Defence`s Feeds

American F-16V "Viper" Lightweight Multi-Role Fighter

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

In this third Long Post in a five-part series on defence and the EU Global Strategy, Daniel Keohane argues that now is as good a time as any for deeper European military cooperation.

The post The paradox of EU defence policy appeared first on European Geostrategy.

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Greetings! This week’s piece pivots off of the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ comments regarding disruptive thinkers, which intersects nicely with an article I am wrapping up on Evans Carlson and his Raider concept in WWII. It is also influenced by the broader context which seems to favour and privilege innovation. And so, as the tide seems to be in favour, I thought I would just disrupt things a little. Enjoy the piece and join the discussion on Twitter at the hashtag, #CCLKOW.

 

In a call for support from the Corps’ hidden legions of disruptive thinkers, General Robert Neller initiated what amounted to a cultural revolution. Confronting what seems to be an increasingly complex world it is hoped that such individuals, as well as contenders from the rank and file whose experiences can light the path to real world solutions, will aid the agility and effectiveness of the Corps. This latest genuflection at the altar of the novel builds on the larger trend which values innovative thinking.

We are all quite certain this is a good thing, right?

But is it?

First, Neller is correct to note that the culture of the Marine Corps must adapt if this has the slightest chance to offer anything more than fits and starts of short-lived new ideas. For its many strengths, there is an historical resistance to figures whose ideas lie too far outside the standard. Evans Carlson, father of a wildly innovative warfighting unit and concept, did not succeed within the institution. Nor did William Corson, the Marine officer behind the first and very novel Combined Action Program in Vietnam. The successful Marines of the last 75 years have been those who have moderated change at the fringes but not fundamentally altered course. These are the cultural terms of success that will need to be countered. Of course, the problem is that institutional culture is a very difficult thing to change, and it is debatable whether that can be achieved under the tenure of a single commandant.

Second, this effort and others more generally assume that the best answers will come from within the armed forces and in direct response to issues. But important innovation is often found in odd spaces disconnected from the particular problem at hand. Much of the smart advances in air mobility between the two world wars came from the private sector or other public services. While I am not in favour of the thinking which posits that war and commerce as activities are similar, I am not so dogmatic that I cannot see the value of certain competencies crossing between the two areas. This is not to suggest that internal voices not be listened to or even heard, but only to caution that left and right of arc is limited if the box one need get outside of is only the military one.

Third, if everyone is disrupting and innovating, when do the armed forces develop competency? There is a point at which there will be diminishing marginal returns if this trend is pushed too far. Yes, at the extreme of every argument one finds foolishness, but in this case I suspect the frontier to that point is far closer than most people want to admit. And as we heap more praise and value upon innovation and disruption, I suspect the ability to admit that frontier will become more difficult. But at some point armed forces must train and do, neither of which are entirely amenable to constant flux. Alternatively, we can let loose the dogs of intellectual and other creativity and ingenuity because this is truly a period of existential peace. Arguing for both sides, the need to plan, prepare, and execute while simultaneously embarking upon revolutionary change seems only a recipe for disaster.

Fourth, are things really changing at such a rate that constant disruption and innovation are necessary? There are elements to the character of warfare which are shifting, but many stable elements remain, and certainly key principles remain immutable. I heard at the beginning of my career in military affairs that a Marine well-trained to his basic job could, on the basis of discipline and leadership, adapt to any situation. I heard the same thing today in class from a French officer. Despite the seeming revolutionary change of the last two decades of conflict, this basic approach remains a significant touchstone to many. Much like the liberal arts remain a valuable education for many different life and career choices despite every effort to drive novelty in university learning, perhaps the old way needed no superseding.

To close, I would point to the arena of military hardware. There is an unrelenting push to create, deploy, and destroy with the next cycle the technology of war. The F-35 has barely entered service and the next generation of aircraft is already a thing. And it will be a costly thing. Replicated across the armed forces, such a phenomenon acquires a heft that I doubt many can truly comprehend. And to what end? It is uncertain what military advantage is gained, but the costs are staggering. Whether these investments can be maintained indefinitely is entirely questionable. Even if possible, to impose this phenomenon across the armed forces, in thinking, software, and hardware, may not, in the end, achieve any greater marginal benefit than is currently seen with every new, expensive bit of major kit.

So, my questions for discussion are:

What is the innovation that American, British, or other armed forces need?

How do we drive the right innovation? How do we kill the bad?

At what point is disruption merely disruptive and not productive? 

Can the culture of armed forces really change? Or, historically, have the best innovations been the ones which accommodated themselves to the extant institutional culture?

What is the right admixture of innovators, disruptors, and status quo defenders for the armed forces?

Join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW

In this second Long Post in a five-part series on defence and the EU Global Strategy, Bastian Giegerich looks at European military capability development and future conflict.

The post European military capabilities and future conflict appeared first on European Geostrategy.

The Centre for Security Governance has just published its latest CSG Paper, “Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Afghanistan” written by Deedee Derksen.This is the first of four papers produced as part of the CSG’s project on Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Conflict-Affected States. The project was made possible by generous financial support

In early January 2016, an Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) operation in Zurmat, a southern district of Paktia province, resulted in civilian casualties. According to local residents, the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers’ heavy shelling of villages they suspected to be Taleban hideouts caused the most harm. Abuses, such as beatings and the use of schools and civilian houses for military purposes, were also reported. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary looks into reports of abuses – both by the ANSF and the Taleban – during the January operation as a case study of the increased threat to civilians during military operations, and also of how difficult it can be to ascertain what happened. 

The operation

Afghan security forces began their operation in Zurmat on 2 January 2016, ending it ten days later, on 12 January. (1) According to Colonel Fazle Khuda, a Public Relations officer at 203 Thunder Military Corps in the provincial capital Gardez, the joint operation (codenamed Khyber) was carried out by the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). Afghan Special Forces were also told to stand by in case government forces faced strong resistance, however they were never called in, he said.

The aim of the operation was to repel insurgents from one of their strongholds, Sahak, an area north of the district mainly inhabited by the Sahak tribe. Ultimately, the operation aimed to undermine the Taleban’s ability to mount attacks from the area. Although it was declared a success by Afghan government forces, it does not seem to have changed anything for the better. Local officials talking to AAN have expressed doubt that the Taleban were ever cleared from the area. It seems that the insurgents did not engage the ANSF in a serious manner, but rather left the area on motorbikes when security forces approached and returned after the operation came to an end.

According to local respondents, there wasn’t any large-scale ground engagement between Afghan soldiers and the Taleban fighters during the operation. According to a local who works as a teacher in Gardez, when government forces arrived in the area, the Taleban only fought back on the first day, but the fighting was not intense. One Taleban fighter and two soldiers were killed during those skirmishes, according to residents.

Fighting continued over the next ten days. Most of the Taleban fighters moved to the Daulatzai area, from where they could fire at the ANA and then retreat. The soldiers then responded by shooting in the direction from where they came under fire, often causing local casualties.

On the last day of the operation, on 12 January 2016, both the Afghan government and the Taleban claimed victory in Sahak, quoting inflated casualty figures. According to the 203 Thunder Military Corps Commander General, Asrar Aqdas, who was quoted in a statement sent to media outlets by the governor’s office in Gardez, 61 militants were killed, 21 wounded and another eight arrested (see Khama press report here). The statement said two vehicles, two motorbikes, 510 kg of explosives and 32 mines were also found and then destroyed. The figures were double-checked with Fazle Khuda of the 203 corps in a recent AAN interview and he confirmed these were indeed the official figures.

The Taleban fighters, in a report on their website (see here) on 12 January 2016, also talked up their ‘successes.’ As a result of “strong resistance by the Taleban fighters,” the report claimed the government soldiers who had used heavy weapons and military vehicles had “faced a severe reaction” and “left the area shamefully.” Their report claimed 25 commandos had been killed, 14 wounded, five ‘tanks’ (usually referring to armored vehicles) destroyed and weapons and ammunition seized, while only one of their fighters was supposedly killed and another three wounded.

However, tribal elders and other sources from the area who talked to AAN did not confirm the high figures given by either side. According to a tribal elder who did not want to be named, one Taleban fighter and two ANA soldiers were killed as a result of the operation. Figures given by local officials were also much lower, and probably more realistic. Zurmat district governor, Kiftan Ekhlas, told AAN that only three Taleban fighters were killed during this operation, an account categorically rejected by Fazle Khuda.

Background on Zurmat: Loya Paktia’s meeting point for two Taleban networks

With its centre located 26 kilometres to the west of the provincial capital Gardez on the main Gardez to Ghazni highway, Zurmat is the largest district in Paktia. It has played a central role, during both the 1990s’ Emirate and the post-2001 insurgency, in terms of its representation of senior Taleban military and civil leadership (more background here). It was the centre stage for one of the largest American-led operations to topple the Taleban, Operation Anaconda, in the Shahi Kot mountains in the southern half of the district from 2 to 16 March 2002, although the Taleban fighters were not completely pushed out. Over the last 15 years it has never come under complete government control. Zurmat was difficult for the international forces as well. The densely populated district with its flat plains connects Paktia to three provinces (Paktika to the south, Ghazni to the west and Logar to the north) making it a crossroads for Taleban fighters who use it to freely move between these three provinces.

Most of the Taleban fighters who fight in Zurmat belong to both the Haqqani network as well as Abdul Latif Mansur’s, nephew of Nasrullah Mansur, the leader of a splintered faction of Harakat-e Nawin-e Inqilab-e Islami (New Islamic Revolution Moment). The focus of the operation, Sahak, is also where Latif Mansur’s wider family residence is. Mansur’s fighters are in the majority in the district, while Haqqani fighters are smaller in number.

The January 2016 operation was preceded by several small attacks by Taleban fighters in different areas of the district, mostly targeting Afghan National Army (ANA) check-posts as well as government convoys passing through Zurmat district on the Ghazni to Gardez highway.

The January 2016 operation itself was mostly centered on the relatively quiet area to the north of Tamir, the main district town, where the district governor’s compound is located. As Sahak has long been almost fully under Taleban control, it had not seen much fighting between Taleban fighters and government forces that tended to avoid the area in the past.

Civilian casualties and abuses

When government soldiers were preparing to leave Sahak on the evening of 11 January 2016 at the end of the operation, Taleban fighters attacked their convoy in the Ibrahimkhel area. This triggered indiscriminate shelling by government forces, which wounded one person at a nearby filling station, according to local residents. The wounded civilian was first taken to the hospital in Gardez, but when family members complained, security forces helped to send the wounded man to Kabul for further treatment.

According to several inhabitants of Zurmat who talked to AAN, Afghan security forces had often fired mortar rounds during the operation into nearby villages, whenever they came under attack from mobile Taleban teams. The shelling, according to their reports, hit several villages, among them Pan, Tarakai, Mangalkhel, Haideri Qala, Pakikhel, Mado Qala, Abdul Rahimkhel, Daulatzai, Sheikhan, Sangikhel and Liwan. The locals described the shelling as ruthless and indiscriminate. They said heavy shelling would follow only a few shots fired by the Taleban. Afghan security forces also set up a temporary base close to the main clinic, as well as in a high school in Sahak.

Taleban fighters were also ruthless, attacking the Afghan forces from within villages and areas close to local houses, which made those inhabited areas into military targets.

According to local residents, four civilians including two women were killed and another six wounded as a result of the ten-day operation. Moreover, residents in a few villages were beaten up when government soldiers checked their houses. The local people AAN spoke with claimed that none of those killed, wounded or beaten were Taleban or had links to them.

Local residents brought up several specific cases of civilian casualties. One girl, who had recently got engaged and was soon to be married, was killed in the village of Pan when a mortar shell landed in front of her house. In the village of Tarakai, a man and a woman from the Kotikhel area were riding on a motorbike when ANA soldiers shot at the couple, killing the man on the spot. Local residents claim the woman died later due to the shock from the death of her husband. Fazle Khuda, the army PR officer, claimed in an interview with AAN that the man had been a Taleb. Lastly, one man was killed and another wounded when a mortar shell hit a house in Mado Qala.

In addition to civilian deaths, locals were wounded in the villages of Pakikhel, Daulatzai, Sheikhan, Haidari Qala and Mado Qala as a result of ANA shelling, according to local sources. For instance, in Haidari Qala, the son of a madrassa teacher, Mullah Jasim, was seriously wounded when an ANA mortar hit his house. In Neknam, ANA soldiers set up a temporary base in the area’s main high school. According to a local resident who spoke to AAN by phone and did not want to be named, ANA soldiers stole lab equipment and computers and made a mess of the school’s classrooms, using them “as bathrooms.” Fazle Khuda rejected this claim. In the houses where the Afghan soldiers set up temporary posts, they reportedly used the firewood locals had collected for the winter. Such incidents happened in Shamulzi, Ibrahimkhel, Khadarkhel and Sangikhel villages.

In the early days of the operation in Neknam, ANA soldiers did not allow residents from nearby villages to go out and purchase food for days, creating a food shortage. When villagers asked the soldiers for permission, they were told to borrow food and other items from neighbours and help each other until the operation had ended.

Another local source said that on the first day of the operation, ANA soldiers beat people while searching their houses. Two young men in Taraki village, the son of Karim and the son of Mohammad Yar, were said to have been injured, incurring broken bones and head injuries. A tribal elder from Sahak said Afghan security forces had beaten people in Sangikhel, Mangalkhel, Taraki, Kotkai, Pan and Samandarkhel.

Although the exact dates of these incidents could not be ascertained, other sources, such as the spokesman for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) in Paktia, Adel Azizi, and Zurmat’s district governor Kiftan Ekhlas, confirmed the killing, wounding and mistreatment of a number of local residents, although they did not provide details. Ekhlas said it was difficult to identify who had killed the civilians because both warring parties shot at each other, while the AIHRC spokesman said it was difficult for them to identify individual cases because of security reasons. But the 203 Army Corps Public Relations officer, Fazle Khuda, did confirm such incidents in general terms, when he said that “of course people are killed and wounded, because there is fighting ongoing and rockets are fired.” However, he rejected the specific accounts and said that Taleban fighters had forced civilians to speak out against Afghan security forces.

Reactions to the operation

In the midst of the operation, on 8 January 2016, a number of Zurmat residents, provincial council members and the AIHRC spokesman held a gathering in Gardez during which they protested against the mistreatment of civilians by government forces (see one media report here). During the gathering, the AIHRC spokesman said that certain non-Pashtun soldiers did not care about Pashtun locals during the operation. When asked for more details by AAN in a phone interview, he declined to elaborate further on the behaviour of government forces.

ANSF’s pursuit of short-term goals at heavy cost in the battle for hearts and minds

Operation Khyber, which aimed to clear the insurgents’ operational bases from Sahak, seems to have achieved little. The ANSF entered an area that had long been run by the Taleban, but were not able to hold for long. This is a pattern seen in many other places. The heavy cost of alienating the local population, who may be more familiar with and supportive of the Taleban, seems to override the short-term benefits of winning a battle against insurgents in their local heartlands.

It is difficult to establish exactly what happened in Sahak. As in many other areas, reports of civilian casualties are often ignored, while government officials tend to rely on what local officials report. It is clear, however, that both sides endangered local civilians: the Taleban, with their use of guerrilla tactics, including using civilian areas as staging grounds for attacks; and the Afghan government forces that, as highlighted in a recent UNAMA report on the protection of civilians, do not take sufficient care of the population’s safety, even while trying to win the battle for hearts and minds.

 

(1) More recently, and seemingly unrelated to Operation Khyber, another newsworthy military development in Zurmat was one in which the Afghan National Army (ANA), on 25 February 2016, abandoned a military base in the Kulalgo area of Zurmat. Local officials called it a tactical retreat (read this Pajhwok report), while military officials said it was due to an order from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to abandon unnecessary bases. The base, which was on the main Ghazni-Ghardez Highway near the Kulalgo bazaar, had been set up by US soldiers in the past and had been handed over to the Afghan army after the US military left. Last autumn, Taleban fighters attacked the base and fighting lasted for one and a half weeks. Now MoD officials appear to believe its presence is unnecessary in the area.

Speaking before the European Parliament’s security and defence subcommittee (SEDE) on Thursday March 3rd, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq stressed the need for a more coordinated European approach to effectively tackle hybrid threats. At a time when hybrid warfare tactics - a combination of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions - are increasingly employed by state- and non-state actors in conflicts close to the EU’s southern and eastern borders (Ukraine, Syria, Libya), “it is essential to focus on the ability and agility of Member States and the EU to anticipate and react in a swift and coordinated manner” to these threats, Mr Domecq said.  Most individual Member States have adequate capabilities in place to counter hybrid threats, “but they must learn to deploy those resources in a more coherent, comprehensive way”, he stressed. The European External Action Service (EEAS), supported by EDA and the Commission, is currently preparing a joint framework on hybrid warfare which will form the basis of the future work in this field. In the meantime, the EDA continues its work of assessing the extent to which hybrid threats will affect capability development in Europe in the broadest possible context, Mr Domecq told MEPs. To this end, EDA will conduct a table top exercise from 9-11 March which will involve relevant actors, such as the EEAS, the European Commission, NATO, Member States and academics. The results will be presented to Ministers of Defence in April.

Enhanced EU-NATO cooperation

Referring to the potential of enhanced EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats, Mr Domecq expressed the view that progress in this particular field could take EU-NATO relations “to a new level”. In the current context of rapidly spreading hybrid warfare, to intensify cooperation with NATO “is not an option, but an absolute necessity”, the EDA Chief Executive stated in the presence of NATO Assistant Secretary General Heinrich Brauss who also attended the SEDE meeting. “Our collective reply to hybrid is a major opportunity (…) The comparative advantages of the EU and NATO should be used to the maximum extent. The deterrence effect of NATO and the complementarity of our (EU) tools and instruments, are more than enough reason to enhance our cooperation”, he said. 

Global Strategy, R&T

In his speech, Mr Domecq also touched upon the upcoming EU Global Strategy telling MEPs that the EDA would use its full expertise to help translate the Global Strategy into EU military capabilities required to deal with current and future security risks, including hybrid threats. He also highlighted the need for increased investments in defence-related research and technologies (R&T) with a particular focus on dual-use technologies and civilian-military synergies. By pushing forward the Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research project which is scheduled to be launched in 2017, the EDA and the European Commission “recognise that investing today in future-oriented defence research programmes is crucial to developing the capabilities that are required tomorrow”, Mr Domecq stated. 

will take place on Wednesday 16 March, 9:00-12:30 and 15:00-18:30, and Thursday 17 March, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

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Upcoming presidential elections in Philippines and a 9.2% increase in the country's defence budget sees National Coast Watch Council Secretariat, Office Of The President partnering with IQPC Asia to host the inaugural Maritime Security & Coastal Surveillance Philippines in

“Malta needs to have an enhanced presence in the European Defence Agency,” said Minister for Home Affairs and National Security, Carmelo Abela, during a meeting with Mr Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the EDA which discussed ways to enhance defence cooperation on a European level.

Malta’s involvement in EDA projects and activities, the upcoming EU Global Strategy and preparations for next year’s Maltese Presidency of the Council of the European Union were discussed during this meeting. 

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq very much welcomed  the Minister’s commitment and underlined the Agency’s flexible, à la carte, approach. Member States can choose areas of interest according to national defence priorities. Mr Domecq encouraged Minister Abela to actively consider participation in EDA’s projects according to Malta’s areas of interest and participation. He also assured Minister Abela of the Agency’s support in preparation of and during the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2017.

Minister Abela reiterated Malta’s commitment to actively contribute to European defence while taking into account its limited resources - Malta’s defence budget amounts to €53 million or 0.6% of the GDP. The Armed Forces of Malta will also continue strengthening their capabilities in both air and maritime surveillance to protect Malta and EU’s borders through EU funds.

The Minister for Home Affairs pointed out that the issue of the Mediterranean will be on top of the agenda during Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union next year. This will be in line with its established priorities, which include the migration and maritime aspects. He also expressed his hope for a functional unity government to be established in Libya, as this will have a direct impact on the stability of the whole region.

Minister Abela noted positively Mr Domecq’s remarks that for the EDA, all Member States have the same weight as stakeholders, irrespective of their size.

The meeting in Valletta was part of a series of visits by Mr Domecq to all EDA Member States, underlining the Agency’s commitment to work closely with and support all Member States.