Defence`s Feeds

China will not resort to the threat of force at will, nor will it "flaunt its military power on others' doorsteps at the drop of a hat," said Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 1 ahead of a ruling by a UN tribunal on the legality of Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea.

South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), has held a steel-cutting ceremony for the country's second KSS-III submarine, a company official told IHS Jane's on 4 July. The ceremony was held at DSME's Okpo shipyard on Geoje Island, south of Busan, on 1 July. The

The Council of the European Union (EU) announced on 1 July that it was extending sanctions against Russia for a further six months. As a result, the sanctions will now be in place until 31 January 2017, when the EU will re-evaluate whether they should remain in place or be lifted. The sanctions

Key Points The contract will allow companies to continue work on variable-cycle engine technology through September 2021 The goal of the AETP is to achieve improved fuel efficiency and increased thrust The US Air Force (USAF) has awarded USD1 billion contracts to General Electric (GE) Aviation

India's Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, formally handed over the indigenously developed Varunastra heavyweight anti-submarine torpedo to the Indian Navy (IN) on 29 June. The IN has ordered 73 of the 1,500 kg wire-guided torpedoes for INR87.6 billion (USD132 million), which will be manufactured

In mid-June, India's Cabinet Committee on Security announced that it had approved the USD1 billion procurement of four additional Boeing P-8I Neptune long-range maritime multi-mission aircraft for the Indian Navy (IN), via the United States' Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. IN officials told IHS

Key Points Belgian police arrested returnee foreign fighter Said M'Nari in Antwerp on 25 June after he had earlier been convicted in absentia for participation in the Sharia4Belgium group's recruitment of fighters for the conflict in Syria. M'Nari's background and history as a foreign fighter

A suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) hit a shopping mall in the middle-class Baghdad suburb of Karrada on 2 July, killing up to 200 civilians. This was the largest number of casualties in a single attack in the capital since 2007. In the aftermath, crowds, which had gathered

Key Points Orbital ATK's Mk 136 TSRM dual-pulse rocket motor is used to propel the SM-3 Block 1B kinetic warhead into the exo-atmosphere Developmental flight tests have proved the performance of design modifications introduced to the TSRM nozzle Two developmental flight tests of the Standard

Key Points GPS OCX has exceeded a 25% cost overrun threshold that triggers a Nunn-McCurdy breach The Pentagon will decide whether to continue the programme or restructure it by October The Pentagon is studying whether the US Air Force (USAF) should continue work on its next-generation GPS control

PZL-Swidnik has handed over to the Polish armed forces the last upgraded W-3PL Gluszec and the first upgraded W-3RM Anakonda platforms, the Leonardo Helicopters subsidiary announced. The handovers, which took place at the company's Swidnik site on 27 June, saw the last four of eight W-3PLs

Against the backdrop of the recent commemorations of the Battle of the Somme, Sandy Johnston reflects on the UK's decision to leave the European Union and on the need for Britain's leaders to bring an historical perspective to bear on the plan moving forward.

The post The Somme: reflections on Europe at war and at peace appeared first on European Geostrategy.

Researchers focusing on Chechen issues point to clear evidence that many Chechens are fighting in Syria, but roundly reject the notion of a Chechen presence in Afghanistan. In the first part of his special two-parter, Christian Bleuer looked at how Chechens became a battlefield myth for western soldiers and a tool for Afghan and US governments frame their fight as a struggle against foreign militants. In this second dispatch, he looks at the difficulties of identifying a Chechen and at how ‘Chechen’ has become a loose term that can mean different things to different people.

(Mis)identifying Chechens in Afghanistan: a few examples

Chechens (dead and alive) are reported frequently in Afghanistan, but that identification usually falls apart under scrutiny. For example, a United States officer reported the alleged capture by Afghan police of a Chechen in Paktia in summer 2007. But when the identity of the ‘Chechen’ was eventually revealed, although he did turn out to be a citizen of Russia, he was an ethnic Russian from Siberia called Andrei who had converted to Islam (see also this 2007 blog). Or, in another example from 2009, a reporter looking into the role of foreign fighters in the Afghan insurgency quoted a United States Army Major in Paktika stating confidently that Arab, Uzbek, Turkmen and Chechen fighters were entering his area of operation. A suspicious analyst personally contacted the major to confirm the report. The major said he had told the reporter that he and his team were fighting against local Afghans. “I never said the quote that he used,” he said. “I stated that there have been reports that Chechens have been in the area, but that we have no way of verifying this information.”

Documents allegedly identifying Chechens are also occasionally reported, such as a 2005 USA Today article citing a government spokesman in Zabul who stated that recently killed insurgents were positively identified as Pakistani and Chechen, as “documents found on the bodies of the three identified their nationalities.” This may be the case for the dead Pakistanis, but very unlikely for the ‘Chechens.’ If they were carrying a passport, it would be a passport of the Russian Federation; in 1997 the Russian government removed the line in the passport where the Russian citizen identified their ethnicity. Of course, a birthplace is still listed, but in the Cyrillic Russian alphabet and by city only, not by republic or province (so the word ‘Chechnya’ would not be included). As for the unknown number of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria passports issued in 1997, none have turned up in warzones, but rather in asylum applications in Europe. (1)

In January 2011, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) wire service circulated a fantastic story: fifteen Chechen women in Dasht-e Archi district of Kunduz had married Talebs and were assisting them as experts in the use of suicide vests and roadside IEDs (improvised explosive devices), and as nurses. (2) The source of this information was the interrogation by Kunduz police chief Abdul Rahman Sayedkheli (3) of Taleban Mullah Jamaluddin – leaving open the possibility that these are the words of the police, put into the mouth of a Taleb prisoner. Furthermore, to believe this story, one must assume that fifteen Chechen women – who are also Islamist extremists, trained in suicide vest and IED construction – left Chechnya on their own and travelled all the way to Kunduz to marry Afghan Talebs. This story could be a play on the Russian ‘Black Widow’ female suicide bombers from the North Caucasus region, itself an exaggerated phenomenon. These women – also referred to as shahidka in Russian – (see here) are overwhelmingly vulnerable widows manipulated into putting on suicide vests inside Russia, rather than globe-trotting insurgent and terrorist tactic experts.

In some incidents where foreign militants certainly were to blame, the Afghan government is still quick to name Chechens as the perpetrators. A good example is the February 2015 kidnapping of dozens of Hazaras on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The governor of Zabul province immediately blamed the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Jangvi and Chechens. But unlike many other reports around the country that named Chechens as the guilty party, this incident generated a relatively large amount of media and public interest. The scrutiny dismantled the government’s initial claims, and it was revealed quite decisively that Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were responsible. (4) But for other reports of Chechens, there is usually no such fact-checking or scrutiny.

Positive identification of Chechens: ‘racial’ stereotyping

If some Afghan mujahedin had been misidentifying dead Soviet soldiers as Cubans in the 1980s (possibly because Soviet soldiers had darkened their faces for night-time fighting; see the author’s previous dispatch), could contemporary American and Afghan soldiers be doing something similar?

Many, including Russians, think they can identify Chechens and fail badly, as noted in a widely circulated Russian article written by a Chechen titled “How to spot a Chechen.” Basically, ‘racial stereotypes’ (anthropologists prefer the word ‘phenotypes’) such as hair type, facial features, skin colour, etc are not particularly useful as the Chechen population is a diverse group of people who speak a common language. A stereotypical Chechen ‘look’ will fail as a tool of identification. If ethnic Russians have problems identifying Chechens despite sharing a country with them, what chance do Afghans have? Even so, some American soldiers trust Afghans to identify dead bodies as Chechen. One soldier who served in Khost made this claim:

…there are Chechens fighting (and dying) in Khost, Paktika and Paktya and there have been for years. […] How do i know? Because the Afghans know a Chechen dead guy from an Arab dead guy from an Afghan from a Pakistani when they see one, that’s how.

In reality, identification of insurgent bodies in Afghanistan is undertaken in the crudest fashion. The Paktia provincial police chief in May 2007 (see here), for example, needed only the disembodied head of a suicide bomber to be able to declare that “the face complexion revealed he was a Chechen.” An ISAF officer with years of experience in northern Afghanistan wrote this in 2011:

We see it here (Mazar-e Sharif) in the provincial hospital, where dead bodies of insurgent KIAs are brought to. When the bodies are not claimed by family members, they are automatically labeled Foreign Fighters and depending on their faces: Asiatic = Uzbeks; dark-skinned = Pakistani; and Caucasian = Chechens. This is done by doctors as well as police and everybody takes it at face value. (5)

Two other researchers whose works includes studies of both the North Caucasus and Afghanistan agree: corpses on the Afghan battlefield that “appeared Caucasian

[ie ‘white European’] were presumed to be Chechens.” In another similar anecdote, an Afghan-American working for US forces near Khost as a cultural advisor said that local Afghans were referring to lighter-skinned foreign fighters generically as ‘Chechens’, partially because that is what they thought the Americans wanted to hear. Add to this the existence of light-haired and light-skinned Afghans, and it is clear as to why making an identification of a dead or live fighter based on crude racial stereotypes is unreliable.

Russian language in Afghanistan: Chechens, Central Asians and others

Analysis in Jane’s Defence published in November 2001 identified Chechen units, bases and ‘civilian communities’ in Afghanistan as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This provides a possible example of how ‘Chechen sightings’ may be the result of linguistic and cultural confusion. As far as language identification goes, the notion that the US military has deployed army linguists and signals intelligence operators proficient in Nokhchiyn mott (the language of Chechens) was completely rejected by a researcher who spent time with the US military in Afghanistan. Outside the US military, in 2013, the terrorism researcher, Murad Batal Al Shishani (an Arab of Chechen descent – Arabic, lacking a ‘ch’ sound, replaces it with ‘sh’ instead), rejected the notion of a Chechen presence in Afghanistan based on the total lack of evidence of the Chechen language being used by any fighters in that country. But like other sceptics, he is convinced of Chechens being in Syria – based on the type of linguistic (and other) evidence found there, that is lacking in Afghanistan.

The use of the Russian language on the battlefield as proof of the presence of Chechens is even less useful. Chechens only comprise 1.5 million people out of Russia’s over 16 million Muslims, and Russian is the dominant lingua franca between and among Central Asians and those from the North Caucasus region of Russia. Hearing Russian spoken or finding Russian language documents in Afghanistan thus does not mean that there are Chechens. However, Afghans have probably been led to assume that Central Asians speaking Russian were in fact Chechens. (6) Documents written in Russian have also been cited as a sign of Chechens in Afghanistan, but researchers familiar with Central Asian militants have instead assigned the papers to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (for example, Russian documents found in the Kabul houses of foreign militants in December 2001).

A survey of publications by researchers with an expertise on the North Caucasus and/or Central Asia (as well as personal communication with them) returns an overwhelming consensus: Afghans and foreign military forces in Afghanistan, as well as some journalists and other researchers, are regularly mistaking Russian-speaking, foreign Muslims for Chechens. In particular, numerous people are mistaking Central Asian fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for Chechens, while others point also to non-Chechens from the North Caucasus as the source of the misidentification. (7) However, it goes beyond just the use of the Russian language. As two researchers of the Chechen conflict argue, “the ethnonym ‘Chechen’ has in fact been employed to describe almost all foreigners whose identity Afghans were unable to discover or whose language was incomprehensible (ie almost anyone but Pakistanis and Arabs).” (8) Even foreign Uzbeks who can speak local languages have been misidentified as Chechens, as the kidnapping incidents of Hazara bus passengers in Zabul demonstrated.

If ‘Chechen’ has become, for some Afghans, a generic term for unidentifiable foreign Muslims, it has followed numerous, similar, historical linguistic practices (in ethnolinguistics, the ‘incorrect’ names of ethnic groups used by outsiders are called exonyms or xenonyms). For example, the Persian word farangi is derived narrowly from ‘Frank’, the western Germanic tribes in the Rhine region (eventually, the name ‘France’ was also derived from ‘Frank’). Yet farangi and similar names were used throughout the Muslim world and as far as China and Southeast Asia to refer to anybody from western or Central Europe, or even just to European Christians in general. So, for example, a Persian in the 1800s could refer to a Swede, Portuguese, Czech or Irishman as a farangi, and be corrected by a European who would then identify them not as farangi (Frank), but by their actual nationality. However, both are correct in their own linguistic context.

Similarly, arguing with every Afghan police officer or soldier about whether someone is Chechen or not misses the point in a similar way: for Afghans, ‘Chechen’ could just mean ‘foreign Muslim of unknown ethnicity,’ and this use would be correct for them even if the person they are identifying is not Chechen. (9) However, the listener may think they are hearing a reference to ‘Chechen’, meaning native of Chechnya. Similar examples of this are the numerous reports of Afghans in isolated areas referring to American and other coalition soldiers as ‘Russian’ or ‘Soviet’ (shurawi). (10) It is obviously wrong to say that American soldiers are Russians or indeed Soviets, but if in one’s own linguistic and cultural context, shurawi refers to foreign, non-Muslim soldiers, then it is not incorrect – it is just a linguistic and cultural difference in terminology.

Real Chechens in Afghanistan

The first known (sort-of) Chechen to visit Afghanistan as a foreign volunteer was Fathi Muhammad Habib, also known as Shaykh Ali Fathi al-Shishani, in 1982. An elderly electrical engineer, he took on non-combat duties with Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad party. However, despite being ‘al-Shishani’ (‘the Chechen’ in Arabic), he was not actually from Chechnya. Rather he was a Jordanian Arab descended from Chechens who had emigrated during the Ottoman period. (11) More recently, another member of the Chechen diaspora fought in Afghanistan. The online ‘martyr’ tribute to Sayfullah Shishani, an ethnic Chechen from Georgia who died in Syria, mentions that he fought for a year in Afghanistan at some point in the past. Another researcher mentioned that he had seen a tribute to another ‘Shishani’ who died in Afghanistan. (12) On the opposite side to the Islamists, there was a Chechen who fought for Dostum against the Taleban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and who apparently was in Afghanistan out of a motivation to kill ‘Wahhabis’. When asked in 2003, he said he had never seen another Chechen in Afghanistan, “despite his best efforts to locate his countrymen amongst the Talib prisoners.” (13)

These few examples of Chechen foreign fighters are rare exceptions. Comprehensive studies of foreign fighters, their biographies and their ‘martyr’ tributes turn up almost nothing. A study of ‘martyr biographies’ killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2002 to 2006 includes only five citizens of Russia, and based on their noms de guerre they were ethnic Tatars or from Dagestan, not Chechens. (14) Furthermore, a study focusing on foreign fighters in Afghanistan from 1980-2010 completely rejects the Chechen narrative. (15) When Russian citizens do show up in lists of ‘martyrs’, they are in tiny numbers and from other Russian regions – usually from Dagestan and Tatarstan – not Chechnya. (16) As for those captured alive, just as when the eight Russian citizens imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay turned out to be non-Chechens, a list compiled by AAN of detainees at Bagram turned up only a single Russian citizen: an ethnic Tatar.

The expropriation of Chechen identity on the battlefield

Najibullah Qureishi’s documentary footage with Hezb-e Islami insurgents in northern Afghanistan from 2010 included a scene where a single insurgent was pointed out by a fellow fighter who declared, “This brother’s from Chechnya.” There are very few instances of Taleban fighters saying they worked together with one or more Chechens. The most prominent is in a 2009 Newsweek article by Sami Yousafzai. Yet there is reason to believe that even someone who self-identifies as a Chechen may not actually be Chechen. The first reason is that it is often difficult for a Russian Muslim to explain their ethnic identity to Muslims and others from outside Russia. In the Russian North Caucasus region alone, there are Muslims whose ethnicity is Avar, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgin, Tabasaran, Karachay, Cherkess, Abazin, Kabardian, Ingush, et cetera. It is easier to just identify out of convenience with the better-known names of ‘Chechen’ or ‘Dagestani’ (which is not an ethnic identify, but rather someone of varied ethnicity from the Dagestan province of Russia).

But convenience aside, there are also insurgents and terrorists who do expropriate the Chechen identity ‘brand’ in order to better promote themselves and project an image of a fearsome and brave fighter. Chechen fighters in Syria have spoken publically of this identity theft. Joanna Paraszczuk, a researcher who focuses on Chechen fighters, reported on this phenomenon:

Meanwhile, Chechens in Syria have also complained that the West — and even other Islamist militant groups in Syria — are trying to claim the Chechen name, “Shishani” in Arabic, because they think this is associated with bravery on the battlefield. 

“The name “Shishani” has become a brand,” one Chechen militant in Latakia said via Facebook. “Lots of people want to be a Shishani, when they are not.”

A reporter asked an American Special Operation Forces officer with an academic and research background on the North Caucasus and Chechnya about the practise of people ‘stealing’ the Chechen identity. He compared these people to Americans who lie and claim to be special forces: “So just as it’s ‘cool’ here to be Special Forces, or to be a Navy SEAL, it is cool in that part of the world to be a Chechen.” The main reasons he gives for the Chechen identity having this sort of value are that Chechens legitimately are good fighters, and that in the early to mid-1990s, videos from Chechnya circulating in the worldwide militant community of Chechens killing Russian soldiers boosted their reputation (as Islamic fighters). He even cites Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters in Afghanistan lying and claiming to be Chechen in order to instil fear in their enemies.

What do Chechens have to say?

Aside from noting that other fighters are falsely claiming to be Chechen, Chechens – both pro-Russian and in the opposition – widely mock the notion that large numbers of their countrymen are in Afghanistan. One 2005 article published in the (anti-Russian) Chechen Press titled “Chechens as a Nightmare” (see here) mocked the “schizophrenic… hallucinations” that turned up Chechens on various battlefields around the world, comparing them to UFO sightings. Citing generals, police and the media, it found examples over several years of people ‘seeing’ Chechens fighting or planning terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Israel, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Iraq, India, China, Mexico and even Arizona (eventually, the Boston Marathon Bombers would provide the first real Chechen terrorists in the US). In most cases, the Chechen sightings were accompanied by bizarre details and ludicrous claims.

A year earlier in 2004, Akhmed Zakayev, the deputy prime minister of the Chechen government in exile also denied claims that Chechens were in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other denials are far more angry, such as one in the anti-Russian website Kavkaz Center which ridicules and condemns the American soldiers and journalists who claim to be identifying Chechens in Afghanistan, stating that “the American Islam-haters speak only lies about Chechen Mujahideen.”

Finally, the (pro-Russian) Chechen president himself, Ramzan Kadyrov, when vigorously denying that Chechens were fighting in Syria, cited the previous false rumours of Chechens in Afghanistan. By 2014, he begrudgingly admitted that there were a few Chechens in Syria, but that they were Chechens who had been born or raised in the West. Of course, Chechens now – in mid-2016 – have no choice but to acknowledge a Chechen presence in Syria, as there are numerous forms of proof, including video. Similarly, there is proof of Chechens fighting on both side of the war in Ukraine (see for example here). Analysts and researchers who have argued that there were no significant numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan have demonstrated that they are perfectly able to acknowledge Chechens on foreign battlefields when presented with evidence (as in Syria). (17)

If there were actually large numbers of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan…

A common sentiment expressed by researchers, analysts, and contractors who work for the US government directly and indirectly is that, if there were truly large numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan, and if the US government and military truly believed this at the levels where the final intelligence products are produced and where funding is allocated, there would be unmistakable signs of this in US government structures and programmes. For example, Chechen would be a prominent and popular language at the Defense Language Institute and other government language schools, the study of Chechen and Chechnya would be given generous funding in various government-supported programs (academic language programmes, for example), contractors would be regularly advertising for Chechen (Nokhchin mott) linguists, and the experts and researchers with long experience studying Chechnya and Central Asia who work full or part-time for the US government and military would not be so dismissive of the idea that Chechens are in Afghanistan. Furthermore, names or at least noms de guerre would emerge from American targeted killings of Chechen terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan (just as they do for Uzbeks, for example). As for US-Russian cooperation, there would be more signs of intelligence sharing, just as there are clear indications of that in Syria, at the moment, and in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11.

Conclusions: ‘Generic’ Chechens

Despite the very small-scale and rare visits of Chechens to Afghanistan in the 1990s, many people eventually came to believe that Chechen fighters were a common presence during that era. The Russian government, being regularly criticised by the US, European and Arab governments for its conduct in its fight against Chechen separatists, saw an opportunity to portray the entire spectrum of the Chechen independence movement to the world as extremists after the Taleban recognised Chechnya as an independent country. The ‘Northern Alliance,’ by the year 2000 heavily dependent on Russian military support, eagerly adopted the Russian view that there were significant numbers of transnational Chechen terrorists in Afghanistan – while Western governments rejected the Russian government view. But then the al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11 convinced the US government to adopt the Russian line on Chechnya in exchange for Russian cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom (for more details see part one of this special two-parter).

From here the myth of Chechens in Afghanistan might have died, as no Chechens were captured or confirmed killed in Afghanistan. However, a renewed insurgency in Afghanistan made regular gains against the Afghan government and ISAF-NATO troops. The Afghan government and its US military backers, in an attempt to portray the insurgency as illegitimate, decided to frame the insurgency as a foreign phenomenon. Afghan and western forces fairly blamed elements of the state and society in Pakistan, but the Chechens were, without merit, added to the mix along with a long list of foreign fighters. Journalists, and even many analysts, did not question the regular statements about Chechen fighters by the Afghan government and by representatives of ISAF-NATO forces, allowing their articles and publications to uncritically disseminate what was at best a mistaken view, or at worst ‘information warfare’ intended to explain the motivations for the insurgency in a manner that absolved the Afghan government and its western backers of blame.

The Chechen myth was also enabled by smaller technical details, primarily the reputation of Chechens in the militant community owing to their successful campaign against Russia (roughly, 1994 to 2000), and the ambiguity of the use of the name ‘Chechen’ as a generic name in Afghanistan. Non-Chechen fighters expropriated the ‘Chechen’ name while Afghan and NATO-ISAF forces often assumed that competent and brave opponents must be Chechen. As for the name ‘Chechen’, it is clearly being used to describe a range of Muslim ethnic groups from the former Soviet Union – including ethnic Russian converts to Islam.

In the context of Afghanistan’s full range of problems, the accidental and intentional misidentification of Chechens is not a major issue. However, it can serve as a symbol of larger, systemic problems: poor intelligence collection and analysis by the US government and military forces and of those of other western allies, the blurring of lines between analysis and psychological operations, lazy journalism, blame-shifting and deflection by the Afghan and US governments, the manipulation of facts to serve Great Power politics (eg, between Russia and the United States) and the lack of critical inquiry by academics, analysts and the general public in the west and in Afghanistan. All of this, taken together, can distract from questions concerning the true nature of the conflict: who are the insurgents and terrorists? Why are they joining the insurgency? What needs to be done to address these problems?

The phenomenon of Chechen misidentification in Afghanistan is just one of many problems encountered when trying to understand the conflict in Afghanistan. Now, as the Afghan government and its western backers attempt to absolve themselves of blame, the alleged large number of ‘foreign fighters’ may well continue to be a tool used in an attempt to manipulate public perceptions. Stories of Chechens in Afghanistan, therefore, will likely persist.

Christian Bleuer is an independent researcher based in Central Asia. From September-December 2015 he worked in Kabul for AAN. He can be reached at Christian.Bleuer@gmail.com.

 

 

(1) In 1997, during the period between the First and Second Chechen Wars, the de facto independent government of Chechnya did print an uncertain number of passports. See: ‘Chechen leader unveils “unofficial” passports – Russian report’, BBC News, 27 November 1997. These passports (adorned with a wolf on the front) were never accepted as official travel documents: ‘Information Concerning the Non-Exhaustive List of Known Fantasy and Camouflage Passports, as Stipulated by Article 6 of the Decision No. 1105/2011/EU (to which a visa may not be affixed)’, European Union, 18 August 2015, 5.

(2) Cited in: ‘Afghan police look for 15 female Chechen militants’, Trend, 31 January 2011; Bill Roggio, ‘Afghan police search for 15 Chechen women aiding the Taliban in Kunduz’, Threat Matrix, 31 January 2011.

(3) Two months later, the BBC posted an obituary for the police chief, noting that he had to contend with hundreds of foreign fighters: Pakistanis, Arabs and Chechens. See: Bilal Sarwary, ‘Sayedkhili: Afghan police chief who took on the Taliban’, BBC News, 14 March 2011.

(4) ‘Afghanistan kidnap video: Hostage beheaded ‘by Uzbek gunmen’, BBC News, 7 April 2015; ‘Afghanistan Hazara kidnapped passengers released’, BBC News, 11 May 2015.

(5) Personal correspondence with former ISAF officer with several years’ experience in northern Afghanistan, October 2011. For another example of ‘body inspections’, see the somewhat less clear example here: Leigh Neville, Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, New York, Osprey Publishing 2012, 25.

(6) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Shattering the al-Qaeda-Chechen Myth (Part II): Exploring the Links Between the Chechen Resistance and Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly 4 (2003).

(7) Guido Steinberg, ‘A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle’, SWP Comments 31 (2014), 1; Laura Miller, ‘Chechens: Legendary tough guys’, Salon, 20 April 2013; James Gordon Meek, ‘The Secret Battles Between US Forces and Chechen Terrorists’, ABC News, 19 February 2014; Mark MacKinnon Twitter post, 23 September 2013, citing comments by Lawrence Sheets at the 2013 Global Security Seminar; Brian Glyn Williams, ‘From “Secessionist Rebels” to “Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades”: Assessing Russia’s Efforts to Extend the Post-September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24 (2004); Thomas de Waal, ‘Chechens I Used to Know’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 April 2011.

(8) Emil Souleimanov & Ondrej Ditrych, ‘The Internationalisation of the

Russian-Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality’, Europe-Asia Studies 60 (2008), 1215-1216.

(9) I ran this line of argument by other researchers and they agree it is either plausible or likely, though as academics they say it is unproven without archival research and dedicated field trips to Afghanistan.

(10) Some examples: Marty Compton et al, Home from War: How Love Conquered the Horrors of a Soldier’s Afghan Nightmare, Edinburgh, Mainstream 2009, np; Ann Marlowe and Derrick Hernandez, ‘Ain’t Reporting Hell: Sebastian Junger’s Afghanistan’, World Affairs, November/December 2010; Jeff Courter, Afghan Journal: A Soldier’s Year in Afghanistan, Flossmoor, IL, CreateSpace 2008, 150; P.J. Tobia, ‘How I spent my fall vacation…in Afghanistan’, Nashville Scene, 26 March 2009; Tom Bowman, ‘For U.S. Troops, One More Big Push In Afghanistan’, NPR, 30 May 2012. There are numerous other examples of this, mostly American soldiers posting comments on online forums.

(11) Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008), 416.

(12) Personal correspondence in 2011 with anonymous researcher who viewed martyrs’ videos in Arabic.

(13) ‘No evidence of Chechens in Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly, Volume IV, Issue 33, 12 September 2003.

(14) Anne Stenersen, ‘Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011), Appendix A., 187-193. The author notes that the study is Arab-centric, and the compiler of the bibliographies noted that he had not been able to collect all of the Uzbek and Uyghur biographies.

(15) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010’, Orbis 55 (2011), 216-239.

(16) For example, see the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan official list of martyrs for the Hijri year 1432 (ending in November 2011), which lists one citizen of Russia: an ethnic Tatar: ‘O’zbekiston Islomiy Harakatining 1432 hijriy yil (melodiy 2011) shahidlar’, Furqon.com (November 2011). Another IMU martyr tribute in video form paid tribute to a Dagestani Russian named Khattab who died in Kunduz in 2010 (source: video screenshot received via personal correspondence with anonymous researcher).

(17) As one of several examples, see: Brian Glyn Williams, Inferno in Chechnya: the Russian-Chechen wars, the Al Qaeda myth, and the Boston Marathon bombings, Lebanon, NH, ForeEdge 2015, especially chapter 7 (‘The Chechen Ghost Army of Afghanistan’).

 

Russian D-20 Towed Gun-Howitzer

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© mrallen / Fotolia

Challenges to security in Europe will take centre stage at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July when its heads of state and government will discuss issues ranging from Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its growing military assertiveness to turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, and the future of the military alliance.

This note highlights a selection of commentaries, studies and reports by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes on European security and defence published in the run-up to the NATO summit. More reports on the subject can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ from in November 2015.

NATO summit

NATO Summit 2016: From reassurance to deterrence. What’s really at stake?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2016

The Warsaw summit and the return of Western nationalism
Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2016

Warsaw summit
Atlantic Council, June 2016

NATO Summit 2016: NATO must reaffirm its “open door” policy
Heritage Foundation, June 2016

National priorities for the NATO Warsaw summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2016

NATO defence planning between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military challenges of a credible assurance against Russia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016

What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and beyond
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw summit: The challenges of adapting to strategic change
Danish Institute of International Studies, December 2015

Other studies

Restoring the power and purpose of the NATO alliance
Atlantic Council, June 2016

Time to restore conventional deterrence-by-denial
Egmont, June 2016

A new strategy: Implications for CSDP
Clingendael, June 2016

All not quiet on NATO’s eastern front
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

A threat-based strategy for NATO’s southern flank
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Activation of risk potential
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2016

The future of Transatlantic security
Rand, June 2016

Evaluating future U.S. Army force posture in Europe
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016

NATO must stop crowding Russia
Cato Institute, June 2016

European defence: From strategy to delivery
Clingendael, May 2016

Embedding NATO into the European Union Global Strategy: The missing link?
European, May 2016

Closing NATO’s Baltic gap
International Centre for Defence Studies, May 2016

Russia: A test for Transatlantic unity
Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund, May 2016

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security
European Policy Centre, May 2016

Russian “countermeasures” to NATO are coming
Brookings Institution, May 2016

EUISS yearbook of European security 2016
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Envisioning European defence: Five futures
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

For a “new realism” in European defense: The five key challenges an EU defense strategy should address
German Marshall Fund, April 2016

A new Helsinki needed? What security model for Europe?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2016

The parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation
Clingendael, April 2016

European defence spending 2015: The force awakens
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Do we need an EU army? Which way for the European security and defence cooperation
Mendel European Centre, March 2016

NATO’s guns point the wrong way
Friends of Europe, March 2016

NATO, the US and Baltic Sea security
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2016

The annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European security
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2016

Ensuring deterrence against Russia: The view from NATO’s front-line States
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2016

Forces terrestres et réassurance: Quelles options pour l’Alliance?
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2016

The defence of Europe before European Defence: Returning to the Schuman method
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2016

A stronger CSDP: Deepening defence cooperation
Clingendael, January 2016

Defence budgets and cooperation in Europe: Developments, trends and drivers
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Consortium of Think Tanks, January 2016

Reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the Baltics
Rand, January 2016

NATO and European security: back to the roots?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

The EU, Russia and the quest for a new European security bargain
Clingendael, December 2015

European strategy, European defence and the CSDP
Egmont, November 2015

L’Europe à la croisée des chemins: La politique de défense et de sécurité a besoin d’initiatives franco-allemandes
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015

Filed under: International Relations, PUBLICATIONS Tagged: At a glance, CSDP, defence policy, EU army, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Marcin Grajewski, Nato, what think tanks are thinking

Welcome to my blog.

My name is Gergely Varga, I’m an international relations and security policy expert, with a PhD from Budapest Corvinus University. Currently I’m working as a non-resident fellow of the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies (CSDS) at the National University of Public Service.

I launched this blog to share my take on international security issues effecting Europe and the wider transatlantic region. As for what to expect balanced approach in understanding competing perspectives, favoring realism in an age of ideologues and extremists, a cherish for traditional values and support transatlantic cooperation in a rapidly transforming world.

I bring extensive research experience from the area of international security studies to this blog: I joined CSDS in 2008 after finishing my law and history studies at ELTE University. In 2012 I was a visiting fellow in Washington D.C. at the Center for Transatlantic Relations Johns Hopkins University. I have written numerous publications, most of the focusing on my primary research areas, US foreign and security policy, NATO, transatlantic relations and European security challenges.

Üdvözlöm a blogomon.

Dr. Varga Gergely vagyok, biztonságpolitikai szakértő. Jelenleg a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Stratégiai Védelmi Kutató Intézetének külső munkatársa vagyok, doktori címemet a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem nemzetközi kapcsolatok szakán szereztem meg.

A blogon Európát és a tágabb transzatlanti térséget érintő nemzetközi biztonsági kérdések kerülnek előtérbe. A blog szellemisége a felmerülő versengő perspektívák megértése tekintetében kiegyensúlyozottságot, az ideológikus és szélsőséges megközelítésekkel szemben a realizmus előtérbe helyezését, a hagyomásos értékek iránti elkötelezettséget és a transzatlanti együttműködés támogatását fogja tükrözni.

Az itt megjejelő cikkek írásakor széleskörű kutatási tapasztalatokra hagyatkozom: 2008-ban kerültem a Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpontba miután befejeztem jogi és történészi tanulmányaimat az ELTE-n. 2012-ben 10 hónapig a washingtoni Johns Hopkins Egyetem Transzatlanti Kapcsolatok Központja vendégkutatója voltam. Számos publikációm jelent meg a fő kutatási területemet, amerikai kül és biztonságpolitikát, transzatalnti kapcsolatokat, NATO-t és az Európai biztonsági kihívásokat érintő kérdésekről.

Language Undefined Tag: StrategoNATOUSA

American EF-111 Raven Electronic Warfare Aircraft

HH-60G, Afghanistan
(click to view full)

In 2006 the US Air Force awarded Boeing a contract worth north of $10 billion for 141 HH-47 combat search-and-rescue helicopters, but by mid-2009 the CSAR-X program was cancelled during its System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase by the Pentagon. At the time Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that this program had “a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution.”

That cancellation may have been warranted, but the underlying operational constraints are increasing as years go by, with a tentative replacement for aging helicopters that keeps slipping. In 2012, the Air Force got the green light to take another crack at it. The competition narrowed to a single bidder, and after wobbly budgetary announcements, the program was greenlighted. By the end of 2014 it was officially designated as HH-60W.

Aging HH-60G Pave Hawks

A solution to replace the USAF’s aging HH-60G Pave Hawk combat search and rescue helicopters becomes more pressing as SAR(Search And Rescue) and MEDEVAC(MEDical EVACuation) flight hours keep piling in. These helos are derived from early-model UH-60 Black Hawks, and were fielded starting in 1982 with an estimated operational life of 7,000 flight hours. Of the initial 112 airframes, the inventory was down to 99 as of late 2010. Only 93 of them were assessed as flyable as of March 2012, with signs of structural fatigue (i.e. cracks) on a majority of them. They are all expected to have reached the 7,000-hour milestone by 2019. In September 2011 two of them were already exceeding 10,000 flight hours.

HH-60G: Longest Sunset Ever

The shortfall in the fleet has been addressed with an Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program that funded 20 replacement H-60 family airframes over FY 2011-12. That’s just a short-term stopgap, as maintaining older helos becomes increasingly expensive and dangerous.

HH-60M and CRH budgets – Source: DoD Comptroller, Feb. 2012

Development funding for a new program was featured in the FY 2013 President Budget, but Congressional dithering took its toll. A couple of months into FY 2014, the Air Force sounded ready to both award the contract, and deprive it of any funding in its FY 2015 budget request. By March 2014, however, funds had been found.

Savvy observers will recall that years ago, CSAR-X Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was scheduled for 2012, at 10 operational aircraft. In order to defend its lead on this all-service mission, the USAF is putting an emphasis on affordability and fast production. Even so, it will be several more years before meaningful replacements begin to arrive in the field. IOC for the CRH-60M isn’t expected until 2020.

CRH: Contracts & Key Events FY 2015 – 2016

Official designation.

July 1/16: The first of 21 US Army UH-60L Black Hawks, converted and remissionized into HH-60G Pave Hawks, has been introduced as part of the service’s Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program. Works on the UH-60s is being carried out by Science and Engineering Services LLC which involves adding a comprehensive kit of modifications to the utility helicopter, along with additional equipment to convert it into a combat search and rescue HH-60G. The OLR program aims to replace aircraft lost in nearly 15 years of deployed combat operations since the commencement of the “War on Terror.”

May 24/16: Sikorsky’s HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopter is to move into the detailed design phase after successfully passing an air vehicle preliminary design review by the US government. The UH-60 Black Hawk variant will now enter a 75-month engineering and development phase which will see nine aircraft produced, including five “system demonstration test articles” to support operational testing. The design includes air force and mission-specific avionics, equipment and defensive countermeasures, plus a larger internal fuel capability and cabin area when compared to its UH-60 cousin and is unique enough to warrant its own development phase and even a separate assembly line.

Nov 29/14: Designation. The CRH is officially designated by the Air Force as HH-60W – or 60-Whiskey more informally – as the HH-60G’s successor. A name will be picked up later. The systems requirement review is scheduled later this fiscal year, with initial deliveries expected in FY19. For one this will depend on how the FY15 budget is actually wrapped up, as well as whether sequestration affects FY16 spending. The W in HH-60W could very well mean “wait”, as this project is clearly not among the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities.

FY 2014

Sikorsky wins, but will there be money? Fuel the Pave Hawks
(click to view full)

June 26/14: EMD Contract. As the sole offeror, Sikorsky in Stratford, CT receives a $1.278 billion Engineering & Manufacutring Development contract that uses a combination of fixed-price-incentive/ firm at target price/ firm-fixed-price clauses to develop and produce up to 4 CRH-60M Pave Hawk Combat Rescue Helicopters, 7 training systems, and initial product support. The government’s Affordability Target Gate was around $2 billion, so the USAF is happy.

The same contract will be used to buy around 108 production helicopters, and if all options are exercised, the contract’s value could rise as high as $7.9 billion. It has been structured to handle quantity changes, so 112 CRH-60Ms (4 + 108) is the target, but it may not be the final tally. IOC is planned for 2020.

It’s also worth being careful around the math. One may be tempted to say that $7.9 billion – $1.28 billion EMD = $6.62 billion, which divides by 108 to get $61.3 million per helicopter during the production phase. That’s almost 3x the regular UH-60M rate, but it wrongly assumes that all of the options are just helicopters. Sikorsky has confirmed that the options also include things like training devices, spares packages, etc., and exact CRH-60M prices will be negotiated year to year as helicopters are bought.

$298.5 million is committed immediately, using FY 2013 and 2014 USAF R&D budgets. Work will be performed at Stratford, CT, and is expected to be complete by June 2029, if all options are exercised. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center/WISV’s Rotary Wing Branch of Special Operations Forces and Personnel Recovery Division/ISR Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH manages this contract (FA8629-14-C-2403). Sources: Pentagon | USAF, “AF Awards New Combat Rescue Helicopter Contract” | Sikorsky, “Sikorsky Awarded U.S. Air Force Contract to Develop New Combat Rescue Helicopter”.

CRH’s EMD & Production contract

March 4/14: Funds found. After initially saying during the FY15 budget rollout that CRH would be delayed by a year for lack of funding, the Air Force then scrambled to indicate otherwise, in these terms:

“Due to the criticality of this mission, the Air Force will realign about $430 million from other Air Force priorities beyond fiscal year 2014 through 2019 in order to award the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) contract to United Technologies’ Sikorsky…. The contract is expected to be signed not later than the end of June 2014. Before moving forward with the contract, the program must complete a Milestone B review including independent cost assessments. In order to enable this timeline, Sikorsky must also agree to extend its pricing through June.”

Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James refers to the contract as “a good competitive price” that “effectively uses the $334 million Congress appropriated for the program.” Plus a bit more. Congress has to approve this, though past indications suggest that this won’t be a problem. James does add that “if the FY16 DoD budget drops back to sequestration levels, this program, along with many others, will need to be reevaluated.”

USAF will go ahead

Dec 13/13: Politics. Secretary of Defense Hagel gets a letter from 74 of 528 Congressional representatives, who don’t want the USAF to leave new combat rescue helicopters out of USAF’s budget. They cite Gen. Moseley’s (correct) characterization of CSAR as a moral imperative for USAF pilots.

The USAF is cagey about committing to anything in response. It’s also worth asking, and answering: if a CRH-60M is really the only choice left, could the US military just choose to equip planned HH-60M buys with a fitting for an aerial refueling probe, then handle the job using a combination of Army (HH-60M) and USMC (MV-22) assets? By all accounts, this is a question being asked in the Pentagon. Using other services’ platforms could meet the moral imperative objection. If the answer is “no, that won’t do,” an effective case requires a precise explanation of why not. Sources: Defense News, “Congress to Hagel: Keep funding search-and-rescue helos.

Nov 22/13: The Air Force posts on its CRH solicitation page that:

“In response to the CRH solicitation, the USAF received one proposal. That offer, from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation has provided an acceptable technical solution and the USAF intends to award a contract based upon budget availability. The USAF is laying the groundwork to award the CRH contract in the second quarter of fiscal year 2014. The award is contingent on the outcome of the President’s budget review process where CRH would need to be funded across the future year’s defense program.”

Earlier in the week Defense News had reported that a CRH start was not funded in the FY 2015 – 2018 budget plans, which were put together by the Air Force under the assumption that sequestration will remain in place over the entire period. Acting Air Force Secretary Eric Fanning explained that new program starts were caught between a rock – the biggest priorities being F-35, KC-46 and the future strategic bomber – and a hard place called sequestration. Maybe this public messaging that the Air Force may have to curtail its combat search and rescue mission will succeed in what looks like a deliberate effort to shame Congress into disarming at least part of the sequester.

FY 2013

RFP, but pull-outs leave just 1 bidder; USAF says that’s OK, but they’re delaying the award. UKMCA/CHC S-92
(click to view full)

Aug 2/13: Delay. USAF spokesman Ed Gulick says that the CRH award will be delayed past Oct 1/13, instead of being awarded before Sept 30/13. The 1-year delay is attributed to “time required to complete an independent cost estimate and the impact of government furloughs.”

It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the USAF is either more focused on other spending priorities and likely to drop CRH in coming reviews, or taking the extra time in order to help ensure that the award will be as difficult as possible to challenge. With Sikorsky’s “CRH-60M” as the only contender, a challenge is likely anyway if the award goes through. Reuters.

Jan 4/13: Only 1. Reuters reports that the USAF wouldn’t confirm that it had received only 1 CRH bid, but USAF spokesman Ed Gulick said that they had “acquisition procedures in place to proceed with this important acquisition regardless of the number of bidders.”

That may not stop GAO protests, however, which doomed the USAF’s CSAR-X predecessor. Ominously, EADS North America Chief Executive Sean O’Keefe is quoted as saying that as written, CRH’s terms didn’t call for an evaluation of full life cycle costs. The Defense Department’s emphasis on affordability, and a new federal law which required such an evaluation, could be enough to sustain a protest.

Dec 12/12: Why 112? James Hasik wonders about the math behind 112 CRH helicopters. Why that number?

“I have watched at least two NATO air wars now in which the US Marine Corps seems to have had the hammer for CSAR. It’s important to note that the Marines don’t actually have specialized CSAR units or aircraft… What they do have is long-range rotorcraft and guys who train hard… In Bosnia in 1995, that was a CH-53 and some escorts from the Kearsarge, pulling out an USAF F-16 pilot. In Libya in 2011, it was an MV-22 from (coincidentally) the Kearsarge, pulling out an USAF F-15 crew.”

“…Without seeing the missions needs statement, it’s hard to know what led to the number 112, but the quantity is easy to criticize, and on the numbers… [set of assumptions made]… The point is that even under these unrealistically generous assumptions, the USAF would only want a fleet of 112 dedicated CSAR aircraft if it was figuring on losing lots of planes in a massive bloody war. The only plausible opponent that could give it that much trouble is China, and in that case, the H-60 hasn’t anywhere close to the range needed to recover the aircrews.”

He doesn’t think that math augurs well for budgetary survival.

Dec 11/12: Sikorsky alone. After studying the RFP’s structure and terms, most bidders decide that it’s impossible to win. Once minimum requirements are met, it’s a straight cost battle, with no credit for additional capacity or capabilities, and terms that will disqualify any bid over $6.84 billion. That’s a legitimate contracting approach, especially with the USAF’s top priorities leaving very little room for anything else. The KC-46A tankers are urgent, the F-35 program is set to spend huge amounts of money, and the vastness of the Pacific has made the next-generation bomber a priority. As contracting consultant Jim McAleese notes, everything else is going to be pushed to bare minimums to pay for them.

For CRH, this means that Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin are the lone team willing to bid. Their 2010 teaming agreement for the HH-60 Recap was issued long before the current RFP, and they won’t say which helicopter they’re bidding. All they could tell us is that: “Sikorsky intends to continue with its proposal to offer the Air Force a proven, affordable combat rescue helicopter system to perform the critical mission of saving warfighters’ lives.”

The HH-60M is certainly proven in this role, but the S-92 could also be touted as “proven” given its coast guard service, so the statement means nothing. As for the others:

• AgustaWestland and Northrop Grumman have decided not to bid the AW101/ “HH-71”.
  
• Boeing won’t bid the HH-47 that won the cancelled CSAR-X competition.
  
• Nor will the Boeing-Bell team bid the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor.
  
• Eurocopter has decided not to submit a bid, either, which presumably would have involved the special forces/ SAR variant of its EC725 Cougar, or a modified NH90 FAME with the MEDEVAC/SAR kit.

The question now is whether the USAF will simply barrel ahead with a late FY 2013 contract and say “these were our terms, whomever bids, bids” – or withdraw and revise the RFP. Reuters | Aviation Week | Defense News.

Oct 22/12: RFP. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition announces the posting of the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) RFP to the FBO.gov website, launching the acquisition program. All previous discussions are superseded by the RFP, and a contract isn’t expected until Q4 (summer) 2013.

The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract will develop the system and produce 8 helicopters. It will be a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) contract, with options for 16 more Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) helicopters. The FPIF contract includes a mandatory 11% profit margin at target cost, with another 1% possible if schedule performance meets the criteria. If costs go over that target cost, they’ll be shared 50/50 with the government, reducing contractor profit margins, until 120% (and just 1% profit) is reached. At that point, all further costs belong to the contractor.

Full Rate Production (FRP) options will be Firm Fixed-Price (FFP), and the USAF expects to buy around 85. A small portion of the contract will be a combination of FFP and Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) in order to cover “over and above” repairs and studies and analyses.

Known competitors to date include Sikorsky/ Lockheed Martin (HH-92? HH-60M?), and AgustaWestland/ Northrop Grumman (AW101/ HH-71). Both helicopter types already perform search and rescue roles. Boeing is believed to be examining a bid involving the V-22 tilt-rotor, similar to AFSOC’s existing CV-22s. FBO.gov | USAF | AIN Online | Rotorhub.

CRH RFP

FY 2011 – 2012

RFP drafts. From USAF Draft Statement of Work: Sept. 2012
(click to view full)

September 2012: Industry Day and 3rd draft. Details emerge as contractors seek clarification on terms and schedules. The “affordability gate” has been set at $6.848B, a number the Air Force does not seem keen to elaborate on. It is going to be a Best Value award with expected discussions past initial proposals, as the sums at stake lead the contracting officers to think an award without discussions would not be realistic. A 1% schedule incentive is built in, to be paid after (timely) delivery.

The draft Statement of Work shows how production of 112 helicopters is expected to be scheduled between EMD over FY 2013-16, followed by LRIP in FY 2017-18, and FRP in FY 2019-24. That would exactly replace the initial HH-60 fleet, but would be below the canceled 141 helicopter CSAR-X buy. CRH’s 2018 date for Initial Operational Capability would come 6 years later than CSAR-X had been aiming for.

One contractor made a salient comment that the Air Force just brushed aside in their answer by saying they won’t change their communications requirements:

“Spec requires basic comms capabilities — have quick SINCGARS, UHF-SATCOM, etc. However, HH-60G is acquiring new suite of multi-band radios that will also provide crypto modernization, full compliance with GATM (ED-23B) [DID: Global Air Traffic Management], and advanced waveforms such as SRW and MUOS. Won’t CRH be a step backwards from what will be fielded on HH-60G in FY14?

The government’s curt answer is disconcerting, given that CRH deliveries are expected several years after said HH-60G upgrades. GATM retrofits were also made on KC-135s an on C-5s among others, to meet new FAA standards and allow shared access within both civil and military airspace.

Finally, the USAF found that answers to an earlier round of classified questions were not mailed out back in July, leaving contractors hanging dry for the expected clarifications. This is to be corrected promptly.

The final RFP was originally scheduled earlier in 2012, and was postponed a couple of times. At the time of this writing its new release date is not known, though Wright-Patterson Public Affairs tells DID that it should be “very soon” as the 3rd draft should be the last iteration before a finalized RFP. As of July 2012, the date for the award was set to Q3 FY2013, but this now looks likely to slip by at least a quarter. Contractors will have 60 days to submit their proposals.

AW101/ CH-149
(click to view full)

Sept 18/12: AW101. Northrop Grumman and Finmeccanica’s AgustaWestland announce they will partner to bid on CRH, as well as the future presidential helicopter. They will offer the 3-engined, AW101-derived “HH-71” to compete for CRH.

Subsequent displays reveal a number of distinguishing features beyond the 3 engines, including a custom-designed medical suite, 7.62mm minigun turret mounted above the ramp, and rotor blades that push air away to reduce brownout during landings. Release | DoD Buzz.

March 21/12: Industry Day. interested contractors are briefed during an Industry Day whose information package is available on FBO (CCR validation required).

RDT&E budgeted as of PB 2013 – source: USAF
(click to view full)

Feb 2012: In the FY2013 President Budget, the USAF starts ramping up RDT&E funding for the CRH with 2 test airframes in FY13.

Jan/Feb 2012: After conducting an Acquisition Strategy Panel, the USAF Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition strategy in January. On February 10 the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) was received from OSD/AT&L.

This clears the way for an RFP with an approach centered on seeking and existing production helicopter with modifications that use existing mature technologies or subsystems requiring limited integration. In this case a Technology Development phase is not necessary and the acquisition process can proceed to the System Development phase.

MDD

Jan 30/12: HH-60Gs. Rotorhub reports that he HH-60G fleet carried out more than 9,700 sorties in 2010, recovering over 1,900 personnel, but falling to around 8,000 sorties in 2011. With respect to cracking and other issues, the past 6 years have seen 83 structural issues that required unscheduled depot maintenance. Col. Chad Franks, the commanding officer of the 347th Rescue Group adds some thoughts:

“What we have done over the last few years is we have put add-ons onto the [HH-60G] aircraft but it has not been integrated the way it should have been. So for us, getting that total integration of our mission systems and our rescue systems all in one package would be ideal… Given the aircraft we have lost over the last nine years, our first job is to get back to 112. We are doing that by buying UH-60Ms right off the line and outfitting them with our rescue equipment.”

August 2011: the Air Force issues a Sources Sought solicitation for a HH-60 Recap Program. This later morphed into the CRH, as per entries above.

May 26/11: Defense Tech reports on the HH-60 Recap program. Meanwhile:

“The service has initiated a band aid program to replace the 13 lost [HH-60] aircraft in the next couple of years with UH-60M airframes purchased from the Army. Still, this does little to address the fact that the vast majority of the CSAR fleet is aging and overused, with dozens of airframes developing stress cracks.”

April 27/11: AW101. AgustaWestland announces that they’ll offer the AW101-derived “HH-71” for the HH-60 RECAP program, and the AW139M for the USAF’s CVLSP utility helicopter competition. Vertical.

July 16/10: Boeing & EADS. Flight International reports that Boeing and EADS Eurocopter have each submitted data 2 alternatives for the HH-60 replacement program:

“Boeing has submitted data on the CH-47 and V-22 to the US Air Force as potential replacements for the HH-60G Pave Hawk fleet of combat search and rescue helicopters (CSAR), a spokesman says… the UH-60M [is] a helicopter less than half the size of the heavylift CH-47 and barely one-third the maximum takeoff weight of the V-22 tiltrotor.

The same variance in size, roughly put, also applies to the aircraft proposed by EADS, which are the NH-90 and EC-725 Super Cougar. EADS submitted data on both aircraft because they believe they “offer proven capabilities at best value and lowest cost to the taxpayer,” says EADS NA chief operating officer Dave Oliver.”

July 15/10: HH-60? Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin announce that they’ll compete together for the HH-60 Recap program, using a modified H-60M Black Hawk. The HH-60M is already in service as a US Army MEDEVAC platform. Sikorsky.

Additional Readings

• DID – CSAR-X: Canceled for Convenience. The CRH’s predecessor program would have bought HH-47 Chinooks.

• DII – Sikorsky’s $7.4-11.6B “Multi-Year VII” H-60 Helicopter Contract. Explains the UH-60M that sits at the contract’s center, though MYP-VII also buys HH-60M, MH-60S, and MH-60R helicopters.

• USAF – HH-60G Pave Hawk. The current CSAR helicopter.

Americas

• The first of 21 US Army UH-60L Black Hawks, converted and remissionized into HH-60G Pave Hawks, has been introduced as part of the service’s Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) program. Works on the UH-60s is being carried out by Science and Engineering Services LLC which involves adding a comprehensive kit of modifications to the utility helicopter, along with additional equipment to convert it into a combat search and rescue HH-60G. The OLR program aims to replace aircraft lost in nearly 15 years of deployed combat operations since the commencement of the “War on Terror.”

Middle East North Africa

• MBDA Italia has secured a contract with Qatar to provide $1.1 billion worth of missiles for its new naval vessels. Missiles to be sold include the Aster 30 Block 1, VL MICA air defense missiles and Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles. The munitions deal follows shortly after Qatar agreed to the $5.1 billion purchase of seven naval vessels from Italy’s Fincantieri shipyard, which include four corvettes, one landing platform dock, and two offshore patrol vessels.

• Iraq has received the last of its ordered Mi-28 NE Night Hunter attack helicopters from Russia. The first of an estimated 15 Night Hunters was delivered in 2014 as part of a wider $4.2 billion defense package signed in 2012. According to Reuters, the deal marks the third biggest agreement for Russian arms sales since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

Europe

• The High Court in the UK has ruled in favor of a judicial review into British arms exports to Saudi Arabia. This unprecedented decision follows a challenge by the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills’ decision to continue issuing licenses worth $3.7 billion to the Saudi regime. CAAT’s campaign against British arms manufacturers has grown in recent years amid growing concerns over Saudi human rights abuses conducted with British made weapons and munitions in Yemen.

• Airbus is to conduct full contact flight trials of the automatic boom mode on its A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft by the end of 2016. While normally the task of a fully qualified boomer, the technology being trialed involves the use of real-time video and image processing to track a receiver aircraft’s exact position. The new concept involves the operator controlling the boom manually until it has been positioned within a required area, close to the receiver aircraft. At this point, its automatic mode would be engaged to complete the contact procedure. If successful, this method is believed to improve time, safety and operational aspects of air-to-air refueling.

• An agreement to create a joint Armenian-Russian air-defense system has been ratified by Armenia’s parliament. Initially signed by both nations last December, the new system will enable the inclusion of the Russian Air Force’s full range of capabilities, including multifunction fighter jets, into joint regional air defense. Opponents of the pact fear that too much control will now be extended to Moscow threatening Armenian sovereignty.

Asia Pacific

• Singapore is to announce its decision on which helicopter will replace its aging Super Puma fleet sooner rather than later. The $1 billion decision was put on ice following April’s crash of a civilian Airbus Super Puma in Norway which killed 13 people, whose military variant was a frontrunner in the competition. As a result, a decision in favor of Airbus would represent a strong vote of confidence in the helicopter after an 18 month evaluation process. Waiting in the wings, however, is Italian firm Leonardo Finmeccanica who is looking to steal the deal and get a foothold with one of South-East Asia’s biggest buyers.

• Japan is to launch a tender in mid-July for its $40 billion fighter acquisition program which has been dubbed the F-3 fighter jet program. Sources close to the program have revealed that US giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin have already been invited to take part in the project alongside local manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Adding to this, analysts say Japan’s preference for an aircraft that can operate closely with the US military, given close Washington-Tokyo ties, makes a non-US option a long-shot. Regardless, Saab AB and the Eurofighter consortium will none the less be looking for any opportunities to involve themselves in this mega bucks project.

Today’s Video

• The first F-35B Lightning II lands in UK for first time:

Pantsir-S1
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In October 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki signed a deal with Russia’s Rosoboronexport, variously estimated at $4.2 – $5.0 billion. The deal is characteristically murky, but it includes a combination of 43 Mi-35 (28) and Mi-28NE (15) attack helicopters, plus 42-50 mobile SA-22 Pantsir low-level air defense systems. Their combined cost is unlikely to approach $4 billion unless very extensive long-term support arrangements are included, but Iraq’s maintenance record suggests that this would be a very good idea. There has also been discussion in the press concerning MiG-29M2 fighters or armored vehicles as follow-on options, and the recent crisis in Iraq has led to a limited sale of refurbished SU-25 close air support aircraft.

The deals fill some important military and political holes for Iraq, and the full civil war in progress

Elements of the Deal Mi-28N
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It isn’t unusual for Middle Eastern countries to consciously split their weapon buys between different suppliers, in order to reduce dependence. Saudi Arabia does this very explicitly, and the same pattern can be found in Egypt and the UAE.

Air Defense: The SA-22 Pansyr/Pantsir is designed for mobile low-level air defense, combining twin 30mm guns with 12 57E6 radar-guided surface-to-air missiles that reach out to 12 km/ 10 miles, and up to 10,000m altitude. Sensors include targeting and tracking radars, with an electro-optical system for passive scanning. It’s more of a low-level air defense system than a remedy against enemies who can use precision bombing from altitude, but that would be quite enough to deal with any threats from Iran or Syria. Its weakness is its use of radio command guidance (RCG) from the launcher, which means that its attacks can be defeated with jamming, or by killing the launcher.

Iraq has barely progressed to airspace monitoring, and the Pantsir-S1s will be their first real air defense assets. Training will be required, in order to ensure that the new systems can work well with Iraq’s own emerging air force. Meanwhile, the system’s mobility allows it to be moved around for point defense as needs warrant. It’s also popular in the region. The UAE, Iran, and Syria all operate it, and Jordan has reportedly ordered some.

DJ Elliott of the Iraq Order of Battle believes the Pantsirs will serve in the same role as their Russian counterparts, acting as point defenses for more advanced air defense systems like the planned buys of American MIM-23 Hawk XXI batteries. Cruise missiles and anti-radar missiles generally don’t have jammers (though there is MALD-J…), so RCG remains effective. There are rumors that Iraq is negotiating for S-300 (SA-20) missiles; time will tell.

That went well…
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Helicopters: Confirmed rumors indicate that Iraq requested AH-64 Apaches, which they had seen up close in American hands, and which are also in use by neighbors like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, et. al. The USA reportedly offered Iraq AH-1Zs Viper attack helicopters instead, and eventually offered AH-64D/Es; by then, Iraq had already ordered Mi-28s and Mi-35s from Russia, and they eventually decided against ordering the American machines.

The Mi-28NE’s heavily-armored design is closer to the Apache than it is to the USMC’s new AH-1Zs, and the NE variant offers day/night capabilities. The Mi-35M is a more modern variant of the Mi-24s that Saddam’s air force flew, and it’s a much larger attack helicopter design, with internal space for 4-6 soldiers. That makes it an excellent choice for special forces. The Russian helicopters can’t use the AGM-114 Hellfire missiles that Iraq has been firing from AC-208 planes and IA-407 helicopters, but their 23/30mm cannons, rockets, guided missiles, and other weapon options make them a formidable force. The Mi-28’s future had been tentative until Russia finally stepped up with a 2006 order, and Iraq becomes an important early export customer.

There are other compensations for Iraq. One is political. Unlike the USA, Russia isn’t going to play politics with spares and support. If Iraq’s central government finds itself using these gunships in armed clashes with the Kurds, or other neighbors, Maliki knows that Russia won’t cut off Iraq’s access to parts, maintenance, or associated weapons. In exchange, Iraq has to accept a separate supply chain for Mi-28 and Mi-35 parts and weapons, coupled with Russia’s well-earned reputation for unresponsive support. They may have fewer attack helicopters in the air at any one time, but at least it won’t become zero.

Then What? T-90: next?
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There have been reports of other elements to the deal, with armored vehicles mentioned most often.

Armored Vehicles: Iraq’s purchases of BTR-4s and M113s, refurbishment of older BMP-1 and MTLB tracked vehicles, and rumored deal for more MTLBs, give them a full array of armored personnel carriers and infrantry fighting vehicles. What they’re really short on, is tanks. 140 M1A1-SA Abrams form the high end of their force, supplemented by some Soviet era T-72s and old T-54/55s. If their moves toward mechanized divisions is serious. Iraq Order of Battle publisher DJ Elliott sees tanks as the biggest gap. That makes rumors of an armored vehicle buy important.

There is a request outstanding for another 140 American M1s, but Iraq will need more than that to fill in its missing battalions, and some form of Russian or Ukrainian design seemed likely. DJ Elliott is wondering whether Iraq might begin buying tracked BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles for use as “light tanks,” at about at 35 per battalion, as an interim step. Their 100mm gun and missiles give them some ability to take on other tanks, their ability to work with infantry would give them broader counterinsurgency and security uses, and the UAE is already a regional customer. The other possibility would be a buy of main battle tanks. Older T-72s could be bought and upgraded at the new Czech-built facility in country. Or, Iraq could buy Russia’s T-90S model, in order to make up those numbers. So far, the Iraqi parliament seems unenthusiastic.

Artillery is another serious weakness in the current Iraqi army, and any deal for “heavy armored vehicles” could also be looking to shore up that weakness. Russia sells the 152mm MSTA-S tracked self-propelled howitzer, and the 2S31 Vena is a 120mm self-propelled mortar on a BMP-3 chassis. 9K57 Uragan (220mm) and 9K58 Smerch (300mm) rocket launcher systems mounted on armored heavy trucks offer longer-range artillery options, if Iraq is interested.

Su-25s unveiled

Fighters: Iraq is already training to fly 18 F-16IQ fighters, which are new aircraft roughly equivalent to Egypt’s new F-16C/Ds. They’ll need about 4 times that number in order to truly control their air space, and Russia really needs to sell MiG-29s. Modernized MiG-29M2s are fully multi-role aircraft, and buying them would remove Iraq’s single reliance of the USA for this critical asset. On the other hand, they come with a need for an entirely separate set of weapons, and have a questionable maintenance record in global service. France has a number of competitive options in this area, and this may be a harder deal for Russia to close. See “The New Iraqi Air Force: F-16IQ Block 52 Fighters” for in-depth coverage of Iraq’s options.

In 2014, however, the collapse of the Iraqi government’s authority in the north and west forced an emergency buy. A shipment of 5 used Russian Su-25 Frogfoot aircraft, along with Russian advisers, arrived in June 2014. Another 7 arrived from Iran, which began using them when Iraqi Su-25s fled to Iran during the Gulf Wars. The Su-25 was the Soviet counterpart to the A-10, a heavily armored close air support jet designed to loiter over the battlefield and accurately deliver ordnance at low speed. They were used in combat during Russia’s Afghan War, and despite their rugged construction, shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles did manage to take down some jets. It will be interesting to see how they fare in Iraq.

Contracts & Key Events Iraq
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July 1/16: Iraq has received the last of its ordered Mi-28 NE Night Hunter attack helicopters from Russia. The first of an estimated 15 Night Hunters was delivered in 2014 as part of a wider $4.2 billion defense package signed in 2012. According to Reuters, the deal marks the third biggest agreement for Russian arms sales since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

February 16/16: The delivery of 24 Pantsir-S1 air defense systems and missiles to Iraq from Russia has been completed. The systems were part of a wider defense package estimated to have been worth $4.2 billion with between 42-50 of the units on order. It remains unclear whether more will be delivered in future as part of the same or future deals, after Russian officials and businessmen met with top Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad to discuss oil, gas, and defense cooperation. The previous sale was met with some controversy as former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki almost cancelled the deal over allegations of corruption.

Oct 30/14: Mi-28s. Iraq has been receiving Mi-28NEs, but it takes time and preparation before new equipment can be used. The Mi-28s appear to be ready now, and:

“Defence Minister Dr Khalid al-Obeidi and senior ministry personnel observed a flypast of the helicopters over Baghdad ahead of their deployment to their operational bases. While their planned location has not been officially revealed, Taiji just north of Baghdad would be a likely option.”

The report arrives in the shadow of a recent announcement that Iraq’s Shi’ite army is preparing a significant offensive for Spring 2015. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Iraq prepares to deploy Mi-28NE attack helos against the Islamic State” | NY Times, “Iraqis Prepare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help”.

Oct 8/14: Shot down. ISIS proves once again that that they’re well-armed and well-trained, shooting down an Iraqi Mi-35M attack helicopter and an IA-407 armed scout this week, and killing all personnel on board. The Iraqi Army aren’t the only combatants (q.v. Oct 1/14) with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles on hand.

Helicopters are inherently vulnerable to those kinds of measures. The Soviets discovered this in Afghanistan, losing earlier Mi-24 variants of the Mi-35M. As for the IA-407, the similar OH-58D was a key player during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the USA had quite a few of them shot out of the sky. Sources: Defense News, “IS downs another Iraqi helicopter”.

Oct 1/14: Pantsir-S1. The Iraqi government heralds the arrival of Pantsir-S1 systems, along with “Dzighit” twin-launchers for SA-16/-18 Igla missiles. The Russian arms contract reportedly includes 1,000 of the SA-18 Igla-S missiles. They won’t help at all against ISIS, but do allow dispersed low-level air control within territories controlled by the Shi’ite government. Russia Today adds that:

“Since November 2013, Russian military suppliers have delivered to Iraq 12 Mi-35M transport-assault helicopters (16 more to be delivered) and 3 Mi-28NA ‘Night Hunter’ gunships (12 to be supplied soon)…. The Iraqi army will soon start using Russia’s Solntsepek [TOS-1 heavy tracked vehicles that fire short range 220mm ‘Sun Scorch’ rockets carrying]… fuel-air explosive munitions… RIA Novosti reported, citing Almada Press news agency. The weapons have been delivered under the contract signed in July 2014.”

TOS-1 systems are normally part of chemical/ biological defense units in Russia, but one suspects that won’t be their role in Iraq. Sources: Russia Beyond the Headlines, “Russia supplies Iraq with Pantsir-S1, Dzhigit air defense systems” | Russia Today, “Iraq military gets advanced Russian air defense, flame weapons”.

July 6/14: Shot down? The Iranian government’s INRA media arm reports that Col. Shoja’at Alamdari Mourjani was reportedly killed over Samarra, north of Baghdad, last week. The Fars media arm showed pictures of the pilot’s funeral. The National Council of Resistance of Iran claims that 2 more Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps members were also killed around Samarra: Kamal Shirkhani and Pakistani-born Javid Hossein.

The Shi’ite cleric and long-standing Iranian ally Muqtada al-Sadr has militia members deployed to protect Samarra’s golden-domed al-Askari mosque, alongside ground forces from the Iraqi government; Iran also has ground forces in theater. It’s possible that the Colonel was fighting on the ground as a Forward Air Controller. The other possibility is that The Islamic State’s Sunni guerrillas have shot down one of Iran’s Su-25s, which are acknowledged to have Iranian pilots (q.v. July 2/14). Iranian sources weren’t giving out those kinds of details, but you’d expect that the other side would be making more of any Su-25 kills. Sources: NCRI, “Third Iranian regime IRGC member killed in Iraq” | AFP via Saudi Arabia’s Arab News, “Iran pilot killed fighting in Iraq” | Voice of America, “Iranian Pilot Killed in Iraq Defending Shrine”.

July 2/14: Su-25s. The BBC reports that some of the Su-25s in Iraq are from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Air Force – which is distinct from Iran’s regular air force. The BBC backs up their contention with cooperation from the IISS, which provides photos and serial numbers. The irony is, the jets were originally Iraq’s. During the 1991 war, 7 planes defected rather than face the allied armada. Now they’re back in Iraq, and the Aviationist says that “…(three Su-25UBKM and four Su-25KM jets) will be operated by four Iraqi pilots and 10 Iranian pilots.”

Actually, they may have been back before their official unveiling. On June 21/14, unidentified Iranian planes reportedly launched heavy airstrikes around Baiji, north of Baghdad. There are also rumors that this is a trade of sorts, wherein Iran gets ex-Indian Su-30Ks from Russia in exchange. Sources: BBC, “‘Iranian attack jets deployed’ to help Iraq fight Isis” | The Aviationist, “All Iranian Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes have just deployed to Iraq”.

July 1/14: Helicopter delivery. ITAR-TASS reports that An-124 ultra-heavy transport aircraft have delivered 4 Mi-35M and 3 Mi-28NE helicopters to Iraq. They’ve previously reported Iraq’s total at 43 helicopters, to be delivered by 2016: 24 Mi-35s and 19 Mi-28s. That differs from Rostvertol’s own financial reports, however (q.v. June 12/14), which list 28 Mi-35Ms and 15 Mi-28NEs, respectively. Source: ARMS-TASS.

July 1/14: Mi-28. Rostvertol celebrates its 75th anniversary, and the displays include Iraqi Mi-28NEs. Sources: LiveJournal bmpd, “Mi-28NE for Iraq” [in Russian, incl. photos] | Russian Helicopters, “Major Russian military helicopter producer celebrates 75th anniversary” (Rostvertol is a subsidiary).

Su-25 Arrival

June 26-30/14: SU-25s. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense confirms receipt of 5 Su-25 Frogfoot close-air support jets from Russia, and Iraqi Army Lieutenant General Anwar Hamad Amen Ahmed says that they will be thrown directly into the battle against the Sunni Caliphate in Iraq & Syria, but that takes more than fighters. It takes maintenance, which Iraqis are poor at. It takes jet pilots that have been trained to operate with ground forces, and Iraq doesn’t really have those. And it takes communications and specialized ground personnel so that support requests are answered in a timely way. Also not really present, though American special forces personnel have at least the training required. Gen. Ahmed says that:

“We have experienced pilots and other professionals. Our Russian friends have also sent their own experts to assist us in preparing the aircraft. All the logistics have been planned for as well.”

Sure. Of course, you can launch a “massive attack” by just sending the aircraft on free-ranging bombing missions, to areas where your own troops have fled. It helps if civilian casualties aren’t a concern.

A June 26th report by Russia’s Interfax had pegged the aircraft at ex-Indian “Su-30MKI”, which was obviously incorrect because India had only returned less-advanced used Su-30MKs from their initial stopgap order. A “source in the Russian aviation industry” added that delivery from storage warehouses of the Russian Defense Ministry could have allowed Su-27SKM fighters or Su-25 attack aircraft. Which seems to be what has happened. Sources: Interfax, “Russia might have supplied rebuilt Sukhoi aircraft to Iraq – source” | Russia Today, “Target ISIS: First batch of Russian fighter jets arrives in Iraq” | UK’s RUSI, “Desperate for Air Support, Maliki Turns to Russia”.

July 28/14: Shot down. The guerillas’ Al-Anbar News Twitter account publishes photos of a shot down Iraqi helicopter, reportedly an Mi-35, over Saklaviya northwest of Fallujah. There isn’t much left, so it’s hard to tell, but it had a large 5-bladed rotor. Twitter, Pic 1 and Pic 2.

June 20/14: Mi-24s. The Czech Republic’s Defense Minister Martin Stropnicky says that they are in talks to sell 7 of their 17 Russian-built Mi-24V attack helicopters to the Iraqi Defense Ministry.

The Iraqi government has lost Kirkuk to the Kurds, and lost most of the northern and eastern Sunni areas to hard-line Islamist forces that are backed (for now) by local Sunni tribes. At this point, Iraq needs any flying attack platform that can be delivered quickly, and they’re very similar to the Mi-35s that Russia recently delivered. Their weapon compatibility with Iraq’s existing armed Mi-17s would also be a plus.

The Czechs, keen to push an advantage, are also pushing Iraq to buy locally-designed L-159 light attack jets. Aero Vodochody had lost that contract to Korea’s KAI (q.v. Dec 12/13), but the FA-50s won’t even begin arriving until 2015 – 2016. The Czechs have about 8 jets in storage that they could deliver fairly quickly, and that may be enough for Iraq’s immediate needs. If Iraq wants more, restarting the L-159 production line won’t solve their problem in time. If the Czechs divert L-159 planes directly from their own air force, on the other hand, they could offer nearly-immediate deliveries as part of a helicopter/jet package deal. The Czechs would then be able to choose whether to refurbish the 8 stored L-159s for their own use, and/or backfill CzAF stocks with the new L-169 that’s in development. We’ll have to see what gets negotiated, if anything. Sources: Defense News, “Iraq Eyes Czech Mi 24 helos To Combat ISIL Militants”.

June 12/14: Rostvertol report. Rosvertol’s 2013 annual report contains a number of interesting details regarding its orders. Iraq (foreign customer K-8) has apparently ordered 28 Mi-35M helicopters, and 15 Mi-28NEs. This differs from other reported figures, but DID will be using these numbers as the standard.

The report adds that Mi-28s have been having problems with increased vibration in the main gearbox. Sources: Rostvertol PLC, “Annual Report ‘Rosvertol’, ZA2013 Year.

Mi-35 delivery

May 6/14: Delivery. The Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Konstantin Biryulin, offers some clarity in an interview with Interfax-AVN:

“Russia is successfully fulfilling the contract for supply of Mi-35 and Mi-28NE helicopters to Iraq. The Mi-35 batch has already been delivered [in December 2013] and the Iraqis are happy with them. As for Mi-28NE helicopters, the first batch of these will be delivered to Iraq before the end of this year,” said Biryulin, who leads the Russian delegation at the Sofex 2014 arms show in Jordan.

Sources: Voice of Russia, “Iraq to receive first batch of Russian Night Hunter helicopters before end of 2014”.

Feb 27/14: Some pictures and unofficial updates:

“Taken at Rostov on Don plant, the photographs show Baghdad’s new [Mi-28] attack choppers in the color scheme chosen by the Iraqi Air Force…. Akram Kharief, the editor of Secret Difa 3, a blog focusing on defense topics in the Maghreb region, we can show you the first images of the brand new Mi-28 Havoc helicopter on delivery to Iraq…. 23 Russian attack choppers have been delivered to the Iraqis, the first batch of 10, in September 2013 and the second of 13 examples, in January 2014.”

Sources: The Aviationist, “First images of the new Iraqi Mi-28 Night Hunter attack helicopters”.

Jan 4/14: Delivery. The Alsumaria television channel says that a 2nd shipment of 13 Russian Mi-28NEs have arrived in Iraq, for use in Iraq’s Sunni Anbar Province west of Baghdad. The 1st shipment reportedly involved 15 Mil helicopters, though it didn’t mention whether they were Mi-28s or Mi-35s. Subsequent reports cast doubt, and suggest that these may be Mi-35 helicopters, a modernized derivative of the Mi-24 made famous by Russia’s Afghan war.

The 1st group of Iraqi pilots and technicians reportedly finished their training in Fall 2013. Sources: The Voice of Russia, “13 Russian Mi-28NE helicopters arrive in Iraq”.

June 2013: Mi-28s. At the Paris air show, Rosoboronexport deputy head Alexander Mikheyev confirms to Russian media that the deal is still on, with the first deliveries scheduled for September 2013.

May 31/13: Deal begins. Rostech CEO Sergei Chemezov tells RIA Novosti that Iraq has begun payments, and production has started for the system in the October 2012 deal. RIA Novosti says the deal involves 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters, and 50 Pantsir S1 short-range air defense missile systems. RIA Novosti.

Deal in force

May 21/13: Investigation. The head of the Iraqi Parliament’s Integrity Committee, Bahaa al-Araji, says that Iraq’s Central Criminal Court has resumed an investigation into officials suspected of corruption related to the Russia deal. Overall verdict? “The deal remains in force, but is not being implemented yet…” RIA Novosti fills in some recent history:

“The Iraqi Parliament initiated an investigation into several officials…. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in March 2013 that Iraq and Russia had initialed a revised deal and deliveries under the contract would start by the summer. The corruption investigation was closed shortly after.”

Nov 9-12/12: Investigation. An Iraqi government spokesman announces that accusations of corruption had led Prime Minister Maliki to review the Russian arms deal.

Within a day or 2, however, Iraq’s acting Defense Minister Sadun Al-Dulaymi tells a press conference in Baghdad that “The deal is going ahead.” He says that the only issue involves a failure to submit some papers to the anti-corruption commission in time. BBC | Al-Jazeera | RIA Novosti.

Oct 18/12: American switch? Acting Defense Minister Sadoun al-Dulaimi tells Reuters that Iraq is talking with American officials about buying air defense systems and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. That’s an interesting comment, given the recent buys of Pantsir and Mi-28 counterparts from Russia, and the challenge of integrating the Pantsir S1s into American command systems if they want to create a unified air defense network. Reuters | Iran’s Press TV.

Oct 17/12: Testing. Russia’s RIA Novosti reports that Russia is going to test its Pansir-S1 systems against live cruise missiles for the first time, instead of target drones. Both tend to be missile-like bodies with jet engines, wings, and guidance systems. Still, some cruise missiles would offer lower radar profiles and evasive maneuvers that may not be programmed into a target drone. The question is how realistic the tests will actually be, given the natural desire to avoid hurting the SA-22’s export status.

Oct 15/12: DJ Elliott, who publishes the Iraq Order of Battle, offers his thoughts on Iraq’s recent buy:

“Iraq is reported to be buying additional long-range radars as part of the package and is rumored to be negotiating for SA20 [S300] SAMs. The 30 Mi-28s [1 Attack Sq-probably to be based at Taji] are reported to be $1 billion with the price for the Pantsir-S1s and additional air defense items is reported to be $2.3 billion according to Iraqi sources. There is also a surcharge for rapid delivery involved in those prices.

At first glance the Pantsir-S1 is a rip-off… However, it is still used for cruise-missile defense of SA20 sites because its communications/radars are compatible and cruise-missiles do not normally carry jammers… 42 Pantsir-S1s is 7 batteries of 6 firing units each in Russian structure indicating 7 initial planned Air Defense Battalions composed of 1 Battery of Pantsir-S1, 1 battery of SA20, and 1-2 batteries of anti-aircraft guns… Also, overlooked by most reporting but mentioned on Iraqi TV, the Czech deal includes establishing an Iraqi Armor rework/upgrade facility for T72 tanks. [At Taji?] This is more important than the aircraft deal and accounts for much of the price. An upgrade facility in Iraq for T72s means that the Iraqis are probably planning on buying large numbers of used T72s and [like the Russian Army] are going to use upgraded T72s as a large part of their tank force vice buying new T90s. The most likely sources for used T72s include the Ukraine and Poland – Russia is retaining its T72s and upgrading them thus is unlikely to have spares available to sell.”

Oct 9/12: The deal is “announced.” It’s clear that Iraq is buying 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters, and 42-50 Pantsir low-level air defense systems, but the numbers don’t quite add, and other elements of the deal are likely to emerge only with time.

The first challenge the deal must overcome is Parliamentary. Maliki can sign the deal, but Iraq’s legislature has to authorize the money for the purchases in its budgets. There has already been some pushback from that quarter, and time will tell how Maliki fares.

The next challenge will involve fielding, though this an easier hurdle. Iraq never really stopped operating Russian weapons, including tanks, artillery, helicopters, and guns. Some were scavenged and restored from the Saddam-era military. Others were provided by US allies. Still others, like Iraq’s Mi-17 helicopters, were bought using the USA itself as an intermediary. What’s different about these buys is that they involve a direct relationship with a new source for support, and also involve new roles within Iraq’s reconstituted military. Working our those kinks, and training to use their equipment’s full capabilities without endangering their own forces, is going to take work and time. Russia’s Pravda | RIA Novosti || Al Jazeera (incl. video) | BBC | Bloomberg | Kyiv Post | Lebanon’s Daily Star | Voice of America.

Russian deal

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections, comments, or information to contribute are encouraged to contact DID’s Founding Editor, Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Background: Weapons

Weapons are listed by designation, in alphabetical order.

• DID – AH-64E Apache Block III: The Once and Future Attack Helicopter.

• DID – Russia Improving its Mi-28 Attack Helicopter Fleet.

• Czech MoD – Mi-35 (Mi-24V) – Technical Specifications.

• Army Recognition – Pantsir-S1 / Pantsyr-S1 Air Defense missile – gun system / SA-22 Greyhound.

• GlobalSecurity – Su-25 FROGFOOT Grach (Rook) / Su-39 FROGFOOT.

• Military Today – TOS-1A Heavy flamethrower system.

Background: Other

• Wikipedia – List of Soviet aircraft losses in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Illuminating.

• DID (July 18/13) – Iraq: Weapons – and Challenges – In the Pipeline. SIGIR confirms reports that an AH-64 export case is pending, and it has now been formally announced – but no contract has been signed.