Defence`s Feeds

Event On 20 November 2017 the Belarusian security service (Kamitet Dziarzhaunay Byaspeki; KDB) confirmed that it had detained Pavlo Sharoiko, a Ukrianian journalist. Sharoiko’s employer, Ukrayinske Radio in Kiev, said he had been detained by the Belarusian KDB in Minsk on 25 October after

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced the first contract related to Saudi Arabia’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme on 22 November. Awarded to Lockheed Martin, the USD22.7 million contract covers “services in support of foreign military sales” of the LCS to Saudi

India is set to commission its indigenously designed, missile-tracking ocean surveillance ship (OSS) in 2018 to support the country’s classified strategic weapon and ballistic missile defence (BMD) programmes, official sources have told Jane’s . Designated VC11184 after the yard in the

The Polish Armament Inspectorate (AI) has issued two documents inviting industry to start a technical dialogue for two separate systems that would expand the current observation capabilities of the nation’s armed forces. A document published on 30 October is for an onshore

Vessels from the Royal Saudi Naval Forces’ (RSNF’s) Gulf-based Eastern Fleet have been seen in the Red Sea port of Eritrea for the first time, satellite imagery has confirmed. Two Badr-class corvettes and an Al-Jawf (Sandown)-class mine countermeasures vessel were present at Assab on 15

AT LEAST 50 people were killed and at least 38 others were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated their explosives at a mosque during morning prayers in Mubi in Nigeria's Adamawa state on 21 November, Reuters reported. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, though Wilayat Gharb

AT LEAST 23 people were killed and 60 others wounded when a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) - described in reports as a truck bomb - detonated near a marketplace in a predominantly Shia Muslim and ethnic Turkmen area in the town of Tuz Khurmatu in Iraq's Salah ad Din

The US Air Force’s (USAF's) 71st Flying Training Wing has grounded its fleet of Beechcraft T-6A Texan II trainer aircraft following a series of physiological events affecting pilots. The temporary suspension of flight activities was announced by Vance Air Force Base (AFB) in Oklahoma on 20

French Wasp 58 Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

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On 20 November, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) finally published her request to open a formal investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan. This means that the Prosecutor agrees with the result of the preliminary examination showing that crimes meeting the ICC gravity threshold have been committed in Afghanistan since 2003 (the period for which the ICC has jurisdiction) and that the ICC considers that Afghanistan is either unwilling or unable to prosecute these crimes nationally. The Prosecutor also made an open request to the victims to send their statements to the Court by 31 January 2018. There is, then, a very important but short window of opportunity for victims to share their stories with the Court. On the occasion of the release of the Prosecutor’s request, AAN is publishing this question and answers dispatch focusing on the ICC and Afghanistan (1).

THE ICC IN GENERAL

1.  What is the International Criminal Court?

The ICC is an independent, permanent court established in 2002 to investigate and prosecute the following international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

2. What are war crimes and crimes against humanity?

War crimes are certain acts that violate international rules on how armed conflict must be conducted. Crimes against humanity are serious human rights abuses committed against civilians on a widespread and systematic scale.  They are sometimes called atrocity crimes, and, unlike war crimes, they can be committed at any time, not just during armed conflict. Some examples of these crimes are torture and cruel treatment (such as abuse in detention), intentional killing of civilians, and attacks on places such as schools, hospitals and mosques. Making these actions crimes means that individuals who ordered or perpetrated them can be held criminally accountable.  They are called international crimes because they are thought to be so shocking that dealing with them should be the business of the whole world and not the state where the crimes were committed.     

3. How was the ICC established?

The Court was created by an international treaty known as the Rome Statute. It came into existence on July 1, 2002, after 60 states—the minimum number required—ratified the Statute. States that have ratified the Rome Statute (at present, 123 states have done so) are legally obligated to cooperate with the Court.

4. When did Afghanistan join the ICC?

The government of Afghanistan ratified the Rome Statute in 2003, so the ICC can investigate Rome Statute crimes committed by Afghans or on Afghanistan’s territory from May 1, 2003 onwards. The Rome Statute was adopted in the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1998, also with Afghan involvement. The Afghan Mujaheddin Government, officially the Islamic State of Afghanistan, sent a delegation, which was led by current Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, to thecConference. That time Abdullah Abdullah was the Deputy of Foreign Affairs Ministry.

5. Who can the ICC investigate?

The Court can investigate individuals, not states or corporations. The Rome Statute does not recognise immunity for any person, even heads of state or government officials. In other countries where the ICC has intervened there have been arrest warrants issued against presidents and high level officials such as heads of intelligence agencies, as well as the leaders of armed groups.

6. Where can the ICC investigate?

The Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a country that has signed the Rome Statute, or crimes by citizens of countries that have ratified the Rome Statute. (This means that even though the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute its citizens can be investigated for crimes committed in Afghanistan since 2003). The Court can also investigate in countries that have not ratified the Rome Statute, but this requires a UN Security Council referral. 

7. Where else has the ICC investigated?

To date, the ICC has opened ten investigations in nine countries: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Central African Republic (where two separate investigations are underway); Darfur, Sudan; Kenya; Côte d’Ivoire; Libya; Mali; and Georgia.

8. What triggers an investigation by the Court?

There are three ways that the ICC gets involved. First, a country that has ratified the Rome Statute can refer a situation for investigation; secondly, the UN Security Council can refer a situation (as it has done in Libya and Sudan); thirdly, the Prosecutor can seek to initiate an investigation in countries that have ratified the Rome Statute. This is what has happened in Afghanistan.

9. What is the ICC’s relationship to national courts?

The ICC operates according to the principle of complementarity, which recognises that states have the main responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in their territories or by their nationals. This means that the Court can only investigate when a state is not already investigating or prosecuting the same individual in a similar case, or is unable or unwilling to do so.

10. How does the ICC enforce its decisions?

The Court does not have its own police force; it relies on state cooperation to enforce arrest warrants and comply with rulings. Other countries that are members of the Court also have a duty to cooperate – including enforcing arrest warrants.

11. How long has the ICC been involved in Afghanistan?

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC started a preliminary examination in Afghanistan at least as long ago as 2006, when it was made public. A preliminary examination comes before a formal investigation and allows the prosecutor to decide if the suspected crimes fit its mandate. The examination also includes assessing whether the national government is doing enough to investigate and prosecute domestically.

THE ICC’s INVESTIGATION IN AFGHANISTAN 

12. What was the result of the ICC Preliminary Examination into the Situation in Afghanistan?

The preliminary examination into crimes committed in Afghanistan lasted almost a decade. The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) released its 2016 Preliminary Examination Report on Afghanistan (released annually) on 14 November 2016. The report stated that the OTP had determined that there was a reasonable basis to believe that, at a minimum, the following crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction had occurred:

• Crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taleban and their affiliate, the Haqqani Network
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment by Afghan government forces, in particular the intelligence agency (National Directorate for Security) and the Afghan National Police;
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment, by US military forces deployed to Afghanistan and in secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, principally in the 2003-2004 period, although allegedly continuing in some cases until 2014.

The Preliminary Examination also said that thresholds of admissibility had been reached, ie the alleged crimes under ICC jurisdiction are sufficiently grave, are not being addressed by domestic or other legal bodies (although this is “subject to further information that could be provided by the relevant national authorities in the course of the preliminary examination or any subsequent investigation”) and there are “no substantial reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.”

The Preliminary Examination was initiated by the ICC Prosecutor and not requested by Afghanistan or the United Nations Security Council, which means under the Court’s rules that, once the Prosecutor has determined that there is a case or cases to answer, there has to be an additional, preliminary judgement by a panel of judges from the Pre-Trial Chamber. The judges will review the Prosecutor’s request, as well as all the supporting evidence, to ensure that an investigation is merited.

13. What has the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor done about the situation in Afghanistan based on the Preliminary Examination?

On 30 October 2017 the ICC Prosecutor notified the Presidency of the ICC of her readiness to submit her request to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC seeking judicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan. On 3 November 2017, the Prosecutor announced that she was submitting her request to the Pre-Trial Chamber. On the same day the Presidency established the Pre-Trial Chamber III to deal with the Prosecutor’s request concerning the situation in Afghanistan.

On 20 November, the Prosecutor announced that she had submitted her request, seeking authorisation to commence a full investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, to the Pre-Trial Chamber III of the Court. According to this lengthy, 181-page request, all legal criteria for commencement of an investigation exist (AAN’s analysis about these legal criteria and the OTP’s arguments concerning them: see here).

On the same day, 20 November, the Prosecutor also released a notification on the ICC website where she said:

By this notice, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, informs victims of alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period of alleged crimes committed on the territory of Afghanistan in the period since 1 May 2003, as well as victims of other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the period since 1 July 2002, […].

The Prosecutor’s notice to victims follows an order issued by the three judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber on 9 November 2017 concerning the issue of victims’ representations. According to this order, war victims “may” submit their representations to the Registry of the ICC until 31 of January 2018. For this purpose, the Registry of the ICC developed special forms in local languages, namely Dari and Pashto, as well as English – although victims can use any format and languages they are comfortable with. The victims can also send their messages to the ICC as audio and video files. The Prosecutor was obliged in the order to notify the victims known to her via public notice by general means. Victims’ engagement with the ICC is voluntary and they are not obliged to prove their claims. The victims can submit their representation individually or collectively.

14. What happens now? What will an investigation in Afghanistan entail?

The prosecutor has now asked the judges (the “pre-trial chamber”) for authorization to open an investigation. The judges will consider the material gathered by the prosecutor, but will also invite victims to tell the judges what happened to them and whether they want the ICC to investigate. This is an important but very short window for victims to be heard; it lasts from now until January 31, 2018 (See 16 below).

A decision from the judges or the pre-trial chamber can be expected within three to six months. If permission to investigate is granted, the real investigation begins thereafter. When the real investigation starts, the Prosecutor and her team have much more power to gather information.

15. Who are likely to be investigated by the ICC in Afghanistan?

Three main groups have been identified by the Prosecutor:

–       the Taleban and affiliated armed groups

–       Afghan government forces

–       the United States military and Central Intelligence Agency

According to information received by the OTP thus far, over 17,000 civilian deaths between January 2007 and December 2015 could be attributed to anti-government armed groups such as the Taleban. The report also highlights attacks by the Taleban against schools, hospitals, mosques and humanitarian organisations (which are “protected objects” under international law). In the case of criminal conduct by US forces and Afghan government forces, grave abuses against conflict-related detainees appear to be the main focus.

16. Can the ICC investigate crimes committed by US forces if the US is not a party to the Rome Statute?

Although the United States is not itself a member of the ICC, because alleged crimes took place by US nationals on the territory of Afghanistan, the Court is legally able to assert jurisdiction over them from May 1, 2003 onwards. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over all international crimes in other countries that are members of the Court where so-called US “black sites” operated, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators (this includes Afghanistan, but also countries like Poland, Romania, Lithuania where detainees were taken for interrogation). 

17. What role can victims play in the Court’s work?

There are three main areas of involvement:

(1) Victim Representations: when the judges/chambers are deciding whether to accept the Prosecutors’ request to investigate (see 14), they may ask for the opinions of victims.

(2) Victim Participation: Once charges are filed against specific individuals (see 15), victims can apply to be recognised by the Court and will then be represented by a lawyer who can participate on their behalf at relevant stages of the proceedings. The Court will also try to keep victims informed about the status of proceedings.

(3) Reparations: If an accused is convicted, victims can receive reparations. It has already ordered reparations for victims in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, but this requires that an individual first be convicted for his or her crimes. The ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) implements Court-ordered reparations; it also has the authority to provide physical, psychological, and material support to victims and their families in situations where the Court is investigating.

18. What role can civil society play in the Court’s work?

During investigations, the Prosecutor sometimes asks local civil society organisations that have information about the alleged crimes to help lead them to sources of evidence such as witnesses. Sometimes they seek to make formal arrangements with people they call ‘intermediaries’.  Civil society should talk to lawyers or groups who work on these kinds of investigations to fully understand the consequences of giving such information later on if it is used in a trial. For example, any information given to the Prosecutor might have to be revealed to the defence in the case.

19. Is information provided by victims to the ICC confidential?

Information provided to judges by victims about whether they want an investigation to open is not made public. Information provided to the Prosecutor when the investigation starts is not made public, although defence lawyers can ask for such information. The Court has significant discretion regarding how much information it needs to share with anyone at this stage. Victims should talk to lawyers or groups who work on these kinds of investigations to fully understand their rights and potential risks before talking to the Court.

20. Can other countries stop the Court if they don’t want this investigation?

The only way that countries can legally stop an investigation is to ask the UN Security Council to defer an investigation, for a renewable period of 12 months. This is not easy: it requires a majority of the Security Council’s vote (9+ out of 15), and no vetoes from any of the permanent member states (US, UK, Russia, China, France). It is noteworthy that the US has not joined the Court but if warrants are issued for American citizens, then they can be arrested if they travel to countries that are ICC members.

Because of the principle of complementarity (see The ICC in General, 9, above), states that are themselves in a position to prosecute these crimes will have the opportunity at different stages to argue that the ICC should stop its actions because they are already investigating the same crimes themselves.

21. What has been the effect of ICC investigations in other countries?

It’s important to see the ICC as having two roles: one being the investigations and trials themselves, the other being the impact the Court can have on domestic prosecutions. A good outcome is accelerating and expanding domestic accountability by, for instance, passing domestic legislation that criminalises international crimes, prosecuting accused individuals before national courts, upgrading domestic court systems to vigorously prosecute such crimes, and passing domestic legislation that improves the means by which to do so (such as improving witness protection programs). So far, ICC examinations and investigations in other countries have led to some prosecutions by local or national courts, as in Uganda, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, although some commentators express concern that the ICC’s involvement can complicate conflict situations, others have argued that the Court has actually helped support peace negotiations in countries emerging from conflict, like Uganda and Colombia, by ensuring that accountability is part of the countries’ post-conflict agreement.

 

 

(1) The first version of this Questions and Answers document was prepared by the Open Society Justice Initiative for a seminar series. OSJI kindly offered the document to AAN for publication and AAN’s Ehsan Qaane has completed it with information about the Prosecutor’s request. For in-depth information about the ICC in Afghanistan, see AAN’s previous publications here, here and here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Many Afghan migrants have been opting to travel through Bulgaria, a country bordering Turkey, on their journey to western and northern Europe. This route, while safer than a sea crossing, comes with its own terrifying experiences, as first-hand testimonies of migrants collected by different human rights organisations have shown. In Bulgaria, Afghan migrants are not only in danger of being attacked by vigilante groups or push back to Turkey, as the reports have shown, but they are also more likely to receive unfair treatment at the hands of the national migration authorities, AAN’s Jelena Bjelica discovered on a recent visit to the Bulgarian capital, Sofia. She also found that many of them eventually end up being returned to Afghanistan by force or under pressure.

Afghans in Bulgaria

Bulgaria, an EU member-country at the southern border of the Union, has seen an unprecedented movement of migrants between its own south-eastern border with Turkey and its western border with Serbia, since 2015. According to a joint annual border monitoring report by the UNHCR, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Bulgarian General Border Police Directorate with the Ministry of Interior, the police detained a total of 34,056 irregular migrants (the majority of whom were Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis) who were attempting to cross the Bulgarian border illegally in 2015. Of these, 26,939 had submitted applications for international protection to the border or immigration police (see here). The country remained the preferred land route for refugees after the closure of what was dubbed the Balkan humanitarian corridor in early 2016, which stretched between Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary and later extended to Croatia (see this AAN analysis).

Afghans in particular favour the route through Bulgaria. In 2016 they made up over half of the 18,884 migrants apprehended there. These numbers were in fact lower in 2016 than in 2015 as the number of refugees arriving in Europe had decreased that year (see this AAN analysis).

Testimonies from Afghans collected by numerous media (see here, here and here) and the human rights organisations (see the Human Rights Watch report here and the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights report here, as well as the Are You Syrious report here) reveal that most of them experienced humiliation, maltreatment and abuse by the Bulgarian authorities. This includes police extortion and robbery; ‘push-backs’ to Turkey (the most frequent expulsion method allegedly applied by the Bulgarian police authorities was forcibly returning migrants picked up near the Turkish border, while ensuring that a Turkish border patrol would take them further into Turkish territory; see here), indefinite detention in spite of official requests for asylum, a lack of access to legal aid and a low rate of accepted asylum applications. Afghans and others also experienced attacks by private, government-tolerated vigilante groups (see also this AAN analysis).

Asylum claims and ‘punitive detentions’

Afghan claims for asylum in Bulgaria have often been rejected without fair consideration and applicants have often been persuaded to give up their claims and return to Afghanistan, lawyers from three different legal aid organisations in Bulgaria pointed out to AAN. This has resulted in a situation whereby Afghans make up the biggest number of asylum seekers in Bulgaria, while their recognition rate is negligible. (1) The rate is also one of the lowest in the EU (only 2,5 per cent in 2016, compared to an EU average of 56 per cent).

Afghans, instead, are put into detention centres (2) and often pressurised into returning home. This practice of ‘punitive detention’ dates back to the riots in the Harmanli camp near the Bulgarian-Turkish border in late 2016. Harmanli made Bulgarian and international headlines in November 2017, when Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov said they had arrested some 300 Afghan migrants after they had protested against poor living conditions in the camp and clashed with the police. Iliana Savova from the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee told AAN that the riots had been a turning point in Bulgaria’s public opinion and consequently its treatment of Afghans. Since then, she said, Afghans have been detained more frequently than other nationalities and kept in detention for longer periods of time. “There is a general assumption in Bulgaria that Afghans are not eligible for asylum status,” she concluded.

This unfavourable treatment is even evident in the latest statistics released by the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior. By 31 October 2017, the ministry reported a total of 2,678 third-country nationals detained so far this year. Of this number, 39,3 per cent were Afghans, making them the top nationality among all foreign nationals detained. (Many of the Afghans detained have been returned by force or voluntarily to Afghanistan; more on this below.)

Diana Daskalova, a lawyer from the Centre for Legal Aid – Voice in Bulgaria, one of the two small organisations that work inside the detention centres (the second one is the Foundation for Access to Rights), pointed out to AAN that many violations take place in those facilities. She said that migrants often do not receive sufficient information about their rights in the asylum process (which partly has to do with the fact that the non-governmental organisations are too small to cover all the applicants) and that migrants are often subjected to “systematic psychological pressure,” which eventually makes them consent to returning to their home country. Even after they register an asylum claim, Daskalova says, Afghans are not usually moved to open centres as they are in many other European countries, but instead are kept in detention.

Bulgaria amended its national asylum law to introduce the detention of asylum seekers on 1 January 2016. Until then, Bulgarian legislation had not formally envisaged the detention of asylum seekers. In practice, however, they had been frequently detained as irregular immigrants (see this EU migration law blog by Valeria Ilareva, the head of the Foundation for Access to Rights). Ilareva pointed out that with regard to asylum seekers, however, neither the EU legal framework, nor Bulgarian national law, “provide for an exact time limit of the length of detention,” but that under the EU Return Directive 2008/115/EC, “a maximum time limit of detention of 18 months, which has also been adopted in Bulgarian law” is stipulated. She further explained how the system in Bulgaria works:

[…] Under the amendments in the asylum legislation, the competent authority for issuing detention orders for asylum seekers is the head of the State Agency for Refugees (or an official authorized by him), who is also the decision-making body on the applications for international protection in the country. […]

Usually, asylum seekers who have entered the country irregularly are immediately issued a removal order and detained for the purpose of its execution. It is against this background that asylum seekers make their applications for international protection, often from within the detention centre for irregular immigrants. Their asylum application is forwarded to the State Agency for Refugees, which is the competent institution to register the third country nationals as asylum seekers and accommodate them in the reception centres for asylum seekers. For the latter there is no time limit in national law, which makes access to the asylum procedure arbitrary: registration as asylum seeker might take from several days to several months (if the asylum seekers’ removal order has not been carried out in the meantime). By national law, upon registration as asylum seeker, the implementation of one’s removal order is suspended until a final negative decision on the asylum application enters into force. (3)

The State Refugee Agency’s (SAR) asylum decisions can be appealed in court, lawyers in Bulgaria say. The SAR decisions are based on their own country of origin’s situation reports, which are not public documents. (4)

The unfair treatment of Afghan nationals by the Bulgarian authorities was also highlighted in a recently leaked letter sent by the European Commission to the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees and the Ministry of Interior in July 2017, as the online publication Balkan Insight reported. The letter sent by the director of the Commission’s Migration and Protection Directorate, Laurent Muschel, on 6 July 2017, noted that Bulgaria’s recognition rate of Afghan nationals is “strikingly low compared to the rate of recognition (granting of international protection status) for the same nationality in other EU countries.”

The letter also confirms:

Particular concerns have also been expressed by stakeholders about the fact that Afghan nationals are apparently often detained for lengthy periods and to a considerably greater extent than occurs for other nationalities.

Even though Bulgaria is under increased political pressure from its European counterparts to improve its treatment of migrants, and in particular Afghans, only 356 Afghans are currently housed in reception centres in the country (the figures, as of 19 October 2017, provided by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee).

Police extortion and push-backs

The European border agency, Frontex, reinforced its presence in Bulgaria in August 2016, but push-backs – prohibited by international refugee and human rights law, ie the non-refoulement principle ­(5) – are still happening to Turkey, a worker with an international organisation in Bulgaria told AAN. The level of the police violence in 2017, which has been well documented in the past, however, has seen a decrease. (6)

Bulgaria’s track record of police abuse since 2015 has been well documented. Reports by Human Rights Watch and the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights put forward detailed accounts supported by first-hand testimonies. (7)

During its research trip to Belgrade in June 2016, AAN also documented the stories of Afghans who came through Bulgaria and experienced police brutality. A young Afghan who had travelled from Teheran told AAN:

When we got into Bulgaria we had to walk for three nights and four days. We were with 30 Afghans. There were families and also an old man and an old woman. Some boys had to carry the old woman. In Bulgaria the police got us. A car was supposed to pick us up and bring us to Sofia. [The smugglers] said it would take one hour, but in the end we had to sleep in the forest. There the Bulgarian police found us. They brought us back to the Turkish border at around midnight. We tried to make a fire, but it was raining. The police had taken all our food and money, and they beat us before they released us. It rained till morning.

Bulgarian police brutality has even been documented in an art project, run by the prestigious Belgrade-based Centre for Cultural Decontamination. Ahmad Favad, from Afghanistan and currently in Belgrade, related his story:

The mobile phone that I took on my journey to Europe was a memento from my brother. When I left for Iran I took some clothes and his iPhone. He once told me that he would let me keep it when he leaves for Sweden. He didn’t succeed, death stopped him. […] I passed Iran and Turkey and managed to keep my phone. However, in Bulgaria at the border with Turkey we got caught by police. They took all our money and everything they could find. I told the police officer, I explained to him that I would give him the money and anything he wanted, I begged him to return my phone… They didn’t want to. They didn’t give me back my brother’s phone. […] Whenever I remember that I didn’t succeed to keep it safe, I feel guilty.

Threats from the vigilante groups and skinheads

Apart from government authorities, refugees coming to Bulgaria – including Afghans – face violence from private vigilante groups. A video posted online by one of these groups, the Organisation for the Protection of Bulgarian Citizens (OPBC) show a man who ties the hands of three Afghan men behind their backs and forces them to lie on the ground, while he shouts “No Bulgaria. Go back to Turkey”. The video made headlines in early 2016 and sparked a debate in Bulgaria and beyond about the existence of such groups (see here, here and here).

In Bulgaria, however, the tone of the debate was far less critical than in the other parts of the world. German public external broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) reported in April 2016 that the country’s prime minister, Boiko Borisov, publicly praised the vigilantes and suggested that the protection of the country’s southern border should be a group effort. DW also quoted a public opinion poll from 2016, which found that eighty-four per cent of Bulgarians supported the vigilantes’ actions, with just 16 per cent opposed to them. Borisov, the Economist later reported, after the release of the OPBC video, condemned the practice of ‘citizen arrests’ and warned that anyone who carried them out would be prosecuted.

Following Borisov’s statement, Petar Nizamov, the man who posted the videos on behalf of OPCB, was detained by the police and placed under house arrest. But he resurfaced again in early 2017 when he announced, according to some media accounts, that he had bought an old Russian helicopter to continue his hunt. Nizamov was officially acquitted by the court of charges in connection with the alleged illegal detention of three Afghan migrants close to the Turkish border in August 2017. Nizamov’s group is not the only one operating along the border area.

While these groups continue to pose a serious threat to migrants trying to cross the Turkish–Bulgarian border, in the capital Sofia skinhead groups intimidate them. An Afghan from Kabul currently residing in the Voina Rampa reception centre in Sofia (there are three open centres in the capital and Afghans are mainly housed in the Voina Rampa), told AAN that one of his friends was recently beaten by the skinheads near a bus station, some 100 meters from the centre. He explained that his friend reported the incident, but “the police did nothing,” he said.

Returns to Afghanistan

The Bulgarian authorities’ approach, as explained above, results in a high rate of returns to Afghanistan. Biljana Stankovic, general coordinator for Médecins Du Monde (MdM) in Bulgaria explained to AAN how migrants, and in particular Afghans, are manipulated into returning home. She said that besides this, they do not have access to correct information, there are often no translators available, and refugees are kept under constant pressure of expulsion even after they have submitted an asylum claim. “For example, the way they are treating unaccompanied minors is telling of practices in Bulgaria,” she said, adding that minors are often forced to sign documents they cannot read or understand. “Whether there are any voluntary returns, is questionable,” she alleged.

According to the Bulgarian MoI’s official figures, over 690 Afghans – or 39,1 per cent of a total of 1,771 third-country nationals had been returned to their country by the end of October 2017 since the beginning of the year. This number includes those that were forced back (441 foreigners); (8) those with imposed coercive administrative measures who voluntarily left the country with their own funds (343 foreigners); those who returned with the assistance of the Migration Directorate in the implementation of programmes for assisted voluntary returns (800 foreigners); those without forced coercive administrative measures who left the country voluntarily (46 foreigners); and those have been surrendered to other EU Member States when performing readmission procedures under Regulation 604/2013 EC, ie the Dublin Regulation (141 third-country nationals). (The Bulgarian MoI does not offer the breakdown by nationality for each of category, so there are no figures for Afghans in each category).

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) dataset, 404 Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Bulgaria between 1 January and mid-August 2017 through the organisation’s Assisted Voluntary Return programme. But, as AAN previously reported, there is little they can hope for in Afghanistan. Services available to those returning are patchy.

Daskalova, from the Centre for Legal Aid, and MDM’s Stankovic said to AAN that the number of returns has increased over the past couple of years. This is confirmed by the IOM’s data on voluntary returns from Bulgaria. While in 2015 only 16 Afghans returned voluntarily from this country, their number increased to 276 in 2016, and to over 400 in 2017.

Bulgaria: A grim outlook for Afghans

While the evidence suggests that Afghans would be better off avoiding Bulgaria, the lack of other travel options dictates the reality of their journey. The fact is that the number of land routes to western and northern Europe has been reduced to the one that goes through Bulgaria following the closure of the Balkan humanitarian corridor in March 2016. Many Afghans who are stuck in Turkey or Greece and still harbour plans of making it through are instinctively discouraged by the dangers that comes with a sea journey from Greece to Italy so they do not even consider this a viable option (see also AAN’s analysis). They have no other way open to them, other than transiting through Bulgaria in the hope of reaching Serbia. Yet while the treatment of migrants in the reception centres is somewhat better there, their prospects of getting international protection status are almost non-existent (see these previous AAN analyses here and here).

It can only be hoped that increased political pressure from the European Union, as the European Commission letter quoted above, will make the situation for Afghans in Bulgaria more bearable.

Edited by Thomas Ruttig and Sari Kouvo

 

(1) Statistics from the website of the State Agency for Refugees show that Afghans lead the number of submitted asylum claims. Afghans made 1,002 claims since the beginning of the year until end of September 2017 and were granted asylum in the same period (breakdown by month): January 2017 – 0; February 2017 – 0; March 2017 – 5 refugee statuses; April 2017 – ­5 refugee statuses; May 2017 – 6 refugee statuses; June 2017 – 7 refugee statuses; July 2017 – 7 refugee statuses; 1 humanitarian status; August 2017 – 13 refugee statuses; 2 humanitarian statuses; September 2017 – 14 refugee statuses; 2 humanitarian statuses.

In fact, the SAR’s statistics show that Afghans submitted by far the highest number of asylum applications between January 1993 — when the agency started collecting statistical track records — and 31 October 2017. Afghans made some 25,166 asylum claims during this period, followed by Syrians (21,041 claims); Iraqis (19,365 claims) and Pakistanis (3,023 claims).

(2) There are three centres in Bulgaria: Bousmantsi in Sofia, Lyubimets and Elhovo.  The Foundation for Access to Rights’ studies about the Bulgarian detention system available here; here and here.

(3) Daskalova, from the Centre for Legal Aid – Voice in Bulgaria, in an email exchange with the author [dated 22 November 2017] explained that according to recent changes in the Bulgarian Law on Refugees the SAR has a three days deadline for the registration of submitted asylum claims, and six days if the claim has been submitted through a different authority such as a detentions centre. “Another question is whether these provisions are implemented by the authorities,” she added.

(4) All three Bulgarian lawyers told AAN that even after the deadly Kabul bomb attack on 31 May 2017, which left over 90 dead and over 500 injured and caused major infrastructure damage, including to the Bulgarian Embassy in Kabul, (see AAN analyses here and here) nothing has changed in the treatment towards Afghans and pressure has continued as have returns, both forced and ‘voluntary’, to Afghanistan.

(5) The non-refoulement principle laid down in Art. 33, para 1 of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 stipulates that no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

(6) A researcher with an international organisation, however, hinted that there is a “strange overlap between police and criminal groups.” This was also confirmed by Iliana Savova, the director of the legal protection of refugees and migrants programme of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, who told AAN that the police in Bulgaria is, in fact, facilitating the smuggling of migrants. Yet the high number of pushbacks could also indicate that there is a financial link between the police and the smuggling groups, as migrants are forced to pay more money each time they try to cross the border.

(7) The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee also reported in 2015 that “various groups of asylum-seekers reported throughout the year that the Bulgarian border police including the mixed patrols deployed for state border protection pushed them back into the Turkish territory not only from the border line but also from inland borderareas (a border zone is considered to be the zone 30 km from the border line).”

(8) The Bulgarian MoI monthly report does not specify what exactly is meant by ‘forced back’. Daskalova, from the Centre for Legal Aid – Voice in Bulgaria, in an email exchange with the author explained that “forced [back] returns are deportations on budget from the Ministry of Interior.” “The rest [other categories listed by the MoI] are at the expense of IOM or [the migrants’] own expense,” she wrote, adding that those “without deportation orders are people in situations when still no administrative measures have been imposed and they have taken action to return, notifying the migration [authority].”

In should be also noted that the Afghan embassy in Bulgaria does not issue travel documents to persons who refuse to return voluntarily. (For more details see this study).

 

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was created in July 2004 in the context of the drafting of the first European Security Strategy. In recent years, developments have triggered talks on the future of the EDA. In the context of the most recent CSDP innovations (EU Global Strategy, EDF, PESCO, CARD) this workshop will discuss the possible role of the Agency in framing a common Union defence policy and in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy.
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
Further information
Draft programme
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 22 November, the Subcommittee will consider the draft opinion establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovative capacity of the EU defence industry by Ioan Mircea PASCU (S&D).
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The European Defence Agency’s second Helicopter Composite Air Operations (COMAO) planning course was successfully completed last week at RAF airbase Linton-on-Ouse, United Kingdom. The course is part of the EDA’s multifaceted helicopter training activities which aim to provide Member States with a framework to develop, consolidate and share best practices in order to meet the challenges of flying helicopters in a modern operational environment.

Sixteen trainees from Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and the UK took part in the second COMAO course, the objective of which was to increase interoperability and the common understanding of complex mission planning in a multinational environment. The course involved support and attack helicopters but also fast-jet, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) as well as air transport and ground force units.

The course started with a theoretical part, including detailed briefs on COMAO, 4Ts (Task, Target, Threat and Tactics) mission planning as well as standard rotary tactics employed to counter a range of different threats. Participants also examined the Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the attack helicopters and fast-jet capabilities in both the Blue and Red Air role delivered by 100 Sqn RAF.

The second part of the course was devoted to the practical mission planning for a multinational joint helicopter force (and its support assets) which had to operate in a given and constantly evolving political and military scenario. As the course went by and the complexity of the missions increased, trainees became increasingly familiar with the planning processes and the crews’ performances improved considerably, even under worsening mission conditions and mounting time pressure.

The course level was gradually elevated to a point where the individual trainees had to prepare their missions on their own. The findings of the lessons learnt session which concluded the course will be used for preparing the next EDA COMAO planning course scheduled for 2018.

 

More information:

• Helicopter Initiatives (EDA project page)

 

Member States experts met on 16-17 November at the European Defence Agency (EDA) for a workshop to assess PESCO related project proposals. The workshop was co-chaired by the EDA and the EU Military Staff, making up the PESCO secretariat. 

The aim of the workshop was to establish a technical expert-level common understanding on: 1) the scope of PESCO related project proposals; 2) the practical aspects of implementing these projects; 3) the assessment methodology to be adopted for all PESCO projects and 4) the proposed way ahead. While the principal aim of the workshop was to further specify and explain the details of the close to 50 proposed projects, Member States were also invited to indicate potential interest in the project proposals to inform further decision making.

Background

On 13 November 2017, Ministers from 23 Member States signed a joint notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and handed it over to the High Representative and the Council. 

The possibility of the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the area of defence security and defence policy was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It foresees the possibility of a number of EU member states working more closely together in the area of security and defence. This permanent framework for defence cooperation will allow those member states willing and able to jointly develop defence capabilities, invest in shared projects, or enhance the operational readiness and contribution of their armed forces.

The Member States who signed the joint notification are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. It is possible for other member states to join at a later stage.

More information

• News item EEAS: Defence: 23 EU member states sign up for permanent structured cooperation 

Russian Kh-101 Air-Launched Cruise Missile

While struggling to prepare for the parliamentary (and supposedly also district council) elections scheduled for the 7 July 2018, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) are finding themselves under increasing fire from a growing number of political groups and election observer bodies. There have been allegations of financial corruption, government interference and divisions within the two commissions. Playing upon these issues, political groups are demanding that all the electoral commissioners be sacked and replaced with new ones. In a move possibly intended to alleviate the pressure, President Ghani has now sacked the chair of the IEC. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili considers these demands and what they might mean for the credibility of the elections and the likelihood of them happening on time.

This is part one of a series of dispatches about where the preparations for the next elections stand. The following parts will address technical issues and district elections.  

This research was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

The first casualty of the criticism mounting against IEC and ECC has come: on 15 November 2017, President Ashraf Ghani sacked IEC chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai, three days after five of Ahmadzai’s fellow commissioners had written to the president asking for his dismissal. The Palace issued a statement, but it was vague, just saying the government had responded to IEC members and asking “relevant institutions” to introduce fresh candidates. Ahmadzai, in turn, said the government had acted against him because he had been standing against illegal demands by the presidential palace which he said included the demand to manipulate the elections. He provided no evidence.

External pressure had been mounting on the commissions, particularly since early October when a broad coordination group of political organisations and protest movements came out with fierce criticism against the two bodies. Called the Shura-ye Tafahum-e Jeryanha-ye Siyasi Afghanistan (the Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan), it demanded the complete replacement of the members of both commissions.

The election commissioners are appointed by the president from a shortlist prepared by a selection committee (more on which below). The IEC has seven members, four appointed for five years and the other three for three years. The ECC has five members, three of whom are appointed for five years and the other two for three years. The current teams are completely new. The old teams were all dismissed, despite not having run to the end of their terms because they were tainted by their role in the disputed 2014 presidential elections: Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah’s camp had accused the two bodies of overseeing widespread fraud in favour of President Ghani. Operating under the assumption that the current IEC and ECC members will serve full terms, they are due to administer both upcoming elections. Parliamentary and district elections are due in 2018 – in this dispatch, we mainly refer to parliamentary elections only, as district elections have never been held before and fundamental preparations for them, including drawing up constituency boundaries, are not yet evident; we hope to look at them in more detail in a future piece. Presidential elections are due in 2019.

The current IEC and ECC members were appointed and sworn in in November 2016, two months after the government finally, after a lengthy deadlock on electoral reform, managed to pass a new electoral law. Although there was some controversy at the time, both over the choice and the process of selection, (see this AAN dispatch which includes short biographies here), it had seemed that the inauguration of the new IEC and ECC had broken the protracted stalemate in the attempt to agree on electoral reforms and that these new faces could now start planning the next (already overdue) parliamentary elections. However, almost one year on after the formation of the IEC and ECC, political groups have focused their attention on the members of these electoral bodies, seizing upon allegations of financial corruption, undue presidential influence on the IEC and internal divisions in both commissions as evidence of their inability to oversee elections.

It is worth noting that all the various political forces, whether in government or out of it, consider it crucial who controls the two commissions, as they will play a crucial role in determining who will become Afghanistan’s next MPs and next president. They will play that role whether or not the elections are fair or rigged. This obsession with the commissions was manifested very vividly in the post-2014 electoral reform process, which, as AAN previously wrote, largely boiled down not to reform as such, but to “a tug of war over who controls the electoral bodies – and through them the election’s outcome.”

Accusations and accusers

The Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan, which has hoovered up most of the opposition groupings and protest movements (full list of members below), has said in its 7 October statement entitled “The Joint Position of the Understanding Council of Political Currents of Afghanistan in Connection with the Transparency of Elections,” that the IEC “with its current composition” did not have the “ability to hold transparent and fraud-free elections and is not trusted by the people or the political currents.” It claimed that the IEC lacked “independence in decision-making,” a “spirit of impartiality,” and “sufficient and necessary managerial capacity” and was marred by “financial corruption and lack of transparency in purchases and internal disputes among the members.” The Council, without giving more detail about its allegations, demanded that:

In order to hold transparent, free and fair elections and prevent the elections from going into crisis… [t]he commissioners and heads of the electoral commissions [should] be dismissed as soon as possible and the National Unity Government [NUG] in agreement with political parties, civil organisations and prominent political personalities, [should] introduce and appoint other eligible members instead of them.

The Council also reopened a much chewed-over, legal debate, contending that the legislative decree issued by the president to pass the electoral law had not been not valid (more on this below).

Individually, members of the Understanding Council, some of whom are members or appointees of the government, had since taken up the call for the dismissal of some or all IEC members. Balkh Governor and Jamiat Chief Executive Atta Muhammad Nur, for instance, on 31 October 2017, called on the NUG to dissolve the current IEC and appoint new and “impartial commissioners.” On 16 October 2017, Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani said the current IEC did not have the ability to hold elections “at the specified time in a transparent and acceptable fashion,” citing lack of clarity on “electoral constituencies, the budget of the electoral commissions and voter registration.” Understanding Council members have also accused the NUG of lacking the political will to hold elections. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, a former finance minister and now head of the opposition New National Front of Afghanistan (NNFA), said on 22 October 2017 that the NUG had no intention of holding elections next year and that it was failing to recognise “the importance of time.” Ahadi’s criticism came one day after Afghan media reported that the president had sacked the head of the IEC secretariat (also known as the chief electoral officer) Imam Muhammad Warimach. Ahadi welcomed the dismissal and said he hoped for more changes to the IEC). Some media reports suggested that Warimach’s dismissal was connected with him speaking in public about the political pressure he said the IEC was under – he referred to “threats to the IEC, personal insults, a propaganda campaign and fraud by some circles.” Other Afghan media, however, reported that Warimach was fired by the president over corruption and poor performance (read here and here). (For more detail on the sacking, see footnote [1].)

The Understanding Council’s demand for new commissioners also came in the wake of an internal dispute within the IEC and ECC (more on this below) and at a time when the IEC is struggling to prepare for the next parliamentary (and district) elections scheduled for 7 July 2018. The parliamentary election is itself more than two years overdue and this has provided the opportunity for various political groups to doubt the NUG’s political will to hold them. So far, since 2001, no elections have been held on time – but none of them with such a long delay. Even so, as the clock ticks on this particular electoral process, both the electoral bodies and the electoral timeline are being scrutinised with increasing scepticism by both national and international observers.

In Afghanistan, the findings of a recent survey conducted by the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) and released on 9 October 2017 showed that a high percentage of people were not upbeat about the IEC’s ability to administer elections effectively. According to this survey, 41 per cent of respondents do not believe that the IEC has the capacity to hold a transparent elections, while 29 per cent believe it does and 30 per cent are uncertain. TEFA did not ask whether people thought any body could oversee elections effectively, so it is not clear if the doubts are about the IEC per se or Afghan elections in general. [2] Another assessment by the Elections and Transparency Watch Organisation of Afghanistan (ETWA), released on 5 October 2017, stated that it considered the IEC to be incapable of holding parliamentary elections next year and that the necessary reforms had not been implemented.

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan Tadamichi Yamamoto, in his briefing to the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 2017, also said that many stakeholders remained “sceptical that credible elections will be held on time.” This doubt has opened – so far not publically – discussions about alternative scenarios: to move the election date to October or November 2018 or even to hold the parliamentary poll together with the presidential election in 2019.

Who is in the Understanding Council and how much clout do they have?

The Understanding Council, which presented itself for the first time at a press conference on 7 November 2017 as a “coordination group” (no other details given), includes the following parties and organisations:

• Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan, a political group formed in July 2017 by former allies and aides of former president Hamed Karzai, including the former director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Rahmatullah Nabil, former National Security Adviser, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, and former Minister Of Transport And Civil Aviation (and former chief electoral officer) Daud Ali Najafi. The group says it aspires to take an independent political course from Karzai and presents itself as an opposition to the NUG (read AAN’s previous analysis about Mehwar here;
• The Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, a semi-opposition group, also known as the Ankara Coalition, formed at the end of June 2017 by first vice-president and leader of Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami Abdul Rashid Dostum, second deputy chief executive and leader of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Mardom Muhammad Mohaqeq, (acting) foreign minister and acting head of Jamiat-e Islami Salahuddin Rabbani and Balkh governor and chief executive of Jamiat Atta Muhammad Nur. They represent three major political parties which have shown strong ethnic support in the polls (Uzbek, Hazara and Tajik, respectively) and have remained internal dissenters and objectors within the NUG (read AAN’s previous analysis on the Ankara coalition here);
• The Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA), a political group formed on 18 December 2015 by influential jihadi leader, 2014 presidential candidate and leader of Dawat-e Islami Party (formerly the Ittihad-e Islami faction) Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, former vice-president and Jamiat stalwart Yunos Qanuni and other prominent former members of Karzai cabinets including Muhammad Omar Daudzai and Bismillah Khan Muhammadi (both former interior ministers), Wahid Shahrani (former minister of mines), Ismail Khan (Herat strongman and former minister of energy and water), Sadiq Mudaber (former director of Karzai’s office of administrative affairs) and Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi and Fazl Hadi Muslimyar, speakers of the lower and upper houses of the parliament (read AAN’s analysis about the council and front here);
• The New National Front of Afghanistan, formed by former finance minister and former leader of the Afghan Mellat Party, Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi, on 14 January 2016. It has presented itself as an opposition force and is a coalition of (parts of) various small political parties, including Afghan Mellat, Hezb-e Adalat wa Tawseha (Justice and Development Party), the former mujahedin faction Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan) (read AAN’s analysis about the council and front here);
• Hezb-e Mutahed-e Melli (National United Party) led by Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, a former People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) military general and governor of Kandahar. Ulumi allied himself with Jamiat-e Islami in the coalition that supported Dr Abdullah in the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections; he served as interior minister in the NUG (January 2015 to February 2016) (see AAN’s previous analysis here and here);
• De Loya Kandahar de Yawwali au Hamghagi Bahir (the Greater Kandahar Unity and Coordination Movement), a regional grouping which includes locally influential figures from the southern provinces. According to Kandahar-based journalist Mamun Durrani, the movement is run by Kandahar police chief General Abdul Razeq, MP Lalai Hamedzai (from Kandahar) and Sher Muhammad Akhundzada (former Helmand governor who is also and close ally of former president Karzai) and the head of Zabul provincial council, Atta Jan Haq Bayan; all are reportedly unhappy with President Ghani;
• De Mashreqi Welayatuno de Hamghagi Shura (the Eastern Provinces Coordination Council) was launched on 1 August 2017 with scathing criticisms of Ghani and Abdullah for what it said was a failure to deliver on (unspecified) promises. Abdul Malek Sulaimanzai, one of the Council’s leaders, told AAN on 2 November 2017 that it included “all the [political] elites of eastern provinces,” such as influential MPs and former mujahedin commanders and figures from Nangarhar, Hazrat Ali, Mirwais Yasini, Haji Zaher Qader as well as Sakhi Meshwanai, an MP from Kunar, and Muhammad Hassan Mamozai, an MP from Laghman;
• Jombesh-e Guzar (the Transition Movement), a Tajik nationalist grouping which announced its existence on 11 May 2017;
• Rastakhez-e Taghir or Uprising for Change, a movement that emerged out of protests in the wake of 31 May 2017 truck bombing near Zanbaq square (see AAN’s analysis on Uprising for Change here); and
• The Commission for the Coordination of Political and Civil Organisations, a political grouping of 12 or so parties including Hezb-e Bidari-ye Mellat Afghanistan (Afghanistan Nation’s Awakening Party), the Republican Party of Afghanistan led by Adela Bahram and Qiyam-e Melli (National Uprising) Party led by Kandahari businessman Zmarialai Ahadi. According to Maqsud Hassanzada of the Nation Awakening Party, the group was established around two years ago by people who had supported President Ghani in the 2014 presidential election, but were disgruntled with him after “he closed the Palace’s gate to them.” Hassanzada said that some of the 12 parties, including his own, were no longer with the Commission for the Coordination of Political and Civil Organisations. However, he said that even those parties that had defected from the Commission might join the Understanding Council. He remained critical of the president, calling him “a liar and reneging on his promises.”

The list of the Understanding Council’s members shows that it is a very broad political umbrella group and includes many of the major fully or semi-opposition political groupings that have emerged during the NUG tenure. It includes both those inside and outside government. The council has enormous political weight, although also a strong tendency to fragment, given that only a common desire to change the IEC and ECC appears to bind it together. It does not even have a common platform of replacement commissioners to propose.

IEC secretary and spokesman Gula Jan Badi Sayyad has tried to play down the significance of the Council, claiming, for example, during a TV discussion on 11 October 2017, that those who demanded the dismissal of the IEC members were just “12 parties” and that “the big parties” were “happy with the commission’s performance to an extent.”

The trust deficit

As was mentioned, at the very outset, the way appointments to the IEC and ECC were made were criticised by both political opposition groups and election observer organisations. First, there were accusations that certain circles around the president had interfered in the formation of the Selection Committee, the body enshrined in the electoral law with the responsibility for vetting and shortlisting applicants for membership of the IEC and ECC. Election observer organisations like TEFA and ETWA complained that the Selection Committee had been formed while most civil society activists were out of the country for the 2016 Brussels conference. They also questioned its transparency and independence, citing the fact that its secretariat was run by the Administrative Office of the President where the committee was also located and also alleging that the committee took most of its decisions behind closed doors, far from observers’ eyes. Second, the appointees were also criticised for lack of necessary experience and expertise. The comparatively small NNFA called the appointments “non-transparent and interest-based,” and aired its doubts about the “transparency of next parliamentary and presidential election” (see AAN’s previous analysis here).

Allegations of government influence on the work of the electoral commissions also followed. On 24 April 2017, Humayun Humayun, first deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, claimed that the president had taken unsigned resignation letters from seven IEC members before appointing them and warned that if they did not obey his demands in the next elections, he would approve their resignations. This claim was picked up by NNFA leader Ahadi who said that he had suspected it “all along” and was firmly of “the belief that this government is not going to hold honest election and we’ll have another disaster.” Humayun, on 25 September 2017, further alleged that a president’s uncle (name not given) was working to engineer elections on the president’s behalf, and that he was doing it by inviting some MPs to his office in Kart-e Parwan, asking them to support “Ghani’s government.” In return, their names would be on the list of the next MPs (see this ETWA’s parliamentary observation report here). [3]

In response to Humayun’s first accusation, the IEC and the ECC issued a joint statement on 25 July 2017 saying his was an effort to “confuse the public opinion” and “to reduce the credibility” of the electoral bodies. Imam Muhammad Warimach, then head of the IEC secretariat and speaking to the upper house on 26 September 2017, accused the first deputy speaker of the Wolesi Jirga of placing “political pressure on the president.” (The senators had summoned all the IEC members, but only Warimach showed up).

In early September 2017, mistrust in the IEC began to be increasingly voiced and not only by opposition groups. Critics also included the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (HCJNP), the first grouping to emerge after the last presidential elections, in August 2015. The HCJNP includes three large parties considered to be pro-Ghani – Nejat-e Melli party led by former president Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, Wahdat-e Islami party led by former vice-president and current head of High Peace Council Muhammad Karim Khalili, and Mahaz-e Melli party of Sayyed Hamed Gailani (see AAN’s previous analysis here). In early September this year, the HCJNP (together with NNFA and CSPA both members of the Understanding Council) came up with a joint proposal titled “Proposal of the Council for Stability and Protection, Council of Jihadi and National Parties, and New National Front about the Transparency of Elections” (AAN has seen a copy of it) in which they made clear they were not happy with the electoral commissioners and the way they had been chosen, saying they had been presented with a fait accompli. (4)

The proposal called for a new election watchdog, an election observation council comprised of representatives of political groupings and parties that would “oversee all the affairs of the election commission [IEC] closely,” including the observation of recruitment and training of the employees in the centre and provinces, the introduction of technology in the elections and logistics and other affairs of the IEC. (5)

The Understanding Council has taken this a step further and, as mentioned above, called for the dissolution of the electoral commissions. It has also threatened that its member-parties will boycott and even prevent the elections if their demands are not met. Harun Mutaref, the head of Jombesh-e Guzar, said, “We will not let it [the elections] to be held in conditions that [mean the government] has such deep influence on the election commissions.” Ajmal Balochzada, head of the secretariat of Mehwar-e Mardom, in conversation with AAN on 2 November 2017, said that their demand to the NUG was either to directly dismiss the IEC and ECC members or accept discussions on “fundamental reforms,” without explaining what these fundamental reforms would look like, except that they would also eventually lead to the replacement of the commissioners. He said that if their demand for new electoral commissioners was not met, they would present an alternative plan, which he threatened, could be an alternative to both the electoral commissions and the NUG. Again he gave no explanation of what this alternative was. Another member of the Understanding Council told AAN on 8 November 2017 that the alternative plan had not yet been decided and it would be based on consultation with people and international community.

The demand for either an additional observation mechanism or the dissolution of the IEC and ECC show that political groups feel they were not (sufficiently) consulted on appointments to the IEC (and the ECC) and that there is widespread mistrust, including even from pro-Ghani parties in the IEC and EEC. However, neither of these two demands offers a solution. An external observation council would also be open to interference and a change of faces on the commissions might also just be the focus of a new struggle for control.

Reactions from the government and IEC

There were three responses from the government and the IEC. First, in reaction to the Understanding Council’s demand for the dismissal of commissioners, the president’s acting spokesman Shah Hussain Murtazawi told Tolo on 7 October 2017 that the IEC and ECC members had been appointed “based on the law and in accordance with a specific mechanism and will continue to work.” However, the Understanding Council has since questioned this very law; on 13 November 2017, Shiwa-ye Sharq, the head of Mehwar-e Mardom’s media committee, told AAN that the legal basis for IEC and ECC appointments, a presidential legislative decree without parliament’s approval, is invalid and this is the reason why commissioners are not trusted by the political groups. Murtazavi called on the political groups “to share their corrective views with the commission.”

Since then, FEFA and TEFA as well as Hezb-e Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have called on the IEC to share their proposals for the “better conduct of elections.” However, Mehwar-e Mardom’s Shiwa-ye Sharq criticised this call, saying it did not make sense; neither Mehwar nor the Understanding Council, he said, would ever submit their views to commissioners they do not trust. Instead, he again insisted on the dissolution of the IEC and ECC and called for an agreement for what he called an inclusive and consultative framework for the appointment of fresh members and the development of an inclusive mechanism for the observation of the whole electoral process.

Second, on 6 November 2017, Murtazawi changed his tone and, in a piece published in Hasht-e Sobh, accused “a number of political currents and some election observer organisations” of “seeking to sabotage this national process [election] with political remarks.”

Third, the IEC, for its part, on 7 October 2017, described the criticism by the Understanding Council as “premature and illegal,” pointing out practical steps for holding the elections had already been taken. On 11 October 2017, then IEC chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai in a press conference rejected the allegation that the government was interfering in the IEC’s work (a position he reversed after he was sacked). Ahmadzai suggested that this accusation by the political currents had arisen from the tensions between the opposition and the government. He asked them not to involve the IEC in those tensions.

Other responses

Some Afghan election observers, such as Yusuf Rashid, FEFA executive director, have described the demand for the dismissal of the members of the electoral bodies as impractical. He and others have argued that it would reopen a time-consuming appointment process which could further delay the parliamentary and even the presidential elections. This point seems to be operating under the assumption that parliamentary elections in July 2018 are still feasible. At the same time, Rashid also pointed to the “issue of distrust in the process.” Politicians who are outside the government and the incumbent parliament, he told Hasht-e Sobh on 9 October 2017, were concerned about the government’s interference and an engineering of elections “in such a way” as to allow the NUG leaders to “bring their favourite individuals into institutions such as the parliament, provincial council and district councils.” Rashid urged the UN to play a more prominent role, not only providing technical support, but also doing “confidence-building and develop capacity within the commission for continuity of a sustainable administration.”

Divisions in the IEC and ECC

The current conflict between the commissions and its critics has been compounded by internal divisions within the IEC, an issue that has been picked up by the political groups as an additional argument, as mentioned in the joint statement of the Understanding Council, that the IEC’s “capability to hold transparent and fraud-free elections” and its credibility to be “trusted by the people and political currents.” Leading Mehwar-e Mardom figure Ajmal Baluchzada told AAN on 2 November that they had to “tell the people that the commissioners have proved incompetent after everything such as corruption and division in the IEC became evident.” (Divisions have also been seen in the EEC, although they have been less serious – see footnote (6) for more detail.)

The divisions were revealed by IEC member Maleha Hassan on 14 August 2017 during an event held by FEFA. She alleged that some IEC members had been “marginalised,” decisions were taken “secretly” by a small circle of commissioners and information was intentionally not shared with certain IEC members. Another IEC member Mazallah Dawlati, on 22 September 2017, also alleged that Chair Najibullah Ahmadzai, Abdul Qader Quraishi (the deputy for finance and administrative affairs), Gula Jan Badi Sayyad and Rafiullah Bidar were part of a group of IEC members who made decisions “secretly.” (Those supposedly out of the inner circle are Hassan, Dawlati and deputy for operations, Wasima Badghisi.) As an example, Dawlati said the four members had introduced three candidates to the president for the post of head of the IEC secretariat or CEO, without any final agreement among all the IEC members. [7]

These disputes resulted in Afghan media reporting, on 7 November 2017, that IEC chairman Najibullah Ahmadzai had resigned from his position (see here). This, however, was rejected by IEC spokesman Sayyad a day later. On 10 October 2017, the IEC issued a statement calling the media reports “baseless claims” and insisting Ahmadzai had neither resigned nor he intended to resign in the future. Maleha Hassan, however, told AAN on 8 November 2017 that the chairman had indeed been called to the Palace where he had been told to step down, but had refused to do so. A member of the Understanding Council claimed, when talking to AAN on 8 November 2017, that Chief Executive Dr Abdullah had confirmed to him that both NUG leaders wanted the IEC chairman to step down, a position, the member said, was an outcome of the pressure by the Understanding Council.

However, Ahmadzai’s refused to go. That, apparently, led to five IEC members Wasima Badghisi, Abdul Qader Quraishi (deputy heads for operations, and administration and finance, respectively), secretary and spokesman Gula Jan Badi Sayyad, Maliha Hassan and Mazaullah Dawlati to sign a letter calling for the IEC chairman to be fired. They said they had reviewed Ahmadzai’s activities and concluded that: he had worked against national interests and electoral law, misused his authority, and been negligent in his duties. On 15 November 2017, the president’s office issued a statement instructing the “relevant institutions” to introduce fresh candidates to the president to appoint instead of Najibullah Ahmadzai, “based on the [IEC]’s 21 Aqrab (12 November) decision and demand” for his dismissal.

One day later, Ahmadzai in a press conference called his dismissal “illegal,” saying the IEC members had demanded his resignation under threat of their own dismissal. He also accused the government of trying to delay the elections and told the people not to expect elections from the current government. According to article 16 of the electoral law, in the event of dismissal or resignation and death of an IEC member, the president should appoint a new member from among the remaining candidates introduced by the Selection Committee. (8) The call by the president’s office on the relevant institutions to introduce new candidates is unclear and only shows the complexity of the new appointment in the current heightened environment of distrust. Mehwar-e Mardom’s Shiwa-ye Sharq, in conversation with AAN on 13 November, had already warned that “a unilateral appointment of a new IEC chairman will not be acceptable.” This is further compounded by the pending fate of the head of the IEC secretariat and unresolved demand for the replacement of other IEC as well as all ECC members.

Reopening a legal debate

In addition to calling for the dismissal of all of the IEC and ECC commissioners, the Understanding Council has also reopened a legal controversy about the president’s authority to pass the electoral law which enabled the government to appoint new commissioners. Referring to article 109 (9) of the constitution which says that the National Assembly cannot amend election law in the last year of its legislative term, the Understanding Council in its joint statement concluded that if the parliament, as “the primary authority for legislation” does not have such an authority, then, a fortiori, neither does the president. It ruled that the president had “violated the law by issuing the decree” and so the decree was not legitimate. The Council’s statement also said that, according to article 90 of the constitution, which concerns the authorities of the National Assembly, the parliament, not the president, has the authority to approve, amend and repeal laws and legislative decrees. [10]

In fact, the Understanding Council in its statement called into question various issues: the need for a new legislative decree to amend the electoral laws; the president’s authority to issue a legislative decree; and his not sending it to the parliament for approval. The Understanding Council also criticised the amendments in the electoral law. It highlighted two areas: one, it called for preventing interference by the National Security Council in electoral affairs as the joint position said,” According to the legislative decree, involving the NSC in electoral affairs is [a] deviation from the principle of transparency, violation and trampling of the democratic process.”

This referred (as Mehwar-e Mardom’a Ajmal Baluchzada also confirmed it to AAN on 2 November 2017) to article 104 (11) of the electoral law which is about a possible postponement and suspension of elections. According to this article, upon proposal of the IEC and approval of a committee “comprised of the Head and members of the National Security Council, Chairmen of the two houses of the Parliament, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Chairman of the Independent Commission of Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan,” elections can “be postponed for a period of up to four months,” in case “security situations, natural disasters and other similar conditions make impossible the principle of general and fair representation in holding elections and or undermine the credibility of the electoral process.” Second, it said that “articles of the legislative decree were about appointment, separation and dismissal of the permanent and temporary employees of the electoral bodies were “in contradiction with the civil service law and labour law and this threatens the job security of the employees with the government’s interference.” However, these criticisms have come very late and might have been raised only to try to increase the pressure on the government to replace IEC and ECC members.

A vote in 2018?

The IEC and ECC members, appointed in November 2016 as part of the electoral reform that the NUG leaders had promised, are now suffering both internal division and political pressure from opposition currents. Moreover, a number of election watchdogs have also rated them as incapable of holding parliamentary and district council elections, which the IEC has scheduled for 7 July 2018. The president and chief executive cannot fully ignore the demands of the Understanding Council, with its significant number of heavyweight politicians and groupings. The president may have sacked the IEC chairman on the demand of other IEC commissioners as an easy sacrifice, made in order to try to alleviate the pressure. However, the lack of constructive dialogue and consensus between the government, political groups and the IEC from the beginning of the electoral process will make finding agreement on what to do next difficult.

Electoral preparations have been turned into a battlefield between the government and its critics. This, in addition to the lack of reform and tardy preparations (which will be looked at in more detail in this series of dispatches) call seriously into question whether a credible election can be held, not only on schedule in July 2018 but even at a later date in the year. The Afghan government and its international backers may already be considering a Plan B. However, if they are, that may only enrage the government’s critics even further.

 

(1) On October 2017, Sayyad, the spokesman for the IEC, told AAN that the IEC had not received any formal notification from the presidential palace nor had it been informed of the reasons for the dismissal. He said, “If the decision to dismiss him is based on any plausible reasons, the IEC will accept it.” On 21 October 2017, Shah Hussain Murtazavi, the acting spokesman for the president, in conversation with AAN, neither rejected nor confirmed the reports, but nor did he say he was unaware of them. On 22 October 2017, Abdullah Nuri, assistant to Warimach, told AAN that the news was “totally wrong” and the source of the media reports “is unclear and Warimach continue to report to the duty.” He also dismissed the report that Warimach had been fired due to corruption saying that “there has been no budget allocated for the election yet and where can be the corruption from.” On 8 November 2017, IEC member Maleha Hassan told AAN that the president in a meeting in the presence of the IEC members and representatives of the International Community told Warimach verbally: “You are a sharif (respected) person, but you cannot work for the IEC. The procurement is in crisis and appointments are problematic. The government is big and there will be a place for you.” She further said that the IEC had not received any official dismissal letter yet, though.

(2) TEFA’s survey asked the following questions:

1. In your opinion, will parliamentary and district councils elections be held next year at the announced date? (45% of the participants were optimistic, 32% uncertain and 23% believed the elections would not be held on time.)
2. Do you think the Afghan government is impartial in relation to next year’s elections? (29% said yes, 33% were uncertain, and 38% said no.)
3. In your opinion, does the IEC have the capacity to hold a transparent elections? (29% believed the IEC had the capacity to hold a transparent election, 30% were uncertain and 41% did not
4. Will you participate in parliamentary and district councils next year? (14% said they would not vote, 33% were uncertain and 53% said they would vote).

(3) Also during the Wolesi Jirga’s plenary session on 25 September 2017, Shekiba Hashemi, an MP from Kandahar and now a member of Mehwar-e Mardom, joined in the chorus, claiming that the government wanted to make former electoral chief officer Zia ul Haq Amarkhel as the Wolesi Jirga speaker by getting 151 candidates elected in the next parliamentary elections. She further alleged that the disputes among the IEC members (more on this below) stemmed from meddling by the government. On 16 September 2017, Sadiqi Zada Nili, an MP from Daikundi province, claimed that meetings were held night and day between the IEC and “parts of the government” to discuss who should be the next MPs.

In conversation with AAN, another MP also claimed that he had an authentic document showing that the IEC chairman and Amarkhel had developed a list of the next would-be MPs from each province, based on an ethnic quota, with a two-pronged objective to elect a Pashtun and pro-president majority that would also be able to elect Amarkhel as the next Wolesi Jirga speaker.

(4) A leading member of the Ankara Coalition told AAN that the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties, which is a pro-Ghani group, opted out of the Understanding Council at the last minute. On 8 October 2017, Abbas Basir, head of its secretariat, explained to AAN why:

The [original] idea was to forge some sort of coordination regarding the election. There are two reasons for not joining Shura-ye Tafahum: one, we did not have any intention to form any new current or council, because we are already operating under the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties. Second, there is a difference of opinion in dealing with the elections. We also want transparency and oversight in the election, but the question of changing the commissions and the law is a bit late.

A diplomatic source told AAN that Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar at the behest of the Palace persuaded members of the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties to opt out of the Understanding Council. A member of the Coalition for Salvation, however, told AAN on 8 November 2018 that the Palace prevented Mujaddedi’s council from joining the Understanding Council. On 31 October 2017, Hamed Azizi, a spokesman for Hezb, told AAN that the High Council was an independent group and Hezb welcomed its decision not to join the Understanding Council, without rejecting or confirming Hezb’s involvement. Like Basir, Azizi also said that they wanted a serious reform and were not happy with the performance of the IEC and ECC members as well as delays in the elections.

Hekmatyar has recently stood by the government’s side against growing pressure from political groups such as the Coalition for Salvation of Afghanistan. In August 2017, Azizi called the Hezb’s support for the government vis-à-vis the political groups as “creating balance” between the government and the demands of its political oppositions.

Hekmatyar went to the IEC on 4 November 2017 to share his party’s proposals about elections. There he appeared in a joint news conference with IEC members and expressed his support for them against the demand for their dismissal, saying, “Although the current commissions were reconstituted in my absence, I had have my observations but still I suggest that the current election bodies should continue their work and the power transfer should be performed peacefully.”

(5) The demand for an observation council was also picked up by Hezb-e Islami as on 31 October 2017. Its member Amin Karim said that a general council comprised of political parties and influential figures should be formed to oversee the election process. Moreover, more and more groups are joining the bandwagon of criticising the electoral bodies. For instance, on 23 October 2017, Amrullah Saleh, former NDS chief, head of the Green Trend of Afghanistan and a close ally of Chief Executive Abdullah, said that the IEC had “gone down with cancer in infancy.” He warned that political forces were already “considering and practicing their possible responses” to a “fraudulent elections.”

(6) Divisions cracked open in the ECC on 22 October 2017 after its chairman Aziz Ariayi issued a statement saying that the ECC had sacked five senior staff including the deputy head of its secretariat, head of analysis and review department, head of human resources department, documents and communication manager, and staff attendance officer. (see here) The ECC chairman listed 11 reasons for the dismissals, including manipulation of electronic attendance, disobedience of the president’s order and creating obstacles for the ECC’s reform plans. (see here) This laid bare the differences that existed in the EEC as its deputy head, Humaira Haqmal, complained that the decision had been based on “vested interest and tendentious.” The head of its secretariat, Muhammad Ali Setegh, also called the dismissal as “cruel political decision and against the country’s effective laws.”

The ECC chairman earlier, during an event organised by TEFA (which was also attended by the author), on 12 October 2017, said that those who were accused of fraud in the 2014 elections were still in the IEC and ECC and only 12 commissioners had been changed, referring to the seven IEC members and five ECC members. He threatened to resign if the government failed to address the alleged interference, without pointing a finger at any particular group.

(7) The position of IEC CEO had remained vacant for more than two years, since former CEO Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhel resigned from his position in 2014, amid allegations of serious electoral fraud. The secretariat had been run by an acting head. Like the IEC commissioners, the CEO is a very important appointment, which according to article 22.3 of the electoral law, is made by the president from among three candidates proposed by the IEC. On 1 March 2017, President Ghani appointed Muhammad Warimach as head of the IEC secretariat, out of eight candidates he, vice-president Sarwar Danesh and Chief Executive Abdullah had interviewed the previous day. A ninth candidate had been out of the country. Unlike the provision of the electoral law, the introduction of nine candidates for the position came after an initial list of three candidates had become controversial Warimach has completed his higher education in India and worked in the office of the former chairman of the IEC, Yusuf Nuristani.

(8) Article 16 (paragraph one) of the electoral law says that an IEC member can be dismissed for the following reasons:

• Faking of the educational documents.
• Deprivation of civil rights on the order of a competent court.
• Conviction for committing crimes of misdemeanor or felony.
• Having membership in political parties during membership of the Commission.
• Breaching provisions of the Constitution of Afghanistan, this law and other laws enforced in the country.
• Suffering from an incurable or long-lasting disease which impedes performance of duties.
• Continuous absence from job for more than twenty days without justifiable legal reasons.
• Non-observance of provisions of Article 17 of this law.

Paragraph five of the article also says that in addition to these conditions, other conditions shall been determined by the Commission. The IEC reportedly demanded the dismissal based on this paragraph.

Based on this article (16.3), in this case (or in the case of resignation or death of an IEC member) the president should appoint a new member from the list of the remaining candidates introduced by the selection committee, as per article 14 of the law, according to which the Selection Committee, from among the candidates for the IEC membership, introduces “21 persons to the president that meet the highest and most appropriate legal standards, while taking into consideration the ethnic and gender composition.” The president then appoints seven out of these 21 candidates. Paragraph four of article 16 further says that if the dismissed (or resigned or deceased) member is also the chairman or deputy or secretary of the IEC, there should be a new internal election by the IEC.

(9) Article 109 of the constitution reads:

Proposals for amending the elections law shall not be included in the work agenda of the National Assembly during the last year of the legislative term.

(10) Article 90 of the constitution reads:

The National Assembly shall have the following duties: 1. Ratification, modification or abrogation of laws or legislative decrees; 2. Approval of social, cultural, economic as well as technological development programs; 3. Approval of the state budget as well as permission to obtain or grant loans; 4. Creation, modification and or abrogation of administrative units; 5. Ratification of international treaties and agreements, or abrogation of membership of Afghanistan in them; 6. Other authorities enshrined in this Constitution.

(11) Article 104 of the electoral law fleshes out the postponement and suspension of elections as follow:

1) In case, security situations, natural disasters and other similar conditions make impossible the principle of general and fair representation in holding elections and or undermine the credibility of the electoral process; the elections shall be upon the proposal of the Commission and endorsement of the Committee, comprised of the Head and members of the National Security Council, Chairmen of the two houses of the Parliament, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Chairman of the Independent Commission of Oversight of Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan be postponed from the specific date for a period of up to four months.

2) In case, situation and conditions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article are not resolved within the period of four months, the Committee may extend the mentioned period for a period of another four months.

3) Decision of the committee mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article is made by majority of votes of its members.

4) In case, situation mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article is limited to one or more electoral constituencies, the Committee may postpone holding elections in those particular electoral constituencies till the removal of those conditions and improvement of the situation.

5) In case, the elections are proved as defective in an electoral constituency, the Commission may order conducting new elections in that particular electoral constituency.

6) In case, elections are postponed or suspended, members of the elected bodies mentioned in this law, shall continue to serve in their positions until holding of elections and announcement of its results.

 

On 22 November, the Subcommittee will discuss, with the involvement of 3 experts, risks and trends and their security implications for the EU as well as EU efforts to mitigate the security relevant effects of climate change. It will also examine to what extent increased economic/military activities, impact on desertification, land degradation, water and food scarcity can be linked to climate change and what major effects they have on EU security.
Further information
Draft programme
hearing documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The EDA Steering Board today appointed Mr Olli Ruutu as next Deputy Chief Executive of the Agency. He will take up his duties in March 2018.

Mr Ruutu is currently the Deputy National Armaments Director at the Finnish Ministry of Defence and Director of the Materiel Unit at the Resource Policy Department. He chairs the Defence Administration Commercial Board and the Export Control Advisory Group and is also Deputy Chairman of the Defence Materiel Steering Group, as well as a member of the Defence Forces’ Technology Board and the Defence Administration’s Industrial Cooperation Group.

Mr Ruutu worked at the EDA between 2009 and 2014, in the Strategy and Policy Unit. Appointed by Dr Jussi Niinistö, the Minister of Defence of Finland, Mr Ruutu took part in the Agency’s Long-Term Review in 2016-2017 as his government’s representative.

Jorge Domecq, the EDA's Chief Executive, stated: “Mr Olli Ruutu’s professional experience and his knowledge of the European security and defence environment make him highly suitable for the position of Deputy Chief Executive, at a time when Member States expect the Agency to support and deliver on key initiatives such as PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund. He will support the Agency’s effort to further improve its effectiveness and contribute to both the implementation of the EU Global Strategy and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration.”

Mr Ruutu was born in Espoo, Finland, in 1976. He is married and has three children. He holds a Master’s degree in Political Science (International Relations) from Helsinki University, Finland. In addition to his mother tongue Finnish, Mr Ruutu is fluent in English and Swedish and speaks French and German.