Defence`s Feeds

On 21 June 2017 from 14:30 to 19:30, the European Parliament will organise a high-level conference on migration management in the European Parliament in Brussels. The conference will bring together political leaders, policymakers and practitioners to contribute to a reflection on a strategy to manage migration flows, and ensure a stable and prosperous environment at our borders. It will be organised in cooperation with the relevant parliamentary committees. Speakers will notably include:

Antonio Tajani, President of the European Parliament

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission

Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission

Werner Hoyer, President of the European Investment Bank

Markku Markkula, President of the Committee of the Regions

Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship

Neven Mimica, Commissioner for International Development

Julian King, Commissioner for Security Union

Louise Arbour, United Nations Special Representative for International Migration

William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organisation for Migration

Claude Moraes, Chair of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee

Linda McAvan, Chair of the Committee on Development

Further information
Registration
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Poster
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The British Royal Navy is set to take delivery of the Albion-class amphibious command ship HMS Albion, following a £90m mid-life technical upgrade programme.

The Australian Department of Defence has taken delivery of the first of three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers (AWDs), HMAS Hobart, from Lockheed Martin.

On 21 June, SEDE will hold an exchange of views with the Commissioner for the Security Union, Sir Julian King. Members will take stock of the state of play of the implementation of the European Agenda on Security and the progress made towards an operational and effective Security Union. The debate will also focus on the increasing interdependence between internal and external security, and the legislative initiatives to be taken in upcoming months to tackle terrorism and organized crime.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On June 15th the EDA Steering Board accepted, by written procedure, the Outline Description for the Governmental Satellite Communications (GOVSATCOM) Pooling and Sharing demonstration project (GSC demo). Under the leadership of Spain, the project brings together Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Norway, which has signed an Administrative Arrangement with the Agency, is also participating in the project. The next step will be the establishment of a Project Arrangement.

The project originates from an EDA Steering Board decision of November 2013 which tasked EDA to pursue its work on GOVSATCOM coordination with Member States, the European Commission and the European Space Agency in order to propose a comprehensive programme for Member States who wish to participate. Subsequently, the task to prepare the next generation of GOVSATCOM was confirmed by the European Council in December 2013 and work on GOVSATCOM has also started at the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Commission.

The main objective of the project is to meet the GOVSATCOM demands of Member States and European CSDP actors through pooled capabilities (bandwidth/power and/or services) provided by contributing Member States. This governmental pooled capability is set up to provide SATCOM resources that cannot be obtained on the commercial market  with a sufficient level of guaranteed access and security. 

The Steering Board acceptance marks the end of the GOVSATCOM preparation phase where EDA employed a sequential approach in developing this project, analysing since 2014 satellite communication needs for European actors involved in the conduct of national or CSDP operations and detailing potential solutions to address the capability development.  

The work in EDA has been supported by a feasibility study since mid-2015. This study identified the GOVSATCOM Information Exchange Requirements and provided a forecast tool assessing both defense satellite connectivity requirements in support of European CSDP activities and national operations of EU Member States, as well as civil government requirements for European government stakeholders. The focus was on communications requiring guarantee of access, security and autonomy that go beyond standard commercial satellite solutions, without requiring the highest level of security that only military satellite systems can provide. 
The next step then was to carry out a detailed assessment of existing and planned commercial and governmental satellite systems and their suitability to meet the aforementioned requirements.

The study relied on a variety of sources and analytical processes, including the use of an external study conducted for the European Commission on civil government requirements and studies conducted for ESA to define new satellite systems to fill gaps identified in the assessment part of the EDA GOVSATCOM feasibility study.
In parallel with the study, EDA’s SATCOM project team developed the GOVSATCOM Common Staff Requirements and an associated Business Case. Both documents have been approved by the Steering Board in March 2017. 

The Business Case closely follows a recommendation of the study for EDA to explore a Pooling and Sharing demonstration as part of the European GOVSATCOM initiative. The project will be put in place progressively with due consideration given to the impact it might have on suppliers, users and alternative frameworks. The Pooling and Sharing demonstration will require close cooperation, not only  between the Member States which contribute to the SATCOM capability pool and those who use it but also with the other GOVSATCOM activities pursued in ESA and the Commission.

The Ad-Hoc Working Group of the GSC demo project, consisting of all 14 Member States and Norway, will now establish the Project Arrangement detailing the legal conditions for the project.
 

Background

Reliable, stable and secure communications are crucial in any CSDP mission or operation. Yet, terrestrial network infrastructures are not available everywhere, for instance in areas hit by natural disasters, at sea, in the air or in hostile zones. Satellite communications (SATCOM) can be the solution: rapidly deployable, flexible and distance insensitive, they offer communication links where terrestrial networks are damaged, overloaded or non-existent.

However, access to SATCOM cannot be taken for granted at any time, especially not when government users require them at short notice and without pre-arranged agreements. In situations of high demand, competition with other users of commercial SATCOM capacities creates a risk of non-availability and high costs. Against this backdrop, EU leaders decided in 2013 that there was a need for a new solution combining the advantages of commercial and military satellite systems in order to address both civil and military needs through European cooperation. The European Defence Agency, in collaboration with the European Commission and the European Space Agency, is now preparing the next generation of GOVSATCOM. 

GOVSATCOM will be a capability that is placed in between the commercial satellite communication market and the highly protected military satellite communication capability.

 

More information:

• EDA factsheet GOVSATCOM
• EDA project page GOVSATCOM
• Video: GOVSATCOM - SATCOM for security and defence 

 

Air show with an A350 XWB, an A400M, an Eurofighter Typhoon and an H160 helicopter.

Tag: Airbus

On 12 April, the SEDE committee will organise a workshop on the implementation of the EU's arms export control system, in the context of its work on the annual report on arms exports. The workshop will focus on the issues of strengthening compliance with the Council common position governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, compliance with reporting obligations, increasing transparency and public scrutiny, and the development of the EU's institutional framework.
Location : Altiero Spinelli building 3G-3
Further information
Programme
Report
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

A review conducted by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended that the US Navy develop a precise cost estimate for the second Ford-class ship USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79).

General Atomics (GA) has received a sole source production contract modification for advanced arresting gear (AAG) for the US Navy's third future Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier Enterprise (CVN 80).

Global science and technology company Leidos has secured a prime contract from the US Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Fleet Logistics Center to deliver professional and technical support to the Joint Staff J6 (JS J6) joint deployable analysis t…

In response to the migration challenge, on 13 May 2015 the European Commission presented the European Agenda on Migration, with the aim of setting out a comprehensive approach for improving the management of migration in all its aspects. Several implementation packages under the Agenda have already been adopted and the measures therein are starting to be deployed; legislative proposals have also been made and are currently being discussed in Parliament and Council.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

This briefing presents a short summary of the positions taken by the European Parliament on issues related to migration and asylum in its most recent relevant Resolutions. It has been prepared for the high-level conference on migration management which takes place on 21st June 2017.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Please find below a link to extracts from the exchange of views of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence with Ursula von der LEYEN, German Minister for Defence on 13 June in Strasbourg.
Further information
Debate
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Essex Innovation Programme and Anglia Ruskin University has presented iX Cameras with The Innovation 50 Award.

Americas

• BAE Systems will provide Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) upgrade kits to the US Navy. The $181 million deal is funded under a recently announced indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity contract and will allow BAE to keep up with increased demand for APKWS rockets instead of more expensive laser-guided munitions such as the Hellfire missile. The APKWS mid-body guidance kit transforms standard unguided Hydra 70 (2.75-inch) rockets into highly accurate precision munitions by easily screwing into place between the warhead and the motor. Export customers can purchase the technology through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

• Lockheed Martin has won a $59 million USAF contract modification to provide fuselage trainers for systems used on the KC-10J. The firm will provide trainers modified from C-10 fuselages designed to represent the functions and appearance of the KC-130J tanker aircraft, and will allow for training on exterior and interior preflight and post-flight inspections and loading operations. Work will be conducted in Tulsa, Okla., and Marietta, Ga, with a completion date scheduled for December 31, 2021.

Middle Easy & North Africa

• Elbit Systems is planning to make the debut of its SkyStriker loitering munitions system at this year’s Paris air show. The system is able to locate, acquire and attack targets with high precision, with an operator using its electro-optical/infrared seeker to identify threats. The company added that the SkyStriker can engage targets from a variety of angles, while an operator will be able to abort a strike as little as 2s prior to impact, before re-engaging other authorised threats or returning to a recovery point. The air vehicle lands using a parachute and airbag.

Europe

• Switzerland has approved funds for the initial stages of its F/A-18C/D fighter successor program. $10 million has been allocated in order to cover preparatory studies, testing and other pre-acquisition costs, with a decision to be made by the end of 2020. Additional funds for the full procurement should be in place by 2022, with deliveries to commence in 2025. Bern is also planning to undertake a life extension program for its current fleet of 30 Hornets, which will bring their active service life to 2030.

• Boeing has been awarded a $411 million modification to an existing contract to provide 38 Apache attack helicopters to the UK. Also included in the deal are three crew trainers for the Apache’s latest Longbow variant of the aircraft, as well as spares for both systems. Work will be completed in Mesa, Ariz., and is estimated to be completed by Feb 28, 2023.

Asia Pacific

• Russian aerospace manufacturer Sukhoi has plans to build a spare parts factory in Indonesia as part of a deal to sell Su-35 fighter aircraft to the country. Indonesia’s Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu made the announcement, adding that the deal will benefit Jakarta as the factory can manufacture parts that can then be sold to neighboring governments—Malaysia operates the Su-30MKM—who operate Sukhoi aircraft. Negotiations between Russia and Indonesia over a deal for ten Su-35 aircraft are still ongoing.

• A crashed North Korean drone found in South Korea is believed to have been spying on the US THAAD system prior to its crash. The drone, mounted with a camera, was found last week in a forest near the border between the two Koreas, where ten photos of the THAAD were found. North Korea has about 300 unmanned aerial vehicles of different types including one designed for reconnaissance as well as combat drones, the UnitedNations said in a report last year.

• Dassault and Indian partner Reliance Defense & Aerospace will break ground next month on a components facility for Rafale fighter aircraft. Construction of the facility comes as part of ‘Make in India’ commitments stipulated in September’s $8.8 billion Rafale fighter jet deal. Dassault are also currently training the first group of Indian engineers at its facilities in France, and the Indian facility is expected to be operational and producing components by the first quarter of 2018.

Today’s Video

• Japan’s first F-35 makes its maiden flight:

For more than six months, the dilapidated barracks behind Belgrade’s main bus station housed over a thousand men and boys – most of them Afghans. Conditions, despite better weather and increased assistance, remained dire and the migrants continued to live under the looming threat of eviction. In May 2017, the authorities finally moved in, vacated the buildings and tried to transfer all the inhabitants to government-run centres. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert and Jelena Bjelica visited the squat and  some of the government-run centres, in the weeks leading up to this event. They describe the changes since they were last in Serbia and discuss the options that are available to Afghans now.

This research on Afghan migration to Europe was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

Afghans in Serbia: an overview

Serbia is an important transit country for Afghans en route to Europe. During a brief period in 2015 and 2016 the borders in Europe were open for Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis as part of the so-called “humanitarian corridor” (see this earlier AAN analysis); during that time well over half a million people passed through Serbia on their way to Western Europe. After the corridor closed in the spring of 2016, Afghans continued to enter into Serbia. The country became a place where they could recuperate from their harrowing journey and reconnect with smugglers to organise their onward journey (for more details see this earlier AAN analysis).

During our first visit to Serbia in June 2016, a few months after the closure of the Balkan corridor, AAN found a large concentration of Afghans congregating around the ‘Afghan Park’ in central Belgrade. This was where new arrivals were dropped off, new deals with smugglers negotiated and from where attempts to illegally cross one of the borders often began. Most people AAN met in Belgrade, in the summer of 2016, had been caught off-guard by the closing of the humanitarian corridor and were now trying to continue their journey through Hungary.

In November 2016 during a second visit, AAN found that migrants’ ability to travel onward to Western Europe had been seriously hampered after Hungary fortified its borders. The number of Afghans who found themselves stuck – out of money and abandoned by their smugglers – continued to grow as more people arrived. A sizable community of single men and boys had, by that time, started to camp out in a series of abandoned warehouses behind the city’s main bus station.

During winter more warehouses were opened or broken into, which meant that existing spaces felt less crowded. Small tents provided a greater sense of privacy. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

During a third visit in April 2017, described in this dispatch, AAN revisited the warehouses behind the bus station and found that things felt slightly more settled, although no less desperate, as the likelihood of successful illegal border crossings into the EU seemed to have greatly diminished. Although the inflow into Serbia had slowed over the winter, it was still greater than the outflow which seemed largely stalled.

The Serbian government tried hard to accommodate all migrants in government-run centres, but up to an estimated 15 to 20 per cent (or around 1,200-2,000 people) continued to live on the margins, seeking shelter in squats and parks in Belgrade city or in the forests close to the country’s northern and western borders. (1) Afghans continued, by far, to make up the largest group of migrants in Serbia, both in and outside the government-run centres.

The Belgrade squat: a more settle community – but only for a short period

Total estimates varied, but on average at least a thousand people were living in the barracks – most of them Afghan (and to a lesser extent, Pakistani), all of them men or boys. (2) The Afghans we met largely came from eastern Afghanistan (in particular Nangrahar, Laghman and Kunar) and the provinces around Kabul (Kapisa, Logar, Parwan). (In the government-run centres, especially those that housed families, the demographic was markedly different: there were more Dari-speakers and a wider range of areas of origin, as opposed to the largely Pashto-speaking inhabitants in the squat).

The squat came into being in late 2016 when the main government-run centre close to Belgrade (Krnjca centre) tightened its admittance criteria and no longer accommodated unregistered migrants. (The two parks, which many would sleep in at night, had in the meantime been dug up, supposedly as part of a landscaping effort.) With winter on the way, groups of men started to camp out on the porches of the old customs warehouses in search of shelter. They gradually forced their way inside and turned the large and leaking halls into makeshift rooms using blankets, pieces of wood and derelict furniture (for early photos, see here). Initially, the government tried to clamp down on the situation. It issued a public letter banning non-governmental organisations from providing assistance. However, after a botched attempt to evict the squat in late November 2016, the authorities’ attitude softened and efforts to somewhat improve conditions in the barracks were slowly tolerated (more details in this dispatch).

The distribution of simple wood-fire cookers with pipes had somewhat improved health conditions, but on cold days the air inside was still thick with smoke. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

When AAN returned to the squat in April 2017, a modest proliferation of NGOs and volunteer groups had improved things. In November 2016, there had been daily hot lunches and ad hoc distributions of blankets and other items, but otherwise the inhabitants were largely left to fend for themselves (see also this Al Jazeera video). In late April 2017, different groups were providing meals and tea. There were field visits by NGO workers and medical teams, as well as social activities – including a cricket match between Afghan and Pakistani teams and presumably a distribution of soccer balls and cricket bats.

More warehouses had been opened up or broken into, which meant that existing spaces felt less crowded. The squat was also noticeably cleaner, after various NGOs and volunteer groups had installed toilets, trash-cans, sinks and showers. Small tents inside the warehouses provided greater privacy. The distribution of simple wood-fire cookers with pipes had somewhat improved health conditions, but on cold days the air inside was still thick with smoke. A small generator powered an improvised outdoor mobile phone charging station a few times a day.

The outer walls of the barracks had been covered in colourful graffiti, which gave the place a slightly surreal feel, while an area at the edge of the premises had been cleared and made into a makeshift open-air mosque with flower-lined paths leading up to its entrance. There were smaller prayer areas inside the buildings for rainy days (attendance varied and several people were also observed praying in their own ‘rooms’).

An area at the edge of the premises had been cleared to make an open-air mosque, with a flower-lined path leading up to its entrance. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

A medical team from Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) visited several times a week on its rounds through the town to distribute tickets for disinfectant showers against scabies (body lice was less of a problem after winter). In a secluded area at the back of the premises there were large white tents with bunk beds where minors could spend the night.

There had been a considerable turnover of people, leaving very few familiar faces from the visit in November 2016. Many of the squat’s earlier inhabitants, tired of the winter’s hardships, seemed to have moved to the new centre for single men in the former military barracks of Obrenovac, which opened in early February 2017 (the centre had an initial capacity of 550 and is is currently at its maximum occupancy of around 1000). There had also been an outflow from the squat towards the northern border in February and March 2017, in a last-ditch attempt to cross into Hungary before it changed its law and complicated its asylum procedures (see this companion dispatch).

Many of the men and boys in the squat that AAN talked to had arrived in Serbia in late 2016 or  early 2017. But even though they were relatively recent arrivals, most of them had left Afghanistan before the Balkan corridor closed in the spring of 2016. They had simply spent a long time on the road.

A few men had left Afghanistan following the closure of the corridor, but they were by far in a minority. Among them was a particularly tragic case of a new arrival from Logar. He told AAN he had been dropped off at the Afghan Park by one of the smuggler’s aides that morning. When he left Afghanistan in December 2016, the smuggler assured him he would still take him all the way to Austria without any problem; he charged 4,500 euros for the whole trip. When they finally arrived in Serbia that morning, after three failed attempts to cross the Bulgarian border, he was told this was as far as the smuggler would bring him and that the deal was now off. The man was visibly shaken. (For more on how many smugglers have left Afghans stranded since the closing of the Balkan corridor, see this earlier dispatch).

Vacating the squat: Serbian authorities try to regain control

During AAN’s earlier visit in November 2016, the squat’s inhabitants had been very much on edge. They feared police raids and eviction, and many were constantly ‘on call,’ hanging around in the Afghan Park in the evening, waiting for word from their smugglers. Others still believed the rumours that Hungary would temporarily open its border and were frantically seeking updates. In late April 2017, in contrast, the squat felt more settled, although most of its inhabitants seemed resigned rather than reassured. It was notable that around half of the Afghans we spoke to said they were no longer trying to cross the border. Some had simply not tried at all – either because there was too little chance of success, or because they no longer had the money to pay for it.

In November 2016 it was already clear that the authorities would not tolerate the squat indefinitely, particularly as the barracks were scheduled to be demolished to make way for the Belgrade Waterfront, a controversial high-end infrastructure project in the centre of town. Several high-rise buildings had already shot up next to the squat in April 2017, providing a towering and surreal backdrop to its makeshift cricket field and outdoor mosque.

The barracks were scheduled for demolition to make way for the Belgrade Waterfront project. Several high-rise buildings had already shot up next to the squat. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

Then, on 5 May 2017, the Serbian authorities announced their decision to definitively move migrants from the barracks – see the Serbian language news here (which cited citizens’ complaints, rather than the Belgrade Waterfront project). A first group was moved on 10 May 2017. Volunteers described scenes of “panic” and confusion – as well as obstruction by smugglers, who tried to stop people from taking lunch, presumably in an effort to bolster claims of a “massive hunger strike”:

There was a feeling of mass panic; refugees were crowding into a dark room to write their names on ‘the list’, which determined where they would go. We felt responsible for boys that help us run the tea project and worried for their future. There is a camp specifically for unaccompanied minors (under 16) but this information did not seem to reach them. Many young boys were boarding the buses to large camps where their minor status may be overlooked and their asylum claim jeopardised.

The squatters’ eviction – together with similar operations in the north and west of the country (3) – appeared to be inspired by the authorities’ wish to establish the government-run centres as the only places where migrants could stay. Aleksander Vulin, the Serbian minister of labour, employment, veterans and social policy, emphasised this point when he visited the vacated squat:

We have shown these people what is better for them, [while] refraining from violence. These hutments will be completely removed, and we will not allow the irresponsible settling of migrants – not only in Belgrade, but also elsewhere in Serbia, because capacities exist to accommodate all of them. (See article, with video footage of the vacated squat, here.)

Belgrade squat, April 2017. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

Moving migrants into the government-run centres

Serbia currently has 18 reception and asylum centres, with a total capacity of around 7,000 beds (for the latest figures see this UNHCR update from early May 2017). Many of the centres were originally set up to deal with the masses of people who were travelling through the Balkan corridor in late 2015 and early 2016, and are, for that reason, located on or close to the various borders. The centres are in principle open, with the exception of Preševo – the largest and best-serviced camp.

Several of the men who lived in the Belgrade barracks were also, or had been, registered in one of the camps. A young man from Baghlan, for instance, showed us his card for the Obrenovac centre, but said he preferred to spend his time in the squat: “I go to the camp about once a week to have a shower. Otherwise conditions are exactly the same as here [in the squat]. Okay, it’s warmer in the camp and there is electricity, but at least here you are free.” A man from Kabul, who had travelled to Serbia with his eleven-year old son, also preferred to spend his days in Belgrade (leaving his son at the centre), as he tried to gauge what his options were. (4)

Some of the centres had been set up specifically to accommodate single men, such as the one in Obrenovac, while others mainly housed families. The camp in Preševo, on the Serbian-Macedonian border in the south, had a mix of single men and families. It was the least popular of Serbia’s camps. Stories about its closed nature had made many wary of going there (in practice, people were allowed out but only in a controlled manner: a limited number of exit passes were granted per day.) It is also the camp that is the furthest away from any border on the way to Western Europe, and the fact that migrants had in the past been expelled to Macedonia instead of being dropped at Preševo, made many migrants nervous. (5)

AAN also visited the reception centre in Pirot on the Bulgarian border. The camp had opened in December 2016 and had a very different feel to it than the squat or the large centre in Preševo. A row of chalets on the side of a mountain, inhabited almost exclusively by families (the majority were Afghans, a smaller proportion Syrians and Kurds) the place had the feeling of a relaxed holiday camp. Conversations with the Afghan families living in the camp, however, showed that, although conditions were marginally better, with no one fearing eviction or expulsion, they experienced the very same feelings of limbo and desperation as those living in the squat.

Where to go from here?

Conversations with the Afghans stuck in Serbia – on where to go and what to do – tended to be circular, with no real resolution. Most still hoped to be able to travel onwards, but many realised that chances of doing so had become slim. Probably around half of the squat’s population was still regularly trying to “hit the game” (game zadan – the Dari slang used for trying to illegally cross the border). (6) The families in the government-run centres seemed more settled, but even there, people still regularly left the centres to try their luck.

Apart from illegally crossing the border, there was the option of the ‘Hungary list” for Afghans who were registered with the Serbian authorities: Every week ten people from this list are allowed to lodge an asylum request with the Hungarian authorities. The system has given Afghans in Serbia something to wait for, but it was unclear to most whether this was actually a real opportunity, or whether they were just waiting for something that was illusory, as chances of actually being allowed into Hungary have seriously declined. (7)

Though psychologically still on their way to Western Europe, some Afghans were slowly starting to consider alternatives – none of which were very attractive or offered much hope of success. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

It was also clear that many Afghans now realised that even if they did reach Western Europe, their journey might still not be over, as asylum requests often fail and deportations – whether back to Afghanistan or a third country – are on the rise (see also this recent AAN analysis). In the Belgrade squat, AAN encountered several deportees and Dublin cases (the latter are those who are returned to their first known point of entry within the EU; Bulgaria in most cases). A Pashto-speaking Pakistani, for instance, who tried to practice what was left of his French, had been sent back to Afghanistan from Belgium and had since managed to make his way back to Serbia.

Although several men in the squat said they were determined to continue their journey (“Germany or death”), it was clear that many were quietly considering other options: a prolonged stay in Serbia, travel to another transit country or a return to Afghanistan.

The asylum system in Serbia is largely untested. Chances of success are slim and there are no real policies yet in place for the integration of those who might be accepted. The appetite to actually request asylum in Serbia, therefore, has remained limited. A profiling exercise by Asylum Office staff in early 2017 (referenced here on p 11) established that out of 8,000 migrants staying in the centres, only up to 130 people wanted to apply for asylum. Interest may have increased somewhat since then, but so far actual applications are few and are often discontinued. (8)

For those who were – reluctantly – considering returning to Afghanistan, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) offers the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) program. (9) According to IOM Serbia, interest was high, and growing. However, in the first four months of 2017 only three Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Serbia through the AVR program. Although many Afghans expressed an interest in AVR, most of them did not follow through with the process, either because they changed their minds or were not quite ready to give up yet. (According to IOM Serbia, eleven Afghans signed a consent form in the first three months of the year; four immediately dropped out and of the remaining seven, only three finally showed up for the Skype interview with the Afghan Embassy in Sofia). Secondly, and more importantly, the Afghan Embassy staff in Sofia, after the first three Skype interviews, told IOM they no longer wanted to do interviews online (and have so far offered no alternative methods to conduct interviews or issue travel documents). As a result, IOM still advertises the programme but, for the moment, can do little for those who no longer have travel documents.

A new alternative option that surfaced was to travel to other ‘transit countries’ where people believed conditions might be better and/or chances for work greater. In particular Greece was mentioned. The trip to Greece, facilitated by smugglers, was said to cost around 1-2,000 euros. Alternatively, those without money could try to be expelled to Macedonia and then make their own way to the Greek border.

We were still asked, both in the squat and in the camps, whether Europe would open its borders again. Migrants found it hard to believe that the EU would leave them in limbo and not come to their aid. Practically everyone we talked to was tired and out of money. Though psychologically still ‘in transit’ and on their way to Western Europe, some were slowly starting to consider alternatives – none of which were very attractive or offered much hope of success.

 

 

Both in the squat and in the camps, people repeatedly asked whether Europe would open its borders again. They found it hard to believe that the EU would leave them in limbo like this. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

 

 

(1) Estimates of both the total number of migrants in Serbia and those living outside the centres varied. UNHCR, according to an early May 2017 report, had counted a total of 7,219 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. This figure included around 1,200 refugees and migrants (mostly Afghans and Pakistanis) who were “sleeping rough” in Belgrade city, an estimated 200 of which were unaccompanied minors. Several aid workers in Serbia, however, told AAN they believed the actual total number to be closer to 10,000, with an estimated 2-3,000 people staying outside the government-run centres. This report by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (BCHR) also indicated that Asylum Office staff believed there were around 8,000 people living in the centres in early 2017 (p 11).

(2) In early 2017, UNHCR estimated the squat had a population of 850 to 950 people; but volunteers working in Belgrade said they believed the numbers to be closer to 1,300-1,500. Getting an accurate number of the people living in the sprawling barracks was complicated by the fact that they tended to move in and out. Many men and boys spent their days in town, returning only at night to sleep, while others visited the squat during the day and took a shuttle bus back to the nearby government-run centres in the evening.

(3) The Serbian authorities also acted in the north and the west of the country, close to the Hungarian and Croatian borders. In April 2017 the authorities said they had detained 200 “illegal migrants” who were staying in the forests near Šid and that they had “unburdened” the city’s local reception in response to “unpleasant events that migrants took part in.” (According to local reports a foreign man with an axe had entered a house and had threatened the children who were home alone. According to Commissariat officials and aid workers, however, the man had been part of an initiative that sought to integrate migrants by having them do errands for local people, such as chopping wood. They said the man had neither threatened nor robbed anyone, and that the incident had either been a misunderstanding or an intentional exaggeration).

(4) The man had just moved to Subotica in northern Serbia to wait for his turn on the ‘Hungary List’ (see further on in the text), which was supposed to be imminent. He said he had also registered for IOM’s Assisted Voluntary Return program, but had not yet heard back. He was not very optimistic about the chances. Others, he said, had already been waiting for several months to be repatriated, and these were people who did have documents (he had ‘lost’ his tazkera or Afghan identity card, in Bulgaria.) He was also unsure of his chances in Hungary, as he was likely to be kept in a closed camp there, which would prevent him and his son from travelling onwards.

(5) Aid workers, on the other hand, considered the Preševo reception centre a model camp, with the highest level of services. Originally established as a one-stop-shop for the humanitarian corridor’s mass transit, the centre had since been rigorously refurbished and expanded to accommodate longer-term stays. This was a big change that took a while to be implemented. An aid worker described how the lagging procurement meant that for months the camp’s inhabitants had received three meals of canned tuna and biscuits per day – food that had only been suitable for people on the move.

(6) A young man from Jalalabad, for instance, who had arrived in Serbia in early January 2017, told us he had tried to enter Croatia twice, and Hungary once. Now, he said, his smuggler was no longer answering the phone and had blocked him on Facebook. He was trying to get more money to find a new smuggler, but was not very hopeful, as his father was a simple sharecropper [dehqan] in Afghanistan. One of his friends said he had attempted eight ‘games’  or illegal crossings so far, including once to Romania, but unsuccessfully each time. Another man, who had been in Serbia for over a year, said he had “hit the game” twenty times, but that might have been an exaggeration. He said he spent a few days in Hungary once, but was detected and sent back. Now with the Hungarian border practically sealed he was unsure whether it was still worth trying.

A boy of around sixteen told us his father had arranged a ‘guaranteed’ trip from Kabul to Europe for him – a higher-end version of the journey, supposedly with less hardship and a greater chance of success – but the smuggler had given him the cheaper ‘chocolati’ version instead. He had spent a total of eleven months in Bulgaria (seven of which in detention) and eight months in Serbia. Now the smuggler had left him completely. He tried to cross the Croatian border once by train without outside help, but he and his friends were discovered by another passenger, who called the police.

(7) The latter – waiting for something that is illusory – seems to be the case. Asylum requests in Hungary are routinely denied based on the fact that Serbia is considered a “safe third country.” Moreover, asylum seekers are, in principle, no longer allowed to enter Hungary when they lodge their claim; instead their request is processed while they are kept in containers in ‘transit zones’ at the border. (According to an adviser to the government this does not constitute detention, as asylum seekers are “allowed to leave the transit zone for Serbia at any time.”)

The list system itself is fairly opaque. New names are passed on to the Hungarian authorities, after which Hungary includes some, but not all, names on a numbered waiting list (usually, we were told, an estimated 20 to 30 names per week are included). Once a week the numbers of those whose turn is near are announced, after which they travel to the reception centre in Subotica in the north and then onwards to the transit zone.

(8) In the first quarter of 2017, the Asylum Office received 92 asylum applications and
interviewed 44 people. No protection statuses were granted. One case was dismissed on its merits and 35 cases were dismissed or discontinued because the people in question had left Serbia or had withdrawn from the asylum procedure. For those who continue their application, chances are slim. According to the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (BCHR), the Asylum Office tends to automatically apply the safe third country concept. Since the Asylum Act came into force almost a decade ago (in 2008), asylum has been granted in 41 cases and subsidiary protection in 49 cases. Moreover, as noted by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (BCHR):

[Serbia] still lacks a clearly defined migration policy. Over the past few years, it has been taking in foreigners, who have not regulated their legal status and have no intention of settling down in Serbia. Although the state officials have told the media that Serbia had vowed “to its international partners to secure 6,000 strong, solid beds” for the accommodation of the migrants, it remains unclear in which specific enactment the state has assumed the obligation and how it reflects on the migrants’ legal status and their realization of their rights.”

(9) In 2016, IOM assisted 6,864 individuals to return to Afghanistan through its AVR program, by far most of them from Germany. See this earlier AAN dispatch for details (under “voluntary returns”) and this IOM report for the 2016 figures.

 

With some borders shared with EU countries that are trying to keep migrants and asylum seekers out, Serbia finds itself increasingly home to people who want to travel onwards but are unable to do so. An estimated eight to ten thousand migrants – most of them Afghans – who intended to travel on to Western Europe are now stuck in Serbia, with more still trickling in. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Martine van Bijlert visited the country’s southern and eastern borders, where they found the old smuggling routes through the Balkans still very much alive. They also looked at the country’s northern and western borders and at how migrants and their smugglers are trying to deal with the EU’s efforts to seal off all entry points.

This research on Afghan migration to Europe was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

Between 2015 and 2017, the movement of people through the Balkans changed significantly. In 2015 and early 2016, an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 people passed each day through what was then called the Balkan ‘humanitarian corridor.’ The corridor first stretched from Greece to Serbia, from where people were ferried on by the Serbian authorities, to its borders with EU member countries. In September 2015, after Hungary fenced off its border (see previous AAN reporting here and Map 1 below), the flow of people was redirected to Serbia’s northwestern border with Croatia. By March 2016 the Balkan corridor was closed. In February 2016 Croatia closed its border and on 20 March 2016, a deal between the EU and the government in Ankara, that aimed to stop the flow of people from Turkey, came into force. Although people continued to arrive in Serbia, brought by smugglers and their facilitators, the flow out of the country was greatly diminished.

As a result, the number of migrants in Serbia increased almost fourfold throughout 2016, from 2,000 in March to 7,550 in December, according to figures provided by the European Commission. The increase was mainly due to the continued flow from Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, despite increased Serbian border controls from July 2016 onwards (Serbia claims to have, since then, prevented the irregular entry of 21,000 people.) The outflow of people to the north and the west diminished as strict Hungarian legal restrictions that came into force in mid-2016 (see previous AAN reporting here) and again, more recently, in early 2017. Estimates vary, but there are probably currently between 8-10,000 migrants stuck in Serbia, most of whom still wish to travel onwards. (1)

Map 1: The Balkan humanitarian corridor, November 2015 to February 2016. Credit: Free map downloaded from d-maps.com, arrows added by AAN.

 

AAN visited Serbia’s southern and southeastern borders, which are the two main borders from where migrants try to enter Serbia: from Macedonia in the south and Bulgaria in the east (see Map 2 below.) We also spoke to aid workers and volunteers who work at the ‘outbound’ borders, from where migrants try to leave Serbia to get into Hungary to the north, Croatia to the northwest and Romania to the northeast.

Map 2: Migration routes in the Balkans, 2017. Credit: Free map downloaded from d-maps.com, arrows added by AAN.

 

The southern border with Macedonia

The 62 kilometre-long border between Serbia and Macedonia has two officials crossings: Preševo and Prohor Pčinjski. The Preševo border crossing played an important role in the Balkan humanitarian corridor (see earlier AAN analysis.) The authorities established a large transit centre here (which is now a reception centre for migrants and asylum seekers staying in Serbia.) The “green” border between the two countries – the areas without official border crossings – is hilly and much of it is wooded. Villages that used to be in the same country – Yugoslavia – are still connected by small roads. The western part of the green border is inhabited by ethnic Albanians, a minority with deep grudges against the Slav majority in both Serbia and Macedonia. They have kept the hidden smuggling pathways through the surrounding hills and woods alive, both in practice and in the local knowledge. (2)

In April 2017 AAN visited two villages in Macedonia famous for smuggling: Vaksince and Lojane. Lojane in particular, which is in the Lipkovo municipality, is well located and well connected, with many paths leading to the Serbian village of Miratovac in the Preševo municipality (the two villages are only a few kilometres apart) and many families having members on both sides of the border. The villages swiftly opted for catering to the influx of refugees and migrants. In February 2016 German broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on the involvement of the villagers in Lojane, who were said to rent out rooms and barns (a room for around 10 euros per night, or a place in a barn going for half that price.) AAN was told that people in transit could also sometimes stay in the local mosque or in ‘wild camps’ in the surrounding hills – in caves, abandoned buildings or the open air.

AAN visited the office of the Macedonian NGO Legis in Lojane village, which documents and supports migrants in transit, whether they are arriving from elsewhere in Macedonia and getting ready to cross into Serbia, or being pushed back from Serbia by the authorities there. Legis offers basic support such as blankets, clothes and (baby) food, and documents the migrants they encounter in an attempt to keep track of the flow of people and of how they are treated. They register three categories in their database: migrants travelling towards Serbia, migrants who have been kept out of Serbia (within days of entry and without having reached a reception centre or town) and migrants who have been ‘expelled’ (after they entered deeper into Serbia, reached a camp where they were registered, or stayed three or more days in the country).

In the seven-month period after it began its registration (25 August 2016 to 31 March 2017), Legis registered a total of 3,911 refugees/migrants in transit through the Lipkovo municipality. Of this number, 1,041 – or 26 per cent – were Afghan. The figures, which represent only the people Legis encountered (not the total number of people on the move), are shown in Table 1 below.

Not all those who were registered as being on an onward journey into Serbia represented new arrivals from Greece, as many had been pushed back from Serbia earlier and were now trying to re-enter. A Legis staff member explained that many people try to enter Serbia many times: “We registered a case of one Afghan family … that was pushed back from Serbia [four] times. We first registered the family in December [2016] when they were on their way to Serbia. Then we saw them again in January [2017], after they had been pushed back. A month later they again reappeared in Lojane. And now our volunteer saw them again a couple of days ago [in late April 2017].”

Credit: Legis report for the period August 2016 – March 2017.

When AAN visited the other well-known Macedonian smuggling village, Vaksince, a couple of kilometres to the south of Lojane, we met a Pakistani man in a local café. He told us he was travelling in a group of five (three Pakistanis, one Bangladeshi and a Sri Lankan) and had recently been pushed back from Serbia. The five were staying in caves in the hills above Vaksince and were waiting for a night time opportunity to cross into Serbia again. The local owner of the coffee shop joined in the conversation, explaining how the Pakistani had lost track of his brother earlier while trying to cross the Serbian–Hungarian border (his brother had managed to cross, while the man we spoke to was found and sent back to Serbia. After that, the Serbian police sent him back to Macedonia).

The involvement of the inhabitants of Lojane and Vaksince in smuggling as well as their provision of transport and shelter was highlighted when another local customer walked in and joined in the conversation. He complained that the smugglers would often drop migrants in the middle of nowhere, practically forcing “local youths to give them a ride, simply to be helpful.” And then, he added, the police would harass them and accuse them of helping the smugglers. Later, it turned out the man’s son had been convicted of migrant smuggling and was currently in prison (the sentence for this offence can be up to five years).

Although locals are involved in their immediate environment, the main facilitators and organisers of onward journeys tend to be Afghans or Pakistani. Some of these people are well established in the local communities and, AAN was told, have been living in the villages for many years and often speak Macedonian or Albanian (see this European Commission case study from 2015 on the smuggling of migrants between Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary.) These Afghan and Pakistani smugglers are apparently so familiar with the region that they can navigate the routes without much help, leaving markings in the woods to guide groups that cross the border during the night. Such markings are well camouflaged to the untrained eye, and often look like rubbish or random pieces of string.

This smuggling network thus stretched all the way from the Albanian villages in Macedonia across Serbia to the north, including a brick factory in the northern town of Subotica. The factory, until recently, used to be a rest stop for migrants hoping to cross into Hungary.

The southern borders with Kosovo and Montenegro

There have been occasional reports of migrants crossing into Serbia from Kosovo and Montenegro – in particular, after the closure of the Balkan humanitarian corridor. However, so far in 2017, the number of people using this route has not been significant.

Both countries, though, could potentially become alternative routes for migrants, if the way through Albania, which lies to the south of both Kosovo and Montenegro, were to reopen for migrant smuggling (see Map 2 above.) In the past, notably during the 1990s, the sea route between Albania and Italy (the narrowest sea point between the two coasts on the Adriatic Sea) was a famous migrant smuggling route, when speedboats carried mainly Albanian migrants to the European Union, ferrying dozens of people across every day. According to local accounts, this route is now mainly used for drug smuggling, such as marihuana, but it is not inconceivable that it could once again be used for smuggling migrants.

The eastern border with Bulgaria

The 318 kilometre-long border between Serbia and Bulgaria is mainly mountainous and very porous. Like the Serbian–Macedonian border, it has a long history of migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In the early 2000s, thousands of Bulgarian women fell victim to (mainly Bulgarian) human traffickers, and were taken to Western Europe. As the networks grew and started to include smaller networks along the route to the European Union, the Bulgarian traffickers also started specialising in smuggling migrants.

According to this 2016 EUPOL study on migrant smuggling in the EU, among European nationals, Bulgarians are the most often identified as migrant smugglers. Although the smugglers usually live in Bulgaria (they may also live in Hungary, Greece, Austria or Italy), they control networks that operate much farther afield: in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, UK and the Netherlands. According to the EUPOL study, Afghans and Pakistanis are often incorporated into these groups and act as facilitators between their fellow nationals and the local smuggling networks.

Another DW story about Afghan smugglers in Bulgaria offers insights into how this works in practice. It describes how Asif, a 25-year old Afghan, had been recruited by smugglers in Milan who needed a Dari-speaker. Asif’s job was to wait for people in the park in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, and direct them to a taxi that would bring them close to the border with Serbia. From that point onwards, the migrants would be guided by a GPS tracking device. Asif also made sure the families in Afghanistan paid the organisation via their local hawalas. (The EUPOL study estimated that in 2015, 20 per cent of the smuggling arrangements into the EU were paid via an alternative banking, ie the hawala system).

Indicators on the number of people entering Serbia from the Bulgarian side varied. According to this blog ‘thousands of people’ left Bulgaria during the first three months of 2017 (the numbers cited for February were, however, much lower than for January, and March was even lower.) The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior reported that in February 2017 (report available here in Bulgarian) the authorities had detained 1,022 migrants on the border with Serbia (on the Bulgarian–Turkish border, only 120 migrants had been apprehended in the same period).

In 2016, Afghans made up over half of the 18,884 migrants that were apprehended by the Bulgarian authorities, with close to 14,000 migrants of all nationalities caught at the Bulgarian-Serbian border (see here and also this Bulgarian Ministry of Interior report from December 2016).

Once migrants have crossed the Bulgarian border into Serbia, local logistical support in terms of transportation to the capital Belgrade is apparently provided by local Serbs. Thus, the journey to the next facilitator, located in Belgrade or to the north, in Subotica, continues.

The northern border with Hungary

As a member of the EU, Hungary has been a primary focus for migrants trying to reach Western Europe through the Balkans (see previous AAN reporting here and here.) Its importance as a main entry point into the EU sharply diminished after it implemented a series of harsh measures aimed at sealing off its border with Serbia. First it built a border fence in September 2015. Then it introduced stricter legal measures in July 2016, which allowed for swifter and more rigorous pushbacks of those who still managed to enter the country (see also the EU’s monthly report on migration for December 2016, the section on Hungary, p 77).

The Hungarian fence is located five metres from the actual border inside Hungary, AAN was told. This means that those who are pushed back are technically still on Hungarian soil. Those caught between the fence and the border have thus technically not been expelled, but in practice they have no choice but to return to Serbia.

Organisations that monitor pushbacks from Hungary have noted that these have often been accompanied by acts of violence and humiliation (there have been accusations of beatings, being bitten by dogs, and forced undressing.) (3) This peaked in late 2016 and early 2017, but since then the violence seems to have subsided somewhat.

In March 2017, Hungary further tightened its asylum laws, introducing mandatory detention, which, according to the United Nations, violates EU law. In late April 2017 it erected a second border fence, despite opposition from the UN, human rights groups and a European court ruling (for more background, see here). The second fence, with sensors, alarms and regular patrols, has greatly complicated irregular entry into the country (making it largely dependent on collusion between smugglers and those in charge of border controls).

For those who do manage to enter Hungary, it has become much more difficult to stay, due to the harshening of the country’s asylum laws. Based on a law adopted in June 2016, the police has been authorised to push back ‘irregular migrants’ who are found up to eight kilometres from the border (the so-called ‘Eight Kilometre Law’.) On 28 March 2017, Hungary adopted an expanded version of its ‘deeper border control policy’, according to which anyone without papers could be expelled from anywhere in the country – without being given a chance to request asylum. Asylum requests based on the new law are only accepted if they are made in the so-called ‘transit zones’ between Hungary and Serbia by people who, technically, have not been allowed on Hungarian soil yet. (For more details on the new 2017 law, see updates by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee here and here). A summary of the 2016 legislative changes can be found here).

Since June 2016, once the ‘Eight Kilometre Law’ came into force, 19,219 migrants have been prevented from entering Hungary, pushed back to Serbia or escorted back to the border (see this case study by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee). Between January and March of this year, 7,673 people have been registered by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee as being denied entry. Throughout March 2017 as the second layer of fencing was nearing its completion and with the tougher asylum law in place, the number of pushbacks from Hungary has gone down (see the joint InfoPark and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee graph 1 below).

Graph 1: InfoPark

In late May 2017, however, the number of pushbacks drastically increased again, according to figures that InfoPark obtained from the Hungarian police (see graph 2 below). Aid workers in Belgrade believe this increase may well be linked to the mass eviction and relocation in mid-May 2017 of the city’s large squat, where up to a thousand migrants, mainly Afghans and Pakistanis, had been living (for details see here). Although many of its former inhabitants were moved to government-run centres, others may be redoubling their efforts to cross the borders.

Graph 2: InfoPark

Similar evictions and rounding-up of migrants have also taken place along Serbia’s border with Hungary. Since 2015, these areas have accommodated groups of migrants on their way to the north. An abandoned brick factory in Subotica, for instance, has been an important rest stop for migrants on the Balkan route since 2015 (for pictures see here and here). More recently, during the winter months of 2016/2017, single men and unaccompanied minors who had not been admitted or had not wanted to go into the nearby reception centres had been squatting there. Others who had come from other parts of the country stayed here while they waited to join groups who were trying to cross the border.

At the beginning of 2017, the number of people in the brick factory apparently swelled, as people tried to cross into Hungary before the amendments in the asylum law came into force. Many facilitators and smugglers moved north as well. Between October 2016 and March 2017, the Serbian police carried out at least five coordinated raids on the brick factory and in nearby woods (for an overview see this report by the Croatian refugee aid organisation Are You Syrious). Following each raid, buses loaded with migrants, and in one instance even a train, took those who had been caught to the Preševo camp on the southern border with Macedonia.

After a recent sell-off of state property, the brick factory was slated for demolition (see this Serbian news report from 1 March 2017, and a sixth raid on the brick factory and nearby woods in April 2017 forcibly evicted the remaining inhabitants from the building. Many were transported to government-run centres or went deeper into the woods to hide. Aid workers in the area told AAN in late April 2017 that only a handful of people were left and that almost no one had been showing up for the regular free lunch distribution organised by international volunteers. It is unclear whether the migrants will return, particularly since the Hungarian border has become so difficult to cross now (see also the other AAN analysis).

The northwest border with Croatia

With the ever-tightening border controls on the Hungarian side, migrants are now setting their sights on Croatia again (for the situation on the Serbian–Croatian border in 2015 and 2016 see previous AAN reporting here and here).

In April 2017, AAN heard from several Afghans who had tried to cross into Croatia that hiding in lorries or under trucks had become a mode of travel (see also this Serbian language report on the apprehension of ten Afghans found in lorry at the border crossing between Serbia and Croatia on 6 March 2017). The migrants’ increasingly desperate attempts to cross into Croatia have only increased since Hungary erected its second fence. This is also indicated by the rise in the number of expulsions from Croatia (often in groups, see UNHCR data for the first week of May 2017 here).

Police attitudes towards migrants have hardened on both sides of the Serbian-Croatian border, and there are now consistent reports of human rights violations at the border. Human Rights Watch, for instance, interviewed ten Afghans, including two unaccompanied children, who described being forced back into Serbia after being apprehended on Croatian territory, without being allowed to lodge asylum claims even though they requested to do so. Nine out of ten said the officers had kicked and punched them, all of them said the officers had taken personal items, including money and mobile phones. In April 2017, the Croatian refugee aid organisation, Are You Syrious, also reported that 72 asylum-seekers had been collectively expelled from Croatia to Serbia, without being granted access to asylum procedures, after having entered Croatia irregularly (see here). The reports sound very similar to earlier descriptions of mistreatment by Bulgarian and Hungarian authorities, indicating how almost all border crossings have become hazardous.

An Afghan boy having just returned from his latest attempt to cross the Croatian border shows his hands that were injured by thorns and branches during his trek through the forest. Belgrade, April 2017. Photography: Martine van Bijlert

AAN met an Afghan group in the squat in Belgrade in April 2017 who had just returned from the Serbian–Croatian border. They had thorn cuts on their hands from trying to cross through the forest. They said the group consisting of 15 men had been found and beaten by the Serbian police. A man who tried to cross into Croatia with a different group sported a cast on his arm. He had jumped off a lorry to try to avoid detection.

Near the border with Croatia, groups of migrants were squatting, as had been the case at the border with Hungary in the north. According to a volunteer working there, there had been around 100 people gathered close to the town of Šid on the Serbian side, in April 2017. After harsh treatment by the Serbian police, most people had moved to the woods to camp out there. They are now reportedly constantly on the move, apparently even afraid to cook outdoors for fear of attracting attention (see the footnote 3 in this companion dispatch for more details on the situation in Šid).

The northeastern border with Romania

After Hungary sealed its border and toughened its immigrant legislation and police attitudes towards migrants hardened in Croatia, interest shifted to getting into Romania.

The border between Romania and Serbia is 476 kilometres long, 134 of which are marked by the River Danube that goes through the Iron Gates gorge, which is difficult to cross. This border has recently not been used much for illegal migration into the EU, as Romania’s geographical location makes a detour through the eastern fringes of the EU necessary – a route that, moreover, would still lead through Hungary (see also previous AAN reporting here). Nevertheless, the human infrastructure for migrant smuggling is present with robust human trafficking networks to and from Romania, which date back to the 1990s and early 2000s.

Official statistics show an increase in attempted irregular entries from Serbia into Romania since August 2016, although numbers are still relatively low compared to entries into Hungary and Croatia (the highest number of apprehensions by Romanian police – 112 – was reported in December 2016. The number of pushbacks from Romania is also on the increase. According to an international volunteer based in Serbia who recently visited Romania, there are also reports of mistreatment by the Romanian police who are said to be beating and threatening people.

As the least used route until now, it was still unknown territory for the Afghan migrants we spoke to. There were anecdotal stories of people who had recently made it through – one Afghan we spoke to said he had friends who had managed to reach Austria through the Romanian-Hungarian border, while others reported bad treatment by the Romanian police and failed attempts to cross this border. In general, it was clear that the details of the route, and its chances of success were still largely unknown. It is also not clear what the official Romanian response will be.

Still, Romania’s geographical location makes for a longer and more expensive journey. This is not an attractive prospect for most people stuck in Belgrade, who have spent all their money and are exhausted.

Changes in movement patterns and policies

The flow of migrants through Serbia so far in 2017 seems to be close to the levels seen prior to the refugee crisis of 2015/16. New but also more complicated routes are being tested, such as the one described via Romania, but it seems unlikely they will become busy in the same way that routes through Hungary and Croatia have been in the past.

Available statistics show that the number of entries into Serbia from the south and east are still higher than the number of exits to the north and the northwest, meaning that the number of refugees stuck in the country continues to grow. On the one hand, the total number of migrants entering and exiting Serbia is much less than the hundreds of thousands of people who crossed its borders in 2015 and 2016. The change in policies in the region, including harsher border controls or, as in the Hungarian case, the total closure of its border with Serbia, has virtually halted the flow of migrants through Serbia into the EU. But the new measures have left almost 10,000 people stuck there, wondering what to do (for more details, see this companion dispatch).

Edited by Kate Clark

 

 

(1) Official estimates of the number of migrants in Serbia vary. UNHCR, according to a report in early May 2017 counted a total of 7,219 refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. This figure included around 1,200 refugees and migrants (mostly Afghans and Pakistanis) who were “sleeping rough” in Belgrade city, an estimated 200 of whom were unaccompanied minors. Several aid workers in Serbia, however, told AAN they believed the actual total number to be closer to 10,000, with an estimated 2,000 people staying outside the government-run centres. This report by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (BCHR) also indicated that Asylum Office staff believed there were around 8,000 people living in the centres alone, in early 2017 (p 11)  (see also this companion dispatch here).

(2) The area has been a key smuggling channel in the Balkans for a long time. In the 1990s and early 2000s, many victims of human trafficking were smuggled via the Macedonian–Serbian border. During the UN sanctions against Milosevic’s Yugoslavia (from 1992 to 1996), oil and goods not readily available were also smuggled into Serbia through this border.

(3) In March 2017, The Guardian reported Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) calling on Hungary to investigate an increasing number of allegations of “widespread and systematic” violence by the police. MSF based its accusations on the fact that it had provided medical treatment to 106 migrants, including 22 minors, for injuries caused by beatings, dog bites and pepper spray in 2016. Hungarian authorities dismissed the account as baseless, the newspaper reported. See also previous AAN reporting from November 2016, here.

 

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