s rights. Palestinian children living in Gaza should be given the opportunity to reach their full educational potential. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial and religious groups.”

Unfortunately, due to the activities of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Authority and their Iranian supporters who fund such terrorist activity, these basic human rights that should be granted to Palestinian children are denied to them. Under the auspices of Hamas, Palestinian children, instead of being educated to love and to reach their potential in life, are systematically being taught to kill and to fight rather than to seek self-improvement, to respect human rights and to support fundamental freedoms.

According to research conducted by Iranian investigative journalist Neda Amin on behalf of the Center for Near East Policy Research and Israel Resource News Agency, Iran is presently funding a new training camp for Palestinian youngsters in Gaza titled, “How do we kill an Israeli?” In this training camp, 180 young Palestinian children are taught to shoot with M-16 rifles at Israelis. Some of the children who are taught to use weapons are of elementary school age. And according to Amin, “Iran is fully aware of all of the indoctrinating activities that go on in the summer camps that they are funding. The Iranian regime supports it.” 

There is a strategic objective behind Iran funding Hamas summer camps. A couple of months ago, the Times of Israel reported that Hamas is seeking an alliance with Hezbollah and Iran in order to foil Trump’s peace plan. Now, Amin’s research implies that Hamas is increasingly warming up to the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the report, a spokesman for the Resistance Committees of the People of Palestine (a coalition of armed Palestinian terror groups opposed to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority) acknowledged how Iran is funding summer camps for Palestinian children, stressing: “All the world knows that Iran has always been the protector and supporter of the Palestinian people and resistance.” A report by the Palestinian Information Center, an independent Palestinian organization, added that Abu Mujahid said on Facebook: “We should not ignore anyone’s good deeds and support and we are obliged to appreciate and thank the government of Iran for that.”

In an exclusive interview, Amin stressed that although America is viewed as the great Satan and Israel as the little Satan, the Iranian regime still considers Israel to be their most dangerous enemy since they never at any point have accepted any bribes from the Iranian regime, like the Europeans, Arab states and even the US under Obama did. For this reason, she claims that Iran believes that the only chance that they got to undermine Israel is to empower the Palestinians and this is what is motivating Iran to fund anti-Israel pro-terror summer camps in Gaza. This is also why Iran supplies the Palestinians with arms and weapons, intelligence and military training, an annual budget for their living expenses and pays the Palestinians to kill Israelis.

Naturally, there are many parallels between how Iran is funding Hamas’s abuse of Palestinian children in these summer camps and how Iran commits horrific human rights abuses against their own citizens. According to Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, “A country that does not respect the rights of its own people will not respect the rights of its neighbors.” Sadly, Amin indicated in an exclusive interview that she witnessed numerous injustices first hand that were committed by the Iranian regime. When she submitted her first book for publication at age 18, she faced the opposition of the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, an institution who decides for a writer, poet, a musician and whoever else wishes to create an art whether their work is in accordance with Islamic thought as understood in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even though her work focused on social issues, animal rights and human rights, she noted that the Iranian regime decided to brutally repress her. They told Amin: “By questioning social issues, you are questioning the Islamic Republic and if you continue, this will be considered a political crime.”

The Iranian regime seeks to have both Palestinian children in Gaza and its own citizens serve as pawns in order to create the Shia Crescent from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. And just as Hamas murders Palestinians who are opposed to their tyrannical rule, the Iranian regime also does the same to its citizens. According to Amin, “My guilt was increasing by the day after every book I wrote. I was arrested, had to pay fines, was raped and beaten in prison and after I was sentenced to 2 to 3 years in prison, I had to flee the country. I sought refuge in Turkey but the Turkish government did the same thing that the Iranian government did plus a new charge of supporting Israel and writing for an Israeli news agency. After several interrogations and being threatened by Turkish intelligence agencies, I had to flee Turkey. They wanted to deport me to Iran, where they were already calling me a filthy Zionist Jew.” Fortunately for Amin, Israel accepted Amin as a refugee and her life was saved. Unfortunately, countless Palestinian children to date are still being utilized as Hamas’s cannon fodder under the patronage of Iran and most of them have not been fortunate enough to escape that fate

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When President Donald Trump announced on 8th May that the United States would not be a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran deal, anymore, it was easily predictable that new tensions between Tehran and Washington will emerge soon. It didn’t take long for the European Union to voice its regret over President Trump’s decision and say in an unequivocal manner that Trump’s unilateralism won’t mark the premature death of the Iran deal, signed and sealed only three years ago.  

Britain, France and Germany issued a statement in which they reiterated their continued commitment to the JCPOA as long as Iran abides by its nuclear commitments. They said Europe will honor the terms of the Iran deal and encourages trade and business with Iran. It was then when the advent of a gap in the US-EU relations was noticeable.  

In phone conversations with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the leaders of the three countries gave assurances that Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal would not be translated into the demise of the agreement, secured in July 2015.  

However, it isn’t difficult to conclude that the fulfillment of one of President Trump’s main campaign promises is a lethal blow to the foundation of a deal, which according to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, was so meticulously negotiated that there were lengthy discussions and debates between the interlocutors over each of its words. The document runs to 109 pages, including five annexes and is an intricate and detailed roadmap for collaboration between Iran, the United States, the European Union, China, Russia and finally the United Nations Security Council on the prospects of Iran’s nuclear program. The Iran nuclear deal is endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, specifying the restrictions Iran voluntarily imposes on its nuclear program in return for the removal of all nuclear-related sanctions it was subjected to by the six countries involved in the negotiations and the Security Council itself. 

The departure of one of the main signatories of the agreement, followed by the enforcement of new sanctions against Iran, however, means a lot of things, including disappointment for those who believed Barack Obama’s commitment to diplomacy and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s overpowering of hardliners at home, translated into the signing of the nuclear deal, were the first steps in a long walk to a lasting Iran-US reconciliation which even Donald Trump couldn’t thwart.  

Even if the European countries, China, Russia and the traditional clients of Iran’s oil in Asia such as India, Japan and South Korea continue doing business with Iran under the shadow of harrowing US sanctions and even if the nuclear deal is salvaged through day and night efforts and diplomacy by the remaining parties, it’s undeniable that the psychological effect of the new sanctions imposed 6th August cannot and will not be alleviated and the international community’s relations with Iran will always be marred with fear of US penalties over business with a country which the Trump administration is apparently fully committed to bring to its knees. Unless anything changes in the White House or unless Iran is back to talks with the United States, Iranians shouldn’t await any good news as their country becomes a pariah state shunned by partners and rivals and isolated on the international scene.  

For a number of reasons, Trump’s decision in pulling out from the nuclear deal with Iran and imposing new sanctions will lead to serious complexities in the future of Iran-US relations and make any rapprochement and reconciliation implausible or at least hard to achieve. Iran has said no to new negotiations with the United States even as its economy is collapsing with the first bites of the sanctions.  

The demands put forward to Iran by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as the US government’s preconditions for the improvement of relations with Iran, sound impossible to be granted by the standards of the Iranian government. The granting of these requests mean forgoing the quintessential and prototypical footing of the 1979 revolution: exporting the revolution. Maybe, situation in the future will be such that Iran forgets about its ideological ambition of exporting its revolution in the Middle East and to its neighbors, but for the moment, Trump’s antagonistic attitude hasn’t convinced the authorities in Tehran to come back to the negotiation table and it goes without saying that the geopolitical dynamics of the Iranian society are fundamentally different from North Korea, so it’s not possible to expect Iran to give in to pressure easily even when it’s conspicuously suffering. 

The new round of US sanctions which target the Iranian people and statesmen alike will be complemented by additional measures shortly when the second phase of sanctions will be triggered on November 5. The first round of sanctions renders three major contracts between Iran and aircraft manufacturers Airbus, Boeing and ATR for the delivery of 230 commercial airplanes to Iran null and void and even cancels deals for $852 million worth of pistachio export and $424 million in carpets export. 

Even if the sanctions imposed by President Trump, who warned the world countries boldly to stop doing business with Iran or they will have their US trade ties compromised, aren’t examples of human rights violation – they directly affect the livelihoods of millions of Iranians including patients in need of imported medicine, they have a clear message. The message imparted by the new US sanctions is that forty years after the Iranian revolution and the cutting off of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States, the two countries aren’t on a promising path to rapprochement and détente. They continue making the proponents of diplomacy and peace even more disappointed, rendering the mending of their flawed relations more difficult for the future Iranian and American administrations.

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The Iranian regime poses a strategic threat to the entire world and thus, it is critical for the US to act against this threat.

Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov once proclaimed, “A country that does not respect the rights of its people won’t respect the rights of its neighbors.”  If one carefully examines Iran’s activities across the globe, one cannot help but conclude that the Trump administration has made an excellent decision when they decided to reimpose sanctions upon the Iranian regime.  From Assad’s regime to the Iraqi government, Hezbollah and the Houthi rebels in Yemen to hostile Iranian activity in Africa, Asia and even the US, Iran is increasingly spreading its tentacles across the globe and it poses a grave threat to the entire world.

Indeed, the Iranian threat extends far beyond the nuclear issue.  According to Iranian political theorist Reza Parchizadeh, “The Iranian regime was shaped under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood,” which is recognized as a terror organization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and many other countries.   According to the Gatestone Institute, there has been cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran despite the Shia-Sunni division.  For example, in December 2012, Essam Al Haddad, then Foreign Affairs Advisor to then Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, met with the head of Iran’s Al Quds Force General Qassem Soleimani, where they set up an alternative security and intelligence apparatus in order to serve Iran’s interests in Egypt.

Such strategic alliances between Iran and groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are not benign for it helps to spread radicalism across the globe by having radicals in the Sunni and Shia camps unite, which can potentially lead to an increase in terror attacks.  It should be noted that groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda originally sprang out of the Muslim Brotherhood and with the Muslim Brotherhood cooperating with Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood can pose a greater strategic threat to the entire world.  In fact, there is no such thing as benign Iranian activity in any country.  Iranian diplomatic activity that appears merely to enhance relations has been used as a cover in order to implement terror attacks against the Jewish community in Argentina and against Kurdish dissidents in Germany.

In addition, Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, noted that Iran is also making inroads within the South Asian country and this poses a threat to the Hindu community: “An advisor named Ali Akbor Belayeti to the Iranian government visited Bangladesh three months ago and had an important meeting with the government.   He also met with Kazi Azizul Hague International Secretary General of Islami Kelafat Movement and A.F. Salafi leader Ahale Hadis of Bangladesh.   He also has a good relationship with the Iranian government.  Bangladesh established an Islamic university in 1995, which Iran funded.  There are many Islamic groups in Bangladesh that collaborate with groups like Hefajate Islam, Olama League, an associate of the Bangladeshi Awami League, the Islamic Movement of Bangladesh, etc.” According to Basu, S.A. Salafi told him that high level figures in Iran will soon be coming to Bangladesh, where they will discuss many issues including giving scholarship money to Bangladeshi students.   Basu fears that such Iranian activity in Bangladesh helps to reinforce radical Islamism.

As a matter of fact, Iran is openly funding universities across the world including in the United States.  The Alavi Foundation, which is a front for the Iranian regime, funds over thirty colleges and universities in North America according to their website.  Among the universities that are supported by the Alavi Foundation are Harvard University, McGill University, the University of California, the University of Maryland, Princeton University and Columbia University.   According to an anonymous Iranian American source, the atmosphere at universities that have received Iranian funding is increasingly hostile towards Jewish students and Iranian students opposed to the regime.

Many Iranians are upset over the fact that their funds are being allocated towards arming Assad, Abadi, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen and other pro-terror causes around the world instead of them.  According to Iranian journalist Mohsen Behzad Karimi, “Iranian air force pilots make barely 300 dollars per month.  Iranian doctors make 800 dollars per month while Hamas terrorists make 1,800 dollars per month.   They are taking our money and giving it to terror groups.  Why are the people in Iranian Balochistan suffering from a lack of nutrition and desalinated water?   1,800 dollars goes per month to one terrorist.  This is very infuriating.  This money can go to the healthcare of ordinary Iranians.  This kind of policy impoverishes Iranians while promoting terror and instability in the region.”

To add insult to injury, Iranians themselves suffer from massive human rights violations when they dare to stand up to such injustices.   According to Iranian human rights activist Shabnam Assadollahi, another Iranian protester was recently murdered by the regime: “Reza Otadi was deliberately shot to death by the Iranian regime in Karaj City.  Otadi gave his life for the freedom and democracy of Iran.”  For these reasons, the world must support US President Donald Trump’s initiative to reimpose sanctions against Iran for a regime that does not respect its own people will never be good to us.

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