Defence`s Feeds

Formerly AgustaWestland, Leonardo’s helicopter business is promoting the AW149 military helicopter to a number of nations.

At a media briefing at AAD 2016 hosted by both the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), the focus was on the co-operation between the two groups in the design and development of the JF-17 Thunder over a long period of time.

The organisers of the Africa Aerospace and Defence Exhibition presented the Turkish Deputy Minister of National Defence, Suay Alpay, with a certificate of appreciation.

Americas

• Cost reductions at Boeing have resulted in the curbing of paid overtime by 80,000 salaried workers based in the US from October 14. The move is part of company-wide attempts to slash costs amid intense market competition. A company memo stated “By curbing exempt overtime pay, Boeing is challenging leaders and employees to come up with work solutions that curb the need to work overtime.”

• Boeing and Saab have officially unveiled their new production trainer aircraft for the USAF T-X trainer competition. The Boeing/Saab T-X aircraft is a twin-tailed, single-engine jet with an advanced cockpit with embedded training, taking advantage of the latest technologies, tools and manufacturing techniques. While the offering faces off with several other designs from rival manufacturers and consortiums, the company stated that their “T-X is real, ready and the right choice for training pilots for generations to come.”

• B-52s are set to be fitted with new ejector seats following a USAF contract award to AMI Industries. The $14 million deal will see the company install the Advanced Conception Ejection Seat (ACES) II ejection seat. Due for completion in December 2018, the ejection seat will be composed of a detachable seatback and bucket structure that does not require removal of the B-2 escape hatches for any maintenance task.

• Elbit subsidiary EFW has won a $102 million US Army contract to provide the service with mortar weapon systems. Under the deal, EFW will deliver 60mm, 81mm and 120mm mortar systems to the Army with completion expected for September 2021.

Middle East & North Africa

• Israel is to receive $38 billion in military aid from the US over the next ten years in what is a landmark military assistance package. The deal, which has been in the works for more than ten months, includes the promise by Israel not to seek additional funds from Congress beyond what will be guaranteed annually. Having the new pact signed prior to the upcoming US Presidential elections allows Tel Aviv to avoid uncertainties surrounding the next president, whether Democrat Hillary Clinton or Republican Donald Trump, and to give Israel’s defense establishment the ability to plan ahead.

Europe

• A legal challenge has been launched by Boeing against the Danish Ministry of Defense for selecting the Lockheed Martin F-35A over the F/A-18E/F as the air force’s next generation fighter. Citing a “flawed” evaluation process, Boeing submitted a request for insight to the Ministry of Defence to obtain all materials related to the selection. Denmark’s parliament approved a recommendation by the MoD to buy 27 F-35As in June after the fighter beat out the F/A-18 in the military, strategic, economic and industrial judging categories.

Asia Pacific

• It’s been revealed that China will be taking delivery of four Su-35 fighters by the end of 2016. The disclosure was made by the Governor of Khabarovsk Territory Vyacheslav Shport during the opening of a production plant. Some experts mark the Su-35 as a potential rival for the F-15, Eurofighter, and Rafale fighters.

• India’s government has launched its investigation into corruption allegations against Brazil’s Embraer regarding the purchase of three EMB-145 aircraft from the company in 2008. The $210 million procurement was destined for the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as part of its indigenous airborne early warning and control systems (AEW&C) program. Embraer has been under investigation by the US Justice Department since 2010 after a defense contract with the Dominican Republic raised suspicions of kickbacks. The US investigation has extended to examine Embraer’s business dealings with eight more countries, including Saudi Arabia and India.

Today’s Video

Boeing’s T-X offering Part II:

The recent reburial of King Habibullah II – aka Habibullah Kalakani aka derogatively Bacha-ye Saqao (The Water Carrier’s Son) – that stirred up controversy and violence was another reflection of Afghanistan’s increasingly ethnicised politics. Competing narratives about historical events and the legacy of historical figures reflect deeper, underlying societal and political cleavages, both between ethnic groups and between conservatives and modernisers. To provide much-needed context, AAN’s Thomas Ruttig (with contributions by Ali Yawar Adili) has searched the literature for historical background about the person at the centre of this controversy.

A ceremony, a standoff and a reburial

On 1 September 2016, scuffles broke out in Kabul’s Kolola Pushta neighbourhood. Shots were fired and people wounded. According to reports, one of the wounded later died. Those involved in the clashes largely belonged to two different ethnic groups – Uzbeks and Tajiks – who were at loggerheads over where King Habibullah II (1) and his associates, who had been executed in 1929, should be reburied.

In the morning, a memorial service held at Kabul’s Idgah mosque had been attended by a number of state officials and politicians. After that, around one thousand people – many of them armed – carried the coffins with Habibullah and his associates’ mortal remains (2) which had been unearthed earlier from a mass grave at the foot of Tapa-ye Maranjan (where Afghanistan’s former Pashtun rulers have their mausoleums), towards Shahr Ara Hill, west of the city’s central Shahr-e Now area. That’s when they ran into the opposing side.

The main objection of the Uzbek party was that they consider Shahr Ara Hill part of their “history and identity” – and that another place had been assigned to the burial party (who had asked for Shahr Ara first) but which was overruled by the crowd on the day itself. First Vice President Abdulrashid Dostum, an Uzbek, sent forces to block them, most likely militias of his party, also some of them armed. (Afghan TV stations showed that on live broadcast.)

After a long and tense standoff, a delegation of Tajik leaders went to Dostum and found a compromise: The reburial would go ahead on Shahr Ara Hill but its historical name would be preserved, princess Shahr Ara’s tomb there would be renovated by the government, and a religious school would be constructed elsewhere “at an appropriate site” and named after Habibullah Kalakani. Habibullah II’s mortal remains were then buried on Shahr Ara Hill around midnight, still on the day of the scuffles.

The initiative to provide Habibullah II and his lieutenants with a proper grave, on one hand aimed to posthumously restore his dignity. But it was also a clear attempt by the armed and politicised Tajik leadership – which includes well-known commanders from Habibullah Kalakani’s area of origin north of Kabul – to create another hero and rallying point for their ethnic group. (Their biggest and most recent hero is Ahmad Shah Massud, whose death is remembered every year on 9 September.) The by now familiar display of civil war paraphernalia (mixed civilian and military clothing and an open display of guns and knives) in the reburial procession showed that it was clearly intended as a display of force. The organisers had more in mind than simply setting the historical records straight, but rather aimed to send a clear message in the context of fresh grievances against what is seen as an increasingly Pashtun-dominated government. (More here about the NUG crisis.) (3) Also the vice-presidential leader of the Uzbek party is a member of that unbeloved government.

A historical hill

According to a number of sources (this one, for example), an aunt of Emperor Babur, Shahr Bano Begum, had created a garden on the hill known as Bagh-e Shahr Ara (The Garden Adorning the City). It is one of a number of Moghul gardens in the city – and beyond, established along the centuries-old Grand Trunk Road linking Kabul and Delhi – many of which, by now, have disappeared. (4) Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, his full name, was a descendant of the Turco-Mongol dynasties of Chengiz Khan and the Timurids. Expelled from his native Ferghana valley, he conquered Kabul in 1504 and made it his capital. (Later, he was also buried there, in what now is known as the Babur Garden.) From there, he went on to conquer India where he established the ‘Moghul’ dynasty. One of his daughters, Shahr Ara, is also buried on Shahr Ara Hill (it is not clear whether the garden there was created before or after her death). After suffering damage and neglect during the recent wars, the Shahr Ara garden was rehabilitated and turned into Park-e Zanana (women’s park), a rare space in the city for women only (more here).

Afghanistan’s Uzbeks see themselves as descendants of Babur and his dynasty, which ruled over a large empire known for its splendour and cultivation for more than three hundred years. (5)

Habibullah Kalakani – from brigand to king

Habibullah II – or Habibullah Kalakani, as he is widely known after his area of origin, Kalakan, north of Kabul – was the first and only non-Pashtun to sit on the Afghan royal throne. (6) He took over power after a military assault on the Afghan capital on 17 January 1929, deposing reformer-King Amanullah. Amanullah, who represented a long-ruling Pashtun dynasty, had ruled since 1919 but was already weakened by other uprisings and the increasing resistance to his modernisation attempts that had been inspired by Turkey’s leader Atatürk.

Habibullah’s enemies, at the time, derided him for his relatively humble origins and called him Bacha-ye Saqao (Son of the Water Carrier) and “Bandit King.” Habibullah II had indeed been a bandit before he ascended the throne and, if one can believe his autobiography, took pride in this, even referring to himself as “the Bacha.” (7) When the ex-brigand from Kalakan was crowned by the Pir of Tagao, a Naqshbandi leader from the Tajik-majority areas north and northeast of Kabul (who also had crowned Amanullah), he received the sobriquet of Khadem-e Din-e Rassul-e Allah (Servant of the Religion of the Messenger of Allah).

Habibullah’s father, Rashid, whatever his original profession, worked as a gardener in the vineyard of Muhammad Hussain Khan in Kabul’s Qala-je Murad Beg neighbourhood. This Hussain Khan, a Safi Pashtun from Kohistan, was first made khan of that area – of which Kalakan is a part – by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880–1901) and became Amir Habibullah I’s treasurer in 1904 (mustaufi al-mamalek). Details of Habibullah Kalakani’s early life come from a semi-documentary novel titled Eyar-i az Khorasan (A Brigand from Khorasan) by Khalilullah Khalili (1907–87) He was Hussain Khan’s son and became sha’er ul-shu’ara (poet laureate) at the Afghan court in the 1960s. (8)

Habibullah was born in 1890 in Sara-ye Khoja in the Kalakan area of Kohdaman, on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush mountains, just north of Kabul. According to Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdulloev, who turned Khalili’s book into a web-based biographical note, Habibullah was illiterate. He “had not even finalised his education at the madrassa” and helped his father with the work in the vineyard. He was also a murid (follower) of the Sufi Naqschbandi Pir of Gulbahar named Shams-ul-Haq Mujaddedi Kohestani.

The young man joined the army and, according to Leon Poullada (see FN 3), served in a model unit under the command of Turkish officers which had been called into the country under Amanullah’s father, Amir Habibullah (who ruled 1901–19). After Amanullah took over the throne in 1919 due to his father’s assassination, Habibullah fought in the short Third Anglo-Afghan War in that same year. Ironically, this was under the command of General Muhammad Nader Khan who, in October 1929, would topple him and later have him executed.

According to Abdulloev, Habibullah – together with many of his ham-watanan in predominantly Tajik-inhabited Shemali, Kohestan and Kohdaman – sympathised with the anti-Soviet struggle of the Basmachi movement north of the Amu Darya border. He also assumes that Habibullah had contacts with refugees who had come to Afghanistan (Russian historian Vladimir Boyko estimates around 200,000 in 1929). In early 1922, Habibullah joined a 140-strong unit of mainly Panjshiri ‘volunteers’ that fought the Soviets near Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, led by a Mawlawi Abdul Hai.

In those first years of his rule, Amanullah – the only ruler at the time of an independent Central Asian Muslim country – harboured aspirations to become the leader of the whole region. He also sympathised with his colleague Muhammad Alam Khan, the Amir of Bukhara, who had been deposed by the Soviets in 1920 and fled to Afghanistan a year later, where he was given accommodation not far from where Habibullah Kalakani’s father worked. Meanwhile, the supporters of the Amir of Bukhara continued a guerrilla war in his home country. So it can be assumed that the ‘volunteers’ that Habibullah joined, had gone with King Amanullah’s blessing.

Not after long, however, Amanullah stopped his support for the Basmachi because he did not want to ruin vital relations with the Soviet Union (and possibly because he considered the Amir of Bukhara as a potential competitor for the lead role in Central Asia). Abdul Hai, the leader of the ‘volunteers,’ was arrested upon his return to Afghanistan, as was Habibullah who had returned to Kalakan. He soon managed to escape and became a highwayman – “half soldier, half bandit,” as Abdulloev put it.

In 1924, Habibullah is said to have joined the Mangal uprising in the Khost area, led by a Mullah Abdullah, better known as Mulla Lang (the Lame Mulla). According to Afghan historian Nazif Shahrani the uprising was triggered by a dispute over a child marriage, which Amanullah had abolished. The uprising was suppressed in January 1925 and Mulla Lang was captured and executed in Kabul. After that, Habibullah spent some years in Peshawar where he was said to have worked in a tea house (although other sources say he owned it). Other reports say that he was involved in robbery and did some jail time in Parachinar in British India. In 1928, he returned to Afghanistan.

According to Abdulloev, upon his return Habibullah attracted the attention of anti-Amanullah circles, particularly the supporters of Amanullah’s uncle Nasrullah. Nasrullah had been nayeb us-saltana (viceroy) to Amanullah’s father Habibullah I and heir apparent, but was deposed and arrested by Amanullah after his father’s assassination and accused of having been behind it. Nasrullah died while detained in the Kabul palace in 1920. Abdulloev obviously believes that Habibullah Kalakani’s later victorious raid on Kabul was not of his own making alone.

Back in Afghanistan, Habibullah Kalakani is said to have offered his services to Amanullah first who, in November 1928, was facing another uprising, this time by segments of the eastern Shinwari tribe about taxation. Amanullah, facing army desertions, accepted Habibullah’s offer, made him colonel and sent him weapons through an intermediary. But again, Habibullah joined the rebels. (9)

The two 1929 opponents: Habibullah II on a 2016 poster… Source: Twitter

 

‘Social revolutionary’ or ‘fundamentalist’?

The new king ruled as Habibullah II. With this name, he puts himself in line with Amanullah’s father, the murdered Amir Habibullah – or Habibullah I – in a side-blow at Amanullah, as some sources suspect that Amanullah supporters were behind the assassination. (10) When in power, Habibullah II immediately revoked Amanullah’s progressive reforms. (11) He made Sharia the only law of the land, ordered that men should not shave and should wear the turban again, and women the hijab (under Amanullah this had been banned for government officials’ wives). He decreed that women should not to leave the house without a mahram, closed girls (and many other) schools and banned the teaching of “kafir languages” to Muslim children (these rules are quoted from his newspaper Habib ul-Islam, here). He also called home the first group of Afghan female students who had been sent to Turkey. He abolished the ministries of education and justice because, US historian Vartan Gregorian writes, he considered them unnecessary and an infringement of the authorities of the clergy. His fighters had free reign to loot and kill, and even in the foreword of his ‘autobiography,’ his rule is referred to as the “Reign of Terror.”

Some authors call Habibullah a “fundamentalist” for his anti-reform course. French author Olivier Roy, for instance, in his standard work Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (1990), calls him the “candidate of a fundamentalist coalition,” because non-Tajik ‘tribes’ and wide segments of the Islamic clergy supported him (or, more precisely, opposed Amanullah). Gregorian writes that Habibullah saw himself as a representative of the “true faith,” which had been compromised by Amanullah’s innovation. This assessment was shared by a number of Afghans when the issue of reburial came up recently; they accused Habibullah II of ‘Talebanish’ policies. (12) In an interesting contrast, some contemporary Soviet authors celebrated Habibullah II as a “social revolutionary,” as he had toppled the “feudal” Pashtun aristocracy. They probably had not forgiven Amanullah for his support for the Basmachi and the Amir of Bukhara, although officially relations were cordial.

… and Amanullah the reformer-king, with Queen Soraya.

 

Regional repercussions

After Habibullah’s take-over of Kabul, emigrants from Soviet Central Asia who had been unhappy about Amanullah’s appeasement policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, took his side. Some of the most important surviving Basmachi leaders were in Afghanistan as they had been viciously pursued by Soviet troops. These included Ibrahim Bek, an Uzbek from eastern Bukhara, who had come in 1926 and the Turkmen Junaid Khan who had crossed over in 1928 and was now living in Herat. Both declared their support for Habibullah II and supported him with fighters. But, they also profited from Habibullah II’s support and were able to invigorate their rebellion on Soviet territory (see, for example, this 27 May 1929 Chicago Tribune report).

In Afghanistan, Habibullah sent Ibrahim’s men to fight the Hazaras who still supported Amanullah, mainly because his 1919 decree abolishing slavery in 1919 had particularly improved their lives (see here). When, in 1929, Amanullah supporters marched into Northern Afghanistan and took Mazar with Soviet support, 900 of Ibrahim Beg’s and Junaid Khan’s fighters were mobilised to bolster Habibullah’s deputy and minister of war, Sayyed Hossain (who was executed with him later). In the last days of Habibullah’s nine-month reign, Boyko writes, Ibrahim functioned as a quasi-chief of the garrison in Khanabad (in today’s Kunduz province), then capital of Qataghan province.

… and from king to an unkind death

Habibullah’s rule soon came under threat, as the Pashtuns tribes had revolted against Amanullah and not in support of him. They were against a non-Pashtun on the Kabul throne; the Suleimankhel even proclaimed their leader the new monarch in Ghazni. Amanullah’s former minister of war, Muhammad Nader Khan, who had quit this post in 1924, returned from exile and challenged Habibullah II as early as March 1929 to seek legitimacy not only from the religious clergy (which he had received) but also from the tribal chiefs. Habibullah responded by arresting all members of Nader’s family and putting a bounty on his head. Under these circumstances, Nader and his brother Shah Mahmud (a later prime minister who Habibullah left as governor in Gardez) were able to mobilise the tribes one by one, starting in the southeast. Months of fighting started, with changing luck on both sides, but in September the tribal forces started to beleaguer Kabul.

Habibullah II finally fled to Jabal us-Seraj on 12 October 1929. Pursued by Nader’s troops, he surrendered a few days later, with Nader’s assurance that his life would be spared. Instead, on 1 November 1929, he and 13 of his closest allies were shot dead, then stoned and publicly displayed at the gallows and later unceremoniously buried. Nader, who as Nader Shah had become the new ruler, later said that he had forgiven the ‘Bandit King,’ but that the tribal leaders supporting him had demanded that the ‘traitor’ die. (13)

Habibullah II’s relatively quick overthrow was also a heavy blow, if not the death stroke, for the Basmachis in Soviet Central Asia, as it deprived them of their hinterland. Nader Shah, after a short period (during which Ibrahim was assistant governor in Mazar-e Sharif), turned against them on Afghan soil and began pushing them over the Amu Darya border in 1930.

Surrogate conflicts?

Some wonder why the reburial and rehabilitation of a ruler long dead still has the potential to stir such strong emotions when the country is struggling with more acute problems, from its ailing economy to the on-going war. It is because competing narratives about historical events sometimes are also put into current political context.

The scuffles around Habibullah II remains and his reburial place broke out not long after Afghanistan’s independence day. On that day, plenty of portraits were shown at official ceremonies across the country of the man he had toppled – reformer-King Amanullah. It was Amanullah who, as a result of the short Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, had returned the country to full independence. (As a result of a series of treaties in the nineteenth century, it had formally been independent, but its foreign relations had been under the control of the British Viceroy in India, in exchange for significant British subsidies.) The war resulted in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Rawalpindi, which was concluded on 19 August 1919 and has since been celebrated as the country’s independence day.

But not everyone shares the narrative of the reformer versus the anti-reformer. Hashmat Mosleh, a former advisor to President Burhanuddin Rabbani, for example, juxtaposes Habibullah’s religiously motivated resistance to what he considers Amanullah’s secular, Westernising modernisation. In a recent op-ed for the al-Jazeera website, he stated:

For the Tajiks and the religious people of Afghanistan, Kalakani was a devout Muslim who opposed the secular policies of the “[W]esternised” Amanullah. He led an Islamic rebellion against Amanullah, who had unveiled his wife and ordered Afghans to wear [W]estern clothes.

This statement also indirectly puts the historical figure of Habibullah Kalakani into a modern context, as it also can be read both as a reference to the mujahedin’s struggle against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s (that also was legitimised as a modernisation project), but also as a side-shot against the current president, with his Western-backed reform agenda.

As Afghanistan’s politics become increasingly ethnicised again, ethnic divides tend to supersede political conflicts. On one hand, the current president is accused of aiming at establishing a “donor-friendly Ghilzai Pashtun administration.” On the other hand, Pashtuns from tribal Paktia now also demand a state funeral for the last communist president Najibullah (murdered in 1996, when the Taleban took Kabul), who was born in their province – although they had fought his regime (a media report here). In 1929, the tribal contingents that helped Nader Khan overthrow the ‘son of the water carrier’ had come from their area, the Afghan southeast – a fact still widely referred to with pride there. The same ethnocentric impulse seems to be behind former President Karzai’s impromptu reply to a question about the Habibullah affair when received by fellow Afghans on a trip abroad, where he asked back, ironically or not, “Mullah Muhammad Omar also was a king, wasn’t he?” (shown in this video).

The supporters of Habibullah II, in turn, contrasted the obstacles they faced to the 2009 state reburial of former president Muhammad Daud (1973–78) who also was a Pashtun (see media reporting here) which they allege shows that the state favours that ethnic group. Finally, in the eyes of some involved in this controversy, the Tajiks-versus-Pashtuns constellation during the end stage of Habibullah II’s reign resembles the current one between the two feuding camps in the NUG (see AAN analysis here and here) – which is in fact about access to power. The conflict over Shahr Ara Hill has additionally pulled in the Uzbeks who, through Dostum, are part of the unbeloved government.

As these examples show, conflicts over historical issues interpreted as ethnic conflict still have a strong mobilising effect. But often they camouflage factional conflicts over power or even deep societal cleavages, like the one between modernisers and conservatives which has shaped much of Afghanistan’s history in the twentieth century.

Apart from the sources cited in the text, the author also used Ludwig W. Adamec’s famous Who’s Who of Afghanistan (Graz, 1975) for the compilation of Habibullah Kalakani’s biographical details.

 

(1) [amended on 18 September 2016: I use Habibullah “II” – a European terminology – as a shorthand, to distinguish from Amir Habibullah (I) and in order to avoid ethnicising. Habibullah from Kalakan also refers to Amir Habibullah I, by distancing himself from his predecessor Amanullah. More about this further down in the text.]

(2) Media reports have varied on how many coffins there were. A photo on the Daily Mail website shows 16 coffins. Louis Dupree wrote in his seminal work on Afghanistan that 17 of Habibullah’s lieutenants had been executed together with him (Afghanistan, 1980 edition, 459). Historical photos however show 13 people at the gallows, including Habibullah (see here, with names added in Dari handwriting, from the British Museum collection).

(3) Recent grievances include President Ghani’s perceived sidelining of the former (Tajik) mujahedin who had supported Abdullah in the 2014 elections and expected to be rewarded (see for example Ismail Khan’s statement here). Since 2015, leading former mujahedin commanders had frequently gathered to make their voice heard and demand more say in the government, for example, after a US airstrike targeted a local commander’s weapons depot in Parwan, after they felt the government had blundered during the Taleban’s capture of Kunduz and generally vis-à-vis the Taleban threat.

(4) According to Soma Mukherjee, Royal Mughal Ladies and Their Contributions, New Delhi 2001 (p 208) several female members of Babur’s family had gardens created in Kabul. There were originally eight or nine gardens in the city. See also Farzana Moon, Babur: The First Moghul in India, New Delhi 1997. Babur had also commissioned Idgah mosque, Kabul’s second largest.

(5) The often-nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes mixed when they came to Central Asia, both among themselves and with the local, mainly Iranian, population. Some of the tribes made their (Turkic) Chaghatay dialect the standard language at the court and in (Turkic) literature. It later morphed into Uzbeki. Others, like Babur, preferred Persian but were often bilingual. Contemporary Uzbeks call Babur’s line the Gurkani, which goes back to the Mongol word for “son in law” (this refers Timur, aka Tamerlan, and Chengiz Khan, of whom Timur was – metaphorically – the son-in-law). Babur actually was kicked out of his fiefdom around the Ferghana, Samarkand and Bukhara by another Uzbek tribe, the Shaibani.

(6) The only other non-Pashtun head of state of Afghanistan was Prof Borhanuddin Rabbani, who served first as interim president and then as president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) between 1992 and 1996. After the Taleban conquest of Kabul, he formally kept this position, but resided elsewhere (in Taloqan, Faizabad and Dushanbe subsequently). He returned to Kabul after the Taleban regime was toppled in 2001, initially expecting to be reinstalled but ultimately vacating the position in favour of Hamed Karzai in December 2001. Like Habibullah Kalakani, he was a Tajik, but from Badakhshan.

(7) In academia, Habibullah ‘autobiography,’ titled “My Life: From Brigand to King” (first English version 1936, London), is not considered an original source (for example by Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1973, and Nazif Shahrani). The foreword claims the text is a translation by a “Persian-knowing scholar” of the original notes of a surviving companion of Habibullah Kalakani, one Jamal Gul, who had supposedly been together with him since childhood and was now “roaming about in Europe as a Man of no Country.” The text is told in the first person singular, and the translator remains anonymous (he claims he did not want to “uselessly intrude and confuse the essential story” but admits that he introduced “some Latin phrases here and there . . . for the accommodation of difficult Oriental expressions into more familiar European terminology”). The book, however, is fully English in style and reads like a thrilling adventure story rather than an autobiography. (The author has used the 1990 edition by Octagon Press in London.)

(8) Quoted from a biographical note on Habibullah by the Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdulloev (in Russian) who uses Khalili’s book (which we do not have access to and cannot say when it was first published). For this book, Abdulloev calls Khalili “Habibullah’s biographer.” Khalili was Habibullah Kalakani’s junior by 17 years. He must have known him in the latter’s early 20s, before he joined the army around 1919. Khalili – whose father had been executed under Amanullah – also held positions in Habibullah II’s government.

(9) According to Poullada, this was a result of a blunder by Amanullah: He cites an informant whom he interviewed in 1967 in Kabul, who recounted how Habibullah had called Amanullah over the phone and had pretended to be the King’s interlocutor. He told the king that he had ‘the bandit’ and his men surrounded – to test the king’s reliability. When Amanullah ordered him arrested, Habibullah revealed himself and turned his weapons on the king. The story may well be a folk tale; what is clear is that a few months later, in mid-January 1929, Habibullah Kalakani’s men seized Kabul. By that time, Amanullah had already fled and put his half-brother Enayatullah in his place; he only ruled for a few days.

(10) Poullada, Dupree and Fraser-Tytler – all authors of standard works about Afghanistan – do not rule out a possible role of Amanullah or Amanullah supporters in his father’s killing.

(11) [amended on 18 September 2016: Amanullah also revoked some of his own reforms earlier, in 1924 and – in a last ditch attempt, already facing Habibullah’s and others’ revolts – in late 1928. The latter came after a new set of reforms he suggested after he returned from his long trip to Europe (he also visited Egypt). But he tried to stick to core reforms – in the legal field and in education, including girls’ education.

(12) This is somewhat unfair to the term, as US scholar James Caron – a Pashto speaker and currently at SOAS London – showed in his chapter “Taleban, Real and Imagined,” in the 2012 book Under the Drones, edited by Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews. He argues that “taleb” in the early twentieth century referred to a “romantic countercultural social type,” a critical voice who performed poetry at “taleb parties,” while often mocking the rich (and ogling girls).

(13) General Nader Khan became the new king, Nader Shah. He ruled from 1929 to 1933, until he was assassinated himself. Nader Shah followed a course of “selective modernisation” (a term used by US historian Vartan Gregorian in his 1969 standard oeuvre The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan) by trying not to repeat Amanullah’s mistake of antagonising the conservatives. As a result of his killing of Habibullah Kalakani, other uprisings occurred in Kohestan, now against the new king; the biggest was in 1930, under a leader named Purdel (Dupree, 460).

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The European Defence Agency (EDA) currently has several job openings in the different directorates: 15 temporary agents, five seconded national experts and one contractual agent. The profiles we’re looking for include director, head of unit, project officer and assistant positions across all EDA directorates. Candidates must apply via the EDA website.

Among the vacancies, you will find the position of Director Capability, Armament and Technology, Head of Unit Human Resources, Head of Unit Industry Strategy and Wider EU Policies, Policy Officer Industry Relations and Support, Project Officer Rotary Wing, Project Officer Maritime Capabilities or Personal Assistant to the Chief Executive and many more. Do not miss this chance and consult the EDA job portal for an overview of all open posts. Starting dates vary between March and October 2017.

The Agency is an “outward-facing” organisation, constantly interacting with its shareholders, the participating Member States, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders. It works in an integrated way, with multi-disciplinary teams representing all the Agency’s functional areas, to realise its objectives including its annual Work Programme and its rolling three-year Work Plan. Its business processes are flexible and oriented towards achieving results. Staff at all levels need to demonstrate the corresponding qualities of flexibility, innovation, and team-working; to work effectively with shareholders and stakeholder groups, formal and informal; and to operate without the need for detailed direction.

 

More information:

• Access the vacancy notices through our job portal

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel,

koya979 / Shutterstock.com

At three recent European Councils (December 2012, December 2013 and June 2015), the Heads of State or government have called for a deepening of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) namely by strengthening its crisis management dimension and further developing civilian and military capabilities. The June 2016 European Council reverted to security and defence policy with particular attention to the strengthening of the relationship with NATO, including on the development of complementary and interoperable defence capabilities.

But what are the achievements? Is there a way of measuring progress made over the past years? Is there a gap between intentions/declarations and deeds? What are the challenges and how to address them?

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) will address these questions at a roundtable discussion on ‘The European Council and CSDP: success or failure?’ on 27 September 2016, 13h30-15h00, in the European Parliament’s Library main reading room in Brussels. Participants at this roundtable debate are: Elmar Brok MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Jean-Paul Perruche, Former Director-General of the European Union Military Staff, Professor Alexander Mattelaer, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst, EPRS.

Registration
If you do not have an access badge to the European Parliament and are interested in attending the event, it is essential to register by Friday 23 September, using this link.

At the event the EPRS study on ‘The European Council and CSDP: Orientation and Implementation in the field of Crisis Management’ will be presented and discussed. This study assesses the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process, areas in which the European Council repeatedly called for further progress to be made.

 

Filed under: BLOG, Events, Policy Cycle Tagged: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), CSDP, EPRS Events, European Council, events, security and defence, Study, Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu

Americas

• SpaceX aims to resume rocket flights in November following a launch pad fire that destroyed a Falcon 9 rocket and an Israeli communications satellite it was due to lift into orbit earlier this month. The company stated that it has suspended Falcon 9 flights until it completes its investigation into why the rocket burst into flames during fueling for a routine prelaunch test at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. SpaceX had previously stated that a nearly-completed second launch site in Florida, located at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center (KSC), would be finished in November. The pad was last used to launch NASA’s space shuttles five years ago.

• Boeing has landed a $700 million US defense contract for Small Diameter Bomb Increment 1 weapons. The USAF deal will see the company deliver the munitions by December 12, 2021 and includes foreign military sales.

• Documents endorsed by retired top US military officers and former national security officials warn of the potential danger posed to US military operations by climate change. A statement in support of the findings was released yesterday and signed by more than a dozen former senior military and national security officials, including retired General Anthony Zinni, former commander of the US Central Command, and retired Admiral Samuel Locklear, head of the Pacific Command until last year. They called on the next US president to create a cabinet level position to deal with climate change and its impact on national security.

• The first units of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead rocket has rolled off Lockheed Martin’s production line. A company statement said the warhead was designed to engage the same target set and achieve the same area-effects requirement as the old MLRS submunition warhead, but without the lingering danger of unexploded ordnance. Lockheed received a US Army initial production contract for the warheads in June 2015.

Middle East & North Africa

• A Yemeni industrial site, supposedly a rebel missile manufacturing site, has been bombed by Saudi-led coalition forces. The bombing, which occurred on Tuesday in the capital of Sanaa, caused a fire that destroyed half the premises and resulted in several million dollars worth of damage. Local businessmen claim that plants located on the site were only used for the manufacture of piping and building supplies.

Africa

• South Africa’s Defense Minister announced plans to update the country’s indigenous Rooivalk attack helicopter. Speaking at this year’s African Aerospace & Defence Show, Nosiviwe Masipa-Nqakula said the helicopter has “blooded” itself having carried out a series of successful operations as part of the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Manufacturer Denel is also working on marketing the helicopter to other African governments who are fighting insurgencies, namely Nigeria and Egypt, and further afield governments like India and Brazil.

Europe

• Deliveries of the Leonardo Aermacchi M-346 advanced jet trainer destined for Poland will soon be underway following the successful conclusion of electromagnetic testing in an anechoic chamber. The next phase of experimental and certification flights will see two Polish aircraft have their communications and avionics systems tested, before moving on to trials of their embedded tactical training simulation (ETTS) equipment. The first of eight aircraft will touch down in Poland in November.

Asia Pacific

• Weapons Experts have warned of the ramping up of uranium enrichment by North Korea. The new uranium, when combined with current plutonium stocks, will give the regime enough material for 20 nuclear warheads. Pyongyang’s ability to evade a decade of UN sanctions has allowed it to develop the uranium enrichment process, enabling it to run an effectively self-sufficient nuclear program that is capable of producing around six nuclear bombs a year.

Today’s Video

Boeing’s T-X offering:

Base, Bleeding Out?
(click to view full)

Back in July 2005 it was apparent India’s sanctions against Denel and possible disqualification from a $2 billion artillery contract could have a major effect on the South African defense firm as a whole. In August 2005, those sanctions came to pass, barring Denel from a contract it was likely to win and accelerating efforts already underway to radically restructure the firm.

CEO Shaun Liebenberg launched that shift in late 2005 with some frank discussion of the global defense market, and the position of small-medium players like Denel in it. At DSEI 2005 in London, UK, the outline of this new strategy was already apparent. Many of the products Denel is known for will no longer define the firm. But could it find a way to stanch the bleeding and survive in a globalized market?

And how has it done since?

• Denel’s Position
  
• Denel’s New Strategy
  
• Updates and Key Events [updated]
  

Denel’s Position

Mokopa Laser ATGM

The new CEO was frank about Denel not being viable under the current model. According to Liebenberg, global prime contractors succeed due to privileged relationships with their domestic customer who largely fund and promotes the development of new system platforms.

“Changes in the defence industry have forced consolidation and the forming of alliances worldwide… Although Denel has an enviable range of products, we no longer have a captive domestic market or the scale to succeed as an independent systems integrator and exporter of such a broad range of products…”

“Our analysis of the international defence environment shows much of global defence spend is not directly accessible to independent contractors like Denel,” Liebenberg explained. “The US Department of Defense in recent years has awarded contracts almost exclusively to US and NATO companies. These companies supply most other markets, too. Developing nations like India, Brazil and Israel have strong domestic industries to serve their own customer, whilst giving intense competition to other independents.”

Rooivalk and Gripen
(click to view full)

Denel’s product range drives the full scope of its ambitions home. If anything, it’s surprising that the reckoning hasn’t come sooner.

Indigenous efforts in the missile field alone include the A-Darter (intended as a Sidewinder 9X/ ASRAAM/ AA-11 Archer contemporary), Ingwe and Mokopa anti-armor missiles (think TOW2 and Hellfire/Brimstone competitors), and Umkhonto-IR ship based anti-air missile. The firm also has a full line of optronics; 3 UAV projects (including a reconnaissance UAV, a high speed stealth UAV, and a target drone); a full-fledged new-generation attack helicopter project in the Rooivalk (Eurocopter Tiger/ AH-1Z/ Mi-28 contemporary); the Umbani bomb kit (a kit that converts ordinary bombs to something approaching a JSOW); world-class artillery systems in the G5, G6, and accompanying base bleed ammunition; vehicle turrets, a full line of military small arms; plus C4ISR products, licensed production of other helicopters, aircraft maintenance, and more.

Some products, like its artillery, are genuine world-beaters coping with a shrinking market for their specific product range. On the other hand, many of these expensive development projects were substitutable at home, and non-viable abroad from the get-go. Little wonder the new CEO has concluded that local defense spending clearly won’t suffice, even with some 45% of Denel’s business still deriving from the domestic market.

Worse, much of South Africa’s recent domestic spend has taken place in areas falling outside Denel’s product range, like fighter jets and naval systems. Denel’s involvement was limited to sub-contracts on the SA Navy’s corvette weapons suite, some workshare on the Gripen, Hawk and Agusta helicopter programs, and the hope of additional workshare as part of the Airbus A400M military transport. Liebenberg clearly understood, and stated, that some non-viable businesses would have to be made viable or exited entirely.

Denel’s New Strategy

Liebenberg believed that his company’s capabilities are attractive to global prime contractors for partnering. Liebenberg said Denel meets the pre-requisites to act as a specialised contractor that could slot into the value chain of the global players, because it has a technology edge or low cost production capabilities in several niche areas, plus good systems integration experience.

As such, he intends to pursue a strategy that focuses Denel business on being a domestic prime contractor, whilst becoming a specialized contractor or sub-supplier to other international defense contractors.

In keeping with Denel’s new strategic direction, formally announced by CEO Shaun Liebenberg in August 2005, the Group is showcasing some of its niche defence and aerospace systems at DSEI 2005 this week in London, UK.

Denel’s advanced LCT-30 combat turret will be part of the South African Army’s new generation infantry combat vehicle. Denel also hopes to interest more customers in its sophisticated sub-systems, like its ‘Eagle Eye’ target location binocular, Denel’s NATO certified LH-40C eyesafe laser rangefinder already in use with some European armies, the ‘Kenis’ infrared thermal imaging camera, and the Goshawk electro-optic stabilized airborne observation system. Denel is also supporting Zeiss Optronik of Germany with periscope equipment for a number of foreign navies.

Umkhonto-IR concept
(click to view larger)

Yet Denel hasn’t given up on all of its bigger projects. Its Umkhonto IR surface-to-air missile, selected by the South African and the Finnish navies, remains on offer now that performance testing and live firings have concluded successfully [DID: Sweden would eventually buy them too, as a partial offset for the SAAF’s new Gripen fighters]. In the artillery department, its ‘Arachnida’ electronic targeting and combat management is already in service on the UK’s light artillery guns and was exported in quantity to a Middle East customer, and Denel’s world-class artillery ammunition is currently being evaluated in the NATO environment as well as in the United States. In 2007, Denel announced a strategic alliance with Germany’s Nitrochemie to develop a new generation of modular propellant charges for 105mm and 155mm artillery, and 2008 saw Germany’s Rheinmetall take a majority stake in Denel Munitions.

It’s going to be a long road ahead for Denel, as it always is in major corporate restructurings. Jack Welch, widely considered to be the gold standard of modern-day CEOs, offered his take on the restructuring/ crisis process in a Wall St. Journal article that covered the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The circumstances are different, but the process is universally applicable.

In a way, however, the scale of the problem is blessing to Denel. The very overreach that has landed the firm in such trouble has also made it sufficiently important to South Africa’s defense infrastructure that allowing the firm to fail will be seen as a last resort option. Given the roster of projects it has successfully brought to fruition, it’s also clear that Denel has some very talented engineers and personnel on hand.

Strong government support, a solid share of South Africa’s production allocation for the A400M global project, and success in its alliance efforts could yet steer the South African firm back to health. Yet the international defense market is becoming a difficult place for small-mid size firms without an in-demand flagship product. Unlike Apollo 11, failure is an option.

Updates and Key Events Hoefyster/ Badger –
Denel concept
(click to view full)

September 15/16: South Africa’s Defense Minister announced plans to update the country’s indigenous Rooivalk attack helicopter. Speaking at this year’s African Aerospace & Defence Show, Nosiviwe Masipa-Nqakula said the helicopter has “blooded” itself having carried out a series of successful operations as part of the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Manufacturer Denel is also working on marketing the helicopter to other African governments who are fighting insurgencies, namely Nigeria and Egypt, and further afield governments like India and Brazil.

November 10/15: South African firm Denel Vehicle Systems has also bagged a $63 million contract to develop and produce N35 mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles with UAE firm NIMR, with this contract reportedly covering the development of both 4×4 and 6×6 variants over the next two years. An initial batch of South African-produced vehicles will be followed by a transition in production to the UAE, including transfer of the production line’s supply chain and technical expertise.

July 22/09: A Denel release suggests renewed efforts to step up exports – even as it makes the importance of the Hoefyster IFV project, and the continued primacy of South African defense spending, clear:

“In 2005 Denel Land Systems was a company “in anticipation.” Inheriting an overdraft of R400m and a loss of R180m year-on-year, DLS was insolvent for all intensive purposes. Despite this however, the strategic and technical value of the company remained evident… Having technical expertise and an artillery capability among the best in the world does not automatically equate to sustainability however… All product lines manufactured by DLS were reviewed as a result, with non-core products such as hunting rifles immediately being exited. We simultaneously applied for recapitalisation funding, which was used to repay an overdraft and give DLS a “clean start”

Despite this however, DLS needed a catalyst for growth and sustainability. With over 70% of its business coming from the local market and notably from the SANDF, it was critical that DLS secured a sizable defence contract… we were conscious of the business and strategic value this type of contract would enable… The Hoefyster project has provided just the required impetus. With a total contract value of R8.3bn and the demand phase in activation already worth R1bn, the contract’s full effects are not confined to DLS, but also being felt by 60 local contractors – a glimpse of the scale of impact the company can have on the local economy.

While Hoefyster proved a critical element in ensuring DLS broke even during the financial year 2008/09… we have started visiting previously interested international parties and looking for new ones in the Middle East, Far East, South America and Africa. To step into these international markets however, strategic partners will be critical in ensuring access. As such, our focus has seen us already engage with a number of key players so as to establish supplier contract relationships.”

July 16/09: Denel Group CEO Talib Sadik discusses the organisation’s revised growth strategy in a corporate release, and offers an update on turnaround progress made to date. Since the turnaround began in 2006, Denel has inked strategic equity partnerships with Carl Zeiss, Rheinmetall Defence and Saab:

“While acknowledging the Group still faced challenges, most notably the continued posting of losses by Denel Saab Aerostructures and securing further recapitalisation, Sadik maintained it was important to acknowledge the milestones that had already been achieved. These included the improved relationship with the South African Department of Defence, enhanced risk management and programme execution, and the significant performance of and turnaround seen in some of Denel’s fully-owned (100% shareholding) businesses… Turbomeca Africa has continued to grow its profits year-on-year. We have also seen Carl Zeiss Optronics’ sales per person has increased from R0.8 million to R1.6 million since its restructuring, and are expecting Rheinmetall Denel Munitions to post its first profits in the new financial year,” explained Sadik. He added that Carl Zeiss Optronics has shown a 100% increase in revenue over a two year period, while Rheinmetall Denel Munitions’ order cover is in the region of 70%.”

Overall, losses are continuing at a declining rate, from R 1.56 billion in the 2004/05 financial year to R 347 million in 2008 (q.v. Sept 9/08 entry). Despite the net loss, Denel Group’s gross profit has grown from -6% in 2006/07 to 16% in 2008/09, while revenue per employee across the Group has more than doubled from R 353,242 in 2006 to R 745,460 in 2009. R&D has grown to R 1.12 billion in 2009 driven largely by development of the A-Darter 5th generation air-to-air missile, the Badger/Hoefyster 8×8 IFV, and subcontracting work on the A400M military cargo aircraft.

Denel’s order book has seen the most growth, from R 3.75 billion in 2006 R 16.05 billion (including confirmed contracts) at the end of 2009. The May 2007 IFV win played a large role in that increase, by adding R 8.3 billion to the order book.

Jan 19/09: In its analysis of the South African defense industry, analyst firm Forecast International sees Denel’s efforts paying off. In accordance with mandates attached to government recapitalization efforts valued at $455 million, Denel has proceeded with restructuring. Forecast International believes that amid rising uncertainty around the domestic defense market, the sector’s decision to discard self-sufficiency in favor of an industry structure optimized to increase access to the global defense market appears is looking like a good strategy. It adds:

“Since the South African Ministry of Public Enterprise opted to divest from unprofitable domestic defense enterprises and relax regulations on foreign investment in the defense sector in late 2005/early 2006, 10 major acquisitions involving foreign defense enterprises targeting South African enterprises have occurred… Since early 2006, Denel has sold 20 percent of it aerostructures division at a price of ZAR66 million to Saab to form the Denel Saab Aerostructures joint venture; 70 percent of its optronics division was acquired by Carl Zeiss Optronics in exchange for phased investment in Denel’s European logistics network; and Rheinmetall AG acquired a 51 percent stake in Denel Munitions in return for the provision of financing and advising on the business unit’s restructuring.”

While Denel has yet to operate at a profit, operating losses declined nearly 37% between 2007 and 2008, and decreased at a compound annual rate of 74% since restructuring efforts were initiated in early 2006.

Talib Sadik

Sept 25/08: State-owned Denel (Pty) Ltd’s Chairman of the Board Dr Sibusiso Sibisi announces Talib Sadik’s appointment as Group CEO for a period of three years. Mr Sadik was appointed as Group Financial Officer of Denel in 2006, and has been an executive member of the Board of Directors since that date.

Sept 9/08: Denel’s Acting Group CEO Talib Sadik, announces that for the fiscal year that ended on March 31/08, the Denel Group increased gross revenue to R 3,894 million (2007: R 3,310 million) and posted a net loss of R 347 million (2007: R 549 million). Of the total turnover 56.8% was from domestic sales (2007: 47.5%) and 43.2% from export sales (2007: 52.5%). Sadik:

“We managed to improve the loss for the past year through focusing on core businesses, phasing out of legacy contracts, savings in operating costs and profits on the sale of non-core assets… Better contract negotiations including higher advance payment receipts towards the year-end and improvements in our debt collection process helped us to achieve the healthy cash situation.”

See full Denel release | Engineering News.

Sept 1/08: The finalized deal involving Rheinmetall and Denel Munitions comes into effect. Denel release [PDF].

June 1/08: Denel Group’s CFO Mr Talib Sadik becomes interim CEO of Denel.

Feb 8/08: Germany’s Rheinmetall Group signs an agreement with Denel (Pty) Ltd, indicating its intention to take a majority equity stake in Denel Munitions. The deal is finalized on Sept 1/08. Read “Rheinmetall Buying Majority Stake in Denel Munitions” for more.

A-Darter
(click to view larger)

July 25/07: Denel’s Group CEO Mr Shaun Liebenberg, announces a net loss of R 549.1 million for the past year ended March 31/07 (2006: R 1,363.4 million) on turnover of R 3,268.1 million (2006: R 2,773.2 million). Gross profit rose to R 754.0 million (2006: loss of R131.1 million). His statement adds:

“Incremental sales by Denel Land Systems and Denel Munitions to clients in South America, Europe and the Middle East added to the increased turnover… At year-end Denel received a number of large contracts, notably the R8.3 billion ‘Hoefyster’ – the biggest in Denel’s 15-year existence, and the A-Darter air-to-air missile contract worth approximately R1 billion… BAE Systems awarded Munitions a contract worth R300 million over three years to supply brass cups, which are used in the manufacture of small calibre ammunition. Denel Optronics, in which German firm Carl Zeiss Optronics has acquired a majority holding, received a BAE Systems contract worth R200 million to produce 450 units of its unique pilot helmet tracker system for use in the Eurofighter-Typhoon jet.

…The agreement signed with Saab in Sweden in June 2006 regarding the establishment of a new aerostructures company, led to Saab AB (publ) taking an initial minority equity stake and operational management control, with Denel retaining an 80% holding… At the close of the financial year Denel and German company Carl Zeiss Optronics GmbH agreed on an equity partnership for Denel Optronics. Denel was to retain a minority share with Carl Zeiss Optronics taking a majority holding of 70%. The effective transaction date was after year-end, with final share transfer on 20 July 2007. The company now trades as Carl Zeiss Optronics (Pty) Limited.”

May 17/07: Denel wins the $1.2 billion, 264-vehicle contract for the South African Army’s new generation “Hoefyster” infantry combat vehicle program. The goal is to produce an 8×8 wheeled APC in the 25 ton class, designed as a family of vehicles that can be equipped with various turret and on-board options. It is described as the biggest single contract in firm history. The vehicle will not be Denel’s, however, but Patria Oyj of Finland’s popular AMV.

April 2007: Denel’s missile/UAV subsidiary Denel Dynamics announces a joint development agreement with Brazil’s Ministry of Defence and Forca Aerea Brasileira for the A-Darter short range air-air missile (SRAAM), signed as a government to government agreement via South Africa’s Armscor. The original contract was apparently signed in July-August 2006, but the formal cooperation launch was announced at the 2007 Latin American Aerospace and Defence exhibition in Brazil.

Additional Readings

• DID – New Options: Denel & Tawazun’s Precision Weapons Partnership

M270 firing M30 GMLRS
(click to view full)

Precision artillery fire offers an alternative to air support. It has a shorter reach, but very considerable throw-weight and repeatable fire, plus 100% persistence and availability in any weather. GMLRS is a highly accurate GPS-guided rocket that can be fired by ground forces 35 miles away and arrive on target, in under a minute, under any conditions, with a 200 pound unitary warhead that will take out a fortified house. That’s very useful. When integrated into a battlefield surveillance/strike setup like Task Force ODIN, their effectiveness is kicked up several more notches. Rocket pods can be carried on M142 HIMARS truck-mounted systems (1 pod, 6 rockets), or tracked M270 MLRS launchers (2 pods, 12 rockets).

In July 2011, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Dallas, TX received a $438.2 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for Full Rate Production Lot VI. It includes:

• 767 unitary rocket pods (with 6 x 227mm rockets each)
  
• 508 reduced range practice rockets (RRPR, used for training)
  
• Plus integrated logistics support.

They’ll go to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, as well as GMLRS pods for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers Japan, Jordan, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike last year, neither the Pentagon nor Lockheed Martin will discuss specific numbers of rocket pods per customer.

Work will be performed in Grand Prairie, TX; Camden, AZ; Orlando, FL; and Lufkin, TX, with an estimated completion date of April 30/14. One bid was solicited with one bid received by US AMCOM Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-11-C-0166). See also Lockheed Martin release.

Updates

September 15/16: The first units of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead rocket has rolled off Lockheed Martin’s production line. A company statement said the warhead was designed to engage the same target set and achieve the same area-effects requirement as the old MLRS submunition warhead, but without the lingering danger of unexploded ordnance. Lockheed received a US Army initial production contract for the warheads in June 2015.

May 24/16: Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $331.7 million foreign military sales contract by the US Army. The sale will see the company provide the defense departments of Israel, Singapore, Finland and Jordan with the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) which includes 290 alternative warhead rocket pods, 34 unitary rocket pods and 529 reduced range practice rocket pods. Work and delivery of the system is expected to be completed by March 31, 2018.

Mikros Systems has been contracted by the US Navy for the production, logistics support and future development of its ADEPT distance support sensor suite (ADSSS) condition based maintenance (CBM) system for its littoral combat ship (LCS) programme.

BAE Systems is testing a new technology, the Ship Energy Assessment - Condition Optimisation & Routing Enhancement System (SEA-CORES), which is being developed to transform ship maintenance for the UK Royal Navy and commercial organisations.

The Gregorio del Pilar-class multi-role frigates have been in service with the Philippine Navy since 2011. They are intended to improve maritime security of the Philippines in Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal islands located in the South China S…

The Indonesian Navy’s new Sigma 10514 Perusak Kawal Rudal (PKR) guided-missile frigate has successfully concluded its sea trials.

Russian Floks 120 mm Self-Propelled Mortar System

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