Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Das Statistische Bundesamt hat heute bekannt gegeben, dass die deutsche Wirtschaft im ersten Quartal dieses Jahres um 0,3 Prozent im Vergleich zum vorherigen Vierteljahr geschrumpft ist. Dazu ein Statement von Geraldine Dany-Knedlik, Co-Leiterin Konjunkturpolitik im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Mit dem Rückgang des Bruttoinlandsprodukts im ersten Quartal um 0,3 Prozent ist nun klar, dass sich die deutsche Wirtschaft im Winterhalbjahr in einer leichten Rezession befand. Das DIW Berlin hatte einen etwas geringeren Rückgang der Wirtschaftsleistung um 0,1 Prozent prognostiziert. Dass er nun deutlicher ausfiel als erwartet, lag vor allem am privaten Konsum, der mit minus 1,2 Prozent nochmal stärker nachgab als zuvor angenommen. Ursächlich für die Konsumzurückhaltung ist die trotz der Entspannung bei den Energiepreisen unerwartet hartnäckig hohe Inflation und der damit einhergehende reale Kaufkraftverlust. Die positiven Beiträge des Außenhandels und auch von den Investitionen konnten dies nicht kompensieren, so dass das Bruttoinlandsprodukt unter dem Strich zurückging. Sowohl der private Konsum als auch die Wirtschaftsleistung insgesamt dürften sich aber im Jahresverlauf deutlich erholen.

Pascal Boniface · Le G7 à la loupe. Avec Bernard Guetta | Entretiens géopo

Utilizing an original data set, this paper demonstrates how protectionist industrial policy during the period of hybrid liberalisation has shaped the organizational structure of clothing firms in Egypt. It investigates determinants of vertical integration of clothing firms into fabric production. High-end market segments are a critical determinant of integration. Limited access to finance restricts the possibilities for many firms to undertake the investment required to integrate, whilst volatile and uncertain market conditions make firms more likely to rely on the market for their inputs. But there are nuances related to market segment. Producers of higher quality garments rely on imported textiles, so these producers do not integrate even if search and switch costs are high. But the opposite is true of producers relying on domestic suppliers. Foreign institutions are better able to ensure contract enforcement with respect to quality and timely delivery so that suppliers opportunistic behaviour is deterred, reducing the necessity of clothing firms to integrate. This may not be the case with respect to domestic suppliers, when domestic institutions do not guarantee the same level of enforcement. The adoption of the hybrid liberalisation model meant that the transition to a market economy was not preceded by the creation of the necessary regulatory framework. This model resulted in inefficient upstream production and in an institutional setting conducive to agency problems. It also meant that business suffers excessive and inefficient bureaucracy. It is thus not possible for firms to achieve the first best outcome of arm’s length relations based on frictionless market transactions. Given these structural constraints firms opt for the second best solution of make rather than buy, i.e. vertical integration. But only some firms are able to use the arbitrary and discretionary decision making system to their favour, negotiating government obstacles to successful business. Those linked to power, prospered, whilst the businesses of others foundered against the wall of patronage, bureaucracy and red tape.

Utilizing an original data set, this paper demonstrates how protectionist industrial policy during the period of hybrid liberalisation has shaped the organizational structure of clothing firms in Egypt. It investigates determinants of vertical integration of clothing firms into fabric production. High-end market segments are a critical determinant of integration. Limited access to finance restricts the possibilities for many firms to undertake the investment required to integrate, whilst volatile and uncertain market conditions make firms more likely to rely on the market for their inputs. But there are nuances related to market segment. Producers of higher quality garments rely on imported textiles, so these producers do not integrate even if search and switch costs are high. But the opposite is true of producers relying on domestic suppliers. Foreign institutions are better able to ensure contract enforcement with respect to quality and timely delivery so that suppliers opportunistic behaviour is deterred, reducing the necessity of clothing firms to integrate. This may not be the case with respect to domestic suppliers, when domestic institutions do not guarantee the same level of enforcement. The adoption of the hybrid liberalisation model meant that the transition to a market economy was not preceded by the creation of the necessary regulatory framework. This model resulted in inefficient upstream production and in an institutional setting conducive to agency problems. It also meant that business suffers excessive and inefficient bureaucracy. It is thus not possible for firms to achieve the first best outcome of arm’s length relations based on frictionless market transactions. Given these structural constraints firms opt for the second best solution of make rather than buy, i.e. vertical integration. But only some firms are able to use the arbitrary and discretionary decision making system to their favour, negotiating government obstacles to successful business. Those linked to power, prospered, whilst the businesses of others foundered against the wall of patronage, bureaucracy and red tape.

Utilizing an original data set, this paper demonstrates how protectionist industrial policy during the period of hybrid liberalisation has shaped the organizational structure of clothing firms in Egypt. It investigates determinants of vertical integration of clothing firms into fabric production. High-end market segments are a critical determinant of integration. Limited access to finance restricts the possibilities for many firms to undertake the investment required to integrate, whilst volatile and uncertain market conditions make firms more likely to rely on the market for their inputs. But there are nuances related to market segment. Producers of higher quality garments rely on imported textiles, so these producers do not integrate even if search and switch costs are high. But the opposite is true of producers relying on domestic suppliers. Foreign institutions are better able to ensure contract enforcement with respect to quality and timely delivery so that suppliers opportunistic behaviour is deterred, reducing the necessity of clothing firms to integrate. This may not be the case with respect to domestic suppliers, when domestic institutions do not guarantee the same level of enforcement. The adoption of the hybrid liberalisation model meant that the transition to a market economy was not preceded by the creation of the necessary regulatory framework. This model resulted in inefficient upstream production and in an institutional setting conducive to agency problems. It also meant that business suffers excessive and inefficient bureaucracy. It is thus not possible for firms to achieve the first best outcome of arm’s length relations based on frictionless market transactions. Given these structural constraints firms opt for the second best solution of make rather than buy, i.e. vertical integration. But only some firms are able to use the arbitrary and discretionary decision making system to their favour, negotiating government obstacles to successful business. Those linked to power, prospered, whilst the businesses of others foundered against the wall of patronage, bureaucracy and red tape.

In light of the deflationary trends following the 2008/2009 financial crisis, as well as the return of inflation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, this book offers insights into price stability issues in various East Asian countries.

Konnektivität, besonders im Transportbereich, ist mit Blick auf den Südkaukasus während der letzten Jahre zu einem allgegenwärtigen Thema avanciert. Auch in der EU-Politik vis-à-vis der Region spielt Transportkonnektivität eine zentrale Rolle. Im Rahmen ihrer Global-Gateway-Initiative hat sich die EU dabei einem Engagement verschrieben, das gleichzeitig werte­basiert und geostrategisch ist. Um diesem Anspruch gerecht zu werden, sollte die EU die verschiedenen Dimensionen von Transportkonnektivität und ihre Implikationen auf mehreren Ebenen integriert betrachten. Vor allem der Verknüpfung von Konnektivität mit machtpolitischen Fragen sollte die EU Rechnung tragen. Bei der Etablierung genuin inklusiver und transparenter Multi-Stake­holder-Prozesse sowie unabhängiger projektbegleitender Moni­torings könnte die EU Unterstützung leisten. Dies könnte die Richtung zu einem eher holistisch gedachten Konnektivitätsansatz weisen. Die EU sollte ihr Konnektivitätsengagement auch kritisch auf mögliche Zielkonflikte abklopfen. Die Policy-Debatten in Berlin und Brüssel würden dabei von einem intensiveren Austausch mit der kritischen Logistik-, Infrastruktur- und Konnektivitätsforschung profitieren. Deren Erkenntnisse könnten zu einer nuancierteren Betrachtung von Transportkonnektivität und der damit verbundenen Komplexitäten und Ambivalenzen beitragen.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the global debt crisis call for more cooperation among nations. Yet instead of well-coordinated, wise cooperation for the global common good, geopolitical tensions are rising and protectionism seems to have  become a “new normal”. As a consequence, the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 has been dramatically slow and the benefits of growth policies are imbalanced across high-, low-, and middle-income countries just as within them.

Die Abteilung Makroökonomie des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (m/w/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

Mit der »Zeitenwende« in der internationalen Politik geht die Notwendigkeit einher, strategisches Denken zu stärken und sich für künftige Herausforderungen besser zu wappnen. Deutschland tut dies bereits, indem es strategische Dokumente zur natio­nalen Sicherheit und zu den Beziehungen mit China vorbereitet. In Bezug auf Russ­land drängt sich eine ähnliche Vorgehensweise auf: Erstens weil Russlands Aggression gegen die Ukraine die Situation in Europa und darüber hinaus für längere Zeit wesent­lich verschlechtert hat. Zweitens weil die Konzeption einer Russlandpolitik, die auf den seit 2022 deklarierten Leitlinien basiert, eine Möglichkeit bietet, frühere Fehler zu korrigieren und Maßnahmen, die aus einer Krisensituation hervorgegangen sind, in eine langfristige Politik zu verwandeln.