Defence`s Feeds

The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) has announced 7 July 2018 as the date for the next parliamentary (and district councils) elections. It has started the preparations for the elections, but has been grappling with a lack of clarity about the budget and decisions about the use of technology in the elections. These issues have already dimmed the chance that elections can be held on schedule. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili looks at the issues with the budget and controversy around the use of technology, as the IEC is already contemplating fallback date. (With a postscript about the selection process for a new IEC chairman by Thomas Ruttig.)

This is part two of a series of dispatches about the preparations for the next elections. Part one (read here) dealt with political aspects. The following parts will address more technical issues, and also the question of district council elections. In this part: the date, the budget and the back and forth concerning the use of election technology.

Setting the date for the elections

On 22 June 2017, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced that the next parliamentary and district council elections would be held on 16 Saratan 1397 (7 July 2018). These elections are long overdue. The term of the current Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of parliament) expired on 22 June 2015. According to the constitution, the elections should have been held 30 to 60 before the expiry date. (1)

This is the second time a date has been set for the elections. The first time, on 18 January 2016, the IEC (in its former composition – it has been changed since –, read about it here), after several attempts in 2015 – had announced the elections were to be held on 16 October 2016 (AAN’s previous reporting here). This date was not taken seriously by the government and donors, because most issues relating to electoral reform promised by the National Unity Government (NUG) leaders had remained unresolved.

By July 2018, the parliamentary election will have been more than three years overdue. The current Wolesi Jirga also will have served extra-constitutionally for more than three years.

One important issue to have stood in the way of holding the election is that the current president and chief executive, when they formed the NUG in September 2014, had agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions with the objective to “implement electoral reform before the 2015 parliamentary elections” (full text of the agreement here). The reforms were delayed. It was only by November 2016 that a new electoral law was passed and members of both electoral commissions, the IEC and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), were changed (see AAN’s previous reporting here; for an update on this see the postscript at the end of this text).

Both the government and the international community welcomed the announcement of the July 2018 election date. This included Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah who, as the runner-up in the controversial 2014 presidential election, in particular, had advocated electoral reform. He welcomed it as “a step towards [fulfillment of] the [NUG]’s commitments and institutionalisation of democracy.” The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), in its statement, even spoke of a “realistic date.” However, the IEC now operates with the assumption that the date is no longer achievable, as Wasima Badghisi, deputy and acting head of the IEC, said on a television debate on 20 November 2017 that there would be an election next year (2018), but with some flexibility about the date.

The budget and financing the elections

During the 22 June 2017 press conference, when the date was announced, (former) IEC chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai (who has been fired since, see AAN’s previous analysis here) said that the IEC had been assured of the election budget and security. According to the IEC, an estimated 210 million dollars is required for holding parliamentary and district council elections. On 14 November 2017, the head of the IEC secretariat, Imam Muhammad Warimach, told AAN that the amount also included the budget for the cost of election technology (more on the debate about election technology below). A deputy spokesman for the president, Najibullah Azad, told the BBC that 40 million dollars were already available in the Ministry of Finance, and the remaining amount would need to be provided by foreign donors.

Afghanistan itself lacks the financial ability to finance a mammoth operation, such as elections, and thus has heavily relied on international donors for funding ever since the first electoral cycle in 2004/05. On 3 October 2017, the IEC, the ECC and UNAMA signed an election project document, which is “providing the legal and financial framework allowing the UN and donors to support and strengthen Afghanistan’s electoral institutions and operations.” However, Warimach told AAN on 14 November 2017 that the IEC had not yet received any budget and only a few million dollars had been paid to the UNDP which only covers their internal expenses. UNDP has been administering the Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) Project, which manages the election budget provided by donors (see more about the project’s phases and name changes in footnote (2)). Warimach further said that the donors told them that they had only 100 million dollars for both the parliamentary and presidential elections. This falls short of the IEC estimation of 210 million dollars required for the parliamentary and district council elections alone. This clearly indicates that there is no common understanding between the IEC and donors about the budget to finance the elections.

The debate about the use of technology

What are the concerns?

The NUG leaders and the IEC are keen to use modern technology solutions in the next elections – particularly biometric technology for voter registration. However, these solutions have already caused delays. Moreover, the IEC, the government and the international donors have been at odds as to what type and scope of technology would, in practice, improve the quality of the coming elections. Discussions have considered full or partial use of biometric voter registration (BVR) and voter verification (BVV), and electronic machines for voting, counting and result transmission.

The idea to introduce digital technology in the next parliamentary election arose first in early March 2017. The president, as its main advocate, pushed for it during several meetings with the IEC and ECC members, ambassadors and donor representatives. He argued that the use of such technology in future elections would “ensure [their] transparency.” (see here) In another meeting, the president complained that a similar 2002 proposal had met with “excuses,” and blamed donor reluctance for missing this opportunity. (This was as a result of a mix of reasons: Although the international community shouldered most of the budgets for the elections in 2004 and 2005, there was a reluctance to further increase the costs by introducing technology in later elections. In the initial post-Taleban years, there also were severe infrastructural hurdles – which still have not been overcome.) IEC officials and the NUG authorities have followed the president’s line and have been insisting since on the introduction of such technology.

However, many Afghan politicians and observers continued to question this obsession with technology. They expressed the following observations:

First, questioning the feasibility of introducing elections technology, for instance, Fazl Ahmad Manawi, a former head of the IEC and close ally of the chief executive, on 26 April 2017, called the use of technology in elections “under the current circumstance” a “political gamble” and “unfeasible” (see here).

Second, they have argued that technology alone could not be a suitable remedy for problems that are primarily political (see AAN’s previous reporting here and here) and that even the most modern technology could be manipulated, especially by the government, according to political opposition groups. For example, on 4 April 2017, Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi, the head of the opposition New National Front of Afghanistan, expressed concern that the new technology could be “misused even more hugely” and that he did not have “any doubt that the government [will use] this technology in its own favour, too.” (see here) The concerns about possible manipulation were also echoed by Muhammad Yusuf Rashid, the executive director of the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), who said on 26 April 2017 on TV that it was necessary “to inform the people”, so they know that it would not be “a controlled technology” and “is directly controlled, overseen by the IEC and they are accountable.”

Third, Afghan observers have pointed to the lack of consensus and institutional capacity as problems for adopting technological solutions. Rashid, for instance, mentioned during his April TV discussion that his organisation had held a conference on that day, “in which there was no agreement between the IEC and the ECC” and also among the political parties present. Moreover, Rashid said that, so far, the “whole capacity” of the IEC had been reliant upon a manual system, and the introduction of technology would need “time-consuming” capacity development.

Concerns have also been raised about potential providers of such technology. (3) Smart Matic reportedly gave a presentation in the Palace and to the IEC on 4 March 2017 when it appears it was the only competitor.

The feasibility study rejects the use of technology

As a result of these discussions, the international community agreed to fund the desired technology only if a feasibility study were conducted. Some local stakeholders interpreted the demand for this study as though the donors wanted to deny Afghans modern voting technology, because they deemed the country too backward. For example, IEC spokesman Gula Jan Badi Sayyad, on 26 April 2017, said during a TV discussion “if [that technology] is not feasible in Afghanistan, how come the [international donor countries] themselves use [such] technology? Afghanistan is not on another planet […].” He said that Afghans were very adaptive to new technology.

A Feasibility Study Team was appointed in March (4) and issued its final report on 17 April 2017 (which AAN has seen) that concluded: First, it was unfeasible “to introduce new digital election technology for an election in November 2017” – the target date given by the government. Second, it strongly recommended shelving the idea of electronic voting until after the next parliamentary elections and recommended: only a partial use of technology “[w]ith a longer time horizon, including a potential election day in spring 2018 or later,” which included “biometric voter registration, biometric voter verification, and electronic result processing.” Third, the report suggested: “biometric registration in some areas” could be still complemented with “other, simpler measures”, in order not to disenfranchise those “citizens that cannot be reached as part of the initial biometric registration drive.” The Feasibility Study Team also referred to “new legal requirements for assigning voters to polling centres, and the poor state of the existing register”, which results from article six of the new electoral law; this article is about voter registration, calls for the registration of all eligible voters in a voters list and obliges the voters to vote at the same polling centres where they are originally registered. (5) These requirements, the team concluded, necessitated “a new, credible voter register”, which it said was “a priority area for the use of technology.”

The report provided “basic estimations” about the timeframe for “a biometric voter registration exercise”, which it said would take “at least nine months to a year from decisionmaking [sic]: 3 months for specification and tendering for equipment; 3 months for production of equipment, shipment to country; 2 – 4 months for registration exercise, depending on operational plan; 1 month duplication and voter list production.” It said that the estimation was “a best-case scenario” and that delays should be “expected and adequate time buffers need to be included in the final operational plan.”

The findings of the Feasibility Study Team corresponded with the recommendations by the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) (which was appointed in 2015 to review the electoral laws and institutions and recommend electoral reforms as part of the NUG’s political agreement in December 2015 (see AAN’s previous reports here and here). After listing the advantages of using technology in electoral processes, such as helping to prevent duplication in voter registration, multiple voting and accelerating safe data transfer from polling centres to the IEC headquarters, the SERC recommended that “the government, considering all aspects related to this subject, such as the possibilities of procuring required machines and their maintenance, public awareness, training of election staff for launching electronic voting and the infrastructural possibilities of the country, conducts the voter registration process electronically and use of technology in other phases of elections be incorporated into mid-term and long-term programmes [our Italics].”

IEC decides for full use of technology

Contrary to the above recommendations, the IEC announced that it had decided to use technology in all phases of elections, including voter registration, voter verification, voting, vote counting and result transmission. This happened during a consultative meeting with representatives of political parties and civil society organisations on 26 April 2017 (which was also attended by the author). Maleha Hassan, a member of the IEC, told the participants that the full use of technology “will be like a revolution in Afghanistan, […] we need to use technology.” She dismissed the recommendations of the Feasibility Study Team as having been only “conducted by three foreigners and one Afghan” who, she said “may not know well about Afghanistan” and might not have researched “properly.” She said that “the electoral law is the only basis for the IEC decisions,” despite the fact the law does not particularly prescribe anything about use of technology.

IEC secretary and spokesman Gula Jan Badi Sayyad also argued that the use of technology was about trust building. He said in “countries like Afghanistan, where there is a lack of trust, transparency and there is fraud” and where “people need to find something to ensure trust and prevent fraud” needed to use them. Similarly, on 2 May 2017, IEC secretariat head, Warimach, said in the Senate, “the commission, after reviewing the use of technology, has come to this conclusion that it has the capacity for full use of it and is going to hold the next parliamentary elections electronically.” Government officials (such as the second vice-president Sarwar Danesh, in a meeting with the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan on 1 May 2017) also continued to press for the use of technology.

This ambitious decision, to fully utilise technology, disregarded the recommendations based on technical studies conducted by SERC and Feasibility Study Team regarding what was feasible and practical which was: only biometric voter registration and verification for the next parliamentary elections.

The IEC fails to secure a successful procurement

Both the restricted tendering method and the procurement process were criticised by Afghan election observers. FEFA’s Rashid questioned why the restricted tendering method was used in the first place, despite the fact that the commission had enough time to use open tendering method) Sughra Sadat of Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) implied that, even this restricted tendering was not conducted transparently, when she told AAN on 12 September 2017 that “TEFA talked to a couple of the companies, including SmartMatic, that were requested to provide proposals for biometric machines. The two companies said that they were notified at the last minute when the deadline was about to close.”

The IEC under fire on 10 October 2017 announced in a press release that, based on the report of its evaluation committee, the offer submitted by the Prologix had fallen short of the set criteria and that, based on the procurement law and rules of procedure, the offer failed “to go to the detailed evaluation phase.” The IEC further declared that the offer by the company was “irresponsive [not fulfilling the functional criteria specified by the IEC in the request for proposal]” and referred it back to the NPC “for further processing”. This, in effect, meant a new tendering process is required.

This is how Plan B could look like again. Photo: Thomas Ruttig (2010)

Plan B: back to manual voter registration?

On 29 October 2017, Tolonews quoted IEC deputy head Wasima Badghisi as saying that, the paper-based elections for the next parliament seemed more feasible. Two days later, IEC spokesman Sayyad explained to AAN that the IEC was working on an alternative plan to conduct voter registration manually, should its “Plan A” for biometric voter registration encounter any problems. According to an electoral roadmap prepared by the IEC (AAN has seen a copy of it), if the BVR equipment is not available by October 2017 (which has not happened), it would affect the other steps in the process, given the approaching onset of winter. The previous IEC in its unrealistic plan for elections on the 16 October 2016 had set four months for the revalidation of existing cards and the registration of Afghans who, for some reason, needed new cards. A new voter registration would certainly take more time (see also this AAN’s previous dispatch here).

According to Sayyad, the NPC had not sent out a new request for proposal for BVR equipment as of 31 October 2017. This has now been forsaken as, on 22 November 2017, Maleha Hassan told AAN that there would not be any procurement process for biometric machines this time, as it would take time. This came after deputy head of the IEC for operations, Wasima Badghisi, also said on 20 November 2017 that their plan for biometric voter registration “was not supported sufficiently by international organisations and the government of Afghanistan and this might remain as a long-term plan and if we receive these supports, we may use it in 2019 presidential elections.” She further said that the discussion was to “make [only] partial use of electronic system in preparing voter lists, but its full use is a weak possibility.” In fact, blaming the international donors and the government about elections technology, the IEC has now started to implement its Plan B. This falls back on use of a paper-based system to register voters, but still link them to the polling centres registration. On 27 November, IEC spokesman Sayyad confirmed to AAN that the IEC had decided to conduct paper-based voter registration based on Tazkera and that the IEC had already signed a memorandum of understanding with Population Registration Department based on which it committed to issue tazkera to eligible voters so the IEC can use it to register voters. According to him, this also reduces the budget, but the IEC is still preparing an estimated budget plan in accordance with Plan B.

Conclusion

The IEC officially sticks to the 7 July 2018 date for the next parliamentary elections (we will discuss district council elections in a separate dispatch), but has already signalled flexibility. AAN has heard from various stakeholders that fall-back dates as late as October 2018 are being considered.

Despite the problems outlined here (and we will soon write about further aspects of necessary preparations), it appears that the IEC will keep struggling to still hold elections in 2018. One of the remaining shortcomings is that the Afghan government insists that it does not have the financial ability to finance elections alone and, thus, needs the support of the international donors. They have continued to be reluctant as they were concerned, not only about the feasibility of technological solutions, but also about their ownership, sustainability and credibility in Afghanistan. They also set conditions, such as: proper use of IEC and ECC assets (addressing questions about the assets taken by the former commissioners (see this media report about the IEC assets taken by the former IEC members); and, a proper budget and operational plan.

Much time was lost as a result of the president’s ambitious desire to introduce, not only biometric voter registration, but also electronic voting. Recommendations by a number of feasibility studies have been overruled, and an unsuccessful and problematic procurement process for this technology has added fuel to the fire. The IEC saw itself as being forced now to fall back on Plan B: to use a manual system for voter registration and to develop a more reliable voter list that, for the first time, ties each voter to a specific polling centre. This was a major demand of electoral reform, which has been enshrined in the electoral law. This also reduces the election budget. However, it remains to be seen whether this new manual voter registration can lay a solid foundation for improving the system that could be built upon by using biometric technology in the run-up to the next cycle of elections.

Postscript: The selection of a new IEC chairman

The sacking of the IEC chairman, Najibullah Ahmadzai, by the president on 15 November 2017 (see AAN’s previous report here has necessitated the selection of a new IEC commissioner to replace him. (The commissioners will elect the new chairman from amongst themselves.)

In this situation, according to the Electoral Law, President Ghani was supposed to appoint a new commissioner from amongst the 14 remaining candidates suggested by a selection committee in 2016 for the IEC within two weeks’ time. The IEC, in its new composition, would then elect a new chairman from among themselves. (7) However, he argued that none of the candidates were sufficiently qualified and, as a result, decreed that the former selection committee should reconvene (see its composition in footnote (8) and more about its previous work here).

Acting presidential spokesman Shah Hussain Murtazawi informed about this decree in a statement published on Facebook on 26 November. The decree came into force with immediate effect. Murtazawi’s statement also repeated the argument about the absence of an eligible candidate. Here AAN’s working translation from Dari:

Considering the importance of elections as a national process and the need for the competent and experienced individuals for better conduct of it [elections] and because an eligible person for membership of the Independent Election Commission could not be appointed from among the list of remaining candidates, the leadership of the National Unity Government has made a decision to issue a decree on the start of the Selection Committee’s work.

The president’s argument was read by many observers of the Afghan election process as a statement in favour of Abdullah Ahmadzai, currently the head of the country office of The Asia Foundation. His name has regularly emerged as a strong candidate for the job and whom key international stakeholders also support. Abdullah Ahmadzai served as the head of the IEC Secretariat for the 2010 parliamentary elections. These elections had been marred by serious shortcomings and followed by more than a year-long aftermath that was badly managed and controversial until finally results were accepted. AAN then concluded that this vote had been sacrificed “for a semblance of control”) (see here and more AAN analysis here). His name was not on the 2016 shortlist of 21 names submitted by the selection committee for the initial IEC.

This decision to reconvene the selection committee immediately created some opposition, including from among members of the committee. Yusuf Rashid, a member of the (former) selection committee argued, as reported by Afghan media that there was “no legal justification for the committee to resume its work.” This was echoed by the chairman of one of the Afghan election watchdog organisations, Jandad Spinghar from Election Watch Afghanistan (EWA), (9) as well as in a statement from The Election & Transparency Watch Organization of Afghanistan (ETWA) published on 26 November. ETWA even suggested that, in order to solve the issue of IEC succession, the Election Law should be amended “in consultation with political parties and civil society.” This would lead to a lengthy process, further extending the preparation period for the elections.

 

(1) Article 83 of the constitution sets out:

Members of the House of People shall be elected by the people through free, general, secret and direct balloting. The work period of the House of People shall terminate, after the disclosure of the results of the elections, on the 1st of Saratan of the fifth year and the new parliament shall commence work. The elections for members of the House of People shall be held 30-60 days prior to the expiration of the term of the House of People. The number of the members of the House of People shall be proportionate to the population of each constituency, not exceeding the maximum of two hundred fifty individuals. Electoral constituencies as well as other related issues shall be determined by the elections law. The elections law shall adopt measures to attain, through the electorate system, general and fair representation for all the people of the country, and proportionate to the population of every province, on average, at least two females shall be the elected members of the House of People from each province.

(2) The UNDP-ELECT, since its launch in 2006, has been “the preferred basket for donors to contribute to, both for UN support to the IEC and for its ongoing daily costs” (quoted from here). The ELECT project has served both as a main basket and vehicle for international financial support for the electoral processes and provider of international technical support to the electoral bodies. This continued until 2012 when it was replaced by UNDP-ELECT II, which provided direct support to the IEC, as well as ECC from 2012 to mid-2015. Since then, it has been replaced by the Transitional Support to Elections in Afghanistan Project Initiation Plan (PIP). PIP was intended “to bridge the period between the operational closure of the ELECT II project on 31 July 2015, and the signing of a new project document, defining the terms and modalities of future electoral support, to be implemented partnership with” NUG.  Starting from January 2018, PIP would be replaced by United Nations Electoral Support Project (UNESP).

(3) On 18 April 2017, for instance, Jandad Spinghar, the head of Elections Watch Afghanistan (EWA) said on TV, “There is a company called Smart Matic which has come into this country in 2015 and has met the president, the chief executive, the leaders and us and everyone. I mean that the company is trying to do a type of marketing. It has been to the commissions for [trying to persuade them into] buying the technology.”

(4) The exact date of the appointment is not clear. Naem Ayubzada, the head of TEFA, who was a member of the team, in a conversation with AAN did not remember the exact date and said that it worked for one month. If true, it might have been established on 17 March.

The report also does not say anything about who ordered the feasibility study and says:

“In support of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned electoral process, the IEC, the government and the international partners have agreed that an independent feasibility study should be conducted prior to the introduction of technology.”

Ayubzada told AAN that the Ministry of Finance had sent a letter to the IEC, which then coordinated the feasibility study.

According to the report, the Feasibility Study Team was composed of the following members:

• Mr. Peter Wolf (Austria): a technical manager with International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance (IDEA) with the expertise in elections, constitution-building, and ICTs in elections.
• Mr. Naeem Ayubzada (Afghanistan): the head of TEFA, a domestic election observer organization,which has observed 2009 presidential, 2010 parliamentary and 2014 presidential elections.
• Ms. Mareska Mantik (Indonesia): electoral capacity building specialist with experience of working with UNDP.
• Mr. Kåre Vollan (Norway): an international electoral expert assisting the Election Commission of Nepal on law issues and providing advice to the Constitutional Assembly members.

The report further said that “Technical staff of the IEC participated for technical support upon the request of the team and approval of the Vice Chairman – Operations who was directly in charge of the overall management and coordination of the study.”

(5) Article six of the electoral law says about registration and voting:

1 The person eligible to vote has to personally appear at the polling center, and register his/her name in the voters list based on the citizenship Tazkera or document specified by the Commission for verification of his/her identity.

2 No person can register his/her name more than once in the voters list.

3 The voter is obliged to vote at the poling center, where his/her name has already been registered in the voters list of that polling center.

4 To get a ballot paper, a voter is obliged to present the citizenship Tazkira (National ID) or a document which is determined by the Commission for proving his/her identity.

6 Every voter has the right of one vote and can use it directly in favor of his/her favorite candidate. (6) In case a voter may need guidance about finding his/her candidate of choice, he/she can seek help of a person he/she trusts.

(6) According to rule 21 of the rules of procurement procedure, an entity can “use the restricted tendering procurement method where; 1) the goods, works and services are only available from a limited number of bidders (maximum 5 references). 2) The use of open tendering is not practicable, due to unforeseeable and urgent circumstances or delays in procurement process because of dilatory, negligence or un-accurate planning of the Entity” (the Dari version of the procedure is available here. (Dari version here).

The IEC and NPC used the second justification for choosing the restricted tendering method.

(7) See paragraph 2 of Article 14 of this law. The whole article reads:

Conditions of Termination of the Member of the Commission

Article 16:

1      A member of the Commission can be terminated from job in the following circumstances:

1.1-      Faking of the educational documents.

1.2-      Deprivation of civil rights on the order of a competent court.

1.3-      Conviction for committing crimes of misdemeanor or felony.

1.4-      Having membership in political parties during membership of the Commission.

1.5-      Breaching provisions of the Constitution of Afghanistan, this law and other laws enforced in the country.

1.6-      Suffering from an incurable or long-lasting disease which impedes performance of duties.

1.7-      Continuous absence from job for more than twenty days without justifiable legal reasons.

1.8-      Non-observance of provisions of Article 17 of this law.

2      Member of the Commission may tender his/her resignation in written to the president.

3      In case of resignation, termination or death of one or more members of the Commission, the President, within seven days, shall appoint new member (s) from amongst the remaining candidates stipulated in paragraph (2) of the Article (14) of this law; with due consideration to the ethnic and gender composition.

4      In case the chairperson, deputy chairperson or secretary of the Commission lose their membership due to resignation, termination or death, new elections shall be conducted among the members of the Commission, in accordance with the paragraph (2) of the Article (11) of this law.

5      Except for the conditions mentioned in sections (1, 2 and 3) of the paragraph (1) of this article, determination of other conditions shall take place by the Commission.

Based on Article 16.3 of the same law, in the described case (or in the case of resignation or death of an IEC member) the president should appoint a new member from the list of the remaining candidates introduced by the selection committee. Article 16.4 says that if the dismissed (or resigned or deceased) member is also the chairman or deputy chairman or secretary of the IEC, there should be a new internal election in the IEC (see here).

(8) The selection committee comprises of the following members: Jawid Rashidi (Pashtun), a member of the Supreme Court, as chair; Yusuf Rashid (Pashtun), representing the election-related civil society organisations; Mary Akrami (Tajik), representing the women’s rights organisations; Muhammad Zia Langari (Sayyed), a member of AIHRC; and Abdullah Shafai (Hazara), a member of ICOIC.

(9) The article we cite Spinghar’s position from wrongly associates him with another organisation, FEFA.

 

 

 

 

Chinese PCL-09 Self-Propelled Howitzer

PONARS Eurasia has just published my memo on Russian military modernization plans from our September policy conference in Washington. I’m reposting it here. Lots of other very interesting memos are available on the PONARS website.

By the end of 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin will approve Russia’s State Armament Program for 2018-2027. This memo summarizes publicly available information regarding the types of armaments that will be procured for the Russian military in the next eight years and assesses the likelihood that the Russian government will be able to meet these commitments. Based on these plans, Russia seems primed to stay ahead of its competitors in some capabilities (anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, air defenses), narrow the gap in areas such as drones and precision-guided munitions, and continue to lag well behind in a few areas such as surface ships and automated control systems.

The Scope of the Program

The Russian State Armament Program (SAP) for 2018-2027, which is set to be approved toward the end of this year, will set out Russia’s rearmament priorities for the next ten years. The previous program, which runs through 2020, was the blueprint according to which the Russian military has been modernizing its equipment since 2011. That program had a total budget of 19.3 trillion rubles. SAP-2027 was initially regarded as a kind of lifeline for SAP-2020, whose expensive, long-term programs were to be transferred to the next ten-year plan. The cost of the successor program is expected to total 19 trillion. This suggests that military procurement spending is actually being kept fairly constant because the ruble amount remains about the same and almost all of the purchases are from domestic suppliers, meaning the sales are not impacted by changes in the ruble’s exchange rate.

The size of the program was the subject of an extended tug-of-war between the Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry. As early as 2014, the military asked for funding in the range of 30-55 trillion rubles over a ten-year period, while the finance ministry set a target of 14 trillion. As the country’s financial situation began to deteriorate in 2015 and the adoption of the SAP was postponed until 2017, both sides lowered their targets. In 2016, the Defense Ministry asked for 22-24 trillion rubles for eight years, while the finance ministry suggested no more than 12 trillion. After an extended and sometimes tense negotiation, a figure of 17 trillion rubles was agreed last winter. This has now been increased to 19 trillion rubles, with the duration extending to the normal ten years. As a result, a number of the most ambitious and expensive projects, including new designs for aircraft carriers, destroyers, strategic bombers, and fighter-interceptor combat aircraft will all be postponed.

This was not the end of tensions over defense financing, however. Although the total amount has been decided, there is now an internal conflict within the defense ministry over how much procurement financing will go to each branch of the military. The various branches have produced documents defending the importance of what they do. As highlighted by the recently approved naval doctrine, such documents often have little connection to any real assessment of either Russian military needs or the capabilities of the defense industry for producing the requested weapons and platforms. Although the final version of the program will not be adopted until the end of the year, it has become increasingly clear that the Russian Navy is in the process of losing the battle for financing. The highest priority for procurement funding will go to the ground forces and to the modernization of nuclear weapons, while the navy, which had the highest level of funding in SAP-2020, will fall to the bottom of the pecking order.

Nuclear Forces

The development priorities of Russian nuclear forces through 2027 are largely clear. After 2021, the naval component of the nuclear triad will consist of six Delta IV-class and eight Borei-class strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), evenly divided between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This will allow for 12 submarines to be in service at all times, while two undergo overhauls and modernization. The air component is being upgraded, with modernized versions of both Tupolev Tu-95MS (Bear H) bombers and 11 Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers receiving new engines and avionics, as well as weapons upgrades. The new long-range cruise missile, labeled Kh-101, is replacing the Kh-55, with a range of up to 4,500 km in the nuclear variant. In addition, the Russian military has announced that it will resume building new Tu-160s, with serial production expected to resume no earlier than 2021. This is a more cost-effective and technologically feasible alternative to bringing a completely new design (known as PAK DA) to the point of serial production in a reasonable time frame.

The future development of the land component of the Russian triad presents the least certainty. There are three projects under way, the Rubezh road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM, and the Sarmat heavy silo-based ICBM. The Rubezh project is closest to fruition, with testing completed in 2015 and deployment expected later in 2017. The RS-26 Rubezh is a further development of the RS-24 Yars, with independently guided warheads designed to break through missile defense shields. The Barguzin is expected to be ready for flight testing in 2019, even though there was a period of several months in 2016 when it appeared that the program was going to be suspended due to budget cuts. The Barguzin is expected to be superior in range and accuracy as compared to the Soviet rail-based system that was decommissioned in 2005. The RS-28 Sarmat is the next-generation silo-based ICBM. It was originally expected to be ready for deployment in 2018, but unspecified snags in its development have pushed ejection testing from the original target date of 2015 to no earlier than June 2017. As a result, the Sarmat is unlikely to be deployed any earlier than 2020, assuming the difficulties have been overcome and the tests proceed as scheduled.

Ground Forces

After being largely starved of funding in SAP-2020, the ground forces are expected to get the largest share of funding in SAP-2027. Some sources indicate that over a quarter of the total program budget will go to equipping the Ground Forces and Airborne Forces. This is in part due to Russia’s experience in Ukraine leading to an increased perception that ground forces may be needed in future conflicts, but mostly the result of new armored vehicle and tank designs being ready for serial production. T-90 and T-14 Armata tanks, Kurganets-25infantry fighting vehicles and Boomerang armored personnel carriers are all expected to enter the force over the next eight years, though numbers of some items such as Armatatanks may be limited due to their high cost of production.

The production of artillery and ground based missiles has been a bright spot for the ground forces. Deployment of medium-range Iskander missiles is proceeding on schedule, with all units set to be in place by 2019. New Uragan and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) are also being deployed beginning in 2017, with purchases expected to continue throughout the duration of SAP-2027. Procurement of the Koalitsiya self-propelled gun started in 2016. It is eventually expected to fully replace the Soviet-era Msta system. New short range air defense systems will also be procured.

There are more problems with tactical automated control systems for the ground forces. Originally expected to be deployed to 40 brigades by 2020, these remain in field testing in a single division. Reports indicate that the military has mixed feelings about the system and may decide that it needs improvement before it can be widely adopted. In that case, the development of network-centric warfare capabilities may be delayed beyond 2027. In the meantime, the ground forces will continue to receive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare systems that have been used to good effect in Syria.

Naval Forces

The Russian Navy stands to be the big loser in SAP-2027. After being allocated 4.7 trillion rubles in SAP-2020 and finding itself unable to spend all of that money due to a combination of problems with Russia’s shipbuilding industry and the impact of Western and Ukrainian sanctions, the Russian Navy’s allocation is expected to be cut to 2.6 trillion rubles in SAP-2027. Despite grandiose plans being mooted in documents such as the recently approved naval doctrine, Russia is planning to focus its naval construction on submarines and small ships. In surface ships, the focus will be on new corvettes of several different types that will have greater displacement and better armament than existing classes, as well as the start of serial production of the long-delayed Admiral Gorshkov-class of frigates. Until the problems with the Admiral Gorshkov are resolved, the Navy will continue to build the less advanced Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates.

The only new class of surface ships expected to be built in the next eight years are the so-called Super Gorshkov-class, an 8,000-ton frigate that is increasingly seen as a cheaper and more practical alternative to the 14,000-ton Lider-class destroyers. The key takeaway is that the Russian Navy is looking to increase the size of its smaller ships in order to increase their armament and endurance, while reducing costs by indefinitely postponing the procurement of larger ships such as destroyers, amphibious assault ships, and aircraft carriers.

As for submarines, SAP-2027 will undoubtedly include financing for the completion of six Yasen-M nuclear attack submarines and possibly for a seventh, as well as for the modernization of four to six each of the Soviet-era Oscar– and Akula-class nuclear attack submarines. Construction of fifth-generation nuclear attack submarines (tentatively named the Husky-class) will begin in the mid-2020s. In diesel submarines, the focus will be on developing air independent propulsion systems for the forthcoming Kalina-class, while Lada– and improved Kilo-class boats are built in the meantime.

More important than new ships and submarines, the coming eight years will see the Russian Navy concentrate on developing new weapons systems and improving existing ones. The introduction of Kalibr missiles has provided the Russian Navy with a standoff anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile capability that can be used to make even small ships that have to stay near home ports a potential threat to adversaries, included NATO member states. The Russian military recognizes the advantages that these missiles provide and has put them on a wide range of ship and submarine classes. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to deploy these missiles on most new surface ships and submarines, retrofit some existing vessels to carry the missiles, and work to improve the accuracy and reliability of the missiles themselves. It is also working to develop a new hypersonic missile that could pose an even greater threat to Russia’s adversaries in the medium to long term.

Air Forces

In the last seven years, the Russian Air Force has begun to receive modern aircraft in significant numbers and has continued to pay for the development of new designs such as the recently christened Sukhoi Su-57 fifth generation fighter jet (formerly known as the T-50or PAK FA). The Su-57 is not expected to enter into serial production until upgraded engines are ready, which is unlikely to happen until 2027. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to purchase small numbers of these planes for testing. It will also continue to purchase Su-35S fighter jets, with a new contract for 50 additional aircraft signed in late 2016. Purchases of Su-30SM fighter jets and Su-34 strike aircraft will also continue, most likely at rates of 12-18 aircraft per year of each type. Mikoyan MiG-35 fighter aircraft may also be procured, but probably not in large numbers. Overall, with many modern fighter aircraft now in place, rates of procurement will slow in order to allow for the purchase of other types of aircraft. The same goes for military helicopters, since the Russian military has received what it needs in new helicopters during the last seven years. Development of a new high-speed helicopter will not start until after 2027.

Transport and refueling aircraft, long an area of weakness for the Russian Air Force, will be one area of focus. Serial production of the long-troubled Ilyushin Il-76-MD90A is expected to start in 2019, and the Russian military is expecting to receive 10-12 such aircraft per year thereafter. A light transport aircraft is under development, with prototypes expected to be completed in 2024. The A-100 airborne warning system (AWACS) aircraft, based on the Il-76MD90A, was expected to be delivered starting in 2016 but has been repeatedly delayed. Nevertheless, procurement of this aircraft will be included in SAP-2027. Finally, Russia is experiencing a boom in domestic production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By 2020, it will have a strike UAV in production, as well as a new generation of reconnaissance UAVs.

For air defense, Russia will continue to deploy S-400 long-range missiles and Pantsir-Sshort-range missiles. However, it seems increasingly unlikely that the next generation S-500air defense system will be ready for serial production any time soon, though official plans still indicate that a prototype will be built by 2020. Original plans called for serial production of the S-500 to start in 2015. The new standard short-range air defense system has just started development and is not expected to be ready for production until 2030.

Impact on Capabilities and Regional Security

SAP-2020 has been widely described as the first successful armament program of Russia’s post-Soviet history. It was designed to help the Russian military catch up from the extended procurement holiday caused by Russia’s economic collapse in the 1990s. During the last seven years, the Russian military has made great strides in modernizing its weapons and equipment. By and large, these new armaments have been based on updated versions of late Soviet designs. The Russian defense industry now faces the far more formidable challenge of bringing new designs into serial production. It has been successful in this regard in some areas, such as nuclear submarines, missile systems, and UAVs. It has been less successful with combat ships and air defense systems. The verdict is still out on combat aircraft and tanks and armored vehicles.

With the most significant gaps largely filled, SAP-2027 is designed to transition the Russian military to a more regular procurement schedule. Funding will remain relatively constant, though it may be adjusted depending on the economic situation. The previous program has shown that this level of funding is more or less achievable for the government budget and for the Russian defense industry to sustain. The biggest challenge will be in bringing new designs successfully to serial production.

In terms of impact on military capabilities, Russia is already strong enough to defend itself in a conventional war against any adversary and to defeat any neighboring state other than China. It also has a more than sufficient nuclear deterrent capability. New procurement will thus be targeted at keeping pace with technological improvements made by its peer competitors (NATO member states and China). In some areas, such as air defenses, anti-ship missiles, and electronic warfare, Russia will continue to maintain capabilities superior to those of its peers. In other areas, such as UAVs, precision-guided munitions, and tanks and armored vehicles, it appears poised to narrow the gap. Finally, in a few areas, such as surface ships, transport aircraft, and automated control systems, it will remain well behind the United States and may start to lag behind China as well.

Chinese SH3 Self-Propelled Howitzer

Hezb-e Islami has run into a legal conflict over registration. This hampers efforts to re-unite the party’s various factions after the return of its ‘historical’ leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and in the run-up to the elections planned for 2018. It also reflects internal dynamics between a more pragmatic wing of Hezb-e Islami, which is participating in government, and the ex-insurgent faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is struggling to re-assert full control over the party. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig looks into the details and implications (with research by Ali Muhammad Sabawoon).

Hezb-e Islami, a major former mujahedin party that recently made a comeback on the political stage, has run into unexpected trouble. One of its factions, which has operated in Afghanistan since 2005, has refused to fully and publicly commit to party unity following the return of the party’s historical leader, who is trying to regain his grip on it.

The issue of party unity had featured high on the agenda of a large-scale gathering (media report here) held between 8 and 10 November 2017 in Kabul and chaired by Hezb’s historical leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It was also a major theme in Hekmatyar’s opening speech. The conference was designed to mark the party’s transition from being one of the post-2001 insurgent groups to a united, political actor on the national scene. But the Hezb wing led by former economy minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal has so far refused to follow. Both sides say negotiations are ongoing.

Hekmatyar returned to the country in May 2017 (AAN background here), after he concluded a peace deal with the government in the name of his party in September 2016 (AAN analysis here). Following the peace deal, several factions of Hezb that had emerged during the party’s post-2001 split into an insurgent wing and several factions politically active in Afghanistan (AAN background here) had committed to reuniting under the party’s historical name Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HIA; Islamic Party of Afghanistan) with Hekmatyar as the party’s amir (leader).

At the conference, Hekmyatyar did not speak of “factions” but of “different offices and addresses” that needed to be re-united in an “organisational renewal.” He added that the groups under these ‘addresses’ had committed to “close their doors as soon as a central office of the party was established” which now was the case. Hekmatyar mentioned two of these factions, namely the faction that had been led, until recently, by the late Khaled Faruqi, (1) and the Union of Hezb-e Islami Councils (more about these groups in this AAN dispatch). This leaves Arghandiwal’s faction and the United Islamic Party, led by Wahidullah Sabawun, still outside the party. (Hekmatyar did not mention either by name.) Sabawun told AAN on 25 November that he had not participated in Hekmatyar’s congress, continues to run his own party and “for the time being” does not intend to join Hekmatyar.

Representatives of Hekmatyar’s wing told AAN that a Memorandum of Understanding had been signed by the leaders of all factions after the conclusion of the peace deal. Hezb Central Council spokesman Fazl Minullah Mumtaz told AAN, that “all had agreed that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the party’s amir and that Hezb is united, without any factionalism. Arghandiwal has also signed this agreement.” Mumtaz declined to share a copy with AAN, but Abdul Jabbar Shelgarai, a member of the Arghandiwal group (and advisor to Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah), confirmed to AAN that his group considers Hekmatyar “the accepted leader of the people of Afghanistan and the leader of Hezb-e Islami.”

The dissidents’ position

On 9 November, Arghandiwal told Radio Azadi, the Afghan service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, that “until now, unity has not come” and that he “hoped that an agreement could be reached.” He also pointed out that Hezb was registered under his name with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). This was interpreted by observers as a bargaining chip in an attempt to avoid handing over full control of the party to Hekmatyar. Arghandiwal added that he would accept “anyone who is elected leader by Hezb”. A leader was not, however, elected at the November gathering.

An MoJ spokesman was quoted as confirming on 13 November that a party by the name of Hezb-e Islami had already been registered by Arghandiwal, and that the activity of Hekmatyar’s wing “could be illegal”. This statement was quickly retracted. (Incidentally, the current justice minister, Abdul Bassir Anwar, is a member of Arghandiwal’s Hezb faction.) Hezb/Hekmatyar spokesman Mumtaz had immediately countered it, arguing that the National Unity Government (NUG) had concluded the peace agreement with Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan under this name, indirectly suggesting that this implied the NUG’s recognition of Hekmatyar’s faction.

While there was no full leadership election at the 8-10 November Kabul conference, a number of other party positions were filled. Nader Afghan, a Hezb/Hekmatyar spokesman, told AAN that the 3,000 participants of the conference elected the High Central Council consisting of 500 persons which, in turn, elected among them a 100-member High Decision-Making Council (De tasmim ali shura) that, between congresses, would take all decisions concerning the party (see also here). This council would have to elect a 15-member Executive Council (De ejraiye shura). The candidates for membership would be introduced to the Decision-Making Council by the party leader. “The announcement of the election for leadership of the party and the provincial leaders will also be the job of the executive committee,” he added.

Nonetheless, there was no word at the conference about the election of the party’s amir. The party’s constitution (asas-nama), however, also provides for the amir to be elected in a “free, direct and secret vote (…) with the participation of the party’s officials and members.” According to this document (in the author’s archive), the amir is responsible to the party’s central council.

Arghandiwal was absent from the Kabul conference (see media report here), as were other leading Hezb politicians who had been active in Afghanistan for years before Hekmatyar’s return. This included Maulawi Ataullah Ludin, who as an MP between 2005 and 2010 was considered Hezb’s parliamentary leader (he also was a deputy head of the High Peace Council and governor in his home province Nangrahar); Abdulrauf Ibrahimi, the current speaker of the Wolesi Jirga; Eng Muhammad Khan, the second deputy Chief Executive; MPs Eqbal Safi (Kapisa) and Haji Almas (Parwan); former minister Naser Durrani; and leadership members Mawlawi Sarferaz and justice minister Anwar.

Shelgari told AAN that they had not attended the conference because some of their ideas for the party’s reunification “were not accepted” and they had not reached an agreement by the opening of the congress. Officials of both sides told AAN they were not able to share what the conflict is about in detail. A member of Arghandiwal’s office, however, told AAN on the condition of anonymity that there were still a number of armed people present in Hekmatyar’ group who continue to participate in the insurgency, which was “against Afghanistan’s political parties law.”

Hezb and disarmament

AAN has reported previously that “Hezb-e Islami has been a fading insurgent group in recent years” due to a “shortage of resources and a near-absence of central command which could supply [its] fighters and provide reinforcements.”

But some Hezb commanders are still active at a local level. Despite a ceasefire declared by the Hezb leadership in September 2016, some have refused to lay down their arms, for example in Laghman, Baghlan and Maidan-Wardak; read also here and see this video, in Pashto, from an undisclosed location, likely in Eastern Afghanistan).

Over several months, Afghan media reported on the “tyranny” of a Hezb-e Islami commander, Bashir Qanet, in Takhar’s Chah Ab district (here and here) against whom reportedly an arrest warrant had been issued after an attack on a gathering in a local mosque, which resulted in four people killed and nearly 30 others injured. The province’s police chief had told Afghan media that Qanet had 1,000 militia men under his command and that the “police have no capability to detain him.” In a Hezb statement, quoted here, Hekmatyar did not disown the commander. According to another media report, Roqiya Nayel, an MP from Ghor province, has alleged that Hekmatyar’s party illegally distributed hundreds of weapons in less than a year to loyal followers and that armed men affiliated to Hekmatyar walked freely in the province’s centre, Chaghcharan. She urged the government to interdict the armed men who have repeatedy harried the province’s civilian population.

There were also reports of land grabbing and illegal mining by Hezb commanders in Baghlan.

In August, Hekmatyar had reportedly stated that the disarmament of his party’s fighters was currently “not on the government’s agenda” and that the fighters would keep their weapons until the government’s security forces were able to ensure their security. This position has been confirmed by Ahmad Farzan, the official responsible for the post-peace deal disarmament in the High Peace Council secretariat.

At the same time, there were allegations of Hezb members being killed in northern Afghanistan as a result of “collusion” between local officials and the Taleban. Indeed, a number of Hezb commanders have been assassinated, for example in Baghlan and in Logar. Also, a former secretary of Hekmatyar was killed in Peshawar in what could have been tit-for-tat killings between Hezb and the Taleban.

Key Hekmatyar positions at the party conference

The exact status of Hezb’s Kabul gathering remains unclear. Was it a full-scale party congress, to be held frequently according to the party’s constitution, including new elections for a new party leadership after Hekmatyar’s return, bringing in all factions that existed inside Afghanistan before? Or was it something lesser, albeit still significant as the party’s first convocation to be held in the country after Hekmatyar’s return and the peace deal? The official title of the event was “De stere markazi shura tarikhi ghunda” (the High Central Council’s historical gathering).

The conference attracted widespread attention and was discussed in the Afghan public and the media that ran some relatively short articles. At the same time, it was severely underreported, including by Hezb’s own media, and few details about what was discussed and what was decided have emerged. Hezb’s main newspaper Shahadat only carried a short report about the opening day and then ran less than three lines about each of the following two days (see example here) (2); Hezb had announced in advance, however, that two of the three days would be closed to the public. (Hekmatyar’s speech on day one can be found on Youtube.) Drawing on these reports and the speech we summarise those areas of debate at the Kabul meeting most relevant for the current political discussion in Afghanistan.

On elections

In his opening speech at the conference, Hekmatyar supported the holding of parliamentary and district council elections on the date envisaged so far, on 7 July 2018 (see AAN analysis). He criticised attempts to postpone the polls; a number of political parties, he alleged, feared his party and were trying to create hurdles for the elections. He demanded a redrawing of the electoral constituencies and called for the country’s ‘more than four million refugees’ to be granted the right to vote. He said further that “foreigners should not interfere in the elections,” but could “oversee [the process].” Before the conference, the party had suggested that, “instead of changing figures and appointing new officials” in the electoral commissions, a council should be formed from political party representatives and other influential figures to oversee the elections process.

Hekmatyar reportedly told his supporters that the next elections would “bring a basic change in the country’s destiny.”

On the political system

Hekmatyar declared his party’s support for the current government, adding there was no proper alternative to replace it – distancing himself from other political forces demanding an interim government (AAN background here). He also reiterated its commitment to the 2016 peace agreement with the government and called on the Taleban to follow this example.

He added that “if the Taleban agree to talks, we will support all their legitimate and reasonable demands.“

On the ‘ethnic character’ of the current war

Hekmatyar’s statements about the allegedly ethnic character of the current fighting created, in particular, a hot public debate including widespread condemnation, among others, in the media, a presidential spokesman, the Chief Executive and number of MPs and political commentators (media reporting here). Afghan ToloNews quoted him as saying:

War is ongoing in every part of Afghanistan. This is the war which continued in the past. A big number of Ghor residents are involved in this war. Sit with them and ask them who is involved in this war? It is between two ethnic groups! In Taiwara, the conflict is not between security forces and insurgents; it is between two ethnic groups. It is the same in Kunduz, in Baghlan, in all northern parts of the country. The real situation of the war is like this across the country.

Hekmatyar called such reports “misinterpretations” and accused the media of working in the interest of foreigners and Hezb’s enemies.

Conclusion

Arghandiwal’s public refusal to join hands with and subordinate himself to Hekmatyar before the much promoted Kabul party conference was an embarrassment for the party amir, known for his “absolutist leadership style” (AAN background here). The Hezb leadership around Hekmatyar has obviously underestimated the depth of the differences between its own ex-insurgent wing and the veteran party leaders who had participated in the governments of presidents Hamed Karzai and Ashraf Ghani as well as carrying out duties as provincial and district governors or sitting in parliament. (3) Indeed, Arghandiwal’s faction had made its peace with the former main mujahedin rival, Jamiat-e Islami, and joined a coalition around its candidate Abdullah Abdullah, the current government’s Chief Executive, while Hekmatyar still considers Jamiat a rival.

Four long-time Afghan observers of the country’s political scene told AAN that above and beyond the members and sympathisers of Hezb, Pashtuns in particular had hoped that Hekmatyar’s return would bring about positive changes to the political system – but now widely feel let down. The observers explained, using almost similar language, that the myth of the absent guerrilla leader Hekmatyar had been punctured by his statements on the ‘ethnic character’ of the war as it reflected a mind stuck in war-time factional thinking. One also said that, in the eyes of many Afghans, he has dropped his often-repeated position that he would only return to the country after foreign troops had left. (Later he modified this to the demand that there should be a timetable for their withdrawal.) In comparison, they agreed, the Arghandiwal faction represented – as one of them put it – a “more moderate tendency within Hezb” and the larger Islamist movement.

Hekmatyar’s and Arghandiwal’s factions are now trying to play down their rift in public and keep cards close to their chests. But the rift clearly hampers efforts to re-unite the party’s various factions under its ‘historical’ leader, Hekmatyar, who has explicitly set course on winning the next parliamentary elections.

How the party conference – or congress? – was handled and how the elections of Hezb’s leading bodies were conducted (or not) is not untypical for Afghanistan’s political parties. There is a general lack of transparency of how they determine their leadership bodies or leaders – namely behind closed doors and through a succession of limited councils, not by a general election of elected delegates to a congress. The leader principle still dominates. (As Kabul daily Hasht-e Sobh quipped in its 5 November issue, Arghandiwal’s party has also failed to hold a congress since being elected leader by a party council in mid-2006.)

The potential legal conflict over who is the registered leader of Hezb also points to another weakness of the political system in Afghanistan. Although political parties have not been given a visible role in it, they are mobilisation platforms for individual leaders who would ‘delegate’ members into political offices as Afghan governments tend to be, all but officially, coalition governments that involve party representatives. (This is particularly the case with the NUG, whose twin camps – that of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah – are coalitions in their own right.) As a result, now a ministry led by a member of one of the two quarrelling Hezb factions might find itself in the situation, if Hekmatyar and Arghandiwal do not find a compromise, where it has to decide on the legality of their claims. This is clearly a conflict of interest that could have easily been avoided if one of the long-standing recommendations for the reform of the Afghan electoral institutions had been heeded: to put party registration under a neutral body. (4)

 

(1) Faruqi was the first leader of the Hezb-e Islami wing registered in post-Taleban Afghanistan, but replaced by Arghandiwal in 2007 as a result of a party conference. He did not recognise this change of leadership and continued separate political activities with his supporters.

(2) There are currently two versions of Shahadat. The print version that officially appears on a weekly basis, but in practice more irregularly, is run by the Arghandiwal faction. The online version that is updated daily is controlled by supporters of Hekmatyar. The Arghandiwal group also publishes a bi-monthly magazine, Shafaq.

(3) According to government statistics seen by AAN, Hezb (both factions) won 18 per cent of the seats in the 2017 elections for the three-member leadership bodies of the 34 Provincial Councils (these elections are held annually), making it the second strongest by this count, after its long-time rival, Jamiat-e Islami (20 per cent).

(4) See this recommendation repeated in a 2015 USIP assessment (here, p3).

South African Vektor SS77 Machine Gun

The latest European Defence Matters magazine is now available with a special focus on the 10 probably most disruptive defence innovations to come.

NEW: the magazine is now also available ONLINE in a user-friendly, state of the art responsive lay-out and accessible via all your devices: smartphone, tablet or desktop! Check it out HERE

Strategic foresight is a necessity, not a luxury. European defence planers in governments, EU institutions and industry must thus anticipate technological developments and integrate them into their long-term capability planning.

As the European hub for intergovernmental defence capability planning, prioritization and development, and with the unparalleled expertise stemming from its Capability Technology Groups (CAPTECHS) and network of defence Research and Technology (R&T) experts from Member States, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is in a privileged position to look out for what comes next.

In this new issue of European Defence Matters, we single out and analyse 10 disruptive innovations and technological trends which EDA experts deem likely to have the biggest impact on defence and subsequently on military capabilities in the next 5 to 20 years. Several of them are cyber-related as cyber is set to feature centre stage in Europe’s future defence capability landscape, as it was also highlighted at this week’s EDA Annual Conference 2017 which had cyber as its topic.

Other topics in this 14th issue of European Defence Matters include ‘Industry Talk’ in which we speak to Airbus Defence & Space CEO Dirk Hoke about his organisation’s innovation priorities, upcoming multinational defence programmes, the European Defence Fund and the future of European defence industrial cooperation. We also sat down with Estonia’s Minister of Defence, Jüri Luik, to discuss the results of EU CYBRID 2017, the first ever cyber defence table-top exercise with ministers jointly organised by the Estonian EU Presidency and the EDA in Tallinn in early September, and to hear his views about recent initiatives to boost European defence cooperation. The European MALE RPAS project, ongoing preparations for the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), the EDA’s Main Battle Tank (MBT) project and the recent opening of the European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC) in Zaragoza also feature in this issue.

 

Go ONLINE and get MORE!

The new ONLINE format of European Defence Matters makes your reading experience even more comfortable:

• in addition to the print version, the online version occasionally offers expanded articles and supplementary pictures
• articles and pictures can be shared instantly via Twitter, LinkedIn and Email
• the magazine’s ‘Explore’ section allows you to easily access the European Defence Matters archive and revisit articles of previous editions
• by joining us via www.eda.europa.eu/webzine, you will have access to the latest issue and the possibility to navigate through the previous editions by using the ‘Explore’ function.

More information:

• European Defence Matters 14 (webzine)

Key Points Reports of an underwater explosion shortly after the last communication with ARA San Juan suggest the boat was lost on 15 November Relatives of the boat’s crew have claimed the submarine had not been properly maintained Hopes of rescuing the 44 crew members from the Argentine

The Spanish Navy has installed a first broadband planet-wide satellite communications (satcom) link on board one of its ships, according to contractor Satlink. The initial recipient is the F-100-class frigate Cristóbal Colón , but a further system has already been ordered for a second

Mitsubishi Materials Corporation (MMC) – part of the Mitsubishi Group conglomerate – said on 23 November that three of its subsidiaries had falsified specification data for products, some of which had been delivered to the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD). It is the second instance

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) is planning to procure up to 24 attack helicopters from 2018 to boost counter-insurgency capabilities, Arsenio Andolong, the Department of National Defense’s chief of public affairs confirmed to Jane’s on 24 November. He also confirmed that the helicopter

UMS Skeldar has undertaken a week-long flight demonstration programme of its newly configured R-350 rotary-wing unmanned aircraft system (UAS) with Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information technology, and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). The demonstration saw the R-350 used

Israel’s Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman has requested a significant unplanned increase to the defence budget, citing dramatic changes in the region, including the Russian military presence in Syria and the proliferation of guided weaponry. The 20 November request is a departure from the

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq  on November 23rd closed the Agency’s Annual Conference 2017 with a call to use the EU’s new defence tools and the EDA’s full potential to enhance cyber cooperation and help Member States’ armed forces to plan, develop, acquire and use the required cyber defence capabilities.

In his final remarks wrapping up the conference, Mr Domecq thanked all the speakers for their contributions: Federica Mogherini, Head of the Agency; Julian King, EU Commissioner in charge of the Security Union; Kersti Kaljulaid, President of Estonia; Mikko Hypponen, Chief Research Officer of F-Secure. He also expressed gratitude to the members of the two panels who shared their expertise and assessments and sparked lively discussions with the audience.
 

Main takeaways

Mr Domceq singled out several key takeaways from this year’s conference, in particular:

• Cyber threats affect all military capabilities. It’s therefore essential to strengthen the cyber resilience elements in the development of all future platforms & systems, across land, air, maritime or space domains;
• Armed forces need to learn their lessons from previous incidents more rapidly and efficiently so as to be able to better prevent, detect and respond to future attacks;
• Europe is stronger if it tackles cyber threats together, in a common and coordinated approach encompassing the full military dimension of cyber defence;
• Member States need to better coordinate their cyber strategies to avoid fragmentation, to ensure and improve interoperability, and to protect special requirements of the military;
• Strategies and policies are essential but what really matters at the end of the day are the capabilities in place to counter cyberattacks. The most effective way for Member States’ armed forces to identify, plan, develop, procure and eventually use these capabilities is by doing it together;
• New EU defence cooperation tools such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are now in place. They need to be used in the best possible way;
• PESCO, in particular, could be a game changer for defence and offer a welcome cooperation framework for Member States to take forward priority projects, including on cyber;
• The European Defence Fund, for its part, will offer new funding opportunities for cooperative projects. Specifically, at the upstream R&T level, it could support the development of cyber defence technologies identified in the future Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) and of related Technology Building Blocks;
• The European Commission’s new Cyber Package, if properly implemented, can contribute to increased security in the Fifth Domain provided that duplication is avoided and that the specificities of the military dimension are fully taken on board;
• Continuous engagement with other parties such as NATO is paramount to ensure continued coherence of output;
• Dialogue with industry is equally important to secure the required future capabilities and the appropriate degree of strategic autonomy.

 
EDA prepared to play its part

As far as the EDA’s cyber work is concerned, “2018 will see the topic stay centre stage in the Agency’s work plan”, with a particular focus on three main activities.

Firstly, the Capability Development Plan (CDP) revision in spring is expected to include new cyber defence needs and priorities some of which were already flagged during the 2016 EDA Table Top Exercise on hybrid threats.

Secondly, the Agency looks forward to seeing the Initial Operational Capability of the CSDP Cyber Training & Exercise Platform next year in close cooperation with the European Security & Defence College. The project on pooling demand for cyber defence training and exercise support by the private sector should also reach its conclusion.

And thirdly, on facilitating the interface with wider EU policies, the EDA will continue its work on the implementation of the Cyber Defence Policy Framework.

The Agency is also considering setting up a dedicated Capability Technology Group (or Cap Tech) on cyber defence. In all of these activities, “engagement with industry will be of central importance to enable our Member States to develop the capabilities they need to stay ahead in tomorrow’s cyberspace”, Mr Domecq stressed.

“Our work to improve Europe’s cybersecurity and cyber defence is still in its initial phases. We must lose no time in embracing this golden opportunity to both plan and implement the next steps together. Only in doing so will we ensure that the advent of the digital era remains an opportunity for European citizens in the 21st century”, the EDA Chief Executive concluded.
 

More information:

• Jorge Domecq closing speech EDA Annual Conference 2017
• Federica Mogherini opens Annual Conference at “most important moment for EU defence in décades”
• Remarks by High-Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the 2017 Annual Conference of the European Defence Agency
• Estonian President Kaljulaid: EU needs shared cyber expertise and joint exercise at strategic level
• Annual conference delivers insights on future of cyber defence
  

 

In addition to the four keynote speeches delivered by Federica Mogherini (Head of the EDA), Julian King (EU Commissioner for the Security Union), Kersti Kaljulaid (President of Estonia) and Mikko Hypponen (Chief Research Officer, F-Secure), participants at this year’s EDA Annual Conference witnessed two lively and interactive panel debates on cyber as a ‘persistent strategic challenge’ and enhanced cooperation in Europe and beyond, and on how to tackle growing cyber threats.

Panel 1: Cyber - A persistent strategic challenge

High-level panellists in the first roundtable were General Riho Terras (Commander of Estonia’s Defence Forces), Dirk Hoke (Airbus Defence and Space CEO), Lieutenant General Ludwig Leinhos (Commander of the German Cyber and Information Space Command), Kevin Scheid (NATO NCIA General Manager), Neil Cassidy (Rolls Royce VP Director Cyber Security, Risk & Compliance) and Fabrice Clement (Proximus Director Security Governance & Investigations).

The panel discussed a number of key questions such as ‘How far do EU Member States share cyber-threat assessments?’, ‘How are national governments tailoring their responses and increasing their preparedness levels?’, or ‘How should European institutions support Member States in their efforts to navigate the myriad initiatives linked to cybersecurity and cyber defence?’.

Better information sharing and enhanced cyber defence cooperation are indispensable, not only between EU member States but also between the EU and NAT. Speakers also pointed to the need to avoid duplication of efforts and to increase cooperation with industry for delivery of the required technological solutions to counter growing cyber threats. The importance of cyber education and training was highlighted, as was the serious problem of finding and recruiting skilled cyber experts in Europe today, set to worsen in the future.
 

Panel 2: European solutions to global problems

The afternoon panel discussion saw high-profile speakers discuss potential technological solutions, how industry is adapting to provide such technologies, and what the EU and NATO can do to support this process. Questions raised ranged from ‘How should Member States’ defence procurement models adapt to the fact that most of the available cyber defence technology today is dual-use?’, ‘How far are civilians and the military cooperating and exchanging best practises to avoid duplication and promote excellence?’ or ‘Where should the EDA focus its efforts to support EU Member States when it comes to cyber?’.

The four high-level panellists were: Annegret Bendiek (Senior Associate Europe Research at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP), Jakub Boratynski, (Head of Unit for Cybersecurity and Digital Privacy, DG Connect, European Commission), Rogier Holla (Deputy Head of the EU Computer Emergency Response Team, CERT-EU), Merle Maigre (NATO CCD COE Director) and George Sharkov (the National Cybersecurity Coordinator & Adviser to the Prime Minister of Bulgaria).

The speakers touched on the importance of research and innovation in the civilian and military sides of cyber, on international norms in cyber warfare, the Tallinn Manual, and failed UN attempts to regulate and on the protection of critical infrastructure. All agreed on the urgent need to update existing SCADA systems to adapt to the current threat landscape.
 

More information:

 

• Federica Mogherini opens Annual Conference at “most important moment for EU defence in décades”
• Remarks by High-Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the 2017 Annual Conference of the European Defence Agency
• Estonian President Kaljulaid: EU needs shared cyber expertise and joint exercise at strategic level
• 2017 Annual Conference closes with call to step up cyber defence cooperation
• Jorge Domecq closing speech EDA Annual Conference 2017