Defence`s Feeds

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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Length of video : 170'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.5Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Russian RPG-27 Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

Providing support to CSDP operations is a core task of the EDA which, since its creation in 2004, has developed tools to provide administrative, contracting and/or technical support to EU-led missions and operations whenever they face capability shortfalls in crucial domains. 

Situational awareness, which presupposes the availability of appropriate information gathering and intelligence management capabilities, is one of such domains. As EU or Member States’ military operations or civilian missions are often deployed on very short notice, putting these capabilities in place often constitutes a challenge. Tactical or medium altitude long endurance (MALE) type Remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), are critical assets in this respect with their ability to provide permanent and all weather coverage with high quality sensors. 

Turn-key solutions

In order to prepare for future decisions to be taken in that area, the EDA decided to launch a market survey to better understand the range of commercially available solutions which could fulfil possible future requirements for RPAS services in operations, as well as their potential associated risks or limitations. At this stage, the primary scope of the survey is the provision of RPAS services (tactical and/or MALE) covering the aircraft, ground segments (both ground control station and ground data terminal),navigation and communications. Personnel, training facilities as well as logistic support are also considered as being part of the ‘RPAS services’ addressed under the survey.

It should be underlined that the objective of this survey is to identify service providers of turn-key solutions and not manufacturers or suppliers of assets.

 

Full details on the aim, scope and participating rules are available here.

 

Deadline for participation is 31 March 2018.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has published its findings from victims who suffered war crimes in relation to the Afghan conflict, either in Afghanistan or in other countries. The victims mentioned murder, rape, forced disappearance, attacks against civilians and pillage. The ICC report said victims’ backing for an ICC investigation was “overwhelming” with 98 per cent of victims who made submissions to the Court saying they wanted to see this happen. As AAN Co-Director Kate Clark reports, the ball is now in the hands of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber’s judges who have to decide to investigate, or not.

AAN initially reported on the victims’ representations after the deadline for making them, 31 January 2018, had passed. This dispatch is an update with the final data from the ICC and its conclusions.

A redacted version of the ICC’s final report on victims’ responses can be read here.

The judges of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber had already heard from ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda that she thought an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan was merited (see AAN reporting here). They then had to hear from victims, to see whether an investigation would be in the ‘interests of justice’ (understood by the Court as in the ‘interests of victims’). A section of the ICC called the Registry, tasked with hearing from victims, gave people two months (December 2017 and January 2018) to respond. The message was clear. Almost all who contacted the Court said an investigation was necessary. Out of a total of 695 submissions (1) – which could be from individuals or collectives, such as a village or family or families – 680 said they wanted an investigation, while just 15 said they did not.

Why did victims want war crimes investigated?

The ICC said those who did not want an investigation cited, “Security concerns and doubts as to the likelihood that the Prosecutor’s investigation would result in the perpetrators being brought to justice were the reasons cited for this refusal.” Those who think an investigation necessary said it was because they wanted an “investigation by an impartial and respected international court; bringing the perceived perpetrators of crimes to justice; ending impunity; preventing future crimes; knowing the truth about what happened to victims of enforced disappearance; allowing for victims’ voices to be heard; and protecting the freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Afghanistan.”

For anyone living or working in Afghanistan over the last two decades, such sentiments are very familiar, even though it has become increasingly difficult and dangerous to speak about war crimes, compared to the early years following the fall of the Taleban. As early as 2004, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) published the results of its consultation with Afghans about how they wanted to deal with the legacies of war crimes, at that time from the beginning of the conflict in 1978 to 2001. This report showed 70 per cent of those consulted considered they had been victims of war crimes and 84 per cent considered justice to be very important or important. Opinions diverged on what was considered to be justice (read the report here). Almost a decade later, in 2012, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) published the results of its research on community perceptions of dealing with legacies of conflict in Afghanistan (read the report here). This report showed that securing peace was the primary concern, but also that peace and justice were not seen as competing, but complementary concepts. The report should there was no genuine will to forgive perpetrators and that people could not just forget the past. A year later, AAN published its report “Tell Us How This Will End” (read the report here). Covering the entirety of the conflict in Afghanistan, the report showed that the strategy of promoting stability without justice – deployed at every turn of the Afghan conflict – had simply not been successful.

Given that victims are rarely heard in Afghanistan, it is worth quoting what some of them told the Court. “Attempts in the country to ensure justice have not been successful,” said one victim submission, “so it is better to give ensuring justice by the international mechanism.” Another said, “We have not seen the central government of Afghanistan create a fair and independent court or prosecuting warlords or Mujahedeen for the international crimes they have committed against innocent victims.” A third said, “The current government of Afghanistan cannot overpower the warlords in Afghanistan and there are a lot of crimes happening, but no one can raise their voices because of fear.” Such concerns by victims about what the ICC called the “effectiveness of the Afghan judicial system” strengthens the view that an investigation would fulfil one of the Court’s conditions, that it will only intervene if no other court can or will do.

Some victims asked the Court to keep their safety in mind. “My concern is not to be victimized again. And my identity must be kept secret. At the moment also, I am under threat.” Some believed that many more people would have submitted their views if they had felt it was safe to do so. One submission, for example, said, “Some other [redacted] we contacted expressed concern about filing a victim representation form for fear of retaliation.” Others said the practical difficulty of filing reports had no all victims had come forward:

Most people in Afghanistan and our bereaved families are not highly educated and do not have access to the internet and facilities and just because they have not been able to file or register this form, please do not disregard their feelings and do not forget them and listen to them so that the continuation of bloody and painful incidents like this is prevented.

What do we know of those who made submissions?

The people who responded to the Court said they had suffered the following crimes, a “non-exhaustive” list, the ICC said:

[M]urder; attempted murder; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty; torture; rape; sexual violence; persecution; enforced disappearance of persons; other inhumane acts; attack against civilian population; attack against protected objects; destruction of property; pillage; forced displacement; outrages upon personal dignity; and denying a fair trial.

As to who they might have named as the alleged perpetrators, this report does not say. However, the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination from November 2016 said she thought there were cases to be made against the Taleban (including for murder and intentionally attacking civilians) (2), Afghan government forces (for torture) (3) and the United States military and CIA (for torture) (4).

We can see from the new report that Afghan victims in the country and the diaspora, (5) and non-Afghans responded. (6) They included victims of crimes that took place on Afghan soil (after May 2003 when Afghanistan became a state party to the Rome Treaty which established the ICC), as well as crimes that had a “prima facie nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan, are sufficiently linked to the Afghanistan situation and were committed on the territory of other States Parties since 1 July 2002.” That date is when Poland and Romania became a state party. Together with Lithuania (which joined in 2004), they have been mentioned by the Prosecutor because they had housed CIA black sites to which US security detainees were rendered and tortured.

Getting a breakdown on victims’ gender, nationality or ethnic group, date of birth, language(s) spoken, place of origin and current location of residence was hindered, said the ICC, because of the collective nature of most of the submissions (534 representations were assessed as collective, 165 as individual). (7) As far as the individual representations were concerned (which the ICC could get data from) the most significant characteristic was that only six per cent of victim submissions were made by or on behalf of women. As AAN reported earlier in the month, at least one NGO had warned this would be the case, saying the tight deadline and winter timing had exacerbated its problem of reaching women victims, many of whom lived in isolated places and could not leave their homes.

Who did not talk to the ICC

The ICC has recognised that, compared with the “vast number of victims in the country,” those contacting it were relatively few. The Court noted that its outreach had been poor and that, with no presence in the country, it had not managed to have a “clear voice” in Afghan media. That so many victims did manage to respond appears to be down to the work of advocacy organisations, “those with experience” in Afghanistan, whom the ICC “contacted and relied on… to reach out to victims with limited access to technology and to the public debate.” It also said it contacted lawyers and members of the Afghan diaspora in Europe for help.

Other factors reducing the numbers of Afghans contacting it, it said, were the “[l]ow levels of trust in judicial institutions” which hampered their “public willingness to engage.” It also cited low literacy rates, particular among women, and the multiple infrastructural challenges to reporting, including poor internet, geographical distances and difficulties in accessing remote areas, especially during winter. As AAN also reported, even though Afghanistan was given an extended time for victims to register their views, two months remained an exceptionally short time given the logistical challenges, insecurity and the ICC’s poor outreach strategy.

The exact number of victims represented in the submissions cannot be known, said the ICC because of the limited information in the submissions and because, given the security situation and the limited time frame, it cannot judge whether all members included in collective representations were properly informed. Nevertheless, it gave this breakdown:

• Representations were made on behalf of approximately 6,220 individual victims.
• Amongst these representations were 17 forms also submitted on behalf of 1,690 families.
• A further 12 representations were introduced by individuals and by organisations on behalf of approximately 1,163,950 victims and 26 villages. 
• Finally, another representation was submitted by an organisation reportedly on behalf of approximately 7 to 9 million people.

In the context of the fact that relatively few victims had come forward, the ICC said:

All [redacted] that the [ICC] Registry engaged with emphasized their longing for justice, which also characterizes many sectors of society, and their belief that peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved through justice. They reported that this belief was their driving force, [redacted].

What happens next?

If the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber do now decide to authorise an investigation, the real hard work will begin. The Prosecutor would have to decide which specific individuals to make cases against and start gathering evidence and witness statements in a country where access – both because of language and security – will be exceptionally difficult. The Court may also have to contend with US pressure, whether direct or indirect. Washington has said it opposes the Court’s involvement in Afghanistan and that any investigation against its personnel would be “wholly unwarranted and unjustified.” The Court would need to carry out its investigation while war crimes and crimes against humanity are ongoing (for a flavour, see this recent UNAMA report on the Protection of Civilians and AAN analysis here), where perpetrators enjoy impunity and victims frequently lack state protection and where the war is far from over.

 

Edited by Sari Kouvo

 

(1) The Court received 794 submissions, of which 41 were assessed to be duplicates and 699 were deemed to fulfil the Court’s criteria of ‘victim’. (It did not give the reasons for the remaining 54 not meeting this criteria.)

(2) The Office of the Prosecutor’s November 2016 Preliminary Examination Report (cited by AAN here) said there was a reasonable basis to believe that the Taleban and Haqqani network had committed war crimes (murder; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian personnel and protected objects; conscripting children; and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary – all of which, it said, “were committed on a large scale and as part of a plan or policy”) and crimes against humanity (murder; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political grounds and on gender grounds, all “allegedly committed as part of a widespread and/or systematic attack…”).

In terms of admissibility, the Taleban and Haqqani network’s crimes passed the gravity threshold. As to whether domestic courts were dealing with suspected war criminals, the Office of the Prosecutor pointed to the almost complete lack of any investigation or trial of alleged war criminals in Afghanistan and to the 2009 Amnesty Law which provides amnesty to everyone who has committed war crimes, including those who, in the future, reconcile with the Afghan government (see also this AAN report). It was noticeable, in this respect, that the government granted immunity to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his armed men in the context of the peace agreement signed with Hezb-e Islami on 29 September 2016. Amnesty for war crimes in domestic legislation can be interpreted as unwillingness by the state to prosecute.

(3) The Office of the Prosecutor (cited in AAN reporting here) has estimated that 35 to 50 per cent of conflict-related detainees “may be subjected to torture” by government forces and said there is a “state of total impunity.” There is a reasonable basis to believe, it said, that Afghan authorities have committed the war crimes of torture and cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to article, and sexual violence. Naming the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police and the Afghan Local Police (ALP), it says available information suggests the alleged crimes were committed on a “large scale.” Although there is no indication that they were committed “as part of any plans or policies at the national level,” in some cases, it said, there were plans or policies at the level of facility, district or province.

(4) The Prosecutor’s 2016 Preliminary Examination Report (see AAN analysis) said the CIA and US military, during interrogations of security detainees and in conduct supporting those interrogations, had:

… resorted to techniques amounting to the commission of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape… Specifically:

Members of US armed forces appear to have subjected at least 61 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity on the territory of Afghanistan between 1 May 2003 and 31 December 2014. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Members of the CIA appear to have subjected at least 27 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and/or rape on the territory of Afghanistan and other States Parties to the Statute (namely Poland, Romania and Lithuania) between December 2002 and March 2008. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Crucially, the Office of the Prosecutor said these “alleged crimes were not the abuses of a few isolated individuals,” but rather were part of a policy:

The Office considers that there is a reasonable basis to believe these alleged crimes were committed in furtherance of a policy or policies aimed at eliciting information through the use of interrogation techniques involving cruel or violent methods which would support US objectives in the conflict in Afghanistan.

(5) The report said, “conference calls were organised with members of the Afghan diaspora [redacted],” as part of the Court’s outreach.

(6) One submission was made in Arabic, likely an Arab victim of US forces. The following sentence also implies foreign detainees of the US military or CIA because Afghan forces have rarely held detainees in indefinite detention: “Video conferences were also held with civil society representatives and lawyers, [redacted], working closely with victims of indefinite detention without trial and victims of torture.”

(7) Some insight was also given by the language of the submissions: 175 in English, 323 in Dari or Pashto, one in Arabic, two in German, 193 in Dari together with English translations, and five in Dari or Pashto together with German translations.

 

 

 

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Two research activities of the Pilot Project on defence research, SPIDER and EuroSWARM, financed by EU budget, were brought to a successful closure at their respective final meetings on the 20 and 21 February 2018. The last activity, TRAWA, is due to be completed by May 2018.

The Pilot Project aims at exploring how the European Union can support building defence capabilities relevant for the Common Security and Defence Policy and Member States. It was proposed by the European Parliament and launched by the European Commission in response to multiple political calls from EU institutions, Member States and NATO to improve Europe's defence capabilities. This objective is also enshrined in article 42 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union.

The Pilot Project had been entrusted to the European Defence Agency (EDA) by the European Commission through a Delegation Agreement, which was signed on 16 November 2015. The EDA proposed to the European Commission a list of topics, for the preparation of the work plan of the Pilot Project. The call for proposals, the submission of proposals, the evaluation and the awarding of the grant agreement were organised and coordinated by EDA. After the signature of the grant agreements, three research activities were launched, executed by the awarded consortia and monitored by EDA.

With a budget of 1.4 million euros from the European Union, the three research activities received a grant in the order of € 430.000 each. All projects were launched in November 2016, namely: EuroSWARM, SPIDER and TRAWA.

The successful outcome of the Pilot Project, as a predecessor to the Preparatory Action for Defence Research, is to be seen in proving the feasibility of defence research funding through the EU budget. The initial rationale and objectives of the Pilot Project, which along with the on-going Preparatory Action on Defence Research was set-up to pave the way for a fully-fledged European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) in the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework after 2020, have already been met. It has supported the demonstration that EU funding can effectively support EU defence research needs, based on a structured cooperation and joint work between the European Commission and the EDA. The successful handling of the Pilot Project by the European Commission and the EDA has been an excellent preparation for the Preparatory Action on Defence Research and a future EDRP.

Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms (EuroSWARM)

EuroSWARM aimed to test and demonstrate that efficient and effective operation of unmanned swarm systems can bring a profound impact to the military arena. The key focus was the minimisation of uncertainties in situational awareness information for surveillance operations through a swarm system of systems composed by static and mobile heterogeneous sensors.

The main objectives of the activity were to:

• develop key techniques for adaptive, informative and reconfigurable operations of unmanned heterogeneous swarm systems, namely: optimal task allocation and resource management, sensor fusion, cooperative guidance, robust sensor network;
• integrate the developed enabling techniques;
• validate the developed enabling techniques based on empirical simulation studies;
• demonstrate the proposed solutions based on a small scale of experiments.

EuroSWARM was carried out by a consortium led by the University of Cranfield (UK) which also included the French aerospace research agency ONERA (Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales), the Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI and the University of Patras (Greece).

Inside Building Awareness and Navigation for Urban Warfare (SPIDER)

SPIDER aimed to develop an innovative system to support Urban-Warfare operations by providing improved situational awareness to operational forces entering an unfriendly building. It focused on the use of radiofrequency (RF) stationary sensors and mobile ground robots.

The main objectives of the activity were to:

• develop and analyse a framework comprising the use of multiple sensors to perform indoor mapping and human detection in an Urban Warfare context;
• consider the choice of a data fusion strategy to process and combine sensor data;
• explore the advantages and constraints of using each solution as well as solutions encompassing autonomous robots combined with static RF sensor networks.

SPIDER was carried out by a consortium led by TEKEVER, a Portuguese technology company, and composed of IT Aveiro - Instituto de Telecomunicações (Portugal), Aralia (UK) and the Bulgarian Defence Institute (BDI).

Standardisation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Detect and Avoid (TRAWA)

The TRAWA activity, which is still ongoing, aims to contribute to the development of standards for a performant and affordable detect and avoid (DAA) system usable on-board Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). It is focused on the Remain Well Clear (RWC) function and contributes to the standardisation activities in cooperation with other international efforts in full alignment with EUROCAE WG 105 Terms of Reference.

The main objectives of the activity are to:

• specify Remain Well Clear in quantitative terms and obtain validation via simulations;
• specify sensor types, detection ranges and position estimation accuracy;
• develop requirements for remote pilot HMI (Human Machin Interface) characteristics.

TRAWA is carried out by a consortium led by the Netherlands Aerospace Center (NLR) with the following partners: the German Aerospace Center (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, DLR), Deep Blue (Italy), Tony Henley Consulting (UK) and EuroUSC (Italy).

 

More information

• Project page on the Preparatory Action

To support the defence sector in accessing European funding, the EDA now provides industry, Ministries of Defence/Armed Forces, research-and-technology organisations, academia with a comprehensive European Funding Gateway for defence, encompassing:

• EDA ad-hoc schemes: both Cat.A and Cat.B;
• European Defence Fund (EDF): Preparatory Action (PADR) and forthcoming European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP);
• European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), its 'Interreg' share and the European Social Fund (ESF);
• European Investment Bank (EIB)’s major project financing;
• EU COSME Programme: financial instruments and grants supporting access to markets;
• Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and its Single European Sky ATM Research-window (SESAR);
• Erasmus+: Learning mobility, Strategic Partnerships and Knowledge Alliances; 
• Horizon 2020 for dual-use projects: Thematic areas, SME instrument and financial instruments.

This interactive Gateway to European funding serves defence priorities under the Strategic Research Agendas in defence and their Technology Building Blocks (OSRA-TBBs), as well as Key Strategic Activities (KSA). It also supports EDA industry engagement.

All defence-related stakeholders can access a:

• comparative view per funding dimension to compare each relevant criterion one-by-one across the many funding opportunities; and
• detailed view per funding source to explore each specific European funding opportunity in detail.

The EDA’s European Funding Gateway is a result of the collaboration between EDA and several Institutions, including the European Commission (DG GROW, DG EMPL, DG EAC, DG RTD, DG REGIO) and the European Investment Bank Group.

 

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