European Union

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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet on 22 September 2015 in Brussels to continue discussions on migration. They are focusing on the Commission proposal for the emergency relocation of 120.000 persons in need of international protection from member states exposed to massive migratory flows to other EU member states.

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Hungarian soldiers build a new section of a border fence, along the Croatian border

Amid the diplomatic fighting over the size of the refugee scheme, one question has been buried: will it actually work?

As some analyses have noted, there is a lot of doubt over the practicalities of the plan to share out 120,000 refugees across Europe. The main one is pretty fundamental: how do you make sure a refugee stays in the country where he or she is sent when systematic border checks no longer exist?

The proposals being debated this weekend, and seen by Brussels blog, touched on this. In short, member states have few tools to keep refugees in one country beyond cutting their benefits, making them repeatedly check-in with authorities and, well, asking them nicely not to leave.

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General : The European Commission's latest proposals to solve the refugee crisis will be discussed by the civil liberties committee this week, while the economic affairs committee will question Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, on the state of the euro zone. In addition the tax rulings committee will discuss tax policies with the finance ministers of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

General : The European Commission's latest proposals to solve the refugee crisis will be discussed by the civil liberties committee this week, while the economic affairs committee will question Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, on the state of the euro zone. In addition the tax rulings committee will discuss tax policies with the finance ministers of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Your Excellency,

On behalf of the European Council, I wish to congratulate you on winning the elections in Greece. I hope that the elections will now provide for the political stability necessary to face all the challenges at hand.

Many of the biggest challenges facing the European Union as a whole are the same as those facing Greece as a country, such as the refugee crisis and the creation of sustainable growth and jobs. I trust that Greece, with your new Government will contribute constructively in seeking solutions to all those challenges. Your dedication and leadership in implementing the economic adjustment programme is crucial in order to make a difference in the recovery of the Greek economy.

I look forward to once again working closely with you and welcoming you at the extraordinary informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government this Wednesday.

Yours sincerely,
Donald Tusk

The real European Games have only just begun: Finding the right approach on Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience. By Eske van Gils

Last June, Baku hosted the first European Games with much grandeur. Azerbaijan spent great amounts on the Games (dubbed by locals as ‘the Games for Europeans’) and wanted to put the country positively on the map. Yet, it seems that the real European Games have only just begun. On 11 September the European Parliament submitted a motion for a resolution condemning the deterioration of the human rights situation in Azerbaijan. The motion has already caused much uproar in bilateral relations, with Azerbaijan threatening to re-consider its participation in the Eastern Partnership; and once again brings the EU’s value promotion policy into the spotlights. However, Brussels and Baku appear to be playing different games. While the EU believes they are involved in a round of disciplinary hide and seek, Baku smiles and runs away in a game of catch me if you can.

 

The motion was submitted following a number of new convictions of journalists and activists who were critical of the Azerbaijani government; many more preceded them. The resolution calls on the Azerbaijani government to respect human rights (regarding a range of issues), and on other EU institutions to take a more active stance on the matter, including imposing sanctions on the regime. The vote on the motion has not yet been scheduled at the time of writing. At this point, I would like to join the debate. The EU seems to find itself caught between a rock and a hard place, and I hope to shed some light on the context of the issue.

 

Tax evasion, heroin and treason

The recent convictions should be seen in light of the urge of the Azerbaijani government to maintain stability in the country. Azerbaijan is a state in the South Caucasus that gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. President Ilham Aliyev succeeded his father, the late Heydar Aliyev, in 2003, after the latter had been president of Azerbaijan for ten years. In the past two decades, the country has undergone a major economic transformation – although poverty is still widespread and the country’s oil wealth is distributed very unevenly. It is exactly the concentration of wealth at the top, along with the regime’s corruption, which one of the convicted journalists, Khadija Ismayilova, tried to expose. This, naturally, would pose a threat to the regime.

 

Commentators as well as international organisations have assessed that the state of democracy and human rights has worsened under Ilham Aliyev’s rule. Currently, there are approximately 100 political prisoners in jail in the country. What is important to note is that these journalists and activists have not been persecuted on grounds of their actual critical activities. Instead, people have been arrested on accusations of among others tax evasion, drug possession, or cooperation with the enemy (working in civil society projects in cooperation with Armenia). According to several international organisations these charges have been trumped up.

 

The regime’s reasons for concealing its real motives are probably firstly Baku’s desire for a positive recognition by the international community. Baku has invested heavily in its diplomatic capacity as well as PR. Also grand events such as the Eurovision Song Festival in 2012, and the European Games in the spring of 2015, can be seen in this light. Perhaps ironically, and definitely fruitlessly, the regime tries to keep up a discourse of democratisation and the government even denies the existence of any prisoners of conscience, with the argument that the definition of ‘political prisoner’ is still contested within the Council of Europe.

 

A second probable reason for covering up the nature of the convictions is that the government wants to prevent domestic unrest, to secure its internal legitimacy – which at the same time is the very reason for these prosecutions in the first place. Moreover, by basing the persecutions on ‘legitimate’ grounds, the idea can be upheld that the justice system has operated fairly and merely according to the law.

 

Criticism on the EU: Oil versus values (but is this really so?)

Back to the current situation: the motion for a resolution by the EP. This is quite a big step by the Parliament, considering that the EU’s overall policy towards Azerbaijan is generally not that outspoken regarding issues of human rights. The EU therefore often receives criticism: it would not be doing enough to address the worrisome situation in Azerbaijan, and would even hold double standards compared to other countries, such as Belarus, where the situation is also concerning but (however wrong this may sound) still better in some regards than in Azerbaijan. It’s often suggested that the EU’s moderate stance is because of its reliance on Azerbaijani oil and gas.

 

It is very likely that the EU indeed limits its criticism on the Azerbaijani regime because of the trade deals between these two actors (note, however, that this concerns mostly individual EU member states, rather than ‘the EU’ as such). But it would be too simplistic to state that the EU doesn’t do a thing because they need the oil. Firstly, energy does not take up such a dominant position as is sometimes suggested: bilateral relations do consist of much more than that. Secondly, the EU does voice criticism, and does make considerable efforts to promote its norms on democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan, despite the fact that this does lead to frictions with the regime.

 

The European Parliament has always been relatively vocal and critical of the situation in Azerbaijan; Embassies of several member states were present at the trials of the people convicted; and the EU Delegation in Baku closely follows the situation, and is in almost daily contact with the Azerbaijani government on these issues. As soon as the motion was submitted, the Head of the Delegation was summoned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that these actions are taken nonetheless, show that the EU is not afraid to confront Aliyev’s government. Even though, indeed, the damage to relations remained limited so far; and while, indeed, the EU could potentially do more.

 

Sharpening the knives for a gunfight?

The problem of all this, however, is that open and public criticism does not seem to work in the case of Azerbaijan. Experts on the ground have argued that it even works counter-productive. Despite – or possibly even in reaction to – the motion for a resolution, several new arrests of journalists have taken place in the past week since the motion was submitted.

 

Exactly because Azerbaijan is so much concerned with its image in the international community, it will not accept such accusations and any criticism coming from international political actors or media is consistently followed by counter-moves from the government and defensive public statements in the media. Despite many years of EU democracy and human rights promotion in Azerbaijan, there are more prisoners of conscience now than ever before.

 

It seems that the ‘silent approach’, which is simultaneously applied by the EU and EU member states, may be more effective in reaching the goals of norm-promotion in Azerbaijan. This approach consists of consultations and discussions behind closed doors, as well as (less visible) support to civil society organisations in the country. Such approach fits much better with the notion of ‘Othering’, the process of acknowledging one another’s national interests, problems, and priorities in bilateral relations. Othering would be a necessary step if the EU wants to achieve a genuine partnership with Azerbaijan, because the current approach of bluntly promoting its own norms and values in another state is not only in conflict with the whole idea of partnership; but it also has not lead to any results. And it probably never will be effective, because Azerbaijan is becoming an increasingly strong actor in international politics who demands a more equal position in the relations.

 

Between the devil and the Caspian Sea

As a consequence, it seems that the EU currently finds itself in between two problematic options and that it will need to choose the lesser of two evils. Either it can hold on to its model of being a value promotor in the world, thereby risking relations with Baku but also the chance to end up with a deadlock. In that case it cannot have any positive effect on the situation in Azerbaijan anyway, since the government will respond to any EU condemnations only more fiercely.

 

The second option would be to follow a pragmatic course whereby the two actors build on the principles of partnership and find a compromise, e.g. implementing democracy and human rights promotion but only behind closed doors using the ‘silent approach’. This could potentially be more effective in terms of outcome in the long run, but the EU will appear to be giving up one of its core principles and let down those who are in prison – is remaining silent also being guilty of the crime?

 

This is a question I don’t know the answer to. One the one hand, the only possibility I see for the release of Khadija Ismayilova, Leila and Arif Yunus, Rasul Jafarov, Intigam Aliyev, Anar Mammadli, and many others who are sitting in a cell while you are reading this, is through pressure coming from the international community, notably the EU.  Naturally, the EU cannot let this go unnoticed. The question is however how public this pressure should be, as it risks working counterproductively, no matter how well we mean.

 

At the same time, I believe that partnership would be the only way in the long run. The current situation, in which the EU unilaterally keeps pushing for its own norms in Azerbaijan – and Azerbaijan not being very impressed by this at all – has so far only led to a deadlock with no results. Perhaps it is therefore time that Brussels and Baku start playing the same game, and search for common rules and shared norms.

 

Eske van Gils is a doctoral student at the University of Kent.

The post The real European Games have only just begun: Finding the right approach on Azerbaijani prisoners of conscience. By Eske van Gils appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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The Association Agreement between Jordan and the EU entered into force in May 2002. Beyond this agreement, cooperation with Jordan has been regulated since 2005 by an action plan within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

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For the second weekend in a row, ambassadors from across the EU are spending their Sunday behind closed doors, trying to reach a deal on sharing out 120,000 refugees across bloc for the crunch interior ministers’ meeting on Tuesday, ahead of a make-or-break migration summit on Wednesday.

At the heart of the plan, which has become a flagship policy for the Juncker commission, is the “distribution key”.

Member states would take a number of refugees based on how big they are, how rich they are, how many asylum seekers they already have, and the country’s unemployment rate. Or as the Commission put it:

But now, it seems, the distribution key is dead – for this scheme, at least. The latest version of the draft agreement seen by Brussels Blog has all mention of distribution keys taken out. Even the percentage breakdown for each member state has been removed.

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This summer Europe witnessed unprecedented events as thousands of migrants embarked on dangerous journeys from the Middle East and further afield to reach the shores of Europe. The growing instability in the Middle East, most of all in Syria which has descended into a state of permanent internal civil war, has resulted in an unprecedented flow of migration towards Europe. As with the other major recent crises the EU is ill prepared to respond swiftly and collectively. The response – or the lack of it- towards the escalating migrant crisis resembles how the EU reacted to the sovereign debt crisis which followed the global financial crisis and externally to the standoff with Russia over Ukraine. All these events illustrate that the EU profoundly lacks a spirit of collective responsibility. It is most noticeable in the failure of the big six (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland) to lead the EU towards effective supranational institutions and policies which are fit to address the various internal and external challenges. For too long national governments in the EU have retreated towards the minimum consensus on policy cooperation. Keen to ensure that they maintain a substantial degree of autonomy on sovereign political decision-making, EU leaders have neglected to determine binding common solutions to crucial areas such as economic and fiscal policy, defence and security as well as justice and home affairs.

The eurozone crisis resulted predominantly from systemic weaknesses in the original design of the stability and growth pact. Before the crisis the SGP operated like a gentleman’s agreement between member state governments and the European Commission. Greece and Italy were permitted to join the eurozone in spite of running a permanent and growing structural deficit of more than 100 per cent of their GDP. France and Germany started breaking the annual borrowing limit of maximum three per cent in relation to the GDP in 2002, the year the euro had come into operation as a hard currency. Both countries also started exceed the 60 per cent structural deficit limit[1]. After a period of political disarray and indecision, eurozone governments were ultimately driven to take action by events. When major credit rating agencies started to downgrade individual eurozone economies there was the risk that this would eventually spill over into a substantial loss of financial market confidence in the euro. As Germany and France became increasingly concerned about the risk of a total collapse of the single European currency, Merkel and Sarkozy embarked on a frantic spree of implementing new coordinative policy mechanisms. These policy mechanisms have blurred the distinction between national and EU-level decision-making even more than had already been the case under the existing arrangements. Moreover, as they are predominantly orientated towards elite-level consultations and decision-making, they have worsened the lack of democratic accountability in the EU. Since the onset of the economic crisis the level of public disillusionment with the ability to influence political decisions in the EU consequently has steadily grown. The lowest point of public confidence in the EU occurred in the autumn of 2014 when only 31 per cent of citizens across the EU-28 expressed trust in the Union’s institutions. At the same time the number of those who disagreed with the notion that their voice would count in the EU had also increased substantially, from 53 per cent in 2003 to 66 per cent in the autumn of 2013. In the first half of 2015 the public levels of trust in the EU’s institutions improved slightly towards 40 per cent.

A smaller percentage of people also expressed the opinion that their voice would not count in the EU (50 per cent)[2]. This can be explained by the new Spitzenkandidaten system for the position of European Commission president which was introduced during the campaign for the May 2014 European parliament elections. The nomination of leading candidates for the post by parliamentary groups in the EP gave the impression that citizens would have a direct influence on the appointment of the new Commission president, although the final decision on the appointment still rests with EU leaders in the Council. Although it was obvious that the EU had emerged from the financial crisis with a legitimacy crisis, there were signs that the public was nevertheless willing to give the EU the benefit of the doubt. The latest Eurobarometer research conducted in May this year actually shows that in spite of widespread reservations about the EU’s democratic accountability, the European public nevertheless expressed support for the deepening of political cooperation on the EU level: 69 per cent of citizens were in favour of directly electing the president of the European Commission and 58 per cent favoured the creation of an EU justice ministry. A majority of citizens also expressed support for transferring the decision-making on major policy areas towards the EU level: Environmental issues (72 per cent), combating unemployment (62 per cent), immigration (59 per cent), health and social security (50 per cent)[3].

The public trust in the joint problem-solving capacity of the EU has however not been matched by the reality of the EU’s response to the migrant crisis. The crisis has made it brutally obvious that EU leaders have for too long concentrated on the internal management of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. External affairs have consequently been neglected the management. This was already shown during the Ukraine crisis during the past two years, where the EU’s institutional level played practically no role. The EU High Representative and the External Action Service, which the Lisbon Treaty created to support the EU’s external activities, were almost completely sidelined by a joint intergovernmental diplomatic leadership initiative of France, Germany and Poland. The three countries intervened early to try to negotiate the peaceful handover of powers from disgraced president Yanukovych. When the situation escalated into a quasi civil war between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian rebels over the control of the Eastern provinces of the country, Germany and France once again became active in trying to negotiate a ceasefire. The resulting Minsk agreement between Ukraine and Russia, which came into effect in February this year has so far managed to prevent further major violent clashes within Ukraine. This can nevertheless not conceal the fact that the EU once again repeated the pattern of behaviour it had previously shown over Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Member states remained divided on each of these external challenges member states and failed to uniformly support a common position. In spite of the gradual institutionalisation of the EU external relations since the newly created EU had created a dedicated Common Foreign and Security Pillar in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, foreign, defence and security policy remains firmly in the hands of national governments.

The same applies to asylum and migration policy, where the EU has practically failed to achieve any substantial institutionalisation. The consensus in the EU in this area has for decades centred on maintaining national regulations. This occurred in spite of the fact that migration has over the years become an increasing burden for the countries who form the Southern borders of the EU. Italy, Greece and Spain have for many years called for greater collective EU support in their struggle to manage the mounting levels of migration from the African continent through the Mediterranean. As in so many other policy areas EU member states were unable to move beyond a lowest denominator consensus which in effect leaves asylum and migration firmly in the hands of national governments. The EU has been working on developing a common asylum system since the late 1990s, which has since developed into a Commission asylum policy plan that member states have now adopted. The plan essentially determines common asylum standards and the need for enhanced cooperation between national authorities on handling asylum applications[4]. In practice the centrepiece of the plan remains the Dublin regulation, which the EU adopted in 1990 in response to an increase in asylum applications. It has been revised twice since with the latest Dublin III regulation having taken effect in January 2013. The core of Dublin is the principle that the member state where an asylum application is first registered remains responsible for administering the case[5]. This provision has shifted the burden of responsibility for dealing with refugees and migrants to the member states at the external borders of the EU. This has been in the interest of the larger member states Germany, France and the UK who were the drivers behind the original directive. The principle of responsibility in the country of first registration has helped to substantially lower the number of asylum applications in the rest of the EU, while the countries at the external Southern border of the EU have had to deal with a flood of new applications. The EU’s policy plan on asylum aspired to put in place as system of ‘well supported and practical cooperation’[6]. In reality the Southern European countries Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Cyprus have expressed their dismay at the lack of collective EU support for dealing with the constant and more recently escalating influx of migrants who started arriving by boat from Libya via the Mediterranean. Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi warned the EU in June this year that it was facing a ‘Mediterranean migrant emergency’. Renzi put the finger in the wound of the EU’s lack of collective solidarity under the Dublin regulation:

“Whoever has the right to asylum must be welcome in Europe, not just in Italy,  despite the EU’s Dublin regime. But it is inconceivable that one country should  tackle the entirety of this problem on its own. Responsibility and solidarity are concepts that go hand in hand (…) We are at a crossroads and we need to decide if events in the Mediterranean are everyone’s problem, or only that of the countries in the region[7].”

 Renzi’s appeal reflected the obvious failure of the Dublin regime to instil a spirit of collective responsibility for asylum and migration matters amongst EU member states. Even more importantly his intervention pointed towards the EU suffering from a profound leadership problem which has been evident for some considerable time. It is the result of increasingly diverging national interests between the former leadership duo France and Germany, combined with the failure of the other larger member states to offer alternatives. Italy and Spain continue to be preoccupied by their internal economic and political problems. Poland has been active in pushing towards progress in a number of policy areas, such as the Eastern partnership under the European neighbourhood policy, as well as on defence and security issues. Polish influence nevertheless remains limited due to the fact that the country is still considered as a transition country, who has yet to master the crucial hurdle of eurozone entry.  The United Kingdom under the leadership of Conservative prime minister David Cameron has increasingly retreated to the sidelines. Since he came to power in 2010, Cameron has chosen not to engage in any substantial EU policy debate except on those issues where he would like to see the renegotiation of the UK’s membership terms. These include the possibility to permanently opt out from the freedom of movement and from a federal political union which may eventually emerge in the eurozone in the future.

France has been reluctantly following what is essentially German unilateral part-time leadership or ‘reluctant hegemony’[8] under chancellor Angela Merkel’s reign. This semi-leadership is characterised by hesitation, short-term and last minute policy decisions and more recently by a lack of willingness to engage in multilateral consultations. Merkel’s leadership style in essence stems from her professional background as a natural scientist. She has shown a tendency to avoid seeking visionary and long-term strategies for the future of the EU. Instead her leadership style has been markedly passive and mechanical and she frequently micro manages EU affairs like a clinical trial in a laboratory. During the eurozone crisis Merkel was clearly driven by events and struggled to take an active role in shaping them. After months of inaction and hesitation she only became active on the EU level late in 2009 when it had become obvious that the loss of market confidence in the future of the euro had become substantial.  What followed was a political approach which presented the focus on budgetary and macroeconomic supervision and rigidity as being ‘without alternative’. The implementation of multiple layers of binding policy coordination under the ‘Six Pack’ mechanisms have substantially strengthened unelected supranational bodies at expense of the policy autonomy of national governments and parliaments. This raises serious questions about the EU’s democratic accountability and ultimately its legitimacy. The approach is most evident in the way the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF), including the newly created European Stability Mechanism (ESM), conducts itself as an illegitimate semi-government in eurozone sovereign debt countries, most of all in Greece. Concerns about the impact of these mechanisms on national sovereignty and the possibility that they could be extended further by transforming the European Commission into an executive government for the EU were voiced by a number of countries, most prominently by the UK, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Concerns about the federalisation of the EU were the main reason for the decision of the British government to demand the renegotiation of the UK’s membership terms and to let the British public decide on the future of the membership in a referendum. David Cameron hence demanded safeguards against what he called a ‘one size fits all approach which implies that all countries want the same level of integration’[9].

Merkel has also persistently ignored the wider political and social context of the crisis and rejected the repeated Greek calls for a more comprehensive long-term strategy to ensure that the budgetary consolidation process in the crisis countries would not have lasting detrimental social and political effects. The drama surrounding the deepening sovereign debt crisis in Greece has hence turned into a seemingly endless standoff between Germany as the leading creditor and an Greece as increasingly dependent debtor country. This has inflicted serious damage to the EU’s internal political cohesion. Merkel nevertheless shows little concern for the perception that the eurozone and the wider EU has increasingly fallen under a German dictate.

This pattern is replicated in the current migrant crisis, where Merkel surprised the rest of the EU when she reacted to the sudden vast influx of migrants into Greece with the announcement that Germany’s borders would be open to all refugees. On August 19th the German government had announced that it expected around 800,000 refugees to come to Germany in 2015. On August 31st chancellor Merkel publicly stated that German would manage this (‘Wir schaffen das’)[10]. On September 10th Merkel followed this up during a visit to an asylum camp in Berlin where she announced that Germany would not determine an upper limit when considering asylum applications amongst the current migrant wave[11]. Already on September 8th Merkel’s Social Democratic vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel expressed the view that Germany could accept around 500,000 refugees per year in an interview with the German public TV station ZDF[12]. None of these announcements were previously discussed with Germany’s EU partners, not even with those who are most affected by the increasing influx of migrants via the Balkan route.  After thousands of migrants started to make their way towards Germany via Hungary and Austria on a daily basis the German government again acted unilaterally and announced the temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement by reinstating border controls on September 14th, only a week after Merkel’s and Gabriel’s original statements. At the same time the German government asked the European Commission to develop concrete proposals for the introduction of a refugee distribution quota amongst the EU-28.

The demand for quota are opposed by a number of EU countries, most of all by the United Kingdom and the Central and Eastern European countries. Since their accession to the EU the CEE countries have mostly been compliant policy-takers who did not try to fundamentally challenge the EU’s policy status quo. Many of the CEEs also have close partnerships with Germany which date back to the Cold War era. They have therefore tended to defend Germany’s leadership during the euro crisis against criticism from other member states. The former Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski publicly supported Germany’s leading role in 2011 when he stated that he feared German inaction in the EU more than its leadership[13]. Slovak foreign minister Lajcak supported this sentiment when he spoke of his country being relaxed about being part of a ‘greater Germany’[14]. The German government is in danger of destroying this good will towards their leadership because of the patronising way it tries to force the rest of the EU to follow its response to the migrant crisis.  Berlin would probably not have to worry too much if it was only the subject of criticism on the part of the Hungarian government led by populist prime minister Viktor Orban. The fact is however that governments across Central and Eastern Europe are alienated by what they perceive as an uncoordinated and patronising approach to the crisis. The Visegrad 4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have collectively rejected the plans for an EU refugee quota. The V4 are especially affronted by the suggestions which emerged from the German government that countries within the EU who oppose the compulsory quotas may face financial penalties. Slovak prime minister Robert Fico publicly declared his intention to vigorously oppose the plan, even if this may mean blocking progress at the upcoming EU leaders’ summit:

“Never before in the EU did it happen that somebody was punished for their  own opinion. We are a sovereign country, we have the right to name things and have different view to tackle the crisis with migrants.”[15]

The Financial Times reports that CEE diplomats have expressed their anger and astonishment at what they perceive as being shut out of the EU’s diplomacy by Berlin as part of an approach of ‘ “passive aggressive bullying” ‘[16]. Berlin’s conduct is all the more astonishing as the German government should be well aware of the fact that the CEE member states in the EU are still in the process of economic transformation. In most cases they have made substantial progress since the fall of the iron curtain but they nevertheless remain between 20 and 40 per cent below the EU-28′s average GDP per capita[17]. The CEE region remains a low-income region with substantially higher levels of material poverty than the EU average. This explains why public and elite level opposition towards an increase in inward migration from outside the EU remains substantial. Germany’s demands for the acceptance of a refugee distribution quota therefore risk overstretching the CEE region and to feed an already underlying potential for a surge in political support for populist and extremist anti-EU and anti-immigration political parties. The same applies to the EU’s Southern European members, where economically and financially weak countries start to feel overstretched under the double burden of sustained austerity and the resource impact of the migrant crisis[18]. The migrant crisis has already played a substantial role in the campaign for upcoming Greek national election, where the neofascist Golden Dawn party currently polls in third place[19].

The at least temporary collapse of the EU’s Schengen system and the now almost daily blame game between member states on their handling of the migration flow shows that EU is dazed and confused by the speed and severity of events. Without swift and determined collective action the EU risks being slowly sucked into the downward spiral of a credibility crisis, which could eventually turn into an irreversible maelstrom that destroys the European project. The crisis has managed to damage intergovernmental relations between member states and the EU’s external reputation quite significantly. As Germany is clearly incapable of leading the EU out of this crisis it is therefore high time for other members and the Commission to step in to ensure that a lasting collective agreement on migration and asylum policies can be established. Especially the Commission has to tread carefully with this and avoid become the advocate of one country’s (i.e. Germany’s) interests.

A refugee quota system may be part of the immediate solution to events but it is definitely not the answer to resolving the crisis. Instead the EU needs to determine an unambiguous joint system of registering and processing asylum applications. This can only be done effectively if the countries at the EU’s external borders receive substantial financial and logistic support from the EU budget.  Collective budgetary resources will be needed to establish collective fast track asylum registration centres in Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and possibly also in Hungary to ensure that asylum applications are processed quickly and a clear disctinction can be made between genuine refugees and economic migrants. The latter may still be able to obtain permanent residence in an EU member state if national governments unambiguously determine the rules of their domestic immigration policies. Here especially Germany will need to move towards the introduction of a immigration law to ease the burden on its already overstretched asylum system. The EU also needs to make sustained efforts to secure its external borders and to combat human trafficking.  In addition to the planned military missions which are aimed at detaining human traffickers in the Mediterranean, the EU’s border management agency FRONTEXT needs to take a more active role in supporting Southern European countries in the policing of the EU’s external borders.

If the EU fails in this momentous task the current practice of reverting to exclusive national solutions will eventually result in the demise of Schengen, which is a cornerstone of the EU’s internal market. Just as with the euro the collapse of a major integration project like Schengen could be the beginning of the end of what the EU has achieved in its more than sixty years long history. The German weekly DER SPIEGEL correctly pointed this out in this week’s leading editorial: ‘Schengen is not any law in the EU’s dense network of regulations. Whoever touches Schengen, the dream of a borderless Europe, touches the Union’s core.’[20] Merkel, Cameron, Hollande and the rest of the EU-28 leaders need to keep this in mind. They must stop dithering and realise what is at stake.

[1] Eurostat, Government Deficit and Debt, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables

[2] European Commission (2015) Standard Eurobarometer 83, available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/66896

[3] Standard Eurobarometer 83.

[4] European Commission (2008) Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated approach to protection across the EU, COM(2008) 360 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0360:FIN:EN:PDF

[5] European Union (2013) Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 26 June, chapter III, article 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=EN

[6] European Union, Common European Asylum System, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm

[7] Matteo Renzi (2015), ‘The Mediterranean migrant emergency is not Italy’s. It is Europe’s', The Guardian, 23 June, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/mediterranean-migrant-crisis-not-italy-but-europe

[8] William E. Paterson (2013) ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany moves centre stage in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (Annual Review): 57-75.

[9] Prime minister David Cameron’s EU speech at Bloomberg, 23 January 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.

[10] Chancellor Angela Merkel summer press conference, 31 August 2015, available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html

[11] Süddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Das Grundrecht auf Asyl kennt keine Obergrenze’, 10 September 2015, available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeskanzlerin-merkel-das-grundrecht-auf-asyl-kennt-keine-obergrenze-1.2643260

[12] Der Spiegel (2015) ‘Gabriel hät 500.000 Flüchtlinge pro Jahr für verkraftbar’, 8 September 2015, available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-gabriel-haelt-500-000-pro-jahr-fuer-verkraftbar-a-1051862.html

[13] Sikorski, Radoslaw (2011) ‘Poland and the future of the European Union’, Address at the German Council of Foreign Relations, Berlin, 28 November. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/33ce6061-ec12-4da1-a145-01e2995c6302:JCR. Accessed 14 January 2014.

[14] Kristina Mikulova (2013) ‘Central Europe’s Pivot to Germany: What does the U.S. stand to gain’,Huffington Post 1 May, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kristina-mikulova/central-   europes-pivot-to-_b_3194342.html

[15] Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico statement on official Facebook page, 15 September 2015.

[16] Duncan Robinson and Henry Foy (2015) ‘Migrant crisis sets Germany at odds with neighbours to the east’, Financial Times, 17 September, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09ffbc28-5d46-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fbrussels%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz3m0s05AvV

[17] High Level Reflection Group (2014), Central Europe fit for the future: Visegrad Group ten years after EU accession,  p. 12.

[18] Ekatimerine (2015) ‘Migrant crisis overwhelms Greek government’, 7 August 2015, available at http://www.ekathimerini.com/200333/article/ekathimerini/news/migrant-crisis-overwhelms-greek-government;

[19] Henry Foy (2015) ‘Greek far right party rides wave of xenophobia’, 17 September 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html#axzz3mCPbbckp

[20] Peter Müller (2015) ‘Der alte Kontinent: In der Flüchtlingskrise ist die EU in Gefahr. Um sie zu bewahren, braucht es Druck und Verständnis’, Der Spiegel 39, 19 September p. 8.

The post The EU’s flawed response to the migrant crisis: Disorientated into the maelstrom appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

 Today's meeting with King Abdullah II was fruitful and constructive. It was an important opportunity to discuss topics of common concern, such as the Syria crisis and the impact of refugees, the fight against terrorism, and developments in our neighbourhood including in the Middle East Peace Process.

The deterioration of the situation in Syria is causing more and more people to flee, seeking safety elsewhere. I commend the generosity of Jordan and its people in hosting and assisting Syrian refugees, despite the challenges this poses. Later today, I will visit a refugee camp to assess the situation there and see how the European Union might help further. We will continue to support Jordan in this.

The EU is committed to achieving peace, stability and security in Syria, as well as the wider region. We share a strong interest in doing so. I will report to EU leaders on today's exchange, as well as from my other recent trips, at the informal European Council on 23 September. 

The European Union also appreciates Jordan's continued efforts in countering extremism and fighting terrorism. I hope that the EU and Jordan will be able to further strengthen security cooperation. Our strong relations make us natural partners in working together in the face of shared challenges.

I conveyed to His Majesty our strong support for the political reform process in Jordan, aimed at strengthening democracy, justice and the rule of law. I encourage ongoing implementation, in spite of the difficult regional environment.

The European Union is firmly committed to continue working together for the benefit of Jordan and Jordanians, and to make our partnership stronger in these difficult times.

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_c96321.r21.cf3.rackcdn.com/15210_169_full_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The EU seeks to develop a particular close relationship to Egypt, its geographical neighbour, and to support its domestic and political reforms. The relationship emphasises close cooperation on democratic reform, economic modernization, social reform, and migration issues.

Download this video here.

President Al-Sisi, thank you for welcoming me to Cairo today, for our first meeting. It is a pleasure to visit Egypt as President of the European Council.

Today President Al-Sisi and I had the opportunity to discuss important issues of common concern, and ways to tackle them together. First and foremost, we discussed the current migration and refugee crisis affecting Europe, Egypt and the whole region. I outlined what the EU is doing and plans to do to address this challenge. I was interested to hear the President's thoughts on how the current crisis, and its root causes, could be managed. I feel it is important to hear the views of our partners as we face this challenge together. I will share the important input of our discussions today with European leaders at next week's extraordinary European Council. I look forward to our continued cooperation in this area, and I very much welcome Egypt's contribution to the Valletta Summit in November.

We also discussed the scourge of terrorism, which affects both Egypt and the European Union. I can only reiterate my condemnation of all acts of terrorism, wherever they occur. The European Union is committed to fighting terrorism with our partners. We will continue to do so, based on the rule of law.

I welcome the preparations for Egypt's parliamentary elections in the coming months. During our meeting, I highlighted the importance of implementing the new Constitution, approved by Egyptians last year, which goes a long way in protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. I also highlighted the importance of checks and balances within the state.

As mentioned during our meeting, the European Union is committed to standing by Egypt. We will continue to support social and economic reforms, to the benefit of the Egyptian people.

This was our first meeting and we had much to discuss. I look forward to our continued cooperation and dialogue, both on the EU's support to Egypt, and on working together to address common challenges.

Thank you again, Mr President.

   

The crisis we are all witnessing is a test of our humanity and responsibility. It causes many tensions and accusations among politicians and people in Europe. I have no illusions that Europe will need to deal with this challenge for many years to come. Therefore I would like us to focus on the overall approach to this crisis. 

Our response will not obscure the brutal reality however. We as Europeans are currently not able to manage our common external borders, hence some States decided to protect themselves by closing their national ones. The protection of the European community is our first duty and obligation and we have failed on this front. For too long our discussions have centred around shifting the responsibility onto others. There is a long list of issues where we could blame one another but it will not help us in finding a common solution. Today we must absolutely work out policies that we can implement in order to help each other. That is why I will ask all of us to honestly discuss what the EU can do to help its Member States in solving this problem. We will also need to discuss our responsibilities at a national level. No one should shy away from them because then we will be unable to build our joint European response based on unity and solidarity. Shifting the responsibility and putting the blame on one another must definitely come to an end. 

There are different experiences and perceptions within the EU and there are no easy solutions. Still it cannot be an excuse not to develop a comprehensive strategy or to build a sound migration policy that is effective and responsible while respecting our core values. The current 'migration policy' is a sum of despair of the victims fleeing war and persecution, of their determination in searching for a better life, of the cynicism of the smugglers, and too often, of the refugees and migrants' tragic fate. Therefore it is essential to establish a credible European migration policy. 

Besides discussing our overall approach to the crisis I want to address issues such as: help to the frontline Member States; cooperation with the Western Balkan countries, with Turkey and the countries bordering Syria; budgetary assistance to the High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme; and the implementation of our conclusions on return and readmission. We must also discuss diplomatic efforts in solving the Syria crisis. I will share with you my assessment of the situation after my visits in the countries of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. 

There is however one issue which cannot wait. The World Food Programme needs money to provide food to 11 million people in Syria and in the region. The WFP has already cut substantially food support to refugees. I would like to appeal to all of you not to wait until our meeting and provide donations to the World Food Programme, in coordination with the ECHO. 

I hope we will be able to address all these challenges at our special meeting next Wednesday at 6pm. The President of the European Parliament will join us in the beginning of the meeting. After the exchange with President Schulz we will discuss the above-mentioned issues over dinner.   

I am looking forward to seeing you all in Brussels.     

D. TUSK

 

Malmstrom, right, signs an intellectual property deal with Beijing at June's EU-China summit

The gloves are coming off in the intensifying dispute over whether the EU should recognise China as a market economy.

A group of European industry organisations has commissioned a report from the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute in Washington, which concludes that the granting of market economy status to Beijing would endanger between 1.7m and 3.5m jobs in the EU.

That report – published here today – certainly lobs a grenade into the debate, and takes it out of the realm of legal hair-splitting by trade wonks. It comes with all the normal caveats about macroeconomic modelling, but it definitely takes things to a more visceral level.

For Cecilia Malmström, EU trade commissioner, China’s status poses a serious headache.

Here’s why: China itself argues that it automatically achieves market economy status within the World Trade Organisation at the end of 2016, according to the terms of its WTO accession agreement in 2001.

If Beijing is right about that, the EU could face significant strategic problems as it would be prevented from using its standard defence – retaliatory tariffs – to block what it sees as Chinese dumping in vulnerable sectors. Under international trade rules, is much harder for the EU to punish a country with high retaliatory tariffs when the offender is officially considered a market economy.

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Saturday 19 September 2015

Visit to Egypt
11.30 Meeting with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 

12.45 Joint press statement

 Sunday 20 September 2015

Visit to Jordan
12.00 Meeting with H.M. the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin al-Hussein

Visit of a refugee camp 

Tuesday 22 September 2015

13.00 Meeting with President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker 

15.00 Meeting with High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini

Wednesday 23 September 2015

15.00  European People's Party Summit (Stanhope Hotel) 

18.00  Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government

Thursday 24 September 2015

09.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron (photo opportunity)

11.45 Meeting with President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz (European Parliament)

Question for oral answer O-000103/2015
to the Council
Rule 128
Elena Valenciano, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The Council of the European Union,

1.           UNDERLINES the critical importance of the 2015 Paris Conference as a historic milestone for enhancing global collective action and accelerating the global transformation to a low-carbon and climate-resilient society. 

Urgency and need for global action

2.           NOTES with concern the findings contained in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); UNDERLINES that global warming is unequivocal and that it is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. 

3.           STRESSES that, consistent with recent IPCC findings, in order to stay below 2°C, global greenhouse gas emissions need to peak by 2020 at the latest, be reduced by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 1990[1] and be near zero or below by 2100; in this context, WELCOMES the Leaders' declaration at the G7 Summit in June 2015 and EMPHASISES that all Parties should pursue transformative pathways towards a long-term vision of global and sustainable climate neutrality and climate resilience in the second half of this century; RECALLS the EU objective, in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990.

Paris outcome

4.           EMPHASISES the importance of agreeing at the Paris Conference: i) an ambitious and durable legally-binding agreement under the UNFCCC ("the Paris Agreement") applicable to all Parties and addressing in a balanced and cost-effective manner mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of action and support and containing ambitious nationally determined mitigation commitments; ii) a comprehensive package of decisions to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to outline interim arrangements before its entry into force; and iii) a decision on enhancing global pre-2020 mitigation ambition, supported by the Lima Paris Action Agenda. 

5.           UNDERLINES that the Paris outcome should send a strong signal on finance in order to support poor and vulnerable countries and enable the transition to resilient, low greenhouse gas economies.  

Further process in 2015

6.           NOTES the considerable amount of work still ahead in order to reach the Paris outcome; CONCERNED about the lack of substantial progress on the negotiating text up to now; ENCOURAGES the co-Chairs of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to prepare a revised and concise negotiating text containing the main options, on the basis of the views expressed by Parties, with a view to a fruitful early ministerial engagement before the Paris Conference. 

Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)

7.           WELCOMES the submission of INDCs so far; UNDERLINES that the EU and its Member States have submitted their INDC on 6 March 2015, which is a binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990; URGES all Parties which have not yet done so to come forward with fair and ambitious INDCs as soon as possible in the coming few weeks; in this context, WELCOMES opportunities for facilitative exchanges of views on the level of the aggregate effort towards the below 2°C objective, including through the forthcoming UNFCCC synthesis report and the INDC Forum in Rabat, Morocco, on 12-13 October 2015. 

Paris Agreement

8.           NOTES the Commission communication “The Paris Protocol - a blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020” as a contribution for articulating a vision by the EU and its Member States in view of the Paris Conference. 

9.           PROPOSES that the internationally legally-binding Paris Agreement: 

-        provide a long-term vision of the needed transformation towards low-emission and climate-resilient economies over the course of this century; 

-        enable the participation of all Parties and engagement of non-state actors; 

-        be in the form of a protocol in order to enshrine the strongest expression of political will and provide predictability and durability; 

-   enter into force after ratification by a significant number of Parties representing a significant level of emissions so as to ensure that the Paris Agreement is truly global and effective.         

Mitigation

10.        PROPOSES that the Paris Agreement: 

-   set out a long-term global mitigation goal in line with the below 2°C objective; 

-   contain fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments by all Parties, consistent with the UNFCCC's principles applied in light of different national circumstances and evolving economic realities and capabilities; 

-   provide that all Parties must have, maintain and implement such a mitigation commitment; 

-   contain a dynamic five-yearly mitigation ambition mechanism in which all Parties should be required to either submit new or updated commitments, without falling behind previous levels of commitment, or resubmit the existing ones; 

-   contain simplified procedures for the renewal and upward adjustment of mitigation commitments; 

-   include a compliance regime which promotes timely and effective implementation; 

-   provide flexibility for those countries with least capabilities. 

            Adaptation

11.        PROPOSES that adaptation must be a central part of a balanced Paris Agreement that: 

-        commits all Parties to plan, prepare for and respond to the adverse impacts of climate change, to integrate adaptation into national development processes and to communicate experiences in order to achieve climate-resilient sustainable development; 

-      calls on all Parties to strengthen monitoring, reporting, information-sharing and cooperation in order to increase effectiveness of adaptation actions; 

-      contains an iterative and dynamic approach to continuously enhance the effectiveness of adaptation measures and their implementation; 

-   contributes to assisting all countries, especially the poorest and particularly vulnerable ones, to achieve climate-resilient sustainable development; 

-   underlines that both ambitious action on mitigation and adaptation, including efficient disaster risk reduction, are essential to manage and reduce the risk of adverse impacts of climate change, including addressing the risk of loss and damage.   

12.        RECALLS the submission by the EU and its Member States on "European Union undertakings in adaptation planning". 

Use of markets

13.        STRESSES that the Paris Agreement should allow for the international use of markets, subject to the application of robust common accounting rules which ensure that the environmental integrity and the integrity of the mitigation commitments are maintained and double counting is avoided; and provide for market mechanisms which promote scaled-up and cost-effective mitigation action entailing a net contribution to global mitigation efforts and contributing to sustainable development. 

            Finance

14.        REAFFIRMS that the EU and its Member States have and remain committed to scaling up the mobilisation of climate finance in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation, in order to contribute their share of the developed countries' goal to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance; in this context, RECALLS its conclusions on climate finance of 7 November 2014; REITERATES its strong support for the Green Climate Fund and LOOKS FORWARD to early allocation of initial funding; UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement's provisions on climate finance need to be dynamic and able to adapt to changing realities and needs by reflecting Parties' evolving capabilities and responsibilities; furthermore, REFERS to its forthcoming conclusions on climate finance.            

Transparency and accountability

15.        UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement must provide for a robust common rules-based regime, including transparency and accountability rules applicable to all Parties, while recognising that their application will differ according to commitment types which reflect Parties' capabilities and national circumstances; STRESSES that this regime should provide for the use of common metrics, respect the most recent IPCC guidelines and build on experience gained under the UNFCCC. 

16.        HIGHLIGHTS that the Paris Agreement should provide for a transparent accounting and reporting framework for emissions and removals for the land-use sector for all Parties, which promote sustainable land management, building on existing relevant decisions under the UNFCCC. 

            Joint fulfilment

17.        CONFIRMS that the EU and its Member States intend to fulfil their commitments jointly under the Paris Agreement; WELCOMES Norway's and Iceland's intention to participate in this joint fulfilment.  

            Other issues

18.        STRESSES the importance of human rights, gender equality, a gender-sensitive approach, a just transition of the work force, decent jobs, education and awareness raising as well as ensuring food security in the context of climate action. 

Implementation of the Paris Agreement

19.        PROPOSES the adoption of a comprehensive package of substantive decisions, in addition to a technical work programme, at the Paris Conference to further develop rules, modalities and procedures on inter alia transparency and accountability of mitigation commitments, including for the land-use sector, and on the international use of markets, to be completed by 2017, in order to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 

Enhancing global pre-2020 ambition

20.        REITERATES that the EU and its Member States are already applying the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol; STRESSES the determination of the EU and its Member States to complete the process of ratification of the Doha amendment in the third quarter of 2015; and INVITES other Parties to do likewise in order to ensure its prompt entry into force; in this context, UNDERLINES the need for adopting at the Paris Conference the implementation rules for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol as agreed in Warsaw and Lima. 

21.        STRESSES that all Parties need to act in order to close the pre-2020 mitigation gap; RECALLS the progress made under the ADP in identifying opportunities to enhance pre‑2020 mitigation ambition in areas of high mitigation potential, in particular energy efficiency, renewable energy, REDD+, short-lived climate pollutants, upstream methane emissions, HFCs, export credits and fossil fuel subsidy reform; UNDERLINES the importance of multilateral cooperation, in particular through the Lima Paris Action Agenda, aimed at identifying and accelerating actions in these areas; in this context, STRESSES the importance of involvement of and cooperation with non-State actors; UNDERLINES the importance to continue and intensify work on enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition beyond the Paris Conference, and to ensure continuity in the political attention for high mitigation potential options by linking the technical examination of mitigation options with regular high-level events building on the Lima Paris Action Agenda.  

22.        EMPHASISES that the examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential continues to be relevant beyond 2020 and can serve as an input to the process to raise global ambition under the Paris Agreement over time. 

23.        RECOGNISES the need to foster the continuing implementation of existing decisions under the UNFCCC; in this context, WELCOMES the completion of the REDD+ negotiations.  

Other processes

24.        While noting that the Paris Agreement should address emissions across all sectors subject to regular review and that emissions accounting and reporting should remain under the UNFCCC, UNDERLINES that IMO, ICAO, and the Montreal Protocol should regulate as soon as possible in an effective manner and in line with the below 2°C objective greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping and aviation and the production and consumption of HFCs respectively. 

25.        WELCOMES the outcome of the Addis Ababa Conference that strengthens the framework to finance sustainable development and the means of implementation for the universal 2030 agenda for sustainable development; LOOKS FORWARD to the upcoming UN Summit that will adopt the agenda “Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development” in order to address the universal challenge of poverty eradication and sustainable development and that confirms the importance of tackling climate change as a key element in confronting that challenge.

 

[1]           See for example 14790/09 (paragraph 7) and 14747/14 (paragraph 2).