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Mit dem Embargo gegen Einfuhren von russischem Öl, Gas und Kohle reagieren  die USA auf die russische Invasion in der Ukraine. Nach den zuvor erlassenen umfassenden und tiefgreifenden Sanktionen, soll auch das Embargo dazu beitragen, dass Russlands Präsident Putin die wirtschaftlichen Mittel genommen werden, die Ukraine dauerhaft unter russische Herrschaft zu bringen. Auch Großbritannien hat sich dem US-Embargo angeschlossen und will eigene Energieimporte aus Russland bis Jahresende aufgeben. Die EU zögert weiterhin, aus teils nachvollziehbaren, teils irrationalen Gründen.

Kosten sind unterschiedlich verteilt

Richtig ist, dass es den USA und Großbritannien wirtschaftlich weniger schadet, auf russische Rohölimporte zu verzichten als der EU, die stärker auf russisches Gas, Öl und Kohle angewiesen ist. Und es stimmt auch, dass der Schaden für Russland begrenzt bleibt, solange die EU nicht mitzieht. Nur rund ein Prozent der russischen Rohölexporte gingen im vergangenen Jahr jeweils in die USA und nach Großbritannien. Gas- und Kohlexporte dorthin sind ebenfalls unbedeutend. Bei einem gleichzeitigen Stopp der EU-Gasimporte wäre hingegen die Hebelwirkung eines westlichen Energie-Embargos für Russland verheerend. Zusammengenommen machten Öl- und Gasexporte über ein Drittel des russischen Staatshaushalts im vergangenen Jahr aus.

Bidens innenpolitisches Risiko

Mit seinem Präsidialerlass zum Energie-Embargo ist Biden dem Kongress zuvorgekommen. Die eigenen Demokraten und auch die Republikaner forderten zuletzt weitere Sanktionen gegen Russland. Mit der Verordnung behält Biden jedoch selbst das Heft des Handels in der Hand und kann zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt Maßnahmen wieder zurücknehmen ohne den – häufig langwierigen – Abstimmungsprozess im Kongress abwarten zu müssen. Hinter wirtschaftlichen Sanktion gegen Russland stehen laut einer Umfrage mehr als 80 Prozent der US-Bevölkerung. 79 Prozent der US-Bürgerinnen und Bürger sagten in einer weiteren Umfrage, dass sie das Embargo unterstützen, selbst wenn es zu Preissteigerung führt.

Trotzdem ist die Entscheidung mutig. Nicht nur, weil Biden und andere aktive und ehemalige Spitzenpolitiker inzwischen von der russischen Regierung mit Gegensanktionen belegt wurden. Der US-Präsident geht mit dem Energie-Embargo ein schwer kalkulierbares innenpolitisches Risiko ein. Bei der Verkündung des Importstopps stimmte der US-Präsident sein Volk auf Preissteigerungen ein, vor allem an den Tanksäulen. Dies würde in erster Linie die Bevölkerung in ländlicheren Gegenden treffen, die auf das Auto als Transportmittel angewiesen ist. Auch die Produktionskosten in der Landwirtschaft, die auf günstige Treibstoffe angewiesen ist, könnten erheblich steigen. Die Folgen, so ist es für Biden zu befürchten, könnten sich schon bei den Zwischenwahlen zum US-Kongress im November zeigen. Um die ausfallenden Importe aus Russland zu ersetzen und einen zu starken Anstieg der Benzinpreise zu verhindern, geht die Biden-Regierung inzwischen auf einige ihrer strategischen Rivalen, wie die Regierungen von Venezuela, Saudi-Arabien und Iran zu, von denen sie sich erhöhte Fördermengen erhofft. Schnelle Lösungen sind hier jedoch nicht zu erwarten. Putins Krieg in der Ukraine wirkt sich auch hier negativ aus, etwa weil er die Atomverhandlungen mit dem Iran zum Erliegen gebracht hat. Scheitern Bidens Versuche russisches Öl schnell zu ersetzten, droht ihm nicht nur der Hohn des politischen Gegners über mangelndes außenpolitisches Geschick. Der US-Präsident müsste darüber hinaus mit einem Anstieg der Inflation rechnen, die derzeit so hoch steht wie seit vierzig Jahren nicht. Die Republikaner werden keine Gelegenheit auslassen, sie ihm persönlich anzulasten. Die US-Notenbank Fed hat für Mitte März eine Zinsanhebung in Aussicht gestellt und derzeit sind weitere sechs Schritte über das Jahr hinweg wahrscheinlich. Wirtschaftsforscherinnen und -forscher warnen schon seit Monaten vor einer drohenden Stagflation, einer Mischung aus stagnierendem Wachstum bei weiterhin steigender Inflation. Die Gefahr könnte durch den Ukraine-Krieg noch ansteigen. Wächst dann die politische Unzufriedenheit, auch wegen anhaltender wirtschaftlicher Belastungen durch die Pandemie, könnte Biden nicht nur die Mehrheit im Kongress, sondern auch die demokratische Präsidentschaft 2024 verlieren.

Ziel eines Embargos klar benennen

Sanktionen wirken vor allem dann, wenn sie an klare Ziele gebunden sind. Die von den USA, den Europäern und weiteren Partnerländern weltweit verhängten Sanktionen entfalten bereits eine für die russische Wirtschaft fatale Wirkung. Tatsächlich kann Russland aufgrund von Sanktionen keine neuen Schulden mehr aufnehmen, wichtige Banken – allerdings nicht die an den Energiesektor gebundenen – sind aus dem SWIFT-System ausgeschlossen, wodurch Zahlungen mindestens erschwert und verzögert werden. Vor allem aber führt das Einfrieren der Zentralbankreserven mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit dazu, dass die Banken zusammenbrechen. All diese Maßnahmen haben bewirkt, dass sich internationale Unternehmen vom russischen Markt zurückziehen – auf unabsehbare Zeit. Die drei größten Rating-Agenturen haben russische Anleihen inzwischen auf Ramschniveau herabgestuft. Während die russische Regierung ausstehende Zinszahlungen zuletzt noch in US-Dollar begleichen konnte, bezweifeln Finanzmarktakteure schon seit einigen Woche die zukünftige Zahlungsfähigkeit. Daher sprechen einige bereits von einem nahenden faktischen Default, dem Bankrott des russischen Staats.

Biden hat Recht behalten, als er Russland zu Beginn der Sanktionen Ende Februar prognostizierte, binnen eines Monats zum »Paria« der globalen Wirtschaft abzusteigen. Außerdem wird zurecht darauf hingewiesen, dass weitere Maßnahmen gegen den russischen Energiesektor das Kriegsgeschehen nicht unmittelbar beeinflussen. Auch ein Gas-Embargo der EU-Staaten oder weitere Sanktionen gegen Energieunternehmen und deren Finanzierer wie die Gazprombank werden Kriegsverbrechen nicht verhindern. Warum dann ein Embargo, vor allem, wenn ausbleibende Importe den sozialen Frieden in Westeuropa bedrohen könnten?

Es gibt für die EU gute Gründe dafür, die russischen Energieimporte zu beenden und es ist auch noch nicht zu spät dafür. Wenn sich die EU tatsächlich vom russischen Gas verabschiedet, sollte sie die Ziele klar benennen. Mit dem Importende würde Russland über Jahre oder Jahrzehnte die Möglichkeit genommen, seine Schulden aus neuen Import-Einnahmen zu begleichen, wirtschaftlich zu wachsen und wichtige Investitionen zu tätigen. Über Russlands Wirtschaft hängt dann der Schatten der Insolvenz. Vermutlich beeinflusst das auch die Überlegungen Chinas und anderer Länder, Russland weiter finanzielle Mittel zukommen zu lassen. Für eine dauerhafte Besetzung der Ukraine und weitere militärische Expansion Russlands würden Putin die Mittel fehlen.

Es sollte im Eigeninteresse der EU sein, nicht länger von Putin erpressbar zu sein. Auch wenn dies bedeutet, dass hohe Kosten auf die EU zukommen und wirtschaftlich starke Mitgliedsländer wie Deutschland gezwungen wären, einen höheren Anteil an diesen Kosten zu übernehmen und andere ebenfalls stark von Russland abhängige Staaten finanziell zu unterstützen. Zum gemeinsamen Ausstieg hatte  die europäische Kommission bereits den Vorschlag gemacht, die russischen Gasimporte bis Jahresende um zwei Drittel zu reduzieren. Die vollständige Loslösung von russischen Energie-Importen könne dann bis 2030 erfolgen. Der Plan mag ambitioniert klingen und es ist noch viel Detailarbeit notwendig. Doch je früher sich die EU und Deutschland an die Umsetzung machen, desto schneller und besser können Märkte und auch Konsumentinnen und Konsumenten notwendige Anpassungen vornehmen.

Event Video 

In a webinar organized on March 17th by IPI MENA under the theme “Energy Security in the MENA region and Beyond,” experts, government officials, members of the private sector, civil society and media representatives warned against the serious ramifications of the Ukraine conflict on the world energy order among other sectors.

Opening the webinar, IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji, warned “the conflict in Ukraine will undoubtedly have the most challenging geopolitical and economic consequences,” and regretted that “the war is waged by a military superpower which is at the same time an energy superpower.” Deploring “the humanitarian and material losses that the war is causing in Ukraine,” he reiterated solidarity with the people of Ukraine and “all other peoples that are victims of aggression, violence, and violations of territorial integrity and international law.”

He pointed to the war’s dramatic effects on energy security in the MENA region and beyond, as some countries, however, are dependent on Russian oil products in addition to other vital food items. He highlighted that some MENA countries have hardly any resilience to tackle the consequences of energy imports bills. Many of these countries and states may face unprecedented unrest.

Imed Drouiche, geophysicist and energy expert, underlined that despite OPEC Countries having the largest fossil energy stocks representing less than 50% of the total oil production of the world, they will not fill the gap left by Russian energy supplies to Europe and other major clients. Therefore “high prices will encourage diversification.”

“The challenge will be to continue the transition by decarbonizing all the oil production mainly using the blue hydrogens. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already engaged in investing in blue hydrogens.”

Derouiche said the gulf countries are shifting from the water desalinization industry to renewable sources of energy, albeit slowly, and would take years to reach required levels. He argued that while some think nuclear energy is a game-changer for power supply in Europe, freeing the continent from Russian gas, the CAPEX procedures have proven the high cost endured during the whole process. He backed adopting “solar and wind as sources of energy as the right way.”

Advocating the shift to renewable energy sources, he said the number one enemy of renewable energy is cheap oil prices. He stated that now that oil prices are nearing $130 per barrel, the cost of renewable energy will be reasonable, predicting several countries will switch to renewable energy alternatives. He praised some MENA countries’ efforts towards renewable energy alternatives, citing Morocco – a leveling leading country in sustainably managing the transition in electricity – as “doing well.” Jordan and Egypt are also coveting that level but others are unfortunately lagging behind, he said.

Nimal Vallipuram, Senior Analyst at JCC Investment wondered “where are we going to get the energy we need right now and how are we going to fit this into the Environment Social and Governance (ESG) framework?”

He said “in terms of ESG transition, it’s a question of how fast we need to do this. We have a net zero target by 2050. We are today facing an extraordinary situation. Russia is a huge country in terms of commodities. When you cut Russia out of the system financially and otherwise, that is going to be felt by significantly in other countries.” He added that ramifications are already being experienced. He said that “a full ESG transition worldwide would cost us two hundred trillion dollars, that is twice the volume of global GDP.” He warned that “we cannot have an advanced-economy solution to a world problem.”

Looking at Western European countries which are dependent mostly on Russian gas, he said they have to find a way to feel more comfortable with what they are going to do and North Africa will play a bigger role in terms of gas and electricity. There are “plans [since] ten years ago to build a massive solar farm in the Sahara. Those plans will come back. People will consider such plans, which ten years ago were considered to be outlandishly humongous.” He reiterated that “North Africa is in an excellent position to supply some of the security to Western Europe.”

Vallipuram predicted that countries like Qatar and Iran are possible “solutions to the problem by becoming larger suppliers, as gas is going to remain the transition fuel. There’s no other way around it.” He added, “there’s another issue we are having which we have to sort out in order to ensure the transition, which is the current production of lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite all of them have to increase in multiples annually for the next thirty years, which means we have to spend an enormous amount of time on mining.”

However, he noted that “we are going to achieve ESG but we are going to do it more intelligently without increasing the immediate cost to people for energy use,” indicating that “right now, given the geopolitical situation, most of the focus will be on policymakers and how to bring down the cost of oil and gas.”

In an answer on whether Iran could be a solution to the energy challenge, he said it’s not a question of how much they can supply, but whether they can come to some conclusion with the existing outstanding issues among the US, the EU, and UN, and will that help the future oil prices to come down [in Iran] rather than seeing the supply going to the market.

He declared that the current crisis is showing policymakers that we have to go green and that there is no way around it, noting that in the near term, the focus will be on how the existing oil prices and gas prices can go down more than anything else: “But I am a huge fan of the Energy Saving Trust (EST) transition.”

Diplomats from Morocco, the USA, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Germany, France, Egypt, Brunei Darussalam, Yemen, and others took part in the question and answers segment of the event.

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Dr. Phoebe Donnelly, Research Fellow and Head of IPI’s Women, Peace and Security Program, moderated a panel during a high-level side event on “Women’s leadership in mitigating the impact of climate change and building a peaceful and sustainable climate-resilient Africa.” The event, organized by the African Women Leaders’ Network (AWLN), was held on March 17th on the margins of the 66th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW66). Discussions focused on the leadership roles that women are playing in mitigating the impacts of climate change in Africa.

The event offered a platform for participants to examine how women and girls in Africa may be well-positioned to access certain sectors that will curb climate change, create green jobs and mediate climate change-related conflict within their communities. However, leaders across Africa must support women in accessing power within new industries, political spaces, and sectors that support the mitigation of climate change. Several country representatives referenced Ms. Antonette Ncube’s passionate statement emphasizing the need to explain what support on the ground means by defining what leadership is. The data is clear – climate change and environmental crises disproportionately affect women and girls, particularly those in vulnerable and marginalized situations. As scientific projections indicate that Africa is among the continents hit hardest by the impacts of climate change, the realization of the aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063, of the Sustainable Development Goals, and the full enjoyment of human rights for all may be compromised.

The event was hosted by the African Women Leaders’ Network (AWLN), in collaboration with the Group of Friends of AWLN New York, co-chaired by Germany and South Africa, and with the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, co-chaired by the Republic of Nauru and Germany, together with UN Women and the International Peace Institute (IPI).

Click here for the full agenda and list of speakers.

Event Video 
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A panel of women experts and practitioners convened at an IPI MENA webinar on March 15 to elaborate on this year’s International Women’s Day theme of “Gender Equality Today for a Sustainable Tomorrow,” with a specific focus on the Middle East and North Africa region.

Delivering IPI MENA’s statement, IPI Policy Analyst Dalya Al-Alawi stressed the importance of government policy in materializing gender parity goals and the need to have legislative frameworks that support this, as women are the key to sustainable growth in the MENA region. She underlined other factors to consider including the role of civil society, the private sector, and education in promoting gender equality among youth.

In a video message addressed to IPI MENA webinar, H.E Sima Bahous, UN Women Executive Director emphasized the “Arab States Paradox.” She decried women’s limited access to political and economic life in Arab States despite women’s relatively high levels of education result in a “financial loss, intellectual loss and developmental loss.” She said that if tackled, these losses could result in powerful forces in development and progress.

“On the regional level, the Middle East is expected to be 4 degrees Celsius warmer in 2050, bearing heavy consequences in terms of heat stress, water scarcity with severe impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems requiring comprehensive, responsive measures,” she noted. “There is good potential in the Arab States to try to address climate change through women’s employment. That is because the percentage of women pursuing an education in STEM fields, which are uniquely important to climate change mitigation, is higher in the Middle East than in other regions.”

H.E Samira Rajab, Special Envoy to the Bahrain Royal Court pointed to the fields of technology and digitalization as important areas in supporting Arab women. She underlined the link between technological skills and economic independence for women, particularly in the current contexts of a global pandemic and the subsequent surge of online use, be it working from home, virtual finance and economic facilities, or online education.

“Developing this knowledge, skill and women’s empowerment have become a priority for sustainable human development plans, so that women remain active players and key development partners,” she stated.

Assistant Secretary General of Bahrain’s Supreme Council of Women, H.E Shaikha Deena bint Rashid Al-Khalifa, highlighted SCW’s mandate in developing a comprehensive national plan for the advancement of Bahraini women while ensuring it is aligned with the National Economic Vision 2030, the sustainable development agenda and most importantly the aspirations of Bahraini women and the significant accomplishments they have achieved. “We affirm Bahrain’s commitments to remaining steadfast to maintain the efforts and progress made so far,” she stated, “in advancing the role of women in development through targeted policies and initiatives that promote equal opportunities.”

“Bahraini women today represent in the government sector 55% as of 2020 which is 17% higher than 2001,” she noted. “In the private sector, Bahraini women make up today 35% of Bahraini employees which is 11% higher than 20 years ago. The percentage of Bahraini women’s participation in the total workforce as of 2021 has reached 43%.” Noting the gradual increase over the years of Bahraini women’s entrepreneurial activities, she underlined that women represent 42% in this sector as of 2021, in comparison to 15% in 2001, and that more than half of the virtual business owners today are women.

Mrs. Hela Ouardi, author, member of the Belgian Academy and Professor at the University of Tunis, explored how women’s marginalized roles in history have resulted in “knowledge fragility”, which affected women in the MENA more severely. She noted that building sustainable peace in the region relies on deep reflection and work to rewrite history, not under male monopoly but with due and fair parity, with a focus on women’s contribution in knowledge building.  History references have side-lined the key roles played by women since pre-Islamic times to our days, she said, adding that achieving sustainable development and peace in this region and beyond cannot be done through political pledges and resolutions, but through encompassing all aspects of society where women play key roles as authors and actors.

Ms. Ouardi called for women’s leadership in re-owning and rewriting history to put an end to perception and stereotypes that kept women as silent or imprisoned victim. Reinstating the ignored roles of women in our history will reinforce their key and decisive roles in designing the future of our society, she said. She referred to Ibn Rushd (Avveroes), one of the 12th century most prominent Muslim thinkers who asserted that women can govern and run a state, while criticizing his generation’s view about women as being oppressive and unjust.

The webinar was concluded with an open-floor debate. Mr. Faysal Mohammed Abdelgadir, former UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP representative in Bahrain underscored the importance of Bahrain partnering with multilateral system to continue promoting women’s achievements.

Mrs. Margaret Nardi, Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy highlighted the dialogue between her country and Bahrain and commended Bahrain on advancing women’s social issues, particularly with the recent laws enabling Bahraini women to pass residency rights to their children and foreign spouses.

German Ambassador H.E Kai Boeckmann drew encouraging parallels between Germany and Bahrain as leaders in gender parity initiatives and pointed to Germany’s engagement on the Commission on the Status of Women as one of the current four co-chairs. “Our new Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is now the first female foreign minister in Germany’s history,” he stated, while stressing Germany’s stronger commitments made by the new government. “When our new Foreign Minister presented the foreign policy agenda in our federal parliament, she explained a concept which in Germany and elsewhere has raised some eyebrows – the ‘feminist foreign policy’. What is meant by this concept is simple, it is about equal representation, rights and resources,” he said.

Opening the webinar, entitled “The Role of Women in the MENA Region in Building a Sustainable Tomorrow,” IPI MENA Director Nejib Friji called for greater solidarity to the women and girls across the world who are on the frontlines of wars and conflicts, in Ukraine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Syria, Yemen and other zones of conflict.

“We find ourselves in a tumultuous moment in modern history where we are dealing with the repercussions of a global pandemic, the threats of climate change and wars – all which disproportionately affect women,” he stated. “Building a sustainable tomorrow begins with addressing the question on gender equality.”

Although electricity grids shape and define both political and economic spaces, the geopolitical significance of electricity remains underestimated. In political communities and beyond, such grids establish new channels for projecting geopolitical influence and new spheres of influence. In the Europe-Asia continental area, integrated electricity grids meet inter­connectors – that is, cross-border transmission lines linking different elec­tric grids. Interconnectors define new, partly competing vectors of integra­tion that extend beyond already integrated electricity grids. In this context, it is attractive for non-EU states to belong to the electricity system of continental Europe. This is because interconnected synchronous systems form “grid communities” that share a “common destiny” – not only in terms of electricity supply but also in terms of security and welfare. Germany and the EU must develop an electricity foreign policy in order to optimise, modernise, strengthen and expand the European electricity grid. Above all, however, Germany and the EU should help shape interconnectivity beyond the EU’s common integrated electricity grid. China is gaining considerable influence in the electricity sector, setting standards and norms as well as expanding its strategic outreach – to the benefit of its own economy. Its efforts are part of Beijing’s larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an attempt to reorient global infrastructure and com­mercial flows. In the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, geopolitical issues have dominated the configuration of electricity grids since the end of the Cold War. There is unmistakable competition over integration between the EU and Russia. The eastern Mediterranean region, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and Central Asia are, each in their own way, changing from peripheral zones into interconnecting spaces. The EU, China, Russia and – across the Black Sea – Iran and Turkey are competing in these zones to influ­ence the reconfiguration of electricity grids. And in South and Southeast Asia, India’s influence is on the rise.

Während russische Panzer und Artillerie nach Charkiw und Kiew vorstießen, unter­zeichnete Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj ein Aufnahmegesuch an die EU. Er fordert eine besondere Aufnahmeprozedur, die die Ukraine schnell in die EU führt. Die Ukraine strebt nicht erst unter Raketenbeschuss eine EU-Mitgliedschaft an; sie sieht – ähnlich wie Moldau und Georgien – in ihrem heutigen Status der Assoziation mit der EU nur eine Vorstufe zum Beitritt. Der Antrag vom 28. Februar ist ein Hilferuf aus dem schrecklichen Krieg heraus. Erste Antworten aus der Kommission und dem Euro­päischen Parlament bezeugten zwar viel politische Sympathie für das Drängen der Ukraine. Dennoch stellen die EU-Spitzen keine schnelle Mitgliedschaft in Aussicht. Die Zurückhaltung entspringt der Erfahrung, dass Aufnahmeverhandlungen in der Regel anspruchsvoll und langwierig sind, es also keine Abkürzungen zum Ziel gibt. Es gibt aber auch Interessen der EU, die selbst einer expliziten Beitrittsperspektive entgegenstehen. In jedem Fall sollte die EU ihre Politik der Integration und Koope­ration mit Ländern der Östlichen Partnerschaft sicherheitspolitisch flankieren.

Even more than a week after the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is still mincing its words. In a Joint Statement, ASEAN foreign ministers did not even name Russia as the aggressor, let alone condemn it. They merely called for dialogue, respect for sovereignty, and a ceasefire. This reaction was to be expected – and yet it is disappointing. After all, ASEAN is a central anchor of Germany’s and Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It is deemed essential for the aspired diversification of political and economic partners to reduce Germany’s dependency on China. It is also an important partner to foster multilateral cooperation and maintain a rules-based regional order. A closer look, however, reveals a more nuanced picture of ASEAN that offers opportunities and starting points for German and European diplomacy.

A weak common position

In its charter, ASEAN emphasizes the importance of peaceful conflict resolution as well as respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the rules-based international order. However, as an intergovernmental organization committed to the principle of consensus, it is subject to the often conflicting interests of its members, which then leads to positions representing the lowest common denominator.

This was also the case in the attack on Ukraine: ASEAN’s position reflected factors such as Vietnam’s historically close relations with Russia, Russia’s role as an arms and energy supplier for parts of the region, and the hope that closer relations with Russia would go some way toward weakening China’s increasing dominance in the region, even if the latter seems increasingly questionable in view of the “ironclad” partnership between Moscow and Beijing.

ASEAN is therefore likely to continue to show restraint toward Moscow. Russia, unlike Ukraine, is an established ASEAN dialogue partner and member of multilateral formats such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and also the economic organization Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. In addition, Indonesia is chairing the G20 this year, which also includes Russia.

Heterogeneity of the ASEAN states

The range of positions within ASEAN are reflected in the voting behavior of its members on the Ukraine resolution in the UN General Assembly: Only Vietnam and Laos abstained, but all others supported the resolution. A special case is Myanmar, whose junta openly supports Russia’s war of aggression because Russia recognized it internationally after its coup d’etat in 2021. Myanmar’s UN ambassador – an avowed opponent of the military coup in his country but who is still accredited to the UN – also voted in favor of the resolution. States such as Indonesia and the Philippines (after initial hesitation) condemned Russia’s actions. Singapore has gone even further: It is the only ASEAN member to date to impose unilateral sanctions against Russia.

Implications for Germany and the EU

How can Berlin and Brussels deal with this complex situation? First, they should not abandon ASEAN despite, or precisely because of, its restraint and neutrality. After all, the consensus principle in foreign and security policy issues often enough leads to weak statements in the EU as well. They should use the channels to ASEAN as well as to individual member states to create awareness about the possible effects of the Russian intervention on the international order.

Furthermore, an adaption of the narrative put forward by the United States – that the world is in the ultimate struggle between democracies and autocracies – is not helpful when it comes to the political reality in the region. At worst, it can even be harmful if such a black-and-white scheme excludes potential like-minded partners who are guided by similar interests. Even states that are not democracies in the “transatlantic” definition may have an interest in a rules-based order where the principle “might makes right” and disregard for territorial sovereignty do not apply. The case of Singapore – classified as “partly free” in the Freedom House Index – as the only ASEAN state imposing sanctions against Russia is a case in point. Moreover, disruptions in the global economy also have an impact on Southeast Asia, for example in areas such as energy security due to rising oil prices or food security due to reduced grain exports from Ukraine.

The voting behavior of the ASEAN states in the UN shows that there is a basis of shared interests, even if not of common values. After all, these are predominantly small and medium-sized states that are themselves exposed to varying degrees of pressure, threats, and attempts at intimidation on the part of a major power, namely China, but at the same time see themselves as dependent, mainly in the economic area. Seeing that even states with close ties to Russia, such as Vietnam, are now discussing the plight of Ukraine, cooperation can be sought at least on humanitarian issues. This would be important, on the one hand, to underline the central role of all ASEAN states for Europe’s Indo-Pacific policy. On the other hand, it would also have symbolic significance, as it would appear to at least partially weaken the close ties of some with Russia in the Ukraine crisis. With other states, such as Singapore or even G20 host Indonesia, cooperation on Ukraine could be intensified at the diplomatic level. Consideration should also be given to an EU-ASEAN special meeting at the ministerial level on the political, economic, and humanitarian implications of the war in Ukraine. Germany and the EU should not use Russia’s invasion of their own neighborhood as an excuse to turn their attention away from the Indo-Pacific again, but should see this as an opportunity for increased exchange and cooperation with the states in the region, including ASEAN members. In doing so, they must take into account existing differences in the region. This requires a flexible rather than a uniform approach.

The war against Ukraine directly impacts agricultural markets: It impedes delivery of existing stocks and the upcoming sowing of many types of grains. Due to the occupation and destruction of major ports, exports will continue to collapse. Agricultural exports from Russia are currently still possible on the main transport route via a few ports on the Black Sea. However, shipping companies report limiting their transport due to the perceived danger and concerns about loss of business. Very recently, Ukraine announced that it would restrict its own exports for domestic supply security reasons.

Ukraine and Russia have become key players for the export of both grain and sunflower (oil) in the post-Soviet era. For quite some time, their crop yields have therefore influenced international volumes and prices: Ukraine provided on average 10 per cent of the world’s wheat export supply, Russia as much as 24 per cent. For maize, Ukraine supplied 15 per cent of the important feed and fodder supply. The international market for fertiliser is even more concentrated: With trade shares of individual fertiliser components reaching up to 50 per cent, Russia dominates the market for ammonium nitrate, and Belarus with 16 per cent for potash fertiliser.

The financial sanctions of numerous states and the EU against Russia currently affect agricultural exports indirectly – due to general business uncertainty – while specific fertiliser sanctions directly target respective exports: Due to the handling of the political opposition in Belarus, the EU had already imposed fertiliser sanctions on the market-dominating Belarusian potash producer “Belaruskali” in summer 2021 and extended them last week.

War weighs on an already tense market situation for agricultural and fertiliser products

Prices for many agricultural products determined by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations currently already exceed the historic highs during the food price crises of 2007 and 2011. Fertiliser prices have also been rising to record levels for months. In addition, shortages due to reduced or cancelled supplies of grain and fertiliser from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are driving up prices. Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia, like many countries, has been using export restrictions on agricultural products to secure its own supplies – despite international warnings against these price-increasing measures. Just last week, the Russian government recommended that Russian companies also limit fertiliser exports.

Besides Ukraine, crop and supply shortfalls initially affect countries that import agricultural products from the war-affected region and are currently looking for readily available alternative sources. This drives up prices on global markets, thereby burdening all importers worldwide but hitting low-income countries and people the hardest. Egypt has an import share of 60 per cent of Russian grain and 20 per cent Ukrainian grain. To date, other countries that are already vulnerable to supply insecurity, such as Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, Bangladesh, and Turkey, also purchase the majority of their grain from the region. The African countries of Chad and Niger imported up to 80 per cent of their fertilisers and raw materials from Russia and Belarus, and Europe as well as many countries in Latin America also purchased large shares.

Absorbing short-term bottlenecks with higher costs and open trade

Affected countries have different options for adjustment: Egypt still has limited but probably sufficient grain stocks of its own for the time being, despite strong supply dependence vis-à-vis the region. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the 2020 explosion at the port of Beirut destroyed wheat warehouses, reducing storage capacity from six months to one month, therefore a continuous flow of supplies is needed.

Remaining supply gaps that cannot be solved in importing countries by means of shifts in consumption towards more food rather than energy use, require food and also fertiliser support. However, these are becoming more expensive as a result of rising prices for procurement and delivery. Transport and delivery must additionally be protected when sourcing from the region along vulnerable routes.

Trade must remain open and possibly protected on routes perceived as dangerous by shipping lines. Typical crisis-induced but price-pushing export restrictions must be avoided, both within the EU and internationally.

Judicious “food first” strategy needed for medium-term risks

Failing supplies from the major agricultural region will show their full effects in the coming autumn crop season, which may only be offset to a certain extent by crops from other major producers, such as Australia, the United States, and the EU.

Large agricultural countries could pursue forward-looking, coordinated market relaxation in order to quickly identify food supply potentials. However, in order to avoid symbolic politics or protectionist reflexes to support domestic production, the volume and price effects of possible approaches – suspension of set-aside programmes, reduced use of agro-fuels, or land rededication from fodder to food production – need to be assessed accurately. If a contribution to market relaxation is to be expected, corresponding measures should be quickly initiated for the upcoming crop year as a temporary crisis measure. Similarly, the United States is discussing the suspension of the conservation reserve programme to allow farmers to bring set-aside area into production. Price-driving sanctions with regard to fertilisers and agricultural goods should be avoided – or at least be accompanied by aid concepts to absorb linked supply risks.

As during the onset of the Covid-19 crisis, the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) – a monitoring system developed by the G20 in response to past food price crises – should be used for an international information campaign to prevent price-pushing export restrictions by means of appeals. However, more important than appeals would be the adoption of strict criteria and deadlines for these measures that are enforceable at the WTO level.

In the future, AMIS should cover not only agricultural products, fertilisers, and energy sources, but also the condition of and access to trade infrastructure. Here, restrictions heavily influence supply and price and should therefore be included in a comprehensive warning system for international supply potential.

Furthermore, a future international political offensive for fertilisers and their raw materials is needed. Not only must the market situation be monitored and – in the event of shortages – be accompanied by aid early on. Technologies to make their use more efficient and to increase fertiliser production capacities as well as approaches to their substitution – whether technologically or by cultivation – are also needed.

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On March 11th, IPI hosted a virtual conversation among four former UN senior officials on “The War in Ukraine: Anticipating Dilemmas for the UN as it Strives to Stop the Fighting.”

As the war progresses in Ukraine and millions of lives are upended, questions concerning ceasefires, humanitarian pauses and the like will advance. What dilemmas will the UN inevitably face when working to establish mechanisms to stop the fighting? How can a ceasefire or humanitarian pause be negotiated without rewarding aggression? What are the lessons from past experience? And how can a constructive path forward be established?

Speakers:
Mark Malloch Brown, President of the Open Society Foundations, former UN Deputy Secretary-General, and Administrator of the UN Development Programme
Karin Landgren, Executive Director of Security Council Report, former UN Under-Secretary-General, and Head of three UN Peace Operations
Jan Egeland, Secretary-General of the Norwegian Refugee Council and former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President of the International Peace Institute and former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Auch mehr als eine Woche nach dem russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine scheut die Organisation südostasiatischer Staaten ASEAN klare Worte. In einer gemeinsamen Erklärung haben die ASEAN-Außenminister Russland als Aggressor nicht einmal benannt, geschweige denn verurteilt. Sie fordern lediglich Dialog, Respekt für staatliche Souveränität und einen Waffenstillstand. Diese Reaktion war zu erwarten – und enttäuscht trotzdem. Denn die ASEAN ist zentraler Anker der deutschen und europäischen Indo-Pazifik-Strategie. Sie ist essentiell für die angestrebte Diversifizierung politischer und wirtschaftlicher Partner jenseits von China und wichtig für den Ausbau multilateraler Kooperation zur Aufrechterhaltung einer regelbasierten regionalen Ordnung. Bei näherer Betrachtung ergibt sich aber ein differenzierteres Bild, das Anknüpfungspunkte für deutsche und europäische Politik bietet.

Eine schwache gemeinsame Position

Die ASEAN selbst betont stets die Bedeutung von friedlicher Konfliktbeilegung, territorialer Unversehrtheit, Souveränität und der regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung. Als dem Konsensprinzip verpflichtete intergouvernementale Organisation ist sie jedoch den häufig widersprüchlichen Interessen der Mitglieder unterworfen, was dann zu einer Position führt, die den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner repräsentiert.

So auch im Fall des Angriffs auf die Ukraine: In der Stellungnahme der ASEAN schlugen sich Faktoren nieder wie die historisch engen Beziehungen vor allem Vietnams zu Russland, die Rolle Russlands als Rüstungs- und Energielieferant für die Region oder die Hoffnung, durch engere Beziehungen zu Russland die zunehmende chinesische Dominanz in der Region ein Stück weit abzuschwächen, auch wenn Letzteres angesichts der engen Partnerschaft zwischen Moskau und Peking fragwürdig erscheint.

Die ASEAN dürfte sich gegenüber Russland auch weiterhin zurückhalten. Das Land ist im Gegensatz zur Ukraine etablierter ASEAN-Dialogpartner und Mitglied in multilateralen Formaten wie dem East Asia Summit (EAS), dem ASEAN Regionalforum (ARF) und auch der Wirtschaftsorganisation APEC. Außerdem hat Indonesien in diesem Jahr den Vorsitz der G20, an der Russland ebenfalls beteiligt ist.

Heterogenität der ASEAN-Staaten

Die Bandbreite an Positionen innerhalb der ASEAN zeigt sich am Abstimmungsverhalten ihrer Mitglieder über die Ukraine-Resolution in der VN-Generalversammlung: Nur Vietnam und Laos enthielten sich der Stimme, alle anderen aber schlossen sich der Resolution an. Ein Sonderfall ist Myanmar, dessen Junta offen Russlands Angriffskrieg unterstützt, da Russland sie nach ihrem Putsch international anerkannte. Myanmars VN-Botschafter – ein erklärter Gegner des Militärputsches in seinem Land, aber nach wie vor bei den VN akkreditiert – stimmte ebenfalls für die Resolution. Staaten wie Indonesien und die Philippinen verurteilten (nach anfänglichem Zögern) Russlands Vorgehen ebenfalls. Singapur ist noch weiter gegangen und hat als bislang einziges ASEAN-Mitglied unilateral Sanktionen gegen Russland verhängt.

Implikationen für Deutschland und die EU

Wie können Berlin und Brüssel mit dieser Gemengelage umgehen? Zunächst sollten sie ASEAN trotz oder gerade wegen ihrer Zurückhaltung und Neutralität nicht aufgegeben. Schließlich führt das Konsensprinzip in außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen auch in der EU oft genug zu schwachen Statements. Sie sollten sowohl die Kanäle zu ASEAN als auch zu einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten für eine Auseinandersetzung über die möglichen Auswirkungen der russischen Intervention auf die internationale Ordnung nutzen.

Wie das Beispiel Singapurs zeigt, erweist sich in Südostasien und im Indo-Pazifik allgemein das von den USA vorgetragene Narrativ, dass sich die Welt im ultimativen Kampf zwischen Demokratien und Autokratien befinde, angesichts der politischen Wirklichkeit in der Region nicht als zielführend. Schlimmstenfalls kann es schädlich sein, wenn damit potentielle Gleichgesinnte, weil von ähnlichen Interessen geleitete Partner, durch ein solches Schwarz-Weiß-Schema ausgeschlossen werden: Auch Staaten, die nicht als Demokratien in der »transatlantischen« Definition gelten, können ein Interesse an einer regelbasierten Ordnung haben, in der eben nicht das Recht des Stärkeren gilt. Überdies haben Störungen der Weltwirtschaft auch Auswirkungen auf Südostasien – zum Beispiel in Bereichen wie Energiesicherheit durch steigende Ölpreise oder der Ernährungssicherheit durch verringerte Getreideausfuhren aus der Ukraine.

Das Abstimmungsverhalten der ASEAN-Staaten in den VN zeigt, dass es eine Basis geteilter Interessen gibt, wenn auch nicht in jedem Fall gemeinsamer Werte. Schließlich handelt es sich überwiegend um kleine und mittlere Staaten, die selbst in unterschiedlichem Maße wachsendem Druck, Drohungen und Einschüchterungsversuchen seitens einer Großmacht, nämlich China, ausgesetzt sind, sich gleichzeitig aber in einer vor allem wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit sehen. Da selbst in Staaten wie Vietnam die Notlage in der Ukraine mittlerweile thematisiert wird, kann zumindest auf humanitärer Ebene eine Zusammenarbeit angestrebt werden. Das wäre wichtig, um zum einen die zentrale Rolle aller ASEAN-Staaten für die Indo-Pazifik-Politik Europas zu unterstreichen. Zum anderen hätte es auch symbolische Bedeutung, da es die enge Bindung an Russland in der Ukraine-Krise partiell aufweicht. Mit anderen Staaten, wie beispielsweise Singapur oder auch dem G20-Gastgeber Indonesien, könnte die Kooperation auf diplomatischer Ebene intensiviert werden. Auch über ein EU-ASEAN-Sondertreffen auf Ministerebene zu den politischen, wirtschaftlichen und humanitären Folgen des Kriegs in der Ukraine sollte nachgedacht werden. Deutschland und die EU sollten die Invasion Russlands in der eigenen Nachbarschaft nicht zum Anlass nehmen, ihre Aufmerksamkeit wieder vom Indo-Pazifik abzuwenden, sondern dies als Möglichkeit für verstärkten Austausch und Kooperation mit den Staaten der Region einschließlich der ASEAN-Mitglieder sehen. Dabei müssen sie die bestehenden Unterschiede in der Region berücksichtigen, was ein flexibles statt uniformes Vorgehen erfordert.

Given the strong economic interdependencies between the United States (US) and Europe as well as the shared commitment to safeguard civil liberties online and com­bat disinformation and unfair market practices, European Union (EU) cooperation with the US on digital markets is crucial. Thus, the EU-initiated transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was established to navigate European and American understandings of “digital sovereignty” and the resulting market regulations. The first TTC meeting took place in September 2021 and demonstrated both a shared commitment to building an alliance on “democratic technology” and diverging ideas on how to best regulate the digital market and its biggest players. As the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed vulnerabilities of international supply chains and accelerated digitalisation, European policymakers are well-advised to continue pursuing their digital foreign policy strategy of advancing digital sovereignty by leveraging the “Brussels effect”, which also fosters the further integration of EU digital policy and contributes to the deepening of the transatlantic digital market.

India is a central partner for German and European foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. The German Federal Government’s autumn 2020 guidelines and the November 2021 coalition agreement both emphasise the importance of expanding relations with India. To advance the common cause of a multilateral and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, both sides should – in addition to deepening their bilateral relations – extend their cooperation to third countries. Such triangular cooperation could herald a new phase of the Indo-German strategic partnership.

The protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict has become a core strategic objective for the United Nations system and for UN peace operations in particular. The UN, however, is not the sole actor engaged in POC. The European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), among other regional actors, have been developing their own policies and approaches to POC. While the significant overlap in these organizations’ member states and interorganizational developments create an opportunity to coordinate and synergize their POC policies, their approaches to POC differ—in some cases substantially.

As the EU and NATO are both in the process of reassessing their strategic direction against the backdrop of new conflict scenarios, there is a need to reflect on the differences and similarities between these three organizations’ approaches to POC, their comparative advantages, and the future direction of the POC agenda. At a time when international peace operations and protection efforts are under intense political and operational pressure, such an understanding could also lay the foundation for more informed and effective interorganizational cooperation on POC.

Toward this end, this paper examines the conceptualization of POC in the UN, the EU, and NATO, lays out the core POC policies and approaches of the three organizations and examines their approaches to implementing these policies in the field. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the UN, the EU, and NATO to strengthen POC efforts within and between the three organizations:

• Adapt POC to new operational realities;
• Revitalize discussion on POC within and between the organizations;
• Improve POC training, preparedness, and institutionalization; and
• Focus on both passive (harm mitigation) and active approaches to POC.

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On March 10th, IPI together with the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, and the French Ministry of the Armed Forces cohosted an open policy forum entitled “Human Rights and Protection by UN Peace Operations.”

The session provided an opportunity to discuss the role of UN peacekeeping operations in protecting human rights, including during peacekeeping transitions, and the applicability of international human rights law (IHRL) to peacekeeping operations.

The policy forum gathered representatives of the UN, member states, and civil society organizations to reflect on the applicability of IHRL in peacekeeping operations. The event also addressed recent initiatives to strengthen the tools available to missions’ human rights sections to protect and promote human rights and the challenges they are likely to face during peacekeeping transitions.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Ambassador Yoka Brandt, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN
Diarra Dime-Labille, Legal Advisor, Permanent Mission of France to the UN

Speakers:
Mona Ali Khalil, Affiliate, Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC)
Regina Fitzpatrick, Protection of Civilians Team Leader, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO)
Oscar Solera, Peace Mission Support Section, Strategic Planning Team Leader, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
Conor Foley, Professor, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President

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Nach fast siebenmonatiger Fahrt im Indischen und Pazifischen Ozean ist die Fregatte »Bayern« nach Wilhelmshaven zurückgekehrt. Mit der Entsendung des Schiffes wollte Deutschland vor allem ein sichtbares politisches Zeichen für seine Bereitschaft set­zen, sich aktiver für Stabilität und Sicherheit im indopazifischen Raum zu engagieren. Im Rückblick hat die Mission dazu beigetragen, die Beziehungen mit Partnern der Region durch militärpolitische und diplomatische Gespräche sowie gemeinsame Übungen von Streitkräften zu beleben und zu vertiefen. Nun gilt es, den entstandenen Schwung in den Beziehungen aufrechtzuerhalten, etwa indem Konsultationen fortgesetzt werden. Dem Anspruch, mit der Fregattenfahrt zum Erhalt der regel­basierten Ordnung und des internationalen Rechts beizutragen, ist Deutschland je­doch nicht oder allenfalls in geringem Maße gerecht geworden. Zu klären ist, welche Folgerungen die Bundesrepublik für ihr künftiges Indo-Pazifik-Engagement zieht.

Der Putsch vom 25. Oktober 2021 setzte dem demokratischen Übergangsprozessin Sudan ein jähes Ende. Militär- und Sicherheitskräften gelingt es seitdem jedoch nicht, ihre Herrschaft zu festigen. Eine Rückkehr zu einer dauerhaften und stabilen Militärregierung in Sudan ist unwahrscheinlich. Zu groß sind die internen Gegen­sätze der Putschistengruppierungen und die wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen des Landes. Die Demokratiebewegung ist gut organisiert und dank ihrer dezentralen Struktur in der Lage, Verhaftungen und Gewalt zu trotzen. Ein neuer demokratischer Übergangsprozess wird nicht allein durch Wahlen herbeizuführen sein, welche die Putschisten für Sommer 2023 planen. Jedwede internationale Vermittlung in Sudan hat nur dann eine Chance, wenn sie eng auf die zivilgesellschaftlichen Pläne für eine Neuausrichtung des Staates abgestimmt ist.

Only a few days before Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the chief commentator of the Turkish daily Sabah, Mehmet Barlas, summed up his assessment of the situation with the sentence, “If we had to reckon with a war, President Erdoğan would not have left today for a four-day trip to Africa.” He added that the Turkish president is in constant contact with Russia’s President Putin. “All experts,” the avowed Erdoğan supporter continued, agreed that Washington was escalating the crisis to solidify its dominance in Western Europe. With that, Barlas also echoed the general mood in the country. It is fortunate, he said, that Russia’s president is so much more reasonable and wiser than his American counterpart.

The bond between Erdoğan and Putin

Such a positive image of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s familiarity with the Kremlin leader is no accident: Particularly since the failed coup attempt of 2016, with Putin’s help, Erdoğan has been able to position himself independently of – and sometimes even against – the United States and Europe on key foreign policy issues. In Syria and Azerbaijan, Ankara and Moscow succeeded in marginalizing Western actors. In Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey acts as a competitor or even adversary to EU member states. Ankara’s flirtation with Moscow and concerns that Turkey might turn away from Europe altogether had contributed significantly to Brussels’ kid-glove approach to Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus and Washington’s belated reaction to the acquisition of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system with sanctions. It is true, Ankara had experienced Putin as a cool strategist and ruthless power politician in the conflicts with Moscow. But Erdoğan always seemed to succeed in avoiding escalation.

Despite all of Ankara’s conflicts with Moscow, Erdoğan’s rapprochement with Russia has brought him much closer to his goal of strategic autonomy for his country from the West. Turkey skillfully maneuvered between the fronts of global rivalry and was thus able to considerably expand its scope and influence in just a few years. In this seesaw policy, however, Turkey is behaving much more confrontationally toward Western states than toward Russia. For years, the government press has painted a positive picture of Russia and a negative one of the United States and Europe. This is not without effect on public opinion: About a month before Russia attacked Ukraine, in a poll carried out by a renowned opinion research institute, a narrow relative majority of 39 percent of respondents favored foreign policy cooperation with Russia and China over cooperation with Europe and the United States.

In the first days after the attack, Ankara’s policy followed exactly the aforementioned pattern. Turkey did condemn the attack. However, it is not participating in sanctions against Russia. In the vote on suspending Russia’s representation rights in the Council of Europe, Turkey was the only European NATO state to abstain and, as such, is keeping its airspace open to Russian aircraft.

The West is paying particular attention to whether and how Turkey implements the Treaty of Montreux. The 1936 treaty regulates the passage of warships through Turkey’s Dardanelles and Bosporus straits into the Black Sea. It limits the number, tonnage, and duration of stay of ships from non-littoral states in the Black Sea. In the event of war, the convention stipulates that the waterways must be closed to ships of the parties to the conflict, and it entrusts Ankara with the application of the treaty’s regulations

Ankara swings around

It took Turkey four days to classify the Russian invasion as “war.” However, Ankara is still reluctant to officially close the waterways – as the treaty stipulates – to ships of parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, Ankara is warning “all countries, Black Sea riparian or not,” against sending warships through the straits. In the literal sense, this step is not directed unilaterally against Moscow, but it also makes it more difficult for NATO ships to sail into the Black Sea. According to the treaty, however, the waterways may only be closed to warships of all countries if Ankara considers itself directly threatened by war. Consciously creating ambiguity, Turkey has triangulated between the West and Russia

Almost imperceptibly at first, however, a reversal has set in, and there are reasons for this. First, the West is showing unity and resolve unseen since the Cold War, and its sanctions are undermining Russia’s standing in the world. Second, Putin is losing his charisma as a successful statesman and reliable partner. Third, Ankara realizes that Putin’s vision of a great Russian empire could provoke more wars. And fourth, the ranks of the adversaries are closing: It is becoming more difficult for Turkey to continue its dearly held seesaw policy.

Thus, strongly pro-Western tones have been coming out of Ankara in recent days. Turkey will continue to support Ukraine in consultation with the West, according to the president’s spokesman. Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoglu now claims to have contradicted Russia’s wishes for the passage of warships through the Bosporus “in all friendship” days ago. And President Erdoğan is in favor of admitting Ukraine to the EU and Kosovo to NATO. Moreover, Ankara is not contradicting reports by Ukrainian diplomats that Turkey is supplying more armed drones and training drone pilots. On the 2nd of March, Turkey joined the vast majority of states in the UN General Assembly’s condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that asks Russia to “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces”. Two days later, during the extraordinary meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Ankara supported the deployment of NATO’s Response Force to NATO countries neighboring Ukraine.

It looks like Putin is not only bringing long-lost unity to the EU but also reminding Ankara of the benefits of its Western ties. Western states should realize that only more unity among themselves and more determination will make Ankara re-engage with the West.

Indiens Enthaltungen bei den Abstimmungen der Vereinten Nationen (VN) gegen die russische Invasion in der Ukraine haben in vielen westlichen Hauptstädten und Medien Unverständnis ausgelöst. Der Konflikt stürzt Indien in ein kaum auflösbares Dilemma. Zum einen kann es sich nicht leisten, Partei im Konflikt zu ergreifen, ohne selbst massive außenpolitische Probleme zu riskieren, da es in der Auseinandersetzung mit China sowohl gute Beziehungen zu den USA als auch zu Russland benötigt. Zum anderen ist Indiens Enthaltung bei den VN zwar durchaus konsequent, vor allem mit Blick auf seine außenpolitische Maxime der strategischen Autonomie und sein Verhältnis zu Russland, doch könnte diese Position im Westen eine Diskussion über die Grenzen der künftigen Zusammenarbeit mit Indien auslösen. Das Land mag weit vom Kriegsschauplatz entfernt sein, doch die geopolitischen Folgen des Konflikts könnten es auch zu einem Verlierer des Ukraine-Kriegs machen.

Indiens Balancepolitik

Russland ist für Indien der zentrale internationale Partner. Erstens sind Schätzungen zufolge die indischen Streitkräfte zu 60 bis 70 Prozent von russischen Rüstungsgütern abhängig. Trotz der umfangreichen militärischen Zusammenarbeit mit den USA und Israel in den vergangenen Jahren wäre Indien ohne russische Waffentechnologie nicht in der Lage, auf die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen durch China und Pakistan zu reagieren. Zweitens haben Indien und Russland eine enge energiepolitische Zusammenarbeit. Russland gilt als einer der größten Investoren im indischen Energiebereich. Zugleich befinden sich die größten indischen Auslandsinvestitionen im Öl- und Gassektor in Russland. Drittens gilt Russland für Indien als wichtigster Verbündeter im Sicherheitsrat der VN. Allerdings hat sich Russland in den vergangenen Jahren zunehmend weniger als zuverlässiger Partner gezeigt. So hat es Indien nicht in die Verhandlungen zu Afghanistan einbezogen, seine militärische Zusammenarbeit mit Pakistan verstärkt und auch nicht gegen China interveniert, als es 2019 Kaschmir zu einem Thema im Sicherheitsrat der VN machte.

Die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Beziehungen zu den USA haben seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts einen massiven Ausbau erfahren. Die gut ausgebildete und wohlhabende indische Diaspora in den USA hat die Beziehungen zu Indien fest in der amerikanischen Außenpolitik verankert. Die größte und die älteste Demokratie haben gemeinsame geopolitische Interessen, und arbeiten zum Beispiel mit Japan und Australien im Quadrilateralen Sicherheitsdialog (Quad) zusammen, um dem Aufstieg Chinas im Indo-Pazifik zu begegnen. Die USA sind mittlerweile der wichtigste Partner für die Modernisierung der indischen Streitkräfte.

Indiens Dilemma

Die westlichen Sanktionen werden Russland wirtschaftlich schwächen und vermutlich zu einer engeren Anbindung an China führen. Indische Experten fürchten bereits, dass sich dies mittelfristig negativ auf russische Rüstungsexporte auswirken könnte, die Indien wiederum in der militärischen Konfrontation gegen China entlang der umstrittenen Grenze benötigt.

Ungemach droht Indien auch von westlicher Seite. Aufgrund der deutlich verbesserten Beziehungen ist es dem Land in den vergangenen Jahren immer wieder gelungen, Ausnahmen von amerikanischen Sanktionen zu erwirken. So konnte Indien ohne Konsequenzen das russische Raketenabwehrsystem S-400 erwerben. Sollte Indien durch amerikanische Sanktionsregime künftig von russischer Energie- oder Militärtechnologie abgeschnitten werden, wäre dies eine massive Einschränkung indischer Sicherheitsinteressen. Sofern die politische Konfrontation zwischen den USA und Russland voranschreitet, könnte auch eine Diskussion über die künftige Rolle Indiens in dieser Auseinandersetzung entstehen. Bislang gilt es als Pfeiler der amerikanischen Indo-Pazifik Strategie mit Blick auf China.

Die Ukrainekrise zeigt auch den außenpolitischen Ambitionen Indiens, zum Beispiel eine Führungsmacht zu sein, klare Grenzen auf. Angesichts der eigenen Interessen und der fehlenden Möglichkeiten, Einfluss auf die Entwicklung zu nehmen, ist wohl am ehesten damit zu rechnen, dass die indische Regierung an einer Politik des »weiter so« beziehungsweise des »Durchwurschtelns« festhält. Die möglichen Reputationsverluste der größten Demokratie – die Verletzung der territorialen Integrität eines Landes durch einen Angriffskrieg seinen engsten Verbündeten de facto in Kauf zu nehmen, in dem auch indische Staatsbürger getötet wurden – sind dabei vermutlich noch das kleinste Problem für Neu-Delhi.

Die Anstrengungen Indiens dürften sich vor allem darauf richten, dass in westlichen Hauptstädten keine Diskussion über die Grenzen der künftigen Zusammenarbeit mit Indien entsteht, sollte die Regierung in Neu-Delhi an ihrer Haltung im Ukrainekonflikt festhalten. Das Festhalten an der bisherigen Balancepolitik könnte unter den veränderten geopolitischen Konstellationen für Indien zu einem unauflöslichen Dilemma werden und Indien zu einem Verlierer des Kriegs in der Ukraine machen.

Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine macht neue Rüstungskontrollverträge mit Moskau vorerst unwahrscheinlich. Mittelfristig wird das Interesse an Abkommen zur Ein­hegung des russischen Atomwaffenarsenals indes wieder steigen. Anders als in den 1980er Jahren würden entsprechende Verhandlungen über neue nukleare Vertragswerke aber misslingen, wenn China, das zum zentralen globalen Herausforderer der USA geworden ist und verstärkt nuklear aufrüstet, außen vor bliebe. Daraus folgt: Es wird keine nennenswerte Stärkung der europäischen nuklearen Sicherheit geben, solange Chinas atomare Aufrüstung ungebremst voranschreitet.