Speeches by Donald TUSK, President of the European Council.
Good evening and welcome to the Eurogroup press conference.
First of all we discussed the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and specifically the setting up of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). Ms Elke König was with us and informed us on all the preparations they are doing to have the SRB up and running on the 1 January 2016. A lot of work has to be done - the organisation has to be put up, rules and regulations have to be designed etc., so we were very impressed by the work she has done so far and hope to welcome her in the Eurogroup on a more regular basis. There were two issues that she draw to our attention:
1. Setting up of the national credit lines. That will also be on the agenda of tomorrows Economic and Financial Affairs Council;
2. Timely ratification of the Intergovernmental Agreement and transposition of the BRRD by all the Member States.
I am happy to inform you that the Dutch Senate will vote on the last part of legislation tomorrow (10 November 2015) so knock on wood. Then we will have our work done, and all that in preparation for 1 January 2016, of course.
The second issue on our agenda was Greece. We were informed by the Commission, the ECB and the IMF on the state of play, and by the ESM. A lot of progress and work has been done in terms of programme implementation, further development and it has been a very cooperative process. This has been emphasised by all sides. So that was very good news.
We've also taken stock of the ongoing recapitalisation exercise with Greek banks. There too a lot of work has been done and the size of the recapitalisation is smaller than expected earlier, and actually the speed of the process is also going quite smoothly so far. The next thing to do is to have all the financial sector measures in place before the completion of the recapitalisation process. Our Greek colleague Efkleidis Tsakalotos gave his commitment to get that done. There are open issues which you may have heard about which have to do with nonperforming loans, and more specifically household insolvency. So more work needs to be done to get an agreement also on those issues. Implementation needs to be finished over the course of the coming week. All of that is necessary to finalise the process of the recapitalisation. As you remember €10 billion has already been put in a segregated account in the ESM, which is ready if needed and when needed for the recapitalisation process, but of course the agreed conditions need to be met.
So there are two key issues - one is about the governance of the banks, and the other key issue still to be resolved is about household insolvency. So those conditions are to be met in the coming days. We have mandated the Euro Working Group to reconvene at the latest at the beginning of the next week to take stock of the compliance report from the institutions. Hopefully the whole first set will be implemented, but also some of the key issues regarding the governance of the banks will be put in place. And then at the beginning of the next week the EWG can assess that and come to a positive conclusion, which will then be followed by an ESM Board of Governance meeting because they in the end have to take the decisions to make available the €10 billion, or less if less is needed at that point. So that's the process that we've outlined for the coming days and we are all committed to get that done in time.
Let me quickly mention a couple of other issues on our agenda. We were informed, on the basis of the autumn forecast, of the ongoing economic recovery in the euro area. The recovery will continue despite some global economic issues which we are all aware off. There was great consensus that at the same time we need to use this period and the benign circumstances to push forward structural reforms to get higher potential growth in the euro area.
On the future of the monetary union, we had an initial exchange of views on the follow-up to the 5 Presidents' report. In October the Commission presented its first proposals on economic governance and today we had a first round of debate on that, and specifically on external representation. Not much I can say about that. It was a first round, and on some other issues like the Fiscal Board and the Competitiveness Authorities. The debate on those governance issues will be on the Ecofin agenda tomorrow, so we'll pick up on that from there.
These were the main highlights from me.
The Council, in full cooperation with the Commission, having in mind the necessity to safeguard the functioning of the Schengen area and to reduce migratory pressures, agreed the following measures to implement fully the orientations already agreed by the European Council and the Council in compliance with EU acquis. It decided:
1. to encourage Member States and relevant third countries to intensify ongoing efforts to substantially increase reception capacities, for which the Council welcomes rapid identification by the Commission of additional financial support for affected countries and for the UNHCR;
2. that the establishment of hotspots in Italy and Greece will be intensified, with support of the Member States, the Commission, Frontex and EASO, so that all of these function by end of November 2015 as previously agreed;
3. that all participating Member States will speed up the relocation process, notably by communicating their capacities for first relocations and by nominating as appropriate relocation liaison officers to Italy and Greece, preferably by 16 November 2015. In parallel, Italy and Greece will substantially accelerate the preparatory steps necessary for relocation. The Council and the Commission support Italy and Greece in their decisions to register migrants before further handling their case on the mainland, in particular with Eurodac machines provided by Member States. Member States endeavour to fill by 16 November 2015 the remaining gaps in the calls for contribution from Frontex and EASO, which will simplify the profiles required and the appointing procedures;
4. that Member States, with the full support of the Commission and Frontex, will substantially improve the return rate. Member States should also provide return experts for the pool of European Return Liaison Officers for rapid deployment;
5. that Member States, to overcome the potential lack of cooperation of migrants as they arrive into the European Union and while fully respecting the fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement, will make use of possibilities provided by the EU acquis, such as (1) asylum procedures at borders or transit zones; (2) accelerated procedures; (3) non-admissibility of subsequent asylum applications by the individuals concerned; (4) coercive measures, including, as a last resort, detention for a maximum period necessary for the completion of underlying procedures. In addition to existing guidelines on systematic fingerprinting, the Commission is invited to issue, in cooperation with EASO and Frontex, further practical guidance on the consequences of the registering obligations in the light of the Dublin rules, the relocation decisions and the international readmission obligations.
Furthermore, the Council agrees to explore the concept of processing centres in countries where the hotspot approach has not been implemented, supported by the Commission and relevant EU agencies, in order to organise access to international protection and/or for the purpose of return;
6. to fully support the Commission in pursuing contingency planning of humanitarian assistance for the Western Balkans, in light of the approaching winter. The Union civil protection mechanism should be used to the maximum possible extent. The Council encourages Member States to provide further assistance through this mechanism;
7. as regards controls for entry and exit at external borders, to assist the Member States concerned in respecting their legal obligation to perform adequate controls, to manage and to regain controls of the external borders and increase coordination of actions relating to border management. This will involve a range of supporting measures by Frontex, gradually extending, as necessary, to the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) in accordance with EU rules;
8. to support the upscaling by 1 December 2015 of the Poseidon Sea Joint Operation in Greece within the current operational plan;
9. to conduct at the December Justice and Home Affairs Council, on the basis of the 8th bi-annual reporting by the Commission, a thorough debate on the functioning of the Schengen area (1 May 2015 - 31 October 2015) and on the lessons learned from temporary reintroductions of controls at internal borders;
10. to invite Europol to accelerate the establishment of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) to strengthen its capacity to support Member States in better preventing and fighting against migrant smuggling. The EMSC will encompass the Joint Operational Team (JOT) Mare initiative and further extend Europol actions, including with a focus on the Western Balkans area, in close cooperation with all relevant EU agencies, and in particular Frontex and Eurojust. The swift and effective deployment of officers at the hotspots on key migratory routes should be a component of this approach;
11. to invite Member States, in coordination with the Commission, to set up by 1 December 2015 a network of single operational contact points on migrant smuggling, as set out in the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling 2015-2020, while stepping up their efforts to intensify investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers and traffickers;
12. to continue examining pending legislative proposals on a crisis relocation mechanism and on safe countries of origin as already planned, as well as on other priority actions such as on the adaptation of the Dublin system and on the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders;
13. to invite the Commission and the High Representative to press for practical results on return and readmission in their bilateral dialogues, notably during the upcoming high-level meetings with Afghanistan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia and Turkey. By its next meeting on 3-4 December, the Council expects a first progress report on these dialogues. This will allow to exchange views on the appropriate incentive packages to be used vis-à-vis third countries;
14. that the first European Migration Liaison Officers (EMLOs) should be deployed as a matter of priority to Ethiopia, Niger, Pakistan and Serbia by the end of January 2016;
15. to reiterate the importance of Member States' resettlement activities to address the migration crisis, noting progress on this so far including at EU level. The Council agrees that further efforts should be made to enhance resettlement opportunities with an emphasis on certain priority third countries. It invites the Commission to continue its work on resettlement as a matter of priority;
16. in order to secure concrete steps on border control, on the prevention of irregular migration and on the fight against trafficking and smuggling of migrants, to support accelerating the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap with Turkey towards all participating Member States and the full implementation of the readmission agreement, in the context of the enhanced cooperation foreseen in the action plan;
17. to define, as a matter of urgency, a common information strategy addressed to asylum seekers, migrants, smugglers and traffickers aiming at (1) discouraging migrants to embark on perilous journey and to have recourse to smugglers, (2) explaining how EU rules on the management of external borders and international protection operate, including resettlement, relocation and return, (3) disseminating counter-narratives to the ones being used by the traffickers and smugglers of migrants, (4) informing about criminal prosecutions against traffickers and smugglers and (5) informing about return operations. As part of an information strategy geared at reducing pull factors, it should be clearly explained that migrants must register in their first Member State of arrival; that, under EU law, asylum seekers have no right to choose the Member State responsible for examining their application; and that migrants without a need of protection will be swiftly returned. Furthermore, a clear message should be passed that migrants cannot refuse to cooperate with the relevant national authorities. Henceforth, all necessary measures will be taken by Member States to prevent, deter and draw the consequences of such movements and non-cooperation. The Commission will pull together in the coming days a dedicated team from all relevant institutional actors to deliver on these objectives and will inform about the implementation at the Council meeting on 3-4 December 2015;
18. to support the Presidency's decision to upgrade the activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) from information-sharing to full activation mode including by providing information to feed the ISAA process, by contributing to the identification of operational gaps and by supporting communication activities, thereby improving political coordination and decision-making process at EU level. In this framework, on the basis of the needs and gaps identified in the ISAA reports, roundtables will be convened regularly for the management of the migration crisis, bringing together appropriate expertise in order to allow a timely policy coordination and response at EU level, in particular on the implementation of interlinked measures on borders, reception capacities, hotspots and returns, on financial and human resources pledges and on operational and logistical priorities.
The Council (Competitiveness) took stock of the serious challenges faced currently by the European Steel industry.
The EU steel sector suffers from major global overcapacity in production, which pushes down prices and encourages trade distorting behaviour from competing regions. High energy costs are eroding margins. And the resulting closure of steel plants is costing thousands of jobs.
The Council agreed on the gravity of the situation as well as on the need to take concrete actions that will help ensure the long-term viability of a modern European steel sector.
The Council also considered that these measures should be part of a comprehensive approach aiming at creating competitive framework conditions for EU industry as a whole, including through a predictable and consistent regulatory environment as well as measures to stimulate innovation, since many of the issues faced by the steel sector are shared by other energy intensive industries.
Taking into account the results of the Council discussion, the Presidency considers that the following concrete actions should be taken as a matter of priority:
To follow up on this extraordinary meeting of the Competitiveness Council, it has been agreed to call for a special High Level stakeholders' conference, involving the social partners, to review the current situation and consider policy actions, in the context of the ongoing work of the High Level Group on Energy Intensive Industries.
The implementation of the 2013 European Steel Action Plan should be assessed in the context of that meeting.
EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet in Brussels on 9 November 2015 to discuss the current migration crisis.
EU Finance Ministers of the eurozone meet in Brussels on 9 November 2015 to discuss Greece's economic adjustment programme, post-programme surveillance in Spain, and the banking union.
Political progress needs to happen faster in Palestine. At the moment, the greatest concern in the country is the Gaza crisis, and the only source of hope has been economic development. But how far can economic development really drive the peace process in Gaza, and a solution that is long-lasting and beneficial to both Israel and Palestine? With a more democratic nation, Palestinians can be in charge of their own land’s development, can contribute to the economy self-sufficiently, and this shift in perspectives in the country can drive the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) closer to home for the EU because it has acted as an important reason for the EU supporting Palestine and it’s agendas, it’s demands for a very long time now.
More support from the EU can only be expected if Palestine manages to tidy up its democratic roots nationally, can assure security and stability in the region and in the country, as well as implement regular good governance. Humanitarian assistance and government-expenditure support is not inclusive to political mishaps that have become the norm in the country, but is that really a good outlook for Palestine for the long run? Political instability and a burden on security issues because of faltering dogmatic concepts, is crating a lot of hardship in the country. The EU over the last ten years has been looked unfavorably in the Middle East, so if this policy shift takes place it can be looked as a two-way street: it is going to benefit both Palestine and the EU, if the latter engages in fair dialogue, with the former and this is inclusive of more other important matters in the region.
One of the key issues that needs to be looked into is that Palestine needs to earn more of an international presence than it does so presently. Israel and Palestine share an unequal global status, and this is happening as there is no deadline in sight for a two-state solution. Palestine is almost always at the receiving end of a faltering economy, so there is always a good amount of skepticism thrown in attitudes towards external powers interested in the peace process. The economy is faltering because of Israel’s restrictive measures on Palestine in the name of greater regional security. What should be viewed as political intervention that breeds financial collapse for the country, is merely looked upon as a leeway to commercialization of standards inside Palestine.
There is not much infrastructure, and the condition of public services is constantly deteriorating, unemployment levels, especially in the Gaza Strip has reached a 41percent and poverty has hit a 39percent, according to 2014 estimates. Public consumption is dependent on what Israel allows into Palestine, and this is not just for resources; there is a restriction on free movement for Palestinians in the West Bank because Israel does not seem interested in it. Where resources are concerned there has been a lack of construction raw materials, a fluctuating manufacturing trade sector and a light industry that does not do much.
Financial support to poverty-stricken people and public sector salaries is what helps Palestinians pay for basic amenities in a country that is only fully-functional as a state. But there needs to be progress from that level of basic consumption for the general public because right now aid from EU is the only thing that is keeping Palestine from sinking. The private sector in the Gaza Strip is not really working all too well for Palestine and this is really nothing more than an untapped area of national resources: agriculture and investment in projects, are multiple capitals that can really drive home greater income tax generation and revenues.
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